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TO:
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FROM:
DoD Controlling Organization: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

GDS per DoD 5200.1-r; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (14 Oct 71) DAFD-OTT

3 November 1971

SUBJECT: ~~Report~~ Lessons Learned, 165th Avn Bn, 145th Avn Bn,
11th Avn Bn, 214th Avn Bn, 222d Avn Bn ~~...~~
1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U) (21.7.1)

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1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter. (21 Oct 71)
4. As Section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program it has been omitted. (21 Nov 71)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Approved by... 2100 *...* 21 Nov 71

Verne L. Bowers

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)

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AVBAXB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group) Period Ending 30 Apr 1971, RCS CSFOR-55 (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

(1) Impact of Battalion Organization.

(a) OBSERVATION: The organization of the Army Air Traffic Control Battalion (Provisional) with four subordinate ATC Companies has resulted in marked improvement in personnel actions, welfare, discipline and morale.

(b) EVALUATION: With the decentralization of personnel actions from Headquarters, 125th Aviation Company (ATC) at Bien Hoa to an ATC Company in each Military Region the overall effectiveness of the unit has increased. A company level administration in each Region is more efficient and provides the commander the opportunity to place the "personal into personnel". A Company Commander in each Military Region has relieved the Battalion Commander of the requirement to impose non-judicial punishment on personnel from Dong Ha to Ca Mau. Additionally with a Company Commander within close proximity to all outlying facilities and the realization that a Company Commander does in fact have many more capabilities than a Platoon Leader the morale of the individual soldier has risen.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To further increase the effectiveness in the areas of personnel actions, welfare, discipline and morale a Battalion Personnel Section should be included in any future submission of an MTOE.

(2) Attachment of personnel for rations, quarters and logistical support.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel manning ATC facilities must individually be attached to collocated units for rations, quarters and POL support.

(b) EVALUATION: Until recently TATCT's or facilities, as a whole, were attached by General Order for rations, quarters and logistical support. Although not consonant with regulations, due to the fact that TATCT's or facilities do not have Unit Identification Codes (UIC) this eased the requirement for continually publishing Special Orders attaching or detaching individuals who have been assigned or reassigned to outlying facilities. USARV Regulation 95-7 gives a format to be used for requesting ATC support. This includes the unit "to which the ATC control team is to be attached" for rations, quarters, POL, etc.

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SUBJECT: Operations Report - Continuation

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That upon the deployment of a TATCT the supported unit and the AATC Battalion enter into a Letter of Agreement (similar to an Interservice Support Agreement) for the support of a specified number of personnel and amount of equipment and that the requirement for attachment orders for each individual be waived.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Deployment of a Tactical Air Traffic Control Team (TATCT)

(a) OBSERVATION: In an airmobile environment such as Vietnam it will be necessary to operate from forward airfields. To control air traffic at these airfields the deployment of TATCT's is necessary.

(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period two TATCT's were deployed in support of airmobile operations. The first, the deployment of one man and an AN/PRC-25 to Thoi Binh was accomplished without problem. However the mission itself was more closely aligned to the mission of the pathfinder team assigned to each Combat Aviation Battalion. The mission of this unit is more akin to the deployment of a team which includes major equipment and sufficient personnel to operate on a 24 hour per day basis. A complete TATCT consists of a tower, a GCA radar, a radio beacon, necessary power generator equipment, and 16 operator and maintenance personnel. A complete TATCT was deployed to Dong Ha, RVN in support of Operation LAM SON 719. The initial requirement was to provide a GCA radar and a non-directional radio beacon for a 10 day period. This requirement was increased to include a tower when the Air Force "Tailpipe" team ceased operations. The TATCT was assembled at Battalion headquarters utilizing personnel and equipment assigned to operational facilities. GCA Radar operators were drawn from Kontam and Ca Mau. The NCOIC came from "D" Company in Can Tho, the generator repairman from Battalion headquarters at Bien Hoa, and the radar repairman from the radar repair school at Long Binh. The AN/TSQ-71A radar was recovered from Can Tho for deployment with the TATCT. When it came time for the deployment of the AN/TSQ-70A tower it was found that the AATC Battalion could not meet this requirement without the reassignment of personnel from within the assets of the 165th Aviation Group. Tower operators were reassigned from the 339th AD(D) at Dong Ba Thin, the 317th AD(D) at Di An, the 344th AD(D) at Pleiku, and the 365th AD(D) at Long Thanh. The NCOIC of the tower team was reassigned from the 364th AD(D) at LZ English. The AN/TSQ-70A tower was laterally transferred from the 361st AD(D) at Dong Tam. Both the tower and GCA were operational at Dong Ha within 24 hours after arrival. It was found that the AATC Battalion was not authorized several items of equipment necessary to support a "bare base" operation. Equipment such as airfield lighting sets, wet

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SUBJECT: Operations Report - Continuation

weather gear for the TATCT members. Tentage was drawn from the supply depot at Long Binh. Other "house-keeping" items were provided by the Battalion headquarters or "A" Company at Hue/Phu Bai. Shortly after the deployment of the TATCT to Dong H the TATC Battalion was assigned the mission to constitute three additional TATCT's at Bien Hoa for possible deployment. Six operational battalion facilities were closed in order to assemble the equipment and personnel necessary to fulfill this requirement. However, due to altered priorities personnel and equipment have since been redeployed. Three sites, including Dong Ha have been designated TATCT's and are subject to redeployment from present locations on short notice.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That TATCT's fully equipped to operate anywhere within the theater of operations, be included in any future MTOE. Furthermore, these TATCT's should be assigned on a basis of one per CORPS/REGION area and be either fully operational at an airfield or in a continuous training status.

(2) Consolidation of ATC facilities.

(a) OBSERVATION: The possibility exists at locations where both a tower and Flight Following Station (FFS) are operational to consolidate these facilities with negligible adverse effects.

(b) EVALUATION: At locations where traffic count indicated a low usage of ATC terminal and flight following facilities, these facilities were consolidated to operate from the tower only. Such a consolidation utilizing a tower has reduced the number of required operators and pieces of ATC equipment. It is necessary to tie the tower into the Flight Following Net by use of the HF radio. This has been accomplished at three sites in Vietnam: Dalat/Cam Ly, Ban Me Thuot and Tay Ninh. Personnel and equipment have been recovered to Bien Hoa or deployed to other sites.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That where possible terminal and enroute facilities be consolidated.

(3) Lack of organic aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: Under the current MTOE the 125th Aviation Company (ATC) is not authorized organic aircraft although Aviation Sections are provided by TOE 1-207 series.

(b) EVALUATION: Although not authorized organic aircraft the unit is assigned two UH-1H's and two U-6A's. These aircraft are distributed as follows:

HQ & C Company	(III MR)	- U-6A
A Company	(I MR)	- UH-1H
B Company	(II MR)	- UH-1H
D Company	(IV MR)	- U-6A

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SUBJECT: Operations Report - Continuation

As an intra-regional means of transportation the UH-1H is ideal for this unit's mission. It is capable of carrying a 10KW generator which is the primary back-up power source for ATC equipment. On the other hand the U-6A is marginally satisfactory for the mission in IV Military Region, where all ATC facilities are located at airfields. However, the U-6A is not large enough to transport a 10KW generator or antennas for the radar and transportation must be obtained from other sources to move this equipment. In III Military Region three sites, Song Be, Vo Dat and FSB Mace are accessible only by helicopter. To support these sites aircraft must be obtained from other units. This often results in unacceptable delays in the repair of ATC and support equipment. Compounding the problem of delays is the location of the radar General Support Maintenance facility at Vung Tau. The ATC Battalion averages three trips per week to Vung Tau by vehicle to deliver or pick up radar parts that are too bulky for the U-6A. The accomplishment of inter-regional transportation is dependent upon inter-theater airlift or larger utility aircraft assigned to 165th Aviation Group.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future MTOE's include provisions for the assignment of aircraft as follows:

- One UH-1H per CORPS/REGION
- One U-21A per Battalion headquarters

d. Organization:

(1) A battalion structure is required to effectively carry out the ATC mission in Vietnam.

(a) OBSERVATION: Operating experience since 12 January 1971 has demonstrated the requirement for certain organizational capabilities not provided in current TOE's

(b) EVALUATION: The Army Air Traffic Control Battalion (Provisional) consists of the 125th Aviation Company (ATC) and four Aviation Detachments (Divisional). There are no provisions for effective control and support of widely dispersed operations in the basic air traffic control unit. To effectively execute its mission, the Army Air Traffic Control Unit should have the following organizational capabilities:

1. Organizational maintenance of all assigned equipment and direct support maintenance of the communications - electronics equipment peculiar to the unit.

2. Centralized control and management of ATC trained personnel and other selected MOS skills vital to installation, operation and maintenance of ATC facilities.

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SUBJECT: Operations Report - Continuation

3. Centralized evaluation and quality control of ATC training and operations.

4. Sufficient uncommitted assets to provide for rapid deployment of trained personnel and operational equipment to perform ATC functions in support of large scale tactical operations, rear area security and damage control.

5. A command and control infrastructure to permit expansion or reduction of terminal ATC capabilities without major reorganization.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That the provisional Air Traffic Control Battalion be organized as an interim measure, under a modification of TOE 1-207G dated 25 October 1968 for USARV.

2. That combat development action be taken to provide an Air Traffic Control organization that has both terminal and enroute air traffic control capability.

e. Training:

(1) Establishment of Facility Evaluation/Quality Control Section.

(a) OBSERVATION: In January 1971 the AATC Battalion (Provisional) established a Facility Evaluation/Quality Control Section.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the wide dispersion of ATC facilities the responsibility for training air traffic controllers lies with the immediate supervisor, the facility chief. To insure that facility chiefs are fulfilling this responsibility periodic inspections of each site will be conducted by the FE/QC Section. This provides the commander with a comprehensive evaluation of each facility operated by the battalion. FE/QC does not have a singular purpose. They are, upon request, available to assist in establishing a training program. Members of the team are ATC examiners and are available to grant facility ratings to individual controllers. During assistance visits or inspections the team administers the semi-annual written examination to all controllers. Upon the conclusion of their visits they make recommendations to the Company Commander for the improvement of the ATC training program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That authorization for a Facility Evaluation/Quality Control Section be included in future modification to the TOE.

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(2) Replacement training:

(a) OBSERVATION: ATC controllers are assigned directly from Ft. Rucker and must undergo extensive training prior to becoming facility rated.

(b) EVALUATION: Although proficient in air traffic control now personnel assigned to the ATC Battalion are unprepared to face the task of controlling traffic in a combat environment. The most glaring shortcoming is the unfamiliarity with tactical equipment, both ATC and support. The existence of a tactical ATC facility depends on the controllers ability to operate and maintain on site equipment. This includes avionics equipment, power generator equipment, and air conditioners in addition to the major end item of ATC equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That uncommitted Tactical Air Traffic Control Teams be established to train newly assigned controllers. Furthermore, that the U.S. Army Aviation School at Ft. Rucker revise the Program of Instruction for air traffic controllers to include training in the field of vehicle and generator maintenance.

f. Logistics:

(1) General Support maintenance facility for ATC equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: At the present time there is no one single agency responsible for the General Support maintenance of ATC equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: General Support facilities do exist for component parts of ATC equipment; however no agency is responsible for the major end items. General Support for avionics radios (UHF and VHF) is provided by one agency while ground type radios (FM) are maintained by another. Maintenance for refrigeration equipment is the responsibility of an entirely different unit. There is no unit in Vietnam designated as the General Support maintenance facility for ATC end items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That one unit be designated as the responsible agency for ATC equipment.

g. Communications: None.

h. Materiel: None.


JOHN J. FALBO
LTC, SC
Commanding

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AF SAC (17 May 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1stst Combat
Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, AF 65-004-0
(R) (U)

TO: Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO SF 963 5 JUN 1971

FROM: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, AFM: AVIGB-001,
APO SF 963

(*) This headquarters has received the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for period ending 30 April 1971, and concurs.

FOR THE COMBAT ZONE:

E. L. Hayward
E. L. HAYWARD
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

7

21 JUN 1971 10

A HQ DO 17 May 71 And Int
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 165th
Aviation Group Period Ending: 30 April 1971, HQ: 165th
(R)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 9775

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, AFTR: 6850-ED,
APO 96363

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 165th Aviation
Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



CHARLES H. SOREN
COL, USA
Acting 1st Assistant General

Cy furn:
165th Avn Gp
1st Avn Bde

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GPOP-FD (17 May 71) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters
165th Aviation Group (Cbt), Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 8 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAL
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 145th Combat Aviation
Battalion, period ending 30 April 1971. (U)

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Evaluation, Observations, and Recommendations:

- a. Personnel: NONE
- b. Intelligence: NONE
- c. Operations:

(1) Communication between UH-1 crew members:

(a) Observation: It has been observed that it is impossible in most cases to have communication between the pilot and crew chief or gunner while the latter are clearing passengers around the tail rotor or refueling the aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: The reason for this is the drop cords presently installed do not allow for freedom of movement in and around the aircraft. An example would be when it is necessary for the crew chief to supervise the loading of cargo from the outside of the aircraft.

(c) Recommendation: That longer drop cards be installed on all UH-1 aircraft. A self rewinding reel should be employed to control the excess slack cord when the crew is on board.

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Battalion, period ending 30 April 1971. (U)

(d) Command Action: An EIR is being initiated at this Headquarters to investigate the feasibility of para (c) above.

(2) Securing of M-16 and smoke grenades in the aircraft:

(a) Observation: It has been observed that crewchiefs and gunners in UH-1 aircraft are having a problem keeping their M-16 rifles and smoke grenades secured in flight. Recently during a turn, an M-16 was lost from an aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: In some cases the M-16's are held by the slings on the back of the pilot's seats, where, if needed quickly they are out of reach. In other cases they are suspended by hooks behind the crew seat posts where they are not secure.

(c) Recommendation: That racks for M-16 rifles and smoke grenades be manufactured for use on UH-1 helicopters in the vicinity of crew stations.

(d) Command Action: An EIR is being initiated at this Headquarters recommending fabrication and introduction into the supply system of above described racks.

(3) Lack of adequate personal survival equipment for aviation crews:

(a) Observation: Several aircraft have been forced down and the crews spent considerable time in enemy dominated territory. Lack of proper survival equipment has complicated Search and Rescue as well as Escape and Evasion efforts.

(b) Evaluation: It appears that availability of survival vests is dependent upon unit of assignment. Vests are plentiful in some units and scarce in others. The same situation appears to be true regarding survival radios. Aviators are responsible individuals entrusted with thousands of dollars worth of Army equipment.

(c) Recommendation: That the vest, mesh, net, survival FSM 8415-177-4818 and survival radio AN/URC 68 or equivalents be issued to individual aviators in a manner similar to flight clothing and flight helmets

(d) Command Action: Not Applicable

(4) Lack of adequate survival training among new aviator arrivals:

(a) Observation: During the reporting period several aviators arrived in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion without sufficient training in the techniques of survival in a tropical area.

(b) Evaluation: This situation constitutes a hazard in that the aviators are not adequately prepared to insure their survival should they be forced down in the Republic of Vietnam.

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(c) Recommendation: It is felt that possibly the initiation of a program to allow Army Aviators to attend the Jungle Survival School located in the Philippines would preclude this situation. Selected aviators could attend, and upon their return initiate a training program that would allow the wide dissemination of the material learned at the school in the Philippines.

(d) Command Action: Not applicable

(5) Maintenance of Individual Flight Records Folders:

(a) Observation: During a recent inspection of the unit's Individual Flight Records Folder (IFRF), it was noticed that many units have failed to exercise proper records management.

(b) Evaluation: The IFRF, in accordance with current DA regulations, should contain that paperwork necessary to maintain a permanent file, i.e., Flight, Medical, Instrument and Orders. Many of the IFRF's received by the 145th Operations contained material which should have been removed prior to the individual's departure from the losing unit. The situation occurs more often in the IFRF's of aviators who have had previous tours in RVN, or a number of PCS's, rather than in the recently rated aviator's folders. This also pertains to the IFRF's of non-aviator type personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That flight operations personnel carefully review the IFRF prior to closing them out for PCS or any transfer of personnel, and remove all paperwork that is not required to be forwarded. This will insure that only the material required to maintain a permanent record will accompany the aviator or crewman.

(d) Command Action: A program of thorough screening of each IFRF immediately after assignment and just prior to departure of all aviation personnel has been initiated.

(6) VNAF I&M Training Program:

(a) Observation: The 145th has been conducting VNAF pilot training in addition to performing its regular missions since 1 July 1970. After receiving initial check rides and orientations, the VNAF pilots began flying on regular missions with U.S. aircraft commanders.

(b) Evaluation: The US aircraft commanders training VNAF pilots found that they had to stay alert, exercise more patience, and explain maneuvers more concisely than they normally would with a US pilot.

(c) Recommendation: That other units which receive VNAF pilots for training emphasize the importance of alertness to the personnel flying with the Vietnamese. Additionally, that extra patience be used to overcome the language barrier and personality difference encountered between allied aviators.

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(d) **Command Action:** Frequent briefings have been conducted with all involved US personnel. The above mentioned points have been discussed in detail. Areas stressed include, insuring communications are thoroughly understood, patience, cultural differences, etc.

(7) VNAF I&M Training Period:

(a) **Observation:** The 60 day Phase I & II I&M Training period appeared adequate, however, the Phase III training period is insufficient to adequately train newly formed VNAF Squadrons.

(b) **Evaluation:** An additional 30 days is required to insure training completion and self-sufficiency of the VNAF Squadron.

(c) **Recommendation:** That Phase III Training be extended to 120 days to allow for an adequate training period.

(d) **Command Action:** Recommendation has been informally presented to US Air Force Advisory Team Three (3) for consideration and evaluation.

(8) The Need For a Checklist of Commonly Carried Loads:

(a) **Observation:** In the past this unit has been unknowingly exceeding the gross weight limitations on the CH-47A aircraft.

(b) **Evaluation:** While supporting units in the field, many times sling loads are already prepared, actually exceeding the 8,000 pound limit. This limit outlined by the Unit SOP allows a 700 pound safety margin. Many of the aviators did not know the actual weight of many typical loads they were carrying. They were judging the weight of the load by how much torque it took to lift the load, using the rule of thumb that it took 800 pounds of torque to lift a load of 8,000 pounds. This unit, using a load with a known weight of 8,000 pounds, found that it required only 700 pounds of torque to be lifted. Consequently it was determined that we were occasionally over-grossing our aircraft.

(c) **Recommendation:** That a list of the weights of the most commonly carried loads by this unit be a part of the flight kit, so that when there is a question as to the actual weight of a load there is a ready reference for the pilot to use.

(d) **Command Action:** A reference sheet has been made available with the weights of the loads commonly carried by this unit. This reference sheet is a part of the flight kit. In addition each Aviator has been given his own personal copy to familiarize himself with the various weights.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 145th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, (U)

(9) CH-47A Operations In Military Region II

(a) Observation: Two aircraft from this organization were required to be detached from Military Region III to support action in Military Region II.

(b) Evaluation: The results of this action indicated problems in areas of different maintenance procedures and load SOP's. In the delta, where the 242nd operates, the density altitude is rarely in excess of 2,000 feet, consequently the aircraft will reach the transmission torque limitations prior to exceeding the NI limitations. This led to the procedure of topping the engines to bleed off RPM at 800 ft/lbs of torque. When the 242nd ASHC was required to send two of these aircraft to operate in Military Region II, where the density altitude varies in amounts exceeding 2,000 feet, the pilots were unable to use the performance charts in the appropriate -10. Therefore, initially the aircraft commanders were forced to rely on their experience and judgment. Also due to differences in the loading SOP's the aircraft on occasion were without the proper tie down restraints for some internal loads.

(c) Recommendations: Although the method of topping engines to 800 ft/lbs of torque was sufficient in Military Region III, it would be more feasible to top the engines to NI indicated on the engine green run sheets. This would allow the use of the performance charts in the -10 to be effective at all times. In addition, when an aircraft is detached from its parent unit it will in the future take all its 780 gear with it. This will allow it to perform all missions that a CH-47 is designed for.

(d) Command Action: In the future commanders will insure that all maintenance procedures developed comply with the operating procedures indicated in the appropriate technical manuals.

(10) Control of Vehicular Traffic in the Vicinity of Aircraft

(a) Observation: In the past several months, numerous aircraft have been damaged during ground operations due to the careless operation of vehicles by supported unit personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Vehicles were backed into the aircraft, damaging skin and formers; vehicular mounted antennas were left untied and struck rotor blades. Although the damage caused by these occurrences was very light, in the future such accidents could cause major damage or personal injury.

(c) Recommendations: No vehicle will be permitted to drive beneath the rotor blades while the aircraft is running. If it is desired to bring a vehicle closer, the aircraft will be shut down and a ground guide will be employed. Make all aircraft commanders responsible for briefing their crews as well as the supported unit about vehicle safety around the aircraft.

(d) Command Action: The unit SOP is being changed to include this safety procedure.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 45th Combat Aviation
Battalion, period ending 30 April 1971. (U)

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(11) Item:

(a) Observation: Recently, this unit has experienced increasing difficulty in maintaining effective flight following with its mission aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: Unit SOP requires flight following through direct contact of relay through other aircraft to operations, however, during recent weeks we have been required to launch our mission ships over an ever increasing grade. Consequently, it has become common for aircraft to be unable to communicate with company operations or other unit aircraft while remaining at normal mission altitudes. Air communications between airfield facilities have also been found to be unreliable for flight following. This has on many occasions required extended periods of flight time to complete flight following radio calls.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That individual aviators be reminded of the importance of flight following, with particular regard to the fact that the purpose of flight following is to protect the pilot and his crew in the event they should be required to make an emergency landing.

(2) That aviators use enroute altitudes sufficient to insure positive radio communications with operations and/or other unit aircraft.

(3) That aviators call immediately before entering traffic to land, giving an accurate estimate of their next take off time and call again immediately after take off. If estimated take off will be delayed more than 30 minutes, pilots should notify operations via land line.

(d) Command Action: All aviators in this command have been briefed on the increased difficulties of flight following and the above suggestions have been implemented.

(12) Item:

(a) Observation: In recent months it has become apparent that hauling water trailers by CH-47 aircraft to resupply field sites is wasteful of both the lifting capability of the CH-47, and CH-47 blade time.

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Battalion, period ending 30 April 1971 (U)

(b) Evaluation: A full 400 gallon water trailer weighs 5500 pounds and, unless it is combined with an internal or piggyback load, it is considerably under the optimum weight of 8,000 pounds for a CH-47 sortie. When returning the trailer to the PZ for filling, airspeed is usually below 60 knots, because of the flight instability of the empty trailer. Consequently, on a 30 mile flight (not at all unusual in the present combat environment) an additional 15 minutes of flight time is required due to the low airspeed. In addition, water trailers are prone to accidental drop because the slings easily become entangled and fray on protruding metal parts of the trailer. By contrast, 1,000 gallons of water can be lifted in two 500 gallon blivits, a load closely approximating the 8,000 pound optimum load for a CH-47. Those blivits can return inside the aircraft at 130 knots, and are virtually indestructible as well as inexpensive. While it is realized that a water trailer is more convenient, the advantages of the 250% greater capacity of blivits, the decrease in the time required to perform the mission, and the expendable nature of the blivits warrant a close examination by field units of this method of resupply.

(c) Recommendation: That all field units evaluate their requirements for water to determine the suitability of resupply by blivits, a method currently in use by the 1st ATF and the RTAVF.

(d) Command Action: None

d. Organization: None

e. Training:

(1) Instrument Training Program:

(a) Observation: During this reporting period it has become increasingly harder to meet requirements prescribed in USARV Supplement 1 to AR 95-1

(b) Evaluation: This problem occurred due to a decrease in mission requirements and an increase in VNAF training among units. Individual companies are only committing 2 and 3 aircraft per day for missions. It has become increasingly more difficult to make available flying time to aviators during mission so they may meet training requirements.

(c) Recommendation: t, as long as this unit's commitment of aircraft to missions remains a at the present time, two aircraft per day be scheduled for training ses.

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

These aircraft will be used to conduct instrument training and to prepare aviators for renewal of instrument certificates. In addition individual proficiency will be enhanced.

(d) Command Action: At the present time this unit is scheduling two aircraft per day for training purposes as aircraft availability permits. An instrument training program has been initiated to allow the requirements of USARV Supplement 1 to AR 95-1 to be met. When an instrument examiner becomes available, the aviators will be prepared to successfully complete an instrument checkride for renewal of instrument certificates.

(2) Items:

(a) Observation: Recently this unit experienced a dropped load incident which was caused by the cargo hook not being properly reset after being manually released (emergency release) during a scheduled maintenance inspection.

(b) Evaluation: Upon investigation, it has been determined that there is virtually no means to visually confirm that the manual release mechanism is set. It has also been determined that the manual release mechanism can be partially released, on one or both sides, such that it may be able to pick up and carry a load, then release it at any time during the flight. This condition can only be detected by removing an inspection plate located on the sides of the cargo hook and inserting your fingers and checking, by feel, the position of the release mechanism.

(c) Recommendation:

(1) That individual aviators and flight crews be made aware of the correct configuration of the components of the manual release on the cargo hook.

(2) That units remove the inspection covers on the sides of the cargo hook fiberglass shroud during pre-flight inspections to allow a comprehensive pre-flight check of the cargo hook.

(d) Command Action: All Aviators and flight crew members of this unit have attended a demonstration class on cargo hook operations and have been thoroughly familiarized with the cargo hook mechanism. Henceforth, inspection plates will be opened on all cargo hook shrouds during the pre-flight inspection.

AVBAUV-C 30 April 1971
 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 145th Combat Aviation
 Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (U)

f. Logistics:

(1) Observation: Units standing down should delay turning in their PLL's until the last minute.

(2) Evaluation: Units that turned their motor vehicle, aircraft, or armament PLL's in early found it necessary to rely on sister units to provide PLL support until all their equipment, vehicles, and aircraft were turned in.

(3) Recommendation: Units should delay PLL turn-in until after all equipment, vehicles, and aircraft have been turned in. With the mass stand down of several units throughout Vietnam, the responsiveness of the logistical support system is hindered and units standing down are forced to wait extended periods of time for PLL support.

(4) Command Action: Subordinate units to this headquarters will, in the future, only turn in PLL after the supported items of equipment are turned in.

g. Communications: None

h. Material None

i. Weather: During the reporting period weather has not had a significant impact on the planning or execution of operations by this unit.

Richard D. Kenyon
 RICHARD D. KENYON
 LTC, TC
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - CG USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
- 4 - 1st AVN BDE, ATTN: AVBAVC-O, APO 96384
- 5 - 12TH CAG, ATTN: AVBAUS-C, APO 96266

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBAUS-C (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 145th CAB for period Ending
 30 April 1971 HCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 28 May 1971

THRU: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, ATTN: MACTR-
 G3PT, APO 96266

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCG-DST, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
 Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
 Lessons Learned, 145th Avn Bn (Cbt) for the period ending 30 April 1971.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

a. Reference paragraph 2c(12). This headquarters has encouraged the
 supported ground tactical units to use blivits, when available, for water
 resupply.

b. Reference Enclosure 4, Aircraft Status. The Aircraft Authorized
 column should reflect TO&E authorization. The correct authorization is:

	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>AUTH</u>	<u>OH-58</u> <u>AUTH</u>	<u>AH-1G</u> <u>AUTH</u>
Reads	HQ, 145th	1	1	
Should Read		0	3	
Reads	242d ASHC		1	
Should Read			2	
Reads	213th ASHC		1	
Should Read			2	
Reads	A-2/20th AFA			10
Should Read				8

FOR THE COMMANDER:

10 
 JOHN H. SUTHERLAND
 MAJ, IN
 Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

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 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 DOD DM 5200.10

25

MACTR-G3PT (30 Apr 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 145th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, HCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 2 JUN 1971

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384


Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DC, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from
Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



4n ROBERT F. CARRELL
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

//

AVRACC (3 April 71) 3rd Ind (4)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 115th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS, CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 5 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHQS-DST,
APO 96375

(U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E.L. Barnard
E.L. BARNARD
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

27

AVHDO-DO (30 Apr 71) 4th ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 145th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period ending 30 April 1971 (RCS: CSPOR-65(R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 ; 1971

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GOPP-FD
APO San Francisco 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters with exception of page 10, paragraph 2c(2). The fabrication of suitable racks for these items is not justified. AR 310-34, Equipment Authorization Policies and Criteria and Common Tables of Allowances, authorizes each aviator and flight crew member a revolver, caliber .38 or .45 caliber pistol. If unit commanders desire that crew members carry M-16 rifles, expedient means should be developed to provide the requisite security and accessibility. Smoke grenades are likewise readily and adequately secured by expedient means. Since the issuance of M-16 rifles to flight crew members is discretionary in nature, no requirement exists for the fabrication of rifle racks. Unit has been so advised.

2. Additional comment follows:

Reference item concerning "Lack of adequate personal survival equipment for aviation crews," page 10, paragraph 2c(3). The Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, has been assembling VEST, SURVIVAL SRU-21/P (FSN 8465-177-4819) at the Defense Depot, Ogden, Utah, for subsequent shipment to RVN. Stocks are expected during 1st Quarter FY 72. This vest is a limited procurement item for SEA and will be administratively issued to commands based on aircraft density. Sufficient vests were requested to assure availability to all flight crews. Survival radio (Receiver-transmitter AN/URC-68, FSN 5820-832-9158) is authorized on the basis of 1 per rotary wing and 2 per fixed wing aircraft in RVN. This item is requisitioned and is a command controlled item. An un-serviceable turn-in is required for issue of new equipment, although an initial issue may be obtained based on change in aircraft density. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F.L. HONSOWEY
CPT. AGC.
Adjutant General

Cy furn:
145th CAB
1st Avn Bde

13

GPOP-FD (30 Apr 71) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 145th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGO
ASST AG

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AVBAUT-AC

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 11th CAB for Period Ending 30 Apr 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

- A. (U) Personnel: None
- B. (C) Intelligence: None
- C. (C) Operations:

(1) Safety Measures with Observer Shoulder Harness.

(a) Observation: On 18 April 1971, an O-1G aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire, crashed and burned. On 19 April 1971, the observer died of excessive burns, the pilot received minor injuries. The pilot was unable to extract the observer from the wreckage because the observer's shoulder harness was tangled with the seat belt.

(b) Evaluation: Although never discussed as a safety item, the excess shoulder harness material can be a serious hazard in the event of an emergency, especially in the case of crew/passenger evacuation from the aircraft. The strap must be adjustable in order to accommodate different sized personnel who may be carried in the aircraft.

(c) Recommendation: That all pilots check to insure that all excess shoulder harness material is neatly tucked out of the way. This would greatly reduce the possibility of the material being wound around the seat belt release mechanism.

(d) Command Action: The hazard has been reported through safety channels, distributed as general information to the pilots and incorporated in the unit SOP for safety and training purposes.

(2) Wear of Fire Resistant Clothing (NOMEX) by Observers.

(a) Observation: In the aircraft crash mentioned above, the observer was not wearing fire resistant clothing.

(b) Evaluation: The Aerial observers carried by the 74th RAC are, for the most part, not equipped with NOMEX clothing. The units to which they are assigned are not authorized to requisition NOMEX clothing.

(c) Recommendation: That all units utilizing aircraft on a regular basis be authorized to requisition NOMEX clothing for use by their observer personnel on flight status.

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711087
Incl 3

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DOD DIR 5230.10

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AVBAUT-AC

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

(3) Lack of US Advisory Personnel with ARVN Forces during the Conduct of Air Mobile Operations in RVN.

(a) Observation: With the increased emphasis placed on the Vietnamization Program during the past few months, there have been numerous instances where there has not been a US Advisor on board the Command and Control aircraft or with the ground forces during the conduct of Air Mobile Operations.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the lack of a US Advisor on board the Command and Control aircraft, there have been several instances where there was a lack of adequate communications between the Air Mobile Task Force Commander and the Air Mission Commander. This resulted in confusion as to exact instructions, particularly in the case of Eagle Flight Operations. There have been cases where troops were inserted into incorrect landing zones because the instructions given by the ARVN Commander in the Command and Control ship were misunderstood by the Aircraft Commander.

(c) Recommendation: That a US Advisor to the ground unit be on board the Command and Control aircraft during the conduct of all air mobile operations in RVN.

(d) Command Action: This recommendation has been made through the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion Liaison Officer to the ARVN Divisions. The situation is improving, however there are still instances where the recommendation is not being followed.

(4) Hazards of PSP Helicopter Landing Pads

(a) Observation: Several accidents and near accidents have occurred as a result of aircraft skids catching on PSP, especially in revetment areas.

(b) Evaluation: PSP is unsafe for aircraft parking because it becomes slippery when wet and quite often when a loaded aircraft lands on PSP, the increased weight causes individual panels to shift on an improperly laid pad. These factors increase the possibility of a skid catching on a ridge of PSP resulting in an accident.

(c) Recommendation: That PSP pads be removed from all parking revetments and be replaced by concrete pads, sand bag pads, or dirt pads with a permeable surface.

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AVBAUT-AC

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(5) Airmobile Assault Tactics,

(a) Observation: On a recent airmobile combat assault, combat troops were inserted into a landing zone between an armored cavalry element and a recent enemy contact.

(b) Evaluation: This was a very dangerous tactical maneuver because the aircraft and combat troops were completely exposed to the area of contact on landing and presented a vulnerable target. Should the flight have received fire, the armored element could not have rendered support because the flight was in the line of fire.

(c) Recommendation: That tactical maneuvers such as this be given more consideration and be avoided if at all possible; and that the air mission commander advise the airmobile task force commander of the vulnerability of the flight and the danger involved in this type insertion.

(d) Command Action: This item will be covered in the newly instituted air mission commanders classes which are given at battalion level.

(6) Use of AH-1G Gunship as Escort on Combat Assaults

(a) Observation: On a recent combat assault in the Republic of Cambodia, it was necessary to utilize an AH-1G light fire team as escort for the slicks making the insertion. When the flight was on short final to the landing zone it came under intense hostile fire. As per unit SOP, the flight aborted the landing utilizing the aircraft dispersion technique, i.e. each aircraft breaking in a different direction. Because of AH-1G employment tactics, the supporting gunships were at approximately 1500 feet and behind the flight. When the flight broke off the approach the gunships were unable to render aerial fire support for fear of hitting one of the slicks.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the fact that AH-1G characteristics require that they be employed at higher altitude than UH-1B/C model gunships, they are not ideally suited for the role of slick escort. UH-1B/C model gunships are able to engage targets from a much lower altitude and can therefore support lift helicopters while they are at their most vulnerable altitudes, i.e., 100 feet on short final until reaching a safe altitude after takeoff. Should the flight receive fire at this critical time, the gunships can immediately suppress it.

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AVIATION-AC

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: That AH-1G gunships be utilized for landing zone preparation and as an aerial fire support platform and that JH-1B/C gunships be utilized on all occasions as escort aircraft.

(d) Command Action: This unit utilizes their gunships as stated in the recommendation. The only variation occurs when, because of unforeseen circumstances, the AH-1G aircraft are the only aircraft available for escort purposes.

D. Training

(1) Lack of Experience In New Personnel.

(a) Observation: Observation of unit mission indicates a reduced level of experience and proficiency, particularly in the performance of combat assault missions. This will be even more amplified in the near future due to the decreased input of aviation personnel in this command.

(b) Evaluation: An immediate need exists for amplified instruction for 1st tour aviators on environmental flight techniques for combat assault formation flight, load work, McGuire Rig and ladder extraction, emergency procedures and tactical instrument training.

(c) Recommendation and Command Action: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has instituted an amplified ground school for new aviators, aircraft commanders and air mission commanders. This ground school includes specialized instructions on the conduct of night and unusual missions, ie. McGuire Rig Techniques.

(2) Drivers Training

(a) Observation: There is a need for a training program for Special Purpose Equipment Operators, ie. forklifts, wreckers and fuel tankers.

(b) Evaluation: Some personnel are being assigned as Special Purpose Equipment Operators who are not adequately trained and instructed prior to being licensed and qualified as an operator on the piece of equipment.

(c) Recommendation: That a training program be established within the command to insure that personnel selected as operators receive adequate instruction and experience on the equipment before receiving operators qualification.

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AVBAUT-AC

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(d) Command Action: The 11th Combat Aviation Battalion has placed special emphasis on the units to insure that personnel with prior experience with Special Purpose Equipment (Military or Civilian) be assigned to the equipment and that all other personnel undergo an extensive OJT program with a qualified operator.

(3) In Country Replacement Training

(a) Observation: With the stand down of US units within the command, the conduct of individual replacement training became a battalion responsibility.

(b) Evaluation: The majority of aviation battalions do not have sufficient personnel or facilities to conduct an adequate replacement training program.

(c) Recommendation: That a central replacement training school be formed in each combat aviation group and that it be responsible for conducting replacement training for all units within that Group.

E. Logistics: Property Accountability

(a) Observation: While processing a unit for deactivation, it was discovered that the unit had equipment in excess of its TOE/MTOE allowance without proper authorization and that this equipment had not been picked up on the unit's property books.

(b) Evaluation: In the past, units received equipment in excess to their TOE/MTOE in order to meet their mission requirements. This was done either through temporary loan or lateral transfer, however, in some cases this property was not picked up on the property books.

(c) Recommendation: That all units conduct a 100% inventory to verify that all equipment on hand is authorized by TOE/MTOE or temporary loan, and that each item is properly accounted for on the unit property book. If an item of equipment is unauthorized or excess, but necessary for mission accomplishment, a request for temporary loan (with justification) must be submitted. Unauthorized or excess equipment not necessary for mission accomplishment must be turned in through proper supply channels in accordance with applicable regulations.

(d) Command Action: Correspondence, reference the above recommendations, was forwarded to all units within this battalion.

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AV3AUF-AC

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

F. Medical: Increase in Non-hostile Injuries and Venereal Disease.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the past several months there has been an increase in the number and severity of both non-hostile injuries and venereal disease. There is no particular group or company which is responsible for this increase, rather it is battalion wide.

(b) EVALUATION: The increase in number of injuries due to non-hostile causes is increasing while the number of individuals for which we were responsible is decreasing. Most of these injuries were preventable and were caused by carelessness or ignorance on the part of the individual concerned. Venereal diseases are also increasing out of proportion to the population. Most of the venereal disease seen is of the gonorrhea type, although other forms are beginning to be increasingly more common. Most cases respond readily to the usual treatment; however, cases have been found where this treatment has not proved effective and more extensive treatment and medication has been required.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: In order to effectively reduce injuries due to negligence, individuals must be educated to the dangers associated with their work and with the effects of carelessness or inattention. This education should be followed by supervision. When an individual takes a "short cut" or becomes careless it becomes a habit unless corrected. Horse play should not be allowed in work areas; this foolishness leads to accidents. The problem of venereal disease can also be reduced by education and supervision. First an individual must be made aware of what VD is and what its effects are. He should be taught how to detect the first signs of venereal disease and what can be done for him. Supervision is more indirect, but still essential. Housemaids should be checked for VD, particularly in companies with high incidence of VD. Taxi girls should be regulated and given VD checks, with unauthorized ones prohibited from entering an area, and violators being expelled from post.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: VD lectures are offered by the battalion surgeon and the 432nd Medical Detachment upon request. Currently a program is underway to check all housemaids of each company for signs of VD.

Richard G. Legeuer
RICHARD G. LEUEUR
LTC, FA
Commanding

- ~~1- Inet~~
 - ~~1- Organizational Chart~~
 - ~~2- Command and Staff Structure~~
 - ~~3- Line of Status~~
 - ~~4- Operational Mission Results~~
 - ~~5- Ammunition Expended~~
 - ~~6- Aircraft Maintenance Statistical Summary~~
 - ~~7- Chapel Statistics~~
- Inclosures withdrawn

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AVBAUS-C (13 May 71) 1st Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 11th CAB for
 Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 28 MAY 1971

TERU: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command,
 ATTN: MACTR-G3PT, APO 96266

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC,
 APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBCG-DST,
 APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
 APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
 Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
 Report-Lessons, 11th Avn Bn (Cbt) for the period ending 30 April 1971.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

a. The numbering/lettering scheme of the subparagraphs is not consistent
 throughout the report.

b. Reference paragraph 1K (2), Mess of the 187th AHC. This headquarters
 submitted a letter to 1st Avn Bde on 23 Mar 71 requesting installation of hot
 water heaters for the mess hall.

c. Reference paragraph 2c(6), Use of AH-1G Gunship as Escort on Combat
 Assaults. Nonconcur. This headquarters recommends exiting the landing zone
 (LZ) in formation. A formation enables the lift aircraft door gunners to provide
 mutual fire support and the gunships can cover a single flight of aircraft much
 easier than several individual aircraft. Supporting artillery fire adjacent to the
 LZ can restrict the dispersion technique. Either the UH-1B/C or AH-1G gunships can
 provide adequate cover when the flight departs the LZ in a single formation.

d. Reference paragraph 2C (4), Hazards of PSP Helicopter Landing Pads. This
 headquarters recommends that concrete pads or gravel be used for parking areas rather
 than PSP or penprimed dirt. PSP has the disadvantages listed in the basic document
 and accidents can also be caused by helicopter skids sticking to the penprimed
 surface.

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 DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVBAUS-C (13 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 11th C&S for
Period Ending 30 April 1971, ACS CSFOR-65 (A3) ()

e. Reference paragraph 2D (3) In Country Replacement Training. The Aviation Groups in Vietnam are tactical headquarters, and as such, do not have the personnel, equipment or facilities to conduct in-country training. Recommend this training be conducted by an administrative aviation headquarters that has been augmented with the necessary personnel and equipment.

f. Reference paragraph 2F, Increase in Non-hostile Injuries and Venereal Disease. This paragraph is poorly worded, particularly where regulation of taxi girls is mentioned. This sentence should not be misconstrued to indicate that there are authorized taxi girls or that this headquarters condones the introduction of such personnel into units of this command.

g. Inclosure 3, Aircraft Status should be corrected as follows:

<u>HHC</u>	<u>UH-1H Authorization</u>
Reads	1
Should Read	0

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN H. SUTHERLAND
MAJ, IN
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

8

37

MACFR-C3PT (13 May 71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (B)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96260 3 JUN 1971

~~THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384~~ /11/


Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDC-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

.. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from
Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



KENNETH A. PAYANT
Major, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

39

CONFIDENTIAL

AVRAGC (13 May 71) 3d Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat
 Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS, CSFOR - 65
 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 7 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGS-DST
 APO 96375

1 (u) This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report - Lessons Learned with comments listed below.

2 (c) Page 19, paragraph 2c(4) comments on the problems related to PSP pads in revetments. The removal of PSP pads should be discouraged unless they are to be replaced by concrete pads. The concrete pads are the most desirable, but restrictive due to cost, availability of materials and down time of the revetment while they are being installed. Dirt pads covered with permeprime or sand bags both present the problem of rapid deterioration of the surface resulting in dust and FOI problems. In addition the permeprime presents the problem of sticking to the soles of boots and being tracked all over the aircraft and especially on the control pedals. The solution is the constant inspection and maintenance of the PSP pads, to include painting with a non-skid paint.

3 (c) Page 18, paragraph 2c(2) comments on authorization to requisition NOMEX clothing. Per CTA 50-901 - NOMEX flight clothing is authorized for the following personnel:

- a. Army aviation pilots/aviators (4 sets)
- b. Flight crew members in SEA whose primary duty requires participation in aerial flight (4 sets).
- c. Air observers and other individuals on flight status whose primary duty is not flying (1 set).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E. L. Barnard
 E. L. BARNARD
 CPT, AGC
 Asst AG

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AVHDO-DO (13 May 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 11th Combat Aviation
Battalion for Semi-annual Period Ending 30 April 1971, PCS:
CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 7 AUG 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PD
APO 96553

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Wear of Fire Resistant Clothing (NOMEX) by Observers," page 18, paragraph 2c(2) and 3rd Indorsement, paragraph 3. Concur with 3rd Indorsement. DA message 262017Z April 1971 subject: Authorization of NOMEX Flight Clothing, authorized one NOMEX uniform and one pair of NOMEX gloves for personnel assigned to air observer duty, pending publication of changes to CTA 50-901, 50-903 and 50-905. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Hazards of PSP Helicopter Landing Pads," page 19, paragraph 2c(4), 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d and 3rd Indorsement, paragraph 2. Nonconcur with 1st Indorsement and concur with 3rd Indorsement. USARV has experienced several accidents during FY 71 due to helicopter skids catching on PSP. However, this hazard can be minimized by proper care and maintenance of the pad. This is preferable to exposing the aircraft to the FOD hazard presented by gravel, sandbag or penepime pads. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Use of AH-1G Gunship as Escort on Combat Assault," page 20, paragraph 2c(6) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Maximum benefit of all fire support means available will be realized when maintaining formation. The AH-1G does not have a restriction that prevents the aircraft from engaging targets and delivering suppressive fire at altitudes similar to the UH-1B/C. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for [unclear] [unclear] COT
F. L. HONSOEWEZ COT
CRT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:
11th CAB
1st Avn Bde

11

CONFIDENTIAL

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GPOP-FD (13 May 71) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 11th Combat
Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs with subject ORLL as indorsed
with the following comment: Reference, paragraph 2c,
page 18: Recommend that in addition, all aircrew members
carry survival knives.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

12

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AVBAW-C

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations,
and recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence

(1) Observation: Recent Hoi Chanh interrogations indicate that command and control (C & C) aircraft give away impending airmobile operations by flying over the intended operational area too early in advance of the first insertion.

(2) Evaluation: In answer to questions concerning airmobile operations, Hoi Chanh's interrogated by this battalion have repeatedly mentioned that command and control aircraft usually fly over and circle the operational area for up to twenty minutes prior to an airmobile insertion. All of those interrogated indicated that immediately upon sighting a circling helicopter their units would either evade or prepare to defend against the coming operation. Although the circling aircraft did not necessarily mean an insertion of troops, nonetheless, the enemy would be prepared for an operation.

(3) Recommendation: That command and control aircraft minimize the time on station prior to an airmobile insertion.

(4) Command Action:

(a) Results of the Hoi Chanh interrogations were disseminated at tactical conferences held within the battalion. Emphasis was placed on the air mission commander's responsibility to limit the time needed in preparation for the first insertion of troops in an airmobile operation.

(b) This subject has been treated repeatedly in airmobile tactics seminars held in coordination with ground advisors within the task force area of operations. Emphasis was placed on flying the C & C aircraft over the operational area just prior to the first insertion or in conjunction with it.

c. Operations:

(1) Observation: It has been observed by this unit that low level, "raid" combat assaults are very effective tactical tools.

(2) Evaluation: This unit has perfected a technique for situations, where it is considered advisable, to gain maximum surprise by use of low level insertions. Firstly, the area must be conducive to low level flight and must display avenues of flight which are potentially void of enemy concentration and hazards to flight.

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AVBWW-C

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

It is preferable that the mission be disguised by diversionary tactics such as utilization of gunship strikes, reconnaissance, and diversionary smoke. The diversion should be conducted at such a distance from the objective as to placate the enemy with his own safety. The actual approach to the target area should be conducted from a distance or angle which would deny the enemy visual anticipation of a raid.

(3) Recommendation: It is recommended that the low level raid mission be utilized where practical.

(4) Command Action: That AMTFC's be made aware of the advantages of low level raids and that they be employed.

d. Operations Continued:

(1) Observation: An excessive number of troops and aircraft have been lost on two combat assaults.

(2) Evaluation: During the conduct of the two Combat Assaults reported as significant operations, a total of 9 aircraft were damaged and 2 destroyed. Friendly losses totalled 38 KIA and 26 WIA. Enemy losses totalled 27 KIA and 7 WIA. Interrogation of a Hoi Chanh revealed that the location of the LZ in the first operation was given in the clear by an ARVN unit and intercepted by a VC unit. An ambush was set up and laid in wait three days for the impending operation. When the operation took place, 4 aircraft were damaged and 22 ARVN's were killed in action. Enemy losses were 1 WIA. On the second operation into a known enemy area insufficient suppressive fire was delivered before the assault. This was due partly to the reluctance of the US Backseat to allow suppression and the lack of utilization of TAC air or Arty. The first lift was on short final into the LZ when they began receiving intense automatic weapons fire resulting in 16 ARVN's killed in action, 9 ARVN's WIA and 7 US WIA with a loss of 2 UH-1H and 5 aircraft severely damaged.

(3) Recommendation: That renewed emphasis be placed on the conduct of Airlift Operations with particular emphasis on communications security and proper utilization of TAC air and Arty as suppressive and preparatory fires.

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AVEAWW-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

13 May 1971

(4) Course Action: Through the use of Air mobility Seminars and a Backseat School which have been instituted at Battalion level, instruction is being given on proper coordination and planning of Air mobile Operations and communications security.

~~2 Incl~~
~~as~~

Inclosures withdrawn

Bobby Maddox
BOBBY J. MADDOX
LTC, AR
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

3

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AVDAWS-C (13 May 71) 1st ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOM-65 (R3)(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 104th Combat Aviation Group, APO 96215 29 May 1971

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVDAWG, APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 214th Combat Aviation Battalion OMLL for the period ending 30 April 1971 has been reviewed by this headquarters.
2. (U) Concur with the comments contained in the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WARREN I. KLEIN
OPT, FA
Assistant Adjutant

AVBAGC (13 May 71) 2nd Ind (4)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 214th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 5 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGS-DST,
APO 96375

(U) The Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned, Period Ending 30 April 1971, and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E.L. Barnard
E.L. BARNARD
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

49

AVHDO-DO (13 May 71) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 214th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 15 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 214th Combat
Aviation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GEDDES E. MCCracken
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
214th CAB
1st Avn Bde

GPOP-FD (13 May 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters
214th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L. M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVBAUW-C

8 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS GSFOR-65 (R) (U)

2. Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Control of Local Nationals.

(a) Observation: It is difficult if not impossible to fire Local Nationals hired through the Civilian Personnel Office.

(b) Evaluation: It has been learned that in order to fire a national that has displayed undesirable traits, a system of counseling periods with letters of reprimand are required. This, in many instances is a great waste of time and damage has been sustained.

(c) Recommendations: That a review be made of the policies regarding the firing of Civilian Personnel Office employees.

(d) Command Action: A detailed personal file is kept on each hired personnel to justify firing of Local Nationals to Civilian Personnel Office.

(2) Improper Use of Aviation Personnel.

(a) Observation: That personnel with little or no supply experience are required to perform the additional duty of Property Book Officer.

(b) Evaluation: Rotation of personnel within the unit (changes in rank, deros, change of duty station in country, and maintaining experience in command slots) and in aviation jobs within an aviation company prevents ample time to OJT into the supply field. Due to this, this unit has noticed that errors in supply management and maintenance occur due to a lack of qualified and trained personnel which is compounded by the appointment of new personnel.

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVBACW-C

8 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 Apr 1 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

An Aviation Company's Property Books are equivalent in many respects to that of an Infantry Battalion and it is imperative that the most qualified personnel be placed in the position as Supply/Property Book Officer.

(c) Recommendations: That a non-rated school trained supply Warrant or Commissioned Officer be assigned to Aviation Companies to act as Supply/Property Book Officer.

(d) Command Action: This unit has one (1) officer with the additional duties of Property Book Officer. This is the individual's primary duty even though he is a rated aviator.

(3) Missions Shortages:

(a) Observation: Mission shortage has contributed to a lowering of morale and a drug problem in the 273rd.

(b) Evaluation: It has been determined that due to the decrease of American units and the removal of their engineer equipment the work load of the 273rd has been reduced drastically. That acquiring now and qualified personnel when an individual is unable to perform his duties takes an excessive amount of time.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel unable to perform their duties be replaced more quickly. The unit be used more often to haul Chinoc' loads, and that the Vietnamese Command be advised and educated on the capabilities and advantages of using the CH-54A to haul heavy loads.

(d) Command Action: Unit functions and recreation has been increased as much as possible. A letter has been submitted thru channels to the field units explaining the capabilities and use of the CH-54A.

b. Intelligence:

(*) LZ Preparation:

(a) Observation: While supporting the 25th ARVN Div. a flight encountered a booby-trapped landing zone during an insertion causing damage to two (2) aircraft and injuries to one pilot.

(b) Evaluation: It is often difficult to make low reconnaissance of the landing zones and the booby-traps are normally well concealed.

(c) Recommendation: The gunships prep the touchdown area in the landing zones during their initial suppression runs to trigger any booby-traps present.

(d) Command Action: This technique has been implemented by the gun platoon.

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8 May 1971

AVBAUM-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned; 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

c. Operations:

(1) Misutilization of UH-1H type aircraft.

(a) **Observation:** Unnecessary use of UH-1H aircraft for liaison or administrative coordination.

(b) **Evaluation:** Aviation unit commanders are often called upon to be present at various senior headquarters for coordination or liaison, visit supported units in the field and respond to unit aircraft accidents that occur as much as 100km away from its headquarters. The only type aircraft available to this unit is a UH-1H which costs \$53.84 per hour to operate. If an OH-6A or OH-58A were assigned to an aviation company, this would reduce the cost of operation by \$20.36 per hour provided the aircraft were only utilized for the aforementioned missions. In turn this observation helicopter would not reduce the supporting capability of the assigned fleet of UH-1H's and would not draw from the assigned aviator strength, especially during the critical periods of under-strength.

(c) **Recommendation:** That one OH-6A or one OH-58A be assigned to each Assault Helicopter Company for purposes other than combat assault and direct combat support missions.

(d) **Command Action:** This unit will continue to draw from its assigned fleet of UH-1H's to meet the aforementioned requirements.

(2) Rations - Head count system.

(a) **Observation:** Since the initiation of the existing ration head count system, problems are consistently plaguing the mess personnel.

(b) **Evaluation:** The amount of rations procured under this system is related directly to the number of personnel fed on any given day. Due to the fluctuation of the amount of personnel served at a given time, it is difficult to manage the quantity of rations so as to provide enough rations for everyone when the entire strength uses the mess facility. This unit is continually struggling to minimize the amount of over drawn meals that are present due to the different amount of personnel that use the mess hall for each meal.

(c) **Recommendation:** That allowances in this headcount system be made for over or under drawing of rations.

(d) **Command Action:** Number of meals drawn are minimized during the first week of month to cut down on over drawn meals, since the mess hall is used more frequently towards the end of each month.

d. Organization:

None

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned; 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

e. Training:

(1) Replacement Shortfall:

(a) Observation: Flight operations specialist, wheel vehicle mechanics, company clerks, and machinists continue to be in short supply.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that there is a critical shortage of these personnel because they are not available in the command. All flight operation specialist within this command have been trained on the job. After four months these personnel have progressed to the point of being capable of doing the job without constant supervision. At the seventh month they are capable of fulfilling the position efficiently for the remainder of their tour.

(c) Recommendation: An increased flow of school trained personnel would greatly enhance the operation of aviation units, within RVN. Greater emphasis should be placed in recruiting personnel for these fields.

(d) Command Action: Continued internal recruitment for these specialty fields and on the job training.

(2) Aviator Training:

(a) Observation: A mission shortage has caused a severe problem in training pilots in the 273rd.

(b) Evaluation: It has been noted that due to the withdrawal program the work load of the 273rd has been reduced considerable.

(c) Recommendation: Field Commanders continually be advised of the capabilities of the CH-54A. That only second tour aviators be assigned to the CH-54A companies in Vietnam.

(d) Command Action: Continuous unit training of all unit pilots is being conducted.

f. Logistic:

(1) Equipment Shortage:

(a) Observation: This unit has a shortage of on-hand field equipment needed for a short-notice move to the field.

(b) Evaluation: The needed items are hard to obtain through normal supply channels on a short notice and storage of this equipment at the company level is difficult.

(c) Recommendation: Assemble the quantities of MTOE field related equipment for three units and hold it in depot for issue if a unit should have to move on short notice, thus insuring the quick availability of this equipment and relieving the local units of the burden of storing and maintaining this seldom used equipment.

4.

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AVBAUW-C

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8 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 202G Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(d) Command Action: This recommendation has been forwarded to the appropriate higher headquarters.

g. Communications:


(1) DS Units Capabilities:

(a) Observation: Time to repair avionics equipment within the unit was excessive.

(b) Evaluation: It has been determined that the unit requirements for avionics support exceeded the unit capabilities.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel and equipment for units requiring them be increased. That when possible sections of one unit be combined with another for better support.

(d) Command Action: Unit avionics section was joined with a section of an adjacent unit.



JACK R. ROLLINGER
LTC, IN
Commanding

~~5~~ Incl

~~(1) Organization~~

~~(2) Aft Status~~

~~(3) Operational Statistics~~

~~(4) Ammunition Expenditures~~

~~(5) Recruitment Statistics for Period~~

Inclosures withdrawn

DISTRIBUTION

5-CO, 12th Avn Gp (Cbt), ATTN: AVBAUS-C

2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOB-DT, APO 96558

3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVGHGC-(DST), APO 96375

2-CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBAGC

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AVBAUS-C (8 May 71) 1st Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d CAB for Period
 Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96266 21 May 1971

THRU: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, ATTN:
 MACTR-G3PT, APO 96266

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOG-DST, APO 96375

Commander-in-chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
 Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
 Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Avn Bn (Cbt) for the period ending 30
 April 71.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

a. Reference paragraph 1c (1), Significant Personnel Changes. LTC
 Arthur E. Dewey, 449-64-4407 retained command of the battalion through
 the end of the reporting period.

b. Reference paragraph 1g, Operations. The CH-54A helicopter
 employment for I, II, III and IV Military Regions should read 2, 3
 and 4 Military Regions.

c. Reference paragraph 2a (3), Mission shortage has contributed to
 a lowering of morale and drug problem in the 273rd. This headquarters is
 studying the feasibility of reducing the number of aircraft and personnel
 assigned to the 273rd Heavy Helicopter Company. The reduced requirement
 for CH-54's could be met with fewer aircraft and a reduction in the number
 of personnel assigned would allow the remaining individuals to be more
 fully utilized.

d. Reference paragraph 2c (1), Misutilization of UH-1H type aircraft.
 Nonconcur. The cost of additional type aircraft, special tools, stockage
 of repair parts and an additional crew chief would negate the savings of
 lower operating costs. The costs quoted in the basic correspondence are
 for stock funded parts, supplies and POL only.

e. Reference paragraph 2f (1), Equipment Shortage. Nonconcur. The
 needed equipment should appear on the commander's Critical Items List
 monthly until the equipment is obtained by the unit. Each unit should
 have the required equipment and have personnel trained to operate and
 maintain the equipment.

6

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AVBAUS-C

SUBJECT: ORLL for Period Ending 30 April 1971

f. Reference paragraph 2g (1), DS Unit Capabilities. This headquarters has encouraged co-located units to combine their avionics sections to help minimize effects of the shortage of avionics personnel.

g. Reference Incl 2, Aircraft Status. The authorized column should reflect TOE authorization, rather than 1st Avn Ede fill. The corrected authorization is:

	UNIT	UH-1H AUTH
Reads	240th AHC	25
Should Read		23
Reads	HHC, 222d CAB	1
Should Read		0

Albert J. Fern Jr.
ALBERT J. FERN JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

7

CONFIDENTIAL

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MACTR-G3PT (8 May 71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 1 1 JUN 1971

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat).

2. Concur with the comments of the 12th Aviation Group (Combat) listed in the 1st Indorsement and submit the following additional comments:

a. Reference item concerning Rations - Headcount System, page 11, para 2c; nonconcur. The present signature headcount system was established at Department of the Army level to control misappropriation of subsistence (commonly known as padding the headcount). Paragraph 432, AR 30-1, explains how to estimate ordering rations by meals and control procedures for over and under drawn meals. Any unit having problems with accountability of subsistence should request assistance from the food advisor/technician having staff supervision.

b. Reference item concerning shortage of field equipment, page 12, para 2f (1); nonconcur. All units are required to have, on hand, or on requisition, all items of equipment authorized by MTOE. Items that cannot be acquired, that would affect a unit's mission, should be reported on the Commander's Critical Items List and also reported through command channels. Units in this theater of operation should never be in such condition that they cannot operate in the field.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



KENNETH A. PAYANT
Major, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

8

AVRACC (8 May 71) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971, MCS CS'CR-05 (R) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384 16 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVIIGS-DST,
APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat).

2. Concur with the comments of the 12th Aviation Group (Combat) listed in the 1st Indorsement and Hq. Third Regional Assistance Command listed in the 2nd Indorsement and submit the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2f(1). Under the provisions of AR 725-50, the depots and ICCV are allowed to stock only those items which are demand supported. The only exceptions allowed are for the stockage of War Ready Reserve, and specified contingencies. Commanders have the option of maintaining equipment in the unit or requesting approval to stand short (USARV Reg 310-32). It must be an individual decision based on many factors, i.e., type of unit, mission requirements and a six (6) month projection for equipment requirements to support the mission. To insure the immediate availability of items needed to support field operations would require retention of the material in the unit area. The process of packing, loading, and transporting from the depot to unit location would defeat the requirement of ready availability.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. L. BARNARD
CPT., AGC
Asst AG

61
AVHDO-DO (8 May 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 111

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 222d Aviation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Control of Local Nationals," page 9, paragraph 2a(1). MACV Manual 690-1, USARV Pamphlet 690, USARV Regulation 690-16 and 690-17, establish Standards of Conduct and Discipline for Vietnamese employees and reveal the following:

(1) Depending upon the offense and mitigating circumstances or gravity, discipline can range from written reprimand to removal. "Undesirable traits" is a general statement which needs explanation. Traits or actions which violate the code of conduct and discipline require corrective action on the part of management officials as outlined in the standard table of penalties. Traits which are undesirable from a personal viewpoint are not subject to disciplinary actions and would bring about resistance from the appointing authority.

(2) A continuous review of regulations pertaining to disciplinary actions is made and when deficiencies are noted; corrections are made. Employees of the US forces, are hired under US Civil Service Codes as adopted for use in Vietnam and are provided job protection rights to preclude arbitrary actions.

It is recommended that a file not be kept for the purpose of justifying the termination of the employee, but for general informational purposes to acquaint the supervisor with his employee. This should preclude possible indiscriminate, unwarranted or illegal actions that may be taken for termination of the employee. It is also suggested that coordination be made between the Unit Commander, Labor Representative, and the servicing Area Civilian Personnel Officer to discuss the methods and regulations pertaining to employee discipline, as many times the problem does not lay with the employee alone, but with the immediate supervisor and/or management not being informed about USARV personnel policies and procedures. Unit has been so advised.

AVHDO-DO (8 May 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 222d Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

b. Reference aircraft authorizations shown at Inclosure 2. The authorization for the following unit should be changed to indicate:

273d Aviation Company (Hvy Hel) OH-58 0

FOR THE COMMANDER

[Handwritten Signature]
F. L. T. SOWVETZ

Cy furn:
222d Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde

63

GPOP-FD (8 May 71) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 222d
Aviation Battalion (Combat) Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-2A), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

64

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA R & D		
<i>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation is not entered when the overall report is classified)</i>		
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HQ DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL
		3. GROUP
		4
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 165th Avn Gp, 145th Avn Bn, 11th Avn Bn, 214th Avn Bn, 222d Avn Bn - for Period Ending 30 Apr 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive notes)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 165th Avn Gp, CO, 145th Avn Bn, CO, 11th Avn Bn, CO, 214th Avn Bn, CO, 222d Avn Bn		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
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