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DAAG-PAP-A (M) (13 Apr 72) DAFL-OTT-712166
SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (America)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. POWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT—LESSONS LEARNED
23d INFANTRY DIVISION (AMERICAL)
FOR PERIOD
1 MAY 1971–15 OCTOBER 1971

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (American)
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-4L

1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(American), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, DC 20310

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: CHU LAI Combat Base (BT555035), RVN

Reporting Officer: Major General Frederick J. Kroesen

Collated by: Captain Denver G. Compton, 3d Military History Detachment


I. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. (C) Background. The 23d Infantry Division continued to conduct combat
operations with 3 brigades deployed throughout the Division Tactical Area
of Interest. Contact ranged from light to moderate in the 196th Infantry
Brigade area and was light throughout the remainder of the 23d Infantry
Division AO. Operations CAROLINE HILL (196th Infantry Brigade), MIDDLESEX
PEAK (198th Infantry Brigade) and FINNEY HILL (11th Infantry Brigade)
terminated effective 011200H July 1971, which concluded all named operations
for the Division. The Brigades operated in areas approximating the three
provinces with 11th Infantry Brigade in Quang Ngai (P), 198th Infantry
Brigade in Quang Tin (P) and 196th Infantry Brigade in Quang Nam (P).

Brigades continued to operate in these areas until selected units commenced
standdown on 4 October 1971. In Quang Ngai (P) the 11th Infantry Brigade
conducted combined operations with the 4th and 6th Regiments of the 2d ARVN
Division. Using two to four infantry battalions the 11th Brigade initiated
combat operations to locate and destroy the VC Provincial Head- quarters and the 21st NVA Regiment. The 11th Brigade also assisted the pacific-
ization program by conducting combined operations with the 4th ARVN Regiment
and RF/PF forces to destroy VC/NVA forces and to assist in rice denial.

The 198th Infantry Brigade with two to three infantry battalions conducted
combined operations with the 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments, targeted against
the 31st NVA Regiment and local force and sapper battalions. The brigade
had a primary mission of protecting Chu Lai Combat Base and therefore
expended considerable effort in the rocket belt west of Chu Lai. The 196th Infantry Brigade continued to conduct unilateral and combined operations with the 1st ARVN Task Force in Quang Nam (P) with 4 maneuver battalions and 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. The Brigade was tasked with responsibility for the defense of the Da Nang complex and operated extensively in the foothills west of Da Nang and in the Que Son Mountains area. The 23d Infantry Division was notified on 12 August that it was included in the USARV Increment IX Redeployment of Forces Plan. During September and October the Division, minus a brigade residual force, initiated standdown activities, and at the close of this period was deeply engaged in redeployment actions. On 15 Oct, all units had been redeployed, stood down, or notified of Increment IX status. Due to the redeployment of the Division headquarters, commencing 31 October 1971, this Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 May 1971 through 15 October 1971. The Keystone After Action Report will contain the essential elements of standdown/redeployment activities. These data are therefore omitted from detailed description in this report.

B. Intelligence.

1. (C) Intelligence Summary.

   a. General. Enemy offensive operations were very limited during this reporting period. The most significant actions occurred during May in Quang Nam (P) and in May and late August-early September in Quang Tin (P). Activity in Quang Ngai (P) was minor throughout the entire period. The May activity was part of the Spring-Summer offensive while the 24 August-6 September action was part of the pre-election highpoint intended to disrupt and influence the GVW Lower House elections. Operations conducted to disrupt the 3 October GVW Presidential election were limited to VCI support of political demonstrations in the cities of Da Nang, Tam Ky, Binh Son, and Quang Ngai and several assassinations and terrorist bombings during the week preceding the election. Minor attacks by fire (ABFs) on election morning against selected district and province headquarters, RP/PP OPs and ARVN headquarters climaxied this period. Continued enemy emphasis was placed on the reorganization, consolidation and improvement of the base areas and transportation corridors in the western highlands. All enemy offensive actions and their rear area activity were seriously disrupted by allied operations. These friendly operations, coupled with VCI/NVA recognition of the cost of massing forces in the face of allied firepower and mobility, resulted in the overall decline in major actions and the return to harassment, terrorist activity, small sapper attacks, and small ABFs.

   b. MR-5 Base Area Construction Plans. Captured MR-5 directives reveal a three year (1971-1973) plan for the establishment and development of Base area A in the mountainous area from the southern Ashau Valley to the Quang Ngai (P)-Binh Dinh (P) border. The purpose of this base area is to "fulfill
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Immediate and long range mission requirements and to prepare for an eventual cease-fire and future national defense." Development of transportation and communication networks linking North and South Vietnam and increased farm production are to be stressed in this area. Four VC provinces are being created. These are:

1. Lam Son - roughly the western 2/3s of GVN Quang Nam (P).
2. Nam Tra - roughly the western 2/3s of GVN Quang Tin (P).
3. Son Tra - roughly the western 2/3s of GVN Quang Ngai (P).
4. Yen The or Chien Thang - roughly northern GVN Kontum (P).
5. Roads and trail systems within and leading into the Base Area from Laos are to be developed and improved so the network will accommodate light trucks throughout. Farm production in Base Area A is to be increased to fully support the laborers working on the trail systems and infrastructure in the area. VR and IR sightings, FOs, and captured documents confirms this activity.

Quang Nam (P)

1. During the first reporting period there were four concentrations of high VC/NVA activity. The first two were Phases II and III of the enemy's Spring-Summer (KBCO) Campaign, and the other two centered on highpoints for the lower House and Presidential elections. Phase II of the KBCO Campaign was conducted from 1 to 3 May, Phase III from 29 May to 5 June, the Congressional election highpoint from 28 to 29 August, and the Presidential election highpoint from 26 Sep to 3 Oct 71.

(a) In May, Phases II and III of the KBCO Campaign were initiated in an attempt to disrupt GWN pacification efforts and return the people to VC/NVA controlled areas. This highpoint revolved around a large scale ABF and battalion size ground attack on Dai Loc (D) Headquarters. There were a number of smaller ABFs and ground attacks initiated against various EF and PF outposts near population centers.

(b) After four weeks of resupply and refitting VC/NVA forces initiated Phase III of KBCO. A battalion size ground attack was launched against hamlets in central Dai Yuyen (D) during a religious pilgrimage on 30 May. VC/NVA forces suffered heavy casualties during the ensuing engagement and were forced to withdraw.

(c) During early June, scattered medium intensity ABFs were reported
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throughout the Province, but no contacts or attacks of significance were reported. In the rest of June, and early August, enemy activity was confined to 3 to 7 day periods of small ABFs and ground attacks during periods of low lunar illumination (July 19 - 26; August 19 - 23). Enemy initiated incidents during interim periods were the result of security element reaction to allied activity.

(d) The first election highpoint consisted of a series of small scale ABFs launched against resettlement camps and population centers on 26 and 29 August. These attacks had no measurable effect on the Lower House election outcome.

(e) VC/NVA supply movement and base preparation for the monsoon began in earnest in late August and continued throughout the remainder of the reporting period. This activity reduced enemy offensive actions.

(f) Enemy efforts to disrupt the 3 Oct Presidential election concentrated on VCI support of anti-GVN and anti-US demonstrations in Da Nang from 26 Sep to 3 Oct. Small ABFs on election morning were intended to disrupt election procedures and to intimidate the population. Only the demonstration in Da Nang appreciably affected voter turnout.

(g) During the reporting period VC/NVA forces initiated 73 Ground Attack/Contacts by Fire, and 124 Anti-Air Incidents.

(2) Allied land clearing operations which began in mid-July in QUANG NAM (P) severely disrupted enemy base areas and LOCs. A special enemy unit, the 160th Anti-Tank Co., was formed to assist local guerrillas in countering these operations. Numerous mining incidents and small B-40 and B-41 rocket attacks against land clearing elements continued throughout the reporting period.

(3) There are eight NVA units in Quang Nam (P) which are directly subordinate to Front 4. These units are: 38th Regiment, 8th Sapper Battalion, 91st Sapper Battalion, 471st Naval Sapper Battalion, 9th Infantry Battalion, 575 Rocket Battalion, 577th Heavy Weapons Battalion, and the 160th Anti-Tank Company.

(a) The 38th Regiment was extremely active in connection with the RB50 Campaign. In early May, elements of the 8th and 9th Battalions of the 38th Regiment launched an attack by fire coupled with a ground attack against Dai Loc (D) Headquarters. During the 3rd phase of the RB50 offensive the 38th Regiment combined with elements of the 91st Sapper Battalion launched an attack in Duy Xuyen (D). During these two engagements, the Regiment lost approximately 325 men, 10 CSC, and 66 IWC. Because of these severe losses,
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(Americo), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RGCSFOR - 65 (R) (U)

the 38th Regiment was forced to move back into Base Area 112, where they have since remained.

(b) The 8th Sapper Battalion has been fairly inactive since the last reporting period. On the 2nd of May elements of the 8th Battalion joined with the 38th Regiment in the attack on Dai Loc (D) Headquarters. Since that attack the 8th Battalion has avoided contact with Allied units and is presently located in Base Area 112, where it is expected to remain until the end of the monsoons.

(c) The 91st Sapper Battalion has taken part in only one major engagement during this reporting period. This engagement took place when elements of the 91st Battalion combined with elements of the 38th Regiment for an attack in Duy Xuyen (D) on 30 May. The attacking forces took heavy losses in this engagement and were forced to withdraw. Since this attack the 91st Battalion has confined itself to resupply and training activities.

(d) The 471st Naval Sapper Battalion is new to the Quang Nam area, and information on the unit is limited. The M6's reported that the Battalion was formed in Quang Ngai (P) and moved into Quang Nam in June with a strength of 175 men. The personnel in this unit have undergone extensive water sapper training, and it's believed that the unit's primary mission is to target strategic bridges along QL1 and the harbor installations in Da Nang.

(e) The 9th Infantry Battalion has not participated in any major engagements during this reporting period, but has concerned itself with its primary mission of protecting the supply routes of the 575th Rocket Battalion.

(f) During the reporting period captured documents revealed that the 575th Rocket Battalion had undergone reorganisation in November 1970. The change gave the 575th Battalion most of the 122mm rocket elements of the 577th Heavy Weapons Battalion, while the 575th Battalion gave up all other heavy weapons elements. With the change in the Battalion's weapons, the unit's mission also changed from providing support for combat elements to launching 122mm rocket AERs on Allied locations. The unit is quite effective in this role.

(g) In its reorganisation of November 1970, the 577th Heavy Weapons Battalion received from the 38th Regiment a recoilless rifle element and a mortar element. These additions strengthened the 577th Battalion for its primary mission as a heavy weapons unit and it was used in small teams to support LF and MF units.

(h) The 160th Anti-Tank Company is a newly formed unit. This 30 man
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force was formed from various sapper elements in the province in an attempt to combat the allied land clearing operations in Quang Nam (F). From anti-armor incidents with land clearing operations, it has become apparent that the 160th is armed with RPGs and various anti-tank mines.

(1) In addition to the above units there are a total of 11 Main Force and Local Force units in Quang Nam (F). For the most part these units confined themselves to small scale offensive operations and concentrated on resupply, retraining and harassment activities.

(4) Significant incidents during this reporting period include:

On 26 April at BT69582 Dien Ban subsector received an ABF of 50 rounds 82mm and 60mm mortar. Result: 1 Civ KIA, 1 Civ WIA, unknown number of homes destroyed.

On 2 May at AT916577 Dai Loc (D) HQ received 250 rounds of unknown type mortar and a ground attack from UNSF. Result: 13 RF KIA, 53 RF WIA, 10 Civ KIA, 100 VC KIA, 33 IHC, 10 CSWG.

On 3 May at AT914576 Dai Loc received 90 rounds 82mm mortar from UNSF. Result: 5 US WIA.

On 30 May at BT098527 RF #122 received unknown amount of 82mm mortar and ground attack from UNSF. Result: 225 VC KIA, 31 IHC, 16 x B-40, 113 Chicom H/Gren CIA.

On 21 June at BT091550 a bridge was blown resulting in making QL-1 impassable.

On 23 June at AT836376, 73th Border Ranger Battalion received 50 rounds 82mm mortar and 2 satchel charges. Result: 3 frd KIA, 2 frd WIA.

On 25 June at AT96614 16th PF Co received 15 round ABF and ground attack. Result: 1 Civ KIA, 1 Civ WIA, 4 frd WIA, 2 VC KIA.

On 29 June at AT966616 51st Regiment CP received 10 x 122mm rockets. Result: 1 US KIA (SA 1st Task Force), 4 US WIA.

On 4 July at Dan Ngai Airfield received 6 x 122mm rockets. Result: 5 US KIA, 37 US WIA.

On 30 July at BT069581 Dien Ban (D) HQ received 15 rounds 82mm mortar. Result: NCD.
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On 19 August at BT048602 unknown size sapper force attacked Thanh Fong. Result: 1 Civ KIA, 28 structures destroyed.

On 25 August at AT903519 1-51 ARVN conducted BDA of AS. Result: 100 enemy KIA, 4 structures and 3 huts destroyed.

On 26 August at AT953524 B/1-1 Cav received AMF, SAF, and RPG fire. Result: 7 frd KIA, 2 M-113 destroyed, 1 M-551 damaged.

On 13 September at AT917314 Recon Co 5 ARVN received 500 rounds 57 and 75mm R. 35 rounds 60mm mortar, unknown amount SAF/AMF. US G/S engaged enemy. Result: 1 frd KIA, 9 WIA, 50 enemy KIA. Two IWC.

On 14 September at AT983577 59th Land Clearing Co received 4 x B-40 rockets, 2 unknown type mortar rounds and unknown amount SAF. Result: NCD.

On 24 September at AT985540 60th Land Clearing Co received 1 B-40 round. Result: 4 frd WIA.

On 25 September at AT935582 59th Land Clearing Co detonated 2 175mm rd BT's. Result: 2 US WIA, 2 bulldozers moderately damaged.

On 30 Sep at AT914513 3-51 ARVN received 40 rounds B-40 rockets and 82mm mortar from USSEF. Result: 3 frd WIA.

On 3 October USSEF fired 4 rounds 122mm rockets at Da Nang AFB, 10 rounds 82mm mortar at BT065731, 6 rounds unknown type mortar at AT870621, 7 60mm mortar at AT890470 and 3 rounds 122mm rocket at AT825455. Result: NCD.

d. Quang Tin (P):

(1) Enemy activity decreased noticeably during the past five months as VC/WIA forces completed Phase III of the B-81 Campaign in May and initiated only one new campaign. The C-62 Campaign was designed to disrupt both the Lower House and the Presidential elections, and consisted of two main highpoint periods centered on the elections; Aug 29th and Oct 3rd respectively. The C-62 Campaign failed to achieve its goal. In general, enemy forces continued to attempt to remove civilians from refugee and resettlement areas and return them to VC controlled areas. Internally, VC cadre concentrated on political training and the creation of sapper elements in all VC units.

(2) Enemy activity remained at a low level until the final week in May when enemy forces initiated Phase III of B-81 Campaign. The highpoint occurred on the 24th of May with rocket attacks on Tam Ky City, Chu Lai Combat Base, and
FSB Fat City. Enemy forces also initiated three light ground attacks.

(a) During June and July, activity remained light as enemy units concentrated on resupply, food production, and retraining. A high concentration of anti-air incidents correlated with captured documents placed the 404th NVA Sapper Battalion (a new unit) in Que Son (D). To avoid Allied operations, the 404th NVA Sapper Battalion later withdrew into Duc Duc (D), Quang Nam (P).

(b) On 19 July documents captured in Que Son (D) indicated that the 31st Regiment, 2d NVA Division was returning from Laos. The Regiment had withdrawn from Quang Tin (P) in July 1970 after suffering heavy losses during contacts in the Hiop Duc (D) area. Heavy APD readings and VF sightings of heavy trail activity along the Quang Nam (P) - Quang Tin (P) border in early and middle August revealed the units eastward movement into Que Son (D). On 21 August, the 31st Regiment initiated a battalion size ground attack and ABFs against a PF outpost in the Dai Loc Son area (BT0829).

(c) During the month of August, enemy activity increased radically with ground contacts and attacks by fire in the Dai Loc Son area by VC/NVA units. These attacks were possibly launched to kidnap civilians from GVN controlled areas, and to terrorize people into voting for anti-GVN candidates in the upcoming lower House elections. The election high point (Phase 1, C-62 Campaign) climaxed on 29 and 30 August as VC/NVA forces launched several attacks by fire and one large ground attack.

(d) During September, enemy activity dropped to a low level as enemy forces again concentrated on their supplies and training. Captured documents outlined VC/NVA plans for Phase II of the C-62 Campaign. This phase was to be directed against refugees and resettlement camps, the assassination of GVN officials, and the disruption of the Presidential election. The high point began on 21 Sep. as VC/NVA forces attacked a village (AT03237) in Hiop Duc (D) and kidnapped more than 35 civilians.

(e) The enemy forces in Quang Tin (P) conducted 58 attacks by fire, 58 ground attack contacts, and 153 anti-air attacks during the past five months. During this report period US forces accounted for the killing of 324 VC/NVA.

(3) There are five units in Quang Tin (P) that are directly subordinate to MA-5: the 31st NVA Regiment, the 406th NVA Sapper Battalion, the 409th MF Sapper Battalion, the 402nd MF Sapper Battalion, and the 78th MF Rocket Company.

(a) The 31st NVA Regiment, with an estimated strength of 1,000 men, is composed of three battalions and various support companies. During the past five months, the Regiment returned from Laos and engaged in a number of ground
contacts in the Mui Loc Son area (BTO828) and then withdrew to its present
location along the Quang Nam (P) - Quang Tin (P) border. Over 400 VC/NVA were
killed in engagements in the Mui Loc Son area. These contacts occurred in
late August and early September and no identified contacts have been made with
the 31st since.

(b) The 404th NVA Sapper Battalion, with an estimated strength of 200 men,
moved into an area along the Duc Duc (D)-Que Son (D) border in June and conducted
small sapper attacks on three PF OPs in late June. In late August, the Battalion
launched ground attacks and attacks by fire against elements of 3rd ARVN
(BTO86285) during Phase I (Lower House election highpoint) of the C-62 Campaign,
23 NVA were killed and 120 concussion H/Grens CIA. No other contacts with the
unit were identified.

(c) The 402nd NVA Sapper Battalion, with a strength of approximately 240 men,
is composed of six companies, one of which is a water sapper company. During
the past five months, the battalion has been operating along the Quang Tin (P)-
Quang Ngai (P) border. The battalion is not known to have participated in any
high point activities.

(d) The 409th NVA Sapper Battalion is considered the most effective
unit operating in Quang Tin (P). With a strength of approximately 260 men, this
unit is capable of launching violent and sudden attacks. In the past five months
the battalion has moved to an area along the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai (P) border.
and is not believed to have engaged in any high point activities.

(e) The 78th NVA Rocket Company has a strength of 88 men. During the past
five months the 78th has rocketed Chu Lai Combat Base twice and FSB Fat City
once causing only light casualties and doing little damage.

(f) The provincial units in Quang Tin (P) include three infantry battalions,
the 70th, the 72nd, and D-11; one combat support battalion, the 74th; and
one sapper group, V16.

1 The 70th Battalion, with a strength of 40 men, remained fairly inactive
during the past five months. On 9 Aug allied forces initiated HIEP DONG 9 in
the area of the 70th, 72nd, and 74th Battalions. In this operation approximately
150 VC were reportedly killed. It is believed that most of the VC killed belong
to the three battalions mentioned.

2 The 72nd Battalion is considered the least effective battalion in the
Province. The 72nd did not participate in either of the election high points.
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(America), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RDS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

D-11 Infantry Battalion continued to be inactive. After its loss of 42
men in April, it is held with a strength of 120 men, leaving it combat ineffective.

Captured documents indicated that the 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion has
been broken into separate support companies directly under the control of the
provincial headquarters. The companies are believed to be using a base area in
the vic of BT1423.

No contacts were reported with either company of the V-16 Sapper Group.
The 1st Company is held at BT2312 with a strength of 32 men, and the 2nd Company
is held at BT0440, also with a strength of 32 men.

Significant incidents during this reporting period include:

On 24 May at BT293212, an UNSEF fired 4 122mm rockets at Tcm Ky City.
Result: 1 VN Civ KIA, 1 structure destroyed.

On 24 May at BT524096, an UNSEF fired 6 123mm rockets at HQ, 23rd Inf
Div. NCD.

On 24 May at BT436075, an UNSEF fired 2 122mm rockets and 2 unknown
type rounds at C/1-14 Arty (PSB Fat City). NCD.

On 24 August at BT051300, 5th ARVN received unknown count B-40 rocket
type, 60mm mortar fire, and ground attack from estimated NVA Battalion. Result:
2 PA KIA, 8 PA WIA (E), 46 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA, 14 WIA, 1 CSLW.

On 29 August at BT085285, 3-5 ARVN received ground attack from UNSEF.
Result: 10 ARVN KIA, 14 ARVN WIA (E), 23 NVA KIA, 7 WIA, 120 concussion H/Grens
CIA.

On 29 August at BT077282, an UNSEF fired 75 rounds 82mm mortar at 3-5
ARVN. NCD.

On 30 August at BT210232, an UNSEF fired 20 rounds 57mm RR at Phu Lai
(V). NCD.

On 21 September at AT903237, an UNSEF BNG a village. Result: 2 PSDFs
KIA, 36 Civ WIA, 25 homes destroyed.

On 23 September elements of B/123 Aviation Battalion supported by 20th
TASS engaged UNSEF at AS905896 and AS972916, resulting in 35 NVA KIA, 36 WIA, 36
bunkers, one cal .51 position, one 3/4 ton truck, and possibly one pallet of
122mm rockets (approximately) destroyed.
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AVDF-HL 1 November 1971

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On 1 October at BT412'26, an estimated VC squad entered a village. Result: 1 police HQs destroyed.

On 1 October at BT107416, an UNSEF entered Phu Hue (K). Result: 1 hamlet chief assassinated, 1 IW lost.

On 3 October at BT220123, an UNSEF fired 5 122mm rockets at Tam Ky City. Result: NOD.

QUANG NGAI (P)

(1) The general situation in QUANG NGAI (P) has not changed drastically since the end of last reporting period (30 Apr 71). The VC/NVA have not extended their power base beyond the mountains in the western half of the province.

(2) The implementation of the spring and summer offensive (B.81) began on 24 Apr 71, placed main emphasis upon disrupting the pacification program and discrediting the GV/N's ability to protect the people. The majority of enemy attacks were aimed at refugee, relocation and resettlement areas as well as RP/PF and ARVN outposts. The enemy's mission was to liberate the refugees and return them to VC/NVA controlled areas. August saw the advent of the fall and winter offensive (T.27). Major objectives of this offensive were resupply and disruption of the Lower House (29 Aug) and Presidential (3 Oct) elections. Resupply was of great importance due to the success of prior friendly rice denial operations.

(a) Politically, the enemy attempted to strengthen and rebuild the infrastructure in villages and hamlets. Some recruitment of youth and selection of personnel for further training in NVA was also reported.

(b) A major objective of T.27 was the disruption of the elections. The Lower House elections on 29 Aug 71, triggered several attacks by fire as did the 3 Oct 71 Presidential elections. These attacks, however, were very limited in scope. This may be partly attributed to the enemy's desire not to antagonize the populace, but rather to encourage support of anti-Thieu candidates. During the Presidential election, the enemy placed more emphasis on propaganda and political demonstrations to produce a negative reaction to the election. However, the major factor in the limited nature of this offensive was the general military weakness of the enemy.

(c) Since 30 Apr 71, there have been 444 incidents initiated by the enemy. 256 of these were anti-air incidents, 107 were attacks by fire, and 81 were ground attack/contacts.
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(d) The enemy continued to utilize the Moc Ong, Dak Drinh, Song Be, and
Dak Salo corridors for transportation purposes.

(3) In Quang Ngai (P), MR-5 directly controls five units.

(a) The 21st NVA Infantry Regiment is the largest and potentially the most
dangerous unit in the province. This unit has not, however, been committed
offensively during this period except in limited response to friendly operations
in its base areas.

(b) The 240th NVA Transportation Regiment has the responsibility of trans-
porting supplies throughout the province. This Regiment has 8 subordinate bat-
talions.

(c) The 36th Main Force Sapper Battalion is a very effective fighting unit.
In late August this Battalion moved from western Binh Son (D) to southeastern BA
TO (D). However, it is possible that an element remained in the unit's former
area of operation. The Battalion has not been identified in contact during the
last five months.

(d) The 403rd NVA Sapper Battalion is located in southeastern BA TO (D) and
also has not initiated any identified contacts within the past 5 months.

(c) The Quang Ngai Province Force controls 2 NVA battalions, (107th Heavy
Weapons Battalion and 40th Sapper Battalion) 3 local force battalions, (38th LF
Battalion, 48th LF Battalion, and 120th LF Montagnard Battalion) and 17 local
force companies.

1. The 48th LF Battalion has been the most active unit within the Province.
Elements of this unit operate in task groups with local force companies and have,
at times, received support from the 107th NVA Heavy Weapons Battalion.

2. The 107th NWA Heavy Weapons Battalion operates throughout the province.
The Battalion is broken down into small fire elements (3-10 men) which supply
fire support to various units during their operations.

(4) Significant Incidents:

On 1 May, at BS615557, 4/4 AHVN found and evacuated 6600 lbs of rice.

On 12 May, at BS754546, RF #103 found and evacuated 10,000 lbs of rice.

On 17 May, at A954875, 3/5 AHVN engaged an UH-60L. Resulting in 5 VC
KIA, 2 IWC, 2500 lbs of corn and 2000 lbs of rice destroyed.
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On 23 May, at AS974743, Ben/2 ARVN found and destroyed 3300 lbs of rice, 5500 lbs corn, and 220 lbs of potatoes.

On 30 May, at AS977836, D/1-1 Cav, B/123rd Aviation Battalion, and 2-5 ARVN, along with VNAF engaged an USNRF resulting in 23 VC KIA.

On 17 June, at BS186618, 2-6 ARVN received an attack by fire consisting of 20 rounds 82mm mortar, 20 rounds B/40, 20 rounds B/41, and 10 rounds of 97mm ER fire. This was followed by a ground attack, resulting in 29 VC KIA, 41 WNC, 50x57mm rounds, 20x82mm mortar rounds, 47xB40 & 41 rounds, and 280 Chicom H/Gs CIA.

On 19 June, at BS513714, B/123rd Aviation Battalion engaged an enemy element resulting in 14 VC KIA.

On 20 June, at AS953874, 1-5 ARVN engaged an USNRF resulting in 43 NVA KIA, 10 WNC, 16 CSMC, 200,000 rounds SA amo, 166 U/I type grenades, 100 B/41 rockets, and 20 bicycles CIA.

On 14 August, at BS9296504, G-4 ARVN engaged an USNRF resulting in 7 VC KIA, 1 CSMC, 320x82mm mortar rounds, 10x122mm rockets, 60,000 rounds SA amo, 240 B/40 & 41 rounds, and 3 cases of plastic explosives CIA.

On 17 August, at BS977798, 4-6 ARVN found and destroyed 10,000 lbs of rice.

On 23 August, at BS387702, Son Ha (D) HQ received an attack by fire consisting of 50x82mm mortar rounds. NCD.

On 24 August, at BS387702, an USNRF fired 20x82mm mortar rounds at Son Ha (D) HQ. NCD.

On 3 October, at BS645730, Quang Ngai City received an attack by fire consisting of 4x122mm rockets. This resulted in 1 VN Civ KIA and 2 VN Civ WIA.

(5) The most effective operations made in this Province have been rice denial and transportation corridor interdiction along the Song Be, Song Ve, Moc Ong, Dak Drinh, and Song Tra Bong corridors. During the past five months, US forces have accounted for 522 VC/NVA KIA.
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f. ASSESSMENT: In these three Provinces, the enemy has failed to carry out successful large scale ground attacks and has regressed into the second stage of insurgent warfare. The following period should hold to the same trends; with some small scale ground attacks and ABFs focused on communication lines and population centers with special emphasis placed along QL-1. Small scale attacks by fire and ground contacts will also result as a response to counter operations against enemy transportation and resupply routes. This regression to limited activity reflects the enemy's weaknesses of low morale and personnel and logistical shortages. Kidnappings, assassinations, and other terrorist activity will rise as the enemy attempts to maintain a viable presence in the area.

2. (C) G2 Operations

a. On 7 October 1971, all Division Surveillance Platoon assets in the 11th Infantry Brigade TAOI were recovered and all sites were evacuated. The only existing site in Quang Tin province is Chu Lai. Camp Reasoner is the only site in Quang Nam province. Three sites are occupied by the SARS relay system. Since 1 May 1971, 12,123 intruders were detected from a total of 843 spot reports.

b. Aerial Reconnaissance Missions continue to obtain timely information on enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period, 495 Infrared missions, 129 APD missions, 215 Photo missions and 1,280 VR missions were flown.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company:

a. Counterintelligence (CI) Section.

(1) During the reporting period there were three reported incidents of possible sabotage. Investigations were not conclusive, and follow-up investigations were not required by USARV. There were no reported incidents of possible or actual subversion or espionage.

(2) Of the 226 investigations conducted pertaining to unauthorized Vietnamese Nationals on Chu Lai Base during the last reporting period, not one was found to be of CI interest. In all cases Vietnamese Nationals investigated were in violation of regulations which should have been enforced by the Military Police rather than the Counterintelligence Section. The routine investigation of unauthorized Vietnamese Nationals found on Chu Lai Base was discontinued during this reporting period. CI has limited its investigative interest, with respect to Vietnamese Nationals, to those individuals who were alleged to have been involved in intelligence activities. However, no Vietnamese Nationals were
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determined to be in fact involved.

(3) CI Sweeps have been conducted on the following unit areas.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>C Co, 26th Eng Bn</td>
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<td>23d MP Substation</td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
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<td>A Co, 228th Aviation Bn</td>
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<td>59th Co (IPSD)</td>
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<td>H Troop, 17th Cav</td>
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UNIT                              LOCATION
90th Chem Det                     Chu Lai
G Co, 75th Ranger Co              Chu Lai
B Co, 23d Med Bn                  Chu Lai
3-18 Arty Bn                      Chu Lai
E Co, 26th Eng Bn                 Chu Lai
71st Avn Co                       Chu Lai
11th Inf Bde, Standdown Area      Chu Lai
1-20 Inf Bn                       Chu Lai
3-1 Inf Bn                        Chu Lai
252 Radar Det                     Sugarmill Hill
1-14 Arty                         (Siberia) FSB
1-20 Inf Bn                       (Siberia) FSB
1-20 Inf Bn                       (West) FSB
1-14 Arty Bn                      (West) FSB
HHG, 11th Inf Bde                 Chu Lai
B Trp, 1st Cav                    Chu Lai
D Btry, 6-11 Arty Bn              Hill 411
HQ Btry, 6-11 Arty Bn              LZ Dottie
1-52 Inf Bn                       LZ Scoopy
3-1 Inf Bn                        Hill 411
4-3 Inf Bn                        LZ Professional
6-11 Arty Bn                      Chu Lai
HHB Div Arty
231st Ground Surv Det             LZ Rawhide
D Btry, 1-14 Arty Bn               LZ Stinson
HHG 1-52 Inf Bn                   LZ Stinson
437 Dental Det                    Chu Lai

(4) Counterintelligence Inspections, 1 May 71 - 15 Oct 71

Announced                         10
Unannounced                       14
AGI                               27
Courtesy                          50
PSI                               24
DAMS Assists                      165
CI Sweeps                         69

(5) During the reporting period the CI Section case officers conducted 185 source meetings and turned in 818 Information reports.

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% 0 16.5 50.9 15.9 1.1 12.1 3.5 100

b. Interrogation Section

(1) During the reporting period the IPW Section interrogated and classified 349 detainees. The break-down of detainees by classification reveals the following.

May 71 - Oct 71

PW/IVA 50
PW/VC 51
Civil Defendant (CD) 109
Innocent Civilian (IC) 110
Inclassified 0
Returnees 42

(2) Information gained from 11 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The break-down by classification for detainees providing useful information is as follows:

Returnees 1
Fees 7
Detainees 3

Tactical units reacted to such information as location of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemy base areas.
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5. Imagery Interpretation Section

(1) During the reporting period the II Section conducted the following missions:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visual Reconnaissance Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hand-held Photography Missions</td>
<td>145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrared Missions</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Missions</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) In addition, the II Section read out 125 Air Force Photo Missions.

d. Order of Battle Section

(1) The Order of Battle Section made no major operational changes during the current reporting period. The only significant change dealt with the G2's Weekly Intelligence Brief. The Briefing was made more concise with an increased emphasis on an analysis and interpretation of trends indicating possible future enemy activities.

(2) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle Section prepared two special projects:

(a) An Area Study was produced in August on the 31st NVA Regiment for the years 1968, 1969 and 1970 because of the Regiment returning from Laos to the Division TAOI.

(b) During August a detailed trail study was prepared of southern Quang Tin (P) and northern Quang Ngai (P), with emphasis placed on possible transhipment points. The study included both enemy and friendly activities in the area during 1970 and 1971.

(3) Numerous Area Studies, Specialised Unit Analysis, and Infiltration Group Studies were prepared. Several studies were also made of particular Allied Operations and enemy initiated campaigns.

- Luc Luong 66 Scout Section (KCS).

(1) During the period 1 May to 15 Oct 71 there were no classes held at the Luc Luong 66 Training Center. This was because of the hiring of former Marine Scouts and the stand-down of 23d Inf Div units. During this period one scout was presented with the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device.

(2) During the reporting period, 148 Scouts were terminated for the following reasons:

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KIA - 1
WIA - 2
AWOL - 61
Resignation - 7
Unsatisfactory Performance - 19
Reduction in Force - 46
Other - 12

4. Co G (Ranger), 75th Infantry: During the period, there were 69 long range reconnaissance patrols conducted within the Division AO including 24 area reconnaissance missions, 15 observation post missions, 8 combined area reconnaissance and observation post missions, and 2 special missions. In 17 sightings, the patrols observed 97 enemy personnel. Results were 8 enemy KIA and 3 US WIA. Company G was notified that it was to stand-down in country between 14 and 25 September 1971. Mission activity continued until 14 September and stand-down procedures were completed on 25 September 1971.

5. (C) Enemy unit locations and movements: Based on FW interrogations, documents and other reliable sources, the following are locations of major enemy units in the 23d Infantry Division TAOL:

QUANG NAM FORCES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
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C. (C) Operations.

1. Major Engagements: Division forces were not involved in any major engagements during the six month reporting period.

2. Operations by AO:

(a) Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK conducted by t.) 198th Infantry Brigade was continued from the previous reporting period. In the first 4 days of May 71 there was light contact reported by the units in MIDDLESEX PEAK. On 5 May action increased, with an element of D/1-52 Inf, vic BS349806, engaging 5 NVA. Results of this contact were 5 NVA KIA. 3-16 Arty at 1730H engaged 3 VC vic BT177214, resulting in 3 VC KIA. On 6-9 May action again slowed as there were no significant contacts reported. B/26 Engr at 101030H, detonated an unknown type mine vic BT218227. Results of this were 2 US KIA, 8 US WIA(E). On 12 May E/1-6 Inf, while conducting a patrol vic BT421048, engaged an UNSEF. The enemy returned fire and evaded. E/1-6 Inf swept the area and found 4 VC KIA. There was also 1 US WIA(E). At 153021H, an aerial observer from Div Arty, while on a VR vic BS092647, found 4 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 1-15 May were: 16 NVA KIA, 23 VC KIA, 4 detainees and 5 WIC. Friendly casualties were: 2 US KIA, 15 US WIA(E).

D/1-52 Inf on 16 May engaged an UNSEF vic BS509912, resulting in 3 VC KIA and 2 WAM detained. The 198th Bde units reported light contact on 17 May.

At 0755H, an element of B/1-6 Inf engaged an UNSEF vic BS395797. Results of this contact were: 1 VC KIA, 1 US WIA(E). In another early morning firefight, A/1-52 Inf, vic BS552792, engaged and killed 1 VC. In two contacts 7/75th Rangers engaged 2 VC. Results of this contact were: 1 VN detained, 1 VC KIA, and 1 WIC. At 1100H a UH-IH from the 116 AVN received SAF vic AS865884, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Light contact prevailed in the 198th Bde AO on 19 May.

In the only significant action reported D/1-52 Inf engaged 3 NVA vic BS350808. Results of this fire fight were: 2 NVA KIA, 1 WIC and 1 US WIA(E). On 20 May B/4-3 Inf detonated a mechanical ambush vic BT184037 resulting in 2 US WIA(E). A patrol from B/1-52 Inf engaged 1 VC vic BS510838, resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1520H A/4-3 engaged and killed 2 VC vic BT184037. At 1150H a CH-47 from the 132 AHC received SAF vic AS9069-732, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Booby traps again took their toll on 21 May as A/4-3 Inf detonated one vic BT200014, resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 22 May an OH-6A from D/1-1 Cav received SAF vic BT350083, resulting in 3 US WIA(E). At 2300H, 23 May, Recon/1-6 and D/1-1 Cav combined to kill 3 VC in the vic of BT12026. A patrol from A/1-52 Inf detonated a B/T 81mm mortar round vic BS550822. Results of this were 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). 26 May saw the gunships of D/1-1 Cav and the 71st AVN combine to kill 4 VC vic...
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BT180212. A D-7 dozer from the 59th Land Clearing Co detonated a booby trap vic BS557778, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Operations on 26 May were dominated by the 1-52 Inf Bn. At 0800H Recon/1-52 Inf ambushed 3 VC vic BS565881 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 6 IWC. In a combined operation, 0/3-52 Inf and the 116 AVN killed 6 VC and captured 1 IN, vic BS551169. On 27 May D/1-1 Cav engaged an UNSF, vic AS832876, resulting in 4 NVA KIA. Action increased somewhat on 29 May, but overall action continued to be light. D/4-3 Inf reported 2 incidents, vic BS229993, and BS234994, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 IWC. At 1125H, a patrol from A/4-3 Inf found 8 CSW vic BS123994, resulting in 8 CSWC. 0/1-52 Inf engaged 1 VC vic BS572858, resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 0040H a gunship from D/1-1 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC vic BS797770. 0/1-3 Inf detonated 2 C/T, vic BT185092 and BT188096. Total results of the 2 incidents were 10 US WIA(E). On 30 May, the gunships from D/1-1 and B/123 AVN combined to kill 10 VC, vic AS977836. Cumulative results for the period 16-31 May were reported as: 64 EN KIA, 19 detainees, 16 INC and 8 CSWC. US casualties were: 42 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). At 1105H 1 June, 0/4-3 Inf killed 1 VC when a mechanical ambush detonated, vic BT208107. A/4-3 Inf engaged 3 VC vic BS162998 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 WN detained. In a contact at 0100H, A/1-52 Inf engaged an UNSF, vic BS563818, killing 1 VC and detaining 2 WN. B/3-16 Artillery killed 5 VC while firing on a suspected enemy location, vic BT203152. On 2 June at 1800H a patrol from D/4-3 Inf detained 2 WN, vic BS491817. Results of these contacts were, 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Action in the AO continued to be light on 3 June. B/1-52 Inf detained 2 WN, vic BS492827. At 1400H, a D-7 dozer from the 59th Engv detonated a B/T 105mm round, resulting in 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). B/4-3 Inf at 1555H, engaged and killed 1 VC, vic BT208061. At 1510H a patrol from A/1-6 engaged an UNSF, vic BT438286. Results of this fire fight were 1 VC KIA, 2 IWC and 1 WN detained. A UH-1H from the 116 AVN received SAF at 1405H vic AS977854 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Gunships from D/1-1 engaged and killed 1 VC, vic BS731765. 198th Bde units reported light contact on 4 June. At 1730H, a patrol from Recon/4-3 Inf detained 1 WN, vic BT190024. D/1-52 Inf engaged in two fire fights at 0835H and 1650H, vic BS505856. Results of these contacts were, 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Action in the AO continued to be light on 5 June. B/1-52 Inf detained 2 WN, vic BS492827. At 1400H, a D-7 dozer from the 59th Engv detonated a B/T 105mm round, resulting in 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). B/4-3 Inf at 1555H, engaged and killed 1 VC, vic BT208061. At 1510H a patrol from A/1-6 engaged an UNSF, vic BT438286. Results of this fire fight were 1 VC KIA, 2 IWC and 1 WN detained. A UH-1H from the 116 AVN received SAF at 1405H vic AS977854 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Gunships from D/1-1 engaged and killed 1 VC, vic BS731765. 198th Bde units reported light contact on 4 June. At 1730H, a patrol from Recon/4-3 Inf detained 1 WN, vic BT190024. In contact at 1955H, B/1-52 Inf received heavy SAF, vic BS495830, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E). At 1206H, gunships from B/123 AVN engaged an UNSF, vic AS976866 resulting in 2 VC KIA. Results for the period 1-5 June were: 14 EN KIA, 14 detainees, and 3 IWC. US casualties were: 1 US KIA, 10 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). In the 1st Bn, 52 Inf AO on 7 June, elements of the Recon Plt at BS542817 tripped a booby trapped 82mm mortar round resulting in 4 US WIA(E). In another contact at BS357756, 0/1-52 Inf engaged an UNSF with SAF and AWF. Results of this encounter were 1 VC KIA and 3 US WIA(M). At coordinates...
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On 8 June 1-6 Inf and D/1-1 Cav engaged 25 VC. In the brief fire
fight, E/1-6 Inf received credit for 7 VC KIA and D/1-1 Cav received credit
for 2 VC KIA. There were no friendly casualties. In a sweep of the same
area of contact on 9 June, C/1-6 Inf and D/1-1 Cav engaged 25 VC.

On 10 June A/1-6 Inf vic B/520924, received SAF from an UNSEF, resulting in 2 US WIA(E). B/4-3 Inf vic BT90098, received SAF, resulting in 2 US WIA(H). On 11 June, 3/4-3 Inf had a mechanical ambush detonate, vic BS177795, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 WIA. G/75th Rangers received SAF, vic BT320061, resulting in 1 US WIA(M). On 12 June, 3/4-3 Inf vic BT168006, received 1 WIA(E) and 1 WIA(M).

On 13 June, 1/1-1 Cav, vic BT330219, engaged 2 VC, resulting in 2 VC KIA. D/1-1 Cav again engaged 1 VC, vic BS371782, resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 14 June, 11th AVN engaged 3 VC, vic BS162774, resulting in 3 VC KIA. D/4-3 Inf on 15 June received 4 M79 rounds, resulting in 2 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). This incident occurred vic BT241100. On 17 June A/4-3 Inf vic BT135235, engaged 4 VC, resulting in 2 detainees and 1 WIA. 1/1-52 Inf vic BS394812, engaged 2 NVA, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 WIA(M).

On 18 June B/1-52 Inf vic BS518892 engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 WIA(E). Gunships from the 16th AVN engaged 2 VC, vic BS397780, resulting in 2 VC KIA. On 19 June had a mechanical ambush detonate, vic BS126911, resulting in 2 US WIA(E).

On 20 June B/1-52 Inf vic BS518892 engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA. D/1-52 Inf vic BS365773 engaged 4 NVA, results: 4 NVA KIA and 2 WIA. D/1-52 Inf vic BS365773 engaged 2 VC, results: 2 VC KIA, and 1 WIA. D/1-52 Inf vic BS371787 engaged an UNSEF, results: 1 US KIA; 1 NVA KIA. On 21 June D/4-3 Inf vic BT98267, received a unknown amount of mortar fire, resulting in 1 US KIA; 5 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). On 22 June D/4-3 Inf vic BT087280 had a mechanical ambush detonate, res: 1 VC KIA. A/4-3 vic BT126922 on 19 June detonated unknown type mine resulting in 2 US WIA(E).

G/75th Rangers vic BT349071 received SAF and CCG, resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 20 June B/1-52 Inf vic BS18892 engaged 1 VC, results: 1 VC KIA. D/1-52 Inf vic BS365773 engaged 4 NVA, results: 4 NVA KIA and 4 WIA. D/1-52 Inf vic BS365773 engaged 2 VC, results: 2 VC KIA, and 1 WIA. D/1-1 Cav again engaged 1 VC, vic BS371782, resulting in 1 VC KIA. A/4-3 vic BT135235, engaged 4 VC, resulting in 2 detainees and 1 WIA. 1/1-52 Inf vic BS394812, engaged 2 NVA, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 WIA(M).

On 23 June, D/1-1 Cav engaged 1 VC, vic BS371782, resulting in 1 VC KIA. D/4-3 Inf vic BS162774, engaged 1 VC, vic BS371782, resulting in 1 VC KIA. D/4-3 Inf on 15 June received 4 M79 rounds, resulting in 2 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). This incident occurred vic BT241100. On 17 June A/4-3 Inf vic BT135235, engaged 4 VC, resulting in 2 detainees and 1 WIA. 1/1-52 Inf vic BS394812, engaged 2 NVA, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 WIA(M).

On 24 June D/1-52 Inf vic BS168006, received 1 WIA(E) and 1 WIA(M).

On 25 June 1/1-52 Inf vic BS365773 engaged 4 NVA, results: 4 NVA KIA and 2 WIA. D/1-52 Inf vic BS365773 engaged 2 VC, results: 2 VC KIA, and 1 WIA. D/1-1 Cav again engaged 1 VC, vic BS371782, resulting in 1 VC KIA. A/4-3 vic BT135235, engaged 4 VC, resulting in 2 detainees and 1 WIA. 1/1-52 Inf vic BS394812, engaged 2 NVA, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 WIA(M).

On 26 June B/1-52 Inf vic BS518892 engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 WIA(E). Gunships from the 16th AVN engaged 2 VC, vic BS397780, resulting in 2 VC KIA. On 27 June C/1-52 Inf vic BS256126, detonated a B/T, resulting in 2 US WIA(E). As the dust off ship came in, his rotor-wash detonated a second B/T resulting in 1 US WIA(E). C/1-52 Inf
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vic BS515873 found 2 graves, results: 2 VC KIA. C/4-3 while on search and clear operations on 28 June, detonated a B/T vic BS256l23, results: 2 US KIA(E). On 29 June A/4-3 vic BT174019 had a mechanical ambush detonate, results: 1 VC KIA. D/4-3 while on search and clear operations vic BT288-068 received SAF resulting in 1 US WIA(E). D/1-6 while on search and clear operations vic BS469972 on 30 June, engaged 2 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 I/C. The snipers, 1-52, vic BS546861, engaged 3 VC, results: 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC. A/3-18 Arty vic BS340900, received 20-24x82mm rounds, resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). B/123 AVN Bn vic BS468858 engaged 1 VC, results: 1 VC KIA. Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK was terminated effective 011200H July 1971. Results of Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK for the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 KIA</td>
<td>189 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>194 WIA(E)</td>
<td>66 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 WIA(M)</td>
<td>2 FW/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 MIA</td>
<td>7 FW/NVA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 RTNEE/VC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 RTNEE/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40 CIV DEF</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 CSWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative results for Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 KIA</td>
<td>463 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409 WIA(E)</td>
<td>184 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 WIA(M)</td>
<td>5 FW/VC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17 FW/NVA</td>
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<td>6 RTNEE/VC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 CSWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Operation FINNEY HILL conducted by the 11th Infantry Brigade continued from the previous reporting period. Operation FINNEY HILL was quiet 1-7 May. On May 8th, the action increased. At 0855H, vic BS443745, Recon/3-1 Inf detonated an unknown type boobytrap, resulting in 3 US WIA(E). The same morning at 1045H, gunships from B/123 AVN engaged 6 NVA in the vic of BS510232. Results of this action were 4 NVA KIA. Action slowed down again during the period 9-11 May, with units reporting no significant contacts. On 12 May action increased slightly, with A/1-20 Inf detaining 3 military age males at 1305H in the vic of BS760376. B/123 AVN at 1835H on the same day, engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vic of BS237432 resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 5 WIA. Action continued on 13 May, when a patrol from A/2-21 Inf, at 1020H, detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade in the vic of BS748276. Results of this incident were 5 US WIA(E). Cumulative results for the period 1-15 May were: 25 NVA KIA, 5 detained and 10 WIA. US casualties were: 23 US WIA(E). B/123 AVN dominated action on 16 May. At 1445H, vic BS345413, they engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results of the contact were 4 NVA KIA and 3 detainees. Light contact prevailed in the 11th Bde AO on 17 May. In the only contact reported, Recon/1-20 Inf at 0910H, engaged 3 VC in vic of BS704264 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 WIA. Action on 18 May continued to be light. B/3-21 Inf and A/39 Engr detonated a 30 lb mine vic BS572727 at 0810H, resulting in 3 US WIA(E). At 1800H, C/1-20 Inf detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade in vic of BS70538 resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Gunships from B/123 engaged 4 NVA at 1335H, vic BS52456. Results of the engagement were 4 NVA KIA. FINNEY HILL reported light contact on 19 May. At 1135H, a patrol from A/21 Inf received SAF vic BS783243, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). B/123 gunships engaged an unknown size enemy force at 1000H vic BS327424. Results of the contact were 5 VC KIA. Contact on 20 May was all in the 1-20 Inf AO where B/1-20 engaged 2 NVA at 1119H vic BS74830. Results of the brief fire fight were 2 NVA KIA. At 1615H D/1-20 detonated an unknown type boobytrap vic BS692513, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). 21 May saw 2 contacts in FINNEY HILL. B/1-20 Inf, at 1912H, detonated a boobytrap vic BS74426 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). At 1228H, B/123 AVN gunships engaged and killed 1 VC vic BS27618. On May 22, gunships from B/123 engaged and killed 1 NVA at 1005H vic BS40431. B/1-20 Inf at 1850H, had a mechanical ambush detonate vic BS70439 resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 WIA. D/1-1 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC vic BS53946 at 2335H. On 23 May C/3-1 Inf found 1 NVA KIA at 1530H, vic BS630575. At 0655H, E/1 Cav had an ACAV detonate a mine vic BS77509, resulting in 4 US WIA(E). The 11th Bde reported no contact on 24 May. In the only contact on 25 May, C/1-20 Inf at 1000H engaged 4 VC vic BS70575. Results of the contact were 1 WIA. C/3-1 was involved in the lone contact on 26 May when they received SAF in vic BS581593 at 1935H. Results of the contact were 1 US WIA(E). Action in the
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AO continued to be light on the 27th of May. B/1-20, at 1905H, had a mechanical ambush detonate vic BS705427, resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. At 0715H, D/4-21 detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade vic BS723384. Results of the incident were 2 US WIA(E). Action increased on May 28, as gunships engaged a lone VC vic BS539764. In three separate incidents, B/123 at 1400H and 1700H killed 2 VC, 2 NVA and detained 1 Vietnamese vic BS388535, 455218 and 392552. At 1800H, gunships from the 174th AHC engaged an unknown size enemy force vic BS789312. Results of the engagement were 13 VC KIA.

Contact on 29 May was again light. At 0710H, B/123 Aero-rifle platoon engaged 2 VC vic BS768738 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC. B/123 accounted for the only contact on 30 May, as gunships engaged 1 NVA at 1030H vic BS288556, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. In the only contact on the last day of May, B/4-21 found 1 IWC at 0900H vic BS822298. Contact continued to be light on 1 June. H/17 Cav at 1910H, vic BS768558, had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 2 June at 1039H, D/1-20 detonated a boobytrap vic BS662565. Results of the incident were 1 US WIA(E). Another element of D/1-20 detonated 2 VN at 1848H, vic BS65662. At 0758H, an element of B/123 received SAF, vic BS155512 resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 3 June a sniper team from 3-1 Inf vic BS475762 detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade resulting in 1 US WIA(E). C/1-20 Inf engaged 18 VC at 2000H vic BS717439. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIA and 1 CSWC. There was no contact reported on 4 June. Results for the period 1-5 June were: 3 EN KIA, 13 detainees, 1 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties were: 5 US WIA(E). There was extremely light and scattered contacts reported by the 11th Bde during the period 6-15 June. On 16 June, vic BS194196 an element of H Troop 17th Cav detonated 2 boobytraps of unknown size that resulted in 4 US WIA(H). Cumulative results of the period 6-17 June were: 12 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. US casualties were 10 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(H). D/3-1 Inf on 18 June in the vic of BS612556 had a mechanical ambush detonate which resulted in 3 NVA KIA and 3 IWC. B/123 AVN on 19 June, vic BS513714 engaged UNSEF resulting in 14 KIA. Credit 10 to the gunships of B/123 AVN, 3 to FAC and 1 to D/6-11 Arty. The snipers of 3-1 Inf on 19 June engaged 4 VC in the vic of BS542-760 resulting in 2 VC KIA. 22 June proved to be a good day for B/123 AVN as their gunships engaged an UNSEF vic BS717496 resulting in 7 VC KIA. Cumulative casualties during the period were 3 US WIA(E). At 1025H on 23 June E Troop 1st Cav engaged an UNSEF vic BS747567, resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 IWC and 7 detained. Recon/1-20 Inf on 25 June vic BS738430 engaged 1 NVA, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. The enemy's use of boobytraps claimed 3 US WIA(E) from C/3-1 Inf on 26 June vic BS506669. During the early morning of 27 June FSB Ironco vic BS321383 received 15x60mm mortar rounds resulting in light damage and 1 US WIA(E). H Troop 17th Cav on 28 June detonated a
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boobytrap vic BS658576 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). The following day 29 June, A-1-20 Inf while on search and clear operations detonated a boobytrap vic BS716405 resulting in 4 US WIA(E). At 0520H on 30 June E Troop 1st Cav had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 VC KIA. On the last day of June H/17 Cav detonated a mine and one boobytrap in the vic of BS655573 resulting in 1 US KIA, and 6 US WIA(E). Operation FINNEY HILL was terminated effective 01200H July 1971. Results of Operation FINNEY HILL for the reporting period were:

US | ENEMY
---|---
1 KIA | 127 KIA
75 WIA(E) | 19 DET
4 WIA(M) | 3 PW/VC
0 MIA | 0 PW/NVA

Cumulative results for Operation FINNEY HILL were:

US | ENEMY
---|---
32 KIA | 454 KIA
252 WIA(E) | 66 DET
28 WIA(M) | 5 PW/VC
0 MIA | 3 PW/NVA

(c) Operation CAROLINE HILL conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade continued from the previous reporting period. At 2025 on the first day of May, D/2-1 Inf and A-1-1 Cav were on a search and clear mission in the vicinity of AT930515, when an ACAV detonated a boobytrapped 155mm round with a pressure firing device. Results of this were 8 US WIA(E) and 1 ACAV a combat
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loss. On 2 May, A/1-1 Cav detonated an unknown type mine vicinity AT970-550, resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). Later that afternoon, HHC 1-1 Cav detonated an unknown type mine in the vicinity of AT945558. The results of this were 1 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). C/3-16 Arty, vic AT975558, received 2x122mm rockets resulting in 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). In an incident on 031420H May, A/26 Engineers received 1 hand grenade vic AT922572 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). During the period 4 May - 9 May, there were no significant contacts in the operation. On 10 May at 14.5H, A/2-1 Inf received small arms fire vic AT986526 from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 5 US WIA(E). The unit returned small arms fire and artillery with unknown results. C/1-1 Cav, on 12 May at 1010H, detonated an unknown type mine vic of AT947583, resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA(E). Another element of 1-1 Cav, A troop, engaged 5 NVA at 1100H on 12 May in the vicinity of AT975543. The results were 2 NVA KIA, 3 WIA. On 13 May there were no significant contacts. On 14 May, the action increased. At 1400H, vic 2C180680, a FAC engaged an UNSEF, resulting in 15 NVA KIA. At 1450H on the same day, a patrol from F/17 Cav detonated an unknown type mine vic AT947520. Results of this incident were 5 US KIA. On 15 May at 1000H A/2-1 Inf was involved in a significant contact, vic AT987534, when they received small arms fire and hand grenades from an unknown size enemy force. The unit returned with small arms fire, hand grenades and artillery. Results of the contact were: 2 US KIA, 5 US WIA(E), 2 VC KIA, 2 NVA KIA. Cumulative results for the period 1-15 May were: 28 NVA KIA, 5 VC KIA, 4 detained and 6 WIA. Friendly casualties were 10 US KIA, 32 US WIA(E) and 6 US WIA(M). There was no contact reported on 16 May. Action on 17 May was light, as A/2-1 Inf at 1830H, vic AT985532, engaged and killed 2 NVA. On 18 May no contact was reported in the operation. On May 19th, action increased. At 1456H, a patrol from A/2-1 Inf detonated an unknown type mine in the vic of AT992513 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). B/3-21 Inf at 0915H engaged and killed 1 VC, vic of BT005370. Also on the 19th, a patrol from A/1-1 Cav, at 1345H, detonated an unknown type mine in the vicinity of AT961548. Results of this incident were 5 US WIA(E). The action in CAROLINE HILL remained slow on 20 May. At 0900H an element of A3-21 Inf detained 2 Vietnamese in the vicinity of AT904342. At 1000H, A/3-1 Cav in the vic of AT65559, found a grave containing 4 VC KIA. A/3-16 Artillery, vic AT92364, engaged and killed 1 VC. On 21 May, units of the 396th brigade again reported light contact. At 205H, an element of D/2-1 Inf ambushed 2 VC vic AT008557. Results of this encounter were 2 VC KIA. A/1-1 Cav at 0945H found 1 VC killed by artillery, near AT964557. B/2-1 Inf at 1937H, vic AT989472, had a mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 WIA. A/2-1 Inf at 0055H, while in NDP vic of AT880580, received 20x60mm mortar rounds. Results of this engagement were 4 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). R/2-1, at 2025H on the evening of the 22d, engaged 2 VC near
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AT981499. Results of this contact was 1 VC KIA. C/1-1 Cav, while on an afternoon patrol, engaged a VC squad vicinity of AT961563, resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC. On 23 May 196th units noted increased activity in the operation. B/2-1 Inf was involved in two separate incidents. At 1030H, a mechanical ambush detonated vicinity of AT989472 resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1300H, vicinity AT987460, a patrol from the same element found 1 IWC. A patrol from D/2-1 at 1655H, detonated a boobytrapped M79 round in the vic of AT996542. The result of this incident was 1 US WIA(E). At 1030H, B/3-21 Inf engaged 2 VC near AT993372 resulting in 2 VC KIA. C/1-1 Cav in 2 incidents vic AT943557 at 1230H and 1500H killed a total of 2 VC. At 1600H, gunships from F/8 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force vic BT020-596, resulting in 2 VC KIA. Action continued at a moderate rate on 24 May. At 0654H, a patrol from B/2-1 Inf, in the vic of AT987460, found 2 VC KBA. C/1-1 Cav in 2 significant contacts at 1025H and 1125H, vic AT988558, killed a total of 6 VC, and captured 3 individual and 1 crew served weapons. F/8th Cav at 1547H, vic AT926281, detained 1 Vietnamese. The 196th Inf Bde reported light contact on 25 May. In the only contact of the day, a patrol from C/1-1 Cav at 1205H, engaged an unknown size enemy force in vic AT996-552. Results of the fire fight were 4 VC KIA. Contact continued light on 26 May as Recon/2-1 Inf at 0130H vic AT981504, had a mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 1 VC KIA. The 27th of May saw Brigade units report two contacts. At 1600H Recon/2-1 Inf, vic AT961497 engaged an enemy force consisting of 7 VC. In the contact, 2 VC were killed. A/3-16 Arty engaged 4 VC at 1509H in the vic of AT917339. Results of the contact were 4 VC KBA. Light action was again evident on 28 May. At 0600H an element of B/3-21 Inf vic AT986378 received AWF and 4 RPG's, resulting in 1 US WIA(N). C/3-21 Inf at 0900H vic AT964323, detained 4 Vietnamese. At 1155H vic AT984-380, 1 UH-1H from 173rd Aviation Co. received SAF and was shot down. The crash resulted in 6 US WIA(E). On 29 May, D/3-21 Inf at 1900H detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade in vic of AT971323 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). At 0955H a FAC in the vic of AT995316 observed 3 VC killed by artillery. F/8 Cav at 1045H engaged a bunker near AT788317. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIA, 3 IWC and 5 Vietnamese detained. A/1-46 at 1315H, vicinity AT970-317, engaged a bunker complex resulting in 4 VC KIA. May 30th was an unfortunate day for the 196th Bde. At 2125H, D/3-21 Inf, while in their NDF vic of AT962314, received 7-9 M79 rounds from an unknown size enemy force. This contact resulted in 8 US WIA(N). Recon/3-21 Inf at 0900H detained 3 Vietnamese in the vicinity of AT916372. At 0105H vicinity of BMT63724, an element of C-1 Cav received SAF and 2 RPG's, resulting in 4 US WIA(N). On the last day of May action in CAROLINE HILL was dominated by 3-21 Inf. At 0645H, an ambush from Recon/3-21 Inf, engaged 2 VC near AT914369. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIA. D/3-21 Inf at 0700H detained 3 Vietnamese.
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in the vicinity of AT976317. At 1020H, another patrol from D/3-21 Inf received 1 M79 round and SAF in the vicinity of AT977317, results of the contact were 2 US WIA(E). C/3-21 Inf, vicinity of AT980334, at 1400H, engaged 2 VC killing one. Results for the period 16-31 May were 9 NVA KIA, 13 VC KIA, 18 detained, 9 IWC and 1 CSW. US casualties were 2 US KIA, 25 US WIA(E), and 15 US WIA(M). Light action prevailed in the operation on 1 June. Recon/2-1 Inf at 0215H, engaged an unknown size enemy force vicinity AT986451 resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1820H, Recon/3-21 Inf vicinity AT906374, detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade, resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 2 June the 196th Bde reported moderate contact. D/2-1 Inf in a series of 3 boobytrap incidents vicinity of BTO052, received casualties of 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Two patrols from D/3-21 Inf at 0730H and 1815H vicinity AT962299 and AT986327, detained 2 Vietnamese. At 1210H a convoy from C/3-16 Arty received SAF and 4 RPG's in vicinity of AT934627, results of the incident were 2 US WIA(E). In a contact at 1720H, an element of F/8 Cav vicinity AT817502 received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Results of the engagement were 2 US WIA(E), 1 Vietnamese detained and 1 IWC. D/1-1 Cav at 022130H engaged 2 VC in the vicinity of AT962424. Results of the engagement were 2 VC KIA. On 3 June contact in the AO slowed. D/2-1 Inf at 0650H, detonated a boobytrapped hand grenade in the vicinity of BTO06524, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). At 1200H a patrol from D/3-21 Inf in the vicinity of AT964556, engaged 1 VC KIA and found 1 IW. At 1200H an element of A/1-1 Cav, vicinity AT986347, engaged 2 VC. They swept the contact area and found 1 VC KIA and 1 IW. At 1630H, C/1-1 Cav found 1 CSW in the vicinity of AT964556. 4 June was also a quiet day, as the 196th Bde reported light contact. 2 VC were engaged with Arty vicinity of AT800478. Results of the contact were 2 VC killed by Arty. Results of the period from 1-5 June were 5 NVA KIA, 11 VC KIA, 5 detained, 4 IWC, 1 CSW. US casualties were 1 US KIA, 11 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). On 5 June Recon/3-21 Inf while in their NDP vicinity of AT993446, had a mechanical ambush detonate. Results of the ambush were 2 NVA KIA and 1 IW. C/1-1 Cav, at 1535H, engaged 2 VC in the vicinity of AT974553. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. F/8 Cav, in 2 incidents at 1455H, vicinity of AT8251, killed 2 NVA and detained 1 Vietnamese. In the early afternoon of 6 June while searching in the vicinity of AT805630 B/1-46 Inf, established a hasty ambush and engaged 10 VC. Results were 4 VC KIA, 2 detained, 1 IWC, 550 lbs of rice CIA and miscellaneous equipment captured. On 7 June F/8 Cav in the vicinity of AT806461 found 1 IW resulting in 1 IWC. At about 0750H on 8 June in the vicinity of AT97539 B/1-1 Cav engaged 6 VC with SAF. The fire fight resulted in 5 NVA KIA and 3 detainees, 1 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). In a series of light and unrelated contacts on
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9, 10, and 11 June, C/3-21 Inf accounted for 2 NVA KIA and 2 IWC in the vicinity of AT976312. At AT816574, D/1-6 Inf detonated a mechanical ambush resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. There were no US casualties. At 1645H, 12 June 71, F/17 Cav, detonated an unknown type mine while operating in the vicinity of AT905540 resulting in 1 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(H). Light and scattered contacts were reported for 13 June through 17 June 71. Cumulative totals for all contacts during the period 6-17 June, were 33 VC/NVA KIA, 12 IWC, 7 CSWC and 1 US KIA, 11 US WIA(E), and 2 US WIA(H). Action was light on 17 June with no contacts reported. On 18 June, B/2-1 Inf vic AT965457 received unknown amount of hand grenades resulting in 7 US WIA(E). On 19 June F/8 Cav vicinity AT919633 engaged 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. Action continued on 20 June as Recon/3-21 Inf vicinity of AT915-395 engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC. A/1-6 Inf vicinity of AT998634 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. On 21 June F/17 Cav vicinity of AT830540 detonated a boobytrap resulting in 1 US WIA(E). 1-1 Cav rear area vicinity BT065725 at 0042H received 13 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 11 US WIA(H). The following day 22 June B/3-21 Inf vicinity of AT916365 detonated a boobytrap resulting in 2 US WIA(E). F/8 Cav vicinity ZQ179633 engaged 2 NVA resulting in 2 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 18-22 June were reported as 14 VC/NVA KIA, 6 detained, 5 IWC. US casualties were 13 US WIA(E), 11 US WIA(H). Action was light on 23 June as F/8 Cav at YQ806573, engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. The following day, 24 June C/1-1 Cav vicinity of AT860545 detonated an anti-personnel mine resulting in 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(H). On 25 June F/8 Cav inserted their "Blues" vicinity of AT946-309, the "Blues" engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC. On 26 June F/8 Cav vicinity ZQ179631 engaged 2 VC, resulting in 2 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 23-26 June were reported as 12 VC/NVA KIA, 5 detained, 3 IWC. US casualties were 13 US WIA(E), 11 US WIA(H). Action was light on 27 June as F/8 Cav at YQ806573, engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. During the early morning of 27 June C/3-21 Inf, vicinity AT908336, engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1710H A/1-1 Cav vicinity AT857548, engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 US WIA(E). During the early morning of 28 June, A/1-1 Cav vicinity AT857548 found 1 IW and 1 CSW, resulting in 1 IWC and 1 CSWC. D/1-1 Cav vicinity AT875550 found 1 IW resulting in 1 IWC. A LOH from the 198th Bde was shot down vicinity AT875550 resulting in 3 VC KIA, 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). C/1-46 Inf had all the action for the 29th of June when a mechanical ambush detonated vicinity AT852633 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. At 0913H C/1-6 Inf vicinity AT854625 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Later that evening C/1-46 Inf vicinity AT844626 detonated a claymore resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 30 June it proved to be a good day for C/3-21 Inf when they engaged the enemy vic AT988354 which resulted in 3 VC KIA, 2 NVA KIA and 1 detainee. D/1-1 Cav vicinity AT953528 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. A/1-1 Cav vicinity of AT823-520 hit a command detonated mine resulting in 5 US WIA(E).
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Operation CAROLINE HILL was terminated effective 01200H July 1971. Results of Operation CAROLINE HILL during the reporting period were:

US
15 KIA
120 WIA(E)
37 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY
158 KIA
54 DET
5 PW/VC
5 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
14 CIV DEF
18 IN CIV
46 IWC
10 CSWC

Cumulative results of Operation CAROLINE HILL were:

US
15 KIA
125 WIA(E)
37 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY
161 KIA
55 DET
6 PW/VC
5 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
14 CIV DEF
18 IN CIV
81 IWC
10 CSWC

(d) MIDDLESEX PEAK terminated 01200H July 1971. In 198th Infantry Brigade Operations on 1 July 1971 B/4-3 Inf vic BT199121 had a mechanical ambush detonate, results: 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC. The next day, 2 July, B/4-3 Inf vic BT202112 had a mechanical ambush detonate, results: 3 VC KIA.
Recon/4-3 Inf vic BT272122, engaged 1 VC, results: 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC.
Recon/4-3 Inf vic BT225132, engaged 3 VC, results: 1 US WIA(E). D/1-1 Cav vic BT518079 found 1 IW, results: 1 IW. On the 4th of July, C/4-3 Inf vic BT223106 received SAF from an UNSF, results: 3 VC KIA and 1 US WIA(E).
There was no contact reported by the 198th Bde on 5 or 6 July. The next day, 7 July, A/1-6 Inf vic BS749725 detonated a B/T, results: 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). D/4-3 Inf vic BT267097 engaged 1 VC, results: 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC.
A/4-3 Inf vic BT144002 reported the only activity on 8 July as they detained 10 VN. On 9 July D/4-3 had a mechanical ambush detonate, results: 4 VC KIA. There were no significant actions on 10 July. Cumulative results for the period 1-10 July were 18 EN KIA, 13 detained and 5 IWC. Friendly casualties were: 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). A/4-3 Inf on 11 July had a mechanical ambush detonate vic BT160005, results: 1 VC KIA. The only action reported by the 198th Bde for 12 July was a LOH from the D/1-1 Cav which was shot down, results: 1 US WIA(E). At 131315H July B/1-6 Inf vic BT313972 enganged 2 VC, results: 1 VC KIA and 1 US WIA(E). D/1-1 Cav vic BT298067 received SAF, results: 1 VC KIA. On 14 July A/4-3 Inf vic BT159000 found 2 VC KIA, results: 2 VC KIA. Later the same day A/4-3 Inf engaged an UNSEF, results: 7 VC KIA. C/4-3 Inf vic BT24057 engaged 1 VC, results: 1 VC KIA. The 176th AVN vic BT233118 engaged 2 VC, results: 1 VC KIA. The next day, 15 July conducted a hot CA, receiving SAF, AW, M79, and mortars vic BT194125, results: 1 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E). D/1-6 Inf vic BT39034 engaged 1 B/T, results: 1 US WIA(E). Cumulative results for the period 11-19 July were reported as: 16 EN KIA, 5 detained, 1 CSWC and 2 IWC. US casualties were: 1 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). No contact was reported by the 198th Bde on 20 and 21 July. On 22 July D/4-3 Inf engaged 1 structure resulting in 1 VC KIA. D/1-1 Cav vic BS522-982 engaged 4-5 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. On 23 July Chu Lai, vic BT258097 received 3x122mm rockets, resulting in 1 US WIA(M). Recon/4-3 Inf, vic BT127275 engaged 6 VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA, 2 detained. The following day, 24 July D/1-1 Cav vic BT108325 engaged an UNSEF resulting in 3 VC KIA. On 25 July D/1-1 Cav vic BT140228 engaged 6 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC and 5 detained. No contact was reported on 26 July. A boobytrap once again took a toll on 27 July as Recon/4-3 Inf detonated one vic BT179088 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). The following day, 28 July, A/1-6 Inf engaged an UNSEF vic BS463890 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 detained, 2 IWC and 1 CSWC. C/4-3 Inf vic BS179997 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC. D/1-1 on a hot insertion vic BT282069 had 1 US WIA(E). The next day, 29 July, D/1-1 Cav vic BT490040 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 30 July D/1-1 Cav vic 28106087 engaged 3 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA. There was plenty of action on 31 July as C/1-6 Inf vic BS509938 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. 116 AVN vic BT179120 engaged 3 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA. D/1-1 Cav vic 20012085 engaged an UNSEF, resulting
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in 2 NVA KIA. Later the same day D/1-1 Cav, again engaged an UNESEF at the same grid resulting in 6 NVA KIA. D/1-1 Cav vic BT290068 engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 20-31 July were reported as: 35 EN KIA, 10 detained, 5 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties were 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). On 2 Aug A/4-3 Inf vic BT140059 had a mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 1 VC KIA. In the early morning of 4 Aug, A/4-3 vic BS165958 engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 CSWC. There was light and scattered contact through 6 Aug with negative casualties. On 7 August B/4-3 Inf vic BT244000 detonated a boobytrap resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA(E). D/1-1 Cav vic BS008850 obtained an airstrike and engaged a SEL resulting in 4 VC KIA (credit to Helix FAC 24). On 8 Aug A/4-3 Inf, vic BT175029 engaged 5 VC resulting in 5 VC KIA. B/1-6 Inf had a brief but fierce fire fight on 9 Aug vic BS298977 resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 1 IWC. The following day A/4-3 Inf engaged an UNESEF vic BT189051 resulting in 3 VC KIA and 1 IWC. In the only contact reported for 12 Aug D/4-3 Inf vic BT280097 had a mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 2 VC KIA. On 13 Aug B/4-3 Inf vic BT287014 had 2 mechanical ambushes detonate resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. Once again on 14 Aug B/4-3 Inf vic BT287015 had 2 mechanical ambushes detonate resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA and 2 IWC. A/4-3 Inf on 15 Aug vic BT215070 detonated a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E), 2 US WIA(M). Action was light until 20 Aug when the snipers of 1-6 Inf, vic BS4993917 engaged 12 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 1-20 Aug were: 5 NVA KIA, 34 VC KIA, 6 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties were: 3 US KIA, 10 US WIA(E), 2 US WIA(M). In a well planned mechanical ambush C/4-3 Inf on 21 Aug vic BT278055 killed 2 NVA, captured 2 AW. A/1-6 Inf vic BS295995 engaged 1 VC with AW and SAF resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 K-54 pistol CIA. Contact was light and sporadic until 25 Aug when D/4-3 Inf vic BT255015 engaged 4 NVA, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. B/4-3 Inf at the same grid found a grave resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. The next day, 26 Aug E/1st Cav vic BT065298 received 1 RPG resulting in 5 US WIA(E). On 27 Aug B/3-82 Arty vic BT115140 received 2x122mm rockets. Results of this were 2 US WIA(E). The gunships of B/123 AVN engaged an UNESEF on 28 Aug at BT077297 resulting in 6 NVA KIA. E/1st Cav in two separate incidents on 30 Aug vic BT083248 were engaged with a command detonated mine and later the same day by SAF. Results of these two contacts were 3 US KIA, and 9 US WIA(E). At 1230H D/1-1 Cav vic BT078296 engaged a SEL resulting in 5 NVA KIA. The gunships of the 176 AVN engaged an UNESEF at grid BT215215 resulting in 8 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 21-31 Aug were: 36 EN KIA, 1 detained, 2 Hoi Chanh and 6 IWC. US casualties were 3 US KIA, 20 US WIA(E). Contact was light on the first 2 days of September. On 2 Sep D/4-3 Inf vic BT215007 had another successful mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 2 IWC. On 3 Sep D/1-6 Inf vic BS284992 engaged an UNESEF, resulting in 3 US
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WIA(E), and 1 US WIA(M). Action increased significantly on 7 Sep as D/1-1 Cav engaged an UNSEF vic BTO98356 results of the contact were 10 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 1-8 Sep were 14 EN KIA, 6 WIA. US casualties were 10 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). In an ambush on 9 Sep, B/4-3 Inf was engaged by an UNSEF. Results of this action were 4 US WIA(E). On 10 Sep FAC's engaged a bunker complex vic AS932882 resulting in 8 VC KIA/S. Action was light within the 198th Bde AO until 13 Sep when gunships from the 176th AVN engaged an UNSEF vic AT917344. Results of this were 30 NVA KIA. On 15 Sep B/1-1 Cav vic AT979333 received mortar and RPG fire. Results of this were 1 US KIA, 15 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Cumulative results for the period 9 thru 15 Sep were reported as 30 NVA KIA, 8 VC KIA and 1 WIA. US casualties were 1 US KIA, 15 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Action picked up for the 198th Bde on 17 Sep as D/4-3 Inf vic BT228003 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 NVA KIA. C/1-6 Inf engaged 1 VC vic BS253965 resulting in 1 VC KIA. B/123 AVN engaged an UNSEF, vic BS353976. Results of this were 7 VC KIA. FAC's engaged UNSEF vic BS353976 resulting in 4 VC KIA. (Credit 4 KIA to FAC's). On 18 Sep C/1-20 Inf vic AT901232, received 20 82mm mortar rounds. Results of this were 5 US WIA(M). On 19 Sep in two separate incidents, A/1-6 Inf engaged 3 NVA vic BS357967, results of this were 3 NVA KIA. C/1-1 Cav received SAF and B-40 rockets vic BT051390. Results of this were 2 US WIA(E). The WIA were from D/1-20 Inf. No contact was reported on 20 and 21 September. Cumulative results for the period 16-21 Sep were 4 NVA KIA, 13 VC KIA and 1 detained. US casualties were 4 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). Mines and booby traps again took their toll on 22 September. C/1-20 Inf detonated a mine vic BT045401 resulting in 2 US KIA, 1 US WIA(M). At 1300H, B/1-1 Cav vic AT984379 detonated a mine, results were: 6 US WIA(E). C/1-1 Cav detonated a booby trap vic BT042388 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Later the same day C/1-1 Cav received 5 60mm mortar and 1 RPG rd resulting in 3 US WIA(E). (1 WIA from C/1-1 and 2 WIA from C/1-20 Inf). This incident occurred vic BT08382. C/1-20 Inf on 23 Sep detonated a booby trap vic BT03392 resulting in 2 US WIA(E). (1 WIA from C/1-20 and 1 WIA, a combat photographer, from 523d Signal Bn). B/123 AVN in 4 separate incidents vic AS905876 engaged and killed 10 NVA. After observing a great amount of activity in this area, several air strikes were flown, resulting in 25 NVA KIA. A/1-6 Inf on 24 Sep found a weapons cache vic BS345976 which resulted in 16 TWC and 10 CSWC. On 25 Sep, C/1-20 Inf while on dismounted patrol with A/1-1 Cav detonated a booby trap resulting in 6 US WIA(E). This incident occurred vic BT060390. C/1-1 Cav received SAF and 2 B-40 rockets vic BT062396 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). On 27 Sep, A/1-6 Inf vic BS352976 found 2 TWC and 1 CSWC, resulting in 2 TWC and 1 CSWC. Later the same day, A/1-6 Inf received hand grenades resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA(E). On 28 Sep C/1-1 Cav detonated a booby trap vic BT014325 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). No contact was reported on 29 Sep. On 30 Sep D/1-1 Cav engaged 2 VC vic BS128955 resulting in 2 VC KIA.
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Cumulative totals for the period 22-30 Sep 71: EN KIA, 20 WIC, 11 CSWC and 3 detained. US casualties were 3 US KIA, 26 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). On 1 Oct B/1-20 Inf received "AF vic AT918267 resulting in 1 US WIA(E). D/1-1 Cav engaged 2 VC vic BS128255 resulting in 2 VC KIA. A DivArty FO engaged UNSEF w/Arty vic AT979334. Results of this was 1 VC KIA. B/123 AVN on 3 Oct engaged 2 VC vic AS976862 resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 5 Oct D/4-3 Inf had another successful mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. This occurred vic BT143086. No contact was reported by the 198 Bde on 6-11 Oct. On 12 Oct B/123 AVN engaged 4 VC vic BS135778, resulting in 3 VC KIA. On 13 Oct, B/123 AVN engaged 1 VC vic BS099822, resulting in 1 VC KIA. As of 1420H October 1971, the results of 198th Infantry Brigade operations were:

US

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<tr>
<td>12 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>102 WIA(E)</td>
<td>35 DET</td>
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<td>13 WIA(M)</td>
<td>1 WFW/VC</td>
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<td>0 KIA</td>
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ENEMY

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<tr>
<td>27 DET</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 WIA(E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 CIV OEF</td>
<td>27 CIV DEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>79 WIC</td>
<td>7 IN CIV</td>
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<td>8 IWC</td>
<td>14 CSWC</td>
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(a) In the 11th Infantry Brigade operations, contact was light for the first three days of July. A/1-52 Inf while on patrol on 4 July received 2 CO hand grenades vic BS369821 resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Action continued on 5 July as B/123 AVN in two separate engagements vic BS309717 engaged 5 VC resulting in 4 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. The next day, 6 July, A/1-52 Inf vic BS381817 received SAF from an UNSEF, resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA(E) and 1 IWC. Action throughout the 11 Bde AO remained light through 9 July. The following day A/1-52 Inf vic BS373814 engaged 3 NVA with SAF and WFW, resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. Cumulative results for the period 1-10 July were: 10 NVA KIA, 5 VC KIA, 8 IWC and 3 detained. US casualties were: 1 US KIA, 13 US WIA(E). Light contact prevailed throughout the AO until 14 July when B/123 AVN in two separate incidents vic BS554431 engaged UNSEF resulting in 13 NVA KIA and 1 US KIA. Contact continued to be sporadic through 17 July. On 18 July the snipers of 3-1 Inf engaged 3 VC vic BS505744, resulting in 3 VC KIA. That same day B/123 AVN engaged 2 NVA vic BS275444 resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Once again the gunships of B/123 AVN on 19 July engaged an UNSEF vic BS293358, resulting in 3 VC KIA. Cumulative results for the period 11-19 July were 13 NVA KIA, 14 VC KIA and 4 IWC. US casualties were: 2 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E).
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B/123 AVN reported the only contact within the 11th Bde AO on 20 July, as their gunships engaged several enemy in the vicinity BS161763 and BS191769 resulting in 3 NVA KIA, 2 VC KIA and 4 IWC and 2 GSWC. At 1810H the Aero rifle team of B/123 AVN found, in the vicinity BS161765, 35 cases of AK-47 ammo, (500 rounds per case), 1 case of AK-47 rifles, (8), 1 case of RPG launchers (2 per case), 40 cases B-40 rockets (3 per case), 16 boxes of 60 and 80mm mortar rounds, (6-8 rounds per case). This was believed to be a transshipment point. The next day, 21 July, B/123 AVN again engaged an UNSF, vic BS157757 and BS231718 resulting in 8 NVA KIA and 5 IWC.

Returning to the previous day's contact site B/123 AVN on 22 July engaged 10 MAM vic BS175667 resulting in 6 NVA KIA. The gunships of B/123 AVN on 24 July, in separate contacts at grid BS167237 engaged and killed a total of 18 NVA and had 3 IWC. The following day, 25 July, B/123 AVN in the area of BS216136 engaged and killed 20 NVA. Contact was light until 29 July when D/1-20 Inf detonated a booby trap vic BS753261 resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). Later the same day B/1-20 Inf on search and clear operations vic BS743367 received SA/AIIF resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 31 July B/123 AVN while on a BDA mission vic BS142508 observed 20 structures destroyed, 4 bunkers destroyed, and a NVA killed by air strikes. Also observed and engaged an UNSF resulting in 21 NVA KIA, and 2 VC KIA.

Cumulative results for the period 20-31 July were reported as: 82 NVA KIA, 9 VC KIA, 11 IWC and 2 GSWC. US casualties were: 1 US KIA, 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Action continued on 2 Aug as B/1-52 Inf engaged 13 NVA with artillery vic BS346986 resulting in 4 NVA KIA. (Credit to D/1-14 Arty). The tempo picked up on 3 Aug as the gunships of B/123 AVN engaged 10-15 NVA at BS122456 resulting in 8 NVA KIA. The following day, 4 Aug, E/1st Cav engaged 6 VC vic BS346986 resulting in 3 VC KIA and 1 IWC. The 5th and 6th of Aug were quiet for the 11th Bde. Action continued on 7 Aug as the 116 AVN, BS705636 engaged an UNSF resulting in 6 VC KIA. B/1-20 Inf had an M-48 tank detonate a booby trap vic BS705637 resulting in: 5 US WIA(E). On 8 Aug A/1-52 Inf vic BS252628 engaged 23 NVA, with artillery, resulting in 2 NVA KIA (credit to B/1-14 Arty). Later the same day, B/123 AVN vic BS222525 engaged 4 NVA resulting in 4 NVA KIA. Once again B/123 AVN gunships engaged 2 VC vic BS146768 resulting in 2 VC KIA/S. E/1st Cav vic BS666534 received a B-40 rocket resulting in 4 US WIA(E). There were no contacts reported on 9 and 10 Aug. On 11 Aug G/3-1 Inf vic BS490630 received SAF, resulting in 3 US WIA(E). B/1-52 Inf vic BS187570 hit a punji pit resulting in 6 US WIA(H). B/123 AVN vic BS199560, engaged an NVA squad resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Punji stakes again took their toll on 12 Aug as B/1-52 Inf vic BS191589 had 4 US WIA(E). 175 AVN vic BS658872, engaged an UNSF, resulting in 2 VC KIA. B/123 AVN had all the action on 13 Aug as their gunships engaged 8 NVA and 2 VC vic BS143661 resulting in
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In the period of 1-20 Aug, 5 NVA and 2 VC KIA. B/123 AVN vic BS146584, reported 4 NVA KBA/S, (credit to FACs). Again on 14 Aug B/123 AVN vic BS165577 engaged 1 VC and 3 NVA resulting in 3 NVA and 1 VC KIA. On 15 Aug H/17 Cav vic BS783503 detonated two separate booby traps resulting in 6 US WIA(E). Action was light until 18 Aug when B/123 AVN vic BS751322 engaged 3 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA(E). Division Artillery aerial observer vic BS488665 engaged SEL resulting in 2 VC KIA (credit to C/3-18 Arty). Cumulative results for the period 1-20 Aug were reported as 41 NVA KIA, 23 VC KIA, 2 detained and 4 IWC. US casualties were 30 US WIA(E) and 14 US WIA(H).

In the period of 22-23 Aug, B/123 AVN engaged an UNSEF, vic BS322569 resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Contact was light until 24 Aug when the gunships of B/123 AVN, in separate engagements vic BS238868 engaged 7 NVA resulting in 4 NVA KIA. B/123 AVN also found 9 VC KIA vic BS254446, (credit to FACs). In a short fire fight A/3-1 Inf, on 25 Aug vic BS5143997 had one US KIA and 2 US WIA(E).

In the period of 21-31 Aug, 10 NVA KIA, 25 VC KIA, 3 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties were, 1 US KIA, 11 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(H). In three separate incidents on 2 Sep B/123 AVN vic BS2388693 engaged 5 NVA. Results of this were 5 NVA KIA. Again on 4 Sep B/123 AVN reported the only contact as they found 1 IWC and had a IOH shot down, resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). Both of these actions occurred vic BS277858. At 2335H B/123 AVN vic BS478770 engaged a sampan resulting in 2 VC KIA. Ten minutes later vic BS478770 B/123 AVN engaged 3 VC. Results of this were 2 VC KIA. The snipers of 3-1 Inf on 5 Sep engaged 3 VC vic BS501744, results of this were 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC.

In the period of 9-15 Sep were: 8 NVA KIA, 6 VC KIA, and 1 IWC. US casualties were: 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E). On 9 Sep B/1-52 Inf vic BS405799 received SAF resulting in 8 US WIA(E) and 6 US WIA(H). Action increased on 11 Sep as D/3-1 Inf vic BS39801 received SA/WIA resulting in 2 US WIA(E). In three separate contacts vic BS339801 B/123 AVN engaged an UNSEF. Results of these contacts were 5 NVA KIA. On 13 Sep B/123 AVN engaged SEL vic BS136749 resulting 3 NVA KIA. In separate contacts on 14 Sep B/123 AVN engaged 9 NVA vic BS233782. Results of this were 9 NVA KIA. FAC's engaged a bunker complex with an air strike vic BS233782. Results of this were 4 NVA KBA/S. Cumulative results for the period 9-15 Sep were 21 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA. US casualties were 12 US WIA(E) and 8 US WIA(H).
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On 16 Sep D/3-1 Inf while on a Search and Clear mission vic BS334796 received SAF resulting in 4 US WIA(E). The gunships of B/123 AVN engaged 2 sampans on 17 Sep resulting in 2 NVA KIA. The following day, 18 Sep, A/1-52 Inf fired 6 graves vic BS311809. Results of this were 6 NVA KIA (Credit to B/123 AVN). The snipers of 3-1 Inf on 19 Sep engaged 1 VC vic BS520750, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. The gunships of B/123 AVN engaged 3 NVA vic BS215616 resulting in 1 NVA KIA. On 20 Sep Recon/1-52 Inf vic BS288829 received SAF and 1 RPG. Results of this were 2 US WIA(H). While on a land clearing mission 26 Engr vic BS789419 detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA(E). Cumulative results for the period 16 through 21 Sep were 10 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. US casualties were 5 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(H). B/123 AVN "Blues" reported the only contact on 22 Sep as they engaged a structure vic BS247682. Results of this were 2 US WIA(E). Action continued on 25 Sep when C/1-52 Inf engaged 2 VC vic BS624522. Results of this were 3 VC KIA and 1 IWC. 176 AVN gunships engaged 1 VC vic BS728624 resulting in 1 VC KIA. Again on 26 Sep C/1-52 Inf engaged 1 VC vic BS625522. Result of this was 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. B/3-1 Inf vic BS611577 engaged 2 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. Action picked up on 28 Sep as Recon/3-1 Inf engaged 1 VC vic BS352732 resulting in 1 IWC. B/123 AVN engaged 2 NVA vic BS235690 resulting in 1 NVA KIA. That afternoon B/123 AVN engaged an UNSEF vic BS387803 resulting in 5 NVA KIA. No contact was reported by the 11 Bde on 29 Sep. Cumulative results for the period 22 through 30 Sep were: 7 NVA KIA, 7 VC KIA and 4 IWC. US casualties were 2 US WIA(E). On 1 Oct B/123 AVN engaged 1 VC vic BS173702 resulting in 1 VC KIA. Again on 2 Oct B/123 AVN reported the only contact as they engaged 3 NVA vic BS390820, resulting in 2 detained. At 1320H, B/123 AVN engaged 4 NVA vic BS390804, resulting in 4 NVA KIA. FACs engaged an UNSEF vic BS381797 with air strikes which resulted in 5 NVA KIA/S. B/123 AVN on 3 Oct engaged 3 NVA vic BS502433. Results of this were 3 NVA KIA. In the only action reported on 5 Oct, B/123 AVN engaged 7 VC vic BS51321. Result was 1 VC KIA. The 11th Bde reported no contact from 6 through 9 Oct. Effective 100001H Oct 71, the 11th Bde became a USARV asset. The 11th Infantry Brigade terminated operations effective 101320H October 1971. Results of 11th Infantry Brigade operations for the period since 1 July 1971 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 KIA</td>
<td>325 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 WIA(E)</td>
<td>7 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 WIA(M)</td>
<td>2 PW/VC</td>
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<td>1 PW/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 RTNIE/NVA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In the 196th Infantry Brigade operations on 1 July A/3-16 Arty vic AT888386 engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. C/1-46 Inf vic AT841632 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 WIA, and 1 US WIA(H). D/1-46 Inf vic AT812588 detonated a booby trap resulting in 3 US WIA(E). D/1-46 detonated another booby trap resulting in 9 US WIA(E). B/4-31 Inf on 2 July vic ZC207632, found 3 IW, resulting in 3 IW. On 3 July B/4-31 Inf vic ZC209632 found 2 IW, resulting in 2 IW. A/1-46 Inf vic AT833626, received SAF and CC hand grenades resulting in 1 US WIA(E). On 4 July C/1-46 Inf vic AT843632 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 WIA, 1 CSWC, 1 US KIA, and 4 US WIA(H).

There was no contact reported by the 196th Bde on 6 July. Action continued on 7 July as Recon/2-1 Inf vic of AT935499 detonated a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E). G/1-1 Cav vic of AT8645496 engaged a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E). On 5 July C/1-1 Cav vic of AT845496 engaged a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E). There was no contact reported by the 196th Bde on 6 July. Action continued on 7 July as Recon/2-1 Inf vic of AT935499 detonated a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E). G/1-1 Cav detonated a booby trap and an anti-personnel mine vic of AT857527 resulting in 4 US WIA(E). Later the same day C/1-1 Cav vic AT8645496 engaged a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E).

Later the same day A/1-1 Cav received 1 RPG and SAF resulting in 1 US WIA(E). On 8 July A/1-1 Cav engaged an anti-personnel mine and a booby trap resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Later the same day A/1-1 Cav vic AT869522 received 1 RPG and SAF resulting in 1 VC KIA, and 1 WIA. F/8 Cav vic of AT823412 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. There were no significant actions on 9 July. On 10 July A/1-1 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). A/3-21 Inf vic AT803103, engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA, and 1 WIA. Cumulative results for the period 1-10 July were: 2 NVA KIA, 8 VC KIA, 2 detained, 11 IW, and 2 CSWC. Friendly casualties were: 2 US KIA, 26 US WIA(E), and 5 US WIA(H). Booby traps took their toll once again as A/1-1 Cav on 11 July detonated a mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E).

Later the same day A/1-1 Cav received 1 RPG resulting in 1 US WIA(E). F/17 Cav vic AT885497, engaged a booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA(E). There were no significant actions reported on 12 July. F/8 Cav on 13 July, vic AT982360, engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. A/3-21, vic AT825305, detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA(E). The 14th of July saw A/3-21 Inf vic AT827314, engage 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. A/1-1 Cav vic AT858453 received RPGs resulting in 4 US WIA(E). F/17 Cav at AT890514 engaged 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA. The following day, 15 July, B/1-1 Cav vic AT874958, received 5 RPGs resulting in 1 US WIA(E), and 2 VC KIA. On 16 July C/3-21 Inf vic AT861339, engaged 6 VC/NVA resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 NVA KIA. B/1-1 Cav detonated a mine vic AT880552 resulting in 7 US WIA(E). F/17 Cav vic AT911513, detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA(E). C/3-21 Inf on
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17 July found 1 IW vic AT861339 resulting in 1 IWC. Later the same day C/3-21 Inf detonated a booby trap resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 18 July F/17 Cav vic AT935530 detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). A LOH from F/8 Cav vic ZC035900 was shot down resulting in 1 US WIA(E). RF#116 vic AT879901 found 12 VC KBA (credit to A/3-16 Arty). The following day, 19 July, snipers from the 3-21 Inf vic AT791339, engaged 2 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA. B/1-46 Inf vic AT916638 found 1 IW resulting in 1 IWC. The 75th Rangers vic ZC168723, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. F/8 Cav vic AT971299 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 detained and 2 IWC. Cumulative results for the period 11-19 July were reported as 2 NVA KIA, 21 VC KIA, 4 detained and 6 IWC. US casualties were 26 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(H). On 20 July F/17 Cav vic AT925515 detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). There was no contact reported on 21 July. The following day, 22 July, C/4-31 Inf vic ZC168726 detonated a booby trap resulting in 4 US WIA(E). On 23 July B/3-21 Inf vic AT909934 engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 IWC. On 24 July G/75th Rangers vic AT817469 had a mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. The following day, 25 July, Recon/1-46 Inf vic AT917637 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. A/3-16 Arty vic BT024387 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. F/8 Cav vic AT975574, LOH engaged 1 NVA, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. On 26 July F/17 Cav vic AT970548 received 1 RPG resulting in 1 US WIA(E). The next day A/3-21 Inf vic AT895361 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 IWC. D/3-21 Inf while on a CA detonated a booby trap vic AT876353 resulting in 1 US KIA, 7 US WIA(E). On 28 July DIVARTY aerial observer vic AT966351 engaged 6 VC/UNSEF resulting in 3 NVA KIA. A/3-21 Inf detonated a booby trap vic AT902474 resulting in 1 US WIA(H). The following day F/8 Cav vic AT986370 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. Casualties continued as D/3-21 Inf on 31 July vic AT977373 received mortar, SAF, and AWF resulting in 3 US KIA, 8 US WIA(E). Co 2 G/75 Rangers vic AT822674 engaged 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Cumulative results for the period 20-31 July were reported as 8 NVA KIA, 5 VC KIA, 3 detained, 7 IWC. US casualties were 4 US KIA, 24 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(H). No contact was reported on 1 Aug. B/3-21 Inf on 2 August engaged 1 NVA vic AT997537 resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. Mines took their toll again as C/1-1 Cav vic AT928532 detonated a mine resulting in 2 US WIA(E). The following day, 3 August, a LOH from F/8 Cav vic AT846567 received heavy AWF resulting in 1 US WIA(E). B/1-1 Cav vic AT987356 engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 US WIA(E). There was no contact reported by the 196th Bde on 4 Aug. On 5 Aug B/1-1 Cav vic BT002350 detonated a mine and received SAF resulting in 5 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E) and 1 Vietnamese detained. C/3-16 Arty engaged an UNSEF vic AT818549 resulting in 5 VC KIA. Again on 6 August C/3-16 engaged an UNSEF, resulting in 4 VC KIA. On 8 Aug G/75 Rangers vic AT825517 engaged an UNSEF with artillery, resulting in 5 VC KBA (credit C/3-16 Arty).
The snipers of Recon/3-21 Inf on 9 Aug engaged 5 NVA vic AT983379, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. B/1 Inf vic BT012343, detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA. F/3-16 Arty engaged 2 VC vic AT862529 resulting in 2 VC KBA. Booby traps accounted for all casualties on 10 Aug as B/2-1 Inf vic AT974737 had 3 US WIA(E). F/17 Cav vic AT933515 detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA. On 11 Aug B/1-1 Cav in two separate engagements vic AT991341 had an mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 2 VC KIA; also engaged 3 VC, resulting in 3 VC KIA and IWC. The following day, 12 Aug, F/17 Cav vic AT925510 had a mechanical ambush detonate, resulting in 3 NVA KIA, 1 detained, 3 IWC, and 1 CSWC. Division Artillery aerial observer vic AT986334A engaged 7 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. F/8 Cav vic AT931511 engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. Division Artillery aerial observer vic AT979526, detonated a booby trap resulting in 5 US WIA(E). On 15 Aug A/3-82 Arty engaged 7 VC vic AT991512 resulting in 2 VC KIA. Action continued on 18 Aug as B/1-1 Cav vic AT983339 engaged 3 VC, resulting in 3 VC KIA. On 20 Aug B/1-46 Inf vic BT036598 engaged 7 NVA resulting in 5 NVA KIA, 2 detained and 2 IWC. Cumulative results for the period 1-20 Aug were as follows: 21 NVA KIA, 41 VC KIA, 8 detained, 12 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties were: 6 US KIA, 24 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Contact was light throughout the AO from 21-24 Aug. On 25 Aug B/2-1 Inf vic AT974525, engaged 4 VC with artillery resulting in 1 VC KBA (Credit to A/3-82 Arty). Again at 1700H the snipers of B/2-1 Inf vic AT975159 engaged 1 VC with artillery, resulting in 1 VC KBA (Credit to A/3-82 Arty). Later the same day B/2-1 Inf vic AT987519 engaged 3 VC with SAF, resulting in 1 VC KIA. The following day B/1-1 Cav while enroute to their NDF received SAF, AWP and RPG rounds vic AT953524 which resulted in 5 US KIA, 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). On 27 Aug B/2-1 Inf vic AT998498 engaged 2 VC with claymores and SAF resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 IWC. D/2-1 Inf vic AT954525 detonated an anti-personnel mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). B/1-1 Cav vic AT948528 received RPG fire resulting in 1 KIA, 1 US WIA(M). The 75th Rangers on 29 Aug engaged 3 VC vic AT901357 resulting in 3 VC KIA. Booby traps again their toll on 30 Aug as an element of B/2-1 Inf detonated one, vic BS146980, resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Cumulative results for the period 21-31 Aug were 2 NVA KIA, 23 VC KIA and 4 IWC. US casualties were 5 US KIA, 20 US WIA(E), 7 US WIA(M) and 1 US MIA. Contact was reported light in the 196th Bde AO for the first seven days of Sep, with no significant actions reported. On 8 Sep F/17 Cav had a M551 detonate a mine vic AT930578. Results of this were 3 US WIA(E). Cumulative results for the first 8 days of Sep were: 8 detained, 1 IWC, and 4 US WIA(E). There were no significant actions reported by the 196th Bde during the period 8-15 Sep. Cumulative results for the period 9-15 Sep were 1 VC KIA, 2 detained and 1 IWC. There were no US casualties reported during this period. D/1-1 Cav reported all the contact on 16 Sep as they detained 2 VN and 1 IWC vic BT021517. At 0945H a LOH from D/1-1 Cav was shot down vic BT018402. Results of this
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Incident were 1 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Later the same day the "Blues" of D/1-46 Cav were inserted vic BTO18402. The "Blues" engaged 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA. On 17 Sep, B/1-46 Inf detonated a booby trap vic BTO23583, resulting in 9 US WIA(E). Contact was light in the 196th Bde AO from 18-21 Sep. Cumulative results for the period 16-21 Sep were: 3 NVA KIA, 2 detained and 1 IWC. US casualties were: 19 US WIA(E). On 22 Sep, The Division Artillery aerial observer engaged 4 VC vic AT8511486, resulting in 3 VC KIA. (Credit 1 KIA to C/3-16 Arty and 2 KIA to D/1-82 Arty.) A/1-4 Cav on 24 Sep received RPG fire and returned fire with the M551 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). This incident occurred vic AT998540. The Division Artillery aerial observer engaged an UNSEF vic AT873512, resulting in 2 VC KIA. On 25 Sep, A/1-1 Cav detonated a mine vic AT985538, resulting in 4 US WIA(E). The following day, 26 Sep, Recon/1-46 Inf vic AT888661 engaged an UNSEF. Results of this were 6 VC KIA. After a sweep of the area Recon/1-46 Inf found 3 IWC. Light and scattered contact prevailed throughout the AO from 27-30 Sep. Cumulative results for the period 22-30 Sep were: 14 VC KIA and 4 IWC. US casualties were: 8 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). F/8 Cav reported the only action on 1 Oct as they engaged 2 NVA and also suffered an LOH shot down vic 2C181183. Results of this were: 2 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA(E). On 2 Oct A/1-1 Cav had a Rome plow detonate a booby trap vic AT879508, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). F/8 Cav engaged 1 VC vic AT977528, resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 3 Oct, B/1-46 Inf engaged movement vic AT850626 resulting in 1 US KIA. C/1-46 Inf in two separate incidents detonated 2 booby traps vic AT835634. Results were 2 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). On 4 Oct, C/1-46 Inf found 3 IWC vic AT824626, resulting in 3 IWC. Later the same day C/1-46 Inf received RPGs vic AT836322, resulting in 1 US WIA(E), and 11 US WIA(M). At 1305H C/1-46 Inf received 1 RPG round vic AT836362, resulting in 1 US KIA. A/1-1 Cav at 1810H detonated a booby trap vic AT917573, results were 1 US KIA, and 4 US WIA(E). Again on 5 Oct C/1-46 Inf received SAF vic AT833627, resulting in 1 US KIA. At 1305H C/1-46 Inf, vic AT836632 received SAF, resulting in 2 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). C/1-46 reported the only contact on 6 Oct as they found 2 IWC and 1 CSW vic AT834628, resulting in 2 IWC and 1 CSWC. C/1-46 Inf on 7 Oct found a weapons cache, vic AT836628, resulting in 3 IWC. Later the same day C/1-46 Inf engaged an UNSEF, vic AT836629, and the enemy returned fire, resulting in 1 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). Again on 8 Oct, the 1-46 Inf Bn reported the only contact. C/1-46 Inf found a grave and 1 IWC, vic AT835625, resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. D/1-46 Inf detonated a booby trap, vic AT854693, resulting in 1 US WIA(M), from the 48th Scout Dog Plt. On 9 Oct, a 1/4 ton vehicle from A/1-1 Cav detonated a mine, vic BTO6764, resulting in 1 US WIA(E). There was no contact reported by the 196th Bde on 10 and 11 Oct. On 12 Oct, C/1-46 Inf detonated a booby trap, vic AT840630, resulting in 1 US WIA(E), and 1 US WIA(M). There was no contact on 13 Oct.

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As of 142400H October 1971, the results of 196th Infantry Brigade operations for the period since 1 July 1971 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 KIA</td>
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<td>59 IWC</td>
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<td>4 CSWC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Plans:

a. The following OPLANS and OFORDS were in effect or initiated during this reporting period:

(1) OPORD 11-70 (Rice Denial); OPORD 1-71 (CA/PSTOP); OPORD 3-71 (Summer-Fall Campaign Plan 1971) was published on 8 June 1971; OPORD 4-71 (Da Nang Defense) was published 13 July 1971; OPORD 5-71 (Chu Lai Defense) was published on 4 October 1971.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley); OPLAN 8-69 (Emergency Relocation and Evacuation); OPLAN 1-70 (Security of High Ranking Officials) was superseded on 16 July 1971; OPLAN 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities); OPLAN 5-70 (FW Recovery Operations) was superseded on 18 July 1971; OPLAN 8-70 (Egress/Recap); OPLAN 9-70 (Civil Disturbance); OPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm); OPLAN 1-71 (Reinforcement of Nr 2, 3 & 4); OPLANS 2-71, 3-71, & 4-71 (Reinforcement of NH 1) were superseded on 2 Aug 71; OPLAN 5-71 (Security of High Ranking Officials) was published on 16 July 1971; OPLAN 6-71 (FW Recovery Operations) was published on 16 July 1971; OPLAN 7-71 (Rapid Reaction) was published on 19 July 1971; OPLAN 9-71 (Reinforcement of NH 1) was published on 2 August 1971.

b. Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to operations of the 11th, 196th and 198th Inf Bdes were also published.
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4. (U) Organizational changes during the period.

a. 1 May 71 - 196th Inf Bde released TF 23d Cav to DISCOM.

b. 2 May 71 - 4-3d Inf Bn released from attachment 11th Inf Bde, placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde.

c. 6 May 71 - DISCOM released TF 23d Cav, placed OPCON to 11th Inf Bde.

d. 8 May 71 - DISCOM released H/17th Cav, placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde.

e. 12 May 71 - DISCOM released H/17th Cav, placed OPCON to 11th Inf Bde. DISCOM released 2d Flt, H/17th Cav, placed OPCON to TF 23d Cav.

f. 17 May 71 - 1st Sqd, 3d Flt, 300th MP attached to MACV Advisory Team 15 for rations, logistical support, and quarters.

g. 21 May 71 - 196th Inf Bde released one cavalry troop from 1-1 Cav, placed OPCON 198th Inf Bde.

h. 26 May 71 - 198th Inf Bde released F/17th Cav, placed OPCON to 1-1 Cav. 1-1 Cav released from attachment to DISCOM and attached to 196th Inf Bde.

i. 20 May 71 - 196th Inf Bde released OPCON 4-31st Inf Bn to 198th Inf Bde.

j. 23 May 71 - 198th Inf Bde released 4-31st Inf Bn, placed OPCON to 196th Inf Bde.

k. 1 July 71 - 1-52d Inf relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and placed OPCON to 11th Inf Bde. 1st Sqd, 3d Flt, 300th MP Co relieved from attachment to MACV Team 15 and attached to MACV Advisory Team 16.

l. 4 Aug 71 - 274th FA (Radar) Detachment attached to 3-82d Arty.

m. 7 Aug 71 - Six Patrol Teams, Co G, 75th Inf (Rngr) attached to HHC, 196th Inf Bde for administration/logistical support. Activation Ranger Command Group #2 (PROV), assigned to Co G, 75th Inf (Rngr). Command Group #2 (PROV) attached to HHC, 196th Inf Bde.

n. 17 Aug 71 - 11th Inf Bde released 1st Plt, E/1st Cav, placed OPCON to 39th Engr Bn. 16th CAG released F/8th Cav, placed OPCON to 196th Inf Bde.
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o. 22 Aug 71 - 196th Inf Bde released F/8th Cav, placed OPCON to 16th CAG.

p. 25 Aug 71 - 1st Plt, E/1st Cav released from 39th Engr, placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde. E/1st Cav(-) released from 11th Inf Bde, placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde.

q. 27 Aug 71 - 196th released 1-1 Cav(-), placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde; E/1st Cav placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde.

r. 28 Aug 71 - 198th Inf Bde released 1st Plt, E/1st Cav, placed OPCON to 196th Inf Bde. 26th LCT placed in DS of 11th Inf Bde.

s. 31 Aug 71 - TF 23d Cav (PROV) inactivated, E/1st Cav and H/17th Cav relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde for all purposes.

t. 4 Sep 71 - 196th Inf Bde released 4-31st Inf(-), placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde.

u. 12 Sep 71 - 11th Inf Bde released 1-20th Inf, placed OPCON to 198th Inf Bde. 198th Inf Bde released 4-31st Inf OPCON to 196th Inf Bde.

v. 26 Sep 71 - 198th Inf Bde released 1st Plt, E/1st Cav, placed OPCON to 11th Inf Bde. 198th Inf Bde released 1-1st Cav(-) OPCON to 196th Inf Bde.

w. 9 Oct 71 - C/3-16th Arty, MET Section HEB, DIV ARTY attached to 3-82d Arty. 271st FA (Radar) relieved from attachment HEB, 23d DIV ARTY attached to 3-82d Arty.

x. The following inactivations were effected on dates indicated: 22 May 71 - 5-46 Inf Bn; 28 June 71 - 4-21 Inf Bn; July 71 - G, 55th Arty Hq); 12 Sep 71 - D/B Co, 23d Med Bn, D/723d Maint Bn, 31st PI Det, 90th Chem Det, G Co, 75th Inf (Rngr); 13 Sep 71 - 71st AHC; 14 Sep 71 - 87th Chem Det, 57th IPSD, 59th IPSD; 15 Sep - E/26th Engr; 16 Sep 71 - H/17th Cav; 1 Oct 71 - B/723d Maint Bn; 5 Oct 71 - 1-20th Inf, HHC, 11th Inf Bde; 6 Oct 71 - E/1 Cav; 8 Oct 71 - 3-1st Inf; 9 Oct 71 - 6-11th Arty; 10 Oct 71 - 132d ASHC; 12 Oct 71 - 1-52d Inf; 14 Oct 71 - D/26th Engr.
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5. (U) Training

a. The Division Combat Center conducted replacement training and in-country orientation for all individuals through the grade of O-3 who were assigned or attached to the Division. During the reporting period 132 courses were completed for 9,230 personnel. On 27 September 1971 training was terminated at the Division Combat Center. A total of 95,268 replacements were trained by the Division Combat Center since its inception on 1 December 1967. The 196th Infantry Brigade assumed 23d Infantry Division replacement training responsibility on 4 October 1971.

b. The Division Combat Center completed six Combat Leadership courses for 207 students and four Support Leadership courses for 114 students during the reporting period.

c. Five Unit Reconnaissance courses were completed, graduating 98 personnel.

d. The 23d Inf Div Sniper School graduated six classes totalling 126 students.

e. Five Territorial Force Junior Officer classes were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 122 RF/PP Junior Officers completing the course.

f. During the reporting period the Sapper Infiltration Mobile Training Team conducted training for 2848 personnel.

g. The Division Combat Center provided a Mine and Booby Trap Mobile Training Team that conducted classes on countering enemy mines and booby traps for units of the Division.

h. The Dust-Off Procedures Mobile Training Team provided instruction to 1706 US and 462 ARVN personnel during the reporting period.

i. The Helicopter Gunship Control Mobile Training Team provided instruction to 529 ARVN personnel during the reporting period.

j. The Control of Combat Assault and Eagle Flights Mobile Training Team provided training to 362 ARVN personnel during the reporting period.
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k. The Control of Resupply Aircraft Mobile Training Team provided instruction to 320 ARVN during the reporting period.

l. During the reporting period 537 ARVN personnel received instruction on CH-47 Sling Loading.

m. On 15 August 1971 Aero Riflemen training was established to provide instruction for selected personnel from the 2d ARVN Division. The training included fundamentals of air cavalry tactics and techniques to include refresher training in artillery fire adjustment, map reading and aviation instruction in gunship control, security of a Command and Control helicopter. Instruction was terminated on 15 October 1971 with the graduation of class number 8. One hundred twelve enlisted personnel, eight officers and four interpreters completed this training. Five classes were from the 2d ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company and one class each from the 4th, 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments. The graduates of these classes were used on actual air cavalry operations in support of the 2d ARVN Division.

n. The Division Support Command continued conducting a monthly PLL course and TAAMS course. A total of 99 and 92 personnel respectively attended these classes. These courses terminated in August 1971.

o. On 1 August 1971 the Division established a consolidated on-the-job training program to alleviate a shortage of trained personnel in certain skills. Division Artillery provided training for 81mm mortar and 4.2 mortar Fire Direction Control Procedure (MOS 11C), Division Support Command provided training for Small Arms Repairman (MOS 45B) and Generator Mechanic Operator (MOS 52B), the 523d Signal Battalion provided training for Radio Teletype Operator (MOS 05C) and the Adjutant General provided training for Clerk Typist (MOS 71B20/30). A total of 139 personnel were trained under this program which terminated in September 1971.

p. During the reporting period 117 ARVN personnel were trained under the "Project Buddy" program. Under "Project Buddy", selected ARVN personnel were trained by the 723d Maintenance Battalion in such areas as wheeled vehicle mechanics, small arms repair, typewriter repair, wrecker operation and welding. This program terminated on 14 September 1971. A total of 208 ARVN personnel completed training under
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this program.

q. The 23d Division Artillery conducted training for Reconnaissance Sergeant, Mortar Fire Direction Control, Fire Direction Control and 105 HE, RAP Round (XM 548). A total of 265 personnel from 23d Inf Div were trained during the reporting period.

r. The 23d Division Artillery conducted Artillery Air Warning Procedures, 4.2 Mortar FDC, Artillery and Airstrike Warning Control Center, Forward Observer Procedures and Map Reading for 124 ARVN personnel during the reporting period.

6. (C) Tactical Air Support

a. During the period 1 May 1971 to 15 October 1971, 565 Close Air Support and 6 Combat Skyspot Missions, for a total of 571 air missions using 1087 aircraft sorties, were flown in support of the 23d Inf Div. This is a decrease from 632 air missions, but an increase over the 1,046 aircraft sorties flown during the previous six month period.

(1) Combat Skyspot (CSS) Missions

During the reporting period only 6 CSS Missions, using 12 aircraft sorties were flown, all by USAF aircraft. This is a decrease from 155 CSS Missions using 244 aircraft sorties flown during the previous six month period. The primary reason for this virtual elimination of CSS Missions was a 7th Air Force Directive issued in early May which dictated that CSS would be flown at night only in combat emergencies and would be used during daylight hours only as an inclement weather substitute for visual, FAC directed airstrikes. Reasons for this directive included (1) the decrease in Tac Air assets available as U.S. and other Free World Military Forces withdrew from RVN, (2) the relative inaccuracy of CSS, and (3) the almost complete lack of bomb damage assessment (BDA). Since the reporting period was a time of generally fair weather for the Division TAOI, few CSS were required.

(2) Close Air Support (CAS) Missions

During the reporting period 565 CAS Missions, using 1075 aircraft sorties were flown. The USAF flew 326 missions, 648 aircraft
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sorties; the USN flew 89 missions, 182 aircraft sorties; the RAAF flew 57 missions, 58 aircraft sorties; and the VNAF flew 93 missions, 187 aircraft sorties. This is an increase over the 477 missions, 802 aircraft sorties flown during the last reporting period. This increase was obtained despite the departure from RVN on 31 May of the RAAF Canberra Squadron, which frequently supported the Division, and the decreasing availability of USAF Tac Air assets throughout the period. The increase can be attributed primarily to the fair weather experienced throughout the first five months of the reporting period.

(3) Ordnance Expended.

A total of 2,246 tons of ordnance were delivered during the period, of which 282 tons were napalm. The increase over the 1,720 tons for the previous period is in proportion to the increase in number of sorties. Another contributing factor was the fact that as the Tac Air assets decreased, the remaining aircraft available were primarily F-4 aircraft which carry a larger bomb load per aircraft than the departed F-100s and Canberras.

(4) Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA)

Bomb Damage Assessment made by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) included the following: 1,344 structures destroyed, 126 structures damaged, 933 bunkers destroyed, 103 bunkers damaged, 7 bridges destroyed, 4 bridges damaged, 24 tunnels destroyed, 53 caves destroyed, 12 bicycles destroyed, 30 boxes of 54 ammunition destroyed, 4 carts destroyed, 2 pack elephants destroyed, 1 truck destroyed, 145 secondary explosions, 63 secondary and sustained fires, and 101 killed by airstrike (KBAS).

b. There were nine Arc Light Missions flown in the 23d Inf Div TAOI during the reporting period; none were flown during the previous period. Two were nominated by the Division, the remaining seven were nominated by higher headquarters or by the ARVN. Reported BDA for these Air Lights included 35 structures destroyed, 25 bunkers destroyed, and 2 KBAS.

c. There were two Commando Vault (CV) drops during the reporting period; none were dropped during the previous period. Both of these 15,000 pound bombs with fuse extenders, dropped from C-130 aircraft, were delivered for landing zone (LZ) construction in support of the 196th Infantry Brigade. Both CV drops were on target and created LZs.
d. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) System.

(1) In an attempt to obtain maximum results from the rapidly dwindling Tac Air assets available to MR 1, XXIV Corps initiated in August the QRF system. Under the previous system all available aircraft sorties, other than sorties reserved for immediate airstrikes, were allocated daily to units in MR 1 on a preplanned basis. Units were required to submit preplanned air requests, to include number of sorties requested, TOT desired, and target description, to Corps 24 hours in advance of the day the strikes were desired. Corps in turn allocated the resources based on its established priorities and the contents of the units' requests. Sortie TOTs were generally inflexible and targets could not be attacked when acquired, unless a unit was fortunate enough to have preplanned sorties scheduled at or near the time a target was acquired, or by justifying an immediate request. With this system many targets, especially those found and developed by the Air Cavalry, could not be hit when Tac Air would have its maximum effectiveness.

(2) Under the QRF System, preplanned airstrikes were allocated only for missions that required either special ordnance, such as area denial munitions or LZ construction, or rigid timing, such as LZ preparations. All available sorties, other than those still reserved for immediate airstrikes, were placed on strip alert with standard ordnance loads at spaced intervals throughout the day. Units could then request these sorties as a target was acquired and therefore when it was most lucrative, rather than having to request preplanned strikes for a later date when the suitability of the weather would often be unpredictable; when a FAC other than the one who acquired a target might not be able to find it again; and quite often, when the value of the target had diminished markedly.

(3) There are many factors, both measurable, such as sorties flown; and unmeasurable, such as level of enemy activity, which would have to be considered in determining which system utilized Tac Air more effectively. There is also a need for a longer period for operation of the QRF System than just the past three months for a good evaluation. However, using KBAS as a relative measure of effectiveness for comparable weather periods, the 65 KBAS obtained from 368 sorties in the months of August and September under the QRF System compared to the 28 KBAS obtained from 486 sorties in June and July under the previous system would indicate that the QRF System is more responsive and effective, especially if the amount of air available is minimal.
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7. (C) Artillery: During this reporting period, Division Artillery continued to provide fire support to the maneuver elements of the Americal Division. The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery remained in direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade; the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery remained in direct support of the 198th Infantry Brigade; the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery remained in direct support of the 196th Infantry Brigade. The 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm), the 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155mm) and the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery continued to provide general support reinforcing fires to the Division.

a. 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. The Battalion continued to provide support to the 11th Infantry Brigade at FSB Bronco (BS812396). On 22 June the Battalion FDC was moved to FSB Dottie (BS628856) to control the fires of the direct support and reinforcing batteries, and Battalion Headquarters was moved to Chu Lai. D Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery was OPOON to 6-11th Artillery from 1 July to 5 October 1971.

(1) A Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. A Battery continued to provide direct support to the 4-21st Infantry throughout the operational period. At the beginning of the period, four howitzers were located at FSB Tiger (BS478478) and two howitzers at FSB Bronco (BS812396). On 4 May two howitzer sections moved by ground convoy to FSB Dragon (BS70528) from FSB Bronco, and were returned by ground convoy to FSB Bronco on 6 May. On 11 May four howitzer sections moved by air from FSB Tiger and two howitzer sections from FSB Bronco were moved by ground convoy to FSB Debbie (BS68319). On 31 May two howitzer sections moved by ground convoy to FSB Dragon. On 6 June the same two howitzer sections moved by ground convoy to FSB Bronco. On 18 June two howitzer sections at FSB Bronco deactivated, and on 21 June the remainder of A Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery deactivated.

(2) B Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. B Battery provided direct support for the 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry throughout the period. At the start of the period, B Battery was located at FSB San Juan Hill (BS343380). On 10 May two howitzer sections moved by air to FSB Jeff (BS688324). On 17 May the same howitzer sections moved by air to FSB Bronco (BS812396), and then moved to Chu Lai and deactivated on 6 June. The remainder of B Battery was moved to Chu Lai and deactivated on 9 June.

(3) C Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. C Battery continued to provide direct support for the 1-20th Infantry throughout the reporting period. At the beginning of the period four howitzers were located at FSB Liz (BS753-432) and two howitzers at FSB Snoopy (BS708609). On 10 August two howitzer
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sections moved from FSB Snoopy to LZ Dragon (BS730528). On 16 August the same two howitzer sections moved from FSB Dragon to FSB Lion (BS715300). On 24 August two howitzer sections from FSB Lion and two howitzer sections from FSB Liz moved by air to FSB Vanguard (BS576433). On 3 September the four howitzer sections on FSB Vanguard were moved by air to FSB Custer (BS513573). On 12 September the four howitzer sections at FSB Custer were moved by air to FSB west in the 198th Brigade AO and were OFCON to the 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery. On 13 September the remaining two howitzer sections were moved by air to FSB Siberia, and were also OFCON to the 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery. On 4 October, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery was deactivated.

(4) D Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. D Battery continued to support 3-1st Infantry during the period. The complete battery was located at FSB 411 (BS539731) at the start of the period. On 21 June three howitzer sections were moved to FSB Crunch (BS535515). On 11 September three howitzer sections from FSB Crunch and one howitzer section from FSB 411 were moved by air to FSB Colt 45 (BS296807). On 22 September three howitzer sections were moved by air from FSB Colt 45 to FSB Lobo (BS645538), and one howitzer section was returned from FSB Colt 45 to FSB 411. On 5 October three howitzer sections were moved by air from FSB Lobo to Chu Lai, and deactivated. On 6 October the remaining three howitzer sections were moved from FSB 411 to Chu Lai and deactivated.

(5) D Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery. D Battery was OFCON to 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery on 1 July. The Battery provided direct support for the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, which was OFCON to the 11th Brigade. At the start of the operation, two howitzer sections were located at FSB Stinson (BS539824), two howitzer sections at FSB Cindy (BS34384A), and two howitzer sections at FSB Ha Thanh (BS384698). On 23 July two howitzer sections were moved by air to FSB Chi Lang (BS289687) from FSB Cindy. On 6 August two howitzer sections from FSB Chi Lang and two howitzer sections from FSB Ha Thanh were moved by air to FSB Freddie (BS229578). On 20 August two howitzer sections were moved by air from FSB Freddie to FSB Duke (BS240855) and two howitzer sections from FSB Freddie returned to FSB Cindy. On 17 September two howitzer sections from FSB Cindy were moved by air to FSB Snoopy (BS707609) and two howitzer sections from FSB Duke were moved by air to FSB Stinson. On 2 October two howitzer sections from FSB Snoopy were moved by air to FSB Dragon (BS730528). On 5 October two howitzer sections were moved by air from FSB Dragon to Chu Lai for deactivation, and two howitzer sections from FSB Stinson...
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moved by air to FSB Phoenix (BS567878), and Battery D, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery was returned to the control of 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery.

b. 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. During the period, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery continued its mission of direct support to the 198th Brigade. Four howitzers of B Battery remained detached from the Battalion and attached to 3-82d Artillery throughout the period. The operational control of A, C and D Batteries by 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery was returned to 6-11th Artillery at the start of the period. On 10 September this Battalion received operational control of C Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. C Battery, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery was OFCON to this Battalion from 16 Sep to 8 Oct. On 12 October this Battalion received operational control of A Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery.

(1) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. A Battery continued to provide support to 1-6th Infantry with four howitzers located at FSB Bayonet West (BT547000) and two howitzers at FSB Ha Than (BS385698). On 23 July while OFCON to 6-11th Artillery for an operation, two howitzers were air moved from FSB Ha Than to FSB Chi LaAg (BS299688). On 3 August the two howitzers from FSB Chi Lang were moved to FSB Bayonet West. On 28 August two howitzers from FSB Bayonet West were air moved to FSB Blackhawk (BS314971). On 1 September two howitzers from FSB Blackhawk were air moved to FSB Carolyn (BS300970). On 14 Sep the two howitzers on FSB Carolyn were air moved to FSB Bludgeon (BT342007) in support of 4-3d Infantry. On 20 September two howitzers from FSB Bludgeon were moved to FSB Chippewa (BS488966) to support 1-6th Infantry. At the end of the period, four howitzers remained at FSB Bayonet West and two howitzers at FSB Chippewa.

(2) C Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. At the beginning of the period, C Battery had three howitzers located at FSB Fat City (BT140077), three howitzers at FSB Professional (BT173077), and two howitzers attached from B Battery, 1-14th Artillery located at FSB Dottie (BS631382). On 16 June two howitzers road marched from FSB Dottie to FSB Fat City. On 16 June four howitzers were air moved to FSB Fury (BT151264); three howitzers coming from FSB Professional and one howitzer from FSB Fat City. These provided support for 3-3d Infantry. On 20 June two howitzers were moved from FSB Fury to FSB Professional. On 25 June the remaining two howitzers from FSB Fury were moved to FSB Professional. On 11 August two howitzer sections were air moved from FSB Professional to FSB Ky Tra (BT260869). On 27 August the two howitzers from FSB Ky Tra were returned to FSB Professional. On 7 October two howitzers were moved from FSB Professional to FSB Fat City. The two howitzers from C Battery,
1-14th Artillery were returned on 9 October to Chu Lai for stand down activities. At the end of the period, two howitzers remained at FSB Saloon and four howitzers at FSB Fat City.

(3) D Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. D Battery began the period with two howitzers located at FSB Stinson (BS599234), two howitzers at FSB Cindy (BS343834) and two howitzers at FSB Ha Than (BS3834698). On 21 July, D Battery was placed under operational control of the 6-11th Artillery and returned to the 1-14th Artillery on 7 October. While OPOON to the 6-11th Artillery, two howitzers from D Battery were moved to Chu Lai. On 10 October two howitzers from FSB Phoenix (BS507878) and two howitzers from FSB Stinson were moved to Chu Lai, completing stand down activities for D Battery.

(4) C Battery, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. C Battery was placed OPOON to 1-14th Artillery on 10 September, with four howitzers at FSB West (BT988243) and two howitzers at FSB Siberia (BT903232). On 15 September one howitzer from FSB Siberia was air moved to FSB West in support of an operation conducted by 1-6th Infantry, and returned to FSB Siberia immediately following the operation. On 4 October two howitzers from FSB Siberia and four howitzers from FSB West were moved to Chu Lai for stand down activities.

(5) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. A Battery, with all howitzers at FSB Fat City, was placed OPOON to 1-14th Artillery effective 12 October. A Battery remained at this position during the entire period.

c. 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. During this period the mission of the 3-16th Artillery was to provide Direct Support (DS) to the 1-1st Cavalry Squadron and General Support-Reinforcing (GS-Reinf) fires to the 3-82d Artillery in the 196th Infantry Brigade and the 6-11th Artillery in the 198th Infantry Brigade areas of operation. The Battalion Headquarters was situated in Da Nang throughout the period. D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (8"/175mm) had been attached to the 3-16th Artillery upon the Battalion's move to Quang Nam Province in April 71. On 9 October, C Battery, 3-16 Artillery and D Battery, 1-82d Artillery were attached to the 3-82 Artillery, enabling this Battalion to complete stand down activities.

(1) A Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. During the operational period, A Battery occupied FSB Chloe (AT938476) with four howitzers and FSB Yonkers (AT945405) with two howitzers and continued its support of 2-1st Infantry and 3-21st Infantry. On 4 October two howitzers from FSB Yonkers were
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moved to Da Nang for stand down activities. On 8 October four howitzers redeployed from FSB Chloe to Da Nang to complete the battery's move to its stand down area.

(2) B Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. B Battery was located at FSB Tien Phuoc (BT100142) with all six howitzers at the beginning of the period. On 29 May two howitzers were moved to FSB Crest in support of ARVN operations, and moved back to FSB Tien Phuoc on 5 July 71. On 20 August three howitzers were moved to FSB Aspen from FSB Tien Phuoc to support the 1-st Cavalry Squadron. On 3 October three howitzers moved from FSB Aspen to Da Nang for stand down activities. On 9 October three howitzers moved from FSB Tien Phuoc to Da Nang to complete the battery's move to its stand down area.

(3) C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. C Battery occupied FSB Rawhide (AT879578) with all six howitzers at the beginning of the period. On 6 May two howitzers were moved to FSB Hawk (AT8355757) in support of 4-31st Infantry. On 29 May two howitzers moved from FSB Rawhide to FSB Thuong Duc to support ARVN operations. These two howitzers returned to FSB Rawhide on 2 August. On 3 October the two howitzers on FSB Rawhide were attached to the 3-82d Artillery. On 9 October the four howitzers on FSB Rawhide were attached to the 3-82d Artillery.

(4) D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. D Battery remained on FSB Rawhide along with C Battery, 3-16th Artillery during the operational period. On 9 October D Battery was attached to 3-82d Artillery.

d. 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery. The 3d Battalion, 18 Artillery continued its mission of providing general supporting fires for the 23d Infantry Division TAOI. On 5 September notification was received by this Battalion for redeployment from RVN.

(1) A Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery. During the operational period, A Battery remained at FSB Cindy (BS342862) giving general support to both US and ARVN units. On 16 September A Battery was moved to Chu Lai to begin stand down activities.

(2) B Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery. During this period, B Battery continued to support operations in the 196th Infantry Brigade AO from FSB Tien Phuoc (BT102104). On 20 September B Battery was moved to Chu Lai to begin stand down activities.

(3) C Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery. C Battery continued its general supporting role in the 11th Infantry Brigade from FSB Crunch (BS54515).
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On 10 September C Battery was moved to Chu Lai to begin stand down activities.

e. 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support-reinforcing fires to the 1-14th Artillery and the 6-11th Artillery throughout the southern half of the Division's TA0I during the entire reporting period. D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (8"/175mm) remained attached to the 3-16 Artillery, providing general support artillery for the 196th Infantry Brigade. On 22 August the Battalion was notified of its redeployment from RVN. A Battery was placed OPCON to 1-14th Artillery on 12 October.

(1) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. A Battery began the period with four howitzers located at FSB Fat City (BT140077) and two howitzers located at FSB Dottie (BS680853). On 15 June two howitzers from FSB Dottie were moved to FSB Fat City. On 12 October A Battery was placed OPCON to 1-14th Artillery.

(2) B Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. B Battery began the period with four howitzers located at FSB Snoopy (BS708610) and two howitzers located at FSB Stinson (BS592354). Its mission continued to be reinforcing fires for both 1-14th Artillery and 6-11th Artillery. On 23 August, C Battery, 1-14th Artillery assumed control of the two howitzers on FSB Stinson. On 5 October four howitzers moved from FSB Snoopy to Chu Lai for stand down activities.

(3) C Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. C Battery began the operational period with four howitzers at FSB Liz (BS757432) and two howitzers at FSB Bronco (BS812396). On 15 June two howitzers from FSB Bronco were moved to FSB Dottie. On 21 August two howitzers were moved from FSB Liz to FSB Bronco. On 23 August two howitzers were moved from FSB Liz to FSB Snoopy. On 23 August C Battery also assumed control of two howitzers at FSB Stinson, formerly from B Battery, 1-82d Artillery, thus controlling the fires for six howitzers. On 25 August two howitzers were moved from FSB Bronco to FSB Snoopy. On 5 October four howitzers were moved from FSB Snoopy to Chu Lai for stand down activities. On 6 October two howitzers were moved from FSB Dottie to Chu Lai. On 7 October two howitzers were moved from FSB Stinson to Chu Lai, completing the battery's move to the stand down area.

f. 3rd Battalion, 82d Artillery. During the period 1 May 1971 through 30 September 1971, the 3rd Battalion, 82d Artillery had the mission of Direct Support to the 196th Infantry Brigade whose Tactical Area of Interest encompassed a major portion of Quang Nam Province, RVN. The vast majority of the maneuver unit's missions during this period were of the "search and clear" variety designed to discover enemy locations; to restrict enemy movement and to deny

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enemy access to the settled areas of the Province. B Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery remained attached during the reporting period. Additionally, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery assumed tactical missions of Reinforcing and General Support with the added operational control of C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm) and D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (8"/175mm). On 15 October 1971, A Battery, 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery was attached to the 3-82d Artillery from XXIV Corps Artillery. Concurrently, D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery was returned to the control of its parent unit for stand down.

(1) A Battery, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. On 1 May 1971 all six guns of the battery were located at Hill 151 (AT938476). On 3 August three guns of the battery were moved to LZ Aspen (AT014348). They returned to Hill 151 on 20 August. On 11 October the entire battery moved to LZ Carolyn (AT965733).

(2) B Battery, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. On 1 May 1971 four guns of the battery were located on Hill 510 (AT934404) and two guns were on Hill 65 (AT880580). On 2 June those two guns moved to Hill 868 (AT838828). On 7 July the four guns from Hill 510 displaced to LZ Crest (BT816379). On 23 July the two guns from Hill 868 were moved to Hill 270 (AT860680) and were attached to B Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery at that location. On 24 July two of the four guns from LZ Crest were moved back to Hill 510 followed by the remaining two guns of 25 July. On 27 September all four guns on Hill 510 were displaced to LZ Excedrin (AT013474) in support of a two battalion operation in the Que Son mountains. On 25 September they returned to Hill 510. On 5 October two guns were moved from Hill 510 to Hill 270 in the first phase of the closeout of Hill 510. The two remaining guns went to Hill 270 on 9 October. The battery regained its two guns from B Battery, 1-14th Artillery, thereby completing its six gun battery.

(3) C Battery, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. On 1 May all six guns of the battery were located on Hill 350 (AT837757). On 16 June four guns were moved to LZ Center (BT053244). On 24 June those guns moved to Hill 502 (AT834-657). On 13 July all four guns were then moved back to Hill 350. On 4 August three guns were moved from Hill 350 to Hill 868 (AT838828) where they remained until 4 September. On that date the three guns were moved to LZ West (AT987247) going under the operational control of 1-14th Artillery in support of 198th Brigade operations south of the Que Son Mountains. On 13 September they returned to Hill 350 joining the other guns of the battery which were OCPON to B Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery since 4 September. On 18 September two guns were moved to Hill 510 (AT946404) and were placed OCPON to A Battery for the multi-battalion operation, (2-1st Infantry and 3-21st Infantry),
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in the Que Son Mountains. They returned to Hill 350 on 25 September. All
six howitzers were at Hill 350 at the end of the period.

(4) B Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. B Battery, 1st Battalion,
14th Artillery remained attached to 3-82d Artillery during the entire period.
On 1 May the battery consisted of four guns positioned at Hill 270 (AT86068C).
Two of this battery's guns had been retained earlier in the 198th Brigade AO.
On 21 July the Battery moved two guns from Hill 270 to Hill 502 (AT840658).
The remaining two pieces were moved to that location on the following day (22
July). On 2 August all four guns returned to Hill 270. On 5 October the
tactical mission of B Battery was terminated and the four howitzers were moved
to Camp Redhorse, to commence stand down. During its stand down, the remaining
two howitzers of the battery were returned from the 198th Brigade AO.

(5) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery (8'/175mm). This unit is
currently assigned to the 106th Artillery Group of II Corps Artillery.

(6) C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery. At 0001 hours on 9 October
this battery was attached to 3-82d Artillery. The Battery consisted of six
155mm howitzers. Four of these were positioned on FSB Rawhide (AT880850) and
two were on FSB Mud (AT837757). On 13 and 14 October the four howitzers on
FSB Rawhide were moved to the Northern Artillery Compound (AT911799).

(7) D Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (8'/175mm). At 0001 hours
on 10 October this battery came under the operational control of 3-82d Artil-
lery. On 15 October the two 8" howitzers and two 175mm guns from FSB Raw-
hide were moved to Da Nang to begin stand down activities.

g. Ground Surveillance Radar Section.

(1) The Ground Surveillance Radar Section of HHB, 23d Infantry Division
Artillery remained at OP 1 (B3516778) and continued to provide surveillance
of the Tra Khuc River-Horsehoe Area. The AN/TPS-25 Radar was replaced by
a PFS-5 Radar which remained the primary surveillance means during the majority
of the reporting period. On 3 August the AN/TPS-58 Radar was emplaced at
OP 1 for field testing. The set performed successfully until 3 October when
maintenance problems developed. The PFS-5 Radar became the primary surveil-
nance means until OP 1 was turned over to ARVN Regional Forces on 9 October
1971. The Ground Surveillance Radar Section was airlifted to Chu Lai for
redeployment.

(2) The 271st Field Artillery Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar) con-
tinued surveillance operations from OP 3 (BS754421) in the Lis-Bronco areas.
On 25 August 1971 the 271st Detachment was airlifted to Rawhides (AT881580) and
OP 3 was closed. The Detachment's AN/TPS-25 Radar successfully acquired and engaged targets in the Rawhide - Charlie Ridge - Arizona Territory area. On 9 October the 271st Detachment was detached from HHB, 23d Infantry Division Artillery, and attached to the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery for support of operations within the 196th Brigade area of operations.

(3) On 3 August 1971 the 274th Field Artillery Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar) was attached to the 3-82d Artillery from XXIV Corps. The 274th was positioned on Hill 327 with the TPS-58 Radar to perform surveillance of the Da Nang Rocket Belt.

h. Counter Mortar Radar Detachment.

(1) The 251st FA Detachment (Radar), located on OP Nui Vong (BC702601) continued to provide countermortar coverage for the OP, FSB Snoopy and the Mo Duc - Nghia Hanh area. On 31 May 1971 the Detachment was moved by air to FSB Rawhide (AT881500) to provide countermortar coverage to the fire base and the Da Loc area. The 251st FA Detachment (Radar) provided countermortar coverage to FSB Rawhide until 9 October 1971 when the unit ceased combat operations and convoyed to Chu Lai for redeployment.

(2) The 252d FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP Sugar Mill Hill (BS613-735) and continued a combined operation with personnel of the 2d ARVN Division Artillery. The Detachment provided countermortar coverage of the Quang Ngai (C) area, technical assistance in training ARVN personnel, and assistance in registering ARVN/US artillery. The Detachment moved to Chu Lai for redeployment on 7 October 1971.

i. Integrated Observation System (IOS) - AN/GWQ-10 Ground Surveillance.

(1) General: The IOS is a tripod mounted observation system consisting of one pair of 10X and 20X power selectable binoculars effective to 12,000 meters, a Night Observation Device AN/TVS-4 with a range of 2,000 meters and a Laser Range Finder AN/TVS-4 with a range of 29,995 meters. The IOS determines the azimuth, elevation and slant range to a target. The primary function of the IOS is the location of enemy forces and adjustment of artillery. The IOS is used to conduct artillery ambushes, registrations, and orientation of friendly units. Since the IOS is a line of sight device, it is limited by heavy foliage, hill masses and periods of reduced visibility due to weather or low illumination. The IOS is normally emplaced in a tower on elevated terrain in order to achieve maximum area surveillance. The IOS is highly mobile (displacement time: 2 hours) and can be moved in two UH-1 Helicopter sorties. Two Integrated Observation Systems were deployed with great success in
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the Division AO prior to this reporting period. Subsequently, six additional IOS were deployed throughout the Division AO and attained high success in acquiring targets.

(2) IOS Chippewa (BS486967) was opened prior to 1 November 1970 to perform surveillance of the southern Chu Lai Rocket Pocket and routes of access, the Tra Bong River valley, and the Suoi Sau River cross corridor. The OP acquired 227 targets of which 135 were cleared and engaged by artillery during the period 1 Jan 71 to 15 Oct 71. The OP continues current operations.

(3) IOS OP 3 (BS753420) became operational on 23 March 1971 to provide surveillance of the FSB Lis (BS752436) - Bronco (BS812383) area. Major areas of activity were to the south and west of the Tra Cau river; however, targets were engaged as far east as the Gaza Coastal Strip (BS8049). OP 3 proved to be a very lucrative acquisition location and engaged more targets than any other OP in the Division. The IOS acquired 265 targets of which 195 were cleared and engaged from 13 Mar 71 to 25 Aug 71. The IOS was displaced to OP 1 (BS516778) on 25 August 1971 when OP 3 was closed.

(4) IOS Rawhide (AT879578) was deployed on 15 April 1971 to provide surveillance of the Vu Gia River Valley, Charlie Ridge (AT8661) and the Arizona Territory (AT850520). In addition to normal personnel targets, the IOS succeeded in detecting launch points and mortar positions used to attack FSB Rawhide. The IOS acquired 91 targets of which 48 were cleared and engaged during the period 15 April 71 to 15 October 71. The IOS was conveyed by road to Da Nang for redeployment when FSB Rawhide closed on 15 October 1971.

(5) IOS Nui Vong (BS702601) was permanently established 20 April 1971 in order to perform surveillance of the Song Ve River, Nghia Hanh, and Mo Duc area. Situated on high ground overlooking the Song Ve River axis of approach, the OP acquired 219 targets of which 126 were cleared and engaged with artillery. On 5 October 1971 the IOS was airlifted to Chu Lai for redeployment when Nui Vong was closed.

(6) IOS Linda (AT865681) was occupied on 25 April 1971 for surveillance of the Tuy Loan River area, southwestern Da Nang Rocket Pocket, and northeastern Charlie Ridge (AT8964). The IOS acquired 147 targets of which 105 were cleared and engaged with artillery.

(7) IOS Hill 175 (AT994188) was established 10 May 1971 in the ROK Marine Brigade AO in order to facilitate the engagement of targets in the Thu - Bon River valley adjoining the 196th Brigade AO. The area was relatively quiet and engaged only 37 of 68 targets acquired. On 7 September 1971 the IOS and tower were airlifted to Hill 151, LZ Chloe (AT938476).
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(8) IOS 270 (BT421048) was opened on 22 May 1971 in order to provide surveillance of the Chu Lai Northern Rocket Pocket, of the approaches to Fat City - Chu Lai, and to the Fat City (BT438073) access road. The IOS acquired 97 targets of which 80 were cleared and engaged by artillery. The IOS continues operations.

(9) IOS Hill 327 (AT971737) was established on 3 August 1971 in order to obtain all-around coverage of the Da Nang Rocket Belt, the eastern slopes of Charlie Ridge (AT91664), and the East - West Happy Valley (AT89666). The southern part of the Rocket Pocket is heavily populated and the remainder has little activity. Of eight targets acquired, four were engaged. The IOS continues counter-rocket operations.

(10) The IOS OP I was established on 25 August 1971 when OP 3 was closed. The IOS improved surveillance of the Tra Khuc River horseshoe area and supplemented the ground surveillance radar by improving daylight surveillance. The IOS acquired five targets of which one was cleared and engaged by artillery during the period 25 August 1971 until 9 October 1971. The IOS was airlifted to Chu Lai for redeployment on 9 October 1971 and OP I was turned over to ARVN Regional Forces.

j. Meteorological Stations.

(1) The meteorological section of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery remained at Chu Lai (BT527070) to provide ballistic and computer meteorological data for artillery units in the northern and central coastal areas. On 15 June the section assumed additional responsibility for the Division's southern AO. On 8 September the unit ceased combat support operations and entered stand down at Chu Lai.

(2) The meteorological section of the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery at Tien Phuoc (BT102410) provided meteorological data to artillery units operating in the western mountains of the Division AO. On 7 September 1971 the section closed the station at Tien Phuoc and airlifted to Chu Lai (BT527070) in order to assume the mission of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery Meteorological Section. The meteorological section of the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided meteorological data to artillery units in the southern and central AO until 12 October 1971 when the station closed and convoyed to Da Nang for redeployment.

(3) The meteorological section organic to HBR, 23d Infantry Division Artillery at FSB Bronco (BSB12396) provided meteorological data for artillery units in the southern portion of the Division AO. On 15 June 1971 the section closed the station at FSB Bronco and displaced by road to FSB Rawhide (AT881580). The 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery assumed responsibility for providing meteor-
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The HHB Metro Section at FSB Rawhide provided meteorological data to the northern AO from FSB Rawhide. On 9 October 1971 the Meteorological Section of 23d Infantry Division Artillery was detached from HHB, 23d Infantry Division Artillery and attached to the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery for deployment in the Da Nang area. On 12 October 1971 the section started providing meteorological data to all units in Division Artillery.

Logistics: Logistical support for the 23d Infantry Division Artillery units continued to be provided from base camp units in Chu Lai and Da Nang. Division Support Command and Da Nang Support Command remain the principal agencies for logistical support. Decentralized execution of logistical operations was employed to the maximum extent. This procedure was necessitated by the numerous battery locations and by frequent moves of firing battery elements to various fire support bases within the AO.

Ammunition expenditures by caliber for the period 1 May to 15 October 1971 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8-Inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>65,525</td>
<td>20,384</td>
<td>5,009</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>93,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>66,233</td>
<td>24,834</td>
<td>4,141</td>
<td>3,590</td>
<td>98,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>65,577</td>
<td>20,840</td>
<td>2,955</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>92,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>51,566</td>
<td>23,935</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>80,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>50,227</td>
<td>9,534</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>65,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>19,372</td>
<td>18,480</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>33,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>308,500</td>
<td>113,017</td>
<td>18,357</td>
<td>13,954</td>
<td>453,828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8. (C) Aviation. A separate ORLL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group for this reporting period.

9. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 May 1971 - 14 October 1971, the Division Chemical Section, 27th Chemical Detachment, 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities.

   a. 755 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain restriction.
   
   b. 262 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were flown.
   
   c. 59,175 gallons of contaminated fuel used to defoliate FSB's.
   
   d. 1,370 pounds of CS was used for bunker restriction.
   
   e. 5,213 55 gallon drums of thickened fuel were dropped on booby trapped areas, enemy bunkers and suspected enemy locations.

10. (C) Engineer. a. Activities for the reporting period consisted of the divisional engineer effort being devoted primarily to direct and general support of the Division with a secondary objective of providing support to the pacification program. Non-divisional units devoted primary effort to the construction of secondary lines of communication (LOC's). Land clearing units supported both pacification and resettlement programs.

   b. LOC Program

      (1) QL-1

         (a) Major division engineer effort was not required on QL-1 during the reporting period. However, the 39th Engineer Battalion completed work on the Son Ve Bridge, a 480 foot, steel stringer bridge.

         (b) In several occasions, temporary emergency repairs were accomplished by the 26th Engineer Battalions on bridges L-8-86 (Song Trau), L-8-87 (An Tan), and L-9-98 (Ong Trung). These repairs consisted of replacing missing or rotting planks in the treadway. The repairs were performed before the bridges became impassable.
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(2) Enemy Interdictions

(a) Bridge 1-8-64 (Song Cau Lau) was partially damaged by a sapper attack on 21 June resulting in traffic being limited to one lane. A 90 foot double-single Bailey Bridge was placed by the 10th ARVN Engineer Group.

(b) A culvert at BT421120 was partially destroyed by sappers on 21 September, closing one lane of QL-1. Temporary repairs, consisting of fill placed in the crater, were accomplished by the 103rd ARVN Engineer Battalion.

(2) Secondary LOC’s. The 39th Engineer Battalion (non divisional) completed its 1971 road construction program. A total of 49km of all weather road and 43km of limited all weather road was constructed. Work on HL 521 included the construction of a causeway-spillway complex, a major engineer effort. The 26th Engineer Battalion concentrated on upgrading roads to an improved fair weather condition in support of pacification programs. During the reporting period 22km of secondary roads were upgraded. A total of 420 feet of double-single Bailey Bridge was installed and 2 existing bridges were repaired on secondary roads. A permanent bridge was constructed on HL 533 at Tien Phuoc. The 103rd ARVN Engineer Battalion continued work on HL 529 to Tra Bong. Additionally, this unit initiated work on LTL 5B. The 26th Engineer Battalion provided and assisted in the installation of four 80 foot double-single Bailey Bridges on this route.

c. Land Clearing

(1) The 59th Land Clearing Company (LCC) (non-divisional) completed clearing operations in the Batangan Peninsula and in the vicinity of Fire Support Base (FSB) Stinson. The company moved to Quang Nam Province and began clearing in the Da Nang Rocket Belt on 20 July.

(2) During August, the 60th LCC displaced from Military Region (MR) 3 to Quang Nam Province to assist the 59th LCC. The 60th LCC began operations in the Da Nang Rocket Belt on 20 July.

(3) During August, the 118th ARVN LCC cleared an area of approximately 1,400 acres in the Da Nang region. The dense population in that area led to the decision to employ ARVN assets.

(4) The 26th Land Clearing Team (LCT) was diverted from the FSB Stinson area to clear in the Ky My area on 6 April. Upon completion of clearing operations in that area, the team began operations in the area south of the Song Tra Khuc in the vicinity of FSB 411. In late July, the team was diverted to
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support the 39th Engineer Battalion by clearing along HL 534 from Nui Lac Son to Hiep Duc. On 28 August the team was returned to the 411 area. Upon completion of that area, operations were shifted to Duc Pho District on September 16. The Duc Pho clearing operations are still in progress and scheduled to terminate on or about 17 October 1971.

(5) Statistical results by area are given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ACRES</th>
<th>BNKRS</th>
<th>TRENCHES &amp; TUNNELS (m)</th>
<th>MINES &amp; B/T</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stinson</td>
<td>59th LCC</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batangan</td>
<td>59th LCC</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>NVA Hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>59th LCC</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky My</td>
<td>26th LCT</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL 534</td>
<td>26th LCT</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
<td>26th LCT</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duc Pho</td>
<td>26th LCT</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>50 lb salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>60th LCC</td>
<td>10,941</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,500lb rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>118th LCC</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,613</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Airfield Upgrade and Maintenance

(1) Chu Lai East. On 6 May, the 39th Engineer Battalion completed application of non-skid paint to 6000 feet of the Chu Lai East Runway. Soon thereafter, the heat absorbent characteristic of the paint caused the AM2 matting to expand resulting in some buckling, preventing use of a portion of the overrun.

(2) Tra Bong. D/26 completed rehabilitation work on the Tra Bong Airfield on 19 July.
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(3) Minh Long and Tien Phuoc. Periodic repair work was performed by the 26th Engineer Battalion on these airfields. Repairs were minor and primarily consisted of welding breaks in the MBAL matting.

e. Base Closure. In support of redeployment activities, the 26th Engineer Battalion assisted in the closure of eight fire bases during the reporting period. Operations consisted of leveling any earthwork and burning and burying all non-recoverable materials.

f. 26th Engineer Battalion Operations

(1) Combat Engineer Support

(a) Minesweeping

1) A/26 mineswept HL 540 from Da Nang to LZ Rawhide as required to permit the resupply of the base by road.

2) During the month of September, A/26 swept LTL 4 twice to support the relocation of the 59th and 60th Land Clearing Companies.

3) B/26 was responsible for periodic minesweeps of the Tra Bong Road (HL 529), Stinson Road (HL 527), Tien Phuoc Road (HL 533), HL 518 to FSB 411, and HL 586 for Division Convoys.

4) HL 535 was swept by B/26 on 14, 25 and 26 September, and by A/26 on 4 Oct. These minesweeps were in support of the 1-1 Cavalry Squadron.

5) D/26 frequently performed sweeps of the Division Sniper Range Road and the BOD Range Road near Chu Lai. Additionally, D/26 swept FSB 411 access road (HL 518), four times in June and twice in July and August.

6) Shown below are the results of minesweeps for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTE</th>
<th>MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS FOUND AND DESTROYED/DETONATED</th>
<th>CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HL 516</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL 517</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL 518</td>
<td>3/13</td>
<td>4 WIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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| HL 527 | 5/1 | 1 WIA |
| HL 529 | 2/0 | 0 |
| HL 533 | 0  | 0 |
| HL 534 | 0  | 0 |
| HL 535 | 4/0 | 0 |
| HL 540 | 4/0 | 0 |
| HL 586 | 0/1 | 2 KIA 8 WIA |
| LTL 4  | 4/0 | 0 |
| TOTALS | 24/15 | 2 KIA 13 WIA |

(b) Road Openings. HL 516-517 from Nghia Hanh to Minh Long was opened on 26 June and 8 September by the 26th Engineer Battalion for the extraction of tracked vehicles by the 11th Infantry Brigade. HL 517 was only a trace of a road and required considerable upgrading. The operation also required the installation of a float bridge. To reduce the time for the tactical extraction, airmobile tractors were positioned at Minh Long and the float bridge installed the day prior to extraction of the tracked vehicles.

(c) Demolition Support. 26th Engineer Battalion provided demolition teams on the following occasions:

1) On 27 May a team from C/26 supported 1-20 Infantry at BS660569 in the vicinity of FSB Woodstock. This operation resulted in the destruction of two machine gun positions and one bunker.

2) On 13 August a team from A/26 supported the 1-1 Cavalry in the vicinity of LZ Aspen, destroying two bunkers.

3) On 9 September a team from A/26 supported 2-1 Infantry in the vicinity of Hill 151, destroying three bunkers.

(2) Road Construction

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(a) HL 534 East. A/26 upgraded 5km of road during the period 17 June to 29 July. The upgrade of the road required to placing of 5000 yds of laterite, 70 cu yds of rock, and the installation of 17 culverts.

(b) HL 224. A/26 upgraded 400 meters of road on 20 - 21 August.

(c) Perdue-Charger Access Road. A/26 began construction on 13 September and the project is still in progress. To date the following has been accomplished: 4851 cu yds of rock were placed, 560 cu yds of laterite were placed, and five (5) 48" culverts were installed.

(d) OP Warrior Road. C/26 began construction on 7 May. In upgrading approximately 6km of road C/26 placed 8929 cu yds of laterite, 273 cu yds of rock, installed 23 culverts, and installed pile bents to support a bridge with LTR docking. The project was completed on 21 June.

(e) New Hau Duc Road. D/26 continued the upgrade of New Hau Duc Road. The project included placement of 2 concrete fords, 17 culverts, and construction of a concrete pier and two 17 foot concrete slab spans to replace a missing section of the Tien Phuoc Bridge. The road surface was upgraded from New Hau Duc to Tien Phuoc. The local citizens provided labor to install culvert headwalls. The project was completed on 15 August.

(f) All upgrading done by the 26th Engineer Battalion resulted in improved fair weather roads.

(3) Tactical Bridging Support.

(a) Liberty Bridge. On 5 June, A/26 and E/26 constructed a 60 foot double-single Bailey Bridge to repair a damaged span of the Liberty Bridge on HL 540. Due to the narrow width, an improved system of bearing plates had to be employed which resulted in limiting the bridge to Class 22 loads.

(b) A/26 installed 15 foot dry spans at AT900774 and AT881776 in support of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal operation on 10 September. The spans were extracted on 20 September.

(c) On 30 August and 10 September E/26 delivered and assisted the 103d ARVN Engineer Battalion in the installation of 80 foot double-single Bailey Bridges at BS611761 and BS569762 on LTL 5B.
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(d) On 22 and 28 September B/26 delivered and assisted the 103d ARVN Engineer Battalion in the installation of an 80 foot double-single at BS54,5765 and a 60 foot double-single at BS529770 respectively.

(e) In support of 1-1 Cavalry Squadron operations, E/26 installed and operated a 4 float M476 raft at Song Vu Gia. The raft was in operation from 22 June to 30 July.

(f) On 26 June and 7 September E/26 installed 141 feet 8 inch bridges at Nghia Hanh in support of LTL 516 and 517 road openings. The bridges were extracted on the following day in each case.

(g) E/26 continued to operate a light tactical raft at Tam Ky. On 8 June the operation of the raft was assumed by ARVN.

(h) E/26 continued to support the 39th Engineer Battalion at My Lai with a 158 feet 4 inch M476 Bridge. The bridge was recovered on 22 June.

(i) On 1 June E/26 installed a floating foot bridge on the OP Warrior Road. The bridge was installed using 10 M4 half pontoons and 24 pieces of M4 bulk. The bridge was removed on 2 July.

4. Airfield and Helipad Construction and Repair.

(a) Tra Bong. The Tra Bong Airfield rehabilitation was completed on 19 Jul by D/26. Repairs consisted of the removal of pieces of the matting and placement of river-run gravel to rebuild the base course. Continued deterioration resulted in the field being again closed to fixed wing aircraft in mid-August. A survey of required repairs indicated the scope was such that repairs could not be completed until early October. As Division resources were not available it was recommended that Province and 2d ARVN Division resources be used to effect repairs.

(b) Repair work consisting of welding loose matting was performed many times on the Minh Long and Tien Phuoc Airfields.

(c) Central Hook-Out Pad. The central hook-out pad at Chu Lai was moved to a better location on 3 August by D/26. On 23 September B/26 began work to again relocate the pad to the Chu Lai East Runway area. Work consisted mainly of upgrading an access road and was completed on 27 September.
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(d) Helipads. Helipads were constructed at all major fire support bases built during the reporting period. Additionally, pads were constructed or upgraded for refuel/rearm points at Hill 55, Hill 65, Tra Song, and Minh Long. Division engineers accomplished numerous projects to rehabilitate existing pads.

(5) LZ Opening.

(a) Hill 350. On 27 April A/26 started construction with one-half squad and a C-450 tractor. The project consisted of clearing fields of fire, clearing a base area, and construction of fighting and gun positions. The project was completed on 5 May.

(b) Hill 502. Utilizing one squad and a C-450 tractor A/26 cleared the base area, cleared fields of fire, constructed five gun positions, three 81mm mortar positions, and two 4.2 in. mortar positions. Construction began on 24 June and was completed on 1 July.

(c) LZ Jeff. C/26 began work on 12 May with one-half squad and a C-450 tractor. The base area and fields of fire were cleared, one 105mm pad, two 6'x8'x4' ammunition storage areas, and a 180 yard defensive berm were constructed. Work was completed on 13 May.

(d) Chaue No. C/26 started clearing area on 22 May with a D-5 tractor. Four preassembled bunkers were installed. Work was completed on 25 May.

(e) LZ Professional. B/26 began work on 19 April to reopen LZ Professional. The area was mineswept resulting in the discovery of four anti-personnel mines. The construction consisted of: four gun positions, clearing fields of fire, bunker excavations, helipad area leveling, trash pit excavation, road system construction, tactical wire installation, ten bunkers, a Battalion tactical operations center bunker, mess hall, two ammunition storage bunkers, and fighting and sleeping positions. The project was completed on 16 July.

(f) Hill 848. Utilizing one squad B/26 cleared and constructed a landing zone during the period 28 April to 8 May.

(g) LZ's Blackhawk, Carolyn, and Bludgeon. During the period 1 September through 30 September, B/26 cleared these three new landing zones.
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(h) Binh Son. During the period 4-8 September B/26 constructed Binh Son Observation Post utilizing one half squad and a C-450 tractor. Twenty-five thousand meters were cleared. Construction included 2 bunkers and a triangular berm 150 meters long on each side. Tactical wire was also installed.

(i) LZ Saloon. B/26 cleared a 200m by 100m area with one squad and a C-450 tractor to open this new LZ. The period of construction was 6-14 October.

(j) Tra Bong OP. D/26 initiated construction on 18 August with 10 men and a D-5 tractor and completed construction of the OP on 25 August. Construction included 3 bunkers, protective berm, and tactical wire.

(6) Firebase/OP Upgrade.

(a) Hill 510. A/26 cleared fields of fire during the period of 5-19 May using one squad.

(b) LZ Rawhide. A/26 constructed 4 refuel pads, 2 rearm pads, 3 fuel bladder berm, and placed 4 ammunition storage (CONEXES). The project was completed on 7 May. A 35' x 350' flyway and IO5 tower was constructed during the period 10-22 May.

(c) LZ Linda. A/26 used one half squad and a C-450 tractor to construct a hook pad and improved 2 gun pads during the period 11-19 July.

(d) LZ Chloe. A/26 leveled 2 hook pads with a C-450 tractor on 24-25 July.

(e) LZ Aspen. A/26 constructed 15 fighting positions on 7 August with one half squad and a D-7 tractor.

(f) LZ Maud. A/26 improved mess hall bunker and tactical operation center bunker, and constructed a trash rack, a meteorological section shelter, and two latrines. The work was accomplished utilizing one half squad during the period 7-19 August.

(g) Da Nang. A/26 placed fill for subgrade and installed CONEXES, retaining walls, and revetments for 4/31 Infantry ammunition supply point.
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during the period 27-30 September. This work required the efforts of one half squad supported with a 5 ton dump truck and a front loader.

(h) Hill 327. A/26 constructed an ammunition bunker with one half squad during the period 14 August through 6 September.

(i) Hill 55. One platoon of A/26 supported with two D-7 tractors, a grader, compaction equipment, asphalt distribution equipment, and additional trucks constructed a rearm/refuel point during the period 6-30 September. The point includes 3 berm inclosed fuel bladders, 5 refueling points with MBAI landing pads and ammunition storage bunkers, a 700 meter access road and a 100 meter by 300 meter flyway. All earth surfaces were peneprimed.

(j) Da Nang. A/26 began construction on 28 September of towers and bunkers for the 196th Bde base perimeter defense. This project is still in progress.

(k) Minh Long. C/26 continued construction of 9 ammunition bunkers and 6 living bunkers. The project was completed on 9 July.

(l) Hill 270. Using one squad B/26 constructed one 15' observation tower during the period 17-19 May.

(m) LZ Chippewa. Using one half squad B/26 constructed one 15' observation tower during the period 15-16 July.

(n) LZ Stinson. B/26 rebuilt a mess hall bunker, ammunition storage point, and shower during the period from 1 June through 3 July. The work required the efforts of one squad.

(o) LZ Cindy. B/26 constructed an ammunition storage point during the period 13-20 June using one squad.

(p) LZ Professional. During the period 1 August through 24 September, B/26 provided technical assistance for construction of a drainage system, and installation of 1100 meters of concertina. The company also cleared a 16,150 square meter area and repaired the mess hall roof.
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(q) Tien Phouc. During May, June and July, D/26 repaired the airfield, peneprimed hook pad, rehabilitated refuel berms, installed refuel pads, and peneprimed the entire refuel area.

(r) Tra Bong. During May, June, and July, D/26 made extensive repairs on the airfield, constructed 3 refuel berms, RPG screen, perimeter fence, rearm blast walls, and upgraded the access road between LZ Cindy and Tra Bong.

(s) San Juan Hill. Using one squad, D/26 started construction of a mess hall on 8 April and completed construction on 8 May.

(t) FSB 411. D/26 completed construction of 4 ammunition bunkers on 31 May.

(u) LZ Dottie. During July and August, D/26 completed extensive repairs to LZ Dottie. The project consisted of general repairs and tactical wire installation.

(v) Tactical Wire Installation. A/26 installed 3000 meters of tactical wire at LZ Rawhide during the period 8 June to 13 July. During the months of July and August, D/26 upgraded the tactical wire at Dottie. The 26th Engineer Battalion also provided technical assistance for tactical wire installation on numerous fire bases throughout the Division AO.

(8) LZ Closings.

(a) LZ San Juan Hill. C/26 completed dismantling 30 bunkers on 10 June. A platoon supported with a D-5 tractor was utilized in the dismantling.

(b) LZ Liz. One platoon of D/26 with two D-7 tractors, two front loaders, and three dump trucks dismantled 10 bunkers at LZ Liz between 21-25 August.

(c) LZ Aspen. During the period 19 September to 4 October, B/26 utilizing a D-5 tractor upgraded for temporary use then dismantled LZ Aspen.

(d) LZ Professional. During the period 1-8 October, B/26 utilizing a platoon, a D-5 tractor, a C-450 tractor, and an airborne backhoe dismantled this LZ.
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(e) LZ Dottie, FSB 411, LZ Snoopy and Nui Vong. During the period 30 September through 8 October, D/26 dismantled and closed the following bases on the dates indicated: Nui Vong, 1 October; LZ Snoopy, 5 October; FSB 411, 7 October; LZ Dottie, 8 October. With the exception of Nui Vong basically the same size force was used on each base. The force was two D-7 tractors, two front loaders, three dump trucks, and one platoon of men. Only two D-7 tractors were utilized on Nui Vong.

(9) Contingency Operations. Close liaison was maintained with the Military Police patrols who performed a reconnaissance of QL-1 twice daily. The S-2, 26th Engineer Battalion kept vehicles on call for an immediate investigation of any major defects. Beginning 20 September, A/26 performed an early morning visual reconnaissance by air of 130km of roads in the TAOI. Resulting information was passed to XXIV Corps. The Battalion maintained at Chu Lai a contingency stock of bridge timbers, pre-assembled culverts, and limited tactical bridging for immediate repairs in support of Division convoys.

(10) Redeployment. During the reporting period, E/26, a float bridge company augmented with more than six sets of Bailey Bridging entered and completed standdown. Authority was obtained to retain in A/26 two sets of M476 bridge along with the necessary ancillary equipment.

(11) The Battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

(a) HHC, B Co, D Co - Chu Lai.

(b) A Co - Camp Perdue, Da Nang

D. Logistics.

1. (U) General: a. Logistics activities during this reporting period concerned both normal supply/maintenance/service activities and redeployment (standdown) activities. Redevelopment planning and preparations were carried out under the staff supervision of AGOFS, GL. The operational functions of Keystone were performed by DISCOM. This report will not address redeployment activities in detail as these will be reported in the Division's Keystone After Action Report.

b. Of significance during the reporting period was the establishment of a Forward Support Element (FSE), Direct Support Maintenance Company, and Medical Company to support the 196th Inf Bde in Quang Nam Province.
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These support units were located at Camp Reasoner, Da Nang, RVN. Since these units were located in the same logistical island as the Da Nang Support Command (INGSUPCOM), separate activity address codes were provided the forward support units of the 196th Infantry Brigade so they could requisition directly on the Da Nang Depot. This action saved time in requisition processing and saved extra shipping and handling of supplies, since the forward support units did not have to process requisitions through their battalions at Chu Lai.

c. Throughout the period ASL zero balances have decreased, with one exception. On 13 July 71 a fire destroyed a warehouse of C Co, 723d Maint Bn containing a portion of their ASL. By cross leveling Class IX items from parent organizations, and obtaining priority fills from the Da Nang Depot the effects of this fire were quickly overcome and the accomplishment of the Division's task mission was not jeopardized.

2. (C) Services Division:

a. Class I:

(1) Food Service Advisors: During the reporting period, the Division experienced a shortage of food service advisors. In order to provide food advisor coverage to all units of the Division it was necessary for one advisor to supervise the units of more than one major subordinate command. As a result of the energetic supervision provided by each available food advisor, the qualitative aspects of the division food service program was not materially affected.

(2) Short Order Meal Service: Short order meal service was implemented within the Division on 4 October 1971. This service was well received by the troops and unit commanders. Mess Stewards cooperated wholeheartedly to make this service a success. The continuing success of the program will depend to a large extent on the availability of appropriate foodstuffs necessary for short order service. The Class I Supply Points are making every effort to insure the availability of these items.

b. Class III: (1) The Division's allocation of FOL was reduced during this period, however, supplies were adequate. JP4 and AVGAS usage was not directly allocated but was controlled through the aviation flying hour program.

(2) In order to account more accurately for bulk fuels received and dispensed by the Division the 23d Inf Div Reg 701-1 was implemented on 22 July 1971. This regulation established accounting and reporting procedures to be used for the receipt and issuance of bulk fuels to both divisional and non-divisional units.
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c. Class IV: (1) Barrier materials were tightly controlled throughout the period. Through intensive management the Division was able to meet all combat essential requirements. During August all issues of concertina and barbed wire were cancelled. Fortunately, the Division had an adequate stock on hand to meet tactical requirements up to this point in time.

(2) Lumber and plywood are presently under suspension and all requests for lumber and plywood have to be approved by INGSUPCOM on a project by project basis. The priority of issue is for the preservation, packaging, and packing of equipment for Keystone units. The Division is presently furnishing a 6 month plywood and lumber requirement forecast to INGSUPCOM to aid them in computing lumber requirements. This forecast is updated on a monthly basis.

d. Class V: (1) The Division was able to remain within its available supply rate (ASR) to a large extent for this period. In those instances where an increase in the ASR was required, immediate action was taken by higher headquarters to provide requirements. Frequently, increased enemy activity during low illumination periods created increased demands for illumination type ammunition.

(2) There were several instances when various ammunition items were allowed to go to zero balance at ASFs 105 and 107. This necessitated the calling of combat emergencies (CEs) when normal replenishment shipping procedures should have sufficed. The Division requested INGSUPCOM assistance in resolving this problem and immediate action was taken to improve the stock record keeping at the ASFs.

3. (U) Supply Division: a. During continuing dry season operations, stockage levels were maintained in accordance with operational and tactical necessities. Resupply of tactical units with fresh drinking water continued to be a problem due to the shortage of both 50 gallon water trailers and the one quart personal canteens. All assets available within the Division for hauling and storing water were screened to insure maximum and efficient usage. Because of this shortage, substitute items, i.e. five gallon water cans and two quart canteens, were issued to insure maximum availability of fresh water to the personnel in the field.

b. Preparations were initiated for the approaching monsoon season. Because of the problems imposed on the supply system by the heavy rains,
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careful planning was necessary to alleviate possible problem areas. This was especially true for Class I, II and V items. Resupply, whether by CH47 helicopter or overland, often becomes difficult or impossible because of inclement weather. In order to maintain tactical effectiveness during the monsoon season, it was necessary to increase unit stockage levels by doubling authorized quantities of Class I, Meal Combat Individual, and certain non-allocated Class V items. Personal clothing, to include wet weather gear and sleeping shirts, were requested in advance to insure on-hand stockage during the monsoon season.

c. The Self Service Supply Center continued to experience shortages on expendable mess hall items. These items included salad/soup bowls, cutlery, and sugar dispensers. Requests were placed with the 226th S&S Co to expedite the release of these items from depot to the SSSC. By the end of the first quarter FY72, SSSC supply problems were eliminated with the exception of diazinon insecticide which continues to be in short supply.

d. Throughout the summer months, paperware and plasticware, which are allocated items obtained through 23d Inf Div S&T Bn channels, were a logistical problem. The Da Nang Depot changed the requirement criteria or responsibility of who would place the supply demand on the depot. This situation was alleviated in July when it was determined that the 23d Inf Div S&T Bn would submit requirements for paperware and plasticware to depot. At the present time plastic forks are still in short supply, however, sufficient quantities of other paper products are on hand. Because of a critical shortage of paperware and plasticware within MRI1, all paperware and plasticware products are currently being controlled by USAICCV.

e. Small and medium regular sizes of fatigues and certain other items of TA 50-901 issue, air mattresses and poncho liners, remain in short supply. To help alleviate this problem it was necessary to cross level quantities stock within the Division.

f. During this period, the shortage trend in Class VII items, wheeled and track vehicles in particular, was partially relieved. Lateral transfers of tracked vehicles were effected from the 173d Airborne Bde. Transfers included twenty-two M113A1s and three M551 Sheridans. These vehicles were used to fill TOE shortages within the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. Lateral transfers of wheeled vehicles were effected from 5th Bn, 16th Inf; 4th Bn, 21st Inf; and D Co, 23d Med Bn when these units redeployed.
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These assets were distributed throughout the remaining elements of the Division. At present, the truck, Utility 1/4 ton is still running at 39% shortage. However, future planning indicated that the percent shortage of these vehicles will drop steadily as a result of Keystone activities.

g. A majority of the COMMEL items, mainly radios, were deadlined for extended lengths of time due to the shortage of electronic repair parts and modules. There continues to be a general shortage of these items in the supply system.

h. Throughout this period, a G4/S4 conference was held monthly. These conferences proved to be highly productive, in that policies and ideas were exchanged between the G4 and the unit S4s and S50s. At all conferences held, the G4 continually stressed the policy of turning in all on hand excesses. This policy was implemented through the Command Supply Review Team and the introduction of a "no questions asked" free turn-in program. Also processing of reports of survey was stressed to preclude any problems in property accountability. During the 4th quarter FY71, 202 reports of survey were processed for a total value of $903,503.60. During the 1st quarter FY72, 287 reports of survey were processed for a total value of $1,109,448.96.

4. (C) Maintenance Division: a. In early Sep 71 C Company 723d Maintenance Battalion reported a problem which the 196th Infantry Brigade had experienced with the M203 Grenade Launcher. The breech insert of the M203 Grenade Launcher was stripping the threads of the M203 receiver. Close inspection revealed the presence of pieces of brass in the firing pin recess indicating the rupturing of the cartridge primer, probably caused by improper firing pin protrusion. Firing pin protrusion of the M203 is adjustable by replacement of the breech insert and firing pin. The firing pin protrusion can vary during firing if the breech insert is loose. If the breech insert is loose during firing, the force would be taken by the breech threads rather than by the force shoulder of the receiver, thus damaging the receiver threads. If the breech insert is in motion during firing, it could possibly strike the force shoulder of the receiver thus causing the breech insert to crack. On 10 Sep 71, a check of 100 M203 Grenade Launchers from the 1/6 Inf, 1/52 Inf and L/3 Inf was made by the 723d Maintenance Battalion. Seventy-five launchers were found to have loose breech inserts. None of the arms room personnel had the tool designed to adjust the breech insert. This problem was referred to the US Army Weapons Command. The Weapons Command recommended tightening the breech insert to 50 in lbs to insure proper firing pin protrusion. Adjustment can be made using the combination wrench and gauge: breech insert wrench and firing pin protrusion gauge, FSN: 4933-481-3671.
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b. The 23d Infantry Division Maintenance Assistance Instruction Team (MAIT) made 27 courtesy visits during the reporting period. On 15 Aug 71 the mission of the MAIT was reoriented toward Keystone activities and courtesy inspections ceased.

c. During the period May through Sep 5,047.7 tons of serviceable and unserviceable material was retrograded by the 23d S&T Bn, 723d Maint Bn and the 335th Trans Co (ADS). Estimated value of retrograde was $42,820,000.

d. As a result of reduced operating expenditures and drawdown activities within Vietnam, a shortage of repair parts in all areas was experienced within the Division. In order to cope with this problem, increased emphasis was placed on organizational maintenance and supply program.

e. The Division has experienced a serious problem in securing repair parts for 16mm movie projectors, particularly the Singer-Gravflex projector. Repeated efforts by this headquarters to obtain parts have produced negligible results. On 23 Aug 71 the Division had 116 projectors on hand. Of these, 26 were deadlined at the DSU level and 40 were deadlined at the organizational level. Thus, 57% were deadlined for repair parts. At the organizational level, repair parts required are primarily projector bulbs and exciter lamps. At the DSU level, power amplifiers, preamplifiers, belts, clutches and sprockets are needed for repairs.

5. (C) Division Support Command

a. 23d Medical Battalion

(1) During the reporting period there were various redeployments made involving units assigned to the Medical Battalion. With the termination of Operation LAM SON 719, B Company returned from Dong Ha to Duc Pho on 30 March 1971. D Company, which had been at Duc Pho, returned to Chu Lai on that same date. With the redeployment of the 11th Brigade to LZ Dottie, B Company returned to Chu Lai on 18 June 1971. The redeployment of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade from Hawk Hill to Da Nang resulted in C Company moving into the medical facility vacated by the 1st Marine Medical Battalion.

(2) With the standdown of B and D Companies on 8 Sep 71, Hq & Co A of this battalion assumed responsibility for medical service to divisional units operating in the division rear.
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b. 23d Supply and Transport Battalion

(1) With the shifting of Division assets throughout the Division area of
operations, and standdown activities within the Division, many of the 23d S&T
Bn activities were curtailed while at the same time new activities were estab-
lished at other locations.

(2) During the month of May, Company B, 23d S&T Bn supported the move of
the 196th Bde from LZ Hawk Hill to its present location at Da Nang. The FSE
that was located at LZ Hawk Hill in support of the 196th was moved to Da Nang
to continue its Class I, II & III and GR mission to the Bde. A helicopter
refuel pad was established at L2 Rawhide during the last week of the month.

(3) In June the 23d S&T Bn assisted the 11th Bde and other units located
at LZ Bronco in their redeployment to Chu Lai and LZ Dottie. The FSE
located at LZ Bronco in support of the 11th Bde was closed and its assets moved to
Chu Lai. The POL tank farm at LZ Bronco was turned over to ARVN after Bn per-
sonnel had trained ARVN personnel in the proper use and care of the P.O.L.
During the month of June a special convoy was run to Qui Nhon for badly needed
repair parts.

(4) On 7 July 1971 a convoy departed for Quang Tri to pick up NCR 500
vans for the 723d Maint Bn. The vans were replacements for older model vans
belonging to the 723d Maintenance Battalion.

(5) During the months of July and August a considerable effort was made
to resupply JP4 to the supply points at Minh Long, Tra Bong and Tien Phuoc.
This effort was necessary because of the grounding of the C123 "Bladder Birds".
As much as 18,000 gallons of JP4 was hooked out in one day. The average amount
of fuel hooked out was 12,000 gallons a day. On 15 August a JP4 supply point
was established at Duc Pho to support Combat Operations to the south and west.
The supply point remained in operation for two weeks.

(6) In August a retrograde program was initiated in anticipation of Key-
stone activities. Since that time 1750 short tons of supplies have been retro-
graded with an average of 583 tons of supplies moved monthly. The previous
monthly average had been 28 short ton-supplies.

(7) During the month of September the helicopter refuel points at Minh
Long and Tra Bong were closed. At the same time new refuel points were opened
at Tam Ky and Hill 55. The refuel point at L2 Rawhide was closed the day after
the point at Hill 55 was opened.

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(8) During the first week of October, the Battalion was officially notified of standdown by Keystone representatives. The Battalion is now carrying out Keystone procedures.

E. Civil Military Operations.

1. (U) Organization. Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Bn attached to G-5 to provide LML (Light Mobile Loudspeaker Team) and LMM (Light Mobile Movie Project Team) support to the G-5 PSYOP effort.

2. (U) Operations.

a. Community Relations: In an effort to maintain and improve US/VN relations, the 23d Infantry Division has continued its active participation in the Friendship Council. Meetings of the Friendship Council consisting of key representatives of the local VN populace and US military took place on a monthly basis in an effort to air problems and find solutions which would aid the US/VN relations. However, at the request of VN officials, there were no meetings conducted during the months of August and September due to the concentrated efforts of the VN during the elections period.

b. Accident Reaction Teams. In order to react more effectively to US/VN incidents and confrontations, the 23d Infantry Division Accident Reaction Teams, which had previously been established down to brigade and separate battalion level, had been refined to a point of timely reaction and completeness of effort in quelling sensitive situations. Not only was the initial reaction improved, but claims generated as a result of US/VN incidents were settled more timely than had been the case during the preceding reporting period.

c. MEDCAP II: In an effort to improve the health of the local VN populace in the furtherance of the pacification program, MEDCAP's proved to be a valuable tool. MEDCAP results during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th># MEDCAPS</th>
<th># TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Inf Bde</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>13,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th Inf Bde</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198th Inf Bde</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVARTY</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>28,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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DISCOM
64
3,218

26th Engr Bn
14
301

d. Police Substations: The construction of National Police substations throughout the 23d Infantry Division's TA0I continued during the reporting period, with materials being provided by the Division for the construction of 20 substations in Quang Tin Province and 75 in Quang Ngai Province.

e. On 21 August 1971 the Division provided emergency relief assistance to 25 families in Quang Tin Province who had been the victims of VC terrorist activities. Materials provided consisted of food, clothing and building material. This action proved to be an effective way of counteracting the effects of VC terrorist activities.

f. New Hau Duc Road: During the months of July and August 1971 the 26th Engineer Battalion provided an all weather road to a remote area of Hau Duc District, Quang Tin Province which not only provided a necessary tactical access to that area, but also provided the populace with a vital link with the Province political and economic center.

g. Project Bright: On 27 September 1971 Major General Kroesen, Division Commanding General, presented 7,000 gifts to the 2d ARVN Division while 3,000 gifts were presented to the orphans within the Division's TA0I by individual subordinate commands, in support of the 3 October, Children's Mid-Autumn Festival. Project Bright was supported in total by voluntary contributions from the individuals of the Division and served to strengthen the friendship between the Vietnamese people and the US Military.

h. Civic Action Materials: In support of the Civic Action Program, aimed at improving the welfare of the local Vietnamese populace, and gaining their support to the GVN, the following materials were used during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Medical Supplies</td>
<td>2,838 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber (Scrap or Salvage)</td>
<td>53,533 bd ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>6,768 bags</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Tin roofing 2,000 sheets
Clothing 162 lbs
School Kits 2,813 ea
Food 10,530 lbs

i. Refugees: Although the refugee population within the Division's TAOI is still of primary concern to the Division, the problem is being successfully dealt with through GVN and MACV Advisory channels. The refugee count in the Division's TAOI as of 20 July 1971 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUANG NAM</td>
<td>16,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG TIN</td>
<td>17,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG NGAI</td>
<td>25,505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification.

a. Population Security: The following information reflects the percentage and numerical count of population in A and B rated hamlets as of 31 Aug 71, and the change since the last ORLL reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>COUNT OF POPULATION</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUANG NAM</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>+ 2.0%</td>
<td>311,000</td>
<td>+ 8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG TIN</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>+ 4.6%</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>+ 47,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG NGAI</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>- 2.0%</td>
<td>344,000</td>
<td>- 21,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. People Self Defense Force: Following is the status of the PSDF within the Division's TAOI as of 30 September 1971:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>ORGANIZED</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>TRAINED</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>ARMED</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUANG NAM</td>
<td>153,464</td>
<td>+ 1,116</td>
<td>139,261</td>
<td>+ 3,204</td>
<td>12,345</td>
<td>+ 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANG TIN</td>
<td>95,907</td>
<td>+ 1,127</td>
<td>95,827</td>
<td>+ 47</td>
<td>13,297</td>
<td>- 245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

QUANG NGAI 107,726 + 286 92,798 + 1,179 18,471 + 966
TOTAL 357,097 + 2,559 327,886 + 4,430 44,113 + 830

c. During the reporting period, the number of Ho Chi Chauhns returning to GVN control within the Division's TAOI were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Viet Cong Infrastructure. (VCI) are considered to be neutralized when individuals are (1) killed, (2) rallied, (3) captured, tried and sentenced for a period of at least one year for their involvement with VC activities. The number of VCI's neutralized within the Division TAOI during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (U) PSYOP Activities (May 1971 - October 1971)

a. Leaflet dissemination missions

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2729</td>
<td>2772</td>
<td>2647</td>
<td>2901</td>
<td>2714</td>
<td>2410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) By organic resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Leaflets disseminated (thousands)

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>47,306</td>
<td>47,345</td>
<td>42,542</td>
<td>42,223</td>
<td>68,492</td>
<td>58,510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(2) By organic resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tape broadcast missions</td>
<td>8,134</td>
<td>9,425</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>4,669</td>
<td>11,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Tape broadcast time (hours)

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th SOS aircraft</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) By organic resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th SOS aircraft</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Tape broadcast time (hours)

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th SOS aircraft</td>
<td>201.4</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>182.4</td>
<td>182.4</td>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) By organic resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th SOS aircraft</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Ground loud speaker broadcasts

Missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

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II. Leaflets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leaflets: (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>560</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) Recent significant PSYOP results.

a. During the reporting period considerable emphasis has been placed on combined PSYOP's utilizing divisional organic resources, with the 2d ARVN Division and Vietnamese officials in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces. Joint missions were conducted six days a week until 26 September when PSYOP activities were curtailed due to the National election; flights were eliminated during October as a result of a large reduction in allotted flight time. By conducting integrated missions, ARVN personnel were trained in the areas of PSYOP targeting, efficient use of blade time, dissemination techniques and the operation and maintenance of the AN/UH-6 loudspeaker system. This experience should prove to be invaluable to the 2d ARVN Division's PSYOP effort.

b. The declining Hoi Chanh rate has been a matter of great concern within the division. Efforts were intensified during all US and South Vietnamese operations with minimal results. NVA ralliers were practically nonexistent. As a result of reviewing Hoi Chanh interrogation reports it was evident that the aerial broadcast was the most effective means of dissemination. Reference was also made to Hoi Chanh testimonials which appeared on quick reaction leaflets. With the redeployment of this Division we foresee a further reduction in the number of ralliers due to less tactical pressure.

c. In early September a demoralization campaign was initiated exploiting the severe North Vietnamese floods. All NVA units within the Division's TAOI were targeted with emphasis on major supply routes leading from Laos into the western portions of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces and noted enemy base areas. After informing the NVA soldier of the floods and the probability of his family needing aid, the campaign suggested that the individual use his conscience to decide his future actions. All efforts were humanitarian in
d. Since a large number of the Division’s casualties were a result of mines and booby traps, heavy emphasis was placed on the Volunteer Informant Program (VIP). This program offers a monetary reward for munitions turned in to US units. During the latter part of May and beginning of June, the intensity of our normal VIP campaign increased sharply in accordance with XXIV Corps guidance. Additional missions were conducted in areas of former incidents, involving the detonation of mines and booby traps by civilians, in order to evoke popular support. During the last two weeks of May alone, civilians turned in 463 mortar rounds, 138 artillery rounds, 1-122mm rocket, 35 various smaller rockets and 95 assorted handgrenades and mines to include one hand grenade booby trap in place. The results of the period did show an increase in the amount of ordnance recovered however a direct relationship between amount recovered and effort intensity is impractical.

e. In response to enemy rocket attacks, special VIP leaflets and tapes were developed for use primarily in the Charlie Ridge area of Hieu Duc District and the lowland portions of the Da Nang "rocket belt". It was hoped this request for information on rocket units and enemy rocket caches would induce the people to better respond because many civilians have been killed by rocket attacks on Da Nang and various district headquarters. The desired results thus far have not appeared.

f. On 4 September the VIP campaign was expanded to include a Missing in Action program. Leaflets have been dropped offering various rewards for information concerning the true status of US or RVN forces listed as MIA or POW.

g. In reaction to rocket attacks on Da Nang and other populated areas, an anti-rocket campaign was initiated on 6 July. PSYOP material was developed by 7th PSYOP Battalion directed at enemy rocket units in the Division TACI informing them that they are killing innocent civilians during their indiscriminate attacks. Another tape, directed at the populace, was developed to create dissension between enemy rocket units, VCI and local people. This material was employed immediately following an enemy rocket attack in both impact area and suspected launch sites.

h. During the reporting period, enthusiastic support has been given to engineer projects because of the positive psychological effects they have on
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the people. Road construction in the Batangan Peninsula, on the New Hau Duc road and on the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc road were targeted daily with a variety of missions to include Pro-GVN and VIP. In response to land clearing operations in Tu Nghia, Duc Pho, Binh Son, Son Tinh, Hieu Duc, Dien Ban and Hieu Nhon a special Pro-GVN leaflet was developed by the Division to enhance the GVN image by telling the people that the land was being cleared to deny the enemy safe havens, to rid the area of mines and booby traps, and then to turn it over to the people for their use after it is safe. This leaflet combined with Chieu Hhi and VIP messages were used as a preparation in proposed work areas prior to the actual beginning of the project. These missions will also continue during the clearing phase. It was discovered that the "preparation" method was effective because the people in these areas were noticeably receptive to the teams when they arrived.

1. Coordination was effected with 7th PSYOP Battalion and 68th Medical Detachment at Chu Lai to insure that the White Helicopter Medevac program was properly supported with PSYOP material. Missions commenced in Quang Tin Province on 26 September and in Quang Ngai Province on 30 September. Daily missions were conducted in both provinces directed at both enemy elements and the local populace. To complement aerial efforts the HB teams in Quang Tin used loudspeaker broadcasts and disseminated handbills to inform the populace of the program. On 3 October while on an ARVN dustoff mission, a white Helicopter received 51 caliber and small arms fire in Son Tinh district. The following day the area was inundated with leaflets and a special tape developed for such incidents employed.

j. Employing the guidance suggested in USARV Circular 551-1, the 23d Infantry Division initiated its local National Drug Suppression Campaign on 11 October. Dissemination of material was coordinated with the civilian personnel office (CPO), 7th PSYOP Battalion and the Division Staff in order to obtain the widest possible distribution. Posters and handbills were used at the Chu Lai CPO gate, HB Teams utilized broadcasts and handbills in villages near the combat base and posters were displayed in other areas frequented by local national employees on Chu Lai. The campaign is attempting to curb civilian participation in drug traffic activities.

k. The most versatile element in our PSYOP program has been our four mobile loudspeaker teams (HB Teams) that are attached to the Division from the 7th PSYOP Battalion. These teams have been employed in air, ground and waterborne operations. HB Teams were used extensively in support of engineer land clearing operations in Duc Pho (September, 26th Engineer), Tu Nghia (June-August, 26th Engineer) and in the Batangan Peninsula (May-July, 59th LCC). These teams conducted daily missions on major roads in all three provinces and
are responsible for recovering a majority of the munitions in the VIP program. In response to a firing incident off the Chu Lai coast, coordination was effected with a local Vietnamese Naval unit and a team initiated waterborne operations designed to inform local fishermen of the fishing limitations near the combat base. Since commencing these operations, there have been no reported violations of the established limits. It is recommended that an HB Team be assigned to each brigade in order to provide the flexibility needed for dissemination of PSYOP material and assistance in various civil affairs projects.

1. On 1 September, an intensified campaign began which was designed to alert the South Vietnamese Civil/Military population in our TAOI as to the expansion, improvement and modernization of the RVNAF and GVN and their ability to maintain security and economy of the country as US forces continue redeployment. Now that official public notification has been made that major elements of the 23d Inf Div are to redeploy, this program is being expanded to include the following: (1) The redeployment is a result of joint planning on the parts of US and GVN leaders; (2) redeployment represents US and GVN sincerity in attempting to obtain a peaceful settlement of the conflict and is not the result of communist military pressure; and (3) the withdrawal of US forces is in accord with the ability of the RVNAF to provide for the country's defense. Each brigade is responsible for the implementation in their respective TAOI until their resources are diverted to stand down activities whereupon the Division G-5 will assume responsibility. Coordination has also been effected with PPA's in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai plus the POLWAR Officer of the 2d ARVN Division to insure the campaign will continue once final redeployment has occurred.

F. Personnel.

1. (U) Provost Marshal.

a. On 24 June, 1971, the Provost Marshal's Office established an aerial patrol, operated on a daily basis from 0900 hours to 1900 hours, for support in the Drug Suppression Program. This aerial patrol was responsible for observing areas of high drug source density such as the perimeter wire.

b. On 11 July, 1971, the Provost Marshal's Office established the Joint Task Force, Crime and Drug Suppression. The Joint Task Force consisted of RVN National Police and ARVN Military Police, with operational support from US Military Police. The primary function of this force was the suppression of illegal activities involving VN citizens.
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2. (U) Staff Judge Advocate

a. During the period Military Justice/Military Affairs continued to comprise the largest activity area of the Staff Judge Advocate. During the period, this command tried 27 general courts-martial, 43 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge was authorized, and 173 special courts-martial. Also received were 183 special courts-martial and 6 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 2,392 Article 15, UCMJ, proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USAFSSC, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana and 100 Article 15, UCMJ, appeals were received for review and advice. Military Affairs actions included 71 Line of Duty determinations, 53 Reports of Survey, 79 Reports of Investigation, 419 Elimination proceedings, 68 Congressional Inquiries, 40 FOW/Detainee Classification reports, and 3 Collateral Investigations for review and forwarding to Department of the Army.

b. Rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were: 1.05, 2.04, 20.05, and .24 respectively.

c. The Legal Assistance Branch processed 4587 cases during the period; including, but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, general counseling, and advice.

d. The Staff Judge Advocate Office presented a three-hour block of instruction entitled "Military Justice in Vietnam" to 5065 personnel of this division in the grades E-5 through O-5 during this period. This block of instruction included the following subjects: search and seizure, rights of an accused, protection of evidence, non-judicial punishment, apprehension, arrest and confinement, and administrative procedures closely related to military justice. In addition, 221 classes of instruction on the Geneva Convention and 248 classes on drug abuse and the drug amnesty program were given.

e. During the period 389 claims for damages to servicemen's property were paid totaling $87,410.45. Foreign claims are now adjudicated at this headquarters since establishment of Foreign Claims Commission #419 in February 1971 at Chu Lai, RVN, and 120 foreign claims were paid totaling 8,849,784 $VN.

3. (U) Division Chaplain
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a. On 13 May, Chaplain (COL) Aloysius J. McElwee, Deputy Chief of Chaplains (designate) visited the Division.

b. On 7 Oct, Dr. William J. Reiss, Executive Secretary, Division of Service to Military Personnel, Lutheran Council in the USA visited the Division.

c. A total of $3,987.40 was donated through the Chaplain's Fund to support local churches and orphanages in the Division area of operations.

4. (U) Surgeon.

a. The number of patients entering the Amnesty program, the number hospitalized or put on quarters during drug withdrawal and the total number of man days lost during withdrawal appears below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of cases entering amnesty</th>
<th>No. hospitalized</th>
<th>Man Days Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER (up to 15 Oct)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absence of good follow-up precluded determining the efficacy of the program, in terms of long-term abstinence from drug abuse.

b. A survey dealing with patterns of drug use was conducted in the Division during June by CPT Larry Alessi and CPT Julius Sontag of the Mental Hygiene Clinic. Based on this survey, it was found that 27.2% of the Division were using drugs at the time of the survey (not including alcohol); 11.7% were using heroin. Other interesting conclusions made from the survey were: of those beginning heroin use in Vietnam, 88.7% did so during their first four months in country, most heroin users were introduced to the drug by a good friend and 75% of those using heroin at the time of the survey had started using it prior to coming to Vietnam.

c. Two hundred sixty-four classes on drug abuse were given to a total of 17,075 men during this period. Comparing the above survey to a previous survey in October 1970, it was found that a much larger percentage of the division had knowledge of the Amnesty program. This is probably due, at least in part,
d. The incidence of malaria over the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. cases</th>
<th>Rate*</th>
<th>Rate Prev. Yr.*</th>
<th>Rate Vivax*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER (to 15 Oct)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rate is expressed as cases per 1000 per year.

The malaria rates in summer of '71 are one-third to one-half lower than the previous year's total. This is believed to be primarily due to a decrease in contact with the enemy, who acts as a reservoir for the malaria parasite. Official reporting through command channels of urine chloroquine tests was discontinued in July, although individual units continued testing as deemed necessary. This policy seemed to have no deleterious effect in terms of malaria incidence.

e. Five epidemics of diarrheal disease involving a total of 332 men were investigated during this period by the Preventive Medicine Section of the Division Surgeon's Office. In all but one case the etiology was the bacterium Shigella. Inspections revealed that the infections were a result of inadequate refrigeration, the re-servings of potentially hazardous foods, such as potato salad, or the drinking of non-potable water.

d. Working in conjunction with the Provost Marshal's Office and the Veterinarian, an extensive program of animal registration and vaccination was conducted at Chu Lai from July-September 71. During this time a total of 380 dogs were vaccinated and another 243 strays eliminated. During the first three months of the period, dog bites from six rabid dogs were reported; during the last two months, there were no dog bites from rabid animals.

5. (U) Information Office.

a. With the wind-down of the war and pending withdrawal of additional troops, press interest shifted from battle coverage to coverage of drug abuse, the Drug Amnesty Program, impact of redeployment on local nationals, the GI
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peace movement and other related subjects. Seventy-two news media representatives visited the Division TAOI since May 1, 1971. Of these, approximately 20 generated stories on combat operations of the Division.

b. In September, the Division Command Sergeant Major began holding "rap" sessions with enlisted personnel of various units. From his notes, questions were extracted by the Information Officer. The questions and answers were published in a 1/2-page fact sheet which was distributed on a 1:4 basis throughout the Division.

6. (U) Adjutant General.

a. In July an AG internal audit team was established to analyze the Division data bank which contained approximately 2000 names of personnel who had departed the Division or never physically arrived. Because of these inconsistencies, the Division was plagued with incorrect data for information and requisitioning purposes. A 100% military personnel records inventory was conducted cross-checking the Personnel Information Roster (PIR) with the personnel records located in Enlisted Records Branch. Seven basic items of data for higher headquarters reports were checked (Name, SSAN, Grade, ETS, DEROS, PHOS, and SMDS). Units of assignment were also verified and on the spot changes were made where applicable. The result of this endeavor was that in August the 23d Infantry Division received its appropriate share of replacements from the USARV replacement stream which amounted to over 4000 replacements. This accomplishment enabled the Division to maintain an ever ready combat posture during a critical period and insured an effective personal change-over during the peak DEROS months of July and August.

b. Postal. On 30 April 1971 the 196th Brigade APO at Hawk Hill was reopened in Da Nang. On 22 June 1971 the 11th Brigade APO at Duc Pho was closed and consolidated with the main APO at Chu Lai. Following are statistics on the sale and cashing of Money Orders, and stamps at both Da Nang and Chu Lai:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Money Orders Sold</th>
<th>Amount (Dollars)</th>
<th>Cashed (Dollars)</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
<th>STAMPS</th>
<th>Da Nang</th>
<th>Chu Lai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>19,962</td>
<td>1,490,284.00</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>42,520.54</td>
<td>50,054.64</td>
<td>49,459</td>
<td>568,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>20,653</td>
<td>1,615,423.07</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>41,117.37</td>
<td>40,727.88</td>
<td>115,435</td>
<td>408,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>22,060</td>
<td>1,590,772.48</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>79,360.79</td>
<td>35,899.83</td>
<td>62,495</td>
<td>475,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>16,678</td>
<td>1,254,139.49</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>39,848.26</td>
<td>38,609.16</td>
<td>65,680</td>
<td>358,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>21,010</td>
<td>1,393,365.87</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>35,465.81</td>
<td>46,495.82</td>
<td>82,575</td>
<td>439,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>1,406,108.54</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>36,000.00</td>
<td>55,000.00</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>451,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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c. Special Services Office.

(1) The beach/recreation center, craft shop, library, gym and Sandpiper Service Club were in operation during the period 1 May - 31 October 1971.

(2) During the latter part of May, a new Service Club, the Sea Breeze, was opened in the 16th Aviation Group (Combat) area.

(3) The attendance figures for beach facilities showed a definite increase, with the NDIO of the beach reporting that 72,005 people used that facility during the reporting period.

(4) The Division library had central air-conditioning installed and the Sandpiper Service Club built a patio/picnic area complete with a running water fountain.

(5) A total of six athletic tournaments were held within the Division AO: A 23 team Double Elimination Fast Pitch Softball tournament was held during the month of May; A 32 team Double Elimination Volleyball tournament was conducted in the months of June and July. The MR1 Volleyball Tournament was hosted by Special Services during the last week of July. The arrival of August featured a 21 team slow pitch softball tournament. The first three mile endurance race ever held in the 23d Infantry Division was conducted on 16 September 1971. Finally, a single elimination tennis tournament was held in late September and proved quite successful. An awards ceremony was held at the completion of each tournament with the Division Commanding General presenting team and individual awards.

(6) Special Services initiated a "Highlights of Special Services" bulletin which described the upcoming activities to be held in each section of Special Services.

(7) The monthly Sports Advisory Council provided the Special Services Officer an excellent opportunity to exchange ideas and disseminate information relevant to individual unit's A&R programs.

(8) In August, the Miss America USO Show visited the 23d Inf Div for two days. One show was held in the Division Amphitheater with 4,700 troops in attendance. In addition to USO shows, numerous Command Military Touring Groups visited the Division.
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1. Personnel Action Branch.

(1) The elimination procedures utilized within the Division were reviewed in July 1971 in an effort to streamline administrative elimination processing. Processing time was reduced by approximately 30% during the past 6 months while the number of elimination actions processed increased by approximately 200%. The following is a breakdown by type of elimination actions by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>200 Drugs</th>
<th>212</th>
<th>212 Drugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October (to 15 Oct)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The following is a breakdown of Congressional and Special Interest inquiries processed and answered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October (to 15 Oct)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Enlisted Records Branch.

(1) On 27 April 1971, an AG Forward was established at Da Nang to administratively support the 196th Infantry Brigade in out-processing personnel assigned to that Brigade. Formerly, all personnel had been processed in Chu Lai. Maintaining liaison with the Personal Management Redeployment Section to obtain reassignment orders, the Enlisted Records Branch obtained orders and shipped records to Da Nang, beginning 5 May 1971. Personnel support from the Enlisted Records Branch was provided. Out-processing and shipping of personnel from Da Nang began 7 May 1971. More than 500 records per month have been processed and shipped to Da Nang since the inception of the 23d Infantry Division AG Forward.
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(2) The Branch was tasked with the preparation of 385 promotion packets for personnel within the zones of consideration for promotion to grade of E-7, which included retyping duplicate DA Form 20 (Enlisted Qualification Records) on each individual. These announcements are made periodically by Department of the Army, and usually establish a short suspense date. Within 20 days, the entire task had been completed.

(3) On 25 July 1971, the Redeployment Section, Personnel Management Branch was moved to Enlisted Records Branch. This was necessitated by the inaccessibility of the enlisted records to the Redeployment Section. Information to be placed on the Advanced Overseas Returnee Report is derived from the 201 file and it was felt that a closer proximity to the records would improve the accuracy of reporting and the efficiency of the Section. Further, it was felt it would reduce, to a minimum, the late AOR reporting and issuance of orders.

f. Morning Reports. On 22 June 1971, Division Consolidated Morning Report Branch was organized and became operational. Its mission was to furnish commanders and their staffs with accurate and timely strength data for the Division. A comprehensive program of morning report audits began immediately and was completed with a command muster on 10 October 1971. Strength data now furnished by this branch is 99.9% accurate, an accuracy level never before experienced in this Division.

g. Personnel Management Branch.

(1) Department of the Army established centralization of promotions to grades E-5 in June 1971. Individuals under the centralized promotion system may be recommended and boarded for promotion without regard to position vacancy. Monthly lists are published by DA indicating MOS cutoff scores and promotions are made from standing lists accordingly.

(2) As part of the Qualitative Management Program, a one time requirement was received from Department of the Army to administer proficiency tests to all eligible personnel in the command not later than 15 November 1971. A subsequent message was received granting a 30 day extension for this testing to be completed. An MOS Evaluation Testing Program and Section was established in the Personnel Management Branch and testing commenced on 30 September 1971. As of 15 October, 760 personnel have been tested. An estimated 2,000 – 2,500 individuals will be tested by the established suspense date of 15 December 1971.
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h. Personnel Out-Processing Center.

(1) The Personnel Out-Processing Center (POPC) opened on 18 September 1971. Its mission was to out-process all military personnel departing or being reassigned within the 23d Infantry Division. It was staffed with personnel from all the branches of the AG Division and also includes trained personnel from the Finance Division. The operation was capable of out-processing up to 100 servicemen per hour.

(2) The POPC consists of two separate buildings; one was used for a holding/waiting area, while the actual administrative out-processing was conducted in the adjacent building. The holding area was also equipped to sleep up to 300 personnel should the emergency arise.

(3) The POPC was devised to offer a smooth out-processing facility with adequate room to manage the large number of troops that would be out-processed due to Keystone activities. It was strategically located close to the 15th Aerial Port.

i. Awards Branch.

(1) A most significant accomplishment in the Awards Branch was the elimination of a backlog of 7,000 awards during the last six months. Through systematic and efficient reorganization and the relentless efforts of the Awards Branch, the backlog was eliminated. Night shifts were initiated and better techniques were implemented. The major cause of the backlog was certificates and citations which were submitted late. Upon receipt of these items, a systematic approach eliminated the backlog.

(2) The number of awards processed in the last six months are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSV</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>345</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>2,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>3299</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>8,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMV</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>1588</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>1268</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>5,745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Special Activities was
established 2 July 1971, to coordinate and administer the Division Drug and
Crime Suppression Program. Prior to that date, the program was monitored
by the G1 with other staff sections performing in their area of staff responsi-
bility. Increased emphasis at all higher levels of command and the imple-
mentation of a Drug and Crime Suppression Campaign in Military Region I by
US and Vietnamese military and civilian officials required full time super-
vision and monitorship of the program. The office provides one central
location for information and statistics on the Division program.

b. A Division Drug Abuse Handbook was published to assist commanders
and leaders in discharging their responsibilities in relation to drug abuse.
The handbook was compiled from several sources and covered a wide range of
topics to include effects and dangers of drugs, amnesty and rehabilitation
program, counselling techniques, present law on drugs, law enforcement pro-
cedures, search, seizure and administrative inspections and comments on
discharges by ex-servicemen. Copies have been distributed to the command for
issue to each unit leader.

c. 23d Infantry Division Regulation was revised to incorporate a change
do the USARV Drug Suppression Program. This regulation along with command
letters on the Drug Exemption Program, unit testing, and the Drug Abuse
Holding Center provide Division policy, procedures and responsibilities for
the Division program.

d. USARV Urinalysis and Treatment Program was implemented in the Division
beginning June 1971. Results of the testing for the period 19 June to 1
October revealed 3.6% of the Division DEROS personnel had positive readings.
Analysis of data furnished on these personnel showed 69.7% were 21 years of
age or younger; 57.2% had less than 12 years education and 84.5% were single.
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a. Exemption (Amnesty) and Rehabilitation programs were active during the period. Increased education on drugs and their effects by unit commanders and surgeons led many individuals to volunteer under the program. A total of 419 individuals enrolled in the Exemption Program with 88 leaving unsuccessfully. An additional 171 individuals were enrolled in rehabilitation with 34 individuals leaving unsuccessfully. An increased interest was exhibited by officers, NCO's, and enlisted men on restoring drug users to complete productive service. Use of the "Buddy System", peer group organizations, and counseling by Surgeons, Chaplains and Commanders have been effective in rehabilitation.

f. Rehabilitation of drug users in the Division was decentralized. A unit oriented program was established with counseling service and liaison provided by the Division Mental Hygiene Consultation Service and unit medical personnel. Detoxification of drug users was accomplished in unit aid stations, 23d Medical Battalion facilities and at a drug ward in the 91st Evacuation Hospital operated by the 23d Medical Battalion.

8. (U) Command Changes.

a. The following command changes have been made during the time from 30 April 1971 through 10 October 1971:

(1) Generals: (a) BG B. K. Gorwitz assumed command of the 23d Infantry Division vice MG James L. Baldwin on 9 Jun 71.

(b) MG Frederick J. Kroesen assumed command of the 23d Infantry Division vice BG B. K. Gorwitz on 9 Jul 71.

(2) Colonels: (a) COL R. D. Beard assumed command of the 196th Inf Bde on 6 Jun 71, vice COL W. S. Hatheway.

(b) COL R. J. Malley assumed command of DISCOM on 3 Sep 71, vice COL G. P. Tilson.

(c) LTC W. E. Ames assumed command of DIVARTY on 16 Sep 71, vice COL J. R. Sadler.

(d) COL P. J. Lindsay assumed command of DIVARTY on 30 Sep 71, vice LTC W. E. Ames.

(3) Lieutenant Colonels and selected Majors: (a) MAJ J. C. Broadus assumed command of the 6-11th Arty on 2 Jul 71, vice LTC G. K. Hobbs.
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(b) LTC R. L. Watts assumed duties as Division G-3 on 17 Jun 71, vice LTC C. E. Saint.

(c) LTC R. G. Arnhym assumed command of 1-6th Inf on 21 Jun 71, vice LTC J. E. Sawyer.

(d) LTC D. J. Delundro assumed duties as the Division Adjutant General on 4 Jul 71, vice LTC R. J. Barnhart.

(e) LTC K. E. Lewi assumed command of the 23d S&T Bn on 7 Jul 71, vice LTC S. H. Levinson.

(f) LTC R. E. Lorix assumed command of the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav on 14 Jul 71, vice LTC G. L. Breeding.

(g) LTC J. H. Leach assumed command of the 723d Maint Bn on 15 Jul 71, vice LTC S. J. Crabtree.

(h) LTC J. Whitley assumed command of the 1-20th Inf on 19 Jul 71, vice MAJ J. S. Peppers.

(i) LTC S. Chaney assumed command of the 23d Med Bn on 27 Jul 71, vice MAJ J. J. Kent.

(j) LTC D. D. Dewey assumed duties as Division G-1 on 27 Jul 71, vice MAJ C. L. Brock.

(k) LTC F. D. McDermott assumed command of the 123d Avn Bn on 1 Aug 71, vice LTC M. Vissers.

(l) LTC J. J. Callahan assumed command of the 26th Engr Bn on 9 Aug 71, vice LTC T. Sands.

(m) LTC D. G. Mallins assumed command of the 1-6th Inf on 14 Aug 71, vice LTC R. G. Arnhym.

(n) LTC F. H. Mitchell assumed command of the 2-1st Inf on 15 Aug 71, vice LTC H. T. Watson.

(o) LTC T. McClain assumed command of the 3-1st Inf on 19 Aug 71, vice LTC J. B. Luke.
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(p) LTC B. J. Thaxton assumed command of the 3-18th Inf on 21 Aug 71, vice LTC F. P. Mulvey.

(q) MAJ J. P. Real assumed duties as Division Inspector General on 28 Aug 71, vice LTC Axtman.

(r) LTC D. R. Zenk assumed duties as Division Information Officer on 5 Sep 71, vice MAJ M. J. Williams.

(s) LTC R. Negris assumed command of the 3-21st Inf on 9 Sep 71, vice LTC L. W. Roberts.

(t) LTC W. L. Mitchell assumed command of the 4-31st Inf on 12 Sep 71, vice LTC H. S. Mitchell.

(u) MAJ G. E. Coffman assumed command of the 6-11th Arty on 12 Oct 71, vice MAJ J. C. Broadus.

(v) MAJ A. V. Hardin assumed duties as Division G-2 on 12 Jul 71, vice LTC A. B. Purcell.

(w) LTC W. C. Roll assumed command of the 1-52d Inf on 26 Jul 71, vice MAJ C. E. Getz.
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II. Section II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations (U).

A. (U) Personnel. None.

B. (C) Intelligence.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Homing Beacon Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: A bilateral agent placed a concealment device containing a homing beacon at a VC/NVA cache site. The beacon frequency was then monitored by aircraft of the responsible brigade. Upon activation of the beacon, the Brigade TOC was alerted. An MI Group technician, in a pad alert UH-1H equipped with direction finding equipment, scrambled to fix the beacon location. After allowing sufficient time for the agent to clear the area, Air Cavalry and Tactical Air strikes were placed on the location of the fix, destroying several caves and structures.

(b) EVALUATION: The initial beacon operation in the 23d Division TAOI was against a fixed, hard target to establish and test the required operational procedures. The success of this operation allowed expansion of the concept, and future operations utilizing homing beacons in known enemy base areas are in process.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional operations be run to test the proposed concept and to develop new concepts for the utilization of homing beacons. Particular care and discretion must be exercised to preclude compromise of the concept, or the devices, by the enemy.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The use of homing beacons will continue to be tested.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Reactions to Sensor String activations.

(a) OBSERVATION: No uniform policy guidance existed concerning reactions to unattended ground sensor activations. Since most sensor strings were established at remote locations, no immediate reaction forces were available and the simplest reaction was that of calling in artillery fire. However, 3 factors cast doubt as to the advisability of this reaction as a general policy.

(1) The delay caused by artillery clearance procedures frequently resulted in firing on a moving target 10 to 15 minutes after it had activated a sensor. The probability for casualty producing fire under such circumstances
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is undoubtedly low, particularly when activations are caused by only a few personnel.

(2) Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy is trained to avoid areas where artillery is received, when it is obvious there is no one in the vicinity to direct such fire.

(3) Photographs of known enemy trails, where sensor strings had been repeatedly fired upon, indicated that the enemy merely established a new trail circumventing the sensor area, thus nullifying the effectiveness of the sensors. As a result of these observations a 60 day test period was established to alter the reaction to activations of new sensor implants. Unless unusual circumstances existed, sensor activations by less than 8 personnel were used for intelligence only, in order to track enemy movement and patterns. For larger activations the reaction would be, at the discretion of the commander, to fire artillery.

(b) EVALUATION: The number of new implants during the test period were insufficient for concrete conclusions. However, in most cases the units were pleased with the results, and felt that the advantages gained in intelligence and the reduced likelihood of sensor compromise, outweighed the possible loss of enemy casualties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units consider adopting a policy of using low level personnel activations of sensor strings primarily as an intelligence tool, reserving larger activations mainly for target acquisition.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This concept will continue to be utilised by commanders.

C. (U) Operations.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Marking of Flooded Landing Zones/Pickup Zones.

(a) OBSERVATION: During a recent "eagle flight" operation, some elements experienced difficulty marking pickup zones with standard smoke grenades because of knee level and in some cases waist level water covering the available LZ/PZ.

(b) EVALUATION: Units often must use less desirable landing/pickup zones due to mission requirements. However, the requirement to mark the area still exists.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units can effectively mark flooded landing/pickup zones without special equipment. By using a standard M3A1 can or similar container and placing a smoke grenade inside of the container, flooded areas can be marked with no damage to the equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Indirect Illumination.

(a) OBSERVATION: Organic illumination sources such as the organic dim and hand flares give an audible warning before illuminating the area.

(b) EVALUATION: This warning allows sappers sufficient time to take cover.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Illumination periodically fired 2000 to 6000 meters from the RDF with a high altitude burst allows the defenders to observe movements through a starlight scope. Also the maximum use of searchlights in both the white and infrared mode is effective in discouraging probes.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (U) SUBJECT: Effective Employment of Mechanical Ambushes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Those units who consistently use mechanical ambushes in an offensive role at least 300-400 meters from their locations frequently produce more enemy casualties than when used in close.

(b) EVALUATION: Mechanical ambushes were employed 300-400 meters from the element's location and placed along recently used, likely avenues of advancement by the enemy, thus making the mechanical ambush a separate ambush from the element deploying the mechanism. With the unit 300-400 meters from the mechanical ambush point, the possibility of compromise by sight, smell, or noise is eliminated and the chances of the enemy being caught unaware in the ambush are increased.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That concerned commands place increasing emphasis on employing mechanical ambushes at a minimum of 300 meters from friendly locations.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: Classes on the proper employment of mechanical ambushes are provided each time a unit is in a refit status. Emphasis is placed on the offensive aspects of the mechanical ambush when emplaced at considerable distances from friendly positions.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Movement of D-5's.

(a) OBSERVATION: When D-5 tractors are transported by helicopter, parts of the assembly kit are sometimes lost. The loss of various parts preclude the assembly of the D-5 on its work site.

(b) EVALUATION: A method is required to insure that all parts of the assembly kit remain with the tractor in transit. This can be accomplished by fabricating a cage or box to hold the entire kit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a cage or box be constructed or affixed to the rear of the tractor of sufficient size to contain all of the assembly kit parts.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This has been adopted where feasible.

D. (U) Organization. None.

E. (U) Training.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Quick Fire Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: During recent operations, elements of battalions in some instances engaged the enemy at less than 100 meters without inflicting casualties. Although the enemy was initially unaware of the presence of US troops, they still managed to evade successfully.

(b) EVALUATION: Encounters with the VC are normally brief, thereby requiring the initial output of fire to be accurate. Field troops often lack experience and training in quick fire techniques. This is reflected in their constant inability to take maximum advantage of situations where the enemy has been surprised.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Field units should allow maximum time for quick fire training while in the rear area. Orientations need to include intensive training in quick fire techniques at ranges established in readily accessible rear area locations.
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(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

F. (U) Logistics. None.

G. (U) Communications.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Use of Radio Terminal Set AN/GRC-163.

(a) OBSERVATION: VHF radio links employing the AN/GRC-163 Radio Terminal Set experienced an excessive number of system and circuit outages traceable to equipment failure.

(b) EVALUATION: An AN/GRC-163 system was used to provide communications to an artillery fire base for a period of several months. Repeated equipment failures and failure of the supply system to provide repair parts in a timely manner caused excessive deadlines. The AN/GRC-163 consists of a Multiplexer Set AN/TCC-70 feeding a Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 configured for wideband operation. Problems were encountered with both units. In the AN/TCC-70, the Z-4 module, which generates 20 kHz ring power, experienced the highest failure rate. The Z-23 module also failed more than could be considered normal. This module is the receive amplifier for telephone channel three. The RT-524/VRC part of the AN/VRC-47 experienced excessive failure due to the fact that it is constantly keyed; this causes overheating of the RT-524/VRC. A second AN/GRC-163 system was installed at another fire base for a period of less than a week. Although some problems were experienced, the equipment was not on the air long enough to experience massive failures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: (1) The equipment, especially the RT-524/VRC, should be operated with the covers removed to improve air circulation. If possible, it should be housed in an air conditioned enclosure. If this is not possible, a fan should be used to circulate air around the set.

(2) Engineering changes should be made on the Z-4 and Z-23 module circuitry in order to improve the reliability of the AN/TCC-70.

(3) It is understood that the manufacturer of the AN/TCC-70 is developing a device which monitors all channels of the AN/TCC-70. If no traffic is being passed, the device turns off the RT-524/VRC. Use of this device would result in the RT-524/VRC being keyed much less than 100% of the time; which would decrease the number of transmitter failures. Consideration should be given to modifying the AN/GRC-163 system to include this device.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (American), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

II. (U) Materials. None.

I. (U) Other. None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

2 Incl
1 - 23d Infantry Division
   Troop List
2 - Distinguished Visitors
AVDF-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCUSARFAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3-CC, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO
1-OCMH-DA
7-CC, XXIV CORPS, ATTN: AVII-GCT
1-CC, 2d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CC, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-CC, 3d Bn, 21st Inf
1-CC, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
1-CC, Support Bn, 196th Inf Bde
1-CC, 3d Bn, 82d Field Arty
1-CC, 10th Public Info Det
1-CC, 27th Chem Det
15-CC, 3d Mil Hist Det
2-S1, 196th Inf Bde
5-S2, 196th Inf Bde
10-S3, 196th Inf Bde
2-S4, 196th Inf Bde
2-S5, 196th Inf Bde
1-Staff Judge Advocate, 196th Inf Bde
1-Inspector General, 196th Inf Bde
1-Chaplain, 196th Inf Bde
1-Provost Marshal, 196th Inf Bde
1-Adjutant General, 196th Inf Bde
SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

23D INFANTRY DIVISION (AMERICAL) TROOP LIST
(as of 15 October 1971)

1. HEADQUARTERS, 23D INFANTRY DIVISION (AMERICAL)

HHC, 23d Infantry Division (Americal)
26th Engineer Battalion (Combat)
523d Signal Battalion
COMSEC CONTACT TEAM #2
23d Military Police Company
328th Radio Research Company
3d Military History Detachment
OLE, 5th Weather Squadron, USAF (-)
USASSD, ACSI, DA

2. 23D INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Division Artillery
6th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery
1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery (-)
3d Battalion, 16th Field Artillery
Battery D, 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery
1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (-)

3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery
Battery B (-), 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery
274th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

Inclosure *
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americial), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

251st Field Artillery Detachment

252d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

271st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

3. 23D INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC, and Band

23d Medical Battalion (-)

23d Supply and Transport Battalion

723d Maintenance Battalion (-)

23d Administration Company

635th Military Intelligence Company

63d Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker Team)

23d Infantry Combat Center (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th Combat Aviation Group

14th Combat Aviation Battalion

116th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

132d Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)

174th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

176th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

178th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)

534th Medical Detachment

756th Medical Detachment

123d Aviation Battalion (Combat) (Infantry Division)

Troop D, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry

Troop F, 8th Cavalry

Company E, 723d Maintenance Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS G3FOR - 65 (R3) (U)

335th Transportation Company
362d Aviation Detachment

5. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade
3d Battalion, 1st Infantry
1st Battalion, 20th Infantry
1st Battalion, 52d Infantry
Troop E, 1st Cavalry

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Infantry Brigade
2d Battalion, 1st Infantry
3d Battalion, 21st Infantry
4th Battalion, 31st Infantry
1st Battalion, 46th Infantry
1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (-)
	Troop F, 17th Cavalry
48th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
10th Public Information Detachment
27th Chemical Detachment

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Infantry Brigade
1st Battalion, 6th Infantry
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

4th Battalion, 3d Infantry
Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(U) Distinguished Visitors.

The following is a list of distinguished personnel who visited this command during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3 May</td>
<td>Honorable Resor</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Kelly</td>
<td>XO to the Secretary of the Army</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COL Willett, Jr.</td>
<td>Deputy SGS Protocol, MACV</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
<td>CO, XXIV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>MG Noble</td>
<td>USARV Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>COL Gross</td>
<td>USARV Facilities Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>BG Sweeney</td>
<td>CO, Da Nang Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>Air Commodore McNamara</td>
<td>Deputy Commander Australian Forces, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>MG Antonelli</td>
<td>Asst Deputy CO for Material (Designate), HQ, USARV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>COL Day</td>
<td>SA, 2d ARVN Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>BG Smith</td>
<td>CO, 101st Abn Div</td>
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<td>COL Cam</td>
<td>CoFS, 2d ARVN Div</td>
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<td>Chap (COL) McKee</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Chaplains (Designate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>Chap (COL) Stiegman</td>
<td>USARV Chaplain</td>
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<td>13 May</td>
<td>COL Franzen</td>
<td>USARV ID</td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Bachus</td>
<td>CO, 45th Engr Group</td>
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<td>COL Atherton</td>
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<td>COL Cam</td>
<td>CoFS, 2d ARVN Div</td>
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<td>13-14 May</td>
<td>COL Robbins</td>
<td>Deputy Commander, USAMEDCOM, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>MG Milloy</td>
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<td>GEN Rosson</td>
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<td>16 May</td>
<td>COL Hoffman</td>
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<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Arena</td>
<td>Good Service Executives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr. Spenza</td>
<td>Association</td>
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Inclosure 2

2-1

116
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<td>24 May</td>
<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
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<td>25 May</td>
<td>COL Dougherty</td>
<td>Logistic Assistance Office</td>
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<td>26 May</td>
<td>GEN Wejand</td>
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<td>MG Milloy</td>
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<td>28 May</td>
<td>Prof. Van Den Haag</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Jun</td>
<td>BG Wittwer</td>
<td>Distinguished Author, Professor of Sociology and Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Jun</td>
<td>Mr. Ken Braddick</td>
<td>USARV Provost Marshal</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-5 Jun</td>
<td>BG Nash</td>
<td>UPI Correspondent</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Jun</td>
<td>COL Ancker</td>
<td>Vice Director, Defense Special Projects Group Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Jun</td>
<td>Mr. Von Luttichau</td>
<td>ICCV, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Jun</td>
<td>MG Milloy</td>
<td>Civilian Historian from DA</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Jun</td>
<td>LTC Dolvin</td>
<td>CG, 2d ARVN Div</td>
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<td>MG Antonelli</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>22-23 Jun</td>
<td>COL Clifford</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Jun</td>
<td>Mr. Jennings</td>
<td>USA Material Command Logistic Assistance</td>
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<td>25 Jun</td>
<td>COL Fea</td>
<td>Chief of USA Auditing Agency</td>
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<td>25-26 Jun</td>
<td>COL Sikes</td>
<td>Director of Military Personnel, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>BG Weaver</td>
<td>USARV IG</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>LTC Lu</td>
<td>CO, 1st Sig Bde</td>
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<td>27-28 Jun</td>
<td>Dr. Ruhl</td>
<td>CO, 5th Regiment, 2d ARVN Div</td>
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<td>28 Jun</td>
<td>MG Deane</td>
<td>Deputy Editor of Die Welt</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>COL Sikes</td>
<td>Newspaper in Hamburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Jun-1 Jul</td>
<td>MG Kroesen</td>
<td>Director of DSPG</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>Mr. Lazar</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Jul</td>
<td>COL Sniffin</td>
<td>MACV J-3</td>
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<td>MG Milloy</td>
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<td>9 Jul</td>
<td>LTC Dolvin</td>
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<td>12-13 Jul</td>
<td>MG Kroesen</td>
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<td>14 Jul</td>
<td>BG Richards</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Jul</td>
<td>Mr. Lehman</td>
<td>Assumed Command of 23d Inf Div</td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Ford</td>
<td>Asst Comptroller for Finance &amp; Comptroller Information System, OCA, DA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Staff Member, National Security Council</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

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<th>DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>15 Jul</td>
<td>COL Cummings</td>
<td>Chief of the Inspection Div, Office of the IG, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Jul</td>
<td>LTG McCaffrey</td>
<td>DCG, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Jul</td>
<td>MG Noble</td>
<td>CG, USAECV</td>
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<td>COL Ancker</td>
<td>CC, ICCV</td>
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<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>BG Knight</td>
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<td>LTG Dolvin</td>
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<td>BG Meyer</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps Army</td>
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<td>28 Jul</td>
<td>BG Lee</td>
<td>CG, 2d ROK Marine Bde</td>
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<td>COL Gentry</td>
<td>From MACV J-3</td>
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<td>MG Milloy</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Aug</td>
<td>BG Sweeney</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps Support Command</td>
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<td>3 Aug</td>
<td>BG Post</td>
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<td>COL Ancker</td>
<td>ICCV, USARV</td>
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<td>COL Connolly</td>
<td>Incoming G3, XXIV Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-16 Aug</td>
<td>Miss Phyllis George</td>
<td>Miss America and Entourage</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MG Toan</td>
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<td>BG Koch</td>
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<td>MG Sweeney</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Sep</td>
<td>BG Timmerberg</td>
<td>CG, 18th MP Bde</td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Yonge</td>
<td>SDSLO, HQ Australian Force Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MAJ Russell</td>
<td>FORS, HQ Australian Force Vietnam</td>
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<td>BG (P) MacKinnon</td>
<td>CG, 1st Avn Bde</td>
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<td>8 Sep</td>
<td>MG Hollingsworth</td>
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<td>MG Schweitzer</td>
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<td>AVM Eaton</td>
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<td>BG Herbert</td>
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<td>DCSLOG, DA</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>Mr. Hayward</td>
<td>Asst Dir. Environmental and Life Science Herbicide Study</td>
</tr>
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Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(Americas), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep</td>
<td>BG Lanagan</td>
<td>ACoS for Military Assistance, MACV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22 Sep</td>
<td>Australian Delegation, Including:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honorable Morris</td>
<td>Ambassador to RVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honorable Lucock</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honorable Wallis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Woodland</td>
<td>1st Sec-Development &amp; Aide to RVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Grenville</td>
<td>1st Sec-Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>Mr. Scurr</td>
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<td>Mr. Allen</td>
<td>2d Sec - Development &amp; Aide</td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Rose</td>
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<td>MAJ Denyer</td>
<td>British Asst Military Attache</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Sep</td>
<td>BG Dunwoody</td>
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<td>MG Hollingsworth</td>
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<td>MG Hieu</td>
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<tr>
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<td>BG Berstein</td>
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<td>6 Oct</td>
<td>BG Knight</td>
<td>DCG, 1st Sig Ede</td>
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<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>LTG Bennett</td>
<td>Director DIA</td>
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<td>Dr. Reiss</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Oct</td>
<td>MG Young</td>
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<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>MG Toan</td>
<td>CG, 2d ARVN Div</td>
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</table>
TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 15 October 1971 from Headquarters 23d Infantry Division and concurs with the report except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference page 8, paragraph 1Bld(3). XXIV Corps OB holdings indicate the 78th Mf Rocket Company is subordinate to the Quang Nam Provincial Unit, not MR-5.

   b. Reference page 9, paragraph 1Bld(3)(f) 1. The strength figure given for the 70th 1F Battalion in this paragraph is far too low. The summary of Quang Tin (F) Forces on page 20 of the subject report lists a strength of 139 for the unit. This figure is far more realistic and approximates the XXIV Corps OB holding of 146 for that unit's strength.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

2 Incl

[Signature]

JULIAN W BRADSHAW
LT, AGC
Ass't AG
AVHDO-DO (1 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americal), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 15 October 1971 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (Americal) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
nc

Cy furn: CPT. AGC.
XXIV Corps
23d Inf Div

F.L. HONSOWFT.
Assistant Adjutant General

121
GPOP-FD (1 Nov 71) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amertical), Period Ending 15 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH

1LT, AGC
Asst AG

2 Incl
nc
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D**

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