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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

Senior Officer Debriefing Report:
18th Engineer Brigade, Period 3 May 1970 thru 27 April 1971 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, dated 4 November 1966, Subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U).

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG H. C. Schrader, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHDO-DO

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG H. C. Schrader

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D. C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG H. C. Schrader. The report covers the period 3 May 1970 thru 27 April 1971 during which time MG H. C. Schrader served as Commanding General, 18th Engineer Brigade.

2. MG H. C. Schrader is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 18TH ENGINEER BRIGADE
APO 96377

26 April 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report/WG H. C. Schrader

Commanding General
United States Army Engineer Command Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96471

1. This report covers my tenure of command of the 18th Engineer Brigade, with Headquarters at Dong Ba Thin, Vietnam, from 3 May 1970 to 27 April 1971. The report discusses the following principal subjects:

a. Command and Control
b. Administration
c. Logistics
d. Operations
e. ARVN Affiliation

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL:

a. Brigade Headquarters Organization: The Brigade Headquarters did not have a sufficient number of senior staff officers and did not have the strength or functional scope to properly manage a decentralized, technically oriented organization of more than 14,000 officers and men and 2500 local national hire employees. The Brigade Headquarters should have had a Colonel, Chief of Staff, in addition to the Deputy Brigade Commander and Lieutenant Colonels heading principal staff elements. The Headquarters did not have sufficient personnel either in the S-1 or the S-4 Sections and therefore had to operate on an overstrength basis. The Headquarters required a Provost Marshal Section, additional legal personnel and other staff elements normally assigned to a Division Staff.

b. Group/Battalion Structure: The three group structure, each with three to five battalions, provided adequate command and control of attached engineer units. It is important in furtherance of Combat/Operational Support roles that designated engineer battalions identify themselves with the tactical
division or brigade that they are to support. A close day to day working relationship is to be encouraged. Boundary changes between groups or the attachment/detachment of battalions and separate companies was found to be necessary as the workload or the character of the workload changed to balance management responsibilities between the several Group Headquarters. For example, it was for this reason that I dropped the southern boundary of the 937th Engineer Group from QL-19 to QL-21 in June 1970 and shifted the 17th Engineer Battalion from the 35th Group to the 937th, giving each group four battalions.

c. Leadership, Management, and Morale: Since today's unit commanders at platoon, company and battalion levels are faced with deep seated problems which have their origin at the national level, it is imperative that senior commanders assist their subordinate commanders by issuing more specific guidance on how to control drugs, cope with racial problems and deal with dissenters. The inclosure expands on this subject and describes specific actions taken by the 18th Engineer Brigade to insure more effective control of individuals and units.

d. Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers:

(1) Officers: The majority of the officers are reasonably well qualified and motivated to perform their responsibilities in a creditable manner. Group and battalion commanders were outstanding. The shortage of majors and captains (average 60% authorized) created a severe management deficiency in controlling enlisted personnel and achieving the desired efficiency in both staff and construction operations during much of the past year. The majority of the junior officers lacked experience in planning, scheduling, engineering and construction activities. On the average throughout the report period the Brigade had less than 15% career officers assigned (average of 70 RA of a total of 450 officers). Warrant officers were usually at or near 100% strength and generally highly qualified, well-motivated individuals.

(2) Non-Commissioned Officers: The Brigade had a severe shortage of top 3 graders throughout the period, usually at about 65% of authorized strength. There was a severe shortage of qualified NCO's to supervise heavy equipment, crusher, asphalt and road construction operations. Emphasis was placed on training E-5/6 section and squad leaders in managing their operations and training them in their specialties.

3. ADMINISTRATION:

a. Personnel:
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26 April 1971

(1) Officers: The officer assignment system needs to be improved. There is essentially no advance notice as to anticipated officer arrivals except at the Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel levels. Since officers are slated for Vietnam assignments 60 to 90 days prior to arrival in theater it should be possible to forecast their arrival by MOS and grade sufficiently in advance to intelligently plan replacements at all levels. Since this has not been possible, there was unnecessary shifting of company grade officers from one position to another as successive arrivals appeared at Dong Ba Thin with little advance notice.

(2) Enlisted Personnel: Enlisted personnel requisitioning and accounting procedures were not satisfactory. Although engineer groups were to be kept at equal percent of fill, their strengths varied by as much as 10% on several occasions. The manual system employed in filling NCO positions did not provide a satisfactory grade and MOS replacement distribution. There was an urgent need to install the Army's standard automated personnel accounting system in the Brigade.

b. Work Schedule: On 15 June 1970 the Brigade changed from a seven day work week to a 6½ day week, including one-half day of organized maintenance. Officers and men appreciated the half day weekly standdown. This change was determined to be necessary in conducting the long term continuing work program of the 18th Engineer Brigade.

c. Safety: The Brigade had an enviable safety record throughout the report period. The USAFBT safety goal is not realistic and should be reduced to provide a realistic target. It would have been beneficial for the Brigade to have employed a senior civilian safety specialist on a full time basis. The USAFECV safety representative was most helpful but additional professional assistance was required.

d. Reenlistment: The success of this program depends upon (1) continuous command emphasis, (2) the continuity of company, battalion and group commanders and (3) the assignment of the best qualified E-7 NCO counselors at group and battalion levels who keep meticulous follow-up records on all potential reenlistees. Further, all recaps must be aggressively followed on a continuing basis to Department of the Army level. Frequent telephone queries to USARV/DA resulted in expediting many reenlistments.

e. Awards: USARV award policies are adequate except there is insufficient flexibility in awarding the Legion of Merit to exceptionally outstanding officers and NCO's. Throughout one year of command, during which the Brigade exceeded 14,000 officers and men, the Legion of Merit was approved for only Battalion Commanders, Group Commanders and the Brigade Command Sergeant Major. Deserving Brigade, Group and Battalion level staff officers and Group and Battalion Command Sergeants Major deserve to be considered for the Legion of Merit when their manner of performance merits it.
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SUBJECT: After Action Report/MG H. C. Schrader

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Supply: The supply system left much to be desired. Throughout this report period US troop strength was on a continual decline. Emphasis too often was on retrograde of materiel rather than improving the operating effectiveness of remaining units with continuing missions. The construction effort was severely handicapped because of the slowness of obtaining replacement TOE equipment, the slowness in getting equipment repair parts and the failure of the system to provide construction materials to build urgently needed operational support, MACV facilities and base construction projects. Logistical planning apparently failed to consider continuing material requirements for residual construction missions. Perhaps it was assumed that "excesses" should satisfy "requirements" but this certainly was not the case. As the troop drawdown continues there is an urgent need to define in detail continuing logistical requirements so that residual forces will be provided necessary support.

b. TOE Maintenance: Equipment maintenance is not afforded the emphasis or the priority it deserves by most commanders or most logisticians. TAMS will work but too many NCO's and officers fail to involve themselves intimately in the system, don't understand the details of the system and therefore do not insist on following the system step by step and as a result the soldier does not have confidence in it. He prefers to take his chances on "scrounging" rather than trying to make the system work. The logisticians are also at fault because there is a failure to accept responsibility when parts are not available for rapid issue. The logisticians must be "graded" for his failure to accomplish his maintenance responsibilities effectively and commanders at all levels must be held accountable for not operating TAMS properly within their sphere of influence.

c. Contract Maintenance (MCA): MCA equipment contract maintenance worked well when the contractor was assured of contract tenure and when given adequate support at field and headquarters levels. Experience has shown that Brigade and Group Headquarters had to constantly insure that the contractor was provided necessary facility, transportation and administrative support at the field "team" level since battalion and company commanders were inclined to give greatest emphasis to their TOE maintenance with the thought that contract maintenance was more of a higher headquarters' responsibility. This, of course, was far from the truth. In the main the contract maintenance support system was faster and more reliable than the TOE maintenance system. During much of the report period consideration was being given by the Army Materiel Command to replacing the MCA maintenance contractor, apparently to reduce costs by a new competitive selection. Once it was determined that the original contractor would continue, the effectiveness of his operations improved markedly.

d. Facility Maintenance: The considerable reduction in OMA funds during the report period was not in balance with troop and facility drawdown. Considerable troop effort was used throughout the I and II Military
 Regions on structure upgrade and base road maintenance, drainage and security lighting improvements that could have been more economically performed by commercial facilities contract - using local hire employees, had necessary OMA funds been available.

5. OPERATIONS:

a. Planning/Management: Emphasis was placed continuously upon improving planning and management at all levels from Brigade Headquarters to the squad. The majority of our leaders, commissioned and NCO’s, had not been adequately trained in management techniques and did not appreciate the importance of detailed pre-planning of operational and logistical and maintenance support activities, that had to be done before a new construction project or program was begun; the lower the level the more apparent the deficiency was. Detailed management scheduling procedures must be developed and published at all levels and emphasized continuously. Every project, large and small, must be carefully visualized in advance, detailed man-day estimates prepared and actual job progress monitored on a day to day basis to compare actual with predicted progress. Every man should be made constantly aware of how well his unit is meeting planned expectations. Analytical charting was regularly used on the larger programs but the most important point is that the unit employ a graphic or tabular chart that is fully understood and is appreciated by all to be useful, rather than an unnecessary, additional task required by higher headquarters.

b. Combat/Operational Support:

(1) Combat Support: I have the highest praise for Brigade/Group/Battalion/Company level emphasis, priority and accomplishments in every engineer combat support operation that 18th Engineer Brigade units performed. All tactical commanders have been high in their praise of our combat support to include tactical bridging, road and airfield construction, mine sweeping and other combat support tasks.

(2) Operational Support: Brigade units were generally quite responsive in pursuing operational support missions. There is a tendency for tactical units on occasion to place a high priority base construction project into the operational support category. When this occurred it was necessary for the Group Commander and me to discuss the project with the tactical or support commander concerned, and to channel the project to the Engineer Command for approval. The Brigade staff on occasion worked with the appropriate District Engineer and the Engineer Command to obtain proper authority for the project and yet be responsive to the commander to get his project accomplished in a timely manner. The main reason for occasional delay in completing operational support projects was the extreme difficulty usually experienced in obtaining construction materials or delay in obtaining shipment of materials from the depot to the work site. In recent months
an ever increasing number of officers and NCO's had to be employed as supply expediters and today the majority of the construction materials are hauled to the work site by engineer unit trucks. This uneconomical use of trucks and trailers is expected to continue as the Vietnam drawdown proceeds.

c. Line of Communications Construction (LOC):

(1) General: I am proud to have participated in this far sighted construction program, the rebuild of the National Highway System of Vietnam. The LOC Construction Program is one of the largest troop construction programs ever undertaken in an active combat theater of operations. The LOC program is one of the most significant pacification contributions to the war effort. Volumes can, should and will be written on the Corps of Engineers involvement in this program. The courage, perseverance and personal sacrifices of the thousands of officers, NCO's and enlisted personnel who worked on the roads and operated the industrial plants month after month were truly magnificent. I am most pleased that throughout my tenure of command, both the Engineer Command and MACV placed emphasis upon quality rather than quantity, thereby insuring the lasting life of the end product, a road which, with even reasonable maintenance, will last for years to come.

(2) Industrial Complex Control Center (ICCC): The management of each of the eight (8) major industrial complexes operated by 18th Engineer units in the past year required management experience and asphalt and rock crushing expertise not normally found in Army engineer units. The battalion does not have the depth of experience and technical know-how to properly operate and maintain these highly sophisticated industrial complexes. It was for this reason that, in August 1970, I outlined a concept for an "Industrial Complex Control Center" at the group level to centralize the required talent to work directly with industrial complex commanders in maintaining and operating their plants. Group ICCC specialists analyzed industrial plant problems and went on site and stayed there to assist plant managers until their problem was solved. The ICCC monitored each industrial complex on a daily basis, advised the Group Commander concerning the prompt redistribution of equipment as appropriate, followed through on critical material and equipment repair problems and proposed changes to improve production or quality of plant output. Quinton-Budlong Associates personnel, on contract to the Army to advise on the technical aspects of industrial plant operations, road construction and associated civil/electrical/mechanical engineering problems were outstanding. Many of these dedicated professionals went beyond the "line of duty" in assisting and working with our men in the field to get the job done.

(3) Functional Organization: The engineer construction battalion TOE was not suited to the LOC mission in Vietnam. The high turnover rate of officers and men, the difficulty in obtaining trained equipment operators
and construction specialists and the repetitious nature of the LOC road construction mission pointed to the desirability of reorganizing construction battalions along functional lines. Each battalion commander tailored his organization to his needs and his mission. Generally, the horizontal earthmoving capability (6 platoons) was gathered together in either one or two companies, the vertical construction capability was centralized in another company and virtually all dump trucks were brought together under either a TOE Company Headquarters or a provisional unit headquarters. In one instance horizontal effort was divided between two horizontal construction companies, (1) to perform stripping, clearing, and grading and (2) to place and compact sub base and base course. Asphalt cement pavements were laid down by "A" Company and/or attached Construction Support Companies. Crusher and asphalt plant operations were also assigned to either "A" Company or the attached Construction Support Company or a combination of the two.

4. MCA Equipment: The MCA equipment augmentation was very effective. TOE equipment just did not have the capacity to accomplish the production required. MCA equipment held up well. It was unfortunate that there were not sufficient 12 1/2 cy dump trucks, compaction equipment and track drills in country to develop the full production of available LOC battalions. In the 18th Engineer Brigade, because of haul and compaction limitations, it was necessary to place the preponderance of our MCA equipment on QL-14, QL-21 and QL-1 to get these roads finished before units "stood down," thereby severely slowing construction operations on QL-20.

d. Local National Employees: In early December 1970 the Engineer Command requested the Brigade to try to "Vietnamize" LOC construction work with as many "hard skill" local national operators as possible. The Brigade succeeded in hiring more than 600 equipment operators and construction specialists to include truck drivers, front-end loader operators, roller operators, drill crews, quarry specialists, asphalt plant and rock crusher technicians. The Brigade's skilled local labor force increased from approximately 700 men and women to almost 1100 in less than 120 days. It was indeed fortunate that we were able to hire these skilled personnel from RMK, PA&E and others who were phasing down their operations. These capable, trained local nationals will provide a sizable force for maintaining construction/maintenance continuity in Vietnam as US military engineers are withdrawn.

e. Security: Security was always a major consideration for the decentralized construction operations in which we were engaged. The combat battalions in the I Military Region were often secured by the US tactical troops they supported. In the II Military Region, however, supporting security was largely limited to local RF/PF forces. The effectiveness of this security varied from excellent in the Phan Thiet area along QL-1 where the Province Chief, Colonel Nghia, took personal interest in security and construction operations to almost non-existence in some areas. It was, therefore, that in November 1970 I encouraged each LOC battalion to form engineer
security platoons, numbering approximately 40 men each, generally tailored along the lines of the security platoon first organized by the 20th Engineer Battalion in the Pleiku/Weigt-Davis area of operations. Each of these platoons varied in organization and equipment but were basically divided into three reconnaissance squads and armed with rifles, grenade launchers, 81 mm and 4.2" mortars. In several instances these platoons were given 3 to 5 Armored Personnel Carriers, self-propelled quad-fifty machine guns and 40 mm self-propelled "Dusters." These security platoons became more and more important as US tactical forces continued to redeploy and 18th Engineer Brigade troops had to rely on their own security.

f. Aviation Support: 18th Engineer Brigade Headquarters and attached groups were equipped with a total of 6 UH-1 and 16 OH-58 rotary wing aircraft and 2 Beaver fixed wing aircraft. This report would not be complete without emphasizing the importance of Brigade aviation to the accomplishment of Brigade missions. I will always remember the dedicated officers and men who crewed and flew our air missions day after day. These aircraft and their crews were vital to command and control, for movement of critically needed repair parts or in transporting military/civilian specialists where and when needed. In 12 months of operation the Brigade experienced a perfect safety record. The two forced landings that occurred were accomplished in good order. The number and kinds of aircraft authorized was quite satisfactory. It was necessary periodically to redistribute aircraft between Brigade Headquarters and the three groups as workloads and missions changed.

g. Quality Control: Engineering/Construction Management must always be supported by a well planned, aggressive Quality Control (QC) Program. QC must not be delegated to contracting units. QC was retained under battalion headquarters and ICCG control at the group level. Brigade Headquarters continuously monitored construction techniques in the field. The Nuclear Moisture-Density Gauges that were procured by HEDO of the Army Materiel Command at my request in mid 1970 were a valuable adjunct to the Brigade QC Program. Once a construction battalion had worked with these gauges the unit never wanted to be without them again. Percent of compaction, dry weight of material in place and percent moisture content were readily obtained to an acceptable accuracy within minutes with the use of these gauges. By letter, subject: Evaluation of Nuclear Moisture-Density Gauges, 19 April 1971, to Army Concept Team in Vietnam (through CG, USABCV), I recommended the Troxler Gauge be type classified "Standard A" for issue of one to each TOE engineer construction battalion when engaged in a horizontal construction mission.

h. Compaction of Earthwork:

(1) Modified 830 MB compactor test: The Brigade was severely compaction (and haul) limited. The construction battalion TOE does not include suitable earthwork compaction equipment. The HCA A7,000# Heister Compactor performed
well; so did the MCA vibratory roller. I received authorization for the Caterpillar Tractor Company to develop a special kit to modify and install standard Caterpillar compaction components on standard military 830 MB tractor. The kit arrived 1 April 1971 and with the assistance of Mr. Charles Beck, Caterpillar representative, and the Vinneil Corporation Maintenance Shop at Cam Ranh Bay, the modified 77,000-lb compactor was placed in operation by the 815th Engineer Battalion to compact sub base rip rock on QL-20. The equipment was performing well the one time I saw it operate in the field on 16 April 1971. If this test proves satisfactory, consideration should be given to the more extensive use of these modification kits for heavy construction tasks such as are experienced in building LOC roads in Vietnam.

(2) Commercial tractor/compactor comparison test: In March 1971 J recommended an ENSURE procurement contract for the purchase of two (2) Model 834 Caterpillar articulated, rubber tired tractors and two (2) Model 835 compactors to conduct comparison tests with D7E tracked tractors, 830 MB equipment and the modified 830 compactor during the construction of QL-20 in the vicinity of the Dillard Industrial Site in the Military Region. I believe the construction battalion TOE needs to be modified with a mix of tracked and rubber tired equipment, with increased speed and production capacity. Since this section of LOC road is not scheduled for completion until June 1972, there is more than a year available for the 815th Engineer Construction Battalion to conduct the test and at the same time have the benefit of this additional equipment during construction.

6. ARVN AFFILIATION:

a. Specialist Training: ARVN junior officers, NCO's and men were effectively trained by Brigade units. Training was conducted in combat engineer tasks, construction and industrial plant equipment operation and in the technical aspects of quality control testing (soils/asphalt) and route surveying. Brigade engineer commanders learned not to press ARVN Commanders to participate in US training but rather to establish a close personal relationship in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, always letting them know that we were available at any time to help them. I am pleased with the response received.

b. LOC Support: The ARVN Engineers were highly motivated, technically competent road and bridge builders. The 61st ARVN Engineer Construction Battalion has completed 77% of its 52 kilometers of QL-1 in a very professional manner. The 201st Engineer Combat Battalion completed the 3,610 foot, 59 span Tuy Hoa Bridge two months ahead of schedule, with little technical supervision in the latter months of construction. Brigade units employed the "sister battalion" concept in providing logistical and technical support to their ARVN counterparts. US engineer battalions provided 100% of the base course, rock, asphaltic-cement and other construction materials to the ARVN Engineers for their projects. To locate and transport the huge quantities of
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SUBJECT: After Action Report/ MG H. C. Schrader

of materials needed to supply the four battalions building LOC roads and
bridges in II Military Region was a prodigious task. Base course and
asphalt were provided on a weekly quota basis and construction materials
were scheduled in monthly in an effort to get materials to the site 30 to
60 days before needed. Due to the continuing limited availability of rebar,
culvert sections, form lumber, bridge timbers, piling, etc., I announced
a firm policy in September 1970 that ARVN Engineer Units engaged in LOC
construction would be given priority logistical support for construction
materials over US Engineer Battalions engaged in LOC construction. This
policy was closely followed and effectively spurred ARVN Engineers to increased
production.

7. CLOSING STATEMENT:

Command of the 18th Engineer Brigade for the past twelve months has been
a challenging, stimulating, satisfying experience. I am appreciative of
the honor and the confidence shown in giving me the opportunity to command
this great engineer brigade. I have the highest admiration for the officers
and men who served the Brigade and their country so completely day after
day, often under the most difficult circumstances. Yes, our young men today
do want to know more about what they are doing and why they are doing it,
but when they are properly informed and know that the chain of command is
cognizant of their needs, their response was always the same - outstanding.
That very small group of individuals, found in many military units today,
who do not intend to work and cooperate, must be identified quickly and
administratively eliminated from the service so as not to be an imposition
on others in the unit.

The Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade "Furled its Flag" on 18 April 1971.
The withdrawal of the Brigade from active operations in Vietnam after 68
continuous months of service in country marks the end of an era of military
engineering in Vietnam. I am deeply honored to have had the privilege to
command and serve the 18th Engineer Brigade.

/s/H. C. Schrader

H. C. SCHRADER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Leadership, Management, and Morale

1. This paper summarizes my thoughts on the subject of leadership, management, and morale. In brief, because today's unit commanders at platoon, company, and battalion levels are faced with deep-seated problems which have their origin at the national level, it is imperative that senior commanders assist their subordinate commanders by issuing more specific guidance than heretofore. Although the clear delegation of both authority and responsibility are as important today as in the past, subordinate commanders should not be expected to cope with and solve such major issues as drug, racial, and dissenter problems on their own under the umbrella of being a "command responsibility."

2. I suggest the unit commander needs more specific guidance in how to control drugs, cope with racial problems, and deal with dissenters, especially at the company level. There is a need for additional specialist teams to be available on call to assist the commander in dealing with these complex issues. Battalion and company commanders need additional training and guidance in these matters.

3. The theatre position of trying to eliminate persons with unacceptable habits and traits as rapidly as possible is sound. The USARV policy permitting the unit surgeon to substitute for the psychiatrist in certain instances speeds the process. Additional facilities were recently provided to take the "bad actors" off the hands of small unit commanders quickly and to hold them until AR 635-212 or other appropriate action could be taken. Everything possible must be done to identify and eliminate the undesirables quickly.

4. The "Chain of Command" is as important today as it has been in the past in obtaining effective military management. Commanders must use their officers and NCO's to insure total unit involvement. When a unit fails to respond effectively the commander must be counseled and assisted.
in an understanding manner. If he fails to respond, reassign him to a position in which he is more apt to succeed quickly. If an individual cannot adequately perform in his assigned position, he must be informed and reassigned to a position for which he is qualified.

5. The majority of our junior officers, NCO's and enlisted personnel want to do well but too often are not given the time necessary to carry out their missions. There is frustration because they are not adequately trained in accomplishing assigned tasks and are not given the time to learn the job and get it done right. Commanders must take the time to see that subordinates accomplish their assignments completely and hold follow-on tasks in abeyance until the jobs underway are accomplished properly. Partly completed projects, and failure to require adherence to professional standards, cause frustration and resentment at all levels.

6. Lack of "communication" between officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men is often cited as a basic problem in the Army today. I believe this to be a fundamental problem but see little positive action to overcome it. The young men of today will not respond blindly. They want to know what they are doing and why they are doing it. If leaders appreciate this fact and take the time to explain their actions, the vast majority of our men will respond willingly and effectively. The relatively small percentage of dissenters who cannot or will not cooperate must be identified and eliminated from the service.

7. The following specific actions were taken by the 18th Engineer Brigade to insure more effective control of assigned units.

   a. Individual weapons and ammunition were locked in readily accessible arms racks in billets in most unit base areas and issued daily for guard or job site security by senior NCO's in the billets. Frequent unannounced shakedown inspections were conducted to seize unauthorized weapons and other contraband items.

   b. E6 and E7 NCO's joined their squad, platoon, or section in the billets; first sergeants, CSM's, and officers were billeted as close to their men as practicable.
c. Stringent controls were placed upon the dispatch, operation, and use of military vehicles. All battalions operated courtesy patrols along roads traveled by their vehicles. Construction material hauling and administrative trips are accomplished in not less than five (5) vehicle convoys when possible.

d. The Brigade established a goal for eliminating substandard personnel in not to exceed seven days; in five days where possible.

e. Enlisted councils, consisting of not more than six men at grade E5 or below were organized at company and battalion levels to provide the commander a better insight into the grievances that caused discontent at the lowest levels.

f. The Brigade drug program was pursued vigorously, emphasizing the amnesty program, showing approved drug movies, and inviting drug specialists to meet with officers and men to discuss the drug problem. In January 1971 a program of Brigade/Battalion level drug rehabilitation centers was established employing carefully selected "contact" men in each company to counsel and work with individuals who desire help. This program had begun to show encouraging results at the time of this writing.
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**MG H. C. Schrader**

**26 April 1971**

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