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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Major General Thomas M. Tarpley, CG, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) - Period February 1971 to February 1972 (U)

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2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Major General Thomas M. Tarpley, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraph 4, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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1. (U) References: AR 525-14, 11 Oct 71 and USARV Supplement 1 to AR 525-14, 11 October 1971, Subject: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report.

2. (C) GENERAL:

a. When I assumed command on 1 February 1971, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was on the verge of LAMSON 719, by March had OPCON of more than five brigades, and was responsible for an area of operations from the Hai Van Pass north to the DMZ and west to the Laotian border. Twelve months later the division had only one brigade remaining at Phu Bai, with a small security area of operations. Vietnamization is no longer a hopeful phrase but is, in fact, a reality. For the first six months the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) planned, executed and supervised combat operations; for the last six months the ARVN initiated and directed all major actions against the enemy. In brief, the 101st Airborne Division, after six and one half years in Vietnam, had proudly worked itself out of a job. Such an accomplishment did not just happen. It was planned in detail and was executed on a specific timetable. The following paragraphs provide the concept, rationale, and accomplishments of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) from February 1971 to February 1972.

b. US combat operations the past twelve months reached a peak during LAMSON 719 (Feb 71 - Apr 71). The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) initially was tasked solely to provide airmobile assets, but its role gradually expanded to include OPCON of more than five brigades, responsibility
for all combat operations, and resupply responsibility for the western half of Quang Tri Province and forces in Laos. Moreover, at the height of the incursion into Laos, the division had under its control more than 800 aircraft. As more ARVN forces were required for combat operations, the division also relieved 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) units from static security missions. In addition, the division simultaneously maintained one brigade in Thua Thien Province to provide security for the lowlands and US installations. In sum, during LAMSON 719 the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) had ultimate responsibility for all combat, combat support, and combat service support operations north of the Hal Van Pass. This expansion of the division base, to include command and control responsibility for several major commands over a large geographic area, proved the validity of the airmobile concept. The flexibility of the airmobile divisional structure permitted the tailoring of forces to meet the ever-changing tactical situation. One of the most significant outcomes of LAMSON 719 was the test of the airmobile and air cavalry concept in a mid-intensity conflict. In brief, the UH-1H helicopter and AH-1G Cobra gunship proved their survivability against tanks and sophisticated anti-aircraft weapon systems. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) also covered the ARVN withdrawal from Laos and continued to provide combat and combat service support as required. USARV resupply support during the operation was outstanding. To take advantage of the confusion brought upon the enemy by LAMSON 719 and to attack enemy supply areas in the A Shau Valley, the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) mutually planned and executed LAMSON 720 (Apr 71 - Aug 71). It was during this operation that a gradual shift took place in the US combat role. The US mission became essentially a defensive one while we continued to provide combat support for the ARVN. The division quickly adjusted to its new mission and increased its surveillance and intelligence collection efforts while strengthening firebase defenses. As offensive operations became limited the division relied on means other than decisive engagement to inflict casualties on the enemy. One brigade ran a successful two week deception plan against the 6th NVA Regiment with the result that the enemy suffered numerous casualties, was forced to leave the field of battle without engaging US troops, and retreated confused and demoralized to the Laotian border. More significantly the brigade did not suffer one casualty. The ARVN increased its desire for dominance in combat operations by planning, executing and supervising LAMSON 810 (Sep 71); an ARVN counterattack against enemy supply and troop concentrations in the Khe Sanh area. The primary 101st Airborne
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Division (Airmobile) contribution to LAMSON 810 was combat support to include air, helicopters and artillery. The division again relieved ARVN units from selected firebases to enable the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to increase its combat power on the battlefield. Throughout the latter two operations (LAMSON 720 and 810) the division established a lower profile. Yet it is important to note that although the division has been in a defensive posture for the past six months, the air cavalry squadron continued to be employed in a high intensity role. To insure continued surveillance and intelligence collection in the A Shau Valley and western Quang Tri Province, the division air cavalry squadron was tasked to continuously patrol these vital areas. Its performance was truly outstanding, extremely productive and proved the validity of the employment of air cavalry as an excellent economy of force measure.

c. During my tenure of command the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) systematically assumed control of most of the division's area of operations and progressively increased large scale tactical operations. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) is one of the elite fighting units of South Vietnam. Its leadership from squad leader to division commander is exceptional; its soldiers are courageous fighters; and its professional competence and esprit are known not only by its allies but also by the enemy. This positive development of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in 1971 was a continuing evolutionary process started when the 101st Airborne Division arrived in NMR1. LAMSON 719 was a combined operation with US forces providing the impetus for most of the planning, executing and supervising of combat operations. However, each phase of the operations was closely coordinated with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) counterparts. Much was learned by both sides; the ARVN in particular gained tremendous confidence in their ability to wage large scale tactical operations. Such confidence was further bolstered by LAMSON 720 (Apr 71 - Aug 71) which was a mutually planned and executed operation by both the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Again the ARVN soldier proved himself capable of taking the fight to the enemy. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) totally planned and executed LAMSON 810 (Sep 71). This operation was an aggressive, bold, well-executed counterattack against extended enemy supply lines in the Khe Sanh area. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) provided necessary combat support, in particular air and artillery, for LAMSON 810; but the ARVN directed their employment. From October 71 to February 72
the ARVN systematically relieved American troops at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, FB Bastogne, FB Rifle, FB Tomahawk, Camp Evans, FB Birmingham, and Camp Eagle. Concurrently with the relief of US units, the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) assumed responsibility for the area of operations from the DMZ to the A Shau Valley. Saturation patrolling, day and night ambushes, and night raids became most successful methods of operation for the ARVN forces. The 3d Regiment, for example, killed over 100 enemy in October and November without taking a single casualty. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) also provided the nucleus for the newly organized 3d Infantry Division (ARVN). The 3d Infantry Division has responsibility for Northern Quang Tri Province and the DMZ. With this additional division the ARVN is better configured to provide security for the lowlands and to counter enemy thrusts from North Vietnam or Laos. The future outlook, therefore, for the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) is optimistic, and Screaming Eagles, past and present, take great pride and satisfaction in the role they have played in assisting the ARVN in achieving such great success.

d. The past twelve months saw an added increase in the professionalism and competence of territorial forces. In the Camp Evans area the Regional and Popular Forces, who earlier conducted combined operations with the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), now are successfully operating in the lowlands with the 1st Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Territorial forces in Nam Hoa District, west of Camp Eagle, conducted extended combined operations in the canopy with the 1st Brigade and have an aggressive saturation patrolling and night ambush plan in operation. RF/PF forces also relieved 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) units at FB Tomahawk and FB Birmingham. The territorial forces at FB Birmingham are the westernmost RF/PF units in Military Region I. During this period the military/political boundary was relocated further to the west than at any time in the history of the war. This extension of the boundary is indicative of the success of the territorial forces and demonstrates the value to ARVN of including RF/PF in the overall defense of the lowland. Continued positive cooperation between ARVN and territorial forces will be required to insure the continued success of Vietnamization.

e. To emphasize the need for accurate, continuous and prompt coordination and information, the division established permanent liaison teams at ARVN division and regimental headquarters and at province and district headquarters. Moreover, face-to-face coordination was frequently effected by brigade commanders and ARVN regimental commanders. This direct contact resulted in the immediate passing of enemy intelligence gained
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from captured prisoners and documents to US brigade counterparts prior to the information being passed to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). This mutual trust between commanders resulted in prompt action being taken and contributed greatly to the success experienced on the battlefield. In addition to the normal liaison between the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), a Combined Operations Center (COC) was established and functioned for every major operation. The composition of the COC included representatives of both US and ARVN divisional staffs plus the Air Force and XXIV Corps. This organization proved invaluable during LAMSON 719 when rapid coordination and timing were so vital for combat operations and resupply. During the past twelve months the mobile COC was located at Quang Tri, FB T-Bone, La Vang and Hue.

f. Concurrent with combat operations, in the past six months, the division was required to expand its subzone coordination and administrative requirements. Responsibility was extended to all US units north of the Hai Van Pass and included coordination for the transfer of fire support bases, resolution of US/Vietnamese confrontations, drug abuse, racial problems, and human relations problems. Urinalysis tests were administered to combat, combat support, and combat service support units of the division. The tests revealed a low percentage of positive cases and indicate that the division drug counseling and drug amnesty programs were successful. The division also received command inspections from MACV, USARV, and XXIV Corps IG inspection teams. A division innovation to reconcile morning reports and improve personnel accountability was the monthly muster. This technique proved invaluable in updating personnel rosters and was so successful that it was eventually implemented by all US units in Vietnam. Although the subzone coordinator requirements placed an added administrative burden on the division, they did provide a sound basis for the division prior to and during Keystone operations.

g. The overall concept for Keystone in Northern Military Region I was to OPCON the 1st Brigade, 5th Mech(-) and 3/5th Cav Squadron to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) with the division having stand down responsibility for these units. Tactically, the decision was made to stand down units from north to south and west to east. Thus the 3/5th Cav covered the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mech(-) from Quang Tri and the units from the division's 3d Brigade covered the withdrawal of the 3/5th Cav. Quang Tri and Dong Ha were then turned over to the
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ARVN by October 1971. When the 3d Brigade stood down, elements from the 1st and 2d Brigades provided security and then passed control of Camp Evans to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) on 21 December 1971. The 2d Brigade covered the stand down of the 1st Brigade and elements of division headquarters, and Camp Eagle was turned over to the ARVN on 17 January 1972. The division minus two brigades then closed on Phu Bai with the responsibility for providing combat support to the ARVN and security of Phu Bai Combat Base. Concurrent with Keystone activities the division received attachment of two XXIV Corps heavy artillery battalions, and was tasked to provide the equivalent of one battalion to secure the Da Nang ASP, one battalion OPCON 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) from 27 October to 28 November to patrol the Da Nang Rocket Belt as the 23d Infantry Division conducted Keystone operations, and one battalion task force for the security of Cam Ranh Bay (this mission is still continuing). Of particular note during the entire Keystone period was that the division at one time had responsibility for the DMZ desk, and a tactical area of interest that included both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This extended area of responsibility plus the above mentioned out of zone commitments severely taxed the division's assets. However, the division met every Keystone commitment and systematically passed control of its firebases and its area of operations to the 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions (ARVN).

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. During the first part of the year the enemy sustained significant personnel and materiel losses during the ARVN excursion into the Laotian panhandle, Operation LAMSON 719. In retrospect, this operation had long term adverse effects on the enemy's capability for offensive activity in Northern Military Region I during the remainder of the year. Further, occupation of western Quang Tri Province by Allied forces during the operation precluded the enemy's prestocking of base areas and cache sites in the region, resulting in a 1971 Summer Campaign characterised by commitment of three ill-supplied regiments against ARVN forces in the central area of the province. All three regiments subsequently suffered severe losses inflicted by combined air and ground operations and were rendered combat ineffective; their only significant achievement was the fixing of ARVN forces along the crescent area in the vicinity of FB Fuller, Nui Ba Ho and FB Sarge. Elsewhere, enemy units in southern Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Province were unable to mount any significant offensive action during the 1971 dry season due to the lack of supplies and personnel. After LAMSON
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719, the division continued to locate and disrupt the enemy's logistical route structure and base areas in the western regions through intensive armed aerial reconnaissance, supported by numerous Arclight strikes, tactical air, and aerial rocket artillery. In addition, we provided extensive aviation assets to support ARVN operations directed at the enemy's routes and base areas in western Quang Tri Province. We now believe that elements of Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue are experiencing severe personnel and supply shortages and that these units are fragmented in support of Viet Cong local force units in an attempt to insure a continued enemy presence in the lowlands. Notwithstanding, the enemy still retains the capability to rapidly commit forces or reinforce with up to four divisions, should he consider the attendant personnel losses acceptable.

b. Throughout the year, in consonance with the decreasing combat role of US forces, the division gradually disengaged from direct contact with the main force North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in the canopied western region and became increasingly dependent on three primary sources for intelligence: (1) ground contact by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF); (2) armed aerial reconnaissance by organic air cavalry assets, supplemented by other visual reconnaissance means; and (3) electronic surveillance (SI & Sensors) of the base areas in the western portion of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and the contiguous areas of southern Laos and the North Vietnamese panhandle.

c. In order to exploit increased RVNAF ground contacts with the enemy, effective tactical and Interrogation-Prisoners of War (IPW) liaison with these forces was established at all levels to insure timely acquisition of the results of such contacts and to gain access to and exploit prisoners of war and documents captured. This extensive liaison requirement was carried out aggressively, while maintaining outstanding rapport and a cooperative spirit. As a result, there was no significant loss in intelligence during the division's disengagement.

d. In reviewing the relative merits of the division's intelligence sources, the most effective means available for determining enemy movement, strength, and the location of base areas was our own air cavalry. Through daily tasking of the division's four air cavalry troops, based on detailed intelligence collection requirements, the division was able to achieve optimum surveillance of a reconnaissance zone which included the entire western half of Northern Military Region I. Armed aerial reconnaissance by the air cavalry was supplemented by other aerial surveillance systems including aerial photography, O-1G visual surveillance,
infra-red sensor and side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) coverage, and Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) missions. However, as previously indicated, the most reliable aerial surveillance device by far was the trained eye of the air cavalry observer. Generally, Air Force aerial photography assets did not provide timely response to the division's continuous requests for photographic coverage of the western regions; however, this deficiency was alleviated for the most part by maximum utilization of OV-1D Mohawk photo coverage and by requesting copies of all imagery taken, regardless of requesting agency. As the northeast monsoon began to take effect in September, all aerial reconnaissance assets were limited by adverse weather conditions, i.e., low, dense cloudiness which prevailed for periods of up to two weeks at a time. During these periods, the division was forced to rely primarily on electronic surveillance systems.

With the departure of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Quang Tri Province in July, the division assumed responsibility for planning and monitoring all US sensor fields in Northern Military Region I. These sensors, along with those subsequently implanted by the division, provided valuable intelligence on enemy movement and concentrations in the western regions. Additionally, sensors proved to be a reliable means of acquiring targets as well as making a real contribution to the security of the division's firebases and critical installations. Careful management of severely limited sensor assets, and the development of a comprehensive ground surveillance plan which provided for maximum effective utilization of both sensors and ground surveillance radars, enabled the division to maintain adequate coverage of the major routes of infiltration and base areas in the western regions and traditional avenues of approach to the division's critical major installations. To provide a timely readout of sensor activations in the reconnaissance zone, a complex relay system was devised using an Air Force aircraft which orbited over the western portion of Quang Tri Province. Initially, in February 1971, this aircraft provided 20 hours of daily relay coverage. However, by December the amount of daily coverage was decreased to 18 hours. Efforts to obtain coverage from the Air Force during this six-hour void were unsuccessful. To fill this void, the division initiated an experimental program using its own sensor monitoring equipment and organic aircraft, which is presently obtaining limited results. However, this experiment is not an acceptable substitute for Air Force coverage.

Special Intelligence provided a reliable and timely source of intelligence concerning the enemy situation in the areas of Laos and North
Vietnam contiguous to Northern Military Region I. In country, however, its productivity was extremely limited. We found that the combination of armed aerial reconnaissance by the air cavalry and comprehensive sensor coverage were the most valid and productive intelligence sources concerning the enemy's activity in the division reconnaissance zone and the canopied regions contiguous to the populated lowlands.

g. During my tenure, the division provided continuous aviation support to CCN/TFLAE operations. We received little hard intelligence useful at division level for this effort.

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS

a. The long term concept of the operation for Jefferson Glen/Monsoon Plan 70, which began on 8 September 1970 and continued into 1971, was to establish a protective shield around the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province by establishing a series of firebases along the fringe of the canopy and aggressively patrolling out from these firebases to prevent infiltration. This concept released the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to conduct offensive operations to search out and destroy enemy forces. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) is a highly capable unit and demonstrated fine fighting ability during the combined XXIV Corps/I Corps operation LAMSON 719.

b. LAMSON 719 (8 February 1971 - 6 April 1971)

LAMSON 719 proved to be of great significance to the war effort in Vietnam and to the concepts of air mobility and the use of helicopters in mid-intensity warfare. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was given primary responsibility for all US Army aviation units employed in direct support of LAMSON 719. As such, the division played a vital role, for indeed the success of LAMSON 719 appears to be directly proportional to the effectiveness of airmobile support. Army aviation provided the means by which the ARVN carried the attack into Laos and the means by which extraction was made possible. A point of critical importance is that the division's accomplishment was a combined effort with massive support from USARV. At the peak of the operation, the division controlled air assets equivalent to the better part of two airmobile divisions. Any evaluation of the success of the operation should recognize that the priority and level of support provided during this operation was not typical of the flexibility and capabilities of an airmobile division with only its organic assets. The division's control and allocation of assets accomplished with great success the objective of providing superior
The operation proved the capability of the helicopter in mid-intensity warfare. The value of this is so significant that the comprehensive two-volume study, Final Report, Airmobile Operations in Support of LAMSON 719, is attached to this report as an enclosure. The objectives of LAMSON 719 were to strike deep into the enemy base areas 604 and 611 in Laos and to cut the NVA supply lines leading south from North Vietnam. This intrusion was to sweep west astride Highway 9 to Tchepone, thus reducing the supplies moving south through Laos and Cambodia. The rain and bad weather of the northeast monsoon tapers off early in January permitting air and ground operations in western Quang Tri Province and Laos. Thus, by attacking early in February, known supply dumps and Base Areas in the Tchepone area could be destroyed and the Ho Chi Minh Trail seriously interdicted for up to 6 months. Although the operation ended in about two months, LAMSON 719 had a serious impact on the enemy. He was forced to reduce tactical operations considerably in NMRI from March until June 1971 because of supply shortages. Reports indicate that this interdiction also reduced NVA offensive capability in the southern military regions of South Vietnam. The enemy realized that his extended supply lines in Laos are subject to interdiction so he increased his efforts to build roads directly across the DMZ into Quang Tri Province and into the A Shau Valley. These roads offer him short and direct infiltration and supply lines to Military Region I.

c. LAMSON 720 (14 April 1971 - 31 August 1971)

Following the success of LAMSON 719, I Corps elected to pursue advantages gained from the destruction of enemy logistical lines by initiating an operation to destroy enemy forward logistical bases inside NMRI. The combined operation that resulted, LAMSON 720, took advantage of the void left in the Da Krong/A Shau Valley as enemy forces withdrew from those areas in reaction to LAMSON 719. By mid-May admirable results were obtained by engaging forward enemy elements and locating and destroying supplies and operational base camps. Again the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) demonstrated excellent combat effectiveness. The gradual shift in responsibility for combat operations from US to ARVN forces became more apparent during LAMSON 720, with the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) providing support while most of the heavy "toe to toe" fighting was undertaken by the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

d. While the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was in the midst of LAMSON 720, the reduction in the number of US troops in Vietnam forecast
the coming of a defensive role for the division. The 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, was included in Increment VII of the redeployment of US forces and stood down on 17 May 1971. The division also provided a battalion(-) for the security of the Ammunition Supply Point, Da Nang, and assumed responsibility for an enlarged reconnaissance zone during this same time period. The announced redeployment in July and August of the 1st Brigade, 5th Division (Mechanized), which was attached to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), expanded the division's TACI to include all of Quang Tri Province and assumption of the DMZ desk responsibility. Also, on 3 August 1971, a battalion from the division was attached to US forces in MR2 to provide security for Cam Ranh Bay.

e. LAMSON 810 (6 September 1971 - 18 September 1971)

The enemy had concentrated on building his supply routes across the DMZ into Quang Tri Province and the A Shau Valley from May through July. During June the enemy stepped up operations in Quang Tri Province and conducted heavy indirect fire attacks on firebases and strong points along the DMZ and in western Quang Tri Province during July and August. To counter increased enemy activity and to reduce enemy pressure, ARVN forces initiated Operation LAMSON 810, supported by air assets of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) was moved north to engage the enemy in Quang Tri Province early in September, requiring the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to secure all of Thua Thien Province. The division was faced with an expanding area of operations and with fewer troops to cover the area. In addition, the division's reconnaissance zone now included the entire western half of NMRL, from the A Shau Valley to the DMZ. That the division was able to cover this vast reconnaissance zone was a major accomplishment, brought about by detailed mission tasking of air cavalry assets. The results of this effort provided optimum surveillance of the reconnaissance zone and provided targeting data for air strikes and artillery. Operation LAMSON 810 ended on 18 September and was successful in that some large cache sites were discovered, to include four 122mm Artillery pieces. During the latter part of September enemy activity decreased in Quang Tri Province as a direct result of LAMSON 810. Upon the return of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to Thua Thien Province, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) began to implement plans for the turn over of various outlying firebases to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

f. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), with the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, OPCON was primarily in a defensive posture in Thua Thien Province.
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ince and provided support to ARVN in Quang Tri Province through September. During October, Operation Jefferson Glen/Monsoon Plan 70 was brought to a close and OPORD 11-71 was initiated on 8 October 1971. Three primary factors were considered in developing this plan. The first consideration was to prepare for the northeast monsoon season. The selection of forward firebases which could be resupplied and reinforced during inclement weather was of major concern. Secondly, a continuation of our policy of turning over the responsibility for NMRI to ARVN forces was included in the plan. Finally, consideration was given to the preparation for the eventual redeployment of the division from Vietnam. The level of combat was reduced significantly as the division assumed a defensive posture. Maintaining adequate protection for those units of the division conducting stand down operations was of primary interest during this time frame. Stand downs continued with the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in mid-October. On 30 October the 1st Battalion (Airmobile), 327th Infantry, was sent to provide security for Firebase Maud in support of the 23d Infantry Division stand down. On 1 November two heavy artillery battalions, the 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery, and the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, were attached to the division to provide general support. The 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery was included in Increment X of the redeployment and began stand down on 21 November. The 3d Brigade also began stand down in November. With the redeployment notifications in December that drew down or redeployed the remaining division forces except for the 2d Brigade, the division continued defensive operations as the ARVN forces assumed responsibility for the majority of the NMRI area of operations.

5. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a. Control of Fire Arms and Explosives.

In order to reduce the number of incidents involving the unlawful discharge of weapons, a vigorous command program was initiated at all levels to control both firearms and pyrotechnics. In addition, the Provost Marshal has conducted numerous inspections of arms rooms and barracks to detect firearms and explosives and to suggest corrective actions to commanders. This program was most successful and considerably reduced the indiscriminate use of weapons within Evans, Eagle, and Phu Bai.

b. Traffic Control.

The control and reduction of traffic accidents, particularly US/Vietnamese accidents, were emphasised. In June the Provost Marshal
implemented the Aerial Detection and Interception of Speeders Program (ADIOS) in cooperation with the 504th Military Police Company. New traffic circulation plans were established to reduce the flow of traffic through populated areas. In addition increased emphasis was placed at the unit level to control the dispatch of vehicles.

c. Drug Program,

Drug abuse was a constant concern during my tenure with the division. Joint patrols with Vietnamese National Police and ARVN Quan Canh (Military Police) were established to apprehend US forces and Vietnamese suppliers in the vicinity of base camps. The chaplains were actively engaged in the various drug programs initiated by the command. The division also proceeded with a vigorous amnesty program. In addition, drug councils were incorporated into all levels of command to combat this serious problem. Training and education programs were established through medical channels to provide guidance on the effect of drugs and methods of treatment. This, combined with USARV-wide programs, significantly reduced the number of drug offenders. We also initiated a Drug Mobile Training Team of CID and SJA personnel to present classes to senior enlisted and officer personnel on identification of drugs, methods of use, search procedures, and methods of identifying users in order to remove the corrupting influence they may have on others. Also, a separate ward with special staff solely for the treatment and initial rehabilitation efforts for drug abuse patients was opened at the Eagle Medical Center, operated by the division's medical battalion. A follow-up counselling program is provided by battalion and separate company drug rehabilitation team members with overall supervision given by the division psychiatrist. Surprise unit urinalysis testing was conducted for units of the division. Individuals identified by these tests were sent to the Drug Treatment Center at Cam Ranh Bay to be detoxified. Upon their return, the individuals entered unit rehabilitation programs conducted by unit drug team members and supervised by unit commanders.

d. Medical (Water Purification).

In April the division medical and engineer assets were combined to install an in-line chlorinator at the Eagle water point to increase the amount of potable water. Upon completion of this project, the production of potable water increased from 22,500 gallons daily to 110,000 gallons daily.
The success of the Modern Volunteer Army Program is dependent upon the actions and attitudes of every unit leader within the division. Each commander/leader was encouraged to take those actions that would enhance the attractiveness of duty within his unit and thus improve the attractiveness of duty within the division. We did not advocate a "soft" attitude, nor did we encourage permissiveness. Actions initiated in each unit should serve to improve professionalism and uplift the morale and welfare of the troops. Most importantly, we conveyed the fact that "WE CARE!". These words expressed to the members of the command our goals and interests in the Volunteer Army Program. The division established a VOLAR Suggestion Program in an effort to solicit comments from all personnel. Training POI's were developed to familiarize officers and NCO's with Army-wide objectives of VOLAR. Early indications revealed great enthusiasm among the enlisted men and leaders. The entire program was geared toward affecting people and their relationships to one another. The essence of the program was the manner and attitude with which men are led and the manner and attitude with which men respond to that leadership.

f. Personnel Management.

In 1971, the division experienced critical shortages in an average of 40 MOS areas. The most severe shortages occurred in aviation MOS areas; however, infantry, artillery and some support MOS areas also were critical. In-country transfers relieved the personnel problem to some extent; however, the majority of personnel obtained from Keystone assets were in the combat arms. Transfers from stand down units to other divisional units also helped, but the MOS areas of support and maintenance remained critical.

g. Special Services.

In preparation for the northeast monsoon season, the Special Services office initiated new, vigorous programs to keep the troops active and entertained. These programs assisted in maintaining high troop morale.

6. (U) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT:

a. LAMSON 719 demonstrated the feasibility of conducting largely expanded airmobile operations. Initially, the 1st Bde, 5th Mech; the 11th Bde, 23d Inf Div; and the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) participated in the operation independently under the control of XXIV Corps. Logistical support was provided by the Da Nang Support Command. This support proved adequate.
and was continued when the participating brigades were placed OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Back up support was provided by the Da Nang Support Command through a base support area at Quang Tri and two forward support areas located at Vandegrift and Khe Sanh. Logistical requirements beyond the organic capabilities of each brigade were coordinated by division G4/DISCOM elements located at Quang Tri. We were pleased with the support rendered and noticed no fluctuation in efficiency during the expansion of facilities to meet the tactical situation.

b. Following LAMSON 719 the division returned to its traditional area of operations in NMR 1. Combat service support continued with each brigade receiving support from its organic Forward Service Support Element (FSSE). With the advent of the dry season the ease of resupply to fire bases and field units was greatly increased. During June and July tropical rain storms temporarily interrupted resupply activities.

c. LAMSON 810 again clearly demonstrated the division's ability to support ARVN airmobile operations. Logistical support was provided for the operational elements by organic combat service support with back-up support provided by the Da Nang Support Command through a Forward Support Area at Quang Tri. DISCOM Forward was located at Mai Loc to coordinate all logistical requirements. Support was smoothly and efficiently handled throughout the operation.

d. Directed to research and organize for redeployment operations, the G4 established a Logistical Operations Center (LOC). This LOC researched all of the available material presented in the Keystone reports prepared by other divisions. In early April 1971, members of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Keystone Control Center briefed the division staff on Keystone operations of that unit. This information was extremely valuable. The LOC was fully staffed on 16 April 71. The LOC prepared a Logistical Annex to the division Keystone operations order and Letters of Instruction. These instructions were formulated into a packet entitled Logistical Guidance for Keystone Units and proved successful during subsequent redeployment of divisional units.

e. "Stand Short" Program.

In addition to the VARP and Temporary Loan review, the G4 began efforts to rid units of unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment. Units were encouraged to review their TOE/MTOE's and equipment densities to determine if equipment was being maintained for which no foreseeable requirement existed. Equipment in this category was presented to USARV requesting approval to
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"stand short" those items. This effort reduced stockage and alleviated storage and security problems by eliminating unneeded equipment with no reduction in unit combat effectiveness.

g. Retrograde of Excess/Unneeded Supply and Equipment.

One of the most vital programs monitored by the G4 was the retrograding of unneeded material. This program was tremendously successful. Dollar value of equipment retrograded amounted to well over 29 million dollars.

7. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Psychological operations have been integrated with combat operations in the piedmont and mountainous areas of Thua Thien Province. During February 1971 we conducted Operation "Cypress Garden" targeted against the C3 Co, Phu Loc Special Action Unit, in the Vinh Phong Mountain Region. Special emphasis was placed on the employment of tactical fire power in support of psychological operations. Fire power and tactical air support for the operation were diverted in support of LAMSON 719; however, the concept of the operation proved sound.

b. In an attempt to reduce the number of casualties produced by booby traps an intensive anti-booby trap/mine PSYOP campaign was conducted, exploiting the Volunteer Informant and Rewards Program. The program has identified booby trap areas and produced a number of cache sites.

c. Psychological operations were employed in conjunction with civil affairs to exploit the pacification in the populated lowlands, utilizing ground loudspeakers and MEDCAP teams combined with aerial broadcast and leaflet drops. To support the division G5 policy of encouraging increased de-Americanization of psychological operations in Thua Thien Province, PSYOP efforts in the division area are coordinated with provincial/district PSYOP agencies and G5, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

d. Psychological operations were designed to maintain a high visibility toward the eventual assimilation of all PSYOP campaigns by elements of the Army of South Vietnam. With the recent recommendation to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to include the MIA/POW campaign in their PSYOP program, the degree of parallelism between the two allied efforts is complete.
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e. One of the primary missions of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) was to enhance the image of the South Vietnamese government with respect to the local population. However, the impact of stand down activities within the division has created a sudden surge in requests from local people and GVN institutions for excess US supplies/materials. While in the past, individual units were authorized to support various orphanages and schools directly, a new policy was adopted on 11 Dec 71. The new program directed all units to route excess/salvage items through the ACofS, G5 to the Social Welfare Bureaus of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. This reduced the number of requests upon military units, reinforced the existing civilian supply channels, and insured equal distribution to all needy organizations.

8. (C) REDEPLOYMENT:

a. In early April, the division began planning for the possible redeployment of units in expectation of trends to scale down the war effort. The possible loss of up to one brigade was envisioned during Increment VII. On 5 April the G3 initiated a study to determine the best method of redeployment and to establish a Redeployment Control Center (RCC). On 19 April the RCC was activated to process the redeployment of the 3d Battalion (Airmobile), 506th Infantry. Upon the satisfactory completion of this stand down, the RCC continued operations under the auspices of the G3 and the G4. Utilizing a reduced staff during the months of June and July, the RCC updated the division's initial Redeployment Planning Guide, prepared Letters of Instruction, and reviewed After Action Reports. Except for two Scout Dog platoons, no divisional units were involved in Increment VIII (June-August 1971). In mid-July, the division was tasked by XXIV Corps to prepare plans for redeployment of the division under a variety of contingencies. These plans were submitted to Corps on 30 July 1971. With Increment X (September-November 1971) drawing near and indications that division units might be included therein, the RCC staff was reconstituted on 1 August to affect detailed planning and coordination. On 12 August the RCC was formally constituted as part of the division headquarters, and consisted of the G5 as OIC, three officer representatives of the G1, G3, and G4 respectively, two operations NCO's and two clerks. Since August, the RCC was the hub for execution of Increment X, base closure operations, and future redeployment planning.

b. On 14 October detailed planning was begun on impending division redeployment. Planning was based on three phases of redeployment: Phase I consisting of the 3d Brigade and closure of Camp Evans, Phase II the redeployment of the 1st Brigade and closure of Camp Eagle, and
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Phase III the redeployment of the 2d Brigade and the closure of Phu Bai Combat Base. Redeployment lines of communication were established with lines to Long Binh, Da Nang, and to stand down units at brigade level. Units were directed to begin turn in of excess equipment and to begin police of their areas of operation.

c. On 20 November we received our first notification of units to stand down in Increment X. The units affected were essentially the 3d Brigade and supporting elements to include the 158th Avn Bn (-). These units were ordered to stand down over the period 20 November to 1 December. AG, G4 and DISCOM teams had oriented the 3d Brigade units in detail prior to this notification so they were able to react promptly and met all of their MIPP and SIPP schedules in an exemplary fashion.

d. On 23 Nov 71 we were notified to also stand down in Increment X the 1st Brigade, a large slice of the division aviation assets (the entire 158th Avn Bn; C/159th Avn Bn; 163d Avn Co (-); A/377th Arty; B/C/HQ 4-77th ARA; B/C 2-17th Cav; air assets of 1st Brigade HQ, HHC 101st Div, and Med Evac helicopters) and a considerable slice of the division support elements. Relatively few problems were encountered by these changes in Keystone Mallard. Da Nang Support Command was most responsive. MIPP/SIPP schedules were established and Increment X redeployments were completed ahead of schedule.

9. (U) Attached to this report are inclosures that provide additional information on intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, psychological operations, administration, and redeployment. Also attached is the Final Report, Airmobile Operations in Support of LAMSON 719.

10. (U) In summary, the Screaming Eagles have met or exceeded all expectations in tactical operations, logistics, and administration. During this especially critical phase of the war, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) performed magnificently. I am extremely grateful to have had the honor of commanding this splendid division in combat.

THOMAS M. TARPLEY
Major General, USA
Commanding
INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Enemy Situation:

   a. General: In southeastern Laos and western Quang Tri (P) during February and March, the enemy reacted violently to the ARVN incursion into Laos, Operation LAMSON 719. Major elements of the 70B Front and MRTTH (324B Division) were committed against ARVN forces in the Laotian panhandle, while B-5 Front elements concentrated on harassing US and ARVN support elements in Quang Tri (P). The 27B Regiment made numerous unsuccessful attempts to interdict QL-9 in the vicinity of the Rockpile, since ARVN and US support elements at Khe Sanh were dependent on QL-9 as their Main Supply Route. With the termination of LAMSON 719, which caused a significant disruption of the enemy's Laotian route structure, enemy activity remained low in Quang Tri (P) through April and the first half of May, although infiltration increased in western Quang Tri (P) as the enemy prepared for his summer campaign. In late May, the summer campaign was initiated by intense attacks by fire in the central and eastern DMZ area. In early June, the 9th and 66th Regiments/304th Division attacked the FB Sarge/Nui Ba Ho area and Vietnamese Marine field positions south of the Ba Long valley, with the enemy sustaining significant losses, after which he broke contact and withdrew to the west. FB Fuller was targeted by intense attacks by fire and ground assaults, which resulted in its temporary abandonment to elements of the 27B Regiment in late June. During July and early August, enemy activity in Quang Tri (P) was at a lull, as enemy units in the west were refitting for future operations. In mid-August, the FB Sarge/Nui Ba Ho area was again the target for unsuccessful enemy ground assaults by the 52B Regiment/320th Division, which suffered 50 per cent casualties in a ten-day period. ARVN Operation LAMSON 810, a multi-regiment thrust into western Quang Tri (P) during September, made no major contact, but did result in the destruction of several significant enemy ammunition caches. Beginning in early September, enemy activity in Quang Tri (P) was light, marked only by sporadic attacks by fire and limited ground probes as the enemy maintained his pressure against ARVN strong points and installations along the DMZ. Activity was expected to remain light along the DMZ through the end of January 1972. To the south, in MRTTH (southern Quang Tri (P) and Thua Thien (P) enemy units were unable to mount any significant offensive activity during the entire reporting period, due primarily to the disruptive effects of LAMSON 719, and continued Allied interdiction of his western base areas and infiltration routes. Operation LAMSON 720, a combined US/ARVN operation, was initiated in mid-April, to continue ARVN momentum gained during LAMSON 719.
and to attack enemy base areas and cache sites in Base Area 129 and the upper A Shau valley. 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) elements aggressively engaged enemy units in the western Route 547 and upper A Shau valley areas in May, resulting in approximately 400 enemy KIA. With the initiation of the enemy's summer campaign in Quang Tri (P), Operation LAMSON 720 was shifted to the north to counter the enemy offensive in central Quang Tri (P), where Allied emphasis remained through the termination of LAMSON 720 in early September. MRTTH units, suffering severe supply and personnel shortages, continued to avoid contact, and concentrated on attempting to reinforce the depleted ranks of the VC local force units. After LAMSON 719, VC/VCI activity declined, reaching the lowest level in over two years by the end of the year. Anticipated enemy operations to disrupt the GVN Lower House elections in late August and the Presidential elections in early October failed to materialize. With the onset of the Northeast Monsoon, enemy activity in Northern MRI was characterized by continued pressure along the DMZ, avoidance of contact in the lowlands, and increased logistical activity and route construction in base areas along the Lao-Viet border.


(1) Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH) maintained a headquarters in Base Area 611, located in eastern Laos.

(a) The 4th NVA Regiment was deployed in the mountainous area of southeastern Thua Thien Province with one Infantry Battalion.

(b) The 5th NVA Regiment was located in Central Thua Thien Province, southwest of Hue with two Infantry Battalions, two Sapper Battalions and one Artillery Battalion.

(c) The 6th NVA Regiment was located in Northern Thua Thien Province with three Infantry Battalions, one Sapper Battalion, and one Artillery Battalion.

(d) The 7th Front was located in southern Quang Tri Province with two Infantry Battalions, one Sapper Battalion, one Artillery Battalion, and one Transportation Battalion.

(e) The 324B Division with its subordinates 29th, 803d and 812th Regiments, was located in its traditional area of operations in the A Shau and Da Krong valleys, providing logistical and combat support to the MRTTH Independent Regiments.
(2) The 70B Front, a newly formed major headquarters, was located above the western DMZ, and controlled the 304th, 308th, and 320th NVA Divisions along with supporting artillery and armor units. Some elements of the 70B Front, including the 24B Regiment/304th Division and the 64th Regiment 320th Division, were deployed in Laos west of the Quang Tri (P) border.

(3) The B-5 Front Headquarters was located in Quang Binh Province north of the central DMZ.

(a) The 27B Infantry Regiment headquarters and support elements was located on the southern edge of the central DMZ.

(b) The 270th Infantry Regiment headquarters and support elements was located on the central DMZ, 5km northwest of Con Thien, with at least one Battalion operating northeast of FB Fuller.

(c) The 246th Infantry Regiment was deployed in the western DMZ.

(d) The 84th Rocket/Artillery Regiment Headquarters was located in Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, with its subordinate Battalions committed in the central and eastern DMZ.

(e) The 31st Local Force Group Headquarters was located in the eastern DMZ with many subordinate units active in northeastern Quang Tri Province.

(f) The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located in the eastern DMZ on the seacoast and was targeted against the Cua Viet River area.

c. Enemy Activity During LAMSON 719.

(1) Initial enemy disposition prior to Operation LAMSON 719:

(a) Enemy forces in and near the operational area prior to the initiation of Operation LAMSON 719 on 8 February were estimated to number 22,000. Of this total, 13,000 were in combat units, and 9,000 were supporting and maintaining the extensive infiltration network.

(b) Units in the area consisted of elements of the 24B Regiment/304th Division, the headquarters of the 304th Division, the 1st VC Regiment/2d Division, and the 64th Regiment/320th Division. The 24B Regiment had remained in the area northwest of Ban Dong while the remainder of the 304th
Division (9th and 66th Regiments and the Division Headquarters) deployed to North Vietnam after the summer of 1970. The 24B Regiment had the mission of guarding the Route 9 approach into the Tchepone area, refitting after operations in southern Military Region I in the summer of 1970. The 64th Regiment/320th Division was north of Base Area 604, infiltrating south along Route 913.

(c) Enemy forces supporting the logistical network were subordinate elements of the 559th Transportation Group, called Binh Trams (military stations). These elements were responsible for the movement of infiltrating personnel and supplies through their assigned areas of responsibility. In order to accomplish this, each Binh Tram was composed of a mix of attached transportation, engineer, medical, communication, liaison, and anti-aircraft battalions. In addition, battalion sized infantry forces were attached for internal security, although all attached units had the secondary mission of fighting as infantry when required. Binh Trams in the immediate operational area; one unidentified Binh Tram in the Tchepone area; Binh Tram 33 in the Ban Dong area; Binh Tram 41 in the Route 926/616 area; and Binh Tram 34, which received supplies from Binh Tram 33 to be moved south toward southern Military Region 1.

(d) Anti-aircraft units subordinate to the Binh Trams were tasked with protecting the infiltration network from allied surveillance and interdiction. Each Binh Tram controlled possibly as many as three anti-aircraft battalions equipped with weapons of varying caliber, from 12.7mm through 100mm.

(e) It was estimated that there were as many as 19 battalions of 150-200 medium caliber weapons deployed along the route structure.

(2) During Operation LAMSON 719:

(a) In late January, a new corps level headquarters infiltrated from north of the DMZ to an area north of ARVN Ranger firebases along Route 1032B. This headquarters, designated as the 70B Front, was eventually to control elements of five divisions committed against Allied operations in LAMSON 719. On 6 February, the 70th VC Regiment/2d Division moved east from the Tchepone area to an area northwest of Ban Dong, probably as a blocking force, to attempt to control the ARVN ground attacks. To the south, the 812th Regiment/324B Division redeployed from the Laotian salient to the vicinity of the hill mass known as the Co Roc, southwest of Khe Sanh. The regiment arrived in early February, probably with the mission of
harassing Allied units along Route 9 and acting as a blocking force to limit any Allied incursion to the south into Base Area 611. ARVN elements crossed the SVN-Laotian border in the vicinity of Route 9 on 8 February and launched a ground penetration in the vicinity of Ban Dong supported by an airmobile assault to the north and south. ARVN elements met little or no resistance during this initial penetration. Enemy reaction, however, was immediate. On 11 February, the 88th Regiment was the first element of the 308th Division to be infiltrated through the DMZ from North Vietnam. The 64th Regiment/320th Division, which was scheduled for operations in Cambodia and eastern Laos, was diverted to the LAMSON 719 area on 11 February. Following the 88th Regiment/308th Division, the remainder of the Division (36th Regiment, 102d Regiment and 308th Division Headquarters) infiltrated south from the DMZ along Route 1032B in mid-February. The division headquarters was located in the western end of the DMZ at this time. To the south, the 29th Regiment became the second major element of the 324B Division to be committed and was located in the Firebase Delta area. Suspected locations of enemy elements were confirmed beginning on 18 February. The 102d Regiment/308th Division was identified as the major force which attacked the 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion in the RANGER NORTH/RANGER SOUTH area north of Route 9. On 24 February, elements of the 24B Regiment/304th Division and the 36th Regiment/308th Division supported by tanks, attacked Firebase 31 in eastern Laos. This battle confirmed the infiltration of an unidentified tank regiment to the north of Firebase 31, probably in mid-February. On 27 February, elements of the 308th Division, employing tanks as fire support, attacked Firebase 30. In the south, the 324B Division became fully committed to blocking ARVN incursions into Base Area 611. The 803d Regiment arrived in the southern sector of the area of operations in the vicinity of Route 92B. Headquarters of the 324B Division was located south of the area of operations along Route 922. During the peak of enemy activity in the LAMSON 719 area of operations (early March), the enemy committed approximately 36,000 troops to the area including Binh Tram personnel.

(b) In early March, ARVN units with heavy support from Allied air, began a series of airmobile assaults along the escarpment west from Ban Dong reaching the Tchepone area on 6 March. Heavy pressure was brought to bear on ARVN firebases on the escarpment east of Tchepone. These attacks can probably be attributed to elements of the 2d Division, Binh Tram 33 and the 141st Regiment. As ARVN elements withdrew to the vicinity of Ban Dong, 2d Division elements pursued in close proximity and continued to exert pressure. In the east, elements from the 324B and 308th Division
brought heavy pressure to bear on ARVN forces along Route 9 and ARVN firebases throughout the area of operations encountered heavy attacks by fire. The enemy employed extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire along routes to and from ARVN firebases. Mining incidents, attacks by fire and ground attacks were directed at ARVN elements along Route 9. During mid-March, the primary US forward support area at Khe Sanh received heavy attacks by fire and sapper attack. During the ARVN withdrawal into South Vietnam, the enemy attempted to maintain pressure from the west, while hoping to interdict Route 9 between Ban Dong and the Laotian/South Vietnamese border. Intense anti-aircraft fire was employed in the east in an attempt to render US air support ineffective, and the same motive was behind the heavy attacks by fire at Khe Sanh.

d. Enemy Activity by Month.

(1) During February, there was a threefold increase in attacks by fire over the previous month. The 304th, 308th and 320th Divisions of the B-5 Front were all believed to be committed against Operation LAMSON 719 near Base Area 604 in Laos. Conversely, activity by units of Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue decreased during February. This decrease in activity may have been a result of a reorganisation by Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue units. Agent reports received in February indicated that enemy forces in Thua Thien Province had reorganised and were ordered to avoid contact with allied forces. This decrease can also be attributed to the commitment of units to the Laotian Campaign. During February, mining and boobytrap activity reached a new high. The enemy continued to direct sabotage activity against the Hue-Da Nang Railroad. Infiltration remained at a moderate level on all major in-country infiltration routes with the exception of Route 616, which experienced a substantial decrease due to heavy interdiction.

(2) Enemy activity in the DMZ area increased considerably in March. The enemy's primary mission during the month was the disruption of allied traffic along Route 9. Heavy enemy activity occurred in the vicinity of the Rockpile and Firebase Shepard areas as the enemy attempted to draw allied attention away from the Laotian border area. In western Quang Tri Province, heavy enemy pressure was applied from Khe Sanh to the Laotian border. Activity also increased in Thua Thien Province. The Hue-Da Nang Railroad continued to be the prime target of enemy sabotage as there were 13 attempts to interdict the railroad. On 30 March, 2 NVA from the 802d Battalion/6th Regiment were captured. Both were captured in the traditional area of operations of the 5th Regiment, possibly indicating a new area of operations for the 6th Regiment. Activity on in-country infiltration routes decreased during March due to increased enemy troop commitment in Laos.
(3) After three consecutive months of increasing enemy activity in northern and central Quang Tri province, enemy activity declined sharply in April. There were 51 reported ground contacts in the DMZ area, as opposed to the 255 reported in March. This decrease can be attributed to the termination of LAMSON 719 and the redeployment of allied forces to their normal areas of operation. Conversely, enemy activity increased in Thua Thien Province in re-action to combined US/ARVN Operation LAMSON 720, which was initiated in mid-April to attack enemy base areas and infiltration routes in Base Area 129 and the upper A Shau Valley. The most significant contacts occurred south of Firebase Veghel where elements of the 6th Regiment were engaged on several occasions. Visual reconnaissance and sensor activity in the A Shau Valley-Route 548 area indicated a renewed build-up of enemy logistical activity, to include road work and bunker construction. Visual reconnaissance also confirmed agent reports indicating enemy improvement and increased use of Route 616 and its adjacent trail system. The Hue-Da Nang Railroad continued to be interdicted by the Phu Loc Special Action Unit and elements of the 5th NVA Regiment. The 324B Division also began to return to its traditional area of operations along the Vietnamese-Laotian border in Base Area 611.

(4) Enemy activity decreased in Quang Tri Province during May. Most of the activity was attacks by fire attributed to the 84th Artillery Regiment. Enemy activity in Thua Thien Province increased in May as LAMSON 720 forces engaged the 6th Regiment in the Firebase Veghel area and Binh Tram elements in the A Shau Valley. Heavy contact resulted in approximately 400 NVA KIA during May. Elements of the 324B Division were reported to be in Base Area 611.

(5) Enemy activity increased significantly during June in Quang Tri Province as units of the B-5 and 70B Front initiated their Summer Offensive, which was countered by the shift of LAMSON 720 forces to the province. The month was marked by heavy attacks by fire and ground attacks against allied fixed installations and allied positions throughout the eastern and central DMZ. On 23 June, Firebase Fuller was captured temporarily by elements of the 27th Regiment but retaken by ARVN forces four days later. Ground contacts increased in June, as did attacks by fire. Enemy activity in Thua Thien Province decreased as allied forces redeployed from the A Shau Valley. Significant activity was concentrated in two primary areas; the Firebase Veghel/Firebase Rendezvous area, and in southeastern Nam Hoa District/northwestern Phu Loc District.
(6) Activity in the B-5 Front area remained low during July. However, despite the lull, the enemy retained the capability to launch offensives in the FB Fuller, Camp Carroll and FB Sarge area and in the southern DMZ area, where the 52B Regiment remained deployed. B-5 Front units operated near the B-5 Front/7th Front boundary and agents reported that the enemy would continue his summer campaign in the B-5 area. Activity in MRTTH showed a general decrease. The activity in MRTTH during July centered around western Phu Loc (D), southeastern NAM HOA (D), and HAI LANG (D). The activity in these areas was probably attributable to the 804th Battalion/5th Regiment and the 7th Front. All intelligence sources continued to indicate the enemy's priority on infiltrating NVA into the lowlands to reinforce VC local force units prior to the August elections.

(7) During August activity in the B-5 Front area reached its highest level since the June operations around FB Fuller, as the 52B Regiment/320th Division initiated another phase of the summer campaign with major attacks against Nui Ba Ho and FB Sarge. This phase abruptly terminated at the end of the month as elements of the 52B Regiment withdrew northward and westward. It is believed that the 52B Regiment was rendered combat ineffective in this action, and eventually returned to NVN. Activity in MRTTH continued to be unexpectedly low, particularly in light of the lower-house elections on 29 August. ARVN offensive operations in southern Thua Thien Province were not productive as 5th Regiment elements withdrew south to Quang Nam Province in order to avoid contact with LAMSON 720 forces. VC/VCI activity was also unexpectedly low, as anticipated operations designed to disrupt the elections did not materialize. Construction activity was moderate along the in-country route structure, and was highlighted by the completion of the Greene-Alpine road and the continual work on Route 616 extension.

(8) Activity throughout the Division TAOI decreased during September, as Operation LAMSON 720 was terminated at the first of the month. As in the case of the August elections, massive enemy efforts to disrupt the Presidential election did not materialize. Enemy anti-election activity during September was largely confined to awkward propaganda efforts. Activity in the B-5 Front area remained low as had been experienced after the August operations around FB Sarge. Operation LAMSON 810 was initiated in early September and although it did not encounter significant enemy units in Western Quang Tri the operation did uncover three large cache sites and resulted in the destruction of four 122mm guns. Activity in MRTTH remained relatively low. There was an increase in enemy food procurement activities during the month, as the rice harvest ended and enemy units attempted to increase their food supplies in preparation for the rainy season. Increased
activity in the lowlands was attributable to this increased food-procurement effort as well as enemy anti-election propaganda efforts. Activity along the in-country route structure was centered around the enemy's concerted efforts to complete the 616 extension. The most significant intelligence derived during the period was the discovery during LAMSON 810 of four 122mm field guns vic YD 6648. These were the first conventional tube artillery weapons discovered in-country since 1968.

(9) Activity in the B-5 Front during October was down considerably as compared to September. Most of the activity occurred during the first half of the month and was heaviest in the eastern DMZ. FB Fuller and strong points along the eastern DMZ remained primary NVA targets during the month while suspected elements of the 27B NVA Regiment and an unidentified unit moved into the area around FB Fuller. Throughout the month, resupply and infiltration efforts continued in western Quang Tri (P) which indicated a possible buildup for a Winter-Spring Campaign. Activity in the MRTTH area continued to decline during October. This decrease in activity was due not only to lack of men and supplies but also apparently to a policy of avoiding contact. During the month, MRTTH units continued to coordinate with District Special Action Units in the lowlands areas. Active areas of MRTTH were noted in the vicinity of OP Apollo and HAI LANG (D).

(10) In November the enemy increased reconnaissance of allied installations in the 5th Regiment's AO while continuing coordination with District Special Action Units which provide NVA units with effective comho-liaison personnel. However, MRTTH units continued to avoid contact with the exception of the southern Da Krong Valley, in the vicinity of FB Erskine/ Cunningham, where the enemy established an extensive logistical base and then defended the concentration with the most intense AA fire encountered since LAMSON 719. By mid-month, the concentration appeared to disperse into Base Area 129 after engagement by 14 Arclight strikes and intense tactical air support and artillery. Overall activity reported during November remained at about the same level as that reported in October. Elements of the 31st Local Force Group remained active in the eastern DMZ, mortaring strong points and ARVN field locations. In the central DMZ, it was confirmed that the 3d Battalion/84th Rocket Artillery Regiment and the 2d Battalion, 246th Regiment were operating in the FB Fuller area. Enemy rear service elements continued their logistical campaign in western Quang Tri (P).

(11) Activity throughout the B-5 Front AO increased during December. During the first week activity in the B-5 Front was concentrated around FB Fuller with elements of the 27B Regiment and 246th Regiment increased
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pressure in that area. These elements maintained pressure into the second week as Strong Points A-1 and A-2 received attacks by fire by elements of the 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment. The 31st Local Force Group also increased harassing actions in the eastern DMZ area while resupply and infiltration efforts continued in western Quang Tri (P). Although ground contacts with NVA units decreased in the MRTTH AO in December, enemy reconnaissance activities continued in the Camp Eagle/Phu Bai Combat Base area. Signs of maintenance of the logistical concentration in the FB Erskine/Cunningham area continued to be detected, although activity appeared to be more dispersed to the north and east.

(12) Projected enemy activity for January 1972. Agent reports continue to indicate that MRTTH units will coordinate with District Special Action Units for the purpose of collecting rice, restructuring local VCi units, limited harassment activities and interdiction of lines of communication. Reports have been received mentioning a Winter-Spring Campaign; however, it is believed that logistical supplies are currently at low levels thereby limiting such a campaign. The number of contacts with units in MRTTH have remained at a low level in recent months; however, an increase in enemy reconnaissance activities has been noted in the Camp Eagle/Phu Bai Combat Base area. The major impetus to an increase in activity throughout the MRTTH AO would be the return of the 324B Division from refitting in North Vietnam to its traditional AO in the A Shau. Reports have been received relating the limited amount of logistical supplies available to MRTTH and activities to rectify this situation. The redeployment of the 324B Division, in conjunction with a successful logistical campaign, are essential to plans of the enemy for a 1971-1972 Winter-Spring Campaign in the MRTTH area of operations. Activity is likely to remain light in the B-5 Front through the end of January, although some increase may be expected prior to the end of January. Units operating in the B-5 Front traditionally use the monsoon period for resupply and reinfiltration efforts but this year it appears that the NVA may be somewhat behind schedule and reinfiltration will probably be complete by the end of January or the first part of February. At that time, we can expect the beginning of offensive measures in a Winter-Spring Campaign. Until then, activity by the 31st Local Force Group and elements of the 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment is expected to continue against strong points along the eastern DMZ while additional elements of the 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment will support activities by the 27B Regiment and 246th Regiment in the central DMZ. The offensive tactic which may be undertaken during the Winter-Spring Campaign will depend on the future deployment areas of elements of the 70B Front Divisions which will probably not be established until the end of January, or early February.
e. Enemy Tactics and Techniques During LAMSON 719.

(1) As the enemy began to react to the initial assault of LAMSON 719, he displayed tactics previously observed in Vietnam. However, there were several tactics employed by the enemy during operation LAMSON 719, which adversely affected allied operations and warrant further discussion.

(a) The enemy had available a considerably greater fire support capability than previously experienced. He used artillery to inflict casualties, to harass ARVN firebases, and to effectively isolate ARVN firebases from aerial resupply. Enemy knowledge of allied troop safety instructions associated with Arc Light strikes caused enemy forces in contact to stay as close as possible to ARVN forces on the ground. This tactic, known as "hugging" was seen often during close contacts. The enemy attempted to prevent the employment of Arc Light missions by creating an unacceptable casualty risk to ARVN forces.

(b) Instructions given to NVA elements in Laos concerning the employment of anti-aircraft weapons against combat assaults by allied forces on helicopter landing zones were as follows:

1. Make a thorough reconnaissance of areas struck by B-52's and where photo reconnaissance or US aerial surveillance has indicated an interest.

2. Deploy 12.7mm weapons, usually two or three, in the vicinity of a high point approximately 1000 meters from a landing zone, engaging helicopters as they land.

3. Reinforce the area around landing zones with 12.7mm weapons, mortars and artillery during the night after an air assault has been made.

4. Cover air zones extending five to ten kilometers from a landing zone with anti-aircraft artillery.

(c) The 12.7mm weapons were often employed in a triangular or rectangular formation. The 23mm guns were employed in circular, triangular, or rectangular formations. A single gun, on occasion, was utilized to protect storage sites or vital road networks. "Hugging" tactics were also employed by anti-aircraft units, especially during a heavy contact when confusion and gaps might occur in allied units. Whenever possible, 12.7mm heavy machine
guns were employed in the midst of friendly units or very close to friendly lines to engage US helicopter gunships and tactical air supporting the RVNAF in contact. This tactic again exposed allied forces to an unacceptable risk of casualties from gunships or tactical air if anti-aircraft weapons were engaged by either of these means. The enemy made maximum use of this tactic during LAMSON 719.

(d) General tactical doctrine holds that anti-aircraft artillery weapons will be moved to a new site (predetermined if possible) once their positions have been compromised, either by means of extensive contact or by friendly surveillance. Captured documents indicate that anti-aircraft weapons are normally redeployed to new sites every six to seven days. During LAMSON 719, however, anti-aircraft weapons were redeployed daily, making it impossible for allied air support to maintain accurate deployment data.

(e) LAMSON 719 resulted in the third confirmed appearance of NVA armor (the first was the attack against Lang Vei Special Forces Camp in February 1968 and the second was against the Ben Het CIDG Camp in the spring of 1969). Unlike the previous armor engagements, enemy armor deployment during LAMSON 719 was more conventional. As supporting fires were shifted onto the firebase, a coordinated tank/infantry assault was launched, followed by a second assault until the position was breached. Though the attack was well executed, the high cost of tanks will likely prevent repeated use of this tactic. The enemy also used his tanks defensively to block ARVN advances along channelized routes and to support the attack on Firebase 30.

(f) General Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

1. Tactics. NVA and VC tactics are based on the principle of economy of force with the aim of inflicting maximum casualties on allied forces while suffering as few casualties and losses of equipment as possible. They continued to operate as small units rather than in large formations, but did mass troops when a distinct advantage could be assured.

2. Armament. The standard weapon for the NVA forces in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) area of operations is the AK-47. Officers are usually armed with K-54 pistols. The NVA have at their disposal a wide variety of indirect and direct fire weapons. These include 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars, 122mm rockets, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, RPG-2 and RPG-7. In addition to HE ammunition, the enemy has CS rounds for the 60mm mortar. He also has 7.62 RPD machine guns which are employed...
against both ground forces and aircraft. Other anti-aircraft weapons in use are the 12.7mm, 23mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns. On occasion, the enemy has employed air rounds from his RPG launchers.

3. Logistics. The enemy is dependent on supplies infiltrated from North Vietnam. He has, however, attempted to obtain foodstuffs from local populace with some success. During 1970 and 1971, the enemy resorted to growing food crops as photography and visual reconnaissance has revealed a large number of cultivated fields in the western portions of the area of operations. Irrespective of source, once supplies enter South Vietnam, they are distributed to cache sites scattered throughout the enemy base areas.

4. Transportation. The infiltration of personnel into South Vietnam and movement within South Vietnam, is accomplished by foot. Supplies are transported by truck as far forward as the road network will allow. The final distribution of supplies within South Vietnam is done primarily by foot or pack animal. The enemy has been known to employ water buffalo, elephants, and bicycles to assist in the transportation of supplies.

5. Communications. Communications between battalion level units and lower echelons are usually accomplished by messengers using established communications-liaison routes. Communications between battalion level units and higher echelons are accomplished by radio or messenger. Low watt radio transmitters are normally employed to avoid detection. The NVA revert to wire communications after becoming established in a secure area.

g. VC/VCI Activity.

(1) Thua Thien (P). February was characterized by high VC initiated interdiction activity along the Hue-Da Nang railroad in Phu Loc District as sabotage incidents occurred over the entire length of the railroad. Formerly the Lap An Bay area received the bulk of mining activity. As allied operations associated with Operation LAMSON 719 occurred, VC incidents in Thua Thien Province showed a sharp increase. Agent reports received from Phong Dien and Phu Loc Districts during March indicated a correlation between VC/VCI activity and operations in Laos. These reports also indicated that VC units attempted to collect food supplies and draw allied attention to the lowlands by increased operations, thus releasing pressure on NVA units in western Thua Thien Province. After a March high point, VC/VCI incidents in the lowlands showed a marked decrease during early April. This was
probably due to VC attention being focused on the collection of food and supplies to replenish those used or destroyed during LAMSON 719. From late April through early May, rice collections increased throughout Thua Thien Province, as the traditional rice harvest season began. Viet Cong activity remained low throughout June. July was characterized by numerous incidents of terror and assassination. There were five incidents directed against the Hue-Da Nang RR in Phu Loc (D), resulting in four interdictions. There were four assassinations in July, marking a high for the year; such activity was at the year's lowest level in August. The only significant increase was in propaganda incidents which were directly related to the lower-house elections held on August 29th. September showed a marked increase in rice collection incidents and anti-President election propagandizing. Anti-election incidents consisted of entering hamlets and passing out anti-President election leaflets. October demonstrated a decline in VC/VCI activity by dropping from 27 incidents in September to 16 in October. As in 1969 and 1970 activity declined significantly in October; however, unlike the two previous years, activity continued to decline in November with the number of incidents dropping to 12. Although overall activity continued to decline, kidnappings and sabotage incidents showed a slight increase. Of significance is the fact that rice collections continued to decline in contrast to an expected increase. However, agent reports and captured documents have indicated that money was given to local units for the purpose of buying food instead of forcefully taking it from villagers which could account for the decline. Contacts have also decreased and almost all contacts have been friendly-initiated with the enemy choosing to flee. The decline in enemy activity is probably attributable to several factors. First, the VC are believed to be actively avoiding contact. Second, as indicated above, the VC are purchasing supplies to gain the goodwill of the people. Lastly, the enemy is believed to be primarily concerned with improving comm- liaison routes and strengthening the infrastructure. The low level of activity has continued into December as the VC/VCI probably continued the same tactics.

(2) Quang Tri (P). The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) assumed responsibility for Quang Tri (P) as a portion of its TAOI from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in August 1971. Incidents in Quang Tri Province for August were mainly propaganda and terror/kidnapping oriented. Propaganda incidents were of anti-election type, in which hamlets were entered and leaflets passed out. There were a total of 32 people kidnapped in August, who were supposedly to be used as bearers by either VC or NVA. The NVA participated directly in one kidnapping incident of which six civilians were taken. VC/VCI incidents declined in September.
and were confined mainly to rice collections and kidnappings. VC/VCI activity in Quang Tri (P) showed a significant increase from six incidents in September to 12 in October. Kidnappings and sabotage incidents accounted for most of the increase. There were a total of 17 persons kidnapped from Gio Linh (D), a traditional area of heavy VC/VCI activity. Also of significance was the partial destruction of two culverts in Gio Linh (D) and two bridges in Hai Lang (D). Ground activity in Quang Tri (P) for the month of October was more aggressive than in Thua Thien (P) with half of the contacts enemy-initiated. November showed a significant turnabout as incidents decreased to two. In contrast to this decline, contacts slightly increased although all were friendly-initiated. Agent reports in October and November predicted increased rice collection, propagandizing and kidnappings; however, these incidents dropped to zero in November. Activity in Quang Tri (P) remained at a low level into December, with one possible kidnapping and two terror incidents. The lack of reported activity as well as reported hamlet entries is possibly due to the fact that the northern part of Quang Tri (P) is a strong area of VC influence, and many incidents may go unreported as a result. Agent reports indicated the VC/VCI have attempted to strengthen the infrastructure, develop their comms-liaison routes, further propagandize the local populace and avoid contacts in an effort to conserve their badly depleted ranks. The future level of VC/VCI activity will depend largely upon the NVA units of MRTTH and B-5 Front. If large NVA main force elements, i.e. the 324B Division or elements of the 70B Front Divisions enter Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, VC guerrilla units will have the necessary support to carry out more aggressive actions and at the same time carry out the traditional missions of providing guides for NVA units and of providing intelligence to NVA units. There have been very few reports of any change in VC/VCI activity for the remainder of the year. There were four reports indicating mortars or ground attacks upon the Phu Bai area; however, these reports are the exception and are not indicators of a major change. G2 expects the VC/VCI activity to the end of January will continue as it has for the past month; improvement of comms-liaison routes, improvement of the infrastructure, disruption of the lines of communication, and the collection or purchase of supplies.

2. (C) Intelligence Operations.

a. Surveillance

(1) Aerial Reconnaissance

(a) Organic Air assets: From February through March of the reporting
period the 2/17th Cavalry (Airmobile) was responsible for conducting reconnaissance of the division's TAOI and supporting ARVN operation LAMSON 719. Two troops from 2/17th Cavalry provided daily tactical support to ARVN combat elements in Laos, while the third troop conducted armed aerial reconnaissance of the division's reconnaissance zone. In May the TAOI of the division for armed aerial surveillance was expanded to include western Quang Tri (P), which strenuously taxed the division's VR capability. During Operation LAMSON 810, 2/17th Cavalry was credited with initially locating three large field guns. ARVN troops were inserted in this area resulting in the destruction of four 122mm field guns and numerous trucks, a tracked artillery transporter and a significant ammunition cache. In August the division assumed control of the 3/5 Cavalry Squadron with its organic Air Cavalry Troop, which continued aerial reconnaissance operations in western Quang Tri (P), where it had previously operated while subordinate to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). With the advent of the Northeast Monsoon the division's aerial surveillance assets were curtailed considerably by rain, low clouds over the mountain areas, and low operating ceiling in the reconnaissance zone itself. Bad weather broke for a two week period in November enabling 2/17th Cavalry to uncover a significant logistical complex and a troop concentration in the lower Da Krong Valley. On a daily basis, weather permitting, armed aerial reconnaissance missions continued to be flown in the TAOI. Increment 10 stand down reduced the division's air cavalry assets to two troops which were tasked to maintain adequate coverage of the TAOI. Although reconnaissance of the TAOI continued, the areas of primary interest were observed less frequently than was previously possible.

(b) Direct Support Air Assets: Mohawk photo, SLAR and infra-red missions were planned on a daily basis and flown as weather permitted. These missions were generally conducted in the division reconnaissance zone. During the month of November, the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company which supports the division, received the OV-1D Mohawk. Notable improvements in the quality of imagery received, especially with regard to photographic imagery, were realized with the new system. Infra-red proved to be very sensitive to adverse weather conditions and therefore, provided very little intelligence data during the reporting period as the northeast monsoon resulted in dominant adverse weather. Hand held photo missions and aerial reconnaissance missions were conducted in the TAOI by the O-1G aircraft of the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company. In addition a program of continuous overflight of Division ground elements by airborne artillery
observers was accomplished by utilization of Birddog assets. Both the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company and the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company were lost to the division due to Increment 10 stand down.

(c) Chemical Reconnaissance Assets: The Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) was utilized on an as-requested basis by the subordinate units of the division. This asset was also used to support adjacent ARVN units.

(d) Air Force Supporting Assets: Large area coverage of the expanded TAOI was requested from the U.S. Air Force to be flown on a periodic basis. Very few targets were flown because adverse weather conditions in Northern MR-1 precluded accomplishment of the minimum Air Force coverage criteria. Although the Division requested numerous photo reconnaissance missions very few were flown. However, numerous Air Force originated missions were flown and resulting imagery was provided to the Division.

(2) Ground Surveillance

(a) Sensor Employment. In February, the division sensor personnel assets of the 101st Military Intelligence Company were placed under the operational control of the ACofS, G2. This change provided the flexibility needed to provide better planning, coordination and responsiveness to the tactical requirements. There were 101 radio frequency sensor strings in the division area of operations on 1 February 1971, with one radio monitor site. This area was expanded on 3 March to 200 radio frequency sensor strings, eleven monitoring sites and a forward control element at Quang Tri Combat Base in support of LAMSON 719. In addition, the Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS) site at Camp Red Devil and four forward relays operated by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) were placed under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). On 16 March, the electromagnetic intrusion detector (EMID) was introduced into the division and employed at Firebase Vandergrift. On 17 May the third and final BASS was installed at Camp Evans. Three BASS systems were employed at the Tactical Operations Center at Camp Fagle, Camp Evans and Phu Bai Combat Base. Three expendable relays (EXRAY) were received on 30 May and were employed on remote sites which were inaccessible to ground troops. In July the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) assumed responsibility for sensor planning and employment in the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry area of operations and in the DMZ. With this increased area of responsibility the
division became responsible for monitoring 15 additional radio frequency sensor strings. As of September the division's sensor assets included: 194 radio frequency sensor strings, 7 monitoring sites, 3 Multi-Unit Relay Packages (MURPs), 3 Battle Area Surveillance Systems (BASS) and a forward control element located at Quang Tri Combat Base. On 5 July, the Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART) at Quang Tri Combat Base discontinued operations in order to move their facility to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand where the facility became fully operational on 31 July. During the transition, the air readout sensor fields in Division Reconnaissance Zones, the DMZ, and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) were monitored by Task Force Alpha in Thailand. During the September through November period, sensor equipment shortages necessitated a more efficient operation of the dynamic sensor program enjoyed by the division. The division was able to overcome these equipment problems by critical review and examination of coverage required for a comprehensive monsoon posture, thus insuring essential surveillance of the tactical area of interest within the confines of equipment on hand. As a result, the division was able to maintain excellent coverage through December. At this time additional sensor equipment was made available for issue and use in SEA. As of 15 December 1971 the division's sensor assets included: 190 radio frequency sensor strings, 4 monitor sites, 3 Multi-Channel Universal Relay Packages (MURP), 3 Battle Area Surveillance Systems (BASS), and a forward liaison element with the 3rd Infantry Division (ARVN) located at Quang Tri Combat Base. As the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) commenced stand down operations, plans were made to provide for the turnover of sensor responsibility and identified assets to the RVNAF elements in NMRI. On 1 December FBRakkavan came under ARVN control for operations to include the responsibility for adjacent sensor fields. The first increment of 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) sensor equipment was transferred on 21 December at Camp Evans, and as Division units stand down, an overlap period will be allowed for a smooth transition of responsibility from US sensor personnel to ARVN personnel.

(b) Surveillance Radar Employment: The employment of ground surveillance radars was a continuing matter of command emphasis in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Radars were employed on occupied firebases to augment the division sensor surveillance program and to provide another dimension to target acquisition and defense of US installations. During February the Division completed its conversion from the AN/PPS-4 to the newer, extended-range AN/PPS-5 radars. With the employment of 5 AN/PPS-5 maintenance floats, radar down time was reduced from 3.2% in
February to 1.2% in June. During July, 33 additional AN/PPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radars became available to the division. The monsoon surveillance plan included provisions for employment of 31 AN/PPS-5 radars and designated 15 maintenance floats for the 801st Maintenance Battalion. Although stand down operations reduced the surveillance radar assets of the division, a decrease in the number of firebases occupied by US troop units with a commensurate reduction in the size of divisional AO and the implementation of the Division Monsoon Plan gave a comprehensive integration of all surveillance and reconnaissance assets and provided maximum coverage during the northeast monsoon season.

b. Counterintelligence Operations: During the reporting period the CI section pursued many and varied activities in accomplishing its mission of safeguarding the division from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion. In conjunction with inspector general visits, counterintelligence inspection of unit personnel, document, and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security violations and identify vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation. Technical support, in the form of fingerprinting, safe combination changing, recovery of lost combinations, and repair of security containers was provided by division and brigade counterintelligence teams. In order to establish better working relationships with the other intelligence agencies in the division area of operations, counterintelligence agents were placed in the Phuong Hoang Agency in Hue and in Phu Loc and Nam Hoa Districts. Limited, background and counter intelligence inspections were conducted throughout the reporting period. In addition, hundreds of local files checks and clearance validations were processed. The source assets of the Special Operations Branch, which had provided reliable low level intelligence, were transferred to the 525th MI Group at the direction of MACV J-2 with the turnover being completed 18 December 1971.

c. IPW Activities: Although there was a large increase in the number of documents and prisoners of war captured and Hoi Chanhs received during the period 1 February through 30 June 1971, both US and ARVN forces, information concerning prisoners and documents captured by ARVN forces was not available on a timely basis and the information was often erratic. During the period 1 July - 30 September, the number of documents and PW's captured decreased. In July, the division established an IPW liaison team with the Combined Interrogation Center (CIC) in Hue. The value of this team was reflected by a considerable increase in information obtained from prisoners and captured documents and an improvement in the exchange of information between US and ARVN interrogation agencies. Finally, during
the period 1 October through 31 December, there was a further general
decrease in the number of documents and PWs captured as well as Hoi
Chanhs, due to a general decrease in the level of enemy activities. Due
to the reduction of US forces in the field, the majority of prisoners and
documents were captured by ARVN forces. It thus became necessary
to send interrogation teams to ARVN facilities to assist in the interroga-
tion of PWs or to study documents. Travel restrictions and the reticence
of ARVN units to release information while still timely resulted in delays
in the processing and dissemination of information. This delay has been
somewhat alleviated through the use of couriers and electrical means of
communications. The division continues to be dependent on close,
effective IPW liaison with ARVN agencies to insure timely acquisition
of intelligence information from documents, PWs and Hoi Chanhs.

d. CCN/TF1AE Operations.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) maintained close coordina-
tion with CCN/TF1AE during the reporting period. The Division provided
continuous aviation support to CCN/TF1AE operations, although at con-
siderable risk to the aviation assets involved. Target areas were recommend-
ed for CCN/TF1AE operations monthly on a priority basis.

(2) The intelligence derived from these operations proved to be of
limited value. Reports received included detailed terrain reports and
descriptions of contact with enemy forces in target areas. Although re-
ports of contact included an estimate of the size enemy force involved, and
some description of the enemy's appearance, uniforms, and equipment,
these operations only rarely yielded any hard intelligence, such as docu-
ments, PWs and unit identification or intentions.

(3) The concept of CCN/TF1AE has great potential for providing valu-
able intelligence; however, unless these operations produce more hard in-
telligence, the level of risk to CCN/TF1AE personnel and the division's
supporting aviation assets makes these operations of questionable value
as a valid intelligence source.
1. (C) Jefferson Glen/Monsoon Plan 70 (5 Sep 70 - 8 Oct 71):

Operation Jefferson Glen/Monsoon Plan 70, which began on 5 September 1970, continued the support of SVN programs and protection of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. As the northeast monsoon season gradually began to lose force, weather conditions in the division's area of operations improved considerably. With favorable weather conditions, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was able to conduct operations in the canopied jungle areas of NMRI. Toward the end of January 1971, the division initiated Operation Dewey Canyon II, conducting artillery raids into the A Shau Valley. The operation was Phase I of the XXIV Corps/I Corps combined Operation LAMSON 719.

a. LAMSON 719:

(1) The combined Corps operation supported the ARVN drive through western Quang Tri Province and into Laos, striking the NVA base area 604 along the eastern Ho Chi Minh Trail. US forces secured Route 9 to the Laotian border and constructed a forward support base and an airstrip at Khe Sanh. The ARVN forces continued into Laos with massive US air assistance.

(2) The primary mission of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) during LAMSON 719 was to plan and conduct airmobile operations in support of ARVN forces. As the operation progressed, and as more ARVN forces were moved into Laos from western Quang Tri Province, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was required to secure all of Thua Thien Province. When enemy activity increased in the Rockpile and Vandergrift area, the 101st committed the 3rd Brigade to Firebase Carroll with the responsibility for the security of Vandergrift. The 101st now had, in addition to the responsibility for supporting the entire operation in Laos, the responsibility for the defense of the area north of the Hai Van Pass.

(3) LAMSON 719 terminated on 8 April 1971. US inflicted losses on the enemy in South Vietnam during the operation were:
ENEMY LOSSES

Killed in Action 333
Prisoner of War 6
Individual Weapons Captured/Destroyed 158
Crew-served Weapons Captured/Destroyed 26
Bunkers Destroyed 448

b. LAMSON 720:

1) Almost immediately after the successful conclusion of LAMSON 719, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) again joined with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to conduct Operation LAMSON 720.

2) On 14 April 1971, the division initiated FRAGO 41 to the Jefferson Glen/Monsoon Plan 70 operation in support of LAMSON 720. The operation continued until 31 August 1971. The order called for a combined airmobile operation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN)(REINF) conducting operations into the Da Krong/A Shau Valley areas. The operation called for the 1st and 3d Brigades, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to conduct airmobile assaults in the Da Krong River Valley and A Shau Valley, utilizing the airmobile raid and heavy fire support to destroy enemy supplies in the enemy base area 129.

3) Phase II of LAMSON 720 began on 1 May 1971. To counter enemy activity in the Firebase Veghel area, the ARVN Commander committed an RVN Marine Brigade to conduct operations in the Veghel area. Concurrently, the 54th Regiment (ARVN) replaced the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in the upper A Shau Valley. The 1st Brigade returned to the traditional area of operations on the eastern mountain slopes.

4) Phase III of the operation was initiated the last of May to counter increased enemy activity in north and central Quang Tri Province in the vicinity of Firebases Sarge, Shepperd, and Fuller. The ARVN Commander deployed the majority of his forces in this area because of the intensity of the enemy activity. The ARVN main forces remained in this area for the remainder of LAMSON 720. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) supported the ARVN Commander by maintaining the protective shield for the populated lowlands.
Phase IV of LAMSON 720 began in the middle of June and continued to the end of the operation. The 3d Regiment (ARVN) was shifted to the south around Firebase Nuts in an attempt to locate elements of the 5th NVA Regiment. After determining that the NVA regiment had moved out of the area, the 3d Regiment (ARVN) moved back up north to join the majority of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in northern and western Quang Tri Province. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) continued the mission of protecting the lowlands.

Enemy losses inflicted by the division during the operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY LOSSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crew-served Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
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c. LAMSON 810:

(1) On 6 September the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN)(REINF), conducted a major ground and airmobile operation, LAMSON 810. Because of the heavy enemy ground activity along the DMZ and in western Quang Tri Province, primarily in the form of indirect fire attacks on firebases and strong points, and because of the anticipated northeast monsoon season, the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Commander believed it was imperative to initiate an operation which would reduce the enemy's capability to conduct offensive operations.

(2) The objectives of the operation were to thwart a possible enemy offensive aimed at disrupting the October Presidential elections, to relieve pressure by locating and destroying enemy cache sites, and to interdict his new supply routes which had been constructed through the DMZ into western Quang Tri Province.

(3) LAMSON 810 was an intense operation of short duration which proved highly successful. The operation ended on 18 September 1971. During the operation, numerous cache sites were located with the largest containing 20 storage huts, 4,000 liters of gasoline, 20 cases of AK-47 ammunition, 5,000 meters of communications wire, 100,000 rounds of 37mm anti-aircraft ammunition, 10,000 kgs of rice, and 2,000 122mm rockets and 122mm artillery.
artillery rounds. An artillery position was also located which had four 122mm artillery pieces and a large supply of 122mm artillery ammunition.

(4) The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) supported LAMSON 810 by continuing the mission of providing a protective shield for the populated lowlands and by assuming control of Firebase Ann's and Firebase Barbara's areas of operation, thus allowing two battalions of the 3d Regiment (ARVN) to participate in the operation. The division provided air cavalry reconnaissance support and assault, medium and heavy lift helicopter support for the operation. Division artillery was also repositioned to give additional fire support to the ARVN forces.

(5) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during LAMSON 810 were:

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<th>Enemy Losses</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>Killed in Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<td>Individual Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crew-served Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) OPORD 11-71 (8 October 1971 - Continuing):

a. The objectives of OPORD 11-71 are essentially the same as the objectives of Jefferson Glen/Monsoon Plan 70, that is, to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communications and to assist GVN officials to meet their pacification and development goals. The major difference in the two plans is the emphasis in OPORD 11-71 on a rapid turnover of the responsibility for providing the protective shield and the conduct of operations to the ARVN Commander.

b. To accomplish this mission, division units were first positioned in the canopied areas to take advantage of the dry season. Later, as the northeast monsoon season approached, units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions. This repositioning permitted resupply operations by road which were necessary during extended periods of inclement weather.
When the division assumed OPCON of all units in NMRI, a Division Tactical CP and Division Artillery Tactical FDC were established at Camp Roberts. This FSE/FDC provided control and coordination for all artillery in Quang Tri Province.

b. In the early stages of LAMSON 720 few problems were encountered concerning fire support because the only major contacts were made in the area south of Firebase Veghel. Fires were concentrated in this area with no significant difficulty. As the operation turned north to Quang Tri Province and the enemy activity heightened in the Fuller and Sarge areas, it became apparent that ARVN was inexperienced in methods of fire support coordination at the division level (massing artillery fire in support of large scale, multi-regiment operations). To lend experience to ARVN, 101st Division Artillery provided an experienced Fire Support Coordinator to assist and train ARVN personnel. This produced significant results. Upon completion of LAMSON 810, the FSE Forward began to shift the emphasis to more ARVN involvement in preparation for the US withdrawal from Quang Tri Province.

c. For the last several months the division has been experimenting with a new method of target acquisition. The division used two Integrated Observation Devices (IOD) in the area of operation. Initially they were employed on firebases in an effort to utilize their target acquisition capabilities and their capability to accurately adjust fire. Additionally, an attempt was made to emplace the systems within the range capabilities of the TPS-25 radars in order to confirm radar sightings and accurately engage these sightings. These initial emplacements were unsuccessful. Employment of the IOD in a passive target detection role to achieve a 6400 mil coverage presented several problems related to the limitations of the operator to monitor and adjust to such a large field of coverage. Presently the IOD is being actively employed within the AO using an observation post technique. Based on intelligence estimates and a thorough evaluation of the surrounding terrain, a site is selected and a primary area of responsibility is assigned the IOD. This method has been quite successful and 101st Division Artillery is continuing the evaluation to determine the best method of tactical employment.

d. With the buildup of enemy activity in the Erskine-Tiger AO in early November, the Fire Support Element in close coordination with the Division G2 was given the task of planning artillery fires on selected artillery intelligence targets throughout the Division Reconnaissance Zone. Initially,
c. After the division received redeployment instructions in November, the plan was modified and elements of the division began stand down operations. The 3d Brigade at Camp Evans was employing screening and mobile defense tactics to protect Camp Evans and occupied firebases from ground and indirect fire attacks. Units of the brigade were committed to the piedmont area, conducting extensive ambush and reconnaissance patrolling. On 20 November the 3d Brigade received orders to commence stand down in preparation for redeployment. The 3d Battalion (Airmobile), 187th Infantry was the first battalion to stand down, followed by the 2d Battalion, (Airmobile), 506th Infantry. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) began taking over the areas of operation as the US battalions departed. The assumption of responsibility for the Firebase Rakkasan area of operations and the firebase itself was an important step for the ARVN and marked the end of the 3d Brigade operations. The security for 3d Brigade's stand down operations was provided by elements from 1st and 2d Brigades, with ARVN forces assuming responsibility for Camp Evans on 21 December 1971.

d. On 1 December 1971 additional units of the division received redeployment instructions and began adjusting forces to complete stand down. The 1st Battalion, (Airmobile), 327th Infantry, conducted stand down from 27 December 1971 through 16 January 1972. The 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 327th Infantry, initiated stand down on 28 December 1971 and completed on 17 January 1972. The 1st Brigade conducted stand down from 28 December 1971 to 17 January 1972. Other divisional units involved in either redeployment or drawdown included the remaining division forces, less 2d Brigade. Camp Eagle was turned over to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) on 17 January 1972 and the division (-) moved to Phu Bai Combat Base, joining the 2d Brigade at that location.

e. OPORD 11-71 results from 8 October through the end of 1971 were:

**ENEMY LOSSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew-served Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) Fire Support:

a. During LAMSON 719, division forward and tactical CPs were established to include a fire support element at each location to provide necessary
selected targets were engaged in the Erskine-Tiger areas, and by mid-November, targets throughout the reconnaissance zone were attacked on a 24-hour basis.

e. In coordination with the XXIV Corps Artillery Fire Support Element, the 101st Division Artillery FSE assisted in the adjustment of artillery fire on several Air Force sensor strings by a sound-ranging technique, the operation and equipment of which were located in Thailand. In addition, artillery was expended on other Air Force sensor strings of "special interest" in an effort to interdict the Route 103 network in NMRI.

4. (C) Aviation:

a. In response to requests from the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to deploy combat forces throughout a substantially enlarged area of operations, aviation support to ARVN was increased proportionately. Over 39,858 flight hours, representing 35% of the division's flight time for the period 1 March - 30 June 71, were flown in support of tactical operations conducted by GVN forces. For the period 1 July - 30 September 71, over 16,280 hours representing 19% of the division's flight time were flown in support of GVN forces. The majority of this support was purely tactical in nature and consisted of combat assaults, critical resupply of combat units in field locations, and resupply of medium and high threat firebases. The expertise provided by our liaison officers provided accurate information to forecast and subsequently support ARVN air requests.

b. A concept was developed for a tactical situation called "High Threat Firebases". The intense ground to air fire experienced by aircraft conducting resupply of firebases such as Fuller, Sarge, and Kim Quy revealed the necessity for protection of CH-47 aircraft in excess of that normally provided. Planning for these missions follows the same sequence prescribed for combat assaults. Artillery fires are planned along all approach routes of known or suspected enemy locations. AH-1G aircraft escort the CH-47s to provide suppressive fires or engage targets presenting a threat to the progress of the aircraft. Gunships escort the heavy lift over designated routes into and out of the high threat firebase. The approach and exit routes were changed frequently and the interval between sorties varied. By employing these procedures, aircraft successfully resupplied firebases in close proximity to enemy forces while sustaining minimum damage from ground fire.

c. In September the division received a reduced Flying Hour Program from USARV. The Assistant Division Aviation Officer applied intensive
management in scheduling the division's air assets in a successful effort to reduce flying time and to obtain maximum utilisation of aircraft consistent with the accomplishment of the division mission.

d. When the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) began Keystone activities aircraft management became increasingly important. The stand down of aviation assets in conjunction with tactical ground forces placed a greater burden on fewer aircraft. The increasing commitment on fewer aircraft required a mission by mission analysis of all requests for aviation assets. While 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) requirements have decreased as Keystone progresses, non-divisional aircraft requirements have remained at a high level. Requirements for non-divisional aircraft support from the 101st Aviation Group took approximately 50% of the assets available within the Group. Task Force IAE requirements commit 20% of the total available assets.

5. (U) Engineer:

a. The division engineers continued to provide outstanding support to both tactical missions and projects in support of ARVN and GVN. The engineers completed extensive road construction throughout Thua Thien Province both in the construction of pioneer roads and the upgrading of existing roads. Because of the extensive precipitation, an attempt is being made to raise vital road networks above the high waterlines. This work is continuing. Roadside in the canopy area are being cleared to provide better fields of observation and fire. Landing zones have been cleared along many roads in the canopy to increase reaction capabilities through use of airmobile assets. The enemy capitalises on roads in the canopy to move supplies to their forward base camps. In the future roads should be strategically interdicted by the engineers when friendly forces withdraw from the canopy area. During LAMSON 719 the engineers opened 16 KM of QL-9, constructed a 56-acre helicopter POL refuel/storage facility and cleared 13 acres of uncharted mine fields. Routine fire base improvement was continued and three new fire bases established.

b. Because of the shortage of construction material in Vietnam, engineers backhaul all reusable material and bunkers from unoccupied fire bases. The engineers developed a prefabricated bunker which enhanced their ability to rapidly deploy these bunkers by CH47 on new or re-opened fire bases and to extract them when the fire base was closed.

c. Following the high winds and rising waters of Typhoon Hester in
late October, the 326th Engineer Battalion reacted efficiently. While cleanup crews were busy on the fire bases and base camps, rescue crews assisted MACV Advisory Teams in Huong Tuy, Phong Dien, Huong Tra, and Phu Vang Districts. At Camp Eagle storm repair included work on aircraft hangars of the aviation elements. Also, work on repairing storm damage at Phu Bai Combat Base was conducted. Boat crews distributed 3,000 pounds of rice in Huong Tuy, delivered 2,000 pounds of food and evacuated 50 civilians in Phong Dien, and delivered 4,000 pounds of food to stranded civilians in Phu Vang District.

d. From November 1971 to January 1972, increased emphasis was placed on the support of Camps Evans and Eagle and Phu Bai Combat Base as division units became involved in stand down operations. Work at Evans and Eagle, prior to closing, consisted of road maintenance and assistance in cleanup of the camps. Facilities for the division (-) were constructed or improved at Phu Bai Combat Base.

6. (C) Chemical:

a. Extensive use was made of tactical flame drops throughout the area of operations. The employment of aerial flame drops on known or suspected booby-trapped areas significantly decreased friendly casualties resulting from accidental detonation. An attempt was made to alter enemy operations and to restrict his avenues of infiltration and deny his base areas by discriminate use of persistent CS2. In addition, a vigorous program in the use of the Airborne Personnel Detector XM3 (Sniffer) and the employment of retro-reflective slurry personnel marking and identification system was pursued during the year.

b. Flame field expedients continued to be extensively integrated into the perimeter defenses of fire bases and base camps. Fougasses, both directional and non-directional, were emplaced with particular emphasis on likely avenues of approach. Hushch flares were employed around the perimeters to provide supplemental illumination for periods of up to 8 hours. Throughout the year, the Division Chemical Section continued to provide technical assistance to the brigades and to installation coordinators on the emplacement and maintenance of flame field expedients. This technical assistance included courtesy inspections of the perimeters as well as advice to the commanders on employment and emplacement of chemical munitions to enhance overall defenses.
7. (U) Training:

a. The division provided in-country training for replacement personnel at the Screaming Eagles Replacement Training School (SERTS) until late in December. The school was moved to Phu Bai Combat Base when Camp Evans was transferred to ARVN control. The school continued at its new location until the replacement flow allowed the 101st Administration Company Replacement Detachment to assume the training mission for replacements. In January 1972, the Administrative Company was drawn down, eliminating the instructor spaces. At this time, responsibility for the replacement training shifted to the 2d Brigade.

b. Due to operational requirements, the battalion refresher training program was replaced with a company refresher training program. The training objective remained to periodically retrain personnel in the areas of small unit tactics, individual tactics, weapons, mines and booby traps, and personal rights, benefits, and obligations. Units continued to conduct company refresher training until notification of stand down. All mandatory training, except UCMJ Training, was eliminated allowing subordinate unit commanders maximum leeway in determining requirements for training. Training guidance and assistance are provided as needed. Division Mobile Training Teams (MTT) were available to provide training in subjects which are beyond the instructional capabilities of subordinate units. As combat support and combat service support units were drawn down or redeployed, the number of available MTT's was reduced. Training assistance was continued however, from remaining division assets.

c. As the direct combat role of the division diminished under the Vietnamization Program, a need arose for increased surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Accordingly, an OJT program was established to familiarize qualified OH6A (LOH) pilots with low-level reconnaissance procedures and techniques.

d. To improve the division's ground reconnaissance capabilities, a training program was developed to reorient the mission of D Troop, 2d Squadron (Air mobile), 17th Cavalry from that of airborne ready reaction to ground reconnaissance, security and economy of force actions.

e. In preparation for the monsoon weather, the division initiated an Instrument Instructor Pilot Program. The objective of the program is to provide a minimum of two instrument IP's for each aviation company/troop and brigade aviation section. The IP's provide the nucleus for a training program within the unit/section.
f. The division continues to provide training assistance to RVNAF. This assistance is normally in the area of airmobile operations and special technical skills. Highlights of the assistance were the courses conducted in pathfinder, rigging, rearm and refuel operations for 168 troops of 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and the course in pathfinder and aero-rifle platoon operations for 30 selected troops of the 3d Infantry Division (ARVN).

g. To lighten the reporting burden of subordinate units, the division reduced recurring training reports to two, one required weekly and one monthly.
1. (U) Logistical Operations:

   a. During the period 1 Feb 71 - 31 Mar 71 the division was engaged in Operation LAMSON 719. The capabilities to support an extended air-mobile operation were demonstrated during this operation. Initially, each US Army brigade taking part in the operation (1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); 11th Bde, 23d Inf Div; and 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), operated independently under control of XXIV Corps. Logistical support was provided by organic combat service support elements with backup support provided by Da Nang Support Command. Since this concept was basically that used in airmobile operations when each brigade is supported by its organic Forward Service Support Element (FSSE), it was decided to continue support without change when the brigades were placed OPCON to the division. Backup support was provided by Da Nang Support Command through a Base Support Area at Quang Tri and two Forward Support Areas located at Firebase Vandergrift and Khe Sanh. Support provided was Class I, III, and V and limited Class II and IV. Logistical requirements beyond the organic capability of each brigade were coordinated by G4/DISCOM elements located at Quang Tri.

   (1) The Division Support Command established rearm/refuel points at Dong Ha, Vandergrift, Khe Sanh and Lang Con. This provided immediate forward support to the division's aviation assets. The following amounts of Class III and Class V were consumed:

   (a) Class IIIa (gallons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFUEL POINT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khe Sanh</td>
<td>1,453,300</td>
<td>927,900</td>
<td>2,381,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandergrift</td>
<td>1,060,000</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>1,538,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lang Con</td>
<td>181,200</td>
<td>224,500</td>
<td>405,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Ha</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td>213,000</td>
<td>668,000</td>
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</table>
(b) Class Va (February):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>KHE</th>
<th>VAN</th>
<th>LANG</th>
<th>DONG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SANH</td>
<td>DER-</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>HA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H490-101b HE RKT</td>
<td>5,803</td>
<td>4,608</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>13,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H534-171b HE RKT</td>
<td>1,817</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H459-FLESCH RKT</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A653-20mm</td>
<td>17,100</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>B470/472-40mm</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A165-7.62mm</td>
<td>241,000</td>
<td>99,750</td>
<td>51,100</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>529,850</td>
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</table>

Class Va (March):

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SANH</td>
<td>DER-</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>HA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H490-101b HE RKT</td>
<td>9,298</td>
<td>11,336</td>
<td>4,130</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>25,604</td>
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<tr>
<td>H534-171b HE RKT</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>7,212</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10,457</td>
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<tr>
<td>H459-FLESCH RKT</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2,186</td>
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<tr>
<td>A653-20mm</td>
<td>22,203</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) During this period the division maintained a high operational rate in all areas, despite the additional difficulties imposed by LAMSON 719. The operational rates for the period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>96.80%</td>
<td>97.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>99.88%</td>
<td>99.94%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>97.10%</td>
<td>98.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>86.00%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following Operation LAMSON 719, the division moved back to its normal TA0I. Combat service support continued with each brigade receiving support from its organic Forward Service Support Element (FSSE).

b. On 7 July the division received approval to establish Quang Tri Forward Operating Base (QTFOB). The G4 Section formulated and finalized a logistical support plan for QTFOB. Coordination was effected with units of Da Nang Support Command to provide the required logistical support which was beyond the capability of the division. Class IV requirements for the establishment of QTFOB were submitted to XXIV Corps and Da Nang Support Command. The G4 Supply Section coordinated the location, acquisition, and transportation of available materials to Quang Tri. The section worked closely with ADE and the QTFOB installation Coordinator on real estate actions and logistical problems encountered during the establishment of the base.

c. During the period 6 Sep to 20 Jul, elements of the division were engaged in Operation LAMSON 810. The concept of support was the same as for LAMSON 719. Each brigade was supported by its organic Forward Service Support Element (FSSE). Backup support was provided by Da Nang Support Command through a Forward Support Area at Quang Tri. DISCOM Forward was located at Mai Loc. Support provided was Class I, III and V; and limited Class II and IV. Logistical requirements beyond the organic capability for the division were coordinated by G4/DISCOM elements.

(1) During LAMSON 810, the Division Support Command established rearm/refuel points at Mai Loc and Quang Tri. These points provided immediate forward support to the division's aviation assets. The following amounts of Class III and Va were used:

(a) Class III (gallons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MOGAS</th>
<th>DIESEL</th>
<th>JP4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>94,000</td>
<td>225,800</td>
<td>709,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai Loc</td>
<td>296,260</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

(b) Class Va:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H490-101b HE RKT</td>
<td>4,273</td>
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</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROUNDS (cont)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H534-171b HE RKT</td>
<td>3,425</td>
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<tr>
<td>H459-FLESCH RKT</td>
<td>1,260</td>
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<td>A653-20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td>A470/472-40mm</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A165-7.62 mm</td>
<td>192,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. On 8 November 1971 US and ARVN representatives met at Quang Tri airfield to transfer the rearm/refuel point to ARVN. One pump set, consisting of five blivets, two pump units and one filter separator were turned in by 321st Avn Co through XXIV Corps. The remaining equipment, belonging to the 426th S&S BN, was laterally transferred through XXIV Corps with USARV approval to IALC.

e. During the period 1 Feb 71 to 10 Jan 72 firebase inspections were made to insure that good supply techniques were being conducted. In November 1971 a combined team was organized with members drawn from all division staff sections. The purpose of the combined team was to conduct one comprehensive inspection of all areas. The inspection for logistical support included:

1. Class I
   (a) Storage and control of combat rations.
   (b) Mess inspection by the Division Food Service Advisor or his representative.
   (c) Resupply procedures for troops operating in the field.

2. Class III
   (a) Storage and control
   (b) Safety in handling
   (c) Backhaul of empty blivets

3. Class V
CONFIDENTIAL

(4) 17 Each additional M60 Machine Guns

(5) 6 Each AN/VRC 46 Radios

(6) 1 Each AN/VRC 49 Radios

(7) 1 Each Biological Refrigerator

(8) 1 Each SB-86 Switch Board

During the period 1 October 71 thru 31 December 71 there was substantial increase of turn insfor items on USARV loan. At the beginning of the period the G4 dispatched a supply NCO to review all unit loans and as a result, a larger amount of property was found to have been turned in, but the documentation had not been sent to USARV. Units made true copies from file copies which were processed through G4 and forwarded to USARV. This helped the units which had already keystoned and will prove essential to keystone units in the future. The G4 Supply Section continuously monitors this program.

b. In February 1971, the ACofS, G4 re-emphasized the "stand short" program to rid units of TOE/MTOE equipment not needed. The ACofS, G4, during support assistance visits, material assistance visits, and messages, encouraged units to review their MTOEs and equipment densities to determine if equipment was being maintained for which no foreseeable requirements existed. Equipment in this category was reported to the G4 for staffing and was sent to USARV requesting approval to "stand short." "Stand short" has increased the retrograde program and enabled the return of supplies and equipment to the Army's inventory for re-issue. This program has enabled the units to reduce stockage and alleviate storage and security problems. By 30 September 1971 over ninety per cent of divisional units had participated in the program. Result of turning in and not requisitioning unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment has highlighted the requirement for a review and evaluation of equipment necessary to conduct operations under the airmobile concept. ACofS, G4 has further contributed to this program by recommending basis of issue of equipment and supplies for the division.

c. From February to November 1971, the division retrograded the following dollar amounts of excess/unneeded supplies and equipment:

54
(a) Storage and safety inspection by the Division Ammunition Officer of ASPs located on firebases.

(b) Storage of Class V on bunker line

(c) Brass retrograde program

(4) Class IV (Proper utilization of barrier material)

(5) Log Pad Operation

(a) Police

(b) Rigging procedures

(c) Serviceability of equipment

(6) Maintenance (Vehicles, Generators and Weapons)

2. (U) Supply and Services:

   a. In February the ACoFS, G4 launched a program to purify temporary and VARP loan accounts within the division. Many needed to be extended. USARV Reg 700-20 required that extensions for loans must be accompanied by a request for MTOE/MTDA change. The ACoFS, G4 and G3 held a meeting with all the S4's and S3's in the division conference room. At this meeting all units were informed of the requirements for obtaining loan extensions and submission of changes to MTOE/MTDA's. During the months of February through May all loans were reviewed and purified with the units. Equipment which was found on loan for which tabular authority existed was dropped as a loan and picked up on units' property book. Unit files were updated to agree with G4 files and USARV files. Excess/unneeded equipment was turned in and accountability for all items was emphasized. In late June and early July the campaign of streamlining units' MTOE's continued with many units retaining equipment previously on loan from depot. The G4, in cooperation with G3, conferred with USARV and requested the modification of nine infantry battalions' MTOE. Items continually required by these units and that were not on TOE's were:

   (1) 1 Each 3 KW Generator for backup power

   (2) 2 Each 2 1/2 ton Cargo Trucks

   (3) 2 Each 10 KW Generator
Automotive $ 9,409,784.00
General Supply $ 4,564,488.00
Aviation $50,373,396.00
Total $64,347,668.00

3. (U) Materiel Assistance and Instruction Team:

a. From February to November 1971 the MAIT conducted 104 visits to divisional and attached units. Units which failed to meet the division standards were revisited for further assistance. During the visits the team placed emphasis on teaching, training and working with units to achieve high maintenance standards. Under the assistance team concept, a truer picture is presented of the units' materiel readiness posture. Problem areas are identified for the commander and appropriate assistance provided to improve his maintenance program. As a result a steady increase in maintenance standards has been achieved in the division.

4. (U) Keystone Operations:

a. The Logistical Operation Center (LOC) was organized and functional on a part time basis during April 1971. The purpose of the LOC was to initiate logistical planning to support Keystone (Redeployment) Operations. The LOC activities were directed by the G4 and staffed with the G4 Plans Officer, the Assistant G4, Supply Officer and members from DISCOM. A Keystone Operations meeting was held on 11 April 1971 by the G4 with representatives attending from other staff sections having keystone responsibilities.

(1) On or about 15 April 1971, the division staff was briefed by members of the 1st Air Cavalry (Amb) Keystone Control Center on Keystone Operations of that unit. Information obtained from the briefing was valuable since both divisions are similarly organized.

(2) The LOC was staffed on a full time basis on 16 April 1971, with one major and one captain from the G4 Section. Logistical planning for Keystone Operations was accelerated so stand down operations could begin in the near future. The LOC began preparing the Logistical Annex to the division Keystone Operations Orders and Letters of Instructions. These instructions were formulated into a packet entitled Logistical Guidance for Keystone Units. These instructions were used by the Keystone units of the division.
(3) On 22 April 1971 the division received notification that the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry would be standing down as part of Increment VII of Keystone Oriole (Alpha). A request was sent to USARV to have the Redeployment Assistance Team brief division personnel concerned with Keystone activities. The briefing provided the details that enabled the division staff, and members of the stand down unit to close the gaps in planning and preparation. A request was sent to USARV that the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry stand down during the period 1 - 14 May 1971 was approved. The LOC made liaison with Da Nang Support Command to establish processing procedures and dates for turn in of equipment. Daily coordination meetings were held by the G4 with representatives from DISCOM, G3, G1 and the Engineers. During these sessions, support commitments were determined and teams were organized to support the operations. A tentative stand down schedule had been made and was followed. The Technical Inspection (TI) team, Special Criteria for Retrograde of Army Material (SCRAM) team, and contact teams were scheduled to assist the battalion in first day of stand down. The processing was executed in an efficient manner and turn in at Da Nang was completed on schedule.

(4) Upon completion of the redeployment of the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry, the LOC formed the Keystone Logistical Assistance Visit (KLAV) team to conduct briefings at the unit level. The mission of the team was to inform units of actions that should be taken immediately to prepare for Keystone Operations and to relate lessons learned from redeployment of the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry.

(5) The LOC began immediate planning for inactivation of the 47th and 58th Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog) scheduled for stand down from 1 - 9 July 1971. On 25 June 1971 the equipment inventory reports from the 47th and 58th Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog) were forwarded to USARV, ICCV and Da Nang Support Command. The 801st Maintenance SCRAM team and G4 Maintenance Assistance Team TI'd and SCRAM'd all equipment and assisted in documentation on 28 and 29 June 71. All equipment was convoyed to Da Nang for turn in on 2 July 1971. By the afternoon of 3 July 1971 all equipment had been turned in. Property books were audited by G4 on 8 July 1971 and forwarded to USARV.

b. Orders were published on 12 August 1971 establishing the Redeployment Control Center (RCC) as a special staff section. The mission of the RCC was to plan and monitor any future stand down or redeployment of 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) units.
c. On 12 September 1971, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, received official notification to begin stand down. Also included in the stand down was A Troop from the 12th Cavalry Squadron. A "hot line" was established between DISCOM and the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry for direct communication. Additionally, a RTT was emplaced for added communication between 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, DISCOM and DISCOM Liaison Team located in Da Nang. The plan was to use land/sea movement to transport equipment to the Da Nang Keystone Facilities. Arrangements were made through DISCOM Movement Control Center to convoy equipment from Quang Tri to Tan My Ramp, then the equipment would proceed to Da Nang by LST. A liaison visit by the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, to Tan My Ramp was conducted to obtain accommodations to quarter equipment escort detachments. Combat rations and potable water were to be furnished by the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, for the escorts until they arrived at Da Nang. Trucks were dispatched to Quang Tri to haul inoperable track vehicles to Tan My Ramp. A staging area was set up at Quang Tri for station property and a mobile contact team was to be at Quang Tri from the period 11-13 October to inspect PC&S property. On 14 October PC&S property of SCRAM 2, 3 and 4 was moved to the PDO for turn in credit, except items transferred to ARVN. Serviceable Class V was turned into the ASP Camp Evans. Unserviceable Class V was disposed of by an EOD contact team. A major problem was that a barge hauling inoperable equipment was beached on a sand reef. Attempts to refloat the barge were unsuccessful. Da Nang dispatched a LST to offload equipment from the barge except for a M88 which was inspected by a team from Da Nang. Turn in credit was given for this M88. The 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry began stand down on 12 September 1971 and finished processing on 12 November 1971. The remaining D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry remained with the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

d. Prior to notification of stand down/redeployment extensive plans were formulated to cover all contingencies if the division was alerted for stand down/redeployment. Close coordination between staffs played an important role in the formulation of detailed plans. G4 and G3 staffs worked closely to insure the tactical and logistical areas during the phase downs were properly oriented.

   (1) Briefings were conducted with nondivisional support elements. These briefings enabled the support elements to be oriented on the division proposed phase-out of units. The support elements could formulate their plans to give continuous support throughout each phase. This coordination proved vital to the smooth operation of stand down/redeployment of divisional units.
(2) Official notification was received on 26 November 1971 concerning the 3rd Brigade of the division. Units of the 3rd Brigade would stand down within RVN and a color guard detachment would return to CONUS. All equipment would be turned in at the Keystone Facilities located at Da Nang. 3rd Brigade units were given stand down dates from 20 November 1971 to 19 December 1971. Each unit had a specific time frame within this period, which included specific dates the units were to process equipment through the MIPP and SIPP points at Da Nang.

(3) Other units of the 101st, not organic to the 3rd Brigade, were also notified of stand down within this increment. Units included aviation, artillery and support elements. Certain aviation units were designated to redeploy with specific equipment to include ground support equipment, prescribed load lists, ground related equipment and aircraft.

(4) Units standing down within Vietnam had to submit the following reports:

(a) 100% Inventories

(b) Final Disposition Reports

(c) Clearance of Temporary/VARP Loans

(d) Division Property Book Clearance

(e) USARV Property Book Clearance

(5) Units redeploying with equipment to CONUS had to submit the following reports:

(a) 100% Inventories

(b) Final distribution reports

(c) Clearance of Temporary/VARP Loans

(d) Division Property Book Clearance

(e) Initial Backfill

(f) Final Backfill
(g) Lateral Transfers to establish 101st Division (-)

(h) Equipment shipment report

(i) Special 711-5 report

(j) Special Planning Report

(6) On 27 November 71 supply personnel of designated units were assembled and given final instructions for 100% Keystone inventories. This report was required in 17 copies. Information required was; Line Item Number, Reportable Item Control Code, Commodity Managers Code, Nomenclature, Federal Stock Number, Quantity on Hand, and X Quantity Operational/Non-Operational.

(7) On 2 December 71 supply personnel of units designated for redeployment were assembled and instructed on Equipment Backfill procedures for units deploying with equipment. This requires a series of three reports with various suspense dates as follows:

(a) Initial shortage list of equipment to be deployed was suspended for 10 December 1971 and required submission of requests and listing of equipment shortages less items listed on "Retain in USARV List."

(b) SCRAM Shortage Listing was required as soon as units had received their SCRAM Inspection. This required submission of requests and listing of additional shortages created by unserviceable SCRAM ratings for equipment.

(c) Completion of processing equipment listing is to be submitted to G4 and then hand carried to USARV within 5 days after the unit has completed shipment of equipment to CONUS. This listing is required in five copies and will contain data as follows: Line Items Number, Nomenclature, Stock Number, Quantity Shipped, Quantity Shipped SCRAM 1, Quantity Shipped SCRAM 2. Each line listed in this report will also be accompanied by a legible copy of USARV Form 562 and 563 for those items on which the forms have been prepared.

(8) The G4 Supply Section initiated a preaudit program of property books to insure that property books going to USARV for final audit were in order. The audit of property books of units returning to CONUS with equipment, was initiated to preclude the units from any difficulty on arrival in CONUS. The pres audits proved successful in that minimum time was involved for USARV to conduct the final audit.
(9) Prior to elements of the division receiving stand down/redeployment orders, the division laterally transferred aircraft among units expecting to stand down and units remaining in the Division (-) in order to maintain the best fleet available in the residual force. After orders were published, the division was directed to surrender 60 low airframe time, UH-1H aircraft by specific serial number for USARV Project 981, transfer of UH-1H aircraft to VNAF. After coordination with USARV Aviation Officers the division again conducted an intra-division lateral transfer to retain a fleet of 190 low airframe time aircraft. All other aircraft will be transferred in-country or deployed with the owning unit to CONUS.
CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Community Relations Program.

a. Discussion: A division wide community relations program was developed by ACoS, G5. The initial step in program development was publishing an appropriate regulation. Division Regulation 360-2 was published and implementation was immediate.

(1) As a result of 101st Abn Div (Ambl) Regulation 360-2, each 101st Airborne Division Installation (Camp Evans, Camp Eagle and Phu Bai Combat Base) has formed a community relations committee. Each battalion and separate company quartered at the installation provides a representative to the committee. Their representative also sits as a member to special subcommittees to research specific problem areas. Regular monthly meetings are centered around the solution of problems between Vietnamese and Americans.

(2) In accordance with XXIV Corps letter, dated 21 July 1971, a Subzone Community Relations Council was formed in addition to the Community Relations Councils already established at installation level. The Community Relations Council is to be combined with the Leadership and Human Relations Council at subzone level only.

b. Activities: During the reporting period, Community Relations coordinated and conducted joint US/Vietnamese sports events in order to enhance this relationship through a friendly atmosphere created at such informal gatherings. In addition, reacting to a number of serious traffic incidents, the committee established measures designed to preclude further incidents throughout Hue and Thua Thien Province. The latest efforts of the Community Relations Committee have been to emphasize the availability of existing tours through Hue for US military personnel in addition to inviting the Vietnamese POLWAR Cultural Drama Team to perform for selected US units.

c. Analysis: Community Relations designed its operations to eliminate irritants, such as traffic accidents, and considered ways and means of minimizing the impact of US personnel on the local community.

a. Discussion: The ACoS, G5, in cooperation with all units in the division, collected assorted items for delivery to ARVN soldiers wounded in the LAMSON 719 operation. Each 101st Airborne Division unit contributed unused C-ration and sundry pack items, including: tooth brushes, tooth paste, soap, writing paper, pens, condiments, chewing gum, etc. These items were then delivered to the wounded troops. Approximately 650 pounds of sundry items were delivered.

b. Analysis: A direct result of this contribution has been an improved working relationship with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).


a. Discussion: MG Tarrley, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), at the request of Madame Phu, wife of Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), approved a one time contribution for a scholarship fund for orphans of LAMSON 719. The Chaplain's Fund Council designated the offering collected on the first Sunday in June to be donated to the Scholarship Fund. The total offering for 6 June 1971 amounted to $786.45. The entire sum was converted into 216,274$VN and donated to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Treasury. At the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Headquarters, on 5 July 1971, MG Tarpley presented for a one month period, scholarship checks drawn on the ARVN Treasury to six selected orphan children.

b. Analysis: A contribution for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to orphan children aids not only the individual orphans, but also the entire Vietnamese people by assisting in raising the educational level in Vietnam.

4. Support of 1st Infantry Division (ARVN)’s Orphanage Program.

a. Discussion: On 28 July 1971, MG Tarpley, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), as a guest of General Phu, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), attended a party for students of deceased servicemen from the Saigon National Funded School and Hue National Funded School. The day following the party, four CH-47 helicopters from the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) carried the children on a sightseeing tour from Tan My Airstrip up the Quang Tri Coast over Dong Ha and back down QL1 to the Province Headquarters pad in Hue.

5. Disaster Coordination Center.
a. Discussion:

(1) The Disaster Coordination Center (DCC) was activated twice during the reporting period, on order from XXIV Corps. The DCC was first activated on 5 - 7 July 1971 for the period of Typhoon Harriet, and then reactivated on 25 - 31 October 1971 in order to utilize the division resources in evacuating stranded Vietnamese personnel, and to transport food for dislocated personnel during Typhoon Hester. Relief operations during these two periods resulted in 1,053 sorties moving 70.8 tons of relief supplies to relocation centers throughout Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. Additional support was rendered by the 326th Engineer Battalion in relocating approximately 3,150 Vietnamese refugees from flooded areas, and by the 27th Engineer Battalion in supplying a 20 ton crane utilized to clear debris from the An Lo Bridge area on QL1.


On 2 Oct 71, the Mid-Autumn Festival (Children's Festival) was celebrated. The personnel of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) contributed 701,290$VN and approximately 100 pounds of candy to the children of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). In addition, toys and candy valued at approximately 100,000$VN were donated to the children of RF/PF soldiers in Thua Thien Province. This program was well received by the Vietnamese and has greatly enhanced the joint military relationship of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and RF/PF soldiers of Thua Thien (P).

7. Thua Thien Project Priority List.

a. Discussion: The present Thua Thien Province Priority List evolved from a meeting at CORDS in March 1971. Representatives from ACofS, G5, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the 101st Airborne Division combat brigades, DISCOM, 101st Airborne Division Artillery, 101st Aviation Group, and the 29th CA Company met with MACV CORDS officials in Hue to determine the numbers and types of civic action projects the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) could accomplish. A list of 37 projects was submitted to the Province Chief and the Province Senior Advisor for approval. In April 1971, COL Than, Province Chief, and Mr. Wensel, Province Senior Advisor, published an approved list of projects consisting of 24 projects in Thua Thien Province.
b. Analysis: On 16 Dec 71, final coordination was initiated with the Social Welfare Advisor, Thua Thien Province, for the delivery of 60 desks and benches for a school in Vinh Loc District, Thua Thien Province. The completion of this project concludes the 24 listed projects of the Thua Thien Project Priority List. To date, there are no further plans to expand this project in Thua Thien Province.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) GENERAL:

   a. Psychological operations, conducted in support of combat operations against NVA and VC elements throughout Thua Thien Province, continued to place increased emphasis on disrupting the morale and combat effectiveness of the enemy through the use of demoralization and Chieu Hoi campaigns. These campaigns, in conjunction with others designed to solicit information from the local populace concerning the location of both enemy ordnance and U.S. personnel listed as MIA/POW, produced a well balanced program for the reporting period.

   b. Psychological operations were employed in conjunction with civil affairs to exploit the pacification in the populated lowlands utilizing ground loudspeaker and MEDCAP teams combined with aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops.

   c. Psychological operations were designed to maintain a high visibility toward the eventual assimilation of all PSYOP campaigns by elements of the South Vietnamese Army. With the recent recommendation to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to include the MIA/POW campaign in their PSYOP program, the degree of parallelism between the two allied efforts is complete.

2. (U) SIGNIFICANT RALLIER ACTIVITIES: The Chieu Hoi program, designed and conducted as a joint US/Vietnamese program, resulted in seven Hoi Chanh's (ralliers) turning themselves into allied units during the reporting period. The tactical and psychological exploitation of these ralliers resulted in 23 enemy killed with approximately 1,160,000 quick reaction leaflets disseminated.

3. (U) COMBINED PSYOP ACTIVITIES:

   a. Cypress Garden Campaign: Operation "Cypress Garden", targeting the C3 Co, Phu Loc Special Unit, located in the Vinh Phong mountain region, began on 25 Jan 71. The concept of the operation was to employ tactical firepower in support of psychological operations. The campaign was terminated on 25 Feb 71. A total of 513,600 leaflets were disseminated on the Vinh Phong mountain region which included 46:30 hours of aerial and waterborne broad- casts. Numerous aerial PSYOP and tactical firepower missions were scheduled, but were cancelled as a result of inclement weather and a higher aircraft priority for LAMSON 719.
b. On 25 July 1971, a meeting was held with MAJ Dumont, Sector S5, concerning the possibility of a joint PSYOP/Drug Campaign. MAJ Dumont stated that the Vietnamese PSYOP agencies have had a program of this nature in effect and that the assistance offered by division PSYOP would have the adverse effect of reducing the satisfactory initiative already shown by the Vietnamese. The discussion closed with division PSYOP offering assistance to Vietnamese PSYOP agencies upon request.

c. During the middle of November, the ACofS, G5, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) coordinated and conducted a three day riverine operation along the Song Huong (Perfume River) utilizing the assets of the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn and River Assault Group (RAG) 32. This operation was designed to contact and build rapport with the civilian population in remote villages within Nam Hoa district. The joint MEDCAP/PSYOP Program resulted in 12 broadcast hours, 24 hours of "face-to-face" contact with the Vietnamese, and the treatment of approximately 800 patients.

d. Psychological operations were used to support the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Drug Suppression Campaign during the month of October. Division PSYOP delivered approximately 20,000 posters and 50,000 handbills to the Installation Coordinator's offices on Camp Eagle, Camp Evans, and Phu Bai Combat Base. These handbills and posters targeted the indigenous labor force at these installations.

e. On 29 November 71, 4th Detachment, 7th PSYOP Bn received orders to return to Da Nang to begin stand down. The ground loudspeaker support rendered by the 4th Detachment continuously produced excellent results, especially in the Voluntary Informant program. The following list of ordnance, received by the 4th Detachment during the final 5 months of operation, illustrates the level of professionalism they were able to achieve in offering direct PSYOP support to the ACofS, G5, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile):

(1) Ordinance received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 x 155mm rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 x 105mm rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 90mm rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 x 82mm rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 x 81mm rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 x 60mm rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 x 75mm Chi-COM HE rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 x B40 rocket rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 x B41 rocket rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 x M79 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 x Anti Personnel Mines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 x Grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 x Blocks TNT/C3 (delay fuses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 x 82mm fuses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 x 60mm fuses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Artillery VT fuse (US)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 x AK47 magazines w/ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x TM46 anti-tank mine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x French hand mortar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 x M72 LAW rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. **SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:**

a. **PSYOP Support of LAMSON 719.**

(1) Operations in Laos were exploited in accordance with XXIV Corps TWX, dated 120557Z Feb 71. Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC), MRI, printed and distributed propaganda material in support of this campaign.

(2) Division PSYOP and units OPCON to division G5 with 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) and 4th Detachment, 7th PSYOP Battalion, conducted 261:00 broadcast hours and disseminated 17,318,000 leaflets. As a result, 375 munitions were received.

b. On 5 September 71, a request was received from the G5, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) for an aerial PSYOP mission in support of operation LAMSON 810, in Quang Tri (P). Conducted in support of this request was a 45 minute broadcast mission. Upon completion of the mission, a recommendation was made to the G5, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), to utilize 9th SOS aircraft for psychological operations. The G5, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) stated they did not want to use 9th SOS because prior experience indicated that the audible quality of the 1,800 watt speaker system attached to an 02-B aircraft was not satisfactory. To correct this misconception, a demonstration was conducted for the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), utilizing the 9th SOS with the message of "Good Luck to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in LAMSON 810." Major General Phu and his staff were very impressed by the demonstration and have since been requesting PSYOP support from 9th SOS.
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel Management and Administration. During the past year personnel policies, administration and personnel support activities have been continually reviewed and improved. The goal of an efficient, responsive, smoothly operating personnel system has been largely achieved.


      (1) During the latter part of 1971 the implementation of the Jumps Army pay system within the division was completed. Approximately 14,000 accounts were converted to Jumps during October and November 1971. The conversion procedures used based on the mechanized system were highly successful. The major problem encountered during the conversion in November and December was the large number of in-country transfers which were delayed in converting to Jumps until January 1972.

      (2) In order to provide better service and handle pay complaints more efficiently, finance contact teams were established and sent out daily to units to resolve pay complaints and inquiries. This system enabled more soldiers to have their pay problems solved quicker. It also enabled the personnel at the finance office to spend more time attending to the administration of finance records.

   b. Personnel Management.

      (1) Administration. The division has continued to improve its administrative accounting procedures to insure that the processing of personnel into, within and out of the division is accomplished in the most efficient manner. The most recent inspection by the USARV Command Personnel Management Inspection Team in July 1971 resulted in the division receiving an overall rating of excellent.

      (2) Strength Accountability. As a result of division-wide musters held during the latter half of 1971 continual reconciliation between personnel and strength accountability was made. As a result of these efforts the division obtained an optimum strength accounting posture to enter stand down.

      (3) Qualitative Management. The division conducted MOS evaluation testing required under the DA Qualitative Management Program. This program required that all "career" enlisted personnel have an annual MOS Evaluation Test in order to qualify for reenlistment, promotion, proficiency
pay or retention on active duty. During the initial period of testing (1 September to 15 December 1971) 3,140 personnel of 3,146 scheduled for testing were tested, which is considered excellent in light of the tactical situation.

(4) Keystone Activities. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) began redeployment in late November, with all division elements at Camp Evans beginning stand down. Camp Evans was turned over to ARVN forces in late December. Other elements of the division are currently undergoing stand down in preparation for redeployment or inactivation. Thus far, no major problems have been encountered, and all operations have been completed in a timely manner.

2. Morale. With the reduction of combat operations during the latter part of 1971 an increased emphasis was placed on providing the individual soldier with various worthwhile activities to prevent boredom and maintain a high state of morale.

a. Special Services. The division special services program provides a wide range of entertainment and recreational activities for the individual soldier. Numerous commercial shows, USO shows and command military touring shows provided a variety of continuous troop entertainment. An active sports program centered around several tournaments to include softball, tennis and flag football. Maximum participation and command support were given to all athletic contests.

b. Division Band and Chorus. The division band has supported both division and non-divisional units throughout Northern Military Region I. In addition to playing at official functions, it has provided troop entertainment on firebases and base camps. A soldiers' chorus was organized in March 1971 to provide another activity for interested soldiers and to increase the variety of troop entertainment. The "Singing Eagles Chorus Show" performed regularly at service clubs and open messes and as its reputation became well established it was invited to perform in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay for hospital patients and troops at various installations.

3. Drug Abuse Prevention Program. The division drug abuse prevention program was greatly expanded during the past year. Emphasis was placed primarily on the education of the individual soldier concerning the dangers of drug use, the identification and rehabilitation of drug users, and the elimination of those individuals from the Army who refused or who were incapable of rehabilitation.
a. Drug Education. A variety of methods were successfully employed to educate the individual soldier on the dangers of drug abuse. Commanders gave drug education classes at least quarterly and unit drug team members conducted frequent informal "rap sessions" in their respective companies. The division provided two mobile drug education teams which, in addition to teaching all incoming personnel at SERTS, also traveled from unit to unit conducting drug classes for commanders and their men. During the latter part of the year both USARV and MACV sent special Drug Education Field Teams to teach classes within the division on a monthly basis.

b. On 25 August 1971 USARV began the urinalysis testing of entire battalion-size units on an unannounced basis. Those individuals identified as drug users on the urinalysis test were sent to the Drug Treatment Center in Cam Ranh Bay for detoxification and then returned to enter an active unit rehabilitation program. Individuals identified as drug users on two or more occasions and who failed attempts to be rehabilitated were eliminated from the service.

c. On 10 December 1971 the Phu Bai Drug Rehabilitation Center was opened. Only those individuals granted exemption by their commanders were admitted to the 14-day rehabilitation program. The rehabilitation center admitted both division and non-divisional soldiers for treatment and greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the entire drug abuse prevention program in Northern Military Region I.
REDEPLOYMENT

1. (C) GENERAL:

   a. Due to the security classification of this document being restricted to CONFIDENTIAL, certain details of a higher classification must be omitted.

   b. The Redeployment Control Center (RCC) was informally established in April 1971, under the auspices of the ACoS, G3 for the purpose of coordinating the stand down of the 3d Battalion 506th Infantry in Increment VII. Upon the satisfactory completion of stand down and redeployment of the 3/506th color guard, the RCC continued operations under the auspices of the ACoS, G3, and ACoS, G4. Utilizing a reduced staff during the months of June and July, the RCC was concerned with updating the Division's Initial Redeployment Planning Guide, preparation of Letters of Instruction and review of After Action Reports. No divisional units, except two infantry platoons (Scout Dog), were involved in Increment VIII (June - August 1971). In mid-July, the division was tasked by XXIV Corps to prepare a contingency plan for redeployment of the division under a variety of contingencies. This plan prepared by the ACoS, G3, was submitted to Corps on 30 July 1971. With Increment IX (September - November 1971) drawing near and indication that divisional units could be included therein, the RCC staff was reconstituted on or about 1 August to affect detailed planning and coordination. On 12 August, the RCC was formally constituted by a letter of instruction as part of the division headquarters and consisted of the G5 as OIC, RCC, three officer representatives of the G1, G3 and G4 respectively, two operations NCOs and two clerks. During August and September 1971, the RCC was involved in planning and execution of Increment IX, base closure operations, and future redeployment increment planning.

   c. The activities of the Redeployment Control Center, RCC, escalated tremendously during the period 1 October to the present due to Increment IX stand down and inactivation of the 3/506th Cavalry Squadron, and the concurrent closure of Quang Tri Forward Operation Base. This was followed closely by the designation of a large part of the division in Increment X which began officially 1 December 1971, but in reality on 20 November 1971, when our first units stood down. During this time the RCC has gained an additional officer whose primary responsibility is to coordinate with the engineer and installation coordinators in the area of base closure and turnover. The center is now composed of five (5) officers and four (4) enlisted men. With the sensitivity
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of information worked with on a daily basis, the RCC has been declared a restricted area, enclosed with a barbed wire fence, and windows of one wing boarded up. Each morning, the Commanding General receives a briefing concerning the status of division redeployment operations.

2. (C) ACTIVITIES AT DONG HA AND QUANG TRI:

a. Following the inactivation of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and its subsequent departure from Quang Tri Combat Base and Dong Ha Combat Base in July 1971, the RCC became involved in monitoring construction and relocation projects at Quang Tri Forward Operations Base being occupied by divisional units.

b. Since base turnovers were not completed by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) prior to its departure, the RCC in August became involved with turnover of portions of Quang Tri Combat Base to the 1st ARVN Division, this being completed on 7 September 71. Upon relocation of the remaining 101st units at Dong Ha to QTFOB in August, base closure of Dong Ha Combat Base became of prime concern. This turnover was plagued with problems in attempting to find RVN organizations that would agree to sign for the area such that the base would not have to be abandoned. Offers of areas not wanted by ARVN were made to the Province Chief and religious and civic organizations, with final acceptance being coordinated with the National Police. After final turnover to the police on 24 September 71, havoc took over the base as civilians, ARVN, and police stripped the area. This resulted in complaints and accusations by and against VN officials which, although out of the hands of the division, has convinced us that a close and accurate account of all turnover activities, including photographs, is a necessity in order to keep our skirts clean. Fortunately, we had maintained this documentation on the turnover of Dong Ha Combat Base.

c. During September and early October 1971, Increment IX brought with it notification that the 3/5th Armored Cavalry Squadron, less "D" Troop and A/4/12th Armored Cavalry Troop units OPCON to the 101st, would inactivate. Concurrent with this inactivation would be closure of the remainder of QTFOB. As such, the RCC was heavily involved with detailed planning and coordination to effect an orderly inactivation and base closure. In conjunction with the base closure, plans were coordinated for relocation of other units, primarily air cavalry units, D/3/5th Cavalry Squadron and A/2/17th Cavalry Squadron, to Camps Evans and Phu Bai respectively.

d. On 15 October the 3/5th Cavalry Squadron and A/4/12th Cavalry Squadron commenced stand down. On this same date ARVN assumed responsibility of
the cavalry area of operations, excluding the reconnaissance area which remained the responsibility of the division. During the stand down period of 15 October to 5 November, bunker line security at QTFOB was gradually taken over by the 3/187th Infantry Battalion with the battalion headquarters locating at QTFOB on 30 October 71. Equipment of the 3/5 Cavalry Squadron was moved to the Da Nang Keystone facilities both by road and sea. Track vehicles went entirely by sea through Tan My Port. In order to move out of QTFOB prior to expected heavy rains, most equipment was moved to Da Nang prior to the unit's scheduled MIPP/SIPP dates, and was infiltrated through the facility on a space available basis. Personnel were outprocessed at QTFOB and flown by CH-47 to Phu Bai for final outprocessing prior to movement to CONUS or new station in RVN. On 5 November, A/4/12th Cavalry Squadron zeroed its property book and completed stand down. Due to extensive storm damage at the MIPP/SIPP, and civil disturbances, the 3/5th Cavalry Squadron was delayed in their equipment processing and did not finish until 12 November, although their area at QTFOB was cleared on 5 November. Upon completion of stand down, A/4/12th Cavalry Squadron was inactivated in-country and 3/5 Cavalry Squadron, less "D" Troop, redeployed with a 17 man color guard for inactivation at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

e. Relatively few problems were encountered in the 3/5 Cavalry Squadron stand down due to the aggressive leadership and control of the squadron commander. We learned, however, that tight controls should be placed on the number of detail personnel sent to Da Nang with unit equipment. These personnel should be kept at the minimum necessary to accomplish the task of equipment turn in, and should be returned to their unit as quickly as possible to alleviate billeting, messing and control problems in the Da Nang area.

f. Concurrent with the stand down of the 3/5 Cavalry Squadron, closure of Quang Tri Forward Operations Base proceeded toward a final closure goal of 6 November. Since the only units standing down were the 3/5 Cavalry Squadron, A/4/12th Cavalry Squadron and 8/4th Artillery, a Corps unit, QTFOB dealt primarily with relocation of supporting units, many of these non-divisional, to other base camps. Although a schedule of clearance dates was established and units were notified of their date well in advance, non-divisional units experienced difficulties in clearing as scheduled. This was due primarily to lack of instructions from their higher headquarters as to where they would relocate or what support role they would continue to provide to MACV Team 155 which was organized for the 3d ARVN Division and remained at QTFOB. The disposition of the Command Control North, CCN,
residing at QTFOB remained uncertain for a long period of time until it was finally decided that they would remain at QTFOB in their own compound. Several other problem areas arose in the base clearance. The POL tank farm consisting of eight (8) storage tanks created problems in determining their disposition. ARVN eventually signed for five (5) and took the chain link fence surrounding the farm. The final major area at QTFOB was turned over to I ALC on 5 November, one day prior to the goal of 6 November. There remained several areas under US control which were subsequently disposed of; on 8 November airfield rearm and refuel equipment was signed over to I ALC. The water point and PA&E was signed over on 20 November. As of this report, the airfield tower and TACAN are being operated by US troops pending disposition instructions from Corps. The teams operating these facilities reside in the MACV 155 Compound.

g. We learned several lessons from the base turnover at Quang Tri which should be kept in mind for future base turnovers.

(1) We should deal through Corps and advisory channels at all times when attempting to resolve problems involving ARVN.

(2) Non-divisional units who are tenants on a base must be kept advised of our plans and particularly their higher headquarters must be continually urged to insure clearance dates are met.

(3) A base should be turned over in one piece to ARVN with a simultaneous transfer of security from US to ARVN troops. This was done at QTFOB and as a result, the stripping and looting that occurred at Dong Ha was avoided.

3. (C) ACTIVITIES IN PLANNING FOR DIVISION REDEPLOYMENT:

a. Since the inception of the RCC in April for the stand down of the 3/506th Infantry Battalion, the staff had been working on preparation and revision of the Division Redeployment Planning Guide and Letters of Instruction. As more experience was gained, these documents became more refined. This process has continued to the present.

b. A number of liaison visits were made by RCC personnel and other staff and unit personnel to Keystone Processing Facilities, Da Nang and to units engaged in redeployment or inactivation. The purpose of these visits was to gain first-hand knowledge in the problem areas involved with redeployment or inactivation. DISCOM provided a liaison officer to work between DISCOM and the Keystone facilities in Da Nang.
c. On 14 October detailed planning began between the RCC and staff for the impending division redeployment. We had no firm guidance from higher headquarters upon which to work, but based our planning on three phases of redeployment, Phase I consisting of the Third Brigade and closure of Camp Evans, Phase II the redeployment of the First Brigade and closure of Camp Eagle, and Phase III, the redeployment of Second Brigade and closure of Phu Bai Combat Base. The first detailed plan consisted of Phase I only, and was based, as were to be Phase II and Phase III, on a general plan submitted to XXIV Corps in July 1971. Also during this time, key division personnel in the engineer, signal, aviation, personnel, installation coordinator, logistics and support areas began coordination for future redeployment. Plans were made to establish an effective system of communications for redeployment operations with lines to Long Binh, Da Nang and stand down units at brigade level. Units were advised to begin turning in excess equipment on a free turn-in basis and to begin police of their area of operations.

d. By early November, the original plan for Phase I had been overtaken by events and we were now working on the overall three phase plan. We again had little guidance. This plan was built around Phase I taking place in December, Phase II in February, and Phase III in April with each phase being designed to permit compression in time, on order. All staff sections, DIVARTY, DISCOM, Aviation Group and Third Brigade were involved in the development of the plan. Each phase was built around the tactical concept of an orderly withdrawal from north to south. The plan was completed about 10 November and was briefed in this three phase concept to the 26th General Support Group who would be not only providing support, but also would be required to relocate some of their units due to the closure of our major bases. On 16 November and, with revisions, again on 22 November, the plan was briefed to CG, XXIV Corps.

4. (C) STAND DOWN ACTIVITIES:

a. On 20 November we received our first notification of units to stand down. The units affected were essentially the Third Brigade and supporting elements to include the 158th Avn Bn, less D, Company. These units were ordered to stand down over the period 20 November to 1 December. This gave very little time between notification date, 19 Nov, and stand down date; for some units stand down date coincided with receipt of the notification message. Fortunately, AG, G4 and DISCOM teams had been, or were in the process of, visiting the Third Brigade units at Camp Evans, orienting and briefing them on requirements and procedures of stand down. These pre-briefings combined with Third Brigade's commendable efforts to turn in excess equipment and police their areas enabled the units to respond to the short notification and conduct an orderly stand down. The major problems which have arisen as of this date are not due to unpreparedness of our units, but...
due to delays at higher headquarters, primarily the delay in individual assignment instructions received from USARV. Now that the initial surge of personnel to be moved has been overcome, assignment instructions are received in a timely manner. Other delays in the redeployment operations have been caused by USARV and DA level changes to redeployment criteria; however, none of these delays have caused, as yet, any unit to miss their final redeployment date.

b. Immediately upon notification, we coordinated with Da Nang SUPCOM and established MIPP/SIPP priority dates for each unit on the original list.

c. On 23 November we received an additional message adding four (4) more units to the troop list. Then on 26 November we received the entire Increment X, Keystone Mallard, troop list. The list included not only the Third Brigade and supporting elements, but also the First Brigade, a large slice of the division aviation assets (the entire 158th Aviation Bn; C/159 Avn Co; the 163d Avn Co (-); A/377 Arty; B/C/HQ/4/77 ARA; B/C/2/17 Cav; air assets of brigade HQ, HHC 101 Div, and six (6) Med Evac helicopters) and a considerable slice of the division support elements. Many units in the list, primarily those at Camp Eagle, the First Brigade and division support elements, were instructed to redeploy to Fort Campbell, KY with portions of their equipment and equipment escorts. Three units, 163d Avn Co (-), A/77 ARA Bn and A/377 Arty, were instructed to redeploy with their serviceable aircraft and cadre detachments. On 28 November another coordination meeting was held with Da Nang Support Command at which time MIPP/SIPP dates for all units in Increment X were established. Key personnel of all units on the troop list, not previously notified, were notified of their stand down dates and MIPP/SIPP dates on 1 December. The dates remained classified SECRET, however, until actual stand down dates were reached.

d. As of 31 December 1971, the following units have entered stand down on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC 3d Bde</td>
<td>20 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/187 Inf Bn</td>
<td>20 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/319 Arty</td>
<td>20 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/39 FA</td>
<td>21 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/75 Rangers</td>
<td>24 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/17 Air Cav Trp</td>
<td>24 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235 FA Det</td>
<td>26 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245 FA Det</td>
<td>26 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/506 Inf</td>
<td>26 Nov 71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

158 Avn Bn 2/11 FA 29 Nov 71
266 FA Det 29 Nov 71
22 Mil Hist Det 30 Nov 71
10 Cml Plt 30 Nov 71
20 Cml Det 30 Nov 71
1/506 Inf 2 Dec 71
25 PID Det 2 Dec 71
326 Med Bn 3 Dec 71
4/77 ARA (-) 5 Dec 71
326 Engr Bn 5 Dec 71
D/801 Maint 6 Dec 71
42d Inf Plt (SD) 17 Dec 71
C/159 Avn Co 20 Dec 71
101 Avn Bn (-) 21 Dec 71
501st Sig Bn 21 Dec 71
101 MP Co (-) 23 Dec 71
101 MI Co (-) 26 Dec 71
A/377 FA 26 Dec 71
HHB DIV ARTY 26 Dec 71
163d Avn Co (-) 26 Dec 71
101 Admin Co (-) 26 Dec 71
426 S&S Bn 26 Dec 71
101 SSD 26 Dec 71
HHC 101 Avn Gp 27 Dec 71
1/327 Inf 27 Dec 71
801st Maint Bn (-) 27 Dec 71
2/320 FA 27 Dec 71
5 Trans Bn (-) 27 Dec 71
2/502 Inf 28 Dec 71
HHC 1st Bde 28 Dec 71
HHC DISCOM 30 Dec 71

e. Other units involved in Increment X include B/2/17th Cavalry and HHC 101 Division, both space drawdown only.

f. In order to maintain a smooth and rapid flow of information between the Division and higher and subordinate headquarters, we established a liaison team at HQ, USARV in the DCSLOG offices. LTC Twitchell, and in his absence, LTC Ledbetter, have been invaluable to the redeployment effort in that they have provided us with rapid and timely information which would otherwise be delayed several days in area communication channels.
Through a direct line to Long Binh located in the RCC we have immediate contact with our liaison at HQ, USARV. In addition, we have established liaison at the Da Nang MIPP/SIPP facilities under the direction of LTC Sutton. LTC Sutton has kept us informed of the status of equipment processing and has been able, on the spot, to correct situations which might otherwise cause delays in the operation. Close coordination and stand down progress monitoring at brigade level is accomplished through the Division RCC having direct lines to Brigade RCCs. Daily, the RCC receives progress reports based upon completion of milestones from the brigade RCCs, data from AG on personnel out processed and data from DISCOM on equipment outprocessed. This information is presented to the Commanding General and staff in the morning briefings.

As of 15 December, relatively few problems have been encountered in the stand down of the units listed above. No problems of an unsolvable nature have been encountered. We have taken the position that we must remain flexible and be able to react to changes in directives from higher headquarters as they occur. To date, we have accomplished this, and expect to continue to do so through the remainder of the increment and any forthcoming increments in which we may be involved.

5. (C) ACTIVITIES IN BASE CAMP CLOSURES:

a. In conjunction with redeployment of the Third and First Brigade and Division support elements, Camps Evans and Eagle are to be closed by the end of Increment X. Our concept of base turnover has remained that of complete turnover of a base at one time, and if at all possible, to one agency, IALC, for their further disposition to other RVN agencies as desired.

b. On 9 November we began coordination with MACV Team 3 (1st ARVN Division), MACV Team 18 (CORDS), and XXIV Corps for turnover of Camp Evans to ARVN. At this time, power requirements, areas to be occupied and security were initially discussed. Further coordination led to the ARVN identifying areas at Evans to be occupied by specific units and identification of a "want" list. Coordination with the Installation Coordinator, LTC Pemberton, led to a schedule for phasing out of unit areas and facilities. On 25 November the phase out plans for Camp Evans were completed and the MACDC-14 report submitted to XXIV Corps on 1 December.

c. Closure of Camp Evans has resulted in the relocation of one air cavalry troop, D/3/5th Cavalry Squadron to Phu Bai. The only problem encountered of significance to date has been coordination with a non-divisional
Air Force unit, this problem having been essentially solved as of the date of this report. Units and facilities cleared Camp Evans on time or ahead of schedule. Minor slippages in some clearance dates had no effect on the target date of 21 December for final turnover of the base. The success with which the Camp Evans turnover proceeded is indicative of the close working relationship developed between those US personnel involved, advisors and their ARVN counterparts. The base was returned to ARVN control in a formal ceremony on 21 December.

d. Initial coordination for Camp Eagle turnover began late November and on 1 December the Installation Coordinator, LTC Quackenbush, the G4, 1st ARVN Division, his advisor and others concerned with the Eagle turnover, met to discuss power requirements, areas desired, facilities and turnover procedures. On 4 December, General Phu, CG, 1st ARVN Division, and his staff visited Camp Eagle to survey the facilities. ARVN has submitted a request for equipment and furnishing which were incorporated into the MACDC-14 for Camp Eagle, submitted to XXIV Corps on 26 December.

e. At the writing of this report, the actual turnover of Camp Eagle has just begun. Several units have cleared their areas. A number of units require relocation to Phu Bai due to the closure of Eagle. Plans for these units are being coordinated with units concerned, the Eagle and the Phu Bai Installation Coordinators, the ADC(O) and ADC(S). Relocation of units into areas with adequate billeting and maintenance facilities has caused some problems which may require units to accept a lesser degree of conveniences than to which they have been accustomed. Every effort, however, is being made to satisfy the needs and desires of all concerned.

6. **(C) PROJECTION TO 31 JANUARY 1972:**

a. Due to the security classification of this document being restricted to CONFIDENTIAL, projection of redeployment operations must be presented in broad terms as details lead to higher classification.

b. Redeployment operations will continue at a rapid pace throughout Increment X resulting in the redeployment of the Third Brigade, First Brigade and a considerable portion of Division support. Camp Eagle will be turned over to ARVN as the division moves south into Phu Bai. The remainder of the division will retain its combat posture and continue in the support of ARVN forces as required. Success in base turnover will depend on close coordination and cooperation between US forces, advisors and 1st ARVN Division. We continue to use the concept of base turnover in one piece and to one agency if at all possible.

c. No projection can be made on future redeployment operations beyond the completion of Increment X.
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