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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
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Atc, 7/4/76, as SD 76-2

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MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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DAAG-PAP-A (N) (3 Mar 72) DAFD-OTT

23 March 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned 1st Avn Bde, 12th Cbt Avn Cp, 165th Avn Cp (Period Ending 31 October 1971)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-10.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AFC
Acting The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
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US Army Aviation Test Activity
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
2. (c) LESSONS LEARNED. COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMAND ACTION.

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None
c. Operations:

(1) Observation: The TAC of the 155th CAG authorizes one Army Approach Control Facility; however, due to increased aviation requirements in a combat environment, there are presently two functional "conventional type" approach controls.

(2) Evaluation: At Hue/Thu Bai an experiment was conducted to determine if the Army could operate a radar approach control utilizing the tactical GCA equipment, AN/TQS-71A control van and the AN/TPN-18 ground approach control radar with IFF/SLAR feature. The radar facility consisted of three TSQ-71A vans and TPN-18 radar sets with the controllers co-located. The radars were set up in the following configuration: one radar covered the airspace from ground level up to 3,000 feet and also the precision final approach course; the second radar covered from 3,000 feet to 6,000 feet and functioned as surveillance and vectoring radar; the third radar was set to cover from 6,000 feet to 9,000 feet with initial pickup, surveillance, and vectoring capabilities. The radar consoles were connected into the FSQ-75 console within the approach control facility, a modification which proved to be unfeasible. The facility has now been changed to a conventional approach control with two radar sets for GCA approaches for the following reasons:

(a) Elimination of the confusion inherent with the number of controllers required to operate such a complex within the limited space of the FSQ-75 console.

(b) Under the experimental complex, this facility did not have a back-up system in the event of a radar failure, thus leaving an area uncovered under that concept.

(c) The AN/TPN-18 is a tactical radar set and is not a dual channel system which is required for continuous 24 hour operation.

(3) Recommendations: Present radar equipment within the army inventory is not adequate for the conduct of a RAPCON operation. A RAPCON requirement was identified for the support of army aviation operations. Subsequent combat operations will
require radar coverage of the 15th Aviation Group

(4) Command Action: The TRN to display - was removed from the AH/FSQ-75. The FSQ-75 was returned to a conventional manual approach control, and the two radars were reconfigured to operational ground control approach.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training:

(1) Language Barrier

(a) Observation: During the training of Egyptian pilots all training was accomplished in French. This required an ailing instructor pilots to translate all material verbally into a common language.

(b) Evaluation: The quality of training could be enhanced by the availability of compatible reference materials.

(c) Recommendations: Foreign national students receiving training conducted by US military instructors should have a pre-requisite command of the English language.

(2) Training of Avionics Communication Equipment Repairmen

(a) Observation: School trained avionics communication equipment repairmen were not familiar with the FSQ-75 and TPN-18.

(b) Evaluation:

(1) When the US Army Sigma School at Ft. Gordon discontinued the three week block of instruction on the FSQ-75 Avionics Communication Equipment Repairmen graduates were not familiar with the equipment. Consequently, upon their arrival at BVN, they were not capable of performing maintenance on the group's primary control tower. The group recognized this lack of training by experiencing excessive outages of the FSQ-75. It was determined that a school must be established to provide the necessary training (HR-1, 1 March 1971). In May of 1971 the school was initiated. Instructors were the COTC (technical) representatives under contract to the US Army. Classes were two weeks in length and averaged three to four students per class. The method of instruction was in the "hands on" school, thereby giving the students a more practical knowledge of the essential school procedures and corrective action. The results of the course were immediately seen when the outage time decreased significantly.

(2) It was discovered that graduates of the MOS 26D course did not have a working knowledge of it. A small was set up in conjunction with the FSQ-75 school to train radar repairmen; 100 graduates trained in the CONUS school were
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lesson Learned
(Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group)
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSEP-65 (R3) (U)

require radar coverage for the replacement procurement of suitable
surveillance radars.

(4) Command Actions: The TPN 10 display was removed from the AN/FSQ-75. The
FSQ-75 was returned to a conventional manual approach control, and the two radars were
reconfigured to operational ground control approach.

d. Organization: Non-

e. Training:

(1) Language Barriers

(a) Observations: During the training of Afghan pilots all training was
accomplished in French. This required speaking US instructor pilots to translate
all material verbally into a common language.

(b) Evaluations: The quality of training could be enhanced by the availability
of compatible reference material.

(c) Recommendations: Foreign national students receiving training conducted by
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block of instruction on the FSQ-75 Avionics Communication Equipment Repairmen, graduates
were not familiar with the equipment. Consequently, upon their arrival
in RVN, they were not capable of performing maintenance on the group's primary
control tower. The group recognized a lack of training by experiencing excessive
outages of the FSQ-75. It was then realized that a school must be established to provide
the necessary training for the repairmen (n.). In May of 1971 the school was initi-
ated. Instructors were two F-106 technical representatives under contract to the US
Army. Classes were two weeks in length and averaged three to four students per class.
The method of instruction was in "hands on" method, thereby giving the students
a more practical knowledge of the equipment's characteristics and corrective
action. The results of the course were immediately evident when the outage time decreased
significantly.

(2) It was discovered that the students in the MOS 25D course did not have a
working knowledge of the TPN 10 display. An AI-51 was set up in conjunction with the
FSQ-75 school to train radar operators, but only trained in the CONUS school were
not given sufficient instruction in the TFN-16 because of the scope of the instruction. When required to repair the TFN-18, the repairmen were limited.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) Emphasis on the "hands on" method of instruction has proven to be more effective than the "theory of circuitry" method used in the CONUS school. Recommend that CONARC analyze the ROI for the 25L and 26D courses with a view toward integration of the "hands on" method of instruction.

(2) Recommend that coordination through personnel channels to the major using headquarters be effected to insure necessary 3L20-130 personnel for maintenance of avionics communication equipment are available on a timely basis.

(d) Command Action: This headquarters continues to conduct the FSQ-75 and TFN-18 school.

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communication:

(1) Repair and Return to Unit, Repair and Return to Stock (RBU/RBS) System:

(a) Observation: The turn around time for repair and return of mission essential sensor and avionics time is extremely excessive and severely affects the mission accomplishment of user units.

(b) Evaluation: Research at this level has revealed that mission essential sensor and avionics components have been turned in for repair and not returned to the user within a reasonable time. In a 360 day period, 17 Doppler Antennas were turned in for repair, nine of these antennas were returned to the user unit for a 47% loss. In the same 360 day period, seven navigational computers were turned in for repair through the RBU/RBS program and none of these items were returned for a loss of 100%. By projection of the loss rate of mission essential equipment it can be determined that mission ready rate would drop to approximately 42% in a subsequent 360 day period if the RBU/RBS in the United States is not vastly improved. In addition it has been determined that the support received from the DS and GS support in-country has been adequate. Work orders are constantly renewed to ensure validity.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that management procedures in CONUS be intensified with a view toward expedite return of mission essential avionics and sensor components.

(d) Command Action: Letters have been forwarded to 1st Aviation Brigade and 24th General Support Group identifying this problem. This headquarters continually works closely with the support units in an attempt to find a workable solution to this very significant problem.
AVBAKS-6

CONFIDENTIAL

17 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group)
Period Ending 31 October 1971, HCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(2) Processor Block Assemblies:

(a) Observations: This unit experienced a shortage of processor block assemblies
(FSN 5841-908-9022) due to overheating. Failure of the heater control transistors
Q1 and Q2 caused the overheat condition.

(b) Evaluation: Test flights established that processor blocks without heaters
produced imagery comparable to that from blocks with operational heaters. Processor
roller blockages due to flight delays were substantially reduced, and roller life
was extended due to less frequent immersion in nitric acid solution required to
clear blockages. Cockpit ambient temperatures were from 20°C to 30°C, with an aver-
age of 24°C. Temperature within the RO-166 was substantially above cockpit tempera-
ture.

(c) Heater assemblies should be redesigned to provide climate stabilisation.
The result would be longer equipment life and fewer maintenance down time due to heater
failures.

(d) Command Action: This unit has disconnected the heater assemblies.

(3) Infrared Imagery: Unsatisfactory results with Anscopan film.

(a) Observation: The Anscopan film, serial type 2913, FSN 6750-825-0270, does
not produce satisfactory imagery when used in the sensor system of the OV-1 aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: Tests were run comparing the Anscopan film and the Kodak film.
The Anscopan film has very poor resolution and is almost impossible to interpret.
The processing of a small strip of unexposed film showed the Kodak film to be clear
and the Anscopan film to have dark areas across the film. The film test took place
in September 1971 with film carrying June 1971 expiration. The Anscopan appears to
be thicker as the emulsion rolls onto the drive mechanism of the cassettes whereas
Kodak film causes no such problem.

(c) Recommendation: Until such time as the Anscopan film can be improved to
acceptable standards, it should not be used in Vietnam.

(d) Command Action: An urgent EIR has been submitted to the appropriate agency,
and at present only Kodak film is being used.

(4) Increased Photo Capability:

(a) Observation: The KA-76 camera has proven to be a high-dependable and
effective item of equipment.

(b) Evaluation: The OV-1A model serves the dual role as visual/photo mission
and training aircraft. The KA-30 camera system used exclusively in the OV-1A and
OV-1C models are old and unreliable. This frequently results in multiple sorties
launched to complete a single mission. The KA-76 camera, previously designed exclusively for the OV-1 "Super C" is a newer and more reliable camera.

(c) Recommendation: That an electrical cable should be constructed that allows the utilization of the KA-76 camera system in the OV-1A. Using the modified cable and modified KA-76 camera mount the OV-1A has full vertical and oblique capability with increased mission reliability and fewer wasted flight hours.

(d) Command Action: The 73d SAD has taken this action and is operating with greater camera reliability due to the modification.

h. Materials: Helicopter Skid Shoes

(1) Observation: Due to the high number of touchdown maneuvers associated with helicopter training activities, factory installed skid shoes last approximately 8 flight hours.

(2) Evaluation: Experimentation with a locally fabricated skid shoe constructed of .090 inch cold rolled steel extended skid shoe life to 65 flight hours.

(3) Recommendation: That heavy duty skid shoes of this general type be introduced in the supply system.

(4) Command Action: This unit continues to have skid shoes reinforced with cold rolled steel at the DS level.

i. Other: None
AVBACC (17 Nov 71) 1st End

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 165th Aviation Group (Combat), Period Ending 31 Oct 71 (NOSEP OPERATOR (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO San Francisco 96284

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96284

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Name]

LT, AG

Asst Adjutant General
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific. ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 165th Combat Aviation Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 165th Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel:
   
   b. Intelligence:

   (1) OBSERVATION: Personnel and units release in their performance and mission execution by making similar mistakes on a recurring basis.

   (2) EVALUATION: Lessons Learned, continuity files, unit SOP's are not being properly executed. With the constant turbulence in personnel resulting from the 12 month RV tour, costly losses in men and equipment are directly related to relearning the same actions over and over again.

   (3) RECOMMENDATION: What a project be developed which summarizes Lessons Learned, to be issued to all units.

   (4) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters is initiating action to provide subordinate units with the experience factor necessary to continually improve mission execution.

   a. OPERATIONS:

   (1) Operations from former locations.

   (e) OBSERVATION: Tactical headquarters that have operated from a fixed
installation are not prepared to operate from a forward location.

(b) EVALUATION: Large scale operations in remote areas occur infrequently in IR3. As a result, battalion and higher headquarters have become accustomed to operating from a "fixed" installation and are unable to rapidly establish a forward tactical operations center.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each headquarters establish procedures for movement to forward locations and identify the personnel and equipment necessary to establish an operations center.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters is preparing an SOP for establishing a forward operations center. Personnel and equipment necessary to operate the center will be identified. Equipment not normally in use at the fixed location will be consolidated and stored. Equipment in normal use will be identified and tagged for rapid relocation and movement.

(2) Security of Forward FOL/Rearm Points.

(a) OBSERVATION: Forward FOL/Rearm points are subject to theft and pilferage. Some aviation units cannot provide security.

(b) EVALUATION: Aviation units do not have the capability to provide security at forward FOL/Rearm points at forward locations. As a result, the ammunition, equipment, and fuel is not secure after the operator secures the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ANW be encouraged to operate and provide security at forward FOL/Rearm points. Not only would this relieve the overburdened US aviation units, it would also give the ANW valuable experience in operating and maintaining the points.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This headquarters has requested and received ANW assistance in securing forward FOL/Rearm points. Also, this headquarters has submitted requests through MAC encouraging ANW to assume responsibility for operating and maintaining forward FOL/Rearm points in IR3.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Location:

(1) Flight Safety Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a shortage of flight safety equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: The primary cause of the shortage of flight safety equipment is the individual aviators. Officers and Warrant Officers are not bringing their complete issue of flight safety equipment to RVN as authorized by AR 700-92. It is suspected that aviators are not being made aware of this...
regulation by their parent command prior to departure for RVN. It is also possible that some individuals are attempting to take advantage of the US Army by purposely leaving one issue at home and receiving a second issue in RVN. Additionally, unit supply personnel are not maintaining accurate accountability of these items. Many individuals not on flight status are allowed to retain these items when they are not required or authorized.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all aviators be required to have a full issue of flight equipment on hand prior to departing their last permanent duty station for RVN and that they be informed that they are required to take this with them to RVN. Aviators arriving in RVN without their issue (or proper documentation) would sign a statement of choice for a second issue. Unit commanders should also confiscate all flight equipment in the possession of unauthorized persons and make the equipment available to authorized personnel.

(c) CONTROLLING ACTION: This headquarters conducted a survey of incoming personnel to determine reasons for returns among new arrivals. Instructions have been issued to subordinate units to insure that only authorized personnel possess flight safety equipment.

(2) Unit Stand down Priority.

(a) OBSERVATION: Some support units are standing down prior to the supported unit.

(b) EVALUATION: Transporting equipment and supplies by vehicle is being complicated and slowed down because transportation support units are standing down.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the stand down of supporting units be carefully coordinated with the stand down of supported units.

(d) CONTROLLING ACTION: This headquarters has coordinated with remaining transportation units to attempt to obtain the required level of support.

g. Communications:

(1) Observation: During the recent Khe Sanh operation, difficulty was experienced in providing adequate communications for the forward element.

(2) EVALUATION: The current MEOS does not provide sufficient communications equipment to establish a forward operations center in addition to the normal communications requirement. This headquarters provided communications for Group headquarters, two 1ARV's and a physical security defense net.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That communications equipment be stockpiled for temporarily loan to meet increased, temporary demand.

(4) CONTROLLING ACTION: This headquarters met the present situation by hand-receiving the equipment from other US units. This is a temporary solution
that will become less effective as more US units stand down.

h. MATERIAL: None

i. MEDICAL: None

JOHN H. REICHARDT
Colonel, PA
Commanding
AVBAGC (12 Nov 71) 1st Ind

14 Dec 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 12th Combat Aviation Group
For Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CHFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO San Francisco 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVNDO-DO,
APO San Francisco 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for the period ending 31 October 1971 and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

MATTHEW SANCHEZ
1LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
AVHD0-DO (12 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 12th Combat Aviation Group
For Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 12th Combat
Aviation Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 12th Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-63 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 FEB 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. WAX

LT, AGC
Aer AGE
2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

1. Personnel status.

(a) Observations: There are no personnel strength problems.

(b) Evaluations: The 1st Aviation Brigade Personnel status has improved steadily throughout the period. The strength has increased from a low of 90% authorized aviators to 95% of authorized. At the end of the reporting period there were no critical shortages of any particular aviator skills. The overall experience level is low in the aviation units. Instructor Pilots in the AH-1G and LCH helicopters are the greatest need. These requirements have not hampered the Brigade mission.

(c) Recommendations: None.

(d) Command Action: None.

2. Drug Problem.

(a) Observations: The 1st Aviation Brigade experienced a drug problem during the period.

(b) Evaluation: The majority of the identified drug abusers were younger personnel in the lower five pay grades. Rehabilitation programs were enthusiastically conducted by the Brigade. 100 percent urinalysis detection programs were begun in the units commencing in September. The Brigade's rate of drug abusers identified through urinalysis was 4.8 percent as opposed to the USNAV rate of 3.3 percent, indicating higher morale among aviation personnel.

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVNACC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1971, LCS GSR-63 (R) (U)

(a) Recommendations: Continued emphasis on rehabilitation and increased rates of elimination from the service for those who fail the program.

(d) Command Action: Continued support of the approved programs.

(f) Morale.

(a) Observation: The morale of the 1st Aviation Brigade continues to be high.

(b) Evaluation: The 1st Aviation Brigade continued to be tasked for combat missions during the period. The Brigade accomplished numerous combat actions resulting in enemy casualties. This factor enhanced the morale of the aviation units and contributed to a highly favorable rate for all morale indicators. In most categories, the Brigade's morale and welfare indicators were more favorable than the USARV average. The Brigade's average rate per thousand personnel of crimes of violence and crimes against property was 1.09 as opposed to USARV's 1.43; the Brigade's average rate of motor vehicle accidents per million miles was 3.8 compared to USARV's 5.3; the Brigade experienced an average rate per thousand of .7 deserters against USARV's 0.85 percent. The above stated indicators show a slightly unfavorable trend over those for the last reporting period. The unfavorable increases are attributed to the increase of leisure time available due to the decrease in combat requirements.

(a) Recommendations: Continued emphasis on intramural sports and related activities.

(d) Command Action: Continued standdown of units whose combat mission has diminished.

b. C-3 Operations: None.

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics.

(1) Flight safety clothing and equipment.

(a) Observation: 1st Aviation Brigade units were not receiving timely support of required flight safety clothing items.

(b) Evaluations.

(1) Long Beach Depot is the only location within EAN where flight safety clothing is stocked. Aviation units are located from the Delta to the Exxon and were too far removed from the supply source to adequately coordinate requirements with the Depot.

(2) Elapsed time from date of request to receipt of the item averaged between 60-120 days. This unaccustomed a stockage of items at a point which would allow rapid response to unit needs.
CONFIDENTIAL

14 Nov 72
AVBACO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CT29-69 (R3) (U)

(a) Recommendations: A request was made that the 1st Aviation Brigade 0-4 Section to provide an account number allowing it to act as the Direct Support Unit (DSU) for all units.

(d) Command Action: This request was approved and a storage and issue section was established at Sanford Army Airfield on 1 August 1971. This action provided units ready access to flight clothing as it was located on a major airfield and maintained stock for immediate issue. A significant improvement in distribution of available assets was also realised as current transactions concerning flight safety items are required to be processed through the Brigade DSU.

(2) Disposition of US Government Property by inactivating/redeploying units.

(a) Observation: Reports received at this headquarters indicated that inactivating/redeploying units were not properly disposing of all US Government property upon unit standdown.

(b) Evaluation: A spot check of several units after standdown determined that units were not ensuring that all equipment and supplies were properly returned to supply channels.

(e) Recommendations: That subordinate units be advised of the policy to properly "police" unit areas subsequent to unit standdown. It was also recommended that staff visits be conducted to each standdown unit to ensure US Government property is returned to supply channels upon final close-out of the unit.

(d) Command Action: A command letter was dispatched to each Group on 14 October 1971 stating the policies concerning property accountability. In addition, a representative from the 0-4 staff visits each inactivating/redeploying unit to ensure an adequate "sweep" has been conducted and all US Government property has been disposed of IAW established turn-in procedures.

(3) Appointment of Property Book Officers.

(a) Observation: Several units within the 1st Aviation Brigade were appointing junior grade officers (Avn WD's, 2LT's, and 1LT's) as Property Book Officers.

(b) Evaluation: A review of Reports of Survey, Quarterly Loss Reports and other supply accounting transactions revealed that junior grade officers because of their lack of supply training/experiences were not maintaining unit property records satisfactorily. A review of the personnel status reports determined that these were excess officers in the grade of Captain throughout the Brigade.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDADC
SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1971, MIP 0896-40 (83) (U)

(a) Recommendation: That a policy be established on the appointment of Property Rock Officers of company size units.

(d) Command Action: A letter was dispatched to all subordinate units on 20 September 1971 concerning the appointment of Property Rock Officers. The letter recommended that, where possible, unit Property Rock Officers of company size units would be Unit Supply Technician Warrant Officers (761M) or officers in the grade of Captain. The appointment of officers based upon experience/training with the US Army Supply System will greatly improve inventory accounting procedures and reporting at the unit level.

(4) UH-1 Fuel Switch Guard.

(a) Observation: Investigation of a UH-1 accident in which engine failure was a contributing factor, revealed that a fuel switch guard was not installed.

(b) Evaluation: Without the switch guard installed it is easy to inadvertently switch the fuel off, particularly when performing hydraulics off landings.

(c) Recommendation: That immediate action be taken to install fuel switch guards on all UH-1 aircraft.

(d) Command Action: The Commanding General directed that, beginning 0600 hours 10 July 1971, all UH-1 aircraft not equipped with a fuel switch guard were grounded until such time as a guard was installed.

(5) UH-1, AH-1 Hydraulic Failures.

(a) Observation: Analysis of precautionary landings by UH-1 and AH-1 aircraft revealed that a predominant number were caused by hydraulic failures.

(b) Evaluation: 36% of the UH-1 and 46% of the AH-1 precautionary landings in the first six months of 1971 were caused by hydraulic failures with the majority caused by chaffed lines. This was indicative of poor maintenance procedures and lack of comprehensive pre-flight inspections by flight crews.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders, Maintenance Supervisors and Technical Inspectors ensure that maintenance personnel strictly adhere to proper maintenance procedures and that flight crews perform thorough and complete preflight inspections.

(d) Command Action: All units in the command have been made aware of the hydraulic problem and the recommended solution.

f. Organization: None.

g. Information Office: None.

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b. Signal: None.

c. Surgeon: None.

d. Safety: None.

e. Chaplain:

(1) Personnel Situation:

(a) Observation: The Brigade had a total of twenty (20) chaplains at the beginning of the reporting period. During the period nineteen (19) chaplains were lost and eleven (11) were gained, leaving a total of twelve (12) chaplains in the Brigade at the end of the reporting period.

(b) Evaluation: While there was almost a complete turnover of chaplains and a major decrease in number of assigned chaplains in the Brigade, no unit was without the services of a chaplain during the reporting period. Religious coverage for all three major faiths was coordinated and supplied through adjacent unit chaplains and chaplains of the Brigade.

(c) Recommendation: That additional chaplains be assigned to the Brigade so that religious coverage can be more adequately provided.

(d) Command Action: USAF Staff Chaplain is aware of chaplain shortage. If and when additional chaplains are available, they will be assigned.

(2) Religious and Moral Training.

(a) Observation: Chaplains were encouraged to promote the Character Guidance Program at their unit level and to make use of the training aids available to them. In June a USAF Religious Volunteer Center was dedicated in General Atwood at One Each Arm. Personnel were authorized by regulations, one fiveday administrative absence during their Vietnam tour to attend one of their denominational retreats. A monthly Brigade Chaplain's Roundtable is scheduled to keep the Brigade chaplains informed of significant events. A one-day Chaplain Training Conference was initiated in September. All chaplains in the Brigade will be brought together once a quarter for this training session.

(b) Evaluation: As withdrawal from combat occurs continued, the can and more chaplains take on religious activities and for moral and religious training. With participation in still far from satisfactory, the trend is in the direction of providing a worthwhile and effective religious program once the can does actively engage.

(c) Recommendation: That chaplains continue to be allowed to every opportunity of service and to be involved with the needs of the men.
AVIATION

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1971, ROG 021-65 (R3) (U)

(d) Command Action: None required.

1. Headquarters Command: None.

a. Historian: None.

[Signature]
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (83) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

HQ, DA (DAFD), Washington, D.C. 20310

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. E. Hohnsowetz
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 1st Aviation Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 FEB 1972

TO: HQDA (DAPD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/Signature/

H. L. MAK
1LT, AGO
Asst AG

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

CG, 1st Avn Bde, CO, 165th Avn Gp, 12th Cbt Avn Gp

Report Date
24 February 1972

Contract or Grant No.

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