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R.C. Whitt, 8 mar. 76

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Best Available Copy
AGDA-A (M) (10 Sep 71) FOR ST UN.

23 September 1971

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, Artillery Units: 2d Bn, 35th Arty, 2d Bn, 32d Arty, 5th Bn, 2d Arty, and 2d Bn, 12th Artillery

RECIPIENT:

Operational Report for Period Ending 30 Apr 71.

1. Section II of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section I of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program it has been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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2. Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) OBSERVATION: That transfer of non-essential personnel from standdown/redeployed units be expedited to reduce personnel turbulence.

(2) EVALUATION: Because the standdown/redeployment operations do not require 100% of authorized strength, the unit’s personnel were divided into essential and non-essential categories. Non-essential personnel were offered for reassignment immediately prior to the batteries withdrawing to the rear area. Gaining units were not responsive to reassignment thus contributing to increased personnel turbulence once the forward elements began arriving in the rear area. Also, immediately prior to official standdown announcement, DEROS curtailment instructions were received which required adjustments to the selected essential personnel list and, as a result, added to the personnel turbulence.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: As soon as practical after the unofficial standdown announcement is made, the redeploying unit should provide a list of personnel for immediate reassignment once the subordinate element arrives in its standdown area. The gaining units must be responsive to announced EIDSA, and personnel turbulence reduced to the lowest possible level.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: This requirement was included as a Lessons Learned in the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery After Action Report—Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations: 

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AVQBY

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(1) OBSERVATION: At 290300 November 1970 a sapper attack was
launched against Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery at FSB Simmons
(XT 579504). The following specific observations were made:

(a) The interior guard of A/2-35 was ineffective, consisting
of one man from FDC walking periodically throughout the battery area.

(b) No security was positioned on the west side of the battery
position.

(c) Alternate means of intra-battery communications were
lacking; once the land lines were disrupted the battery commander could not
control the fires of the battery.

(d) A ready reaction force deployed immediately before anyone
knew what was happening or before the force was ordered to deploy.

(e) Most of the assigned FDC personnel were in the immediate
confines of the FDC bunker, to include the personnel who were off duty at
the time of the attack. Thus, the entire FDC capability could have been
nullified if the satchel charges were more effective.

(f) Class IV and Class V material was stored on the western
edge of the FSB, giving additional cover and concealment to the enemy's
entry into the FSB.

(g) Friendly defensive fires were not adequately controlled
once the dust-off ship reported on station, resulting in a delay of 29
minutes.

(2) EVALUATION: At 290300 November 1970 a sapper attack was
launched against Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery at FSB Simmons
(XT 579504). The sappers used the usual techniques of placing bamboo to
short up the wire, wire cutting with essentially noiseless wirecutters,
tying off trip flares to prevent their detonation and using RPG and satchel
charges as their offensive weapons. Three sappers entered the FSB through
a lightly guarded wire barrier on the western side of the base; this portion
of wire could not be observed because of a depression in the terrain. Once
inside the position area, the sappers moved into the vicinity of the FDC
and hurled 2 plastic satchel charges into the FDC bunker resulting in one
FDC damaged, disruption of all land line communications, destruction of
plotting equipment and wounding 5 FDC personnel. Since there were no other
breeches in the wire, it appears that the sappers intended to exit by the
same route. Once the charges in the FDC exploded, the entire battery was
alerted of the attack. Several RPG rounds then impacted inside the perimeter,
one of which is believed to have killed one of the sappers and wounded a
second. With the personnel on the perimeter alerted, 5 additional sappers
were killed in the ensuing defensive fires; a crew of three sappers armed
with a RPG launcher and a supply of RPG rounds were killed while trying to
approach the position from the north with the obvious mission of destroying
nearby howitzers; the others were killed on their attempt to exit the battery

2

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position. Upon the initiative of the chiefs of section, the howitzers began firing their defensive fires in response to RPG indirect fire. The ready reaction force that quickly formed deployed prior to receiving an order to do so. Lastly, the 5 US WIA were dusted-off at 0357 hours, although the dust-off ship reported on station at 0326 hours. After checking in with the battery the dust-off ship made one pass to land but a howitzer fired a round and the pilot aborted thinking it was incoming artillery. On the next pass a flare was fired in the vicinity of the approaching aircraft and the pilot was temporarily blinded. Finally, all defensive fires were stopped and the pilot landed to pick-up the wounded personnel.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Batteries must have interior guards overlooking vital installations and sleeping bunkers, in addition to stationary guards at each howitzer section.

(b) Perimeter wire must be emplaced as specified by doctrine. Moreover, the perimeter wire must be inspected daily and improved as the situation dictates.

(c) Alternate means of intra-battery communications must be installed and checked daily.

(d) Ready reaction force must be instructed to deploy on order of the battery commander or his representative.

(e) Off duty FDC personnel must have sleeping bunkers that are separated from the FDC by a physical barrier or by an appropriate distance.

(f) Class IV and Class V material must be stored within the perimeter in such a way to deny the sappers cover and concealment as they attempt to breach the perimeter, yet positioned for troop safety.

(g) Batteries must develop and periodically rehearse plans to counter sapper attacks.

(h) FSB Commanders must have positive control of the defensive fires. Once a dust-off pilot is cleared for his approach into the position, he should not be forced to abort due to friendly firing.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: A interim Operational Report - Lessons Learned was published by 23d Artillery Group concerning the sapper attack against FSB Simmons on 29 November 1970. The report was disseminated immediately to all units throughout 23d Artillery Group.

c. Organization: None
AVGE-Y
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Administrative support requirements.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a large standdown/redeployment troop list is published, it is essential that TO&E items be deadlined for processing as soon as feasible. Equipment and vehicle support is required when processing TO&E items.

(b) EVALUATION: Equipment and vehicle support requirements were submitted early in the initial standdown phase but were not available to support the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Administrative support must be predetermined and available to facilitate the unit's operation. Required items should be obtained from depot stock or from Keystone resources on a temporary loan basis by the parent organization and hand receipted to the standdown/redeploying unit.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This requirement was included as a Lessons Learned in the 2d Battalion 35th Artillery After Action Report-Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment.

(2) Property Book Officer for Equipment Escort Detachment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Control and accountability for all TO&E being redeployed must be obtained at the earliest possible date.

(b) EVALUATION: Six days prior to redeployment, the unit must provide a list of TO&E shortages to the gaining command. These items must be thoroughly inventoried early in the standdown phase to facilitate packing operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A property book officer must be appointed in sufficient time to allow him to become familiar with the TO&E of the unit. This will greatly enhance the accountability inspection which is used to determine the required shortage list.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This requirement was included as a Lessons Learned in the 2d Battalion 35th Artillery After Action Report-Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment.

g. Communications. None

h. Material. None.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

1. Other. The impact of weather and weather support forecasting was not a major factor in the planning of operations during the reporting period.

MOODY E. HAYES
LTC, PA
Commanding

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3 cys: USAFRV, ATTN: AVHQ-DD
5 cys: 23d ARMY CP, ATTN: AVQE-C

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5
AVGC-C (6 Mar 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO 96266

1. This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual report of the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery and concurs in its content with the following exceptions:

2. Non-concur with paragraph 2f(1), Administrative support requirements. Temporary loan of equipment and vehicles from depot stock or from Keystone resources will only add to the maintenance and control requirements of the unit when it cannot afford an additional burden. This type of support can and has been provided to stand down/redeploying units during the latter stages of processing on an as-required basis. This mission support is normally provided by 23d Artillery Group units and Saigon Support Command to satisfy short term needs. In this manner the unit receives only necessary support and is not burdened with additional maintenance/control requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BERTRAM B. DALES
MAJ, FA
Adjutant
MACOR-G3PT (6 Mar 71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS OSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 31 MAY 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery.

2. (U) Comment follows: Reference item concerning administrative support requirements, page 5, para 2d (1), this headquarters supports the non-concurrence of HQ, 23d Arty Grp.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT F. CARRELL
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery
Period Ending 30 April 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furn: TRAC

Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-FD (6 Mar 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 JUN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZMKI
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG
2. (c) Lessons learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations
   a. Personnel: None
   b. Intelligence:
      (1) Unattended Ground Sensors,
         (a) Observation: Due to the reduction of both US ground forces and
            the number of automatic weapons located at each FSB, a greater emphasis
            was placed on the early detection of enemy forces by magnetic and seismic intrusion
            devices.
         (b) Evaluation: Since the withdrawal of US ground forces from FSB
            Katum in December, patrolling activity in that area has been limited to that
            performed by the 6th Ranger Group. In order to provide early warning and a greater-
            or reaction time, seismic intrusion devices (GSIDs) were requested and employed
            around the perimeter of that FSB. Subsequently, as more sensors became available,
            complete coverage was extended to each FSB occupied by a firing battery within
            this battalion. The worth of those sensors was demonstrated on the evening of 30
            March 1971 at FSB Langwird. Early in the evening, movement was detected by
            MINISIDS located outside the perimeter wire. The area was engaged; however, during
            the engagement, a firing incident occurred which resulted in ARVN casualties.
            Later that evening, another activation was recorded, but fear of a repeated inci-
            dent delayed engagement of the activation. At approximately 210430 March 1971,
            the FSB received a sapper attack from the same direction of both activations. A
            captured sapper disclosed that both activations had been his unit and that the
            engagement of the first activation had wounded three sappers and caused the unit
            to withdraw and regroup. If the second activation had been engaged, the sapper
            attack may have been stopped again. Since that time, magnetic intrusion devices
            have been added to confirm the seismic activations.
         (c) Recommendation: That more sensor strings capable of being
            monitored by a static from a central location be authorized and employed for
            FSB security to allow greater depth.
         (d) Command Action: All firing units that employ unattended
            ground sensors have been instructed to engage all properly cleared sensor activ-
            itions.
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AVG-Q

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery)
Period ending 30 April 1971, ROG CRFOR 55 (R3)

(2) CSR-III Radar.

(a) Observation: The experimental Camp Sentinel Radar III provides excellent area surveillance during the hours of darkness.

(b) Evaluation: The CSR-III Radar was initially employed at FSB Phu Dong II on 10 February 1971 and later at FSB Lanyard on 31 March 1971. This radar has been effective in confirming sensor activations, detecting movement in dense vegetation, alerting guard manned starlight scopes as to location of possible enemy movement, and denying the enemy use of natural camouflage. Targets have been detected between 100 to 1400 meters from the perimeter of the FSB’s. When the close range at which some targets were detected prevented the use of artillery, M-79 grenades and .50 caliber fire from the Quads were placed on the target. This type of engagement has proved effective in some cases, however, an 81mm mortar fire would have been more appropriate in most instances. Some difficulties were initially experienced in the activations recorded by the radar, in that it was very difficult for the operators to distinguish between animal and personnel activations. When initially deployed at FSB Phu Dong II, a voluminous number of activations were recorded in and around the garbage dump which were duly engaged by the organic weapons of the battery. In an effort to determine the nature of these activations, an area around the dump was cleared and the ground smoothed to indicate foot or track prints. That night, the area was again very active according to the radar. The next morning, numerous animal tracks were found in the area. This, however, does not detract from the value of the radar. On numerous occasions, activations were recorded, the area engaged with an appropriate weapon system, and upon a search of the area the following morning, foot prints and blood trails have been found. As a case in point, one such engagement and search revealed a partially buried unfuzed mine located on Highway QL 22 north of FSB Phu Dong II with sandal tracks and blood trails leading into the woods. We have found that with experience, operators have been able to distinguish between animal and personnel type sensorings. This radar has been instrumental in the prevention of attack on both FSB Phu Dong II and FSB Lanyard.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That each fire support base located in remote areas be equipped with a CSR-III Radar for base defense.

(2) That each using unit be given an 81mm mortar and associated ammunition, to include VT fuzes, to be employed against close-in targets.

(d) Command Action: This unit is currently attempting to obtain 81mm mortars for each of its firing batteries.

c. Operations.

(1) Support of ARVN Operations.

(a) Observation: The apparent reluctance of the ARVN to utilize
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery)
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR 65 (R3)

heavy artillery for "close in" support was noted on several occasions during the reporting period.

(b) Evaluation: The firepower and shock effects of heavy artillery make it well suited for support of ground forces. Due to the large redeployment of US ground forces within M-E 3 during the reporting period, the vast majority of the fires delivered by this battalion have been for ARVN forces operating in Cambodia; however, most of these fires have been unobserved and delivered against intelligence targets developed by the battalion's higher headquarters. Very few of the missions indicated in paragraph 1c(26) have been for "close in" support of ARVN forces.

(c) Recommendation: In order to gain the ARVN's confidence in heavy artillery, we have instructed our liaison officers and fire direction officers in particular when co-located with an ARVN unit, to strive to familiarize the ARVN with the capabilities and limitations of heavy artillery. Personal tours of our FSBs, having the ARVN ground commander adjust the heavy artillery and witness its effect, and repeated volunteering to support a particular ARVN operation are a number of the methods utilized to overcome this problem.

d. Organization: None
e. Logistics: None
f. Communications: None
g. Material: None
h. Other: None

1 Incl

Incl

M. R. WHITAKER
LTC, FA
Commanding

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AVGE-C (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for the Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR (R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266     19 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery and concurs with operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
BERTRAM B. DALES
MAJ, FA
Adjutant
MACR-G3PT (30 Apr 71) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)  

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266  2 MAY 1971  

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375  
       Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538  

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310  

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.  

FOR THE COMMANDER:  

[Signature]  
ROBERT F. CARRELL  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General
AVHD-D0 (30 April 71) 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery)
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR 65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375
JUN

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion,
32d Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
TRAC
2d Bn, 32d Arty
GPOP-FD (30 Apr 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery) Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 JUN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL
Organizational Structure

1. Organic Units
   a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
   b. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
   c. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
   d. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
   e. Service Battery, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery

2. Attached Units
   a. 5 M-55 (Mund 50) machine guns from "D" Battery, 71st Artillery are attached for operational control and common logistical support.
   b. CSR-III experimental radar is attached for common logistical support.
   c. Integrated Observation System (IOS) is attached for common logistical support.
2. (c) **LESSONS LEARNED:** COMMANDER'S OBSERVATION, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Personnel:

1. **Battalion Drug Amnesty Program**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The Drug Rehabilitation Program established by this Battalion in conjunction with the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, has produced some significant lessons learned.

(b) **EVALUATION:** During the period 1 November 1970 to 26 April 1971, the Battalion became involved in the drug amnesty program. Fifty-two patients were seen during this time, all physically addicted to heroin. Initially, patients were sent to the Pioneer House at II PFORCEV. Subsequently a rehabilitation facility was developed at Camp Frenzell Jones in conjunction with the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. During the administration of the program several areas became apparent:

1. The best counselors for the program are non-ex-addict enlisted men, with some college-level training in the social and behavioral sciences, who are motivated to work in the program. Experience has shown that using ex-addicts is frequently unsuccessful, as many of these men return to the use of heroin while serving as counselors, thus defeating the purpose of the program.

2. The majority of men who became addicted to heroin in Vietnam did not use heroin in the states, although many experimented with marijuana, LSD, amphetamines, and/or barbiturates.

3. Although the majority of men seeking help through the program are motivated and successfully undergo detoxification (physical withdrawal), up to 80% of them return to the use of heroin. They attribute this to three things:

   a. Continued craving for the drug (psychological addiction), which lasts from weeks to months.

   b. Peer Pressure: When they return to their unit, many of their friends are still using heroin and encourage them to join them.

   c. Recognized lack of an efficient means of legal drug suppression. The
26 April 1971


A majority of addicts interviewed have stated that the only way to stop the widespread use of heroin among US troops in Vietnam is to legally identify all users. There is no officially sanctioned, effective method of doing this at the present time. A urine test for heroin is available which, if done on a large-scale, unannounced basis, would identify all heroin users. They could then be dealt with medically and/or administratively. Until such a program is carried out, it appears that dealing with the drug problem on a purely voluntary, medical basis will continue to be unsuccessful.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That more attention be given to the internal operation of the Drug Amnesty Programs, where non-addict enlisted men are used as counselors, and that necessary means are devised to legally and timely identify those persons who are addicts or potential addicts of heroin.

b. Intelligence: None

Operations:

(1) Employment of the 23-inch xenon searchlight in interdiction operations along a river bank or waterway.

(p) OBSERVATION: The use of searchlights in the infrared mode along a river bank for interdiction operations is ineffective.

(f) EVALUATION: During the period 18 November 1970 through 15 December 1970, two searchlights from Battery I (2LT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery, and 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, were employed in an interdiction capacity with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment along the Song Dong Nai River. The searchlights were deployed at ambush points with M113 tracks of the supporting unit. It was discovered during this operation that the xenon searchlight used in the infrared mode proved to be ineffective due to the weather and atmospheric conditions along the river which distorted the vision and extremely limited the range of the infrared light. In addition, the sound of the jeep motor along with the constant motor decreases the capability of the ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units employing the AN/MS-3 searchlight set be made aware of the limitations of the infrared mode when operating the light in search missions over water, and areas where atmospheric conditions, such as fog, degrades the capability of the infrared.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This limitation has been made known to units employing the lights along waterways.
AVCB-J-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AN) (SP) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSPFOR-65 (R3) (U)

26 April 1971

(2) Employment of the 23-inch zenon searchlight in interdiction operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of searchlights in interdiction operations using white light has been highly successful.

(b) EVALUATION: During the period 5 December 1970 through 3 January 1971, two searchlights were deployed on two hilltops overlooking a rice belt located between Vo Dat and FSB Dreamer. The lights were in support of a MACV Advisory Team at FSB Dreamer and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) at Vo Dat. The mission of the lights were to shine white light on call at selected and/or pre-designated points in the valley below. Their purpose was to assist in interdiction of NVA/VC in their attempt to obtain rice during the harvest. The lights proved to be highly successful in this type operation due to the range of the light and the wide and narrow beam capability. The lights were deployed above the rice field and in conjunction with radar.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: The use of the searchlight in interdiction operations utilizing white light and infrared (in areas where atmospheric conditions do not degrade the infrared capability) has proved to be highly successful and effective. In addition, the element of surprise adds to the effectiveness of the mission. Units employing searchlights should be made aware of the various capabilities of the AN/MSS-3 searchlight.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The capabilities and limitations of the searchlight have been made known to units employing the lights in support of their missions.

d. Organization:

(1) Drawdown of Battery D (MO) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery.

(a) OBSERVATION: Battery D (MO) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery were reduced in authorized strength during Increment Five of standdown of units in UHARV.

(b) EVALUATION: As a result of the reduction in spaces imposed upon each of the batteries lost their command and control and administrative personnel. In both batteries only those personnel required to form complete combat crews were retained, in addition to a minimum number of mechanics. Battery D (MO) 71st Artillery retained one-hundred and twenty-two enlisted men; twenty-four (5) man crews and two artillery mechanics. Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery retained thirty-six enlisted men; sixteen (2) man crews and four searchlight mechanics. To alleviate the problem of command and control and administration of personnel and records, property books and equipment, the following was initiated: The crews with their weapons and equipment were
attached to the Duster batteries. As the Quads and/or Searchlights changed area of operations the personnel were detached from the former battery and attached to the battery having responsibility for that area of operation. Property book records, hand receipts and clothing forms were retained by the HNB Battery Commander, who maintained accountability for property in both Battery D (MK) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery as an additional duty. The mechanics in Battery D (MK) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery and the PLL of repair parts were controlled by the 5th Battalion (AV)(SP) 2d Artillery Battalion Maintenance Section. This procedure of retaining the mechanics, PLL, and responsibility for maintenance on the tactical assets at Battalion level allowed for an adequate density of five ten vehicles, 1/4 ton vehicles, M55 mounts and searchlights, to maintain a PLL for repair parts on the equipment. This procedure was established as the Duster batteries do not have the capability of maintaining the five ton prime mover, the M55 Quad .50 and the searchlights. This system once implemented and followed through was workable. However, the system devised to control the searchlights and Quads was cumbersome and was an attempt to substitute coordination by several elements for command by a single individual.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In such a situation, responsibilities of individuals are very apt to become diffused. Since the unit is not authorised a battery commander, First Sergeant or platoon sergeant, the personnel assigned to the unit have no one individual to whom they could present their individual problems or who would look after their interests and provide them with support and guidance. The battery lacks unit integrity and the personnel are attached to different line batteries with which they are operating. Although the battery commanders of the line batteries make a sincere and honest effort to fill the void created by a lack of command and control element in the unit, satisfactory results are not always achieved. This is due to the fact that the attachment of forty to fifty or more personnel to the line battery creates an additional burden in control, operations and administration on that battery, and a burden which the battery is not equipped to handle. Thus, it is recommended that during a reduction of spaces in a unit, that unit should retain its command and control element. If the control element has to be eliminated, the entire unit should be inactivated or redeployed. TOAE units are designed to perform a specific mission, to temper with the organisational structure, without an attendant analysis and restatement of the unit's mission creates severe command and management problems.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The detail procedures of command and control of Battery D (MK) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery were implemented within this command through command letters and SOP's.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, MSG CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(e) TRAINING: None

(f) LOGISTICS: None

(g) COMMUNICATIONS: None

(h) MATERIAL: None

(i) OTHER: None

G. W. McIntyre
LTC, ADA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - USARPAC; ATTN: OPOP-DT, APO 96558
3 - USARV; ATTN: AVHQ-DD, APO 96375
6 - 23d Arty Gp; ATTN: AVG-B C APO 96266
4 - Bn File
AWG C (26 Apr 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

DA, HQ, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery and concurs with operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BERTRAM B. DALES

MAJ, FA

Adjutant
MACR-G3PT (26 Apr 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery, for Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) 

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 2 JUN 71


Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT F. CARRELL
Adjutant General
AVHDO-DO (26 Apr 71) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery
for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 22 Jun 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 26 April 1971 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW)
(SP) 2d Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning "Battalion Drug Amnesty Program," page 21,
paragraph 2a(1); Concur. The recommendations presented are being
studied by USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GORDON F. MACLAREN
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy: fum
5/2d Arty
TRAC
GFOR-PO (26 Apr 71) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Bn (AW) 2d Arty, for the period ending 30 Apr 71, RCS GFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 1 to Incl 3
BATTALION ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
AS OF 31 MARCH 1971

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
### DEPLOYMENT AND MISSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS OF 5TH BATTALION (AM)(SP) 2D ARTILLERY

**Location of deployment as of 31 March 1971**

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<td>Sec 22</td>
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| Sec 11 | FSB Dora YT 251726 PS, RRF, CE |
| Sec 12 | Camp Price YT Q65116 Stand Down |

Inclosure 2 to Incl 3
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Mission Key:
PS - Perimeter Security
RRF - Ready Reaction Force
CE - Convoy Escort

Location of deployment as of 31 March 1971
### Key to Enclosure 3

**5th Battalion (ANZSP) 2nd Artillery**

**Summary of Positions Occupied**

**During the period 1 November 1971 - 26 April 1971**

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**Appendix 1 to Enclosure 3**

**CONFIDENTIAL**
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DEPLOYMENT AND MISSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF BATTERY D (MG) 71ST ARTILLERY

Location of deployment as of 1 April 1971

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Includes 4 to Incl 3
2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, Recommendations
and Command Action taken:

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence:

(1) Observation: The major problem area affecting Fire Support Base
Security is the lack of adequate detection devices, particularly during the
hours of darkness. Individual and crew served weapons authorized under the
Firing Battery TOE are adequate to repel ground attacks once detected. It
is the opinion of this headquarters that perimeter lighting devices are the
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

best means available for detecting ground probes under conditions of poor visibility or darkness. During the reporting period, this battalion employed various illumination devices at Fire Support Bases to include:

(a) Diesel Pots - a 40mm ammunition container, filled with diesel, will burn for approximately 3 to 4 hours.

(b) Husch Flares - when detonated, a Husch Flare will burn for approximately six hours.

(c) Self Illumination with 155mm Howitzer Illuminating Projectiles.

(d) Hand flares.

(e) Searchlight Vehicles.

(2) Evaluation: The employment of a continuous illuminating device, covering the entire length of the external wire system, provides an excellent detection means, discourages sappers from attempting to breach the perimeter, and raises the morale of the personnel on the Fire Support Base.

(3) Recommendation: That lightweight, portable, battery or generator powered lighting devices be made available through the supply system, for use on Fire Support Bases.

(4) Command Action: This battalion will begin experimenting with vehicle headlights, powered by 12v DC batteries to provide the continuous illumination required on the Fire Support Base. This battalion has also requested portable lighting devices through the supply system, however these devices were not available at the end of the reporting period.

c. Operations:

(1) Observation: On 5 Dec 70, Battery B, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery replaced Battery C, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery at Fire Support Base Snuffy. Battery B had previously supported the 5th ARVN Division Artillery, and was now assigned a mission of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Artillery. The battery immediately became involved in firing GAP (Ground and Air Preparations) missions for air mobile insertions of elements of the 5/7 Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The GAP mission requires extremely close coordination between the elements involved, and precise timing in firing, as the airmobile force approaches the landing zone.

(2) Evaluation: Battery B failed to meet these standards during the firing of its first GAP mission. This obvious failure resulted from a lack of experience on the part of Key battery personnel in firing the type GAP mission required by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Battery B had not fired this type mission prior to occupying Fire Support Base Snuffy.
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AVGE-R
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Recommendation: That any artillery battery, prior to or upon closing into a new position area, coordinate with the Maneuver Force Commander for simulated and live training in missions peculiar to the new location. Immediate training of this type will insure effective coordination and precise timing when fires are requested in an actual combat situation.

(4) Command Action: This battalion has implemented the above recommendation with total success and will preclude future incidents of the type mentioned.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications: None

h. Materiel:

(1) Maintenance program for 155mm Howitzer M114A1.

(a) Observation: The 155mm Howitzers, M114A1, assigned to this battalion have experienced numerous component failures due to age, environment, and extensive use. Replacement components have been available through the supply system in sufficient time to preclude excessive maintenance down time.

(b) Evaluation: Individual component failures often initiate a sequence of failures of major howitzer parts to include recoil systems, elevating and traversing mechanisms, brake systems, sight mounts etc. The howitzer is then unsafe to fire or move.

(c) Recommendations: An R&R program for the M114A1 Howitzer was initiated by the 185th Maintenance Battalion on 2 Jan 1971. It is recommended that additional float M114A1 Howitzers be made available from resources of stand down units, to allow complete overhaul of all primary weapons in this battalion. This overhaul program should be completed at the earliest possible date to insure safety in firing, and successful accomplishment of the fire support mission.

(d) Command Action: An R&R program for the M114A1 Howitzer was initiated on 2 Jan 1971. One float howitzer was made available. The float howitzer has been used however, to replace deadlined tubes at Fire Support Base locations detracting from the R&R program. Additional float weapons are required to effect successful completion of the program at the earliest possible date.
AVGE-R

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Airlift Rigging Techniques

(a) Observation: On 26 Jan 1971, during an airlift move from FSB Snuffy to FSB Sunday Punch, one of two loads of class V, cluster rigged, was dropped by a CH-47 helicopter, approximately one kilometer south of FSB Sunday Punch. The load had been inspected prior to take-off by a Pathfinder, the Battery Commander, and the Flight Engineer. It was determined to be secure for airlift by all personnel concerned.

(b) Evaluation: The two loads had been cluster rigged, (both loads suspended from the hook on the CH-47) however, the heavier load of projectiles was suspended by a 20' sling, while the lighter load of powder was suspended by an 11' sling. Due to flight movement, the 20' sling rubbed excessively against the powder cannisters and pallets of the upperload causing the sling to deteriorate and break.

(c) Recommendations: That when cluster rigging a double load for airlift, both loads be suspended from the aircraft by the same length sling. If it becomes necessary to utilize different length slings, the heavier load should be positioned higher than the lighter load, and the longer sling should be taped in the areas in which friction will likely develop.

(d) Command Action: The above recommendations were immediately implemented.

1 Incl
Annex A w/d HQ DA

THOMAS P. RAVETTA
LTC, FA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 CC, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO
5 CO, 23d Arty Gp, ATTN: AVGE-C

CONFIDENTIAL
AVGE-C (1 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971. MCS GSFLR-65 (R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266 14 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APC 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery and concurs with operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BERTRAM B. DALLAS
Maj, FA
Adjutant
MACTR-G3PT (1 May 71) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266  5 Jun 71

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning lighting for Fire Support Bases, page 12, paragraph 2b; concur. Currently there are no light sets available through the supply system. However, sufficient lighting fixtures and wiring have been obtained through PDO and depot to light the 23d Arty Gp's Fire Support Bases. Generators to power the lighting systems have been issued on temporary loan from the supply depot.

   b. Reference item concerning additional float 155mm howitzers, page 14, paragraph 2h; nonconcur. There are presently two 155mm howitzers, M114A1, issued as floats to support the R&R program for the two 155mm howitzer battalions in the 23d Arty Gp. The float howitzers are used to support the R&R program and to replace howitzers that cannot be immediately repaired. Using this system, the deadline rate for 155mm howitzers has been consistently below 2% and normally closer to 0%. When the float howitzer is issued, the unserviceable howitzer has all the necessary repairs completed before it is returned to the unit. In addition, the supporting unit does not have sufficient personnel or the capability to maintain more than the two float howitzers presently on hand.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH A. PAYANT
Major, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
A/HDO-DO (1 May 71) 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Rigging Techniques," page 15, paragraph 2h(2). Regardless of which load is on the longer sling, friction will still develop that will cause the sling to fray. TM 55-450-12 recommends using slings of equal lengths when moving cluster loads. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

GEDDES, F. MADLEEN
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Copies:
2/12th Arty
TRAC
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC

[Note: Handwritten annotation]
Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Artillery Units - 2d Bn, 35th Arty, 2d Bn, 32d Arty, 5th Bn, 2d Arty, and 2d Bn, 12th Arty for Period Ending 30 April 1971.

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 70 to 30 Apr 71.

CO's, 2d Bn, 3th Arty, 2d Bn, 32d Arty, 5th Bn, 2d Arty, and 2d Bn, 12th Arty.