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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAAG-PAP—A (M) (17 Jan 72) DAOF-OTT 711008 711007
8 February 1972

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned—1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, 16th Artillery

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and
evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure
that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit
of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training
material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation
should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned
program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED

1. (U) Defense of Medium and Heavy Artillery Bases.

In medium and heavy artillery batteries where Flechettes Anti-Personnel Rounds (see Hide) are not available, it has been found that firing HE with a minimum burst time setting (Killor Junior) had the best effect - both physical and psychological - for defensive fires. To insure their effectiveness, instruction should be given to each howitzer section on targets located at different ranges, also on shooting not only on level ground but on slopes. Placing a range card showing quadrants and fuse settings, in each section will also enhance the results.

2. (U) Artillery Movement Along Unsecure Roads.

In moving self-propelled batteries along unsecured roads, it was found that main losses came not from active enemy activities but from mines. Not only must the road be swept prior to movement, but also a careful watch must be kept for freshly buried mines during movement. A method that helped in this respect was to use a helicopter at low level, to blow dust off of the road, revealing fresh mine emplacements. Because of mines, it was not practical even with armored cavalry providing security, to resupply remote firebases by convoy. Enough supplies can be carried in on the initial insertion to allow resupply by CH-47 on an as needed basis. This would release units, that would normally be used for resupply convoys, for other missions.

3. (D) Change in Mission For a Medium Artillery Battery.

The mission of medium artillery batteries in the Republic of Vietnam (with some exceptions in the Mech Units) is General Reinforcing or General Support. When used in the direct support role instead of the normal direct support artillery, additional burdens are placed on all concerned. The Medium Artillery's TOL does not provide for LNO's or FO's for this type of mission. If the FO's from the normal BS battery are used they are often reluctant to call in close fire when needed, as they are unfamiliar with the effects, and many times use more rounds than would normally be used to accomplish the mission. The forward observer needed, in most cases, additional training in the use of medium artillery and the effects that they achieved. The use of medium artillery in the BS role, in support of Infantry, does not provide the most effective utilization of the artillery's firepower. The normal reinforcing mission is more appropriate and should be adhered to, if at all possible, when light artillery is available.

4. (U) Disposition of LNO's and FO's During Stand Down

When a field artillery unit is standing down, the continued effective utilization of LNO's and FO's to supported units becomes a problem. Should another artillery unit be designated to take over the mission, the LNO's and FO's should be reassigned to the new artillery unit. In doing this, there will be minimum of confusion and operational time lost. It was found that an LNO or FO could be cleared, reassigned and back on the job in 48 hours. The remaining LNO's and FO's were able to provide support during this period so there was minimum operational loss.

DAFD-OTT
711007
Incl 1
5. Emplacement of Sensor Devices in Heavy Jungle:

When sensor devices (duffel bag) were first emplaced in the Central Highlands as an early warning system, they were dropped from an aircraft (helicopter) and their location was then plotted on a map from the air. When it then became desirable for the Duffel Bag strings to be more accurately located, they were dropped from an aircraft, but this time a MPQ-4 Radar employing a double beam scan was used to give grid coordinates that would be effective up to 50 meters. Both methods proved ineffective however; for the first relied principally on the viewers ability to read a map, and the second because the radar picked up only 62% of the sensors that were dropped. Therefore, it was determined that in order for the Duffel Bag program to be effective each position would have to be surveyed. Because of the extensive amount of time and the sizable security force that was needed to emplace the system using a traverse method, an alternative method had to be used that would ensure an acceptable accuracy, and reduce the time required and security element needed for a traverse.

Hence, it was determined that a triangulation method would be used; first the proposed sensor locations were plotted on a map; second the survey team went out and taped six (6) bases long enough so that the end points would ensure an acceptable apex angle; third, the Duffel Bag accompanied the three (3) APC’s maneuvered through the jungle to start laying out their strings. On reaching a point where a sensor was to be emplaced, the emplacing personnel would notify the survey team by radio, then the T-16 theodolites, that were set up at each end of the approximate base, would move to the general area. A pinflare was then fired through the jungle so that the theodolite could better locate the sensor. Then a hand flare was fired. After recording the reading, a second hand flare was fired another reading was taken. The two readings were then counted. The team in the field would then move on to the next location and the procedure was repeated, until all strings were emplaced. Total time to emplace sensors using this method was eleven (11) days in which twenty-four (24) strings, five (5) sensors per string, were emplaced.

LOWELL G. SMITH
LTC, FA
Commanding
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AVOG-FAB-OP (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind (u)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion, 16th Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROB: OSFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, Hq, 52nd Artillery Group, APO 96318, 8 May 71

THRU: Commanding Officer, SRAC Artillery, APO 96350

TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC, 20310

Subject reports have been reviewed and are approved.

[Signature]

JAMES M. WROTH
COL, FA
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery for Period ending 30 April 1971, APO 606 (U)

DA, Headquarters, Second Regional Assistance Command Artillery, ATTN: AFR-AIAT-D, APO 96350, 14 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command, APO 96350

This headquarters has evaluated subject OREL and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

BILL M. WALDK
Lieutenant Colonel, FA
Adjutant
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion, 16th Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

This headquarters, has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

S. D. EY KORNERT
M.N., AGG
Assistant AG
AVHD-DO (30 Apr 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery For Period
Ending 30 April 1971. RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 29 SEP 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
    APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion,
16th Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
5/16th Arty
SRAC

HONSOVETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558        1 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (BAPF-2A), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.H. GAINE
SPT. AGO
Asst AG
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AVGG-F/A-OP
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

5 May 1971

2. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel: None
b. Intelligence: None
c. Operations:
   (1) Gunship Employment

   (a) Observation: Gunships were effectively employed at the beginning of
   the battle by the 1-92d LMO. Once the situation became critical, personnel from
   various other agencies attempted to control the aircraft, leading to more con-}
   fusion. (See after action report on battle of Phu Nhơn, attached)
AVCF-FAA-OP
5 May 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSF0-65 (L-3) (U)

(b) Evaluation: Gunships were not used to their fullest due to the
lack of control and coordination. This likewise hindered the employment of
artillery.

(c) Recommendations: That an overall fire support coordinator be
appointed by the highest headquarters involved in the operation. His task
should include both U.S. and Vietnamese artillery, air aviation and Air
Force personnel.

(d) Command Action: Discussions were held with representatives of
Pleiku Sector, II Corps, and the 20th Engineer Battalion to effect coordi-
nation, but to little avail.

(2) U.S. Artillery:

(c) Observation: The Vietnamese personnel initially were reluctant to
use U.S. artillery fire support.

(b) Evaluation: The tactical situation grew critical when perhaps con-
tact could have been broken by the use of artillery fires.

(c) Recommendations: That Vietnamese personnel be made aware of the
support available to them and the effectiveness it can produce prior to the
initiation of such actions.

(d) Command Action: Liaison officers and forward observers from this
unit were kept with Vietnamese units and were eventually able to show what
we could do for them.

(3) Perimeter Security:

(a) Observation: Our defense of Phu Nhon was successful primarily be-
cause of adherence to the basics of position defense, specifically having alert
guards and deep, simple fox holes, which allowed good grazing fire.

(b) Evaluation: More effort should be spent in keeping guard personnel
alert and motivated than in constructing elaborate, extensive defensive barriers
around positions.

(c) Recommendation: Methods of keeping guards alert be stressed in peri-
meter defense classes.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has in effect the following proced-
ures to assist in developing and maintaining guard alertness;

(1) Guards are briefed on the current enemy situation at guardmount.
(2) Soup and Coffee are delivered to guards throughout the night.

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AVGG-FAA-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, TCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

(3) The CO checks each perimeter position hourly.

(4) Cassio checks are made with each perimeter position hourly.

d. Organisation: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications:

(1) Equipment status:

(a) Observation: When the battalion is spread out as far as we have been in our support mission, communications with the more distant firing positions is virtually impossible.

(b) Evaluation: More communications equipment is needed to allow us to perform our jobs at optimum effectiveness in such an extended configuration. Current TOEs are unrealistic considering the situation.

(c) Recommendations: That Corps- or Army-wide facility be established from which units may draw required non-TOE or above TOE communications equipment. This facility should be under the direct control of the Corps (Field Force) Operations section. When missions are assigned, the equipment needed to perform them can be provided.

(d) Command Action: The battalion borrowed additional equipment from our support agencies and neighboring units to meet our requirements, pending submission of a request to change the TOE.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

2 Log

1. List of locations

2. After Action Report of battle at Phu Nhon

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AVOO-FAL-OP (5 May 71) 1st Ind(U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, Hq, 52nd Artillery Group, APO 96318, 8 May 71

THRU: Commanding Officer, SRAC Artillery, APO 96350

TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC, 20310

Subject reports have been reviewed and are approved.

JAMES M. WELSH
COL, FA
Commanding
AVFA-12-D (5 May 71) 2d Inf (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92d Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CMON-4 (A-3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, Second Regional Assistance Command Artillery, ATTN:
AVFA-12-D, APO 96350 14 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command, APO 96350

This headquarters has evaluated subject CALL and forwarding endorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIGNED

BILLY M WALKER
Lieutenant Colonel, FA
Adjutant
AVFA-GC 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92d Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS 65 (R-3)(U)

Commanding Officer
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHD-ID
APO 96375

This headquarters, has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. PENCE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
AVHD-DO (3 May 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92d Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 20 SEP 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 92d Field Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT. HONSOWETZ
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-FD (5 May 71) 5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 92d Field Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 NOV 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.W. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVGG-FAA-03

SUBJECT: Operation 1 Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, ECS: CSP00-65 (R-3) (U)

The coordinates of locations occupied by the 1st Battalion 92d Artillery are listed below.

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<th>LOCATION</th>
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<td>ZA 228536</td>
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<td>FSB Sarch II</td>
<td>ZA 111677</td>
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<td>LZ Weight Davis</td>
<td>AR 8961113</td>
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<td>FSB 6</td>
<td>YB 935169</td>
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<td>YB 869256</td>
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<td>ZA 228535</td>
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<td>FSB Athene</td>
<td>AR 775904</td>
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<td>BR 367468</td>
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<td>BR 676706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp Fidel</td>
<td>BR 898405</td>
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<td>FSB Kers</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96318

AVGG-FAA-OP

29 April 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report—Phu Nhơn Relief Operation

1. (C) General Summary: This report covers U. S. Artillery operations in support of the defense of Phu Nhơn during the period 15 March 1971 to 21 March 1971. The following is the disposition of artillery during this period:

FSB West Davis (AR 897117)
2 x 155mm, 1st Plt, Btry C/1-92 FA
1 x 8 inch and 1 x 175mm, Btry B/7-15 FA
2 x 40mm, Btry E/4-60 Arty

FSB T. C. Miller (AQ 870998)
2 x 155mm, 2d Plt, Btry C/1-92 FA
2 x 40mm, Btry B/4-60 Arty
2 x 105mm (ARVN), 214th Sector Platoon

LZ Lonely (AQ 852871)
2 x 155mm, 3d Plt, Btry C/1-92 FA
2 x 40mm, Btry B/4-60 Arty

FSB St. George (AR 847148)
2 x 105mm (ARVN), 223d Arty
4 x 155mm (ARVN), 223d Arty

AQ 862905:
6 x 105mm (ARVN), Btry C/232d Arty

2. Intelligence:

a. During the past six months GVN pacification areas have been a principal target of VC/NVA attacks. Since early February the Phu Nhơn District area has been identified as the focal point for the attacks in Pleiku Province. Based upon normal enemy areas of operation, captured documents and agent reports, the K394th Composite Battalion and the K1 Battalion of the 95B Regiment, both regular NVA units, were identified as units active in this area as early as 1 February 1971. Activity during the period of 1 February through 15 March...
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AVG-FAA-OP

SUBJECT: After Action Report—Phu Nhon Relief Operation

29 April 1971

consisted primarily of company-size ground attacks, harassment, stand off
attacks and interdiction of QL-14 by mineings and ambushes. Although agent
reports concerning the Phu Nhon area were not numerous there were several
of possible significance which were received prior to the attack of 15-16
March. These reports identified the location of a battalion-size unit
approximately 15 kilometers South of Phu Nhon on 13 March and the arrival
of an artillery company approximately 10 kilometers Southeast of Phu Nhon
on 14 March. These reports were forwarded to the IV Corps Province S-2. It
should be noted that intelligence reports of battalion-sized elements are
not unusual in the Phu Nhon area and it is not surprising that the reports
received prior to 15 March failed to warn sufficiently of the impending
attack of a regimental-sized element.

b. The well coordinated attack of 15-16 March was made by a regimental-
sized unit under the command of the HQ 95B Regiment. In addition to the
K34th and the K1 Bn/955, the K20 Sapper Battalion and elements of the 408th
Sapper Battalion are also believed to have participated. A detainee picked
up on 4 April at AQ 82189, approximately 15 kilometers North of Phu Nhon,
was reported as being a member of 6-1 16th/32 Bn/40th Artillery Regiment
as a participating unit in the battle. With the exception of the document cap-
tured on 18 March locating the command post of the 95B Regiment at AQ 821955,
approximately 4 kilometers West of Phu Nhon, no further information was cur-
rently available concerning specific enemy disposition prior to the battle.
The enemy was determined and well prepared. Intelligence analysts estimate
that at least one month’s preparation went into the planning of this attack.
The enemy’s heavy volume of fire and his ability to hold his positions for
as long as he did indicate that he was very well supplied and had effective
medical support.

3. Situation:

a. On the evening of 15 March at 2355 hours, a North Vietnamese force of
estimated regimental size initiated a sustained attack against Phu Nhon
District HQ (AR 868992), attached Regional Forces, collocated U. S. artillery
forces of 2d Platoon, Battery G, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, and supporting
duster sections from Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery. During the
course of the initial evening attack the North Vietnamese forces, elements
of 95B Regt, attempted to overrun the friendly forces utilizing sapper at-
tacks, assaults by fire with 62mm mortars, 120mm mortars, 20mm rockets
and ground assaults. The initial attack came from the South against the U. S.
artillery sector of the perimeter held by the Dusters from 4-50 FA and the
men from 1-92 FA. The enemy was unable to penetrate this area due to the
heavy volume of fire and the aggressiveness of the U. S. soldiers in defense
of the artillery sector. The attack then moved to the eastern perimeter in
the vicinity of the ARVN artillery and ARVN guard bunkers. The enemy pen-
etrated the wire inflicting damage to facilities and causing casualties among
the South Vietnamese defenders. (See Inclosure 1, diagram of the compound).
The U. S. liaison officer from 1-92 FA directed all gunships and other air-

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AVGG-FAA-OP

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Phu Nhơn Relief Operation

29 April 1971

Draft during the first night and morning of the attack. At times very little artillery was fired because of the danger of hitting aircraft in the area. The training and ability of the U.S. artillery and Duster personnel was shown by the fact that they had killed 21 sappers within 10 meters of the wire surrounding their compound. These sappers were heavily armed with satchel charges, B-40 rockets, Bangalore torpedoes and M-16 rifles but not one enemy gained access to their compound, and thereby were unable to inflict any major damage or wound any artillery personnel. One Duster crewman was seriously wounded by a .50 Cal round after 16 hours of fighting. Confidence in their leadership and training and a great deal of individual initiative were displayed by the artillerymen throughout the 5 day campaign. Despite lack of sleep the platoon was able to perform their missions of firing and securing their own position in an outstanding manner.

b. The ground attack which was directed against the eastern and northeastern sides of the perimeter ran into very little resistance from the ARVN. The men on the perimeter were never reinforced as those on guard duty remained inside their bunkers with their families. No reaction force was formed until daylight. When the MACV compound was overrun, the ARVN soldiers brought their families to the American bunkers. The ARVN artillery fired no more than 40 rounds and did not fire direct fire. Sappers were running freely through their compound with little or no resistance enabling them to occupy several key bunkers and one building while holding dependents as hostages. Finally at 161400 March CS gas grenades were employed to clear the enemy from the bunkers.

c. The enemy was able to cut off road routes North and South of Phu Nhơn surrounding the defending forces and isolating them from other friendly forces and cutting off all normal land resupply during the period 16-20 March. There were pockets of enemy resistance on QL-14 South from My Tho Village (AR 855178) to Phu Nhơn District HQ (AR 868992). Villages held by the enemy were located at the following areas: AR 865027, Phu Long-AR 863045, Phu Quang-AR 870050, and Phu Nhơn-AR 862997. The 2d Battalion 47th Regiment was tasked to move South and clear QL-14. At 1614 March 3rd Company/2-47 Regiment encountered a small enemy force at AR 855125 and engaged them with small arms fire. The enemy force was estimated to be a platoon-sized element, but it managed to pin down 3rd Company effectively. Gunships were requested and contact was broken. The unit continued South and on 18 March the 1st and 3rd Companies of 2-47th ran into heavy resistance from the village North of Phu Nhơn. A U.S. convoy escort, attempting to resupply our units, arrived on the scene and the commander offered the assistance of his four (4) Dusters and one (1) APC in dislodging the enemy. The Dusters and the APC moved on the road and provided fire support while the two ARVN companies launched another attack. The assault to the objective was made on line, but the tracked vehicles moved forward faster than the ground troops. When the objective was reached the Dusters were 100 meters in front of the ground forces. The Dusters were under heavy fire and one was immobilized. The remaining forces moved through the village to the South and after consolidating...
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AVGG-PAA-OP

SUBJECT: After Action Report—Phu Nhun Relief Operation

29 April 1971

At their position moved back around the village to the East and returned north to their forward location. The Dusters had leveled the village where the enemy resistance was heavy. Later the immobilized Duster was recovered.

Vehicle resupply was found to be impossible due to heavy enemy resistance along QL-12, so aerial resupply was utilized. Throughout this period the besieged village was subjected to daily attack by enemy 82mm mortars, 120mm mortars, 81 mm mortars, and small arms while U.S. helicopters and aircraft, attempting to provide aerial resupply and aviation support, were forced to launch devastating ground to air fire from enemy machine gun positions encircling Phu Nhun.

d. The 1st Battalion 45th Regiment moved to Buon Hiech on 16 March and was to proceed north towards LZ Lonely and link up with the 3rd Cavalry Troop at AQ 688829. The 3rd Cavalry leading the advance was ambushed north of Lonely, but continued to advance north toward Phu Nhun after breaking contact. The 4-45 Regiment, with the 5/3 Cavalry (-) attached, proceeded north to the vicinity of AQ 870965. The task force was under intense fire from a well fortified enemy force. When they attempted to by-pass the enemy on the eastern flank, the task force began taking heavy casualties. After regrouping, the element made no more assaults on 17 March while awaiting reinforcements. On 16 March the 1-45 Rgt and the 3/3 Cavalry assaulted the position again from the east side of the road while the newly arrived 4-45 advanced on the west side of the road. The 3/3 Cavalry received heavy casualties and heavy damage to many of its APCs in these assaults and was rendered ineffective and moved to the rear. The 1-42 FA battalion observer with this task force, 3/3 Artillery Battalion, did an outstanding job during these assaults. On the morning of 20 March an extensive artillery preparation was fired on the enemy position and after it was completed, the 1-45th, 4-45th and 2/3/3 Cavalry committed an assault on the objective and encountered heavy resistance. The southern force moved north and the northern force continued south until they met at Phu Nhun District HQ where the enemy encirclement had been broken.

e. Throughout the siege the U.S. Artillerymen distinguished themselves by repeated acts of individual heroism. During the campaign the surrounded elements of G-125 plt/1-92 FA and B/1-89 Army, together with C/1-89 FA and 3-7-11 FA at Longv, Davis and C/12 plt/1-92 FA at LZ Lonley, expended over 1,500 artillery rounds, thousands of 40mm Duster rounds and a large amount of small arms and automatic weapon ammunition inflicting hundreds of casualties among the attacking enemy forces while suffering minimum U.S. casualties. The enemy defense was characterized by heavy ground to air fire, B-40 rockets, and small arms fire. Activity recorded during the week included 13 assaults by firing, 0 significant contacts, 5 road ambushes, and 6 incidents of ground to air fire. For their actions the artillerymen of 1st Battalion 92d Artillery received the following awards: 1 Silver Star, 1 Distinguished Flying Cross, 7 Bronze Stars with "V", 27 Army Commendation Medals with "V", 1 Air Medal with "V" and 1 Combat Medic Badge. C Battery is being submitted for an ARVN Unit Award for the period 16 to 20 March 1971 and for the U.S. Valorous Unit Citation.

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4. Communications:
   a. At the time of the attack, radios were distributed as follows:
      2 ea GRC-46 - LNO 1-92 PA
      1 ea GRC-46 - MCV Team
      3 ea VRC-77 - MCV Team
      1 ea GRC-46 - 2d plt, Btry C, 1-92 FA
      1 ea FRO-25 - Btry B, 4-60 Arty
   b. The following equipment became inoperative during the campaign:
      2 ea GRC-46 - LNO 1-92 PA
      1 ea 30 KW Generator (destroyed) - MCV Team
      2 ea 10 KW Generator (destroyed) - MCV Team
      1 ea 1.5 DC Generator - LNO 1-92 PA
   c. The U.S. personnel at FSB Miller were never without sufficient communications. Replacement equipment was sent out within 24 hours of the attack.

5. Logistics:
   a. 94.3 tons of supplies were airlifted or trucked into C Battery's three locations at Weigt Davis, FSB Miller and LZ Lonely.
   b. Convoys were used to take supplies to Weigt Davis and were unable to go further South.
   c. All resupply to Phu Nhon was accomplished with UH-1 helicopters, which made sorties from Weigt Davis.
   d. CH-47 hook sorties were used to resupply Weigt Davis and LZ Lonely. Due to intense ground to air fire, Phu Nhon could not be resupplied by hooks.

6. Liaison/Forward Observer Teams:
   a. Liaison Teams:
      (1) Initially one four-man LNO team (1-CPT, 3-EM) operated at Phu Nhon. It had been in position since 31 December 1970.
      (2) As the mission requirements increased, one three-man LNO team was sent to the 47th ARVN Regiment and one three-man LNO team was sent to the 45th Regiment.

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b. Forward Observer Teams:

(1) Initially one FO team was deployed with the 45th Regiment, SP4 Richard Parrish. SP4 Parrish distinguished himself while serving with the 45th and with the 3rd Cavalry in the southern task force by controlling artillery fire, air strikes, gunships, medivac and maintaining contact with the battalion all during the numerous assaults South of Phu Nhon. SP4 Parrish was with the lead elements during the conflict and did an outstanding job in keeping elements informed of the changing situation and his location while directing accurate and timely fire against the enemy. He was seriously wounded and had to be returned to the rear. For his valorous actions SP4 Richard Parrish received the Silver Star Medal.

(2) Air observers were on station during daylight hours throughout the conflict.

7. Ammunition:

a. During the campaign from 16 March to 21 March expenditures were reported by II Corps as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6,617*</td>
<td>780*</td>
<td>7,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>7,669</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>9,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures could not be verified by U.S. artillery personnel.

b. Ammunition resupply was accomplished by air using CH-47 and UH-1D helicopters. The road South was cut off and convoys were unable to reach Phu Nhon. Service Battery convoyed to Weigt Davis and UH-1D helicopters took resupply from there to Phu Nhon.

8. Losses:

a. The cumulative results for the period 16 March when the attack on Phu Nhon District commenced until 21 March when the relief operation was terminated are listed below.

b. Enemy Losses:

387 KIA (178 of these KIA)
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48 Small arms CIA
23 Crew-served weapons CIA
2 Radios (Chinese Communist Manufactured)
40 RPG-2 (RPG-2) Rounds CIA
12 82mm Mortar Rounds CIA

o. Friendly Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-92 FA</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. 1-92 FA losses included 1 ea 45 Cal pistol and 1 ea M-16 rifle which were lost in action by the INDO team.

1 Incl

JOHN S. CHESBRO
LTC, FA
Commanding

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DIAGRAM OF PHU HOCH DISTRICT HQ COMPOUND

LEGEND:
A - Initial attack
B - Second attack

10cm ARVH
155mm U S
Duster
60cm mortar
L - 12-60 LG (VII 12-60m and 50 cal not included in diagram)

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery; Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations

COs, 5th Bn 16th Artillery, 1st Bn 92d Artillery

January 5, 1972

N/A

DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310

(This page is unclassified)