<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1971 (M)

The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 6b, AR 360-1.

The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Distribution:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the scope of the Espionage Laws (18 USCA 793, as amended). The obtaining of unauthorized classified information from any individual under a classified clearance is prohibited by law.

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Military Police School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Signal School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Chief of Staff, US Army (DWSA)
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Provost Marshal General
Commanders in Chief
US Army, Europe
US Readiness Command
Commanding Generals
US Army, Alaska
Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
Commanding Officers
US Army Land Warfare Laboratory
US Army Logistics Doctrine, Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96224

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR - 65(R3).

THRU: Commanding General, I Corps (ROK/US) Group ATTN:
EAICT-T, APO San Francisco 96358
Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army ATTN: EAGO-MH,
APO San Francisco 96301
Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: ACSFOR, Department of the Army, Washington DC 20301.
ATTN: FOR OT UT

Attached is the 2d Infantry Division Operational Report -- Lessons
Learned for the period 1 May 1971 to 31 October 1971.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Major AG
2nd AG

Incl
DAFD-OTT
712163

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED**

**1 MAY - 31 OCTOBER 71**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Missions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Visitors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Command &amp; Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. DMZ Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) 3d Brigade Operations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Rotation of Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Personnel:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Status Of Officers and Warrant Officers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Status of Enlisted Personnel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Force Structure Change:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Division TD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Unit Reductions due to Personnel Shortages</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Unit Drawdown</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Training:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Policy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Dynamic Training</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Range Upgrading</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Interference with training</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Personnel Shortages</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Range Retention and Acquisition</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Air Defense Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Exercises</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
j. Intelligence ........................................... 8

k. Internal Personnel Actions:
   (1) Change in CARS Designation .................. 8
   (2) Change in Artillery Units Designation ........ 9
   (3) Decentralized Orders ......................... 9

l. Logistics:
   (1) DLOGs ........................................... 9
   (2) Shortage of Class IX Repair Parts ............ 10

m. Engineer ............................................ 11

n. Military Police:
   (1) Investigation of Larcenies .................... 12
   (2) Division Assembly Exercise ................... 12
   (3) Movement of Fourth MP Platoon ............... 12

o. Drug Abuse Counteroffensive-Drug Urine Screening Test . 12

p. Finance:
   (1) Joint Uniform Military Pay System ........... 13
   (2) Division Data Center .......................... 13
   (3) Personnel Shortage ............................ 13
   (4) Pay Enquiry Section ............................ 13

q. Civil Affairs:
   (1) Racial ......................................... 14
   (2) Civil Affairs Study ............................ 14
   (3) Cultural Program ............................... 14
   (4) Off-Post Entertainment Facilities ............ 14

r. Public Information:
   (1) Consolidation of Photo Facilities ............. 15
   (2) Closing of Branch Offices .................... 15
   (3) Photographic Supplies ........................ 15

s. Staff Judge Advocate:
   (1) Brigade Judge Advocate System ............... 15
   (2) Shortage of Qualified Personnel .............. 16
### 2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

#### a. Personnel:
- (1) Extensions and Re-Enlistment ........................................ 18
- (2) Skilled Leadership ........................................................ 18

#### b. Intelligence:
- (1) Ground Surveillance Radar Training ............................... 18
- (2) Re-evaluation of the Military Intelligence Detachment Role 19

#### c. Training:
- (1) Brigade Committee Training ........................................... 19
- (2) Sheridan Gunnery .......................................................... 19

#### d. Logistics:
- (1) DLOG Conversion .......................................................... 20

#### e. Engineer:
- (1) Relocatable Buildings .................................................... 20
- (2) Drainage of Roadways .................................................... 20

#### f. Clubs and Exchanges:
- (1) Slot Machines .............................................................. 21
- (2) Pilferage ................................................................. 21
- (3) Graft ................................................................. 22

#### g. Race Relations:
- (1) Communications and Leadership .................................... 22
- (2) Open Door Policy ....................................................... 23
- (3) Standards of Appearance .............................................. 23
- (4) Segregation Off-Post .................................................. 24
3 Incl:

1 to Incl iv -- 2d Infantry Division Task Organisation -- 31 Oct 71.
2 to Incl iv -- List of Distinguished Visitors to 2d Infantry Division.
3 to Incl iv -- Changes of Command and Staff Assignments (1 May -- 31 Oct 71).

The above inclosures were withdrawn by the Department of the Army.
1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities

   a. (C) General: During the reporting period the Division completed its transition from a tactically oriented posture with two brigades employed on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), to that of a reserve unit. One brigade, under operational control of I Corps (ROK/US) Group, continues to maintain limited U.S. presence on the DMZ. The remainder of the Division has placed primary emphasis on training and maintenance to achieve and maintain a high state of combat readiness. Efforts in this direction have been adversely affected by continued severe personnel shortages, particularly in the grade of major and certain critical enlisted skills, and by inadequate training areas. The personnel situation appears to be improving at the close of the current period. The lack of adequate training areas continues to be a significant problem. Some progress is being made.

   b. (U) Missions:

      (1) Continuing:

         (a) To be combat ready.

         (b) To further the institutions and ideals of the United States Army.

      (2) Tactical. I Corps (ROK/US) Group Reserve.

   c. (U) Organization: Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division is organized under MTOE 07-004E by authority of USARPAC General Order 634, dated 17 October 1968, and augmented by TDA P8 WAH49902. The 2d Infantry Division Task Organization at the beginning and close of the reporting period is at Inclosure 1.

   d. (U) Visitors: During the reporting period, 16 distinguished personnel from outside Eighth U.S. Army visited the Division. Their names and positions are at Inclosure 2.

   e. (U) Command and Staff: MG Gilbert H. Woodward commanded the 2d Infantry Division until the final week of the reporting period. MG Jeffrey G. Smith assumed command on 23 October 1971. Change of Command and Staff assignments are furnished at Inclosure 3.
f. (C) DMZ Operations:

(1) The 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, consisting of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry (M) and the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (M), remained under operational control of I Corps (ROK/US) Group during the entire period. One of these battalions, located north of the Imjin River, maintains U.S. presence on the DMZ, and is the only U.S. combat unit in Korea entitled to hostile fire pay. The specific functions performed by this "forward" battalion are to:

(a) Man two guard posts, (Collier and Ouellette) of approximately platoon-size force, each within the DMZ.

(b) Secure approximately 500 meters of the barrier fence crossing the access road into the Joint Security Area (JSA) and control checkpoint on the Main Supply Route entering the DMZ to Panmunjon.

(c) Control and secure Freedom Bridge, which is the only wheeled vehicle access bridge to Panmunjon.

(d) Conduct security patrols in the DMZ by squad-size element daily in randomly chosen sectors.

(2) The 1-17th Infantry (M) performed the above functions during the current period through 27 September 71. The 1-31st Infantry (M) relieved the 1-17th on this date and is currently employed in the DMZ role.

g. (C) Personnel: Under current E series MTOE (AL03), the Division is authorized a total of 800 officers, 102 warrant officers, and 11,021 enlisted personnel.

(1) Status of officers and warrant officers. As of 1 May 1971, the Division had 1,016 officers and 128 warrant officers assigned. This was due to personnel assets still excess resulting from the merger with the 7th Infantry Division in February-March 71 time frame. This excess was eliminated and the Division was at authorized levels by 1 July 71. As of the end of the current period the Division is at 61% of full MTOE (Level 1) strength, with 727 officers and 106 warrant officers assigned. The most critical officer shortage is in the grade of major, with only 55% of authorized strength assigned. Company-grade officers therefore are extensively utilized in field-grade positions. This, plus the fact that 65 company grade officers are diverted from TOE positions to perform essential non-TOE functions, results in only 70-75% of assigned captains
being utilized in captain's positions, and 60-65% of the assigned lieutenants in lieutenant's positions. The officer shortage has been amplified by the recently announced Department of the Army early release program for OBV II officers. This program affected 243 officers in the Division, with 113 officers to be released during the months of September and October, and an additional 63 officers by the end of November. The remainder will be released after 1 Jan 72. Even with involuntary extensions of 91 of these officers, the above percentage for lieutenants could drop to as low as 50% by 31 December 1971. From present projected officer input and telephonic conversations between this headquarters and OPO-OPD, there will be no significant relief for the Division until January 72. The critical shortage of officers has obvious adverse impact on units' ability to operate at an acceptable level of efficiency. Without influx of armor lieutenants, the Division will have less than 15 such officers to support two armor battalions and an armored cavalry squadron by 31 December 71. At present there are only 14 signal corps lieutenants assigned out of 36 authorized. A shortage in maintenance warrant officers still exists, however the shortage is not as significant now as it was at the end of last reporting period.

(2) Status of Enlisted Personnel. Shortages of enlisted personnel, compounded by lack of personnel authorization for additional continuing missions, such as MSA 31 security (80 pers), Emergency Action Teams (32 pers) and Nuclear Support Teams (33 pers), have been problems during the reporting period. From an initial over-strength posture during the March-April 71 time frame brought about by the merger with the 7th Infantry Division, the Division's assigned strength declined to the point where it was impractical to attempt meaningful training with the normal force structure intact. At the end of the reporting period, the Division had assigned a total of 8,817 Enlisted personnel, compared to 11,021 authorized and 14,123 full MTOE strength. Actions taken in view of personnel shortages are covered separately under force structure changes.

h. (C) Force Structure Changes. Due to (a) personnel shortages listed above, and (b) requirement to provide personnel for essential post, camp, and station functions, several units have been placed in caretaker status. A summary of such actions follow:

(1) Division TD (2d Div Reg 616-2). In August 71, a Division Table of Distribution was published diverting 68 officers and 598 enlisted personnel from TOE positions to perform essential post, camp, and station
functions. This program, established by 2d Division Reg 616-2, was designed to limit the number of TOE diversions within the Division as well as to establish accountability procedures for personnel so diverted. The accountability procedure put into effect reduced designated company-sized units to caretaker status. Personnel performing Division functions were then assigned to vacant spaces within the caretaker units and further attached to units where duties were performed. The latter unit was responsible for all support to the individual, including UCMJ. The program resulted in four company-sized units, one from each brigade and Division Artillery, being reduced to cadre status. The primary beneficiary of the program was Support Command. Results were mixed. The administrative burden which was placed on the units in caretaker status, and Adjutant General’s Office to account for personnel assigned to one unit, but attached to another was the most significant problem area. Morale problems also existed in that personnel involved in the program often lacked unit identity and were sometimes overlooked for promotion, port call, etc. Although the program is still in effect, it is being re-evaluated to determine if a less complex system with fewer personnel diversions, may be developed.

(2) Unit reductions due to personnel shortages As the personnel status within the Division declined to the point where units could not engage in effective training, the decision was made to delete elements within company-sized units and redistribute personnel assets made available. In June 71, action was taken to delete one rifle platoon per infantry company, and one rifle squad per rifle platoon within mechanized battalions. Subsequently, two rifle platoons per rifle company were deleted from the 1-32d Infantry. Personnel made available by these deletions were redistributed within units concerned. In September, the personnel status within the Division had become critical to the point that a decision was made to place two infantry battalions, the 1-9th Infantry and the 1-32d Infantry, in caretaker status. The actual draw-down of these two units took place in October. Personnel were redistributed to other infantry and armor battalions, and to the 4-7th Cavalry Squadron. As of the end of the current reporting period both of the above battalions remain at cadre strength with no firm planning date for reconstitution. Current personnel assignment priorities provide for maintaining the 1-17th Infantry (M) and 1-31st Infantry (M) at 90% of authorized strength due to the operational mission these units have under operational control of 1 Corps (ROK/US) Group. The 1-72d Armor, 1-73d Armor, nuclear capable units will also be maintained at 90% of authorized strength. An even distribution of fill
will be made to remaining units in the Division. Action is contemplated
to reconstitute the 1-32d Infantry when the remaining units can be filled
and maintained at 85% of authorized strength.

(3) Unit Draw Down. During the reduction of the two infantry
battalions to caretaker status, in which a residual cadre element re-
mained and equipment was placed in administrative storage, significant
conclusions were drawn:

(a) It is mandatory for the unit being drawn down to issue specific,
detailed, written instructions for the draw-down; to require some form of
"briefback" or written plan from subordinate unit commanders; and to
closely supervise the entire operation.

(b) Division headquarters must establish measures for coordination
and procedures for the transfer of personnel.

(c) Units to be drawn down should be consulted in advance, so that
they may offer a summary of their local problems and requirements. This
information should then be considered for inclusion in the directive to be
issued by the headquarters ordering the draw-down.

(d) Priori ty of administrative and logistic support must be given to
any unit ordered to draw down. It is particularly critical that priority of
personnel replacements be given to the unit following the draw down,
since the number of personnel assigned to the drawn down unit is the
minimum required to perform the necessary tasks.

(e) The unit being drawn down should be authorized direct coordination
with the Division headquarters on all administrative and logistic matters,
with the brigade headquarters being kept informed of progress and inter-
vening only to provide necessary guidance and assistance.

(f) The entire battalion staff should remain for a reasonable period
(approximately 10 days) following the draw-down in order to finalize plans
and reports which were unable to be completed because of other more
pressing duties during the draw-down.

(g) Qualified inspectors must be provided to insure that equipment is
stored in proper condition. Their area of concern must encompass main-
tenance records as well as the technical aspects of maintenance.
i. (U) Training:

(1) Policy. The Army Chief of Staff's message of 30 June 1971 decentralizing training and placing sole responsibility upon battalion commanders, had major impact. Individual training records and reports of training status, including most of the statistical portions of the Unit Readiness Report, were discontinued. Most training subjects which previously had been categorized as mandatory were designated as required. This program had been adopted to some extent throughout the Division approximately six months previously by I Corps (ROK/US) Group directive. Division regulations and directives were changed to reflect the new DA policy.

(2) Dynamic Training. The concept of dynamic training was highlighted in a message from the Army Chief of Staff dated 7 September 71. Special emphasis is given to training proficiency at small unit level. A board for dynamic training was convened at Ft Benning on 18 October 71. Major Charles T. Talbott, S-3, 2d Brigade, represented the Division.

(3) Range Upgrading. The range upgrading program continued to be hindered by pilferage problems, although progress continued in maintenance of stationary facilities. Most significantly, the 3/4 ton truck engine which propels the target trolley on Hyon-ga-ri Tank Range was replaced with a multi-fuel engine from a 2 1/2 ton truck. This engine has proven adequate to drive the target trolley at speeds from 8 to 15 miles per hour for tank gunnery qualification.

(4) Interference with Training. Encroachment on permanent acquisition U. S. training areas and interference by Korean nationals with training on firing ranges continues to be a problem. To reduce the adverse effect of this interference on training, commanders have been informed of their exclusive right to use permanent acquisition property and of support guaranteed under Korean law. As commanders more fully exercise these rights, noticeable improvements are expected to result in training.

(5) Personnel Shortages. Personnel shortages, combined with administrative and operational requirements, have made it necessary to conduct training exclusively at small unit level. The same problems have made it difficult for training managers and supervisors to conduct
challenging, adventurous training under the Dynamic Training Concept.

(6) Range Retention and Acquisition. In accordance with 8th Army guidance, the Division evaluated training and impact areas to turn back to Korean control those which are no longer required. Five large training areas and ranges reverted to Korean control, as well as portions of three others. The Division acquired two large training areas on temporary acquisition.

(7) Air Defense Training. The Division is seriously lacking training facilities for assigned air defense units. All gunners of the 8-61st ADA (C/V) (SP) and the Division Redeye teams must be proficient in tracking and simulated engagement of high speed aircraft. This training must be as current and frequent as unit training demands allow. In October 71, coordination with the 314th Air Division resulted in the Koon-ni Range, located southwest of Suwon, Korea, being made available for training of 2d Division Air Defense units. After an initial liaison visit, the 8-61st ADA sent four Chaparral firing units to the Koon-ni Range on 11 October 71. The tracking conditions were ideal, with a wide variety of allied aircraft available. Redeye teams will go to Koon-ni for their first active training in November. Plans are to develop a permanent arrangement with the 314th Air Division for regular periodic use of Koon-ni Range facilities.

(8) Exercises:

(a) Command Post Exercise Capella Drive, 13-17 Sep 71. Division, Brigade, DivArtY, Support Command, and separate battalion headquarters participated in I Corps (ROK/US) Group CPX Capella Drive. This exercise was designed to prepare Corps units for the United Nations Command-wide CPX Focus Lens to be conducted in October 71. This exercise afforded the staffs at various levels the first opportunity to operate in a tactical situation since October 1970.

(b) Command Post Exercise Focus Lens FY 72, 11-17 October 71. Headquarters listed above, plus the 8-61st ADA (C/V), participated in United Nations Command Exercise Focus Lens FY 72. This exercise was designed primarily to exercise current war plans and evaluate
tactical standing operating procedures. The exercise proved particularly beneficial in enabling Division staff personnel the opportunity to function with ROK counterparts at I Corps (ROK/US) Group staff. No significant problems arose in this area.

j. (U) Intelligence: By TOE the G-2 section is authorized six officers and nine enlisted personnel. Due to personnel shortage in the Division, the working strength of the G-2 section has been reduced to four officers and six enlisted. As a result, the G-2 section's mission and internal organization has been tailored to reflect the decrease in personnel, and also adapt to the Division's reserve posture. The air and operations sections have been combined into a joint G-2 air/operations section in which the same personnel perform both functions. Another innovative refinement has been the re-evaluation of the mission and organization of the 2d Military Intelligence Detachment (MID). The 2d MID has been restructured so that instead of the horizontal organization employed before, a vertical arrangement has been established so that specific sections and personnel perform specific functions in the overall area of responsibility. This "specialization" has definitely increased efficiency and is tending to counter-balance the adverse effects of the 13 month tour length. Additionally, the scope of the 2d MID's activities has been significantly expanded, based primarily upon a redefinition of the term "subversion". The ACofS, G-2 determined that the key element of subversion is the effect upon the mission readiness of the Division. This approach allows the 2d MID to take a more active interest in areas, such as the drug traffic organization and racism, that have before been the exclusive area of interest of other agencies. Early indications are that this program, making use of MI's trained investigators, will be of substantial benefit. The ACofS, G-2 continues to work closely with and provide operational guidelines for the 2d MID.

k. (C) Internal Personnel Actions:

(1) Change in Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) Designation. In June 71, five maneuver battalions were brought to zero strength and four battalions, earlier reassigned to the 2d Division from the 7th Division at zero strength, were filled. This action was to retain in country all regimental colors then in Korea as part of the U.S. Programs in Korea (USPIK) residual posture.
The following reassignments were made:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-23d Inf (M)</td>
<td>1-17th Inf (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9th Inf (M)</td>
<td>1-31st Inf (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-32d Inf</td>
<td>1-32d Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-72d Armor</td>
<td>1-73d Armor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1-12th FA (HJ) was redeployed to Fort Sill. Personnel were transferred to I Corps Artillery and 2d Infantry Division. Units reduced to zero strength were subsequently redeployed to CONUS for inactivation. This headquarters' position was that the change in CARS designation should be accomplished by simple redesignation of units concerned, with only one general order required. This position was not adopted by Department of the Army, and consequently approximately 1700 personnel were moved on "by name" reassignment orders. This procedure greatly taxed the administrative capabilities of the Personnel Service Division, Division Data Center, and units concerned.

(2) Change in Artillery units CARS designation. During the reporting period Artillery units were redesignated by DA as Field Artillery or Air Defense Artillery.

(3) Decentralized Orders. A pilot program of decentralized orders was instituted on 7 September 71. As a local exception to the centralized personnel system using the PERMACAP configuration, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, and its attached battalions (1-17th Inf (M), 1-31st Inf (M)), were authorized to publish intra-battalion reassignment, promotion to grade E-3, ordinary and compassionate leave orders. This system modification was developed to improve timeliness of critical orders required by units which are geographically separated from the supporting Adjutant General. Initial results were favorable and the program will be extended to Division Artillery units on 1 November 1971.

1. (U) Logistics:

   (1) DLOGs. On 1 June 1971, 2d Division initiated the conversion of
TOE property books from the manual system to the automated DLOGs system. This action entailed consolidating all unit property books at division level, and constituting company level hand receipts for all company/detachment sized units within the division. The pre-conversion phase of this operation commenced on 1 June 1971 and continued through 28 July 1971. During this phase, unit property books were verified and corrected as necessary, and company level hand receipts were initiated and forwarded to battalion and company commanders for editing and verification. This process was repeated three times to insure correct posting had been accomplished. Upon completion of the above process, final hand receipts were prepared for company commanders' signatures. Upon verification, 95 hand receipts were established from the previous 27 battalion/separate company/detachment property books. The final stage of conversion of TOE property books began the week of 9 October 1971. During this stage all transactions were frozen to facilitate machine programming. This data has to be incorporated at specific quantities so that the machine can be programmed at the authorized quantity levels. This could not be accomplished if variations or transactions were fed into the machine system. Requisitions are being filled on DA Form 3122 and held in abeyance until the system has been completely programmed. It is expected that this phase will be completed during the week of 8-13 November 1971. Installation property books will be totally machine programmed under this system by 1 February 1972.

(2) Shortage of Class IX Repair Parts. The merger of the 2d and 7th Divisions (Feb-Mar 71) caused an excess amount of Class IX repair parts on hand. Consequently, parts were issued to major subordinate units from stocks on hand. Demand for repair parts was not established and demand data was not developed. A shortage of repair parts resulted when the excess was depleted. The following table illustrates this point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>ASL (LINES AUTH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>5578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>3604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>3766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>3795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>5764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-10-
m. (C) Engineer: The 2d Engineer Battalion has been involved in a significant number of missions, not only in the combat engineer support area, but also in Facility Engineering projects. A listing of those missions follow which will provide general information concerning engineer effort during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ASSIGNED TO</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2E-71-15 (Construction of Relocatables)</td>
<td>Cp Casey Area</td>
<td>A and B Companies</td>
<td>Normally would normally be a facility engineer project, however, due to a severe shortage of working personnel and time limitation for completion, project was assigned to 2d Engr Bn. The buildings were erected to alleviate billiting shortages in Camp Casey area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2E-71-2 (Howze Access Road)</td>
<td>NW end of Cp Howze to MSR #1</td>
<td>C Company</td>
<td>Purpose of the road was to provide an additional exit from Camp Howze to facilitate expedient and safe movement of military vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2E-71-4 (Minefield Clearing)</td>
<td>JSA Compound and DMZ</td>
<td>Volunteer element from 2d Engr Bn</td>
<td>Purpose was to eliminate old existing minefields that presented a significant hazard to U.S. personnel operating in the area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
n. (U) Military Police:

(1) A squad of Military Police were assigned solely to investigate the increasing number of larcenies on U.S. compounds. Efforts were concentrated on detection and recovery of U.S. property going out the gates. The result has been the recovery of approximately $3,788.00 of stolen property, as well as a deterrent to would-be thieves.

(2) On 28 August 71, a division-wide assembly exercise was initiated at 0615. At 0815, Military Police units conducted a coordinated sweep of the villages of Tongduchon (Camp Casey), Sonyu-ri (Camp Pelham), and Yongju-gol, with the purpose of apprehending U.S. personnel AWOL and residing in these areas, or those failing to respond to the alert. A total of 65 personnel were apprehended.

(3) In October, the Fourth Military Police platoon was moved from Camp Howze to Camp Pelham in order to locate the main police effort as close as possible to the main troop concentration. The move was accomplished within one week, with no loss of police support in the Western Corridor.

o. (U) Drug Abuse Counteroffensive-Drug Urine Screening Test.
On 16 August 1971, the 2d Infantry Division implemented the drug urine screening test to identify DEROSing individuals who are abusing morphine derivatives, barbituates and amphetamines. On 1 September, the program was expanded to include urine testing of personnel departing on leave or extended TDY. Urine samples are collected at the three 2d Medical Battalion Dispensaries, located at Camps Casey, Stanley, and Edwards. Urine samples are then accumulated at the
43d Surgical Hospital and transported to the laboratory at USAH - Seoul. At the end of the reporting period, 3919 samples had been collected from 2d Division medical facilities and processed by the civilian contract laboratory in CONUS. Thus far 99 samples have been reported positive. Due to the large number of personnel who have received legitimately prescribed medication (giving positive test results) and due to other administrative reasons, only 45 individuals have been escorted to the Detoxification Center. Two people have been identified by USAH - Seoul as drug users and subsequently medically evacuated to rehabilitation centers in CONUS. No individuals from the 2d Infantry Division have been identified as drug addicts by the urinalysis screening program.

p. (U) Finance:

(1) During the period, the 2d Infantry Division Finance Office intently prepared for the conversion of its military pay accounts to the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS). The conversion effort required a coordinated program of pay data verification and quality assurance auditing in order to establish a member's pay account on JUMPS as accurately as possible. Due to the severe reduction of Finance personnel during the period of May - August 1971, many hours of overtime were required to meet established target dates for task completion.

(2) Assistance in the conversion effort was provided by the Division Data Center in the form of data edit and conversion card format programs. In all respects this assistance was rendered in an efficient and professional manner. The cooperation and coordination between the Division Data Center and Division Finance enabled the Finance Office to successfully convert its pay accounts to JUMPS without severely disrupting normal Finance Services.

(3) As a result of the reduction of qualified Finance personnel and the JUMPS requirements of data reconciliation and quality assurance, several lessons were learned. Quality assurance must continue to be an integral part of Finance Operations even during a reduction in personnel strength. The temptation to internally shift personnel from Quality Assurance to other pay operations must be resisted.

(4) In order to maintain adequate customer service to the soldier.
while still performing the normal mechanics of preparing payrolls, a pay enquiry section was formed. This section, staffed with several experienced and qualified personnel was able to answer pay enquiries and provide customer service, this enabled the Finance record clerk to perform JUMPS as well as to meet payday deadlines.

q. (U) Civil Affairs:

(1) Racial. In coordination with EOT Officer 2d Division and 24th PSYOP Det, Yongsan, G-5 has made attempts to combat racially discriminatory practices by Korean establishments. Pamphlets, and posters have been distributed to such entertainment facilities emphasizing the need for brotherhood and understanding among all ethnic groups. G-5 has been in constant contact with local officials and business men stressing the importance of eliminating discriminatory practices. Recommendations have been made to the CG on the use of his off limits powers in this regard.

(2) Civil Affairs Study. An area civil affairs study of the division area has been initiated by the G-5. The study will provide a means of evaluating the effect of division policies and actions on the local inhabitants, and provide information required for planning civil affairs and psychological operations in the division area. Estimated completion date is March 1972. Periodic updating will be required after completion.

(3) Cultural Program. Coordination for the "Hello Korea" cultural program was provided by G-5. Seven battalion-sized units viewed the program during the past six months. Cultural tours for officers and enlisted men were organized. Two such tours were conducted to the Seoul area in late spring and were guided by G-5 personnel. Tours of important government agencies in Seoul are conducted monthly for field grade officers. In addition, similar junior officer and enlisted excursions are periodically scheduled by I Corps (ROK/US) Group and 2d Division G-5.

(4) Off-Post Entertainment Facilities. New responsibilities: In accordance with a staff study approved by the Chief of Staff on 8 September 1971 the G-5 has become the focus of coordination for enforcement of standards for off-post entertainment facilities. This responsibility entails close coordination with Korean officials and merchants, and the military agencies which conduct inspections to insure compliance with division sanitary and safety standards.
r. (U) Public Information:

(1) Consolidation of Photo Facilities. The Information Office assumed operational control of the Division Photo Lab in lieu of maintaining a separate photographic capability. The consolidation resulted in more efficient utilization of available personnel and equipment. After the assumption of operational control, it was further decided to reduce the number of photographic facilities from three to two. This was accomplished without lessening the degree of support available to division activities by supplying film to requesting units or activities to take their own pictures, which were developed and printed at the Photo Lab.

(2) Closing of Branch Offices. The Information Office had maintained two branch offices, one at the 3d Brigade and one at Division Artillery. Because of personnel shortages, these offices were closed. To maintain adequate coverage of the activities, a "reporter beat" system was devised under which each member of the Information Office had primary responsibility for coverage of the activities of a major subordinate command. This one-for-one relationship preserved the coverage formerly enjoyed through the use of branch offices.

(3) Photographic Supplies. The acquisition of photographic supplies was a continuing problem. The major contributing factor was the excessive number of people that were authorized to draw supplies. To alleviate this problem all photographic supply accounts were closed and all photographic supplies for the Division were drawn by the S-4, 122d Signal Battalion. The S-4 and the Information Officer then issued supplies on an as-needed basis to users throughout the Division. This closer control resulted in better utilization of supplies.

s. (U) Staff Judge Advocate:

(1) Brigade Judge Advocate System. The mission of the Staff Judge Advocate was accomplished during this period by operating under a Brigade Judge Advocate System consisting of three geographic areas: Camp Casey/Hovey, Camps Stanley/Essayons, and 3d Brigade area. Each major geographic area had attached a JAGC or certified non-JAGC officer. He advised commanders on matters of military justice and military affairs (reports of survey and investigations and
administrative elimination actions) and was available to individuals for legal assistance. This system requires sufficient personnel to man not only the Division Staff Judge Advocate Office, but also each subordinate command Judge Advocate Office. The Division SJA Office requires, at the minimum, a SJA, DSJA, Chiefs of Military Justice and Military Affairs, Claims Officer, and a Legal Assistance Officer. Each major subordinate command JA Office requires at least one attorney-officer, with 3d Brigade requiring two. The minimum number of attorney-officers required is twelve. At present, the Division MTOE plus Eighth Army TDA is eight JAGC officers which is further augmented by four certified non-JAGC officers. This office presently is manned by eight JAGC attorneys and two certified non-JAGC officers.

(2) The Brigade Judge Advocate System consisting of an attorney-officer and legal clerk at each subordinate command has proven its effectiveness. The present shortages of JAGC attorneys and legal clerks, create a void in the Division Office, thus forcing the Division Office to consolidate its duties. Two JAGC attorneys and one non-JAGC attorney are presently assigned to the Division Office. This shortage requires one attorney to act as Deputy and Chief of Military Justice, one attorney to act as Claims Officer and Chief of Military Affairs, and one attorney acting as Chief of Legal Assistance. This consolidation coupled with the duplication of administrative work at the Brigade level with unqualified legal clerks diminishes effective responsiveness to the demands placed upon this office.

t. (U) Strengthened Inspector General Role:

(1) The role and presence of the Inspector General has been publicized in the 2d Infantry Division by command letter and the Division newspaper. The command letter of notice to troops is updated as required to present the most current information on the Division Inspector General, his location, name and availability as well as the availability and location of other Inspectors General. Two acting Inspectors General are appointed, on orders, to assist the Division Inspector General in receiving complaints and requests for assistance. They are located at Headquarters, Division Artillery, Camp Stanley, and Headquarters, 3d Brigade, Camp Howze; both locations are separated from the Division Inspector General's location by approximately a one hour drive. These acting inspectors
General assist the two detailed Inspectors General in providing additional coverage to the soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division.

(2) The Annual General Inspection has been changed to more nearly reflect the needs of the command. This inspection has been combined with the Command inspection thereby providing a broader based inspection and eliminating one major annual inspection. Lengthy in-ranks inspections are no longer held. Inspector General contact with troops is accomplished in brief stand-by inspections of personal areas in troop billets and in soldiers' work areas. Emphasis is placed on evaluation of troop welfare and morale, discipline, mission accomplishment and utilization of resources.

(3) Emphasis is continuously placed on the Inspector General role in relation to the chain of command. Soldiers and commanders and staff are reminded and shown that the IG function supplements not supplants the chain of command.

(4) It is planned for Division Training Academy to include in its orientation course a presentation on the role of the Inspector General and the assistance available through the Inspector General. This information will be presented to newly assigned enlisted members of the Division. The Division Newspaper and other information media will be used to highlight the presence and role of the Inspector General.
2. (U) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation:

a. Personnel:

(1) Extensions and Reenlistment.

(a) Observation. Insufficient numbers of replacements arriving in the Division without significant relief in the immediate future require an interim measure to reduce the effect of critical personnel shortages.

(b) Evaluation. Previously, selected personnel have been allowed to extend in country or reenlist for present duty positions. This policy has been discontinued, however.

(c) Recommendation. Programs to permit extensions and reenlistments for present duty positions should be reevaluated and updated to permit qualified and experienced personnel to extend or reenlist for present duty position.

(2) Skilled Leadership:

(a) Observation. Shortages of qualified personnel in leadership positions reduce the efficiency of the Division as a tactical unit.

(b) Evaluation. Relatively inexperienced personnel must be called upon to fill vacant leadership positions.

(c) Recommendations. An intensified program to teach leadership skills and responsibilities should be directed toward junior NCO's and specialists who have ability and the desire to accept leadership positions.

(d) Command Action. Emphasis at all levels of command within the Division has been placed on utilizing allocations to the Eighth Army NCO Academy.

b. (U) Intelligence:

(1) Ground Surveillance Radar Training.

(a) Observation. Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) team training tends to be isolated from other unit training.

(b) Evaluation. Static training of GSR teams is not challenging or realistic.

(c) Recommendation. GSR teams should be attached to recon elements.
or other tactical elements to provide stimulating, tactically oriented, and integrated training.

(d) Command Action. More training integrated with maneuver elements is being provided for GSR teams.

(2) Reevaluation of the Military Intelligence Detachment role.

(a) Observation. Pressing current problems have not been addressed sufficiently because of a diversity of commitments for Military Intelligence agents.

(b) Evaluation. The key element of subversion is the effect on the mission readiness of division. By placing the problem of subversion in proper perspective with other problems which effect the Division's readiness, investigators have directed more effort toward drug traffic organization, racism, and other contemporary problems.

(c) Recommendation. The Military Intelligence Detachment should continue to devote a large portion of its effort toward non-tactical problems.

c. (U) Training:

(1) Brigade Committee Training.

(a) Observation. Brigade committee training concept was tested as manning levels decreased.

(b) Evaluation. Lack of unit identity and conflicts between organizational and committee tasks made committee training impractical.

(c) Recommendation. Training be conducted at lowest unit headquarters.

(2) Sheridan Gunnery.

(a) Observation. Sheridan Gunnery qualification has pointed out that Sheridan gunners require more frequent training than M-60 Tank gunners because of the skill required to correctly aim the main gun. After firing 150 or more main gun rounds in a short period of time the turret of the M551 requires considerable maintenance.

(b) Evaluation. M551 gunners require more than semi-annual service firing in order to establish and maintain proficiency. After firing more than 150 rounds for qualification in a short time period, turrets require
maintenance that could be reduced by decreasing the number of rounds fired, or extending the time interval between rounds.

(c) Recommendation. Sheridan Gunner Qualification should be conducted more frequently, with fewer rounds fired during each qualification course.

d. Logistics:

(1) DLOG Conversion.

(a) Observation. Experience gained through conversion to the DLOG system indicates that the majority of small unit commanders lack the experience required to monitor this system.

(b) Evaluation. Training and experience have not prepared many small unit commanders for conversion of their property to the DLOG system.

(c) Recommendation. A training program on DLOG conversion would better acquaint small unit commanders with the task confronting them.

e. (U) Engineer:

(1) Relocatable Buildings.

(a) Observation. The 2d Engineer Battalion constructed buildings from assembled relocatable sections which had been previously used and not properly disassembled.

(b) Evaluation. Lack of care in disassembly and storage of building sections cause component parts to be lost and damaged.

(c) Recommendation. Careful handling and close supervision in construction, disassembly, and storage of components of relocatable buildings must be emphasized by all elements which construct relocatables.

(2) Drainage of Roadways.

(a) Observation. Monsoon rains and resulting high velocity run-off cause great annual damage to roads in Korea.

(b) Evaluation. More costly design of drainage systems for roads and beds would eliminate a significant amount of recurring annual road repair.

(c) Recommendation. Initial overdesign of road drainage systems would significantly reduce subsequent time and expense incurred in road repair.
(3) Motor Pool Resurfacing.

(a) Observation. Two Armor Battalion motor pools were resurfaced with 3 inch minus angular granite.

(b) Evaluation. Where tanks turned in motor pool areas, this surface material proved to be inadequate.

(c) Recommendation. In similar projects, areas where tracked vehicles turn should not be paved with a loose rock material. Only maintenance pads should be paved with course angular rock or other similar material.

f. (U) Clubs and Exchanges:

(1) Slot Machines.

(a) Observation. Slot machine collections did not reflect a profit from the machine.

(b) Evaluation. The local system of slot machine money collection was not carefully controlled.

(c) Recommendation. Receipts should be picked up daily by a disinterested responsible individual, and all keys to machines must be carefully controlled.

(d) Command Action. Recommendations above have been instituted throughout the Division, resulting in increased slot machine profits.

(2) Pilferage.

(a) Observation. Loss of personal and government property has been reported in large quantities, particularly from Post Exchanges.

(b) Evaluation. Investigation proved that a large quantity of pilfered merchandise left the compound on contracted garbage disposal vehicles.

(c) Recommendation. Where outside labor is allowed access to government facilities, an inspector should accompany the vehicle, or the vehicle should be spot checked by designated personnel as it leaves the compound.

(d) Command Action. Recommendations above have been implemented on all compounds.
(3) Graft.

(a) Observation. Illegal practices which include overcharging, not registering cash receipts, and shorting liquor content of drinks have been common.

(b) Evaluation. These practices have occurred because control and enforcement have not been strict.

(c) Recommendation. Club operations should be closely supervised and spot checked.

(d) Command Action. A Mobile Audit Team conducts unannounced inspection both day and night randomly of club operations; this has resulted in a noticeable decrease in discrepancies and deficiencies in club operations.

g. (U) Race Relations.

(1) Communications and Leadership.

(a) Observation. There has been a lack of communication between lower enlisted grades and their leaders, as well as between various ethnic groups.

(b) Evaluation. The area of communication is of paramount importance. Only through an exchange of ideas, opinions and grievances can misunderstandings and resentment be prevented.

(1) Lack of effective communication can largely be attributed to the lack of experience and training of personnel in the lower, and middle leadership grades. The junior officers and NCO's do not understand the basic techniques required in the problem-solving process.

(2) This lack of communication often results in minority personnel misinterpreting orders as being based on prejudice. The subordinate and supervisor at the lower echelon must understand each other. The overall problem appears to be more of a lack of communication between individuals, rather than races.

(3) The commander is accountable for the welfare of his men and properly has considerable latitude in accomplishing his management and supervisory responsibilities. Regulations provide guidelines for dealing with personnel, but application of directives is left to the commands judgment. Accordingly, different commanders are likely to render different decisions on similar incidents and the same commander may decide differently.
in like situations involving different individuals. Whether there are ex-

tenuating circumstances or not, if subordinates believe a commander

has unfairly discriminated, the impact on morale will be the same as if

he acted with prejudice. In this respect, demonstrated leadership that

has caused the commander to be held in high regard may be the only

solution.

(c) Recommendation. The leader must demonstrate where he stands

on racial matters, or fear and mistrust will pervade the unit. Each of-

ficer and NCO in a supervisory position is evaluated on his leadership

qualities by his subordinates. Actions rather than words form the basis

for categorizing his values and principles. The ambivalent leader who

fails to take a stand on issues or declare his position on controversial

matters is considered to be a poor leader by his subordinates.

(2) Open Door Policy.

(a) Observation. "Open Door" policy is not effective.

(b) Evaluation. Many men felt that by the time they made it through

the chain of command they were tagged as complainers. Additionally,

personnel in the chain often inquire into the matter to be discussed, al-

though it is known that the man wishes to discuss only the commander.

This tends to undermine the effectiveness of the entire program.

(c) Recommendation. Insure that all junior leaders are aware of

the importance of the open door policy and that no obstruction to the

commander’s door are permitted. The open door policy should state

that during certain designated hours the commander will be available

without prior appointment. Those hours should be at a time readily

accessible by all enlisted men.

(3) Standards of Appearance.

(a) Observation. Standard enforcement of policies relating to off-

duty dress and to haircut styles does not exist in the command.

(b) Evaluation. Although a policy relating to personal appearance and

off-duty dress exist, it is not always uniformly enforced. Different com-

panies within the same battalion often have different policies.

(c) Recommendation. A precise uniform regulation is needed with

standard enforcement throughout the command.
(4) Segregation Off-Post.

(a) Observation. Business establishments in the local villages discriminate by refusing to serve or by overcharging individuals associated with certain groups. These groups may be either black or white.

(b) Evaluation. Because of this discrimination, resentment and frustration may be felt by individuals who are the object of discrimination. Discrimination among groups within the villages causes undue polarization. Such matters are better resolved at lower unit level through their Community Relations Advisory Boards.

(c) Recommendation. Owners and managers of local establishments should initially be encouraged to render their services to all groups. Continuing actions by clubs or areas practicing discrimination should result in placing the entire area off-limits.
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR - 65(R3)

Headquarters I Corps (ROK/US) Grp, APO 96358

TO: Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, ATTN: EAGO-MH, APO 96301

Forwarded for review and transmittal to Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558 is the inclosed 2d Infantry Division Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 May 1971 to 31 October 1971.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MICHAEL F. SABINO
CPT, AGC
Deputy AG
EACS-MH (20 Nov 71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division,
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following
comments supplement the report.

2. (U) Reference item concerning Extensions and Reenlistment, page
18, para 2a(l). Nonconcur.
   a. Present policy concerning extensions is outlined in Eighth
Army Supplement to AR 614-30. Eighth Army permits, and in some cases
encourages, extensions with certain restraints. These restraints
are necessary for the good of the command and the US Army.
   b. If otherwise qualified for reenlistment, an EM may reenlist
for his present duty assignment and concurrently apply for an ex-
tension not to exceed 25 total consecutive months in country.

3. (U) Reference item concerning Skilled Leadership, page 18, para
2a(2). Concur. A presentation on "Leadership for Professionals"
is being developed for inclusion in the program of instruction for the
Eighth Army NCO Academy.

4. (U) Reference item concerning Ground Surveillance Radar Training,
page 18, para 2b(1). Concur.

5. (U) Reference item concerning Reevaluation of the Military
Intelligence Detachment role, page 19, para 2b(2). Concur, with
the following stipulations:
   a. Investigations into the area of racial dissidence must indicate
primary Counterintelligence interest. All Counterintelligence racial
investigations should meet the criteria outlined in DOD letter,
AGDA(M), ACSI-CICR, dated 31 Jul 70, subject: Policy Limitations on
Counterintelligence Coverage of Racial Matters.
   b. Investigations into drug traffic organizations must indicate
primary Counterintelligence interest. In all other cases, drug
trafficking falls into the Provost Marshal's area of jurisdiction.
   c. Investigations of contemporary problems should fall within
the parameters outlined in (C) FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Opera-
tions (U).
FACS-MH (20 Nov 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)

6. (U) Reference item concerning Brigade Committee Training, page 19, para 2c(1). Concur.

7. (U) Reference item concerning Sheridan Gunnery, page 19, para 2c(2). Concur.

8. (U) Reference item concerning DLOG Conversion, page 20, para 2d(1). Concur. It is recommended that an orientation type training program be developed from in-house resources.

9. (U) Reference item concerning Relocatable Buildings, page 20, para 2e(1). Concur. Following actions have been taken:
   a. Subordinate commands have been advised to caution personnel involved in disassembly, storage, transportation, and construction of relocatable buildings to take greater care that component parts do not become lost or damaged.
   b. Subordinate commands have been requested to identify material shortages when buildings are dismantled and to take the necessary supply action to insure building is complete prior to re-erection.

10. (U) Reference item concerning Drainage of Roadways, page 20, para 2e(2). Nonconcur. Roads presently designed by or for US Army in Korea are designed on the basis of a 30-year storm severity. Design in excess of this standard is not warranted.

11. (U) Reference item concerning Motor Pool Resurfacing, page 21, para 2e(3). Nonconcur. The suitability of angular rock material for surfacing motor pools for armored vehicles is exceeded only by concrete, and the cost of concrete would be extremely expensive and not justifiable for such facilities. Recommend drivers be cautioned to exercise greater care in executing turns on the material.

12. (U) Reference item concerning Slot Machines, page 21, para 2f(1). Concur with command action taken.

13. (U) Reference item concerning Pilferage, page 21, para 2f(2). Concur. A new command policy directive dealing with the searching of vehicles suspected of hauling diverted property is presently under review. In this policy directive, commanders are directed to establish strict procedures for checking the contents of Korean Regional Exchange vehicles, vendor vehicles, open mess vehicles, and military vehicles entering and exiting military installations to prevent the unauthorized removal, diversion, or transfer of Korean Regional Exchange merchandise.
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)


15. (U) Reference item concerning Communications and Leadership, page 22, para 2g(1). Concur. Leaders at all echelons must be willing to hold open and frank discussions with their men. Problems must be identified and addressed if a program is to be effective to the soldier. Every leader must commit himself to actually resolving a soldier's problem, directing corrective action or assisting the individual through proper referral. Poor supervisory practices and discriminatory actions must be eliminated before a leader can fulfill his duty of effectively communicating with his subordinates. After resolving tasks, the leader must be completely open to feedback on job satisfaction if he is to be effective.

16. (U) Reference item concerning Open Door Policy, page 23, para 2g(2). Concur. This policy should be enforced at the lowest echelon possible to enhance the commander-soldier relationship. Junior commanders are not experienced on counseling soldiers and have a tendency to forget the soldier once he has voiced his problem. Commanders at all levels should understand it is their obligation to assist the soldier in his problems, providing time and mission so allow. The designated hours in which the policy is in effect should be convenient to the soldier, not the commander.

17. (U) Reference item concerning Standards of Appearance, page 23, para 2p(3). Concur. Standard enforcement of policies relating to off-duty dress and to haircut styles is being enforced in clubs and exchanges. Courtesy patrols are performing daily checks on personnel in areas off the compound in the Seoul area. Other areas are not enforcing the existing policy as should be expected. The policies on personnel appearances and off-duty dress are not being enforced with the same degree in all commands. Emphasis should be placed at the command level to insure that the existing regulations are enforced uniformly throughout the command.

18. (U) Reference item concerning Segregation Off-Post, page 24, para 2g(4). Concur. The utmost discretion must be used prior to imposing economic sanctions on certain areas. This becomes more
EACS-MH (20 Nov 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)

important in overseas areas where local customs and attitudes must be taken into consideration. Decisions must be tempered and every effort must be made, to include joint actions, to resolve the problems prior to imposing off-limit restrictions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
DANIEL M. CAHILL
2LT, NV
Adjt Av.
GPOP-FD (20 Nov 71) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 MAR '72

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs with the subject ORLL with the following comment:

a. Reference para 1g, page 2: This item is no longer applicable since "H" series MTOE's will become effective on 30 June 1972.

b. Reference para 1g(2), page 3: The "H" series MTOE's include personnel authorizations for nuclear support teams and emergency action teams listed in subject paragraph.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

W. L. MASH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters 2d Infantry Division**

**Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations**

**CO, 2d Infantry Division**

**Report Date**

12 April 72

**TOTAL NO OF PAGES**

38

**ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER**

712163

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**

DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C.