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31 August 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL William H. Tucker, Jr., CO, United States Army Military Forces, Military Region 2, Artillery, Period 14 April 1971 thru 1 July 1971 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, dated 4 November 1956, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program. (U)

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL William H. Tucker, Jr., subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report -
Colonel William H. Tucker, Jr.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report
prepared by Colonel William H. Tucker, Jr. The report covers the period
14 April 1971 thru 1 July 1971 during which time Colonel Tucker served
as Commanding Officer, United States Army Military Forces, Military
Region 2, Artillery.

2. Colonel Tucker is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service
schools or joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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1. (U) References:
   a. AR 1-26 dated 1 November 1966, subject: Senior Officer's Debriefing Program (U).
   b. USARV Regulation Number 1-3 dated 1 June 1968, subject: Senior Officer's Debriefing Program (U).

        WILLIAM H. TUCKER, JR.
        Colonel, FA
        Commanding

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DEBRIEFING REPORT (NCS-CSFOR-74)(N)

Country: Republic of Vietnam


Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, US Army Forces MR2 Artillery

Inclusive Dates: 14 April 1971 to 1 July 1971

Date of Report: 1 July 1971

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1. Summary of Observations

da. My tenure of command has witnessed the continuance of the US withdrawal of forces from the Republic of Vietnam and the involvement of US artillery in the first major battles in the Central Highlands of MR2 in nearly a year.

b. During Keystone Increment VI US Forces MR2 Artillery inactivated two additional artillery battalions, the 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105 towed) and the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155/8" SF). Keystone Increment VII inactivated 46, 52d Artillery Group and B Battery, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (Automatic Weapons). These inactivations left USARV MR2 Artillery with three tube battalions (7/15th and 6/32d - 175/8" and the 5/27th - 105mm towed), and an automatic weapons battalion (7/60th minus). Withdrawal of the units in Increment VII removed all US artillery from the interior of Southern MR2 and decreased the density by one third in the Northern Highlands and QL19 area. Repositioning of our remaining units was necessary primarily to provide QL 19 coverage. Planned withdrawals under future Keystone increments will further reduce our remaining coverage capabilities.

2. Major Tactical Activities

da. The following is a brief summary of the major tactical operations involving units of USARV MR2 Artillery during the recent battles in the highlands.

(1) Plei Trap valley (Quang Trung 22 FWD/4): Operations in the Plei Trap valley began on 10 February when B(Plt)/7-15 FA conducted a diversionary raid to Do Co. Following this, A/7-15 FA displaced two 175"s to Plei Kleng on 13 February to support the initial thrust of the 22d ARVN Division's Operation Quang Trung 22/Forward/4. On 15 February 2x8" howitzers were retubed as 175mm guns and on 16 February the two converted 175mm tubes joined the platoon at Plei Kleng and the unit was redesignated A (Forward). The operation continued until 26 February when A (Fwd) displaced to Ben Het as the 22d Division continued operations in the Upper Plei Trap valley. Total expenditures while at Plei Kleng were 619 rounds. Results: 14 KBA: 8 hootches, 10 bunkers, and 1 raft destroyed; 1 secondary explosion. Extensive support of 22d Division operations in the Upper Plei Trap valley continued from Ben Het from 26 February until 6 March. During this period 1659 rounds were expended. Results: 17 KBA; 1 bridge and 2 hootches destroyed; 1 secondary explosion. On 1 March 58 rounds were expended in close support of the 1st Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment when they were overrun in the vicinity of YB8207. On 6 March A (Fwd) displaced to Tan Canh where they remained until 20 May. As of the 30 March termination of the Plei Trap operation the unit had expended 2999 rounds. Results: 26 KBA; 8 bunkers and 11 hootches destroyed; 3 secondary explosions; 1 sustained fire.

(2) Phu Khon/Lonely: The Phu Khon operation began the night of 15-16 March when the enemy attacked the Phu Khon district headquarters, overran the sector artillery platoon and occupied portions of the district headquarters compound. The platoon perimeter of the 1-92 FA within the compound was

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attacked but not breached. The platoon accounted for 22 VC/NVA killed in
the perimeter wire. Fighting continued to be heavy over the next 7 days
during which resupply was a continuing problem. During the period 16 March-
22 March when resupply by road was impossible, 94.3 tons of food, ammunition
and material were delivered by aerial resupply. On or about 21 March the
enemy proceeded to withdraw to the Chu Don Mountain area to the southwest
and to Phu Bon Province to the east, resulting in a low level of activity
until 2 April. On that date the enemy launched an intensive attack by fire
on LZ Lonely consisting primarily of 120mm mortar fire. On 2 April additional
support was provided when C/7-15 FA displaced from FSB Schueller to
Weigt Davis and supported the ensuing ARVN operation until 6 April, at which
time C/7-15 FA displaced to FSB Piersson. On 7 April a 105mm howitzer platoon,
C/5-27 FA displaced from vicinity of Nha Trang to LZ Lonely and on 13 April
B/7-15 FA displaced from LZ Oasis to Weigt Davis. B/7-15 FA later displaced
to Phu Nhon on 20 April and subsequently terminated participation in the Phu
Nhon campaign on 30 April when the battery moved back to LZ Oasis. C(Plt)/
1-2 FA at LZ Lonely displaced to FSB Schueller on 13 April and C(Plt)/5-27
FA displaced to Artillery Hill when LZ Lonely was abandoned on 14 April. The
discontinuance of LZ Lonely as a fire support base was due to the change
of mission of the 20th Engineer Battalion and the lessening of enemy activity.
During the active portion of the engagement (15 March-15 April), expenditures
were as follows: C(Plt)/1-92 FA at Weigt Davis, 532 rounds; C(Plt)/1-92 FA
at Phu Nhon, 1095 rounds; C(Plt)/1-92 FA at LZ Lonely, 1305 rounds; C(Plt)/
5-27 FA, 245 rounds (7 April-14 April); B/7-15 FA (13 April-20 April), 1360
rounds; C/7-15 FA (2 April-6 April), 215 rounds. Casualties: 1 US KIA; 25
US MIA; 110 NVA KIA. Expenditures also produced 13 bunkers destroyed and 12
secondary explosions. Awards presented as a result of this operation were:
1 Silver Star; 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses; 13 Bronze Stars and 34 Army
Commendation Medals with "V". 2 Air Medals with "V" and 1 Combat Medic Badge.
C/1-92 has been recommended for the Valorous Unit Award for its heroism
during this action.

(3) Fire Base 6 (Quang Trung 22/1): 31 March saw an early morning
attack on FSB 6 by elements of the 26th NVA Regiment. In a well coordinated
attack from the northwest, west, and southwest, the NVA succeeded in occupying
four bunkers including the Artillery 105m bunker. By 1500H all but one
bunker had been recaptured by the 4th En, 42dRegt. At 1600H the fire base
was again under attack and by 1630H artillery fire was requested within the
fire base. A/7-15 FA fired 30 HE with VT fuzes directly on the fire base.
ARVN and US forces were forced to evacuate the fire base and by 2000H it was
considered free of friendly troops. At that time A/7-15 FA fired a 40
minute destruction mission on FSB 6. Total casualties for 31 March: 4 US
KIA; 2 US MIA; 11 ARVN KIA; 43 ARVN MIA; and over 200 enemy KIA. On 1 April
the 105m howitzers at FSB 6, manned by VC/NVA, were turned on Dak To II
and Ban Hot. An Air Force Forward Air Controller adjusted 57 rounds of 175mm
HE on the fire base, destroying one howitzer and obtaining 30-40 secondary
explosions. These rounds were observed by the 105s at Ban Hot. On 2 April
the fire base was recaptured by ARVN Forces of the 22d Division. Total
results for the day included 77 ARVN KIA/MIA, 51 ARVN WIA and 459 enemy KIA.
On 6 April C/7-15 FA displaced from Weigt Davis to FSB Piersson to support the
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22d Division Forward at FSB 6. On the 9th of April LT Thacker, the Officer in Charge of the TOS on FSB 6, walked back onto the fire base after having been missing for 10 days. On 23 April C/7-15 FA displaced from FSB Piorson to Ben Hot to fire on supply areas in Cambodia-Laos, routes of withdrawal from FSB 6 to Base Area 609 and cache areas near the border. On 29 April C/7-15 FA further displaced from Ben Hot to Artillery Hill, on route to FSB Schueller, terminating their participation in the FSB 6 action. While at FSB Piorson, 1867 rounds were fired and while at Ben Hot they expended 1824 rounds. A/7-15 FA continued to support the 22d ARVN Division in the vicinity throughout the month of April firing 4533 rounds in support of their operations and obtaining results of 109 enemy KBA, 42 secondary explosions and 2x105mm howitzers destroyed.

(4) Base Area 226 (Operation Moeng Ho-16): Support of the Capitol ROK Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade Operation into Base Area 226 began on 19 April with the displacement of C/6-32 FA from Dong Ba Thin to Camp Fidel. On 22 April B(-)/1-92 FA was airlifted from LZ Pony to LZ John Henry where they remained until 6 May supporting the 173d Airborne which was the blocking force for the GRID assault into BA 226. After moving from Dong Ba Thin to Camp Fidal on 19 April C/6-32 FA displaced to LZ Mars on 23 April with the mission of GSR, GRID DIVARTY. This mission continued when they displaced to LZ Diamondhead on 3 May and eventually terminated on 14 May when they displaced to FSB Schueller and were released from OPCON. C/6-32 FA (OPCON) to 1-92 FA during the operation fired 2638 rounds and were credited with the following results: 38 KBA; 1x51 cal machine gun, 7 bunkers, 2 hoochies and 1 tunnel destroyed; and 1 secondary explosion. There were no casualties as a direct result of enemy action.

(5) Fire Base 5 (Operation Quang Trung 22-2):

(a) Extensive support of the Fire Base 5 operation began on 25 May when C/6-32 FA displaced from FSB Schueller to Tan Canh with the mission of GSR, 22d ARVN DIVARTY under OPCON. C/7-15 FA. This move was made on 2 hours notice in response to a sudden increase in enemy activity around Fire Base 5. On 5 June a provisional battery (2x8" howitzers) was formed from elements of 7-15 FA and occupied a firing position at Dak To II to further support the Fire Base 5 Operation as GSR, 22d ARVN DIVARTY. As of 27 June the operation in and around Fire Base 5 continues. The two heavy batteries fired a total of 3231 rounds during the period 25 May - 15 June. Results: 61 bunkers and 4 caves destroyed; 13 secondary explosions. Additionally, the Q-4 radar located with C/6-32 FA at Tan Canh located more than 100 enemy mortar positions.

(b) The US Artillery Support provided to these operations required a major effort by all concerned. Many problems in coordination, resupply, fire support and maintenance appeared and were resolved. Many positive results, other than the casualties inflicted on enemy forces, were achieved. The artillery units involved re-learned the things they had forgotten about moving, shooting and communicating. A definite jump in morale was visible especially in the firing batteries that were heavily involved. An equal
benefit was the improved relations with the ARVN maneuver and US artillery units. The visible presence of the US artillery supporting ARVN operations and responsive to their needs generated a greater spirit of mutual trust and confidence. Hopefully, it also will help to overcome the ARVN reluctance to use heavy artillery in a close support situation.

3. Fire Base Security

a. Physical security of artillery fire bases has received great attention. There are two aspects to this. The first is the obvious responsibility of the commander to provide for the security and well-being of his people. The second is the hue and cry that would result back home if a fire base were overrun and large numbers of US casualties inflicted, and the resultant impact on the Administration’s withdrawal policy.

b. In many cases fire base security is provided by the artillery unit itself. While this is not completely true for those artillery elements co-located with 1/10 Cav units and US Engineers, it is applicable to most of our other units.

c. In order to emphasize fire base security and assist subordinate commanders, this Headquarters formed a Fire Base Security Assistance and Inspection Team. Staffed with the most highly qualified personnel available, this team has made continuing visits to every fire base occupied by US ARMYHR2 Artillery units. A complete evaluation of all security aspects was conducted including protective wire, fighting positions, fields of fire, reaction forces and all other aspects of defense. Corrective action was directed and follow-up inspections conducted. This program has resulted in a distinct improvement in our security situation. It must continue to receive command attention. Most of our residual bases will be dependent on ARVN or HRF/RF for local reinforcement therefore must be able to hold out until this help arrives.

4. Future Planning: Planning for the use of remaining US artillery is hindered by Keystone security requirements. Combined planning with the ARVN is impossible until the beginning of standdown. With a lead time of about four months needed for activation of ARVN sector artillery platoons, for example, there is no chance to request timely activation of new platoons to fill the gap left by departing US units. Thus there is a need, at this level at least, for earlier release of information regarding US drawdowns.

5. Maintenance and Logistics

a. Maintenance of our equipment, especially heavy artillery weapons, is a real and ever present problem. Our deadline rates on those weapons have been far above acceptable standards. A combination of factors is responsible for this situation.

(1) Shortages of qualified maintenance personnel both at the unit and support maintenance organization level.
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(2) Extremely heavy usage of the weapons during their recent battles in the highlands. A large part of the firing done was at high charges and for prolonged periods. The continuous use of those weapons to support the ARVN forces delayed the scheduled quarterly maintenance services, in some cases further adding to the problem. Quarterly maintenance services are now being conducted on a regularly scheduled basis.

(3) The shortage of repair parts, the cumulative effects of increased usage criteria for PLL stockage and reduction in parts stockage at support maintenance levels have increased down time on our equipment. Stated another way, the maintenance system has been degraded to the point where it is not responsive to requirements unless drastic action (such as declaration of a combat emergency) is taken.

b. Continuing drawdowns of artillery and support units will most certainly increase the present problems. Fewer major items will lead to a further decrease in parts stockage density. Furthermore, as the number of artillery tubes in the Region decreases, keeping the remaining tubes operational becomes more critical. It would be highly embarrassing to commit the majority of our remaining assets in support of a major ARVN operation and not be able to provide fires as needed due to inoperational weapons.

c. In order to do what can be done at the unit levels to correct this problem, I have directed an intensive program of 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance be undertaken within all artillery units. This will help to some degree and some results have already been seen. It cannot overcome the lack of trained maintenance personnel and repair parts. The necessary steps must be taken to insure that our remaining equipment is kept in an operational status and the capability to repair quickly any item deadlined is present wherever needed. The above comments are also applicable to our OH-58A helicopter fleet which is suffering from most of the same illnesses as our heavy artillery weapons.

6. Personnel

a. In the officer ranks, a shortage of Field Artillery officers, both company and field grade, existed from April thru July 1971. Lack of replacement flow, coupled with mandatory fill requirements from higher headquarters for various officers, has caused a constant shifting of the remaining Field Artillery assets. It must be pointed out that the next three months will be very crucial in that 50% will depart the command on normal rotation. These shortages have caused firing batteries to operate at less than the strength authorized by NTOC; however, they have not adversely affected the ability of units to furnish the required support to military operations. Assignment of liaison officers with supported ARVN and ROK forces have suffered due to this shortage, but liaison for designated operations has been effected by pulling an officer from other duties and having him perform liaison duties. Air Defense Artillery officers have been furnished in adequate numbers to maintain officer strength at near 95% of that authorized by NTOC. It must be noted that the complete ADA of the 4/60 staff will rotate by the end of August. In addition, several battery command positions will be vacant because of rotation during the same period.

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b. Enlisted strengths have been maintained at approximately 100% of those authorized. However, certain MOS shortages have caused degradation of the effectiveness of units. In each case, individuals of lower rank and experience than desired must be utilized. The following MOS's are those which fall into this category:

13B40  Chief of Firing Battery and Section Chief (must carry more than MTOR due to mission requirements)
13E20, 13E40  Fire Direction Computers
16F20, 16F40  Light Air Defense Artillery Crewmen (we have on-the-job trained several EM to fill these positions. Few school-trained personnel exist within sections and numerous maintenance problems develop due to the lack of school training)
91B20  Medical Specialists (in most cases 91A's are being trained to fill these vacancies)
94B40  Mess Stewards

c. Replacements have been gained from the various stand-down artillery units. The overall officer and enlisted assets from these type units allow for only temporary relief, due to normal rotation dates. There is no sign of any improvement in view.

d. Field artillery battalions can effectively support operations with less than authorized officer strength when activity is at a relatively low level. When officer strength falls below 65% authorized, serious impairment to the unit's ability to perform its mission is experienced, even when no major combat activity occurs.

e. The Air Defense Artillery battalion (4/60) requires authorized strength for effective operations, due to its missions and widely separated operations.

f. A shortage of senior NCO's in key positions causes a lack of proven experience which cannot be overcome by replacing them with junior personnel.

7. Morale and Welfare

a. Inactivity at some fire bases has been a challenge to commanders in ensuring that the morale and esprit of their units remain high. Although meaningful work is always required to improve fire bases and make living conditions better, these activities do not have the same effect on morale as actually performing the unit's primary mission, that of furnishing fire support for operations. Commanders have kept their people busy on meaningful (not make-work) projects. A positive morale factor has been the availability of movies at all locations, both on fire bases and in headquarters areas. Adequate and timely distribution of movies is made in this area; however, when projectors require repairs, a lack of parts keeps the projectors

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confidential for lengthy periods of time. This is detrimental to troop morale and every effort is being made to alleviate this situation.

b. Drug Abuse

(1) Commanders at all levels have devoted a large part of their time to the problem of drug abuse. The extremely high grade and low cost of heroin and marijuana coupled with the ready accessibility of drugs in Vietnam is a hindrance to the suppression of drug abuse. Various reasons have been put forward as to why a man goes on drugs in the first place. The fact that he is in the Army and in Vietnam is not the real reason. The type of individual who goes on drugs is often a loser, one who, as a civilian in the States, could be expected to become a user (or an alcoholic) and end up on welfare. He may be a sociopath, who can look you in the eye and convince you of his high motives and still be a pusher. Yet these generalizations do not always hold true.

(2) As for the reason that a man goes on drugs, the best explanation I have heard comes from an ex-user assigned to the L/60 AV Bn. Writing from the Long Binh Jail, he says "There's one thing that no one except the users can seem to understand. A person doesn't use heroin to get away from it all or for a means of escape for a little while. The bare truth is that he uses it to just simply get high. And not even the user can explain why he wants to get high. No more than the drinker can explain why he wants to get drunk. It's a crazy world."

(3) A good estimate of the actual number of drug users within MR 2 is extremely difficult. MACV, for example, estimates that there are five drug users who avoid detection for every violator who is apprehended. The majority of formal and informal surveys within RVN during the past two years indicate that between 30-45% of the servicemen questioned at a particular time had either experimented with or used marijuana or other drugs. This was reflected in a survey taken of artillery commanders within Military Region 2. The results of this survey were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug Category</th>
<th>Habitual Users</th>
<th>Non Habitual Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous Drugs</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is continued use of shake down inspections, National Police and U.S. Military Police combined anti-narcotics raids, as well as search and destroy missions on marijuana and poppy fields, only limited success has been achieved. Laws governing search and seizure are complicated, hard to follow, and hence frustrating to both junior commanders and NCO's alike.

(4) The Drug Amnesty Program has met with only limited success, although there is continuing Congressional interest in the matter. Some prospective participants of the Amnesty Program claim that there is little amnesty in the program. One area of concern centers on individuals who enter the program to "dry out" and are hospitalized. Those personnel are subject to
a Line of Duty determination of "No", resulting in a formal LOD investigation, and a subsequent adjustment of their DEROS for the number of days spent in the hospital. Additionally, many use the program as a matter of convenience or a way to avoid prosecution for their illicit activities. Still others avoid the program because of a natural desire for anonymity, to keep from being ostracized by their peers and seniors. Education of personnel on the harmful, long reaching effects of drugs is an effective tool that is being used. Counseling and group therapy sessions by doctors and chaplains do some good. Negative motivation very definitely plays a part, such as publication of court-martial results. The new urinalysis test program is having a salutary effect in that the in-patient population at the local dispensary has suddenly jumped as a result of men wanting to come down before DEROS.

(5) Here at Nha Trang, a group of soldiers has decided to devote their off-duty time to helping their comrades kick the habit. We are working with these men and are presently renovating a building here at Camp McDormott that will function as a kind of do-it-yourself half-way house. These men have written their own rules and regulations, which I have examined. Supervisors will be appointed, and the Human Relations Officer of this headquarters is overseeing the operation. There is a risk, of course; elsewhere, supervisors have also been pushed. We will keep a close eye on the project.

(6) The problem of drug abuse is one that is receiving high priority, but the solution to discouraging and eliminating individual usage is difficult, and no completely workable program has been found to date.

c. Human Relations

(1) Shortly after my assumption of command I designated a black major, who had been Assistant S-2, as Human Relations Officer. He immediately began plowing new ground, visiting fire bases and units here at Nha Trang and ferreting out potential racial problems. He attended the USARV Human Relations Seminar, expanding his knowledge and our awareness of the problem.

(2) The problem is one of sensitivity and attitudinal change. I have directed all artillery commanders and urged others to conduct discussion sessions using the USARV Resource Materials as a guide. A letter went out recently over my signature discussing General Cotton's (Commander, Military Airlift Command) assessment of the Travis riot. I think we have a relatively healthy black-white situation, but all concerned must continue to work on people's attitudes.

2. Sub Zone IV Coordination

2. Within Military Region 2, Sub Zone IV includes Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, and Ninh Thuan Provinces plus Cam Ranh Special Sector. The Commanding Officer, USAFRY, 1st Artillery has been designated the Sub Zone IV Coordinator. Key and critical installations within Sub Zone IV include Nha Trang, Can Ranh Peninsula, Dong Ba Thin, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet.
b. No particular problems have been encountered although a substantial amount of my time has been required to supervise the various administrative and security functions. A regulation governing control of personnel was written that has been implemented with good effect. At the end of the period we were trying to convince the CG, Cam Rahn Bay Support Command that he ought to be the Sub Zone IV Coordinator.

9. Clubs and Masses

a. With the publication of chapter 1 to USARV Regulation 230-60 in June 1970, the responsibility for operation of all open mess systems was placed with the G-1/S-1 elements of all staffs. At that time only one system was operating within the USARV, MR 2 Artillery. This was a battalion open mess system with three small branches. However, as Sub Zone IV Coordinator, the Commanding Officer, USARV, MR 2 Artillery assumed responsibility for operation of the Nha Trang Open Mess System and the Nha Trang NCO Open Mess System. The Nha Trang Officer Open Mess System is composed of two branches located in the various military installations in Nha Trang. The NCO Open Mess System consists of six different branches in the Nha Trang area. The combined assets of these three open mess systems are valued at more than $400,000. The June 1971 net profit was $9,201.68. Military personnel are assigned full time duty with these three systems and additional personnel, both Vietnamese Nationals and off-duty military personnel, are employed by the club systems to administer the clubs.

b. Overseeing the operation of these clubs is a large undertaking. The responsibilities include monitoring the financial condition, inspecting the physical facilities, and insuring that proper management is accomplished. It was necessary to select one officer for the S-1 section for full-time staff supervision of open mess activities.

c. We have experienced a problem locating personnel with experience and training in club management and supervision to fill positions within the club systems, as well as the staff positions. Although the Army now trains some personnel in this field, there are insufficient qualified and available personnel currently assigned to this organization.

10. A Final Word: This war, I am afraid, has given the wrong kind of experience to our young professionals in several areas.

a. Mobility: This is the war that has proven the concept of air mobility. Yet for most artillerymen, it has been a static war fought from isolated fire bases. Some of these bases approximate garrison conditions. Many items of TA-50 equipment were turned in last year as unnecessary impediments. As a result, our young officers and NCO's do not know what it is to move frequently or how to live in the field. This observation is not universally true because some of our units did move fairly frequently. During my tenure I stressed the artillery raid both as a means of getting at the enemy and of teaching our people how to be artillerymen. It also had a fine fringe benefit of being a morale booster.

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b. Firepower: This has two aspects. The first has to do with the helicopter gunship, which has been both a boon and a curse. Many junior leaders, both US and ARVN, have become gunship oriented so that the first thing they do when they get into trouble is to call for gunships. As a result the artillery, which often can do a better job, goes begging. The other aspect pertains to observed versus unobserved fires. It is sad but true that most of our fires are unobserved. Real effectiveness can not be determined. Of course, part of the problem is the difficulty of observing fires in triple canopy jungle. And there is also a human tendency to avoid the risks associated with being an artillery observer. With a climate of opinion back home in opposition to the war, it is quite understandable that we must do everything possible to avoid friendly casualties. This poses a problem for the artillery commander in Vietnam—that of bringing maximum, effective firepower to bear against the enemy on the one hand and minimizing risks on the other, while at the same time giving our people the experience they will need to hold them in good stead in the event of a future war.
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