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<tr>
<td>31 Nov 1983 - per doc marking DoDD, 5200.20; AGC, d/a ltr 25 Jun 1975</td>
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IN REPLY REFER TO
DAAG-PAP-A (M) (23 Apr 72) DAFD-OTT 712099
10 May 1972

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP
APO San Francisco 96349

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AVBGF-6

3 December 1971

SUBJECT: Change 1, Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

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2. (U) IAW paragraph 5c (2), referenced regulation, the following are added.

a. Reference para 2a, page 11. Add subparagraph 2a (4), Command Action: Personnel have been shifted within the Group to insure an equal balance within each battalion. Letters have been forwarded to HQ, 18th MP Bde, referencing the problem and requesting assistance.

b. Reference para 2c (1), page 15. Add subparagraph 2c (1) (d), Command Action: Information concerning the aforementioned problems was forwarded to HQ, 18th MP Bde, as material for discussion by the Combined Police Council.

c. Reference para 2c (2), page 16. Add subparagraph 2c (2) (d), Command Action: N/A.


e. Reference para 2g, page 18. Add subparagraph 2g (4), Command Action: N/A.

DAVID J. ANDERSON
LTC, MPC
Commanding

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DAFD-OTT
712099
Incl

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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DOD DIR 845200.10
AVBGF-B

1 November 1971

SUbject: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, ROS CSFOS-65 (R3) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Actions


   c. Personnel, Morale, and Discipline.

      (1) Awards and Decorations

      (a) Legion of Merit 5
      (b) Silver Star 0
      (c) Soldier's Medal 0
      (d) Bronze Star with "V" 23
      (e) Bronze Star (Service) 182
      (f) Air Medal 9
      (g) ARCOM with "V" 25
      (h) ARCOM (Service) 357

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AVBGF-B

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS GSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

1 November 1971

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1 (1) Purple Heart
2 (2) Good Conduct Medal
3 (3) 16th MP Bde Certificate of Achievement

(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures

(a) Assignments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Job Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stephen W. Trescot</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Op Adjutant</td>
<td>Jul 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter J. Ermer</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Op Adj/Dct Cdr</td>
<td>Jul 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John B. Reiss</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Op Asst S-3 Off</td>
<td>Jul 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Palermo</td>
<td>SqM</td>
<td>Op S-4 NCO</td>
<td>Aug 71</td>
</tr>
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<td>Robert J. DiFelice</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Op Traffic Control Off</td>
<td>Aug 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight L. Gentry</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Op S-4 Off</td>
<td>Sep 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James C. Cashman</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Op XO</td>
<td>Sep 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John A. S. Bokor</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Op XO</td>
<td>Oct 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilton W. Bowmen</td>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Op CSM</td>
<td>Oct 71</td>
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(b) Departures

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<tr>
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<th>Grade</th>
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<tr>
<td>Carl C. Swanson</td>
<td>Lt</td>
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<td>Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary J. Krafft</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Op Asst S-3 Off</td>
<td>Jul 71</td>
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<td>Stephen W. Trescot</td>
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<td>Jul 71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas F. Stinchjem</td>
<td>SqM</td>
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<td>Aug 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnny J. Dusenberry</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Op Adj/Dct Cdr</td>
<td>Aug 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis K. Morris</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>Op XO</td>
<td>Sep 71</td>
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<tr>
<td>William C. Baum</td>
<td>SqM</td>
<td>Op Pars NCO</td>
<td>Oct 71</td>
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(3) Casualties

(a) Battle Losses

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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
### Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 15th Bde, Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971

#### (b) Non-battle Losses

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<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
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<td>1 Killed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Injured</td>
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#### (4) Reenlistments

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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) 1st Term RA</td>
<td>181</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) RA Career</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) AUS</td>
<td>396</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Other</td>
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<td>(e) Total</td>
<td>552</td>
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#### (5) R&R

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<tr>
<td>June</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>84</td>
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#### (6) Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) US</th>
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<td>1 As of 1 May 1971</td>
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### AUTH

#### OFF WO EM TOTAL

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<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>147</td>
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2 As of 31 October 1971
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SLOT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

AUTH ASGW

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<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
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(b) Local National Direct Hire

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<th>ASGW</th>
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Authorization Voucher Number: USARV Voucher #383

2 As of 31 October 1971

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<th>ASGW</th>
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<tr>
<td>157</td>
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Authorization Voucher Number: USARV Voucher #383

(7) Extensions of Overseas Tour

(a) Total Extensions (by Month)

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<td>September</td>
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(b) Under PL 89-735 (6 Month)

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<tr>
<td>October</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG 350 FOR-65 (R3) (U)

(8) Disciplinc, Law and Order
   (a) General Courts 2
   (b) Special Courts 16
   (c) Summary Courts 3
   (d) Article 15a 263

(9) Congressional Inquiries 29

(10) Publications

(a) LCI

1 Unnumbered—Support of Confinement Facility (LBW), 16 Jul 71.
2 7-71—Redeployment of Forces—504th MP BN—15 Jul 71.
4 3-71—97th MP BN—Mission—15 Sep 71.
5 9-71—Training—15 Sep 71.
6 Unnumbered—Combined Police Patrol—15 Sep 71.

(b) Regulations
   1 16th MF Op Reg 550-1, ARVN Inspection Program, 9 Jun 71.
   3 16th MF Op Reg 600-1, Casualty Reporting, 16 Jun 71.

(c) Circulars—negative.

(d) Supplements
   1 16th MF Op Suppl 1 to 18th MF Bde Reg 58-1, Motor Transportation, 30 Jun 71.
CONPDENTIAL

AVBGF-B 1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG5 CPFCR-65 (R3) (U)

2 16th MP Gp Suppl 1 to USARV REG 606-5, Personnel Security Clearance, 8 Jul 71.

(11) Public Command Information Activities

(a) Five News Stories Released
(b) 33 Hometown News Releases

(12) Civic Actions

(a) The Group Headquarters engaged in no significant civic activities during the reporting period.

(b) On 27 Oct 71, the Song-Vinh-Phouc River, Quang Tri Province, overflowed its banks causing severe flood conditions. C/504th MP Bn engaged in emergency evacuation procedures of indigenous personnel residing in the flooded area. Flood victims were transported to an orphanage on Quang Tri Combat Base. C/504th MP Bn suffered one EM casualty during the operation as a result of sniper fire.

(13) Historical Programs: The headquarters maintains a historical file containing pictures of former commanders, change of command ceremonies, promotion and dedication ceremonies.

d. Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Intelligence summaries continued to be received from 16th MP Bde, XXIV Corps, SHAPE, and USARV.

(1) On 19 Jun 71, one classified document was discovered missing by the documents custodian, 16th MP Gp. The loss occurred between 17-19 June. On 17 June, the document, classified SECRET, was accounted for and, with other classified documents, was being prepared for destruction. On 19 Jun 71, the documents to be destroyed were removed from the classified container prior to destruction. It was then observed that copy 2 of two copies of one document was missing. Investigation determined that the missing document may have been destroyed by burning on 19 June, as a result of careless handling. The possibility of a compromise was considered remote, but not discounted. The subject of the lost document was "Truce Violation Reports" and contained instructions for the Tet Truce of 1971.

(2) Intelligence is collected from the following sources:

(a) Intelligence Spot Reports from subordinate units.

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1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG 65 SFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) Intelligence summaries from higher headquarters.

(c) Local MPI units.

(d) Vietnamese police agencies.

(3) 238 Intelligence Spot Reports (ISR's) were processed by this headquarters during the reporting period.

e. Communications and CONSEC Activities.

(1) The number of RTT messages passed over the RTT net continued to increase. At the end of the reporting period (Sept, Oct), this headquarters received an average of over 1000 RTT messages per month. This is a 20% volume increase over the last reporting period. The rise in RTT traffic may be largely attributed to a steady increase in the number of serious incident reports and drug related reports processed by this headquarters. There were 5166 RTT messages received by this headquarters during the reporting period.

(2) The 16th MP Co established an administrative military police radio net within NR 1 at Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Hu during July 1971. The basic structure of the net provided any user with an FM radio, the capability of contacting the nearest military police station for assistance and/or for reporting drug transactions, traffic accidents, or other incidents of a police nature. In October, the net became operational in Military Region 2, at Tam Ky, Phu Loc, Tuy Hoa, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku, thereby giving coverage over the entire group area of operation.

(a) The AN/VRC-16 radio, with an AO-292 antenna, PF-2953/4 power supply, and the installation unit for the radio set AN/VRC-16 radio were used. This equipment provided an adequate communications system in order to operate the administrative net.

(b) In order to establish the net, each provost marshal office required one AN/VRC-16 radio, plus ancillary equipment over and above the equipment necessary to operate on the normal MP frequency.

(c) The required equipment had to be obtained from outside the Group's assets. Current MP CO's did not provide for the required power supplies to operate the AN/VRC-16 radios. High radio deadline rates due to repair parts shortages for the AN/VRC-16, plus normal MP operational requirements for radios, made it desirable that additional AN/VRC-16 radios be secured prior to installing the administrative net.

(d) An auxiliary power supply, consisting of one 1.5 kw generator,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

should be positioned at each PNC operating on the administrative net, since it is considered unrealistic to require two mobile units to act as the base station during periods of commercial power failure.

f. Operations and Plans

(1) OPORDS and OPLANS: No OPORDS or OPLANS were published during the reporting period.

(2) Review of significant operational activities. During the reporting period, the battalions of the 16th MP Gp conducted combat support operations, discipline, law and order, and security operations to include road security for convoy movements throughout military regions 1 and 2. Weather conditions did not pose a significant problem to military police operations. During periods of severe typhoon conditions, MP patrol operations were limited to on-call or emergency response only. However, weather conditions never prevented military police from responding when required. Occasionally some AIDOS missions (i.e. use of helicopters for the aerial detection of speeders) were cancelled or curtailed due to adverse weather; however no significant delays were noted.

(a) On 7 May 71, military police operations were established at Cha Rang Valley by the 93rd MP Bn.

(b) On 1 Jun 71, sentry dog operations were initiated at ASP 103 in Phu Bai.

(c) On 13 Jun 71, sentry dog operations at Phan Rang were terminated with resources transferred to Cam Ranh Bay. On the same day, the 97th MP Bn assumed DMSO responsibility for the USAFRD Heroin Detoxification Center located at Cam Ranh Bay. Thirty-two MPs from the 93rd MP Bn were attached to the 97th MP Bn for this mission.

(d) On 20 Jun 71, joint police checkpoints were established at Khanh Duong and Duc My, located on QL 21 between Ninh Hoa and Ban Ma Tho.

(e) On 5 Jul 71, military police operations in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were established at LZ Uplift during the brigade's standdown operations.

(f) On 5 Jul 71, sentry dog operations were terminated at the Class 500 Yard in Da Nang.
AVBGF-B

1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, R&S GSPR-65 (13) (U)

(g) On 31 Jul 71, Port, Vessel, and Inland Waterway Security operations were terminated at Qui Nhon Harbor and turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. Personnel resources were transferred to parent unit for standdown of the 458th Transportation Company (FIR).

(h) During July military police were placed into post exchanges doing a gross total business of over $100,000 monthly. In PR 1 this included three PEs (China Beach, Freedom Hill, XXIV Corps); and in PR 2, eleven (Qui Nhon; Phu Tai; Cha Rang; Tuy Hoa AAF; Camp Kelloway, Pleiku; 62nd Log, Pleiku; 22nd Repl BN, Can Nanh Bay; CRB Main Exchange; Nha Trang; Dalat; and Ban Me Thuot).

(i) On 3 Aug 71, sentry dog operations were terminated at ASP 101, Quang Tri Combat Base. Resources were transferred to POL security, Quang Tri and an ASP at Phu Bai Combat Base.

(j) On 4 Aug 71, military police operations were terminated at Bao Loc and LZ Uplift.

(k) On 18 Aug 71, military police operations were terminated at LZ English.

(l) On 13 Aug 71, 91 military policeman from the 93rd IF BN were attached to the 97th MP BN to support the Heroin Detoxification Center at Can Nanh Bay.

(m) On 20 Aug 71, sentry dog operations were initiated at ASP 107 in Da Nang.

(n) On 23 Aug 71, sentry dog operations at Quang Tri Combat Base were terminated.

(o) On 27 Aug 71, sentry dog operations were established at the ASP on Chu Lai Combat Base.

(p) On 30 Aug 71, military police operations in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were terminated with resources transferred to Qui Nhon.

(q) On 6 Sep 71, military police operations in support of the 131st Airborne Division were established in Mai Loc, in connection with Operation Lam Son 810. A detachment from C/504th IF in established a CP at Mai Loc to coordinate and control personnel and vehicle movements in and around the Mai Loc fire support base.

(r) On 7 Sep 71, a combined police station was established at Camp Coryell, Sen Ho Thu t. At this time, all unilateral police patrols and operations were suspended in lieu of combined police activities.

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SUSPECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSPOR-69 (R3) 69

(s) On 13 Sep 71, a US soldier riding in a convoy near Hue shot and killed a Vietnamese boy attempting to steal goods from his vehicle. The incident sparked large scale Vietnamese student demonstrations in the city of Hue. Several assaults by firebombing and rockthrowing were made on US vehicles, necessitating the rerouting of all US traffic around Hue.

(t) On 18 and 30 Sep 71, a military police task force composed of members of the 97th MP Bn conducted intensified search operations at the Nya Checkpoint, Cam Ranh Bay. Composition of the task force elements consisted of military police, PM investigators, Guard members, and marijuana dogs. Several confiscations of heroin, marijuana, and weapons were made on both dates. Several Vietnamese nationals were apprehended attempting to gain access without authorization. Over 500 Vietnamese Installation Cards were invalidated for various reasons.

(u) On 25 Sep 71, military police from the 97th MP Bn were deployed by air to Whiskey Mountain to assist in the apprehension of 14 personnel, armed and barricaded in a bunker. All subjects were apprehended by military police and transported to the Long Binh Stockade. There were no injuries.

(v) On 6 Oct 71, sentry dog operations were terminated at Ben Me Thanh with resources transferred to Nha Trang.

(w) On 9 Oct 71, the 127th Military Police Company was assigned from the 93rd MP Bn to the 97th MP Bn. The transfer of the 127th MP Bn was affected to support the USMV Heroin Detoxification Center at Cam Ranh Bay.

(x) On 12 Aug 71, the 97th MP Bn was relieved from OPC 4 to the 178th MP Det (PM). The CC, 97th MP Bn, assumed the mission of Area Provost Marshal for Military Region 2 (South), which consists of the seven provinces of Earlac, Khanh Hoa, Quang Duc, Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan, Lam Dong, and Binh Thuan. The 178th MP Det (PM) came under OPCG of the 97th MP Bn.

(y) On 1 Oct 71, the combined police station in Hue was closed between 1900 and 0700 hours on a daily basis as a result of student demonstrations.

(z) On 2 Oct 71, the 560th MP Co assumed MP operations from the 127th MP Co at Qui Nhon and Phu Cat.

(aa) On 25 Oct 71, military police support at An Nhon was discontinued due to closure of R13 Buffalo. Resources were transferred to Qui Nhon.

(bb) On 31 Oct 71, joint police operations at Phu Cat Airbase were terminated.

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1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, R3 CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) During the last reporting period (1 Nov 71 to 30 Apr 71) the 16th MP Gp processed 1518 serious incident reports which had occurred within military regions 1 and 2. In contrast to this, there were 2121 SIR's processed by the Group between 1 May 71 to 31 Oct 71.

(b) A comparative analysis of the two reporting periods is as follows:

(1) During the period 1 Nov 71 to 30 Apr 71, there were a greater number of US troops within the 16th MP Gp Area of Operations; however, at that time, a large number of these personnel were deployed to field units engaged in combat operations, limiting their contact to 16th MP Gp units.

(2) During the period 1 May 71 through 31 Oct 71, the total US troop strength in military regions 1 and 2 was significantly reduced through withdrawal and standdown operations. Conversely, the removal of US troops from combat operations brought a heavy influx of US personnel into troop enclaves such as Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay areas. The increasing number of US troops in concentrated areas has contributed to a proportionate increase in the number of reported serious incidents.

g. Force Development

(1) On 21 Jun 71, a Drug Treatment Center (DTC) was established at the 6th Convalescent Center, Cam Ranh Bay. Due to an insufficient amount of military police resources within the 97th MP Bn to adequately support this activity, 32 military policemen from the 93rd MP Bn were attached to the 97th MP Bn. On 18 Aug 71, an additional 44 military policemen from the 93rd MP Bn were attached to the 97th MP Bn, again as augmentation to support the USARV Heroin Detoxification Center (DTC). On 10 Oct 71, the 13th MP Bde published General Order 395 relieving the 127th MP Co from assignment to the 93rd MP Bn and further assigning the 127th to the 97th MP Bn. On 10 Oct 71, 49 military policemen attached to the 97th MP Bn returned to the 93rd MP Bn.

(2) On 12 Aug 71, the 16th MP Bde General Order 33 relieved the 97th MP Bn from OPON to the 178th MP Det (PM). The 97th MP Bn, under the provisions of General Order 336, assumed operational control of the 178th MP Det (PM) with responsibility for logistical and administrative support requirements.

h. Organization

(1) MTOE 19-500F518, 595th and 981st MP Companies (3D), was approved and implemented by USARPAC 30 255 dated May 71.
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1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, NGS CSFYR-65 (33) (U)

(2) On 21 Jun 71, 32 military policemen from the 93rd MP Bn were attached to the 97th MP Bn for duty at the USARV Heroin Detoxification Center.

(3) On 31 Jul 71, the 458th Transportation Company Detachment (PBR) was detached from the 93rd MP Bn and deactivated.

(4) On 17 Aug 71, the 595th MP Co (SD) was relocated from China Beach, Da Nang, to Camp David Land, Da Nang. The relocation was brought about to improve control and provide for greater administrative efficiency.

(5) On 18 Aug 71, 44 military policemen from the 93rd MP Bn were attached to the 97th MP Bn for duty at the detoxification center.

(6) On 20 Sep 71, 5TOE 19-37GP50h, 66th MP Co, was approved and implemented by USARV CO 506, dtd 14 Sep 71.

(7) On 16 Oct 71, 49 military policemen from the 93rd MP Bn, attached to the 97th MP Bn for duty at the USARV Heroin Detoxification Center, were detached and returned to the 93rd MP Bn. The 127th MP Co assumed the mission at the detoxification center.

(8) On 27 Oct 71, the 66th MP Co assumed military police operations from the 560th MP Co in Ploiku.

i. Training

(1) All newly assigned personnel below the grade of E-7 are initially attached to the 97th MP Bn where they undergo an intensive four day training program (AVN Orientation) prior to receiving a duty assignment within the 18th MP Bde.

(2) The following subjects are presented to all incoming personnel at the in-country training center.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Hours of Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Orientation (Unit History)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/Vietnamese Relations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Orientation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Convention</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Unit Tactics Refresher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Conduct</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Driving</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBGF-3

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (A3) (U)

Military Courtesy 1
Physical Security 2
PT and Detainee Handling 1
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 1
Sapper Tactics/Counter Measures 2
Safety 1
Helicopter Flight Procedures 1
Map Reading 2
Escape and Evasion 1
VC/NVA Tactics 1
Mines and Booby Traps 1
Convoi Escort Operations 1
SLID 1
Drug Suppression 2
Traffic Law Enforcement 1
COMSEC 1
Rules of Engagement 1
IF Records and Forms 1
Authority and Jurisdiction 1

31 Hours Total

(3) Sentry dogs and sentry dog handlers each receive a four week cycle of training at the 961st MP Co (SD) in Cam Ranh Bay prior to assignment within the 16th MP Grp.

(4) Mandatory training is conducted at each company and detachment level. Training is monitored by each battalion.

j. Logistics

(1) M73 and XM73E1 Machine Guns: The unreliability of the M73 has led to their replacement by the XM73E1. Test firings, conducted in late October 1970, indicated that 37% of the M73 guns malfunctioned under controlled conditions. Users indicated two possible reasons for the malfunction: the bolt, due to heat and possible expansion, frequently jumped from the bolt recess groove thereby causing the weapon to jam, and/or electrical failures in the firing system. As a result of these findings and opinions, the M73 is being replaced by the XM73E1. As of this date 50% of the total amount of M73 machine guns have been replaced by the XM73E1. There appear to be no major problems encountered in the use of the newer XM73E1. Battalions have been instructed to exchange the M73s on a one for one basis as equipment becomes available.
2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. Requisition of Soft Skill MOS Personnel

(1) Observation: During the reporting period May 71 through Oct 71, numerous shortages have been noted in soft skill MOS categories, notably in the clerical, mechanical, supply, M25, and communications areas.
AVBGF-B

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGS 35FOR-65 (33) (U)

1 November 1971

(2) Evaluation: Efficiency of units is often greatly affected when trained personnel are not received to replace departing personnel. This presents a serious problem of diverting, in most cases, school-trained military policemen into unrelated jobs which are critical vacancies.

(3) Recommendations: That replacements for departing personnel be requisitioned in a more timely manner so as not to impair the mission of concerned units. Personnel holding these MOS fields affected by unit stand-down, should be dispersed to a gaining command within RVN as soon as possible.

b. Intelligences none.

c. Operations:

(1) Combined Police Activities:

(a) Observation: The uniform effectiveness of combined police activities is not universal throughout the group area of operations.

(b) Evaluation:

1 In many instances, Vietnamese National Police have failed to respond to incidents involving US/Vietnamese which have occurred during their normal 24-hour duty period, and are reluctant to work past the normal quitting times.

2 Vietnamese National Police personnel who do work with US Military Police during night operations, generally show up late and would prefer to sleep in the station, or return home early.

3 There is an apparent reluctance on the local level to counter the difficulties experienced with Vietnamese National Police.

4 A common failure of Canh Sat and Quan Canh personnel is late reporting for duty, early departure, and/or failure to report for scheduled commitments.

(c) Recommendations:

1 Stronger high level command emphasis, both American and Vietnamese, should be placed on combined police operations down to the operating levels to counter the experienced difficulties.
2 Local US Provost Marshals and operations officers should be identified prior to assignment in RVN, in order that they may attend Vietnamese language courses. An advantage of a working knowledge of the language would be of immense value in establishing rapport between counterparts on the local level.

3 Military police officers assigned as Provost Marshals should remain as such for the duration of their tour in order to maintain a somewhat consistent working relationship with their Vietnamese counterparts.

(2) Drug Suppression

(a) Observation: During the period Jun 71 through Aug 71, a 90 day intensified drug suppression program was initiated throughout RVN. The campaign was a joint US/VN effort with the impetus for action upon RVN officials.

(b) Evaluation

1 A drug suppression team was established within each of the battalions' areas of responsibility. Each team operated under the cognizance of the Area Provost Marshal rather than at the local unit levels. This was considered necessary in order to properly utilize the teams and gain reciprocating results from their extended efforts, thus narrowing the possibilities of a "hit and miss" type operation. The methods of operation of the drug teams were fully coordinated with CID and with military/civil police when necessary.

2 Local drug suppression teams were established at the installation or sub-area levels to monitor and control all persons entering or leaving US controlled bases. The teams were effectively utilized in the searching of personnel and vehicles.

3 MP checkpoints were established at random locations throughout each battalion's AO with the responsibility to stop and search vehicles and personnel for drug related items. Those checkpoints were not a significant deterrent to drug suppression activities.

4 Unilateral military police patrols in marked MP vehicles were generally ineffective in the drug suppression campaign except in the selective enforcement of off-limits violations. Off-limits regulations were the most effective working tool in the drug suppression program for military police operating off US installations. However, this method of enforcement was limited since military police are not authorized to enter VN establishments in order to check for the presence of US personnel.
As the drug suppression campaign continued, personnel illegally involved with drugs became increasingly aware of the concentrated military police efforts and resorted to more adept methods of hiding or transporting drugs. VN are the primary source of drug supply to US personnel. Drugs are being sold by all classes of VN without regard to age or status.

(c) Recommendations:

1. The drug abuse program was initiated with little time for effective planning. The campaign received less than 11 days notice prior to its initiation. The incomplete planning thereby created a catch-up type attitude rather than the detailed, logical and thorough campaign that was intended. When joint efforts are to be conducted, an even greater planning phase is necessary. Consideration should have been given to one or two months planning in order to allow all concerned to begin on the same step with one common direction and purpose in mind.

2. Installations housing large troop populations should have their perimeter barrier inspected by trained physical security personnel. Inspections should be aimed at identifying areas where drug transfers may take place. Minimized reports should be forwarded to the zone coordinators who should insure compliance with recommendations. Clear zones should be established IAW U.S.M.R. Reg 190-30 and maintained. Clear zones should be extended to a distance to make it difficult for personnel to throw money and drugs over the barrier. Regulations should be published and enforced, forbidding US and VN personnel from approaching the perimeter barrier.

3. KP support should be requested for unit "health and welfare" inspections by Group and Battalion Commanders. The staffs and personnel of the unit to be inspected should not be informed of MP assistance or the inspection until the military police are on the scene and have the area cordoned off.

4. VN female search monitors are relatively useless in detecting drugs in most cases. The women are neighbors and relatives of personnel being searched and are subject to intimidation and/or bribes. As the US military presence and the number of installations decreases, the possibility of utilizing VN police women, or VN women of the armed forces should be encouraged.

5. Specifically selected combined police teams should be formed to operate in VN built-up areas frequented by US military personnel. Teams should be authorized to enter VN establishments to authenticate the authority of US personnel therein.
Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

d. Organization

(1) Observation: The USAWC Drug Detoxification Center at Cam Ranh Bay (6th Convalescent Center) was activated in June 1971. The 97th MP BN assumed DL&O responsibility for this operation. Due to the lack of an adequate number of military police resources to support the detoxification center, the 93rd MP BN was tasked to provide a platoon to be attached to the 97th MP BN. Again in July 1971, a greater need for additional military police personnel at the detoxification center necessitated tasking the 93rd MP BN for an additional platoon to support the 97th MP BN. Some logistical problems were met and overcome with little difficulty; e.g. hand and leg irons, XM-32 Riot Control Dispersers.

(2) Evaluation: The 97th MP BN was not properly equipped to accept a DL&O responsibility for the Detoxification Center. The necessity of bringing in additional MP resources from outside of the command sphere of the 97th MP BN brought some problems in continuity and control. Billoting for attached personnel was poorly equipped to handle the influx. The ultimate action was reassigning a full military police company from the 93rd MP BN to the 97th MP BN in order to provide the necessary MP support for the Detoxification Center.

(3) Recommendation: During the planning of an operation, such as described above, the designation of a single military police unit, with the capability of supporting the activity should be considered. This would greatly enhance the effectiveness and command control of the operation.

e. Training: none.

f. Logistics: none.

g. Communications

(1) Observation: During the reporting period, a non-tactical military police radio net was established in Military Regions 1 and 2. The structure of the net provided any US unit with an FM radio, the capability of requesting an immediate military police response from the nearest MP station receiving the transmission. After the net became operational, it did not receive the anticipated usage.

(2) Evaluation

(a) The establishment of the net received personal command interest from major commanders; extensive publicity through messages and daily bulletin notices highlighted its innovation. However, the net had initially been used only infrequently and then primarily by MP personnel on special police aerial missions.
(b) During communications checks over the administrative net, the MP desks could not be reached because the desk radio and the calling station were using different squelch positions.

(c) After publicizing the administrative net over the American Forces Vietnam Network, the amount of radio traffic began to increase significantly.

(3) Recommendation

(a) Prior to the actual operation of future administrative radio nets, all required equipment should be obtained, installed, and tested.

(b) All stations in the net should operate in the "New Ch" squelch position and this fact should be published along with the call signs and frequency of the established net.

(c) When publicizing the use of such a radio net, the TV and commercial radio media appear to have a greater troop audience than does printed matter.

h. Material: none.

i. Other: none.

David J. Anderson
LTC, 1st C
Communications
AVBG-O (1 Nov 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491 15 December 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DC, APO 96375
Provost Marshal, MR162, APO 96349

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

   a. All references to "heroin Detoxification Center, "Detoxification Center" and "Drug Detoxification Center" should be "Drug Treatment Center (DTC)."

   b. Page 10, para 1f (2)(w): The date of the move was 10 October 1971 not 9 October 1971.

   c. Page 11, para 1h(1): These MTE's were reorganized by USARPAC GO 401, dtd 29 July 71, deleting 2 officers.

   d. Page 13, para 1l(3): The training period for sentry dogs and handlers is one week, not four weeks.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:

   a. Page 14, para 2a, Personnel. Requisition of soft Skill MOS Personnel: Concur. However, due to the present situation of rapid withdrawals and last minute diversions of replacement personnel, it is not always possible to fill all shortages immediately. The 18th MP Bde is filling shortages in subordinate units as expeditiously as possible.

   b. Page 15, para 2c (1) Combined Police Activities.

      (1) Page 15, para 2c(1)(c): Concur. A Combined Police Council, composed of the ARVN Provost Marshal General, The Vietnamese National Police Chief, and the Commanding General, 18th MP Bde, has been established to effect coordination on a national level. A series of Combined Police Surveys have been conducted and recommendations made to the Council. GVN authorities are taking positive steps to correct noted deficiencies.
These surveys will continue in the future with the intention of improving all aspects of Combined Police Operations.

(2) Page 16, para 2c(1)(c)2: Nonconcur. The expenditures for this training far exceed the return value that would be derived. Proper utilization of available GVN interpreters can achieve desired results. Additionally, the use of GVN interpreters will improve relations by showing US trust and faith in the reliability of the Vietnamese to perform all facets of police work.

(3) Page 16, para 2c(1)(c)3: Concur. This is the current policy of this command.

c. Page 16, para 2c(2) Drug Suppression.

(1) Page 17, para 2c(2)(c)1: Concur.

(2) Page 17, para 2c(2)(c)2: Nonconcur. While perimeter barriers and clear zones should be inspected, it does not take trained physical security personnel to identify areas where drug transfers may take place.

(3) Page 17, para 2c(2)(c)3: Concur.

(4) Page 17, para 2c(2)(c)4: Concur.

(5) Page 17, para 2c(2)(c)5: Concur. This recommendation will be presented to the Combined Police Council for consideration.

c. Page 18, para 2d Organization: Concur.

c. Page 18, para 2g Communications.

(1) Page 19, para 2g(3)(a) Concur.

(2) Page 19, para 2g(3)(b) Concur. This Hq3 has taken steps to adopt and publicize a standard squelch position. However, to facilitate
AVBGC-C


Netting with the PRC 25, the "Old" squeich position is being utilized.

(3) Page 19, para 2g(3)(c): Concur.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

[Signature]
PAUL M. TIMMERBERG
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
AVHDO-DO (1 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

The Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group has been reviewed and is considered an adequate reflection of the units operations during the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT. A.O.C.

Assistant Adj. Gen.
GPOP-FD (1 Nov 71) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH
ILT, AGC
Asst AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

CO, 16th Military Police Group

24 April 72

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N/A

N/A

DAFD, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310