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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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SEÇÃO I - OPERAÇÕES

1. (C) INTRODUÇÃO: Este Relatório Operacional - Aprendizados cobre o período de 1 de Agosto a 31 de Outubro de 1970. Durante o período de reportagem, o 11º Regimento de Cavalaria Armada continuou as operações em BÌNH DUONG, BÌEN HÌA, e LONG KHÁNH Provinces. Operações no BÌEN HÌA - LONG KHÁNH AO foram direcionadas contra as forças do VC, a 274ª Regressão de VC, e o BÌÍNH BÔN Distrito. Operações no AO foram caracterizadas por busca e limpeza, refeições em força, Rome Plow segurança, população e controle de recursos com o Police Nacional, o uso de ambuscas automáticas para interditar rotas de suprimento de inimigo, e emprego de sensor e radar para expor infiltração ao longo do RIO DONG NAI. A introdução de Ranger Teams e unidades de Infantaria do 25º Division de Infantaria ajudou as operações no AO. Operações no BÌNH HOÀ - BÌNH DUONG AO foram direcionadas contra a Sub-Região 5 (SR-5) e o Regimento BÌNH NÀI. Unidades de força local ao longo de BÌNH NÀI e BÌNH CO vilarejos também foram alvo.

As operações de fortes, ao longo das rotas tradicionais de suprimento do VC, utilizaram apoio de infantaria do 25º Division de Infantaria e extensivas ambuscas automáticas. Controle de população e recursos operações ou Rota LTL-16 foram seguros pelo 11º ACR e netted resultados para o Police Nacional.

On 13 August, 2ª Squadron desertou do BÌEN HOÀ - BÌNH DUONG AO e foi substituída pelo 3º Squadron. On 9 September, após um standdown de manutenção em Di An, 2ª Squadron assumiu um novo AO em BÌNH TUY Província sob o OPCDN da 3ª Brigade, 1º Cavalaria Divisão (AM).

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

a. Geral: A situação inimiga em III MR durante o período de reportagem é análoga à sua situação durante o pré-1965 político/guerrilha conflito. Presentemente, a inimiga está em um estado de fluxo, sendo que ele tenta preservar, reorganizar e reabastecer suas bases de apoio que têm sido deteriorando desde Tet 1968.
Enemy activity in III MR has been at an extremely low level during the reporting period; the enemy has not initiated the majority of contacts and the enemy has avoided US forces. Instead the enemy has employed economy of force tactics primarily against indigenous military personnel who, in light of US disengagement, pose the long range threat to eventual enemy victory. This course of action is prompted by the diminished resources the enemy has on hand and the feeling that personnel and munitions must be conserved and expended as economically as possible. Contact with US troops does not offer as large a return on the enemy investment of men and materiel in terms of military success or political impact as does an attack on Vietnamese personnel. In fact, it is probably not an overstatement to say that the enemy in III MR is presently resigned to the fact that a military success is impossible and that therefore the enemy effort is exclusively a political one. Economy of force tactics in a situation like this, which include small harassing attacks, propaganda efforts, and terrorism, are ultimately significant only to the extent of their political impact. The primary objectives of these tactics being, of course, to impress the enemy's presence upon the populace and to discredit the South Vietnamese government. Economy of force tactics also allow a substantially weaker force to extend a conflict almost indefinitely with the hope that eventually political inroads can be made into local government, that revolutionary ideas can be propagated, that people can be recruited and that finally, the guerrilla movement will reach such a magnitude that it can come from underground and the war can be escalated. The enemy in III MR has been through this cycle, beginning before 1965, culminating in Tet 1968, and is now beginning again to rebuild and reorganize his organization.

A detailed examination of enemy activity within the 11th ACR area of interest for the last three months provides a good illustration of how the enemy has begun to reorganize his effort. For the sake of clarity, this discussion will be broken down into three sections: political activity, military activity and logistical activity. In reality, of course, these three considerations are inseparable and are properly perceived as interrelated, impinging parts which together comprise the enemy system. Any course of action the enemy chooses to follow cannot be classified as purely political, military or logistical as each type of activity inherently predicates the other. Countermeasures can be effective only if founded on this understanding and pursued in an organized manner.

Political Activity:
The overriding consideration of the enemy has always been political and this has been particularly apparent within the 11th ACR area of interest during the last three months. The thrust of enemy activity has been to rebuild the VCI throughout the area in an attempt to gain a quasi-legal foothold in the district, village and hamlet level governments. That the enemy be well established within the government is imperative in the event of a coalition government. Military and logistical gains are also dependent
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The enemy's ability to gain a greater political foothold within the government. In addition, the greatest threat to the enemy within the 11th ACR area of interest, the pacification program, can best be attacked on political grounds. There has been ample evidence of the enemy's concern with the political aspect of the war during the last three months. Captured documents often contain directives to step up propaganda activity and to motivate political sessions among the people. Success on the part of the enemy is understandable considering the number of legitimate complaints the people have. The very fact that the enemy is able to move relatively freely through the people, spreading his propaganda, lends credence to what is said, or at least raises questions about the GVN's ability to control what happens within the country. The occasional acts of terrorism within the 11th ACR area of interest are perpetrated by the enemy for political impact, to raise doubts about the GVN's ability to protect the people, and to firmly establish the enemy's presence within a particular community. Political methods, more subtle than terrorist acts, have also been noted within the 11th ACR area of interest during the reporting period. Guerrillas in Phu Cuong, for example, have employed a chain recruitment program, in which each member of a cell concentrates on enticing a friend or relative to join the VCI. VCI in the Xuan Loc area also used this procedure during the reporting period. Political directives have been explicit in their recruitment objectives for certain districts and villages. Documents were captured in August which listed villages in Di An District and directed that a specific number of VC secret cells be organized within each village, the number depending on the population of the village. VC also spread their ideology through various associations throughout the 11th ACR area of interest. The associations include farmers, students, women and any group of people which by some common denominator could be logically formed into an association. The chain recruitment concept could obviously be applied here. Tran Van Chin, Bung Dia 1 Local Force, Chau Thanh (U) Binh Duong (P), when questioned by the 541st IPW Section on 21 October revealed that a student organization is being formed in his village. Chin's association with the VC in his village came as a result of request for help from his brother and other friends. Another important aspect of the political war is military proselyting. Several captured documents have indicated that the VC are stepping up efforts to appeal to ARVN, RF, PF and Psalm forces through their families. One example of how this might work is to have an ARVN soldier's family write him a letter stating how much he is needed by his family at home. The VC can also intimidate the individual's family, all of this resulting in lessened effectiveness for the ARVN army.

The KF, PF and PSDF forces have been a prime target of the VC political effort within the 11th ACR area of interest during the reporting period. These forces are particularly threatening to the VC effort as they represent the outer limits of the GVN and the pacification program. The manner in which these people are approached has ranged from speeches to leaflets,
appeals through the soldier’s family, intimidations and finally assassinations.

Political considerations within the 11th ACR area of interest are the basis for military activity. The close relationship between the two has been particularly apparent during the last three months. For lucidity, the military situations in the Western and Eastern areas of interest will be discussed separately.

Military Situation: Western Area of Interest
In the Western area of interest, the majority of which is situated in VC Sub Region 5, political and military interest have become so closely related that it is difficult to speak of one without including the other. During this reporting period sufficient evidence has been accrued to prove that the Dong Nai Regiment has disbanded and its battalions assigned District AO’s within SR-5. This reorganization is particularly important as it changes the whole concept of operations for which SR-5 was originally created. It can, therefore, be assumed that the structure and thinking of Sub Region 5 has also been altered drastically. This change was dictated by the deteriorating military and political situation faced by the enemy subsequent to Tet 68. The sheer loss in numbers of men plus the successful allied interdictions of supply lines and a rapidly spreading pacification program from 1968 until the present forced the realignment of Sub Region 5 and the Dong Nai Regiment. The result of the reorganization is that the enemy situation in SR-5 is very similar to their situation before 1965. The primary thrust of the enemy operation in SR-5 has become political in nature with the military used in a supporting or supplementary role. The Dong Nai Battalions have been assigned to District AO’s in order to strengthen and rejuvenate the local forces so that the VC can start rebuilding their forces from the lowest level.

The location of enemy units within Sub Region 5 is as follows: K1 Dong Nai Battalion is held in Phu Giac (D) as a mobile reserve force. This battalion moves wherever its services are required within Sub Region 5’s Northern portion. K2 Dong Nai Battalion is held in Tan Uyen (D) operating with C301 Tan Uyen Local Force. To an unknown degree K2 and C301 have merged. It is known that their respective medical units and facilities have been incorporated. K4 Dong Nai Battalion is held in Chau Thanh (D) operating with C62 Chau Thanh District Local Force. K3 Dong Nai Battalion, which had disbanded and been redesignated the Thang Loi Group long before the rest of the Regiment disbanded, is held as operating in Di An, Lai Thier and Thu Duc Districts. The Thang Loi Group has been divided among these district forces and the remnants of the organization, probably the command section, has formed into the "Silent Capital," a covert liaison network between SR-5 Headquarters and the three Southern districts. The implications of the reorganization are primarily political in nature. The "Silent Capital" has no real military
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capability at all and is presently totally concerned with preserving and rebuilding the VCI in Di An, Lai Thier and Thu Duc. VC within each district are capable of terrorist activities, but the whole significance of this type of activity lies in the political effects they produce. Acts of terrorism and propaganda activities are conducted against the populace and indigenous military personnel in order to discourage them. The Dong Nai Battalions, located in the northern districts also have a primarily political mission. The facts that the area is less pacified and still has unpopulated areas allowing concealment enables these forces to be more militarily oriented. Economy of force tactics, i.e., harassing sapper type activity, is still the only military operations the enemy can realistically hope to profit from. That the enemy is in fact committed to these economy of force tactics within the 11th ACR area of interest is reflected in the recent sapper training received by K1 and K2 Dong Nai Battalions. In addition to sapper training for the Dong Nai Battalions, and presumably for the local forces with whom they operate, there are also indications that new sapper units are being formed within SR-5. A recent Ho Chi reported that he had been placed in charge of forming two new sapper platoons which would operate in Chau Thanh District. This Ho Chi also mentioned C500, a unit previously unknown to the 11th ACR, which is supposed to be sapper company subordinate to SR-5 and operating autonomously in Chau Thanh District. Additionally, captured documents issued on 21 September directed that sapper platoons be formed in Tan Uyen, Chau Thanh and Bien Hoa. There are also indications that several infiltration groups have arrived in the SR-5 area, some of the members of which have been assigned to sapper units. A PW captured by the 1st ACD at XT 994356 identified himself as a member of the 123rd Infiltration Group which had been allocated to SR-5. The source stated that he had been assigned to unit C500/J30. In conclusion then, it is clear that during the reporting period units within SR-5 have received sapper training, that new sapper units have been formed, that replacements have arrived in SR-5 providing new manpower for enemy forces, and that SR-5 forces are committed to economy of force tactics.

With the reorganization, and retraining taking place, enemy activity within the western area of interest has been light during the reporting period. Enemy units have nothing to gain in sustained contacts with elements of the 11th ACR and have avoided contact in most instances. The new small sapper units, unless surprised, are able to avoid track vehicles. The most effective weapon of the 11th ACR during the reporting period has been the automatic ambush. The 11th ACR has also had success in screening enemy supply routes and supply points. During the reporting period RF and PF units have been involved in the overwhelming majority of the activity.
Military Situation: Eastern Area of Interest

The military situation in the 11th ACR eastern area of interest is similar in many respects to that in the west; however, there is no evidence that main force units have broken down into autonomous units. VC U-1 Province comprises the majority of the eastern AO. U-1 Province is divided into three VC districts -- Vinh Cuu, Trang Bom, and Bien Hoa City. No main force units are permanently based in U-1 province but they do operate in and move throughout the province. The forces subordinate to U-1 Province are the Vinh Cuu and Trang Bom District Forces, D1 and D2 Sapper Battalions, the Bien Hoa City forces, and various small local force units. The status of the U-1 Provinciaal forces is largely unknown. D1 Sapper Bn has not been contacted since July 1970 and is believed to be operating with local forces and VCI. D2 Sapper Bn has been out of contact since July 1969 but was mentioned as still in existence by a Hoi Chanh in May 1970. This Battalion may have broken up to support local force units. The Trang Bom Force is still active, but lack of contacts or identifications indicate the Vinh Cuu District Force is no longer in existence. Again, in the east the political and military aspects of the war are inseparable although as in the northern portion of the western AO, the unpopulated centers of concealment and the less advanced pacification program allow the enemy units to maintain their unit integrity and operate in up to battalion size groups. Economy of force tactics are employed by the enemy, normally manifested in indirect fire attacks and recently in ambushes of vehicles along Highway 1 between Hung Loc (V) and Hung Nghia (V).

Enemy activity has been light during the reporting period and primarily concentrated in the southeastern portion of the AO because this is where the population and rice are most readily available to the enemy. Enemy main force units operating in the eastern AO are as follows: 274th Regiment and 74th Arty Regiment. Recently captured documents provide an apparently valid update of intentions and activity of the 274th Regiment. 2d Bn, 274th Regiment, which historically has been used primarily in a logistical support role, has recently been assigned the mission to ambush vehicles on Highway 1. This battalion, its ranks decimated by casualties and malaria, is being supported in this role by C-13 Company, 3rd Battalion, 274th Regiment. 1st Battalion is operating east and west of Highway 2 from Kuan Loc to Phuoc Tuy (P). The 3rd Bn is operating South of Hwy 1 apparently acting as a ready reserve or reaction force for 2/274 Bn.

Contacts on 22-23 September vic YT 3805 in which RF and ARVN units sustained significant casualties involved 2d Bn, 274th Regiment and, according to Hoi Chanh Lot who rallied 8 October, these contacts were the last rainy season battles to be conducted by the 274th. Lee had been sent to the 274th from MR-7 with a recon team to aid in planning this attack. At the same time another recon team was sent to the 74th Arty Regiment,
presumably for the same purpose. The 74th Arty Regiment was probably responsible for the 18 October rocketing of fire support base Michelle. Because a small fire support base is not usually a target for rockets and because the 74th Arty Regiment has not fired rockets for a considerable length of time, this attack may have been a training exercise with Long Binh or Bien Hoa the ultimate target. Recent identifications found K3 Bn, 74th Arty Regiment at YT 2506 on 26 August, 2d Bn at YS 2395 on 15 Oct, and 1st Bn vic TY 3046 on 20 Aug. The 3d Bn and 1st Bn identifications were made from documents and may not pinpoint the actual location of the battalions. Elements of the 74th are felt, however, to be operating South of Hwy 1 vic YS 2395, YT 2506, probably in conjunction with elements of the 274th Regiment. The most often identified local force unit in the area is the Trang Bom District Force which is probably aiding the 74th and 274th Regiments logistically and providing guides for these units. The Trang Bom District Force had base camps located along the Suoi Ret vic YT 2514 during September, but friendly operations and some plow operations have probably forced this unit to re-locate. Whether the Trang Bom District Force moved north or south is a matter of conjecture.

To the north of the Suoi Ret vic YT 2221 is the most likely location of the U-1 Province Headquarters. Terrain in the area prohibits track movement and for that reason few friendly operations have been conducted in the area. Recent sensor activations, sniffer readings, and usually reliable agent reports indicated that enemy units were in the area and for that reason a Battalion (-) of Infantry was inserted on 22 October. They did not contact any enemy units nor find any cache systems. OB feels that the presence of main force units within the eastern AO is accounted for by difficult access to their more southern supply points. Allied operations have made access to supply points along highway 15 more difficult and necessitated a northern enemy movement to find food. Additionally, these are traditional supply routes which run through this area from War Zone D, and enemy movement may be supply parties moving munitions south.

Logistical Situation:
At the present time the logistical system is the enemy's most vulnerable spot throughout the 11th ACR area of interest. Several reasons account for this vulnerability. First, the logistical system is the least flexible of the three enemy organizations under discussion. As has been pointed out, the military can be de-escalated, broken down into small groups, kept out of contact and hidden from friendly units. As in the case of Thang Loi Group, the whole structure can become very covert in nature and to date impossible to eliminate. A logistical system on the other hand is by its very nature always open for exploitation by US and ARVN units. This fact, of course, accounts for large measure for the problems the enemy is presently encountering.
The enemy's supply lines from Cambodia have been fairly successfully interdicted. The Cambodia operation also served to worsen the enemy's logistical situation. For these reasons a system that has become known as the Shadow Supply System is presently being more heavily relied upon in the 11th ACR area of interest. The Shadow Supply System which is not a new system, is a system in which supplies are transported quasi-legally from metropolitan areas along major LOC's to enemy units. This system is based on procurement of supplies by VC sympathizers in large cities such as Saigon as well as in small villages and hamlets. Enemy units are tenant on certain villages and hamlets in their respective AO's and from these centers obtain supplies. The advantages of this system is that large caches which might be discovered do not have to be reloaded over again. The small amount of captured rice during the last three months in the 11th ACR area of interest suggests that the Shadow Supply System is working well. Most of the traditional VC supply centers scattered throughout the 11th ACR area of interest have been recognized as such and some steps have been taken to control VC access to these villages. In SR-5, for example, the VC have encountered considerable difficulty in acquiring the requisite amount of rice from Binh My/Binh Co during the last 3 months because of the presence of 3/11 ARVN.

Binh My/Binh Co is a major supply center for elements of the former Dong Hai Regiment and local forces in the area and the present difficulty in obtaining rice in this area has forced these units to range farther afield to get their supplies. Supply parties from SR-5 are known to have travelled as far east as Bau Hon (via HT 3014) to acquire rice. One of the major supply centers for CR-4/ML-7 units is Binh Son and Zal operations in that area have also caused using enemy units to seek rice elsewhere. In fact, the situation at Binh Son is partially responsible for the northern movement of the 274th Regiment and toward the Bau Son area in an attempt to acquire supplies. It is notable that the most frequently used method for obtaining these supplies is purchasing. In lieu of the supplies themselves, which the enemy is having difficulty transporting, money is provided to enemy units which they can buy their own supplies.

In early October members of the 81st Rear Service Group came to Bau Ham to buy rice. They brought one US $100 bill which was exchanged for approximately 200 plasters/1 dollar and bought 500 lbs of rice. The extent to which the Shadow Supply System has replaced the old concept of extorted supply lines is illustrated by the apparent dissolution of the 84th TSG and the reorganization of its personnel to ML-7. This process of reorganization was not a sudden event, but extended over a period of approximately two years, from 1968 to 1970, and in its present form represents the newer concept of localized logistical system. Finance/Economy sections and procurement/production sections have
replaced to a great degree the transportation units of the Rear Service Group. A similar phenomenon has also occurred in SR-5, most recently reflected in the interrogation of a rally from 57 Supply Section SR-5. He stated that the supply section is divided into five branches, each with the mission to collect and purchase foodstuffs. Each branch is responsible for a specific area which the VC refer to as a supply point. The 1st branch is located vic XT 8437. The 2nd branch is located vic XT 07059 and is provided foodstuffs by a group of suppliers residing legally in Tho Do (C), Tan Binh (V). On each occasion the total amount is approximately 6-7 tons and it is transported by 547ck to An Binh vic YT 000018. The 3rd branch is responsible for the supply point in Binh My (V) area vic XT 925310. The 4th branch is responsible for the supply point in the Dong Quinh area vic XT 900585. The 5th branch is responsible for the supply point in the Quo Can area vic XT 94250. Through this last reporting period, the transformation of the supply system was documented and some understanding of how the system works was acquired. The role of the 11th ACR, or for that matter any US unit, in combating this altered system will necessarily be minimal. The system will be difficult to eradicate. The necessary weapons to fight such a system, such as population control measures, thorough checkpoints and honest administration, are all under the control of the South Vietnamese government.

The relationship between the logistical system and the political and military situations of the enemy during the last quarter has been expanded in acquiring adequate supplies at the expense of military operations. The majority of contacts the 11th ACR has had with enemy units during the last quarter have involved enemy supply parties. Enemy morale has also been hurt during the reorganization of the logistical system as he finds himself short of food and ammunition and constantly in a defensive position. Captured documents and Hoi Chans attest to the sometimes dire circumstances of enemy units.

In assessing the enemy situation as a whole during the last three months, then, the obvious conclusion is that the enemy is in a period of transition. This is apparent in each of the areas discussed: political, military, and logistical. The success of all three depends on the enemy's ability to exert his influence among the population as a whole; politically as the enemy attempts to rebuild the VCI, militarily as his units are reorganized and logistically as his system is localized. It should be noted of course, that transition is a dynamic term and does not necessarily connote a deescalation of the war or a breakdown of enemy forces into small guerrilla units. If the situation is presently analogous to the pre 1965 era, then the lessons learned during that period should be applied today. The alternative is that the enemy will be successful in his present reorganization and refitting efforts and will sometime in the future be able to mount large operations in this area.
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1970

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b. Order of Battle: SR-5

K-1/Do Ngoc Battalion: The K-1 Bn is believed to be the mobile reserve battalion for SR-5 operating in Phu Giao District. It was identified on 10 Oct 70 by documents captured at KT 994356 and on 29 Oct by a PW at KT 902415. Agent reports have indicated that K-1 is now being utilized as a security force for resupply missions. The current strength estimate is 100 personnel.

K-2/Do Ngoc Battalion: The K-2 Bn has been subordinated to the Tan Uyen District Force and was last identified on 17 Sept 70 at TT 052313. Since this time agent reports have placed it in the vicinity of Minh Chu and Tan Uyen (V). The current strength estimate is 100 personnel.

K-4/Do Ngoc Battalion: The K-4 Bn has been subordinated to Chau Thanh District and is operating in conjunction with the Chau Thanh District Force. It was last identified on 29 Sept 70 at VT 822287 by documents taken off a KIA. Indications are that K-4 Bn participated in the Sep 26 attack on Tan Binh outpost. The current strength is 100 personnel.

Thang Loi Group: PW's and Hoi Chanh's have indicated that the Thang Loi Group has been replaced by a "Silent Corridor" Agency with a strength of 5-6 personnel. The remaining members of the old Thang Loi Group are believed to be operating with elements of the Lei Thi and Di in local Forces. It should be noted, however, that OS still receives agent reports referring to the Thang Loi Group operating in Western Le Thi (D) Minh Duong (F).

Other units reported to be operating in SR-5 are the C62 Chau Thanh Local Force Company (renamed C1) with a strength of 6-7, the C1 Mortar Platoon operating in Chau Thanh District with a strength of 6 men, the C1 Female Mortar Platoon operating in Tan Uyen District with an unknown strength, and the C601 Tan Uyen LP Company operating with a strength of about 60 personnel. C500 is tentatively held as a new sapper company subordinate to SR-5 operating in Chau Thanh District.

Order of Battle: NR-7

65th Engineer Battalion: The 65th Engineer Bn is consistently identified with the 11th ACR. On 2 Oct 70, Vicinity VT 291098, documents captured following a contact identified the 65th Engineer Bn and the 74th Artillery Regiment. This is probably a small element of the 65th operating with the 74th Regiment. Current strength of the 65th Bn is estimated at 225, armed with M-40/G41s. The Battalion's
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Mechanicalized Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1970

mission: is interdiction of Route 15 between Long Thanh (YS 1392) and Ba Ria.

3rd Battalion, 33rd Regiment - The 3rd Regiment is currently well to the East of the 11th AGR AO, however the 3rd Battalion was identified on 1 Oct 70 at YT 6004. A Hoi Chanh on 5 Oct 70 identified the 6th Co/3rd Bn vic YT 8037. The 3rd Bn has an estimated strength of 195, armed with B-40, 60mm and 82mm mortars.

D6 Sapper Battalion - The D6 Sapper Battalion was last identified by documents on 7 August 70 vicinity YT 239136, Rest of Trang Bao. The Battalion’s primary mission is to oppose the GVN pacification effort. Strength is estimated at 80. A Hoi Chanh verified the existence of the D6 Bn in this area in Sep 70.

74th Rocket Regiment - The 1st Bn/74th Regiment was identified by documents on 20 Aug 70 and 23 Aug 70 vicinity YT 3046. This unit was probably on a supply mission to pick up ammunition. The 2nd Bn/74th Regt was identified on 10 Oct 70 vic YT 297096. The 74th Regiment provides rocket support for infantry units and has the mission of attacking by fire the Bien Hoa/Binh Hung military complex. Strength is estimated at 505 and weapons include 107mm, 122mm rockets and 120mm mortars. Recent 107mm rocket attacks in MR 7 occurred on 18 Oct 70 at YT 275098 and YT 282098. The relative inactivity of the Regiment is probably caused by a shortage of food and ammunition.

274th Infantry Regiment - The 274th Regiment is currently carried West of Bien Hoa in the general area from YT 2407 to YT 3105. Recent documents and Hoi’s identified elements of the 274th South of Highway 1, from YT 2905 to YT 3106. These elements were probably in this area on resupply missions. The estimated strength of the Regiment is 615. The 274th along with the 74th Regt, is responsible for attacking the Bien Hoa/Binh Hung areas. Rocket and heavy mortar support is provided by the 74th Regiment. The 274th’s armament includes B-40/B-41, 60 and 81mm mortars, and 75mm RPs.

D1 Sapper Battalion - This local Force Sapper Battalion has an estimated strength of 160 and was located by contact on 11 July 70 at YT 078107. Few contacts have been made and disposition is difficult to determine other than an operational area in Northern US (F). The Bn is composed of 3 sapper companies and a heavy weapons company; arms include 60mm and 82mm mortars possibly a 75mm RP and B-40/B-41. Based on limited intelligence the D-1 Bn has probably retained unit integrity but is currently operating in small individual groups with orders to assist the local guerrilla and avoid contacts with regular US/RVN forces.

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RC 65

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

The normal operational area of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) is in the Eastern and Southeastern U-1 province. The last contact was on 19 July 1969 at IT 2000075. A Ho Chi Minh in September 1970 stated he stayed at the 11th ACR has basecamp in March 1970. He estimated the basecamp to be 2 hours South of Bau Ca (IT 2221). This unit was also identified by documents in February 70 at IT 250140. Strength of the unit is estimated at 80-100 personnel. This unit is in doubt and it is not carried as a confirmed unit. Whether this unit exists as a battalion or has broken up to support local guerrillas and VC is unknown, however, the VC in Eastern and Southeastern U-1 province retain a significant harassing capability.

26th Local Force Company - This Trang Bom District Unit has an estimated strength of 25 and is armed with small arms, 60mm mortar and RPG-2's. The unit was identified by documents at IT 315056 on 10 Sep 70 and last contacted on 13 Aug 70 at IT 230139.

29th Local Force Company - This unit is held with a strength of 20-25 men and supports the Vinh Ouu District. There have been no recent contacts; however, a recent Ho Chi Minh stated the unit operates with the 1st Cavalry Div. Limited intelligence on this unit may indicate the breakup of this unit into guerrilla type elements or possibly coming under the operational control of larger LF units such as the 1st ACR. This unit may also be operating as a security element for the Provincial Headquarters.

c. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: During the last quarter the 11th ACR used an assortment of intelligence sources with mixed results. Traditional sources, such as prisoners of war, and captured documents provided information of interest, particularly with regard to enemy order of battle. On the other hand, results with technical sources were less successful because of the low density of enemy, the terrain, and the lack of prior experience by the 11th ACR in employing these sources in the present AOIS.

(2) Visual Reconnaissance: The size of the 11th ACR area of operations plus the fact that terrain in certain portions of the AO is not accessible to vehicles made the visual reconnaissance missions flown by Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, during the last quarter extremely valuable. Missions were flown on a daily basis for target acquisition, to confirm or deny agent reports, red haze, sniffer, or sensor readings, to determine enemy movement, to locate enemy base-camps, and to provide an overview of the 11th ACR AO not covered by ground forces.
Captured Enemy Documents: The breakdown of enemy units into smaller units and the sporadic contacts have made it difficult to really know the strengths and locations of the enemy within the 11th ACR AO. Captured documents have helped to provide this information. From these documents the order of battle section learns unit organization, personalities, cover designations, LBN's as well as more abstract information regarding enemy morale, general trends of activity, insight into political thinking and possible future activities.

Prisoners of War and Ho Chi Chanhs: PW's and Ho Chi Chanhs provided the 11th ACR with its best intelligence during the quarter. The type of information reported is naturally the same type provided by documents. During the reporting period 26 PW's and 43 Ho Chi Chanhs were interrogated and provided information of value. Of this total, 2 PW's and 1 Ho Chi Chanh were taken by the 11th ACR. Notable Ho Chi Chanhs and PW's exploited during the reporting period included An Van An, Thong Van Xa, and Bui Van Chu. An Van An, member of the Di An District Force, was captured on 1 September and provided a great deal of information about SR-5 and the reorganization of the Dong Nai Regiment. Thong Van Xa, captured on 12 October, was Assistant Political Officer, Military Section, Chau Thanh District Force, and was therefore able to give a detailed account of the enemy organization and strength within Chau Thanh District. Xa provided strengths and locations for K4 Dong Nai BN, mentioned the formation of new sapper platoons in Chau Thanh (D) and stated that C500, a sapper company, previously unknown to OB section, operated in Chau Thanh. Ho Chi Chanh, Bui Van Chu, former member of the armed force unit, Trang Bom District Force, rallied on 22 July and on 7 August led elements of 11th ACR to Trang Bom (D) force base camps VIC YT2312, resulting in 5 VC KIA.

Agent Reports: The 11th ACR received agent reports during the reporting period from the following sources: 3d and 5th Battalions, 525 MI Group, 219 MI Detachment, the Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh National Police, CAS Binh Duong (P), and the 1st ARVN MI Battalion, Saigon. The 11th ACR INTSUM included those reports containing pertinent information about the AO. Agent reports were supplemented by comments from the OB section which related the report to the enemy situation. The primary value of agent reports was their use in pattern analysis. Used in conjunction with contacts and unit identification, agent reports helped to define enemy areas of operation.

Integrated Civic Action Projects (ICAPS): Indigenous personnel have assumed responsibility for ICAPS within the 11th ACR area of operations. On the ICAPS run by the 11th ACR interrogation personnel accompanied the team, made village profiles, and discussed recent enemy activity with village chiefs.
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Technical Detectors:

(1) SLAR: Although capable of covering large areas, SLAR was an unsuccessful source during the reporting period. The facts that enemy units are generally operating in small groups, the population is dense in the 11th ACR AO, and the unpopulated areas are heavily vegetated, coupled with the space-time limitations of SLAR, make this source unsuccessful.

(2) Sniffer: The heavy population density and the rainy season weather were detrimental to the effectiveness of this source; however, its usefulness increased significantly during the latter part of the reporting period as the weather improved.

(3) Red Haze: Enemy units operating in small bands made red haze readings scattered and prevented any enemy patterns from being established.

(4) Ground Radar: Since returning from Cambodia, the 11th ACR has initiated a program to increase the use of radar. Terrain permitting, the program has been successful. The use of towers increased radar range. Limited experience and a lack of trained operators hampered the effective use of ground radar.

Ground Sensors:

a. Personnel Seismic Infiltration Detector (PSID): PSID was limited by over sensibility, but was of some use around NDP's.

b. Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS): UGS has only been used by the 11th ACR during the last month due to personnel and equipment limitations which were alleviated upon being made OCPON to the 25th Inf Div. These sensors have been used on a target acquisition role. Responses to sensor activations have included artillery, VR's, and Ranger insertions. The primary problem has been determining the validity of activations.

Ranger Teams: Ranger Teams have been inserted into areas prohibited to track vehicles in order to confirm or deny other sources of intelligence and to monitor enemy activity in these areas.

Vietnamese Pacification Cadre: Armed propaganda teams and National Police field forces working with elements of the 11th ACR have provided valuable information with regard to VC influence in particular villages or areas. National Police have assisted 11th ACR in resource control programs in an attempt to restrict the shadow supply system.

Liaison: Intelligence has been gained through liaison with personnel in Bing Duong and Bien Hoa provinces. CI section, 541st MID, makes monthly liaison trips to DIOCC's to get firsthand impressions about enemy activity from the DIOCC advisor.

d. Enemy Personnel and Material Losses:
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Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 October 1970
RCS CSPDR-65 (R)

Quarterly Report

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*Numbers inside ( ) indicate number of unidentified mines.

3. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation of Operations:

(1) BIIK HOA - DONG SHAPE AO. Operations in the Regiment's eastern AO met with sporadic success. VC forces avoided elements of the 11th ACR whenever possible throughout the reporting period. The 1st Squadron was based at FSB Henderson (TH 131210) continuously.

b. Rome Plow Operations. During the period 1 - 26 August, the 60th Land Clearing Company 60th Land Clearing Company plowed a large area northeast of Henderson. The ACAV's of A Troop secured the operation to the jungle areas which served as base camps for the TRNC SOW VC District Force. On 17 October, the ARVN 318th Land Clearing Company began Rome plow operations along the railroad which parallels Route 2L1 south of TRNC SOW. B Troop provided security for the operation until the end of the reporting period, experiencing no enemy contact.

b. Population and Resource Control. Throughout the reporting period almost daily operations were conducted by the 1st Squadron and the
National Police along Routes QL-1, QL-20, and LTL-24. The National Police checkpoints along these routes were secured by the Squadron's armored cavalry troops and tank company. Two 155mm SP howitzers were moved north-east of FSB Henderson in order to provide fire support for operations along the Dong Nai River and Routes QL-20 and LTL-24. These National Police checkpoints did much to control contraband traffic and to apprehend individuals without proper identification. At night, these operations with the National Police were augmented by mobile night patrols which were aimed at enforcing curfew restrictions on these highways. Although considerable armored cavalry and armored assets were devoted to this project, results were gleaned from the operation. Numerous personnel with improper identification were detained and some VC suspects were apprehended. Perhaps the best indication of success was the improved position of the National Police in the AO. Although ralliers did not present themselves to the 11th ACR, they did rally to the National Police and other CVN agencies in the AO.

c. Automatic Ambushes. 1st Squadron employed automatic ambushes in the AO during the reporting period; however, this tactic produced limited results. Six (6) AA’s were detonated, resulting in three (3) VC KIA.

d. Unattended Ground Sensor and Radar Employment. During the period 22 - 24 October, unattended ground sensors were emplaced in conjunction with reconnaissance operations conducted by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and Team 1C, 75th Rangers, 25th Infantry Division. The ground sensors were placed south of the Dong Nai River and were covered by fire from the 155mm howitzers of 1st Squadron. Although the Ranger Team reported little evidence of enemy movement across the river, the ground sensors revealed significant activity throughout the remainder of the month. Fire cracker artillery rounds were fired in response to sensor activations; however, the results remained unknown. There was a general upgrading of radar operations with emphasis placed on maintenance of the radars and training of the operators. Readings were engaged by fire and also held for intelligence purposes.

e. Ranger and Infantry Assistance. The 25th Infantry Division provided three (3) Infantry Companies, a Ranger Team, and a Reconnaissance Platoon to the 1st Squadron for operations in the BIEN HOA - LONG KHANH AO for short periods. These units conducted ground reconnaissance in the area located six (6) kilometers southwest of the CAY GAO Rubber Plantation. There were no significant findings made.

f. Operations in Coordination with ARVN Task Force 333. The ARVN Task Force 333 operating south of 1st Squadron's AO initiated a sweep north toward Route QL-1. In support of these operations numerous strong
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points were established south of QL-1 by 1st Squadron. Up to three (3) armored cavalry troops, the tank company, plus the Regimental Scout Section and elements of the Air Cavalry Troop Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP) were utilized in the blocking force. This seal of Route QL-1 did produce some sightings and enemy contacts as elements of the 274th VC Regiment attempted to avoid the sweeping ARVN Task Force. On 2 October, a night ambush patrol of A Troop spotted and engaged 12 - 15 individuals. A light fire team and artillery supported in the contact as four (4) VC were killed and a large amount of equipment was captured. The seal of Route QL-1 was continued throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

g. Mine and Boobytrap Incidents. In the Bienen Hoa - Long Khanh AO, twenty-four (24) mining incidents occurred. Fourteen (14) of these incidents involved boobytraps and fifty-four (54) percent of all mines/BBT's encountered were found without friendly losses. During September and October, these incidents were greatly reduced when only five (5) devices were discovered.

h. Enemy Eliminated. Thirteen (13) VC/NVA were eliminated in the eastern AO during the reporting period. One VC was wounded and captured, while the remainder were KIA.

(2) Bienen Hoa - Binh Duong AO. Operations in the Regiment's western AO were directed against the Dong Nai Regiment and were designed to interdict enemy supply routes east of Binh My and Binh G village. The 2d Squadron continued to be located at FSB Victory (XT896318). On 13 August, 2d Squadron was relieved by 3d Squadron in this AO. 3d Squadron established FSB Bandit I (XT910317) and on 17 September moved to FSB Bandit II (XT908294).

a. Automatic Ambushes. 2d and 3d Squadrons successfully employed automatic ambushes in their AO. During the reporting period, thirteen (13) VC and four (4) NVA were killed in a total of seven (7) detonations. Four (4) automatic ambushes detonated in which no creditable results were found. The VC in the AO made a distinct effort to remove automatic ambushes. During the reporting period thirteen (13) of these devices were stolen, and two were subsequently found by the 11th ACR. These two devices were boobytrapped by the enemy.

b. Population and Resource Control. Population and resource control operations were conducted in the Bienen Hoa - Binh Duong AO along Routes LTL-1A and LTL-16 in coordination with the National Police. Checkpoints were established both north and south of Binh My and Binh G' villages. VC suspects were detained by the National Police and contraband items were confiscated.
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c. Combined Operations. A very large number of combined operations with the RF/PF units were executed in the BIEN HOA - BINH DUONG A0. The vast majority of these operations consisted of ground reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force by platoon size elements. These operations yielded the best results for this A0. Since our Vietnamese Allies were able to search small base areas in detail and they were provided with nearby fire power from the armored cavalry, contact with the enemy was possible with favorable results.

d. Ranger and Infantry Assistance. The 3d Squadron was aided in its A0 by A and C Companies, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, D Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and Teams 2D and 2E, 75th Rangers, 25th Infantry Division. These units were very valuable in conducting detailed ground reconnaissance in the area east of BINH MY and BINH CO villages. This area was considered a base for the KI Battalion of the Dong Nai Regiment. These units also filled in strong points of the Regiment with dismounted ambush patrols which led to an effective screen across this traditional VC supply network.

e. Mine and Boobytrap Incidents. In the BIEN HOA - BINH DUONG A0, mining incidents totaled one hundred sixty (160). Seventy-four (74) percent of these devices were found without friendly losses. Although the preponderance of devices encountered were boobytraps of various designs, while most of the mines hit were homemade antitank mines of remarkable size. Most of these mines were concrete encased and weighed 30-50 pounds, with some mines weighing over 80 pounds. The average antitank mine was slapstick activated and produced considerable damage on the vehicle. In areas near population, such as BINH MY and BINH CO villages, some antitank mines were clearly marked with signs in Vietnamese as well as the traditional VC mine markers for this region. It was noted also that explosives were commonly removed from dud Air Force and Army munitions found on the battlefield.

f. Enemy Eliminated. 3d Squadron in the BIEN HOA - BINH DUONG A0 killed forty-two (42) VC/NVA and had one enemy soldier rally. There were no enemy PW's captured during the reporting period. Numerous other enemy soldiers were eliminated by capture and rallying to GVN agencies within the A0.

b. DONG TIEN (Go Forward Together) Program: During the reporting period the 11th ACR worked closely with ARVN, RF and PF forces, and the National Police in its A0's. These operations consisted of population and resource control, ground reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, road security, and ICAP operations. Represented below are the combined operations from 1 August to 31 October:

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COMBINED OPERATIONS

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<tr>
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The following ICAP's and MEDCAP's were conducted in coordination with provincial medical personnel:

ICAP's AND MEDCAP's

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<th></th>
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<th>2/11 ACR</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

c. Training:

1. The Replacement Training School at Di An serves an important function in preparing replacements for their assignments with the 11th ACR. In addition it also conducted replacement training for the 3/17th Cavalry. During October the school’s seven day course of instruction was increased to nine days. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

   August | 496
   September | 198
   October | 366

2. Five (5) Blackhorse troopers graduated from the 1st Cavalry Division (A) FIRST TEAM Academy Sniper Course during the reporting period.

3. The 1st Signal Brigade’s Southeast Asia Signal School #1
trained three (3) personnel from the 11th ACR on the operation and maintenance of the AN/PPS-5 radar.

4. The 25th Infantry Division gave the Regiment valuable aid by training twenty (20) troopers in a number of courses at the Division's Tropic Lightning Academy during October.

4. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Chemical:

(1) General: The 33d Chemical Detachment (CBRC) continued to provide direct chemical support and technical advice to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Concealed Personnel Detector ("Sniffer") missions:

(a) During this reporting period there were 12 Sniffer missions flown for the 11th ACR and 1 mission flown for the 3/17th Cav at Tay Ninh. The 3/17th provided the aircraft for this mission.

(b) Toward the end of October, there was a slight improvement in the early morning weather. The improved weather gave the Cav the opportunity to utilize the Sniffer to locate the enemy in areas it was previously unable to operate in due to excessive contamination caused by downwind drift of smoke from the numerous villages scattered throughout the AO. As the dry season progresses the weather should continue to improve until we reach a point where we will be able to operate the Sniffer on a daily basis.

(3) Defoliation Projects: The perimeter of the Di An Base Camp was defoliated by using contaminating diesel fuel provided by the 277th S&S Bn. This was a joint project with the 33d Chemical Detachment providing the spray equipment and operator and Base Defense Personnel providing most of the manpower and a supervisor. This project is still continuing with some defoliation of small spots that were missed on the first spray. This project has required approximately 20,000 gallons of diesel fuel to date.

(4) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Mission:

(a) Persistent CS Bunker Use Restriction Bombs (BURBS) are again being manufactured by the 33d Chemical Detachment. During this reporting period 500 BURBS have been logged to the three squadrons.

(b) There were four CS missions flown during this period, of which one aerial CS drop was used to prevent enemy escape during sweep by friendly troops. Three were used in conjunction with direct and indirect fire on known bunker complexes.
b. Signal: Throughout the period the Regimental CP was located at Di An. In order to obtain better communications with the squadrons, six sections were added to the AB216 antenna tower, raising it to 108 ft. This improved communications, but the relay at Nui Chia Chan was still necessary to reach units in the Xuan Loc Area.

The second squadron went under the operational control of the First Air Cavalry Division in early September. Additional personnel were sent to Nui Chua Chan to relay the squadron FM A/L Net to the Ham Tan area. AM RTT/Voice Net was established using AN/GRC 142's and AN/GRC 106's. The net was used primarily between Second Squadron Rear and the squadron elements in the Ham Tan area with the Regimental Headquarters entering the net on teletype or voice as required. Two telephone circuits to Ham Tan through VHF and cable were requested and obtained, but they were of poor quality.

In mid September the Regiment minus went under the operational control of the 25th Division. The Regiment entered the Secure Division Command and Intelligence FM Nets. The 25th Division established a Multi-channel VHF terminal providing both common user & teletype sole user circuits to the 25th Division. A AN/MGC-17 teletypewriter was provided by the 25th Division and installed adjacent to the RTOC. Using the teletype terminal, a sole user circuit was established between the RTOC and DTOC. The common user telephone and teletype circuits to II FFORCEV were deactivated.

Telephone circuits were established from the Regiment to the 1st and 2nd Squadron Fire Support Bases. This was accomplished by using the 4 channel AN/GRC-163 equipment. The circuits were of good quality when the Log Periodic Antenna were used.

c. Artillery:

(1) General: During the quarter, 11th ACR howitzer batteries supported allied forces as well as their respective squadrons in Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, and Long Khanh Provinces. From 1 Aug 70 to 15 Sep 70, while 11th ACR elements were OPCON to II FFV, the FSE coordinated with and reported to II FFV Arty. On 15 Sep 70, 11th ACR FSE began coordinating with and reporting to 25th Div Arty when elements of 11th ACR became OPCON to 25th Div. Significant reductions in ammunition expenditures were realized during the quarter due to reduced enemy activity in the AO and more effective management. Because of maintenance stand-downs and 2/11th ACR OPCON mission to 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), at no time during this quarter did the FSE clear fires of more than two (2) howitzer batteries.
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(2) How Btry, 1st/11th ACR: During the quarter, 1st How Btry supported squadron operations in Bien Hoa Province from FSB Henderson (YT182120). Due to the large AO, 1st How Btry established a two (2) howitzer FSB at YT384263 on 17 Aug 70. On 18 Sep 70 the two (2) howitzer FSB was relocated to YT347159. On 21 Oct 70, due to increased activity in the northern portion of the AO, 1st How Btry re-established a two (2) howitzer FSB at YT384263.

(3) How Btry, 2d/11th ACR: From 1 to 13 Aug 70, 2d How Btry provided DS fires from FSB Victory (XT895316) to squadron maneuver elements. During this period, 2d How Btry also fired in support of RF/PF units throughout Tan Uyen District. From 13 Aug 70 to 6 Sep 70, 2d How Btry participated in a maintenance stand-down. On 9 Sep 70, 2d/11th ACR became OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) and began operations in Bình Tuy Province with How Btry providing DS from FSB Bolan (YS982568). From 9 Sep 70 to 31 Oct 70, 2d How Btry was usually split into two locations to keep maneuver elements within the artillery range fan. The battery placed three (3) howitzers in FSB Bolan and three (3) howitzers in five (5) other bases during this period.

(4) How Btry, 3d/11th ACR: From 1 to 12 Aug 70, 3d How Btry participated in a maintenance stand-down. From 13 Aug 70 to 31 Oct 70, the battery provided DS to squadron maneuver elements operating in Binh Duong Province from FSB Bandit I (XT918316) and FSB Bandit II (XT908293). 3d Btry also fired in support of RF/PF units throughout Tan Uyen District during this quarter.

(5) During this quarter, 25th Div Arty conducted combat readiness evaluations (CRE) on each of the 11th ACR howitzer batteries. The evaluations proved most beneficial in improving the technical proficiency of the units. All 11th ACR howitzers were borescoped in Aug 1970. In Oct, 1970 11th ACR howitzer batteries were calibrated by the 23d Arty GP. Through the efforts of the 25th Div Arty, 1st/11th ACR was able to make use of II FFV searchlights to aid in screening QL1 in support of Task Force 333 in Oct 70.

(6) Artillery Expenditures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>No. of MISSIONS</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>ILL</th>
<th>FC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2259</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>4832</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbattery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1611</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>4224</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Support</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>13828</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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D. Engineer Activity:

(1) General: During this reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) were engaged in operations in the vicinity of Tan Uyen, Xuan Loc and Ham Tan. Three platoons were attached to the respective squadrons with the fourth platoon in general support of Regimental Headquarters. The Equipment Section was in general support of the Regiment and was committed in support of squadron operations on a mission basis. In general, activities included: vertical and horizontal construction, bridge repair, FSB construction, security, mine sweep operations, engineer reconnaissance, culvert installation and other general tasks.

(2) Operations: During the period 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970, the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) was employed in diversified missions northeast of Saigon and later in vicinity of the South China Sea. This unit initiated a program of rotating so that each would gain experience both in combat operations and also other engineer skills required in a general support role. In this regard, the First Platoon assumed the missions of the Third Platoon at FSB HENDERSON YT182122 on 14 September 1970. Activities of each platoon, for the reporting period, are listed below:

(a) First Platoon: Initially the First Platoon was in general support of Regimental Headquarters at Di An Base Camp. Projects included the construction of perimeter bunkers, water tower construction, emplacement of concrete pads, construction of briefing room and improving of regimental TOC, security improvements for units within the base camp, removal of old revetments, construction of a tank firing range, construction of berms for the rearmament pad and expansion of this facility, and construction of field latrines for two squadrons. The platoon repaired HHT, 11th ACR, mess hall which was damaged by an accidental explosion of an ammunition dump. A significant portion of platoon’s effort was devoted to improvement of the company area. These projects included renovation of the orderly room, supply room, dayroom, showers, and maintenance shops.

The platoon then moved to FSB HENDERSON in support of 1/11 ACR. There they assumed the minesweep, water supply, access road improvement, and combat support missions formerly performed by the Third Platoon. Specific tasks included culvert emplacement and installation of a double apron fence. Other activities ranged from engineer reconnaissance of bridges to construction of firing ranges for ARVN forces. Currently the platoon is rebuilding a washed out abutment.
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(b) Second Platoon: During the reporting period, Second Platoon provided direct support of 3d Squadron. Leaving Di An on 10 August after a brief standdown, the platoon began constructing FSB BANDIT. The platoon, with appropriate security, constructed FSB BANDIT prior to the closing by the main element. This allowed better construction of internal roads and smoother occupation of the new FSB. Within one week, two radar towers, two landing zones and an ammunition storage area were also constructed. The platoon then began daily operations, including mine sweeping, water supply operations and security, and improvement of access roads. On 11 August 1970, the platoon removed an old ARVN minefield consisting of 133 M-16 AP mines.

While at BANDIT, Second Platoon continuously found and destroyed a variety of mines, to include: a 60mm mortar rigged as a mine, 30 lb homemade mines, several encased slapstick mines, and fragmentation grenade booby traps. During this period, the platoon also engaged in civic action projects at Binh My and improved an RF compound located nearby.

When adverse weather conditions resulted in road deterioration, forcing the movement of the FSB, Second Platoon made another innovation in FSB construction. FSB BANDIT II was constructed with an interior berm enclosing an area restricted to wheeled vehicles, and an exterior berm for the protection of tracked vehicles. This resulted in better maintenance of the road system within the FSB. Old FSB BANDIT was closed September 17, and the platoon began preparing the helipads, erecting a radar tower and improving access roads at BANDIT II. Plows cut fields of fire. On the daily minesweeps, the platoon continued to find mines: two tilt rod detonated types, a 60 mm mortar round and a US fragmentation grenade encased in mud with the pin removed.

Virtually all the mines found on the daily sweeps were clearly marked; mines were found in an area bracketed by several types of signs. On two occasions, the location of mines were marked by sticks stuck on the side of the road with a piece of cardboard which read, "Civilians do not pass." Other times, the mines were marked by a line of limestone across the road, or heavy sod or branches forming a passable barricade. This experience suggests that minesweep teams must constantly be alert for anything which could be used by the enemy as a sign or marker. Visual inspection of everything, on and off the road, is a key to effective minesweeping.

(c) Third Platoon: From 1 August to 10 September. Third Platoon supported 1/11 ACR at FSB HENDERSON. The platoon conducted normal combat support operations. They also assisted Co B, 46th Engineer Battalion in the improvement of access and internal roads into FSB HENDERSON. This unit was committed by higher headquarters when the task proved too big for organic engineers. The platoon constructed a radar tower which was emplaced by helicopter. This maneuver called for additional and expedient bracing of the tower using strands of barbed wire as cables. The platoon remained at FSB HENDERSON and instructed
the relief platoon in all phases of its support missions. This close coordination between platoons was instrumental in a smooth and effective assumption of squadron missions by First Platoon.

On returning to Di An Camp, Third Platoon became the general support platoon and engaged in tasks ranging from construction of a company Ammunition Supply Point to assisting in repair of the Regimental chapel which was also damaged by the ammunition dump explosion noted previously. Of particular importance was the excellent maintenance operations of the platoon in preparation for a courtesy CMK on 6 October 1970.

(d) Fourth Platoon: At the beginning of the current reporting period, the Fourth Platoon was attached to 2/11 located at FSB VICTORY XT896317. The platoon engaged in normal combat support operations to include daily minesweeps and operation and security of the water point. When a vehicle hit a mine that was missed by the platoon, an investigation showed that the slapstick activated device could not be detected when placed under a sandbag. The unit is awaiting receipt of nonmetallic mine detectors to remedy this problem.

On 13 August, Fourth Platoon moved with other squadron element to Di An Base Camp for a maintenance standdown. Here the platoon presented classes to all squadron elements on minesweep operations and maintenance of the mine detector. After a concentrated period of maintenance, the platoon moved on a 140 kilometer road march culminating in the construction of FSB BOLAN and immediately began conducting minesweeps and water point operations. The platoon replaced a collapsed culvert at YS971970. A 5-ton dump truck in support of this operation caved in a section of the road in the vicinity of the culvert. In future operations, a more thorough investigation of the area surrounding damaged culverts will be conducted prior to employment of heavy equipment. The platoon successfully emplaced two additional culverts at YS986853, and accomplished road improvements at the culvert site and along route 2b to Ham Tan.

Because of the distance to the platoon, more detailed coordination is needed to ensure that the right equipment is present at the right time.

(e) Headquarters: Headquarters consist of maintenance, equipment, mess, supply, communications, water supply and combat engineer vehicle sections. Under the control of Command Headquarters, these sections supported the platoon on a mission basis. Water supply eradicators and CEV's were assigned to line platoons performing their mission on a continual basis. All engineer equipment was dispatched to the platoons as needed for a specific operation. By controlling these assets at company level, more efficient utilization was possible.
On 22 August, the equipment platoon was removed from the supervision of the Maintenance Section. This allowed the Maintenance Section to concentrate on maintenance operations and management. In addition, all of the units' front leaders and 5-ton dumps were incorporated into the Equipment Section, resulting in better maintenance, fewer difficulties caused by deadline items, and smoother coordination between operations. Much of the activity of the Equipment Section was directed toward base camp development. The 5-tonns, when not operationally committed to the field, hauled laterite, aggregate and debris. The crane, graders, and wreckers were utilized in numerous projects listed in the base camp development section of this report. As much as possible, 919th engineer equipment was at the disposal of other units for assistance in a host of minor projects.

The Maintenance Section initiated several activities designed to improve the operational status of all the unit's vehicles. In accordance with the regimental safety program, maintenance personnel began strenuous before operational checks and increased supervision of daily maintenance activities. Since almost all the unit's vehicles made frequent trips to the field, operating over rough roads and in deep mud, it was difficult to keep these vehicles operational. Of particular difficulty was mud caking on brake shoes. To alleviate this and other problems, the unit initiated more frequent scheduled maintenance and sent mechanics and the contact truck to the field more often. The lesson learned was that vehicles can be kept operationally ready only if there is constant command emphasis upon scheduled preventive maintenance.

The Water Supply Section with its three erdalaters was in the field practically the entire reporting period. The van with 1st and 2nd Squadrons was responsible for providing these squadrons with purified water. Third Squadron was able to meet their water requirements by utilizing water trucks from Di An. Since supplying erdalaters with limestone and diatomaceous earth was a recurrent problem, it became necessary to stockpile the needed supplies to the field before shortages developed.

The units' three rme plows were used continuously in clearing operations. In direct support of Squadron Headquarters the plows worked singly and in pairs clearing fields of fire around Fire Support Bases HENDERSON and BANDIT II. It was found that the plows worked most efficiently when they worked in pairs, allowing the third plow to standdown for maintenance.

The plows were used most extensively in denying the enemy the cover and concealment of dense jungle and streamlines. Working with K and L Troops in the vicinity of FSB BANDIT II, the plows uncovered several bunkers and a cache of explosives. On several occasions, grenades and
booby traps exploded harmlessly against the plow, indicating the plow's asset in RIF operations. At the end of the reporting period, the unit acquired chains to evaluate their effectiveness in clearing operations.

3) Base Camp Development: In addition to a program of constant improvement of the 919th company area, this unit has assisted base camp development through numerous projects designed to improve the security and living conditions of Di An.

Early in the quarter, the 919th conducted a facilities survey of the entire base camp. The purpose of this informal survey was to evaluate the current level of base camp development. Areas of interest included internal road systems, drainage, shower and latrine facilities and recreational facilities. This survey provided a reservoir of information for improvement as an impetus for improving our own company area. As a result to this survey, this unit assigned the construction platoon numerous projects noted in the platoon sections of this report.

Despite severe limitations imposed by a lack of sufficient operational equipment, the 919th was able to complete several sizeable projects. A D7 dozer worked improving the berm in the 1st Squadron sector of the perimeter and completed a training range for the M-551 Sheridan. Headquarters Troop received approximately 20 loads of laterite and aggregate for their mess hall area. A front loader, 5-ton dump and grader filled and leveled 2nd Squadron's motor pool. Technical assistance and manpower was provided by the 919th for repair of the 11th ACR main chapel and Headquarters Troop mess. In addition, the regimental ASP was improved by construction of gates and fortification of storages conexes. Other projects which relate to base camp development were undertaken by the various platoons and were covered in previous sections of this report.

(e) Army Aviation

1) Employment: In July the regiment moved from Cambodia into an area of operations consisting of portions of Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh Provinces. The Air Cavalry Troop has supported the regiment as well as regional/popular forces and conducted last-light operations in the Capital Military District. Normal daily pink team coverage is given to each squadron in their respective areas of operation. The contacts participated in or initiated by the troop have been greatly reduced over the previous reporting period. Greater reconnaissance effort is required to find the enemy and consumes the majority of the time flown by the troop. Because of the requirement to provide extensive last-light surveillance around the Capital Military District, the troop loses some effectiveness in supporting its local ground units.
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(2) Safety: The regimental safety officer initiated the policy of each air section or troop within the regiment conducting the monthly aviation safety meeting. This is done on a competitive basis and does much to intensify the interest of the agenda for the meeting.

(3) Maintenance: In the latter part of October, the 398th Transportation Company was moved from Long Binh to Di An. It is felt that this move will possibly implement a better aircraft availability rate as the 398th is now consolidated in the immediate area.

(4) Construction: Work has been completed on the regimental heliport with the exception of Pene-Prime. Within the next quarter, the area should be ready to house all aircraft of the Air Cavalry Troop and the Squadron Air Sections. The aviation platoon has continued remedial construction of its heliport near Regimental Headquarters.

(f) Base Camp Development

(a) General: During the reporting period, continued effort was made to upgrade facilities. Some success was met despite a drastic cutback in funding for the post engineer, Pacific Architects and Engineers. Specific areas of improvement were:

(1) Regimental Aviation revetment area: Work begun in late July was continued with increased activity despite the weather. The revetments (38 each) were completed and the area brought to grade. As soon as weather permits, the area will be impacted and peneprimed.

(2) Upgrade of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division standdown area: Engineer contact teams were committed to complete electrical upgrade of the areas to be used by the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division during its standdown. These areas were in an unusable state of repair due to looting and stripping which occurred in the period since the 1st Infantry Division departed Di An.

(3) Base Defense: A total of fourteen new bunkers and two towers were rebuilt.

(4) The roof of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regimental Chapel was replaced. It had been damaged by an explosion in an ammunition storage area.

(5) The MARS station added three 80 foot antennas to improve operations to the United States.
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(b) Problem Areas:

(1) Electricity: During the period it became evident that 24 separate generator sites and low quality distribution systems are inadequate for the needs of the units. Daily outages and low power situations were prevalent through the post.

(2) Engineer support: With the reduction in PA&E assets and workforce, and the increase in operational requirements for the 919th Engineers, the quality and quantity of engineer assistance on post greatly diminished.

5. (c) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Logistics:

(1) General: During the reporting period the logistical posture of the Regiment changed from the previous quarter. 2nd Squadron moved into its new AO centered at Ham Tan. 1st and 3rd Squadron occupied FSB HENDERSON and BANDIT II respectively. The flow of logistical support continued to originate in the Long Binh area with Class III and V supplies being convoyed to all three squadrons. Class I and II supplies were either convoyed or flown to 1st and 3rd Squadrons and flown to 2nd Squadron. One noticeable change in the logistical flow was the relocation of the staging area from plantation Compound to Di An in September. This was necessitated by the movement of the Regiment from Quan Loi to Di An, thereby negating the advantage of operating the staging area at its long established location at Plantation.

(2) Supply and Maintenance:

(a) Class I: Troops in the field continued to receive two hot meals per day, ice, water, soda, and beer in sufficient quantities. Problems were experienced in obtaining sufficient quantities of plastic and paper eating utensils. In October a thorough analysis was made of the problem. The Regiment has been given approval by Saigon Support Command to operate a mission account at the SSSC for each unit of the Regiment. Higher requisition objectives and reorder points were some of the corrective measures instituted by our DSU, the 223rd Supply and Service Company to assist the Regiment in this area.

(b) Classes II and VII: A project was initiated by S-4 in early October to reconcile all tool shortages in the Regiment and obtain bulk issues to replete these shortages. Additional assets of tools and spare parts were transferred to the Regiment from the 25th Infantry
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Division. No real problems were experienced in obtaining Class VII (end item) replacements. Replacement of M548, cargo carriers, continued to lag due to non-availability at Long Binh Depot. In late October, receipt of these vehicles in SVN, ICCV released all back-orders due to the Regiment. AN/PPS-4 radar sets were partially replaced by AN/PPS-5 sets in a program controlled by USARV. By the end of November this exchange program is expected to be completed.

Difficulties were experienced by the Regiment in turning in of excess property, particularly mechanical end items. Revision of the 29th CS Gp Pamphlet 750-10 delineated specific instructions on correct procedures to be used in all turn-ins of excess property. Copies of this pamphlet were distributed throughout the Regiment.

(c) Class IV: Problems were experienced in adequate supply of M8A1 matting due to non-availability at the depot and priorities established by USARV. Lumber supply was adequate.

(d) Classes III and V: No real problems were encountered in these areas.

(e) Aerial Resupply: The Regiment has been allocated 9 hours blade time since its relocation to Di An from Quan Loi, except when tactical situations in other units overload the aircraft capabilities of IIIFORCEV. This blade time was sufficient, due to the fact that until 10 Sept the Regiment was conducting Squadron standdowns. Commencing 10 Sept, lst Cavalry Division (AM) has been supporting 2nd Squadron with CH-47 aircraft. This Chinook Support was supplemented by C7A Air Force Aircraft delivering Class I supplies to the Squadrons. Since 30 Sept, the Regiment has ceased flying missions originating from Di An. It was determined that better use could be made of truck deliveries, thus decreasing the blade time needed by the Regiment. There have been no significant problems in either rotary or fixed wing aerial resupply during the reporting period.

(f) Maintenance: The D/L rate rose on all combat vehicles during the month of October with the exception of the M48A3 Tank. The primary reason for the increase is the increasingly large 0 balance of Class IX repair parts within our DSU Tech Supply and the Long Binh Depot - both over 50%. The IX program has been unsatisfactory for the last three months, especially in the repair of M551 DX Components.

Average deadline rates during the reporting period on selected vehicles:
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ITEM   AUG  SEPT  OCT  AVERAGE

M113A1  4.8   9.0   11.0  8.3
M48A3   14.3  13.0  11.5  12.9
M109 SP How 9.3   9.1  13.3  10.5
M551 AR/AAN 17.3 21.8 24.0 21.0

b. Medical:

(1) General: The health of the Regiment has remained satisfactory since the past quarter. The medical statistics for the current quarter indicate slight variations of certain specific conditions. Worthy of mention is the sharp decrease in the malaria incidence beginning in August. Also, the drug abuse problem has recently come to the attention of all command levels and is currently being dealt with in the 11th ACR through an intensive Drug Amnesty Program.

(2) Injuries:

(a) The incidence of non-battle injuries has increased since the previous report. Total incidence of accidental injury was 1323 cases. However, the number of cases requiring admission to a medical treatment facility was only 69, or an average of 23 per month. Thus, most of the accident cases required only minor medical treatment.

(b) The incidence of battle injuries has greatly decreased during the present reporting period. The total number of cases of injury sustained from hostile action was 65, as compared to 265 during the past period.

(c) A statistical summary of all injuries is shown in Table I.

(3) Diseases: Aside from malaria, there were no significant changes in any reportable conditions since the previous reporting period. The decrease in malaria incidence beginning in August can be attributed to the changes in climate, areas of operation of the Regiment and the increased command emphasis on malaria prevention.

(4) Medicap: Vietnamese civilians were treated by MEDCAP personnel from each squadron and the 37th Medical Company. Emphasis has been placed upon treatment of acute medical problems in conjunction with obtaining tactically oriented intelligence and education of the ARVN medics in the Di An District. An effort is being made to encourage the ARVN medics to assume more responsibility in providing medical supplies.
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(5) Accomplishments/Comments

(a) Drug Amnesty Program: A Regimental Drug Council was established during this reporting period. The Council is actively involved in evaluating the extent of the drug control. Drug Abuse patients are presently being interviewed by a social worker assigned to the 37th Medical Company. In addition, personnel of Air Cavalry Troop can participate in a Drug Advisory Program established by the Regimental Flight Surgeon. This approach to the drug problem involving the reaction of the patients' psychological problems rather than the use of only punitive action has been met with considerable success.

(b) Malaria Prevention: Steps have also been taken to decrease the malaria incidence reported last quarter. Insecticide spray missions have been scheduled on a regular twice-weekly basis in an effort to reduce the mosquito population at each squadron AO. In addition, each squadron commander is required to prepare a formal reply to the Regimental Commander each time a member of his command contracts vivax malaria. This tends to insure the emphasis upon personal protective measures and use of chemoprophylaxis at the troop and company levels.

| TABLE 1 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidence</th>
<th>Admissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle Injuries</td>
<td>1266.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Injuries</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All rates express as incidence or admissions per 1000 troops per year.

| TABLE II |

Significant disease diagnosed during this quarter are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Quarter</th>
<th>Past Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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18 Nov 1970

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>243.0</td>
<td>168.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Noneffectiveness*</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All rates expressed as admission per 1000 troops per year.

*includes man days lost for all admissions to 11th ACR treatment facilities, expressed as sick days per 1000 troops per day.

(c) Religious: In the conduct of the 11th ACR religious program the chaplains section operated with four chaplains, one less than the normal number. They were able to give essentially the same coverage as in previous quarter and noted in their contact with troops that morale seemed generally high. Attendance at services was noted to be slightly less than usual and this has been interpreted as an indication of a lowering of the anxiety level among the men. This is anticipated during periods of light contact with the enemy. The chaplains reported that their Sunday ministeries were well received by the men in the field and their presence with the troops during their operations and in the NDF's during the week seemed to be appreciated by both officers and men.

SPECIFIC: There were 569 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 5478. In 106 of these services communion was offered. The unit chaplains made 1936 pastoral visits to troop areas, hospital and the stockade. A comparison of statistics showed a small decrease in number of services and attendance at services. Participation was still considered to be good. The counselling ministry seemed to demand greater proportion of time and attention of the chaplains. This was possibly due to the fact that operations allowed more time to think and to talk than in previous quarters.

(d) Postal

(1) General: There are currently two officers and forty-three enlisted men assigned at this unit. However, on 15 November 70 the 46th APU will become operational at USA8 at Di An. At this time the 7th APU will once again serve only the 11th ACR. Our strength will drop to one officer and fifteen enlisted men. The 46th APU will assume postal responsibilities for all non-11th ACR units located at Lai Khe, Phu Loi, and Di An which the 7th APU now serves. This will decrease our total number of troops served by approximately seventy percent.

(2) Money order sales for the period 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970 totaled $3,320,860.96. Stamp sales during the same period totaled $40,058.00.

(3) Breakdown of mail received and dispatched is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Dispatched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches (letter mail)</td>
<td>2,989</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks (parcel post)</td>
<td>9,288</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside pieces</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>2,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>2,587</td>
<td>2,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) During the quarter, the postal situation in the Lai Khe, Phu Loi, Di An area was in a state of flux due to relocation of units, and deactivation of units. Troop strength in the area fluctuated almost weekly. In addition, this unit was taxed to provide a certain amount of postal support to 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division during their standdown at Di An.

(5) This unit has already relocated its troop billets, supply areas, and orderly room. In the near future, the 7th APU operations area will also be moved to an area on north post more conducive to serving the 11th ACR.

6. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

   a. Strength: The following are strength by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
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<td>4333</td>
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<td>SEPT</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4543</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4626</td>
<td>95</td>
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   b. Casualties:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>HBD</th>
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<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>SEPT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. MOS Shortages: In the table below the monthly figure represents the number of personnel assigned to the Regiment with the MOS indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17K</td>
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</table>

11E4K  54  13  3  2
45K2T  18  7   6  6

Replacements: Replacements which have arrived in the Regiment this quarter have been MOS qualified and there is no indication that quality of personnel will decrease.

Awards and Decorations:

(1) Statistical Summary of US Awards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze Star Medal/Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Medal</td>
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<td>Army Commendation Medal/Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze Staff Medal/Valor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Medal/Valor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal/Valor</td>
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(2) Statistical Summary of Foreign Awards:

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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Cross of Gallantry with Palm</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cross of Gallantry with Bronze Star</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order 2d Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honor Medal First Class</td>
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<td>Honor Medal Second Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Medal with Gold Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Action Honor Medal</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT FOR
PERIOD ENDING 31 OCT 1970

RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

7. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

   a. General: The period covered from 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970 reflected a decline in our PSYOPs program in the areas of leaflets and aerial broadcast time. During this item, however, there was a realized increase in our face to face PSYOPs program. Total leaflets dropped during the reporting period was 3,521,500 with 12½ actual hours of aerial broadcast time. These totals are approximately 60 and 50 per cent of the respective totals reported in the previous reporting period. The reductions can be directly related to the following items:

      (1) The Regiment is now operating in a low density, minimum contact area. Subsequently, there are fewer contacts and targets, and fewer requirements for quick reaction missions. In our previous area of operation, Cambodia, War Zone C, and Binh Long Province, the majority of our missions were of a quick reaction nature.

      (2) During the current reporting period, the Regiment also suffered a severe reduction of organic blade time. This situation drastically reduced our capabilities to react quickly or to plan long range programs. Instead of Regimental aircraft, we have been forced to rely primarily on aerial missions to be flown by the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). Originally, this support was on an irregular basis, but has recently settled to a twice a week schedule. A request is in at this time to increase this to daily support or as a minimum every other day.

   b. The Chieu Hoi Program: Emphasis during the reporting period was on the Chieu Hoi theme. Results amounted to one Hoi Chanh who actually turned himself in to the Regimental Forces. Other Hoi Chanhs from our areas of operations rallied to GVN and ARVN forces and reflected a dissatisfaction with life under VC influence. Many stated that they had been influenced by our leaflets and tapes, but were reluctant to rally to US forces for fear of being shot while rallying. Exploiting these Hoi Chanhs provided the Regiment a great deal of information and access to numerous base camps and caches.

   c. As stated, an increase of face to face PSYOPs was realized. This increase was related to the following areas:

      (1) First, an increase in the PSYOPs program for the Regimental MEDCAP was initiated. This program primarily consisted of taped music and GVN messages and handouts of safety, hygiene, and news leaflets. This program has proven to be quite popular with the people.
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(2) The trial use, for one month, of an armed propaganda team accounted for the additional increase in face to face PSYOPs. This team came from the Binh Duong Chieu Hoi Center and was used by the 3rd Squadron. This team was just beginning to show benefits when its 30 days had elapsed and had to return to the Chieu Hoi Center.

c. The general attitude of the population within the Regiment's area of operation is as follows:

(1) In our western area of operation, the general attitude of the people could be described as friendly. Initially, the people of Binh My and Binh Co, Phu Giao District, were hesitant to communicate with our forces in that area, however, daily contact and repeated efforts to assist them in any way has improved the situation to a point where information is now volunteered.

(2) The eastern area of operation also presents a friendly attitude toward the Regiment.

9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION: No major civic action projects were undertaken during the reporting period. Vietnamese authorities from each of the three provinces which our areas of operation cover, continue to proceed adequately with their own programs. As a result, very little has been requested from us in the way of support or assistance. That support given was primarily in the form of monetary purchase or donated materials and equipment resources which were not readily available to the Vietnamese. These projects which were aided or completed during the reporting period are as follows:

a. Civic action projects for the Regiment expended a total of 251,120 Vietnamese dollars.

b. Materials for construction of dispensary at Chanh Luu.


d. Road work, Binh My and Binh Co Hamlets.

e. Developed rice paddies around perimeter of RF Compound at Binh My.

f. Road work in Binh Tuy Province.

g. Security improvements of Binh Co RF Compound.

h. Emplaced culverts and road work in Long Khanh Province.

i. Purchased gifts for rice growing contest in Binh Duong Province.


k. Started rebuilding Nursery/Dispensary at Buddhist Orphanage in Di An District.

l. Provided transportation for Scouts of Saigon to attend Jamboree at Lai Thieu.
SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: During ground reconnaissance operations an armored cavalry platoon often has the need for a tracker team or visual trackers. On one such operation the Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP), Air Cavalry Troop, and a platoon of L Troop, 3/11 ARC, spotted a "hot" trail. The ARP had two men who were visual trackers. Their knowledge facilitated the finding of nine (9) various boobytraps along the trail.

EVALUATION: A platoon that has formally trained visual trackers is not hampered by waiting for a tracker team to be flown in. Visual trackers are extremely valuable because of their ability to determine fresh changes in terrain caused by moving personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: A minimum of two personnel from each armored cavalry platoon should be formally trained as visual trackers.

(2) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, numerous automatic ambushes were emplaced in the Regiment's BIEN HOA - BINH DUONG A0. While eleven (11) of these devices were activated by enemy personnel, thirteen (13) were removed by the enemy.

EVALUATION: A concerted intelligence effort by the enemy has aided his discovery of automatic ambushes. Friendly troops can reduce enemy knowledge of automatic ambush locations by using a minimum number of personnel to discretely emplace these devices. When armored vehicles remain near such sites they leave easily distinguishable signs, such as tracks from a temporary defensive laager. One unit achieved deception by never stopping vehicles near a proposed automatic ambush site. The vehicles dropped off their men and picked them up again on the move.

RECOMMENDATION: When emplacing automatic ambushes, a unit must consider the probability that the enemy will watch the ambush be emplaced. A well conceived procedure to deceive the enemy should be devised and changed to avoid setting a pattern.

(3) OBSERVATION: The vast majority of all automatic ambush activating mechanisms involve the use of a trip wire. On one

occasion a VC was killed while he was attempting to roll up the trip wire.

EVALUATION: When using a trip wire activation device, the wire must not be positioned at such a height that it can be seen by the enemy. Other devices could be used to trigger the automatic ambush. Slapstick devices can be simply constructed; however, they must be carefully tested to insure a workable design. Men who design and emplace automatic ambuses should be encouraged to attempt to safely test their ideas.

RECOMMENDATION: Routine designs of automatic ambushes should be avoided. Any new designs must be checked to insure the safety of friendly troops employing the devices.

OBSERVATION: When securing rrome plows, an armored cavalry platoon would have the rrome plows move back away from the area where they were curtir. and the platoon would move forward and recon the area y fire with .50 caliber machineguns and 152mm canister rounds from the Sheridan tanks. This technique successfully prevented the enemy from ambushing the plows.

EVALUATION: Reconnaissance by fire while securing rrome plows is superior to having the armored cavalry enter the jungle to clear the way for the rrome plows because the armored vehicles are forced to follow favorable terrain rather than the azimuth where the land will later be cleared. When reconnaissance by fire is used at unpredictable intervals, the enemy is unlikely to get close enough to gain the advantage of surprise that he must have. In addition, the rounds fired into medium jungle during a reconnaissance by fire have left damage to the foliage up to two hundred meters to the front.

RECOMMENDATION: When securing rrome plows, reconnaissance by fire by the security force at unpredictable intervals should be accomplished whenever possible.

OBSERVATION: Communications between rrome plows during a tactical land clearing operation is essential to insure the security force is able to accomplish its mission.

EVALUATION: The tactical direction of all elements involved in tactical land clearing is the responsibility of the security force commander. The land clearing element commander must be able to control each of his vehicles. Hand signals and voice are unsatisfactory methods of communication due to the visibility in the jungle and the noise created by the plows. Each rrome plow should be equipped with an AN/PRC-25 radio with a headset or CVC helmet. Often it has
been found that the rome plow operators are plagued by ants or bees and they throw smoke grenades to ward off the insects. The security force becomes confused when this happens. A radio would solve this communication problem. When the security force commander decides to utilize reconnaissance by fire to secure the operation, the land clearing commander must be able to withdraw his plows to the center rear of the cutting area. Radio communication will facilitate these maneuvers. All the rome plows have large numbers painted on the rears of the vehicles and direction of the plows in a contact would be immensely simplified by providing the radio communication.

RECOMMENDATION: All rome plows should be equipped with at least an AN/PRC-25 radio with a headset on CVC helmet.

(6) OBSERVATION: When the M113A1 is equipped with the personnel armament subsystem, it is possible to traverse the left side 7.62mm machinegun over the driver's hatch. This is a potentially dangerous situation, since during a contact the driver often raises himself out of his hatch to fire his grenade launcher. At the same time, the machinegunner does not normally use his weapon sights, but rather fires the weapon at hip level, therefore giving him a false impression of the muzzle height of his weapon.

EVALUATION: A device can be fabricated to limit the clockwise traverse of the left machinegun on the M113A1 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV). One solution is to partially fill a 7.62mm Minigun ammunition can with dirt and secure it behind the driver's hatch. This safety device also may serve as a smoke grenade receptacle for the track commander.

RECOMMENDATION: A safety device should be employed to prevent the left machinegunner from traversing his weapon over the driver's hatch on the M113A1 ACAV.

c. Training:

OBSERVATION: CONUS/ITT replacements serving second and third RVN tours and in-country transfers required training before being deployed to the maneuver squadrons.

EVALUATION: The CONUS/ITT replacements needed the complete course of instruction given to first tour replacements. This was due to the changing aspects of the war. These aspects included the scarcity of enemy contacts, and new techniques such as utilizing mechanized ambushes and developing territorial forces. In-country
transfers needed an amount of selected training designed to orient them to operations with the Regiment.

**RECOMMENDATION**: In-country indoctrination training should be conducted for all classes of replacements. This training should be revised periodically to meet changing requirements of combat operations in RVN.

d. **Intelligence**:

(1) **OBSERVATION**: VCI Personality information was not readily available to the Regiment.

**EVALUATION**: Definite need for centralization of all VCI Personality files and VCI trends in the Regimental AO.

**RECOMMENDATION**: Utilizing information obtained by the DIOC's and PIOCC's, National Police Special Branch, and other intelligence agencies operating within our AO, a correlated central file has been established between the above mentioned agencies and the CI Section to insure the continued success of the project.

(2) **OBSERVATION**: Problems encountered by one CI Section and the solutions to these problems were not disseminated to other CI Sections in USARV.

**EVALUATION**: Numerous problems were arising and the CI Sections involved, having no guidance available to them, had to expend numerous hours in research to find a solution. The end result, i.e. the solution, should have been disseminated to the CI Sections throughout USARV to insure that the number of hours spent in research would not be needlessly duplicated should a similar problem arise.

**RECOMMENDATION**: It has been recommended to USARV, AC of S, G-2, CI Section that a seminar for all CI Sections in USARV be held periodically to discuss problems encountered and solutions. The USARV, AC of S, G-2, CI Section had been thinking of initiating such seminars, and now plans to start them in the near future.

(3) **OBSERVATION**: Village sketch maps.
EVALUATION: Combat and intelligence operations in built-up areas have at times been limited by the need for usable, current village and hamlet maps.

RECOMMENDATION: A project was initiated to draw up sketch maps from photo mosaics. Maps of 45 different built-up areas in and around the 11th ACR AO were subsequently drafted and reproduced for use by intelligence and command personnel. The project has shown itself to be particularly useful in areas where extensive road construction has taken place or where sections of villages have been destroyed.

(4) OBSERVATION: Redeployment of Air Force reconnaissance squadrons.

EVALUATION: Air Force redeployment of resources significantly reduced the number of aerial photo missions flown in support of the 11th ACR. The number of photo missions received fell from 22 during the month of June, as an example, to 4 missions in August, 10 in September, and 9 in October.

RECOMMENDATION: Due to reduced Air Force reconnaissance capabilities, a more thorough and economic use must be made out of photo missions received. Besides publishing a photo interpretation report listing items of immediate tactical value, trail studies, village sketch maps, and photo mosaics booklets are currently compiled out of each mission received by the II Section.

(5) OBSERVATION: Briefing/debriefing of VR pilots.

EVALUATION: Method of relaying VR spot reports by radio from pilot to Regimental S-2 was found by itself to be unsatisfactory as a means for gathering information of tactical importance.

RECOMMENDATION: A project was initiated to brief and debrief Scout pilots on a once-a-day basis. This subsequently evolved into a program where a full-time debriefing/briefing specialist was attached to Air Cav Troop in order to update pilots on their areas of interest and to debrief them immediately upon their return from VR missions. The same individual was also tasked with liaison duties between the Regimental S-2 and Air Cav Troop.

(6) OBSERVATION: Utilization of Hoi Chanhs on Operations.
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EVALUATION: Hoi Chanhs can be a very valuable asset to the unit with which they are operating when they are handled properly.

RECOMMENDATION: The Hoi Chanh must be properly handled before he can lead a unit into an area. Time must be taken to explain the direction of march and to point out pertinent terrain features. Once the Hoi Chanh has been oriented and his credibility is established the Hoi Chanh should determine the route of march, otherwise he has a tendency to become confused and lost.

(7) OBSERVATION: Publishing agent reports in the INTSUM.

EVALUATION: Agent reports can be useful aids in pattern analysis, but should be kept in proper perspective.

RECOMMENDATION: When agent reports are published, the source, 525 MI Group, 219 MID, etc., as well as the agent's number, should also be published. This provides an easy reference to determine if one agent or several agents are reporting the same thing by publishing agent numbers in the INTSUM along with the report, as quick check can be made to ascertain what the situation is.

(8) OBSERVATION: Lack of any central control agency for maintaining records on disposition of PW's/Hoi Chanh's.

EVALUATION: At present, no one unit within III Corps makes any attempt to monitor the flow of PW's/Hoi Chanh's with the result that these sources are difficult to find due to the lack of control and overlapping areas of interest, when a PW is captured or a Hoi Chanh rallies it generally becomes a question of who gets there first as concerns the exploitation of any information the source may have.

RECOMMENDATION: Create a central control agency that will maintain records on the disposition of Hoi Chanh's and will insure that the unit which could best utilize the Hoi Chanh is the first to interrogate him.

f. Army Aviation:

(1) OBSERVATION: There has been a lack of reaction ability to our aircraft lost in dense jungle. The Aero-rifle Platoon has often been forced to travel long distances from an available LZ to reach downed aircraft and crews.
EVALUATION: A jungle penetrator was borrowed from USARV G-4 to determine if this would be a significant aid in providing quick reaction by organic air cavalry elements. Since that time, the jungle penetrator mounted on a UH-1H flying cover for Pink Teams has proved invaluable. It has cut down losses of human life and reduced requirements on III Corps medevac companies. In five different situations the jungle hoist allowed Air Cavalry Troop aviation assets to complete a variety of insertions, extractions, and medevacs from within the Troop, minus the usual additional assist from other aviation sources than the 11th ACR.

RECOMMENDATION: It would greatly increase the recovery techniques of an air cavalry troop to have a jungle hoist capability within its Aero-rifle (Lift) Platoon. The saving of time, lives, and resources would more than offset the problem. By adding this capability, commanders would gain a much needed asset and reduce mission load on outside aviation companies. This in turn gives the greatest benefit, no loss of time in extraction of downed crews regardless of terrain.

(2) OBSERVATION: During the Cambodian Campaign, it was realized that there was a need for a system of controlling traffic over a contact area.

EVALUATION: During enemy contact situations within the Regiment, there are usually several aircraft working over the contact area. These include usually a Pink Team, one or more Command and Control Ships, and sometimes a FAC with TAC air support. It was found that aircraft were often flying into each other's traffic pattern or into the gun target line of the Cobra.

RECOMMENDATION: Since FM radio is used by ground commanders and UHF is the Cobra's communication with his LOH, all aircraft within the Regiment and supporting FACS monitor and report to the gunships on the Air Cav Troop VHF. This enables all aircraft to be aware of other aircraft in the area, establishing adequate separation between aircraft.

g. Signal: None.
h. Medical: None.
i. PSYOP/Civic Action: None.
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j. Base Camp Development: None.

k. Artillery:

(1) OBSERVATION: 2/11th ACR supplemented their fire support by employing a NGFS(DE USS Henderson) while operating near the coast in SE Binh Tuy Province.

EVALUATION: Naval gunfire support was not sufficiently responsive, as excessive time was lost in transmitting FO fire requests through artillery channels to the NGLO at brigade.

RECOMMENDATION: Enable FO's with maneuver elements to establish direct FM communications with the ship's gunnery officer.

(2) OBSERVATION: Artillery warning data must be broadcast to aircraft on AWCC nets before a battery commences firing.

EVALUATION: The battery FDC is initially delayed in computing howitzer data, while it is occupied with the determination of air data.

RECOMMENDATION: Artillery liaison station should compute air data and broadcast same to AWCC stations. This enables the battery FDC to devote its full attention to computation of howitzer firing data.

(3) OBSERVATION: Cl V is sometimes stored outside the berm of fire support bases.

EVALUATION: Direct fire weapons firing from the berm in defense of a fire support base might easily cause secondary explosions of Cl V outside of the berm.

RECOMMENDATION: All Cl V should be adequately stored.

(4) OBSERVATION: Wire communications in a howitzer battery are too often cut by vehicle traffic and shrapnel.

EVALUATION: Overheading of telephone wire is not always possible, and buried wire is often torn out when heavy vehicles pass over it.
18 Nov 1970


RECOMMENDATION: 155mm powder cannisters make excellent conduits for telephone lines in a FSB. These buried cannisters provide excellent wire protection from shrapnel, wheeled vehicles, and weather.

1. Chemical:

OBSERVATION: It is a known fact that the garbage dumps of fire support bases are dug up and rummaged through after the fire support base has moved.

EVALUATION: It must be assumed that some of the material removed from these dumps finds its way into the hands of the VC.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the garbage dumps of the fire support bases be seeded with type II CS Crystals at the time of being closed. This can be accomplished by placing B pound bags of CS at 5 meter intervals on top of the garbage dump. A moderate amount of Det Cord should be placed under each bag. The dump should be covered with soil prior to detonation of the charges under the bag of CS. This method of closing a dump will greatly impede the efforts of the VC to recover reusable material.

FOR THE COMMANDER:
4 Incls
Incls B & D w/d HQ DA

DISTRIBUTION:
1-COMR
2-CINC USARPAC
3-CO, USARV
1-CH, USARV
3-CO, IJFFV
3-CO, 1ST CAV DIV (mr.)
1-USAREUR
1-USASAM
1-USWDC
1-US army War College
1-USASCGSC
1-CO, 11th ACB
1-XC, 11th ACB
1-CO, 1/11th ACB
1-CO, 2/11th ACB
1-CO, 3/11th ACB
8-2nd MHD, 11th ACB

OMER E. PIGEON
Major, AG
Adjutant
AVDCOP (18 Nov 70) 1st Ind


D 14, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, AR 96225 24 November 1971

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, ATN: AIFDC-KS, APO 96266

CC: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATN: AMCG-OC, APO 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period 1 August 70 to 31 October 70 from Headquarters, 11th ACR.

[Signature]

F. J. [Name]
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS C3FOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMDO-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOR-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Operations," page 38, paragraph 1b(1); concur. II FFORC FORC unit training programs include specialized training based on experience and requirements appropriate to the tactical area of operations.

   b. Reference item concerning "securing Rome Plows," page 39, paragraph 1b(4); concur. This method of warding off a possible enemy ambush has proved to be one of the most successful, but cannot be used in close proximity to populated areas or authorized working areas, eg., rice paddies or wood cutting areas. Other methods which have been used effectively are artillery preparations in an area ahead of the plows, and sending in an infantry unit to make a physical recon of the area. The artillery preps are limited by the same restrictions as those stated for reconnaissance by fire, plus the minimum safe distance for the type of weapon firing. Using an infantry unit is the least desirable, since the unit is exposed to the same possibility of ambush as the Rome Plows. Of all the means used to ward off a possible ambush, the reconnaissance by fire has proved to be the most effective, and, within the limits mentioned above, the most desirable.

   c. Reference item concerning "safety device for limiting traverse of machine gun," paragraph 1b(6); page 40. To obtain authorization for the proposed alteration, the unit should submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) IAW the provisions of TM 38-750. AR 75C-35 states that equipment cannot be altered without authorization.

   d. Reference item concerning, "Training," page 40, paragraph 1c(1); concur. II FFORC FORC Reg 35C-1 and USARV Supplement 1 to AR 35C-1 require
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

all replacements to receive an area orientation on general subjects at the replacement battalion, and transition training at the unit of his assignment. Commanders establish additional training requirements appropriate to the unit mission and operational conditions.

e. Reference item concerning "Redeployment of Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons," paragraph 1d(4), page 42; concur. This evaluation is somewhat misleading in that the 11th ACR received six of the photo missions they requested from the Air Force during the reporting period. However, this headquarters agrees with the recommendation as submitted: Air Force reconnaissance capabilities are being reduced within MR 3 TACI and more economical use of other available resources will be necessary in the near future, such as Army Mohawk aircraft and the use of prior photo coverage. Many missions flown may be used for a number of intelligence purposes besides those of immediate tactical value; for example, bridge and trail studies, sketch maps and photo mosaics of a given area may all be compiled from a single photo mission.

f. Reference item concerning "Agent Reports," page 43, paragraph 1d(7); nonconcurs. The security classification of source and agent number data often preclude their publication in the INT3UM. However, this headquarters forwards hard copies of all agent reports to subordinate units which are operating within the area of such reports, so that source and agent number data, which are included in the hard copy are available to such units.

g. Reference item concerning "Central Control Agency for PW and Hoi Chanhs," page 43, paragraph 1d(8); nonconcurs. A central control agency for maintaining records on the dispositions of PW and Hoi Chanhs does exist. The III Corps Interrogation Center at Bien Hoa is the central repository for the disposition of all PW and Hoi Chanhs in MR 3. However, it should be noted that the effectiveness of such a repository is dependent on the accuracy and timeliness of the information furnished to it. It is incumbent on all subordinate units within MR 3 to report the disposition of the PW or Hoi Chanh to the Interrogation Center as rapidly as possible, so that the unit which can best exploit the intelligence information can be notified first. The minimum amount of information which must be reported before disposition is realized is the following: the capturing unit, coordinates of capture point, date of capture, and name of PW or Hoi Chanh.

h. Reference item concerning "Artillery warning data," page 45, paragraph 1k(2); nonconcurs. The FOC is the logical place for computation of air warning data. The necessary information can be taken directly
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AVFBC-RE

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1976, RCS CSFR-65 (R2) (U)

from the FADAC. Using additional liaison personnel to compute this data only complicates the system, and enhances the possibilities of errors due to the coordination required.

i. Reference item concerning "Naval gunfire support," page 45, paragraph 1k(1); nonconcur. Naval gunfire support must be requested by the maneuver unit and transmitted to the NGLO location at the brigade tactical operations center. The NGLO obtains the appropriate clearances and transmits the request for naval gunfire support to the ship. After initial contact has been made with the ship, and when warranted by the urgency of the situation, the NGLO may authorize direct communication between a qualified naval gunfire observer and the ship with the NGLO monitoring. If the observer is not qualified or if he uses standard artillery procedure, the adjustments must be relayed through the NGLO who converts artillery corrections into naval gunfire spotting.

j. Reference item concerning "155mm powder cannisters for conduits," page 45, paragraph 1k(4); concur with exception. Using 155mm powder cannister as field expedient conduit is excellent on a temporary basis; however, the cannisters are recoverable and should be turned in for reuse. Their use as conduit should be on emergency basis only.

k. Reference item concerning "seeding closed garbage dumps with persistent CS," page 46, paragraph 11; concur. The suggested use of CS is excellent. To make the recommendation more definitive and useful, it is suggested that approximately two feet of detonation cord be used under each bag of CS2. The use of CS2 is important because it is much more resistant to moisture than CS1, therefore the duration of effectiveness is much longer for CS2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. BARTEL

CPT, AGC

A-1 MAG

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TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTW: GruF-57, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report, Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Operations," page 38, paragraph 1b(1) and 2nd Indorsement, paragraph 2a. The USARV Dog Training Detachment (DID), located at Bien Hoa, has the capability of training Visual Tracker personnel. Recommend units send personnel to the LTD for Visual Tracker Training if personnel from the COMUS training base are not available. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Army aviation," page 43, paragraph 1f(1). Units having a requirement for a jungle penetrator should submit a proposed STOE with justification for subject item. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Control of Airspace," page 44, paragraph 1f(2): nonconcur. Control of airspace immediately over the support area of a ground unit should be controlled by the air mission commander. Instead of control should be determined at the coordination meeting for the operation. This doctrinal issue is constantly being contested as a result of JCS Publication 2 which gives the air component commander single manager responsibility for control of US tactical air resources. This role is filled in Vietnam by the 7th Air Force. Negotiations are underway between USARV and 7th AF attempting to resolve the assignment of airspace control to FAC and US Army aircraft supporting airmobile operations by working out a procedure involving coordination of applicable US Army and Tactical Air Control personnel at the operational level. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy Furn;
11th ACR

W. Stevens Jr.
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (18 Nov 70) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  7 APR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
7th Army Postal Unit
17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment
33rd Chemical Detachment
124th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment
399th Transportation Detachment
409th Radio Research Unit
541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Howitzer Battery

* Attached Support Unit
Annex C

1. (C) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was OPCON to the following organizations during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II FGCN</td>
<td>1 Aug - 15 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>15 Sep - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:
   a. During the reporting period the following units were OPCON to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Aug - 9 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4/9 Inf</td>
<td>16 - 24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/4/9 Inf</td>
<td>22 - 28 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/4/5 Inf</td>
<td>29 Sep - 17 Oct, 22 - 28 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn 4/9 Inf</td>
<td>22 - 24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2/27 Inf</td>
<td>19 - 22 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/27 Inf</td>
<td>17 - 20 Sep, 20 - 25 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team 16, 75th RR</td>
<td>22 - 24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team 21, 75th RR</td>
<td>19 - 22 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th LCC</td>
<td>1 - 22 Aug</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:
   a. 1/1/11 AGR was OPCON to the 4/9 Inf during the period 26 - 28 Oct.
   b. D/1/11 in direct act of 315 LCC (ARBO) during the period 17 - 31 Oct.
   c. The following units were OPCON to 1/11 ACR during the period indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scout Section, 1/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>3 Aug - 31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/4/9 Inf</td>
<td>22 - 24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/4/9 Inf</td>
<td>22 - 28 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn 4/9 Inf</td>
<td>22 - 24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2/27 Inf</td>
<td>19 - 22 Sep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Team 10, 75th Rangers
22 - 24 Oct

4. (C) HQ, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. The 2/11 ACR was OPCON to the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) during the period 9 Sep - 31 Oct.

b. The following organic units of 2/11 ACR were OPCON to other units during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPCON TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 - 16 Aug</td>
<td>2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>26 - 29 Aug</td>
<td>Mtr Cav Trp, 11th ACR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) HQ, 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. The Security Section, HHT/3/11 ACR was OPCON to MAT Team 3-6 during the period 21 - 31 Oct.

b. The following units were OPCON to 3/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/4/9 Inf</td>
<td>16 - 24 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/4/9 Inf</td>
<td>29 Sep - 17 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/27 Inf</td>
<td>17 - 20 Sep, 22 - 25 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team 2D, 75th Rangers</td>
<td>15 - 21 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team 2F, 75th Rangers</td>
<td>2 - 7 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Report - Lessons Learred, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

18 November 1970

N/A

N/A

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