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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. General.

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAX QUEEN — HITES.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HITES, 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970, is set forth in Enclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Enclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates of hillheads, LZ's, and FSB's are listed at Enclosure 5.

(5) Mission. The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations to support GVN pacification programs; to locate, pursue and destroy VC/NVA elements attempting to disrupt pacification; to interdict enemy infiltration corridors; to upgrade security of populated areas and territorial forces through combined operations; to secure the major LOC within its AO; and turnover the security of Highway 19 west of the Mang Giang Pass to ARVN.

(6) Concept of Operation. At the beginning of the period, one brigade was operating to the north of Camp Radcliff to interdict enemy infiltration corridors, and one brigade was operating in the Nui Mieu Mountains in conjunction with the 40th ARVN Regiment. At the end of the period, one brigade was conducting combined operations with territorial forces in the populated areas of An Tu District and one brigade was preparing to withdraw from combat in preparation for redeployment activities.

(a) Highway Security. Highway 193 was secured by the mechanized
AVDDH-GC-2C

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SUBJECT: Operations Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Infantry battalion and the armored cavalry squadron under division control. Other routes were secured when necessitated by division units operating in the area.

(b) Reaction Forces. One infantry battalion was stationed at Camp Radcliff, and was engaged in training, security, and patrol activities. This battalion constituted the division reserve and maintained one company on one hour alert, prepared to reinforce division elements, or if directed, relieve or reinforce GVN units.

b. Intelligence.

(1) General. Enemy activity within the division area of operations has consisted of attacks by fire, attacks against lines of communication and sapper attack. The enemy has avoided ground contact and has remained principally in and near Base Areas 226 and 202. At the beginning of the period, the 2nd NVA Regiment and other supporting elements of the 3d NVA Division began to move to the east and north side of Base Area 226. Few reports and captured documents indicate that the 3rd NVA Division Headquarters may be in the process of disbanding and the 400th Sapper Battalion and the 300th Artillery Battalion may now be subordinate to the 2nd NVA Regiment. Both the 2nd and 12th Regiments are reported to be directly subordinate to Military Region 5. The 90th Sapper Battalion moved from Base Area 226 to positions southeast of An Khe and may now be subordinate to the 12th NVA Regiment. The remainder of the enemy forces in the division area of operations remained in the same general locations throughout the period.

(2) Binh Dinh Province.

(a) Activity in Binh Dinh Province was moderate during August. The most significant incident occurred on 28 August when Bridge 19 and a convoy in that vicinity were attacked by small arms, 3.5cm, and recoilless rifle fire from enemy located south of the highway. Documents captured on an enemy KIA in the area identified the attacking unit as a company of the 6th Battalion, 112th NVA Regiment. Camp Radcliff received a sapper attack on 7 August resulting in one sapper KIA, one friendly KIA and light damage to several buildings. On 13 August, LZ Hardtimes, northeast of An Khe, received 15 mortar rounds with negligible effectiveness. On 30 August, the village of Binh Binh south of LZ Hardtimes was attacked by 70/80mm sappers who killed or wounded 20 villagers. On 31 August, the enemy destroyed a culvert on Highway 19 west of An Khe.
(b) Activity was light during September in Binh Dinh Province. There were numerous small contacts with enemy elements who would immediately break contact. Three sapper training areas were discovered in the southern portion of Base Area 226. Division elements were attacked by fire on three occasions while operating in Base Area 226. Ten mortar rounds were received on 18 September, 20 8-40 rounds, and small arms fire on 19 September, and eight mortar rounds on 21 September. A small base camp with an ammunition cache consisting of 15 60mm mortar rounds, 14 recoilless rifle rounds, and six 8-40 rounds was discovered southeast of An Khe.

(c) Activity during October was light. An enemy high point occurred on 4 to 5 October, LZ Action, on Highway 19 west of An Khe, received seven rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire. On the same day, Camp Redcliff received seven rounds of 122mm rocket fire and FSB Schueller received five rounds of B-40 fire. On 5 October, FSB Schueller received 20 to 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and an estimate 1500 rounds of small arms fire. Division elements were attacked by fire on three occasions while operating in Base Area 226. Seven 82mm mortar rounds were received on 8 October, 15 60mm mortar rounds on 9 October, and eight 82mm mortar rounds on 10 October.

(3) Pleiku Province.

(a) Enemy activity in the division area of operations in Pleiku Province was light during August. On 30 August, division elements in the vicinity of Bridge 30, west of the Mung Giang Pass, received four B-40 rounds and small arms fire. At the same time, the enemy partially destroyed a culvert on Highway 19.

(b) During September, activity along Highway 19 increased. The enemy attacked division forces in the area with B-40's and small arms on 3, 4, and 5 September. On 6 and 8 September, the same unit received RPG and small arms fire. The division turned over the security of Highway 19 west of the Mung Giang Pass to ARVN forces on 15 September 1970 and withdrew all forces from Pleiku Province.

(4) Phu Bon/Phu Yen Province. During September, elements of the 4th Division operated in the vicinity of the Phu Bon/Phu Yen border. Activity was light during the operation. There were eight ground to air incidents all with negative results. Division forces were attacked by mortar fire on 14 and 19 September. On 23 September five VC were killed and on 28 September an airstrike accounted for eight enemy KIA.
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20 November 1970

SUGGEST: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(5) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of
31 October 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Estimated Strength</th>
<th>Probable Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd NVA Division HQ</td>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>BS 5315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd NVA Regiment HQ</td>
<td>100 - 200</td>
<td>BR 8371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>150 - 200</td>
<td>BR 8377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td>150 - 200</td>
<td>BR 9968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td>150 - 200</td>
<td>BR 7877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th NVA Regiment HQ</td>
<td>100 - 200</td>
<td>BR 6755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>BR 7449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>BR 7254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>BR 6133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th NVA Regiment HQ</td>
<td>100 - 200</td>
<td>BR 6035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th AA Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>BR 8664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243rd Trans Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 250</td>
<td>BR 4392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246th Trans Battalion</td>
<td>150 - 200</td>
<td>BR 4977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>551st Signal Battalion</td>
<td>250 - 300</td>
<td>BS 7030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600th Medical Battalion</td>
<td>150 - 200</td>
<td>BR 8369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300th Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 300</td>
<td>BR 8465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400th Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 250</td>
<td>BR 8367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>958th Regiment HQ</td>
<td>50 - 100</td>
<td>BR 1526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-2 Battalion</td>
<td>200 - 250</td>
<td>BR 0937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-17 Engineer Co</td>
<td>60 - 70</td>
<td>E of Nang Giang Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-18 Engineer Co</td>
<td>60 - 70</td>
<td>W of Nang Giang Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-15 Local Force Battalion</td>
<td>180 - 200</td>
<td>BR 0824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-12 Co, 407th Sapper Bn.</td>
<td>60 - 75</td>
<td>BR 3569</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>3000 - 4000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Forces</td>
<td>600 - 800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enemy Forces</td>
<td>7160 - 9565</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

(6) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques. The enemy has not
employed any new tactics or techniques during the period. He continues
to avoid contact and limits his offensive action to attacks by fire, harass-
ment of convoys and limited terrorist activity against local villages.

(7) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses.

(a) Personnel.

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA CIA</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC CIA</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lesson Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Weapons.

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<tr>
<td>S/A</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
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(c) Ammunition.

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<tr>
<td>S/A rds</td>
<td>9,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S rds</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
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(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items.

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<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>10,698 lbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>136,400 pages</td>
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(e) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action.

(a) Capabilities.

1. Elements of the 3rdVN Division vicinity of Base Area 226 and southeast of Camp Radcliff are capable of launching battalion size ground attacks supported by weapons up to 140mm rockets.

2. Elements of the 95B Regiment, vicinity Base Area 202, are capable of attacks of multi-company size with supporting fire up to 82mm mortar.

3. Both forces are capable of sapper attacks, attacks by fire, and harassing attacks against Highway 19, populated and military installations.

(b) Vulnerability.

1. Enemy units are subject to airstrikes and artillery fire while moving, in base areas, or when massing for an attack.

2. Enemy munition and food caches are vulnerable to allied search operations.

3. Enemy movement can be detected by a variety of surveillance devices.

4. Enemy base camps can be located by airborne personnel detectors (Snecpy), and red hase (Infra Red) detector devices.

5. Enemy lines of communications are overextended and subject to interdiction by friendly forces.
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROCS GFOR-65 (R2) (U)

6. Low morale, personnel losses and shortages of food and medical supplies provide an excellent climate for psychological warfare operations.

(c) Probable Courses of Action.

1. The enemy will probably avoid ground contact concentrating his offensive on attacks by fire, mining and harassment of lines of communication.

2. The enemy will probably continue to attempt to disrupt the SVN pacification program and probably conduct terrorist activity in local villages.

3. He will probably continue his rice collection activities.

(g) Military Intelligence Activities.

(a) General. During the quarter, intelligence support has been provided to the division in the form of Counterintelligence, Aerial Reconnaissance, Imagery Interpretation, Interrogation of Prisoners of War, and Order of Battle Information. A maximum effort was expended in the collection and production of intelligence to support current and future operations.

(b) Counterintelligence. The operations of the CI Section during the quarter included investigations of sabotage reports, increasing the VIP program, providing intelligence to the Order of Battle and Viet Cong Infrastructure Sections, security checks of indigenous personnel, and the further development and exploitation of agent sources within the Camp Radcliff area. In addition, periodic counterintelligence inspections were administered to subordinate division units to assist their intelligence activities.

(c) Aerial Reconnaissance and Imagery Interpretation. Support has been provided the division in the form of visual reconnaissance, airborne personnel detectors, red haze and photo missions. The importance of the airborne personnel detector (Snoopy) has been increased during the period as it was firmly integrated into division operations. It was used to develop and investigate intelligence reports many times in close support of ground forces. The imagery interpretation section has provided numerous aerial photo coverage studies of proposed operational areas. In addition, the hand held photography capability of this section was continually exploited to locate EZ's and potential enemy targets.
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(d) Interrogation, Prisoners of War. Accurate and timely information
was provided the division by the effective interrogation of prisoners and
the accurate translation of captured documents. The section has provided
continual field support to the division's brigades to insure prompt ex-
ploration of tactical information. Interrogation teams have been assigned
to interrogate prisoners captured by adjacent units. This has insured a
prompt exchange of information between units and it has provided the divi-
sion with timely, accurate usable intelligence.

(e) Order of Battle. The section has provided timely and accurate
analysis of enemy movement, trends, and capabilities. The section has
continued to develop the data processing system of storing intelligence
data. This system has provided prompt detailed information, covering many
categories, to other staff sections and subordinate units. The information
provided by the order of battle section has been essential to the develop-
ment of operational plans and the selection of target areas for future
operations.

(f) Ground Surveillance. Project Dufflebag personnel have expanded
security around Camp Radcliff and along Highway 19 west of Camp Radcliff.
To accomplish this mission 136 sensor devices were emplaced on likely
enemy avenues of approach to Camp Radcliff. These devices are monitored
from Hon Cong Mountain by means of a newly emplaced ESSL monitor that
has an automated monitoring capability that produces a written readout.
In addition, 55 new devices were emplaced along Highway 19 to provide
increasing coverage against enemy activity along this route. These devices
are monitored from Fire Support Bases Schueller and Action, both located
on the highway. Ground surveillance radars and ground sensors have been
integrated into an accurate system capable of locating and tracking the
enemy for either target acquisition of intelligence purposes.

(g) Weather Forecasting.
Support Provided.

1. Hourly weather observations
   4,600
2. Special weather observations
   400
3. Local weather observations
   4,466
4. Routine scheduled forecasts and amendments
   301

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2. Planning forecasts issued to staff agencies 184
6. Aircraft accident reports (summary of weather casting at the time) 13
7. Monthly Climatology Reports for GVN MR 2 3
8. Out of station briefings conducted 92
2. Telephone request for weather information 2,760
10. Area climatology summaries and special area or long range forecasts 6
11. Climatology briefings and safety briefings to aviation companies 2

(11) Radio Research. The 374th Radio Research Company has been continually tasked with the mission of providing the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, through the AGofS, G-2, with timely special intelligence on events in the division area of interest. Though its parent unit is the 313th Radio Research Battalion, located elsewhere, the company was organized as a support unit geared tactically to the ever changing requirements of a combat division. Consequently, detachments and liaison officers have always been deployed with brigade operations, from the South China Sea to Cambodia, to lend direct support to the intelligence requirements of the brigades in the field, and special teams have often been established at battalion fire support bases (FSB) and highway strong points to assist in developing a concise and accurate picture of the battlefield.

c. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Enclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

(b) 1st Brigade. Operation WYNE SPIN II which commenced on 28 July, continued with the 3-8 Infantry and the 3-12 Infantry conducting operations in the northern Nui Mickey Mountains, to locate and destroy enemy forces and installations, in cooperation with elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and four battalions of the 22nd ARVN Division. On 30 July, the 2-35...
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Infantry had combat assaulted into the Fishhook area of the northern An Lao River Valley to conduct reconnaissance operations and to locate enemy forces and installations. Operation WAYNE SPAN terminated 6 August as operations in the Nui Musu Mountains were not productive.

1. On 6 August, the 1-14 Infantry chopped to 1st Brigade and Operation WAYNE PIERCE, with 1-14 Infantry and 2-35 Infantry, was initiated in the Fishhook area of the An Lao Valley to locate and destroy enemy forces, installations and resources of the 3rd NVA Division. On 9 August, the 3-8 Infantry chopped to division control for training standdown. On 14 August, the 1st Brigade conducted a redistribution of forces as the 1-14 Infantry airlifted into Camp Redcliff to conduct a training standdown and the 3-12 Infantry moved overland from Camp Redcliff to LZ Beaver. On 15 August, the 3-12 Infantry conducted multiple combat assaults into the northern area of the An Lao Valley. Operation WAYNE PIERCE continued with the 2-35 Infantry and the 3-12 Infantry conducting search, destroy, and ambush operations throughout the Fishhook and An Lao Valley region. In addition to their assigned missions, the 1st Brigade elements also served as a blocking force for the 173rd Airborne Division, which was operating to the north. On 27 August, Operation WAYNE PIERCE terminated and all elements withdrew from the area of operation utilizing a combination of airlift and overland movements, and returned to Camp Redcliff. The 22 day operation resulted in 10 enemy killed and 12 small arms captured.

2. On 28 August, in response to a contact on Highway 19, the 1-22 Infantry chopped to the 1st Brigade and Operation WAYNE FORGE was initiated to deploy the 1st Brigade against suspected elements of the 6th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment working along the ROK/US boundary. The following day, the 3-12 Infantry moved overland into the area of operation and initiated search and ambush operations. On 8 September, 2-35 Infantry moved overland to Phu Yen and Phu Bon Province. 2-35 Infantry combat assaulted into their objective area in the vicinity of BQ 670700 on 9 September. On the following day, two RF companies from Phu Tuc District were combat assaulted into the 2-35 Infantry area of operation. During the three week operation, a total of five RF companies from Phu Ben Province were rotated in the combined operations with 2-35 Infantry. Only two RF companies were in the area at one time. On 20 September, 3-12 Infantry airlifted to Camp Redcliff, chopped to division control, and began a standdown to train and prepare for future operations. On 30 September, the final two RF companies airlifted from the 2-35 Infantry area of operation as 1st Brigade terminated

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operations in Phu Son and Phu Yen Province. 2-35 Infantry airlifted to Phu Xuan on 1 October and moved to Camp Radcliff on 2 October. The results of the three week combined operation were 16 enemy KIA, one POW, and five small arms captured. On 4 October, 1-14 Infantry began operations northwest of Base Area 226 along the Song Con River (BR 6080). On 12 October, 1-22 Infantry airlifted to Camp Radcliff terminating Operation WINE FORGE.

3. On 10 October, 3-8 Infantry chopped to 1st Brigade and moved into an area of operation 15 kilometers southwest of Camp Radcliff, beginning Operation WINE SABRE. Operation WINE SABRE was designed to increase the security of populated areas in the An Khe area, prevent enemy interdiction of Highway 19, and upgrade the operational capabilities of territorial forces. On 14 October, 3-12 Infantry began operations northeast of Camp Radcliff in the vicinity of BR 5252. The operation was designed to upgrade security of the populated area and conduct combined operations between US Forces and local RF/PF forces. Company K, 75th Rangers joined 1st Brigade operations on 15 October with the insertion of four teams southwest of Camp Radcliff to locate and destroy elements of the 95B NVN Regiment. On 18 October, the 1-14 Infantry terminated operations along the Song Con River and airlifted to Camp Radcliff for a three day standdown before convoying to LZ Hardtimes to begin combined operations with local RF/PF forces.

4. On 30 October, Company K, 75th Rangers reverted to division control and the 3-8 Infantry moved to Camp Radcliff to standdown. At the close of the reporting period, 1st Brigade was continuing combined operations in the An Tu District with 1-14 Infantry and 3-12 Infantry.

(c) 2nd Brigade. Operation PUTNAM PARAGON, which commenced on 19 May, continued throughout August with the 1-12 Infantry, 1-22 Infantry, and 1-14 Infantry conducting search and destroy operations against the 3rd NVN Division in the vicinity of BR 3070, BR 5282, and BS 4807. On 6 August, the 2nd Brigade released operational control of the 1-14 Infantry and was joined by the 3-8 Infantry. On 9 August, the 2nd Brigade initiated operations in cooperation and coordination with three battalions of the 22nd ARVN Division in the vicinity of the Suoi Kon Valley to disrupt the enemy's infiltration corridor. As the 3-8 Infantry conducted multiple combat assaults for surveillance and interdiction, the 1-12 Infantry airlifted to Camp Radcliff to conduct a training standdown and to prepare for future operations. Continued operations by the 2nd Brigade in the Suoi Kon River Valley (BR 6075), restricted the freedom of movement by enemy elements in the area. Reacting to intelligence reports and sightings in and around Base Area 226, the 2nd Brigade employed three
battalions to locate and destroy enemy forces in that area. The employment of the 3-8 Infantry, 1-12 Infantry and the 1-14 Infantry caused enemy elements to relocate their units to prevent contact with US Forces. Other small unit contacts accounted for 14 enemy soldiers killed during August.

1. Operation PUTNAM PARAGON continued during September with three maneuver battalions in the vicinity of Base Area 226. 1-12 Infantry, 1-14 Infantry, and 3-8 Infantry conducted search and ambush operations in the area with platoon and squad patrols and mechanical ambushes. On 5 September, the 3-8 Infantry was chopped to division control and airlifted to Camp Radcliff to begin a standdown. The same day the 2nd Brigade moved its command post from Camp Radcliff to LZ Uplift. On 6 September, 1-12 Infantry and 1-14 Infantry combat assaulted and airlifted eight company sized units to new locations in Base Area 226, as the 2nd Brigade continued to restrict the enemy's freedom of movement in that area. On 13 September, 3-8 Infantry was chopped back to 2nd Brigade and airlifted into Base Area 226. 1-14 Infantry airlifted to Camp Radcliff on 27 September to begin a standdown to train and prepare for future operations. 3-12 Infantry was chopped to 2nd Brigade on 27 September and airlifted into Base Area 226. The successful employment of squad and platoon size patrols and mechanical ambushes accounted for 24 enemy killed and the capture of 12 small arms in Base Area 226 during September.

2. In conjunction with Operation PUTNAM PARAGON, the 2nd Brigade conducted Operation TIGER MOUNTAIN with one Ranger company (K-75) and a direct support 155 SP Howitzer Battery (A/5-16 Artillery). This operation was aimed at locating and capturing enemy forces, equipment and documents in the Tiger Mountain area (BR 9393). Operations commenced on 26 September and terminated on 10 October with the Ranger company reverting to division control.

3. 2nd Brigade continued Operation PUTNAM PARAGON into October with three infantry battalions in Base Area 226. On 5 October, 2-35 Infantry replaced 1-12 Infantry in Base Area 226. On 10 October, 3-12 Infantry replaced 1-12 Infantry in Base Area 226. On 10 October, 3-12 Infantry airlifted out of Base Area 226. On 12 October, 2-35 Infantry left Base Area 226 and 2nd Brigade CP moved to Camp Radcliff from LZ Uplift terminating Operation PUTNAM PARAGON.

4. Operation PUTNAM VALLEY commenced on 13 October when 1-12 Infantry began operations in the Vinh Thanh Valley to strengthen security of populated areas and upgrade local territorial forces. The termination of Operation PUTNAM VALLEY on 24 October terminated 2nd Brigade tactical operations.
5. On 24 October, the 1-22 Infantry ceased combat operations with the 4th Infantry Division. On 26 October, the 2-35 Infantry ceased combat operations with the 4th Infantry Division. At the close of the reporting period, the 2nd Brigade had control of the 1-12 Infantry and was conducting standdown operations.

(d) Armored Cavalry Operations. The 1-10 Cavalry continued Operation PHUK SILVER which commenced on 2 March 1970 with primary responsibility of convoy security along the assigned area of operation of Highway 19. This mission was accomplished by establishing a series of observation points located on key terrain features north and south of the highway. Selection of these observation points was based upon maximum observation of the highway, fields of fire and likely enemy avenues of approach. Each observation point was manned by a track vehicle with a series of platoon (nom) bases being established at critical bridges requiring 24 hour security. During the hours of darkness, all bridge sites were physically manned or ambushed to prevent enemy destruction. Night ambushes were employed utilizing night observation devices. In addition, mechanical ambushes were utilized to the maximum in an offensive role. Enemy interdiction of the highway was reduced by conducting troop size area and zone reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations.

1. The squadron air cavalry troop (OPCON to division) assisted in the highway security mission by conducting aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. The air cavalry troop also countered enemy interdiction by conducting limited offensive operations.

2. On 15 October 1970, the squadron was relieved of the western portion of their area of operation by the 3rd LRH Cavalry Regiment from coordinates 36 245490 west to vicinity Bridge 34 (JR 9348). This released A/1-10 Cavalry of their highway responsibility and allowed them to initiate operations northwest of Camp Radcliff to locate and destroy enemy installations and prevent interdiction of Highway 19.

(e) Division Controlled Operations. During August, the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry conducted operations south of Highway 19 and east of the Dak Fuyen River. The battalion conducted operations west of the Mong Giang Pass and south of Highway 19 during the first half of September. The battalion also conducted operations north of Camp Radcliff for the period 25 September to 11 October 1970.

1. Operation BRIDES BLUE, which commenced on 2 July, continued with the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry conducting search and clear operations south...
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and southwest of Camp Radcliff to locate and destroy enemy forces, facili-
ties, and supplies of the 95B NVA Regiment. Extensive mounted operations
were conducted to destroy crops within the area and to establish trails
that could be used by reaction forces operating in the area. Operation
BRINDIES BLUE terminated on 25 August and the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry moved
overland to Camp Radcliff to conduct a maintenance standdown.

2. 2-8 Mechanized Infantry began the month of September operating
west of Camp Radcliff (ER 2050) to prevent enemy interdiction of Highway
19 with its command post at LZ Blackhawk. Two companies and the Flame
Platoon conducted extensive mounted and dismounted patrols, saturation
ambushes and mechanical ambushes at night. On 16 September, the battalion
moved to Camp Radcliff and began a standdown to train and prepare for
future operations.

3. On 25 September, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry moved overland into an
area of operation 15 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff (ER 4660) and
initiated Operation MURRAY BLUE. Two companies conducted mounted and
dismounted operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, supplies, and
installations. Operation MURRAY BLUE terminated on 11 October and the
2-8 Mechanized Infantry moved overland to Camp Radcliff for a maintenance
standdown.

(f) Division Artillery.

1. 1st Brigade. At the start of the reporting period, the 1st Bri-
gade supported by 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was participating in Opera-
tion WAYNE SPAN II with B/4-29 Artillery and C/6-29 Artillery positioned
at FSB Uplift in support of operations in the Nui Mieu Mountains, while
A/4-42 Artillery and 1A/1-92 Artillery were located at FSB Powder sup-
porting elements in the Fishhook area. On termination of this operation,
B and C/6-29 Artillery moved overland to Camp Radcliff and were placed
OPC's to 4-42 Artillery. The two units in the Fishhook area remained in
position as Operation WAYNE FORGE commenced on 6 August. During Opera-
tion WAYNE FORGE, B-29 Artillery supported the 1st Brigade with 1/6-29
Artillery, A and C/4-42 Artillery. Initially, A/6-29 Artillery and C/4-42
Artillery supported the operation from firing positions at Camp Radcliff.
On 6 September, A/6-29 Artillery and C/4-42 Artillery moved to Fire Sup-
port Bases Lincoln and Winnie respectively. 1/4-42 Artillery moved to FSB
Hastings on 9 September. On 3 October, 1/4-42 Artillery moved to Camp
Radcliff and reverted to control of its parent organization. On 14 October,
the final phase of Operation WAYNE FORGE terminated and 1/4-42 Artillery
airlifted to Camp Radcliff and reverted to the control of its parent

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organization. Operation WAYNE SABRE commenced on 4 October with 4/6-29
Artillery airlifting to FSB Challenge to support the initial phase of the
operation. On 10 October, C/6-29 Artillery moved overland to FSB Schueller
to support 3-8 Infantry. B/6-29 Artillery closed Camp Radcliff on 10 Oc-
tober and reverted to control of 6-29 Artillery. C/6-29 Artillery returned
to Camp Radcliff on 15 October 1970. At the close of the reporting period,
Operation WAYNE SABRE continued with 4/6-29 Artillery furnishing support
from FSB Hardtimes.

2. 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Brigade supported by the 4-42 Artillery began
the reporting period with Operation PUTNAM EAGLE in process, continuing
the mission of interdiction of enemy routes of resupply in Binh Dinh
Province. The 4-42 Artillery was composed of B/4-42 Artillery at FSB Ute,
C/4-42 Artillery at FSB Terrace, and 3/6-29 Artillery at FSB Hooper. On
6 August, 4/6-29 Artillery airlifted to Camp Radcliff and reverted to
control of 6-29 Artillery. On 9 August, the TAC command post 4-42 Art-
illery and C/6-29 Artillery occupies FSB Toughie. Also on 9 August, B/4-42
Artillery and 1-12 Infantry closed out FSB Ute and airlifted to Camp Rad-
cliff for a training standoff. On 19 August, the 2nd Brigade reacted to
heavy enemy activity in the northern Base area 226 by sending B/4-42 Art-
illery and 1-12 Infantry to FSB Augusta. B/6-29 Artillery became OPCON to
3/4-2 Artillery on 31 August and moved from Camp Radcliff to FSB John Henry.
Also on 21 August, C/4-42 Artillery moved to Camp Radcliff for augmentation
to base camp defense. During the period 1 August through 21 August, B/4-42
Artillery at FSB Terrace was in direct support of 1-22 Infantry and fired
24 contact missions. A/4-42 Artillery returned to 4-42 Artillery control
on 27 August and moved to Camp Radcliff for augmentation to base camp de-
fense. On 5 September, 2nd Brigade moved its command post from Camp Rad-
cliff to FSB Uplift and closed FSB Toughie, the 4-42 Artillery TAC command
post airlifted to FSB Crystal. C/6-29 Artillery returned to Camp Radcliff
to assume the mission of augmenting the base camp defense. On 6 September,
1-14 Infantry closed out FSB John Henry and combat assaulted into FSB Digger
and was followed by B/6-29 Artillery. On 13 September, C/6-29 Artillery
became OPCON to 4-42 Artillery and moved by air from Camp Radcliff to FSB
Football in direct support of 3-8 Infantry. On 21 September, a platoon
of 8 inch Howitzers from B/5-16 Artillery moved into position in the
vicinity of BR 645-85 to engage a bunker complex discovered by B/3-8
Infantry. Ninety-six HE rounds were expended, severely damaging the
bunker/cave complex. On 26 September, A/5-16 Artillery road marched from
FSB Crystal to FSB Two Bits to support a K-75 Ranger operation under 2nd
Brigade control in the Tiger Mountain area. A/4-42 Artillery moved from
FSB Washington to Camp Radcliff on 2 October to augment the base camp
defense. Also on 2 October, B/5-16 Artillery moved into position to fire

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on a bunker complex discovered by D/3-12 Infantry in the vicinity of BR 764564. Thirty HE rounds were expended, destroying some of the bunkers. On 3 October, B/5-16 Artillery engaged a bunker complex discovered by D/3-12 Infantry in the vicinity of BR 751654 destroying the complex with 39 HE rounds. On 7 October, C/6-29 Artillery moved from FSB Football to Camp Radcliff for augmentation to base camp defense. On 10 October, B/6-29 Artillery moved from FSB Digger to Camp Radcliff for augmentation to base camp defense. On 12 October, B/4-42 Artillery moved by air from FSB Augusta to Camp Radcliff to augment base camp defense. Operation PUTNAM PARAGON terminated on 12 October. On 13 October, the 4-42 Artillery TAC command post closed back into Camp Radcliff as did A/5-16 Artillery. Also on 13 October, A/4-42 Artillery moved from Camp Radcliff to FSB Hardtimes in direct support of the 1-12 Infantry to begin Operation PUTNAM VALLEY. Operation PUTNAM VALLEY terminated on 24 October with all 2nd Brigade units moving to Camp Radcliff for standdown operations.

3. 1-10 Cavalry, under division control, had the mission of securing Highway 19 and conducting operations in the vicinity of the highway. The 5-16 Artillery, in addition to general support mission, provided a liaison section and one 155mm SP battery in direct support. In early August, B/5-16 Artillery was in direct support of the 1-10 Cavalry, with three tubes at LZ Blackhawk and three tubes at FSB Lotion. In addition, divisional artillery at Camp Radcliff and FSB Schueller fired in support of operations along Highway 19. On 25 August, C/5-16 Artillery occupied FSB Action and assumed the direct support mission. The three tubes of B/5-16 Artillery at FSB Action moved to the south end of Camp Radcliff and on 1 September joined the remainder of the battery at FSB Blackhawk to support 2-8 Mechanized Infantry operations south of the highway. On 18 September, B/5-16 Artillery returned to Camp Radcliff as the ARVN 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment assumed responsibility for Highway 19 from the Mang Giang Pass to Pleiku.

4. 2-8 Mechanized Infantry performed a number of operations under division control during the reporting period. The 5-16 Artillery provided a liaison section, forward observation parties and one 155mm SP battery in direct support. 2-8 Mechanized Infantry started the reporting period conducting sweep operations south of Highway 19 with C/5-16 Artillery at FSB Frustration in direct support. On 25 August, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry returned to Camp Radcliff for standdown and C/5-16 Artillery assumed a direct support mission for the 1-10 Cavalry. On 1 September, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry initiated screening operations south of Highway 19 with B/5-16 Artillery. These operations lasted until 16 September with B/5-16 Artillery returning to Camp Radcliff on 18 September. During
the period 25 September through 11 October, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry conducted search and destroy operations north of Camp Radcliff with B/5-16 Artillery in direct support. At the end of the reporting period, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry was conducting standdown and B/5-16 Artillery had reverted to its battalion's general support mission.

(g) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 2, Inclosure 4, at the end of the reporting period.

(2) Summary of OPLANS and OPORDS published.

(a) Background Information. Toward the end of July, the division was well dispersed over Boh Dinh Province. 1st Brigade was conducting Operation WAYNE SPAN with two infantry battalions, 3-8 Infantry and 3-12 Infantry, in the northern Nui Mieu's in conjunction with two battalions of the 40th ARVN Regiment operating in the southern Nui Mieu's, and two battalions of the 41st Regiment and one battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade operating along the base of the Nui Mieu's. This operation was the second in a series of combined operations with 22nd ARVN Division, the first having been conducted in the "Crows Foot" area early in the month. In addition to the two battalions in the Nui Mieu's, one battalion of the 1st Brigade, 2-35 Infantry, was conducting reconnaissance operations in the upper An Lao River valley area, known as the "Fishhook," in an effort to locate the rear headquarters and service elements of 3rd NVA Division. This operation was also being conducted with a view towards developing another target for joint operations with 22nd ARVN Division. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation PUTNAM PAILGON north and northeast of Long, with 1-12 Infantry, 1-14 Infantry, and 1-22 Infantry. This was a continuing operation begun at the end of May originally targeted against the Gia Lai Provincial Unit. Since that time, the brigade's battalions had moved north and northeast with their current mission being to interdict the two major enemy infiltration corridors, the Song Ba River Valley and the Song Con River Valley. To accomplish this mission, the brigade had 1-12 Infantry targeted against the Song Ba and 1-22 Infantry and 1-14 Infantry targeted against the Song Con. The 1-22 Infantry was also positioned to comply a CRID operation being conducted in Base Area 226. Throughout the month, intelligence had indicated the enemy was moving to the northwest out of Base Area 226 and it was hoped that 1-22 Infantry could prevent the enemy's exfiltration from that area by interdicting one of his major corridors. 2-8 Mechanized Infantry (-) was continuing Operation BRANDIES BLUE targeted against the 953 NVA Regiment and Base Area 202. This was an attempt at conducting mounted type operations against an enemy force that had traditionally avoided contact except for harassing type
actions of short duration. The object of conducting this mounted operation was to cross the Song Ba River as expeditiously as possible, and conduct a mounted attack along two axes of advance towards the enemy's base area in an attempt to catch the enemy off balance and engage him before he had time to withdraw from the area. 2-8 Mechanized Infantry at this time had only two of its organic mechanized companies, since one company was OPCON to 1-10 Cavalry, which in turn had one troop supporting the CRID operation. 1-10 Cavalry (-) with one mechanized company from 2-8 Mechanized Infantry continued Operation PANK SILVER designed to secure Highway 19 and its critical bridges from the Pleiku Defense Sector to the 4th Infantry Division/CRID boundary in the vicinity of the An Khe Pass. At the end of the month the cavalry's third troop (-) had just completed operations in the mouth of the Suoi Ca Valley in support of CRID operations in Base Area 226. It would return to Camp Redcliff on 1 August and undergo a two day maintenance standdown and then CHOP to 2-8 Mechanized Infantry for operations with that unit against 95B NVA Regiment.

(b) Operations 1-31 August 1970.

1. At the beginning of August, it became obvious that 1st Brigade's operation in the Nui Mieu was not going to be productive. While the battalion operating in the "Fishhook" area had not had any major contacts, the area looked more lucrative. This, combined with an impending Americal Division operation to reevaluate its current disposition of 1st Brigade forces. ARVN had also taken a good hard look at the Nui Mieu and decided that the effort was not worth it. Coordination was initiated with 22nd ARVN Division and it was mutually agreed upon to terminate operations in the Nui Mieu on or about 5 August 1970. The task organization for combat of the division at the beginning of August was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
<th>2nd Brigade</th>
<th>Division Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-8 Infantry</td>
<td>1-12 Infantry</td>
<td>2-8 Mech (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12 Infantry</td>
<td>1-14 Infantry</td>
<td>G (-)/1-10 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-35 Infantry</td>
<td>1-22 Infantry</td>
<td>1-10 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L/2-8 Mech (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>K-75 Rangers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Also affecting the termination of operations in the Nui Mieu was the increasing contacts being made by 2nd Brigade along the Song Con River and on the periphery of western Base Area 226, especially with 1-22 Infantry. Since it was desirable to continue combined operations with 22nd ARVN Division, an analysis of various target areas was conducted. The three areas given consideration were Base Area 226, An Lec Valley.
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(Fishhook), and Phu Cat Mountains. The Phu Cat Mountains fell within the
CRID area of operation, and based on the past experience of the division
in attempting to get the CRID to relinquish an area of operation to the
division for operations, it was almost immediately disregarded. The An
Lao Valley looked like a lucrative area; however, it was doubtful that the
employment of more than two or three battalions would be worth it. This
then left Base Area 226. 1-12 Infantry had been having numerous con-
tacts in the area and the intelligence Reports indicated the possibility
of a substantial enemy force operating in the area. This was also tied
with the recent CRID operation in that the enemy had apparently moved
to the northwest to avoid the CRID sweeps and was currently straddling
the boundary between the division and the CRID. With the completion of the
CRID operation on 1 August, the temporary area of operation given to the
CRID terminated, thereby giving the division access to the area.

3. Taking all of the factors stated above into consideration, the
division took the following action: On 4 August FRAGO 53-70 was published
terminating operations in the Nui Midias and orienting the 1st Brigade
forces towards the Fishhook area. Actually, this only constituted a change
of one battalion since the division had organized a seven day training
standdown program in which each battalion would participate, with the
3-12 Infantry being chosen as the first unit. To compensate for the loss
of the 3-12 Infantry, division placed 1-14 Infantry a second Brigade bat-
tallon, OPCON to 1st Brigade. The location of the 1-14 Infantry at the
beginning of August was such that it only required a short move to the
north to be in position to participate in operations with the 1st Brigade.
Also, 3-8 Infantry, a 1st Brigade unit, was placed OPCON to 2nd Brigade
because of the division's desire to weight the operation in Base Area 226
with at least two battalions.

4. On 6 August 1970, FRAGO 54-70 was published. This FRAGO actually
complemented FRAGO 52-70 in that it was directed towards getting 2nd
Brigade invested into Base Area 226 with 22nd ARVN Division, while FRAGO
52-70 was designed to get 1st Brigade invested into the Fishhook area.
The tactical plan for 2nd Brigade had been coordinated with 22nd ARVN
Division and basically called for the ARVN to work the east side, and for
the division to work the west side of a mutually agreed upon area of
operation. Since this was the third combined operation with 22nd ARVN
Division within the last month, coordination at division level was done
quickly and efficiently. Whereas with the last two combined operations
a number of long and detailed coordination sessions were required, this
one was dispensed with in a short period of time with all sides reaching
agreement quickly. Because of the possibility of establishing a docu
contact with the enemy, the division placed a number of its resources behind the operation. The rangers were given an area in which to operate that complimented the combined area of operations. D Troop, 1-10 Cavalry was given a recon zone to operate in which also complimented the combined area of operations. 2nd Brigade was instructed to establish liaison and coordination with the ADFs in Vinh Thanh Valley, at FSB Hardtimes, and attempt to have them operate with our forces in an area that the enemy would likely try to exfiltrate. The operation commenced on 9 August with the two battalions of 2nd Brigade, 3-8 Infantry and 1-22 Infantry, moving into position and the ARVN's initiative, their operation on 10 August. The task organization for combat of the division was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>K-75 Rangers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

On 6 August, the 1st Brigade with its new mission in the Fishhook terminated Operation WAYNE SPAN and initiated Operation WAYNE PIERCE. This was the only operational name change effected at this time.

5. At the beginning of August, with the close out of 1st Brigade operations in the Aol Mieu, I Field Force directed the division to deploy one battalion to Tay An District, Phu Yen Province. The mission of the battalion would be to upgrade the territorial forces through combined operations. It was envisioned that the battalion would operate in one district for about two months and then move on to another district. The 1-12 Infantry was selected for this mission and, in order to properly prepare and reorient the battalion, it was moved to Camp Radcliff on 9 August. It was envisioned that the battalion would conduct training and personnel services for approximately 5-6 days then move to Phu Yen. One problem that had not been solved was that of obtaining an area of operation for the battalion to operate in. Phu Yen Province was part of the CRID area of operation and they were reluctant to allow a US unit into their area. However, I Field Force had hopes that by 15 August this problem could be resolved. The move of 1-12 Infantry to Camp Radcliff was also covered in FGGO 54-70.

On 12 August 1970, division published FRAGO 55-70. The main
purpose of this FRAGO was to switch the training standdown battalion and reorient the 1st Brigade operation in the Fishhook area more to the east to take advantage of the American Division operation across the I/II Corps boundary and 173rd Airborne Brigade one company operated along the coast. Consequently, 1-14 Infantry was airlifted out of the field west of the Fishhook and 3-12 Infantry was inserted into an area of operation east of the Fishhook. All other operations and units remained the same.

7. On 18 August 1970, FRAGO 56-70 was published. The purpose of this FRAGO was to terminate 2-8 Mechanized Infantry operations against 95B NVA Regiment in Base Area 202. The mechanized battalion had been operating in the area under Phase II of BRANDIES BLUE since 27 July 1970. During the first week of August the weather in the area began to worsen and by 18 August 1970 it became apparent that the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry operation would have to be terminated soon in order to avoid the possibility of having the weather interfere with their extraction.

8. During the interim time between 9 August and 19 August, 2nd Brigade and elements of the 22nd ARVN Division continued their operation in western Base Area 226. ARVN had been fairly successful and had shifted their emphasis to the northeast towards the Crow's Foot, and, in fact, were in the process of withdrawing from the area. The 1st Brigade continued their operation in the Fishhook and 2-8 Mechanized Infantry was still in the process of withdrawing from their operational area. The disposition of 1-10 Cavalry along the highway remained the same. Also during this period, 1-12 Infantry continued their preparation for operations in Tuy An District. However, by 15 August it became apparent that the GRID was not going to give the division an area of operation within which to operate. The ROK Field Command had developed its own plans for increasing the security of the populated areas and for upgrading the territorial forces, and literally did not want any US Forces interfering with their plans. Therefore, I Field Force identified two additional target areas for the division. One was the border area of Phu Bon/Phu Yen Province and the other, Can Lon District in Khanh Hoa Province. The division mission in Phu Bon/Phu Yen would be to locate and destroy the Phu Yen Provincial unit and also conduct operations in conjunction with the ARVN of Phu Bon Province. The mission in Can Lon District would be relatively the same as that given the division for Tuy An District, i.e., combined operations with territorial forces and upgrade the security of the populated areas. In addition, it was envisioned that the division, with C-75 Ranger, would also engage and destroy the Khanh Hoa Provincial unit. To accomplish these missions, coordination and planning was conducted with both the Phu Bon and Khanh Hoa Province GVN officials and US advisors. There was one major
problem that had not been resolved and that was an area of operation for the units to operate in. The majority of the area in which I Field Force desired the division to operate in belonged to the AOK's, and as we had learned with the Tuy An operation, the AOK's were reluctant to give up any of their territory. The proposed plan for accomplishing this mission was to have one battalion operate in each area, and to this end both 1-12 Infantry and 1-14 Infantry were being held on a string pending clearance of the areas. However, on 19 August 1970 the requirements for these two operations were overridden by events in Base Area 226.

2. On 17 August 1970, the 173rd Airborne Brigade operating in eastern Base Area 226 had discovered a cache and suspected enemy headquarters complex. To take advantage of the find, without having the 173rd Airborne Brigade deploy more forces into the area and possibly detract from its mission in support of pacification in eastern Binh Dinh Province, I Field Force ordered the division to take over the area and exploit the find. This order was received on the morning of the 19th end, by the afternoon, elements of 1-12 Infantry, under control of 2nd Brigade, had been airlifted into the area and established a fire support base. The division had been considering making some changes in both 1st and 2nd Brigades operations and this action provided the necessary impetus. It also temporarily relieved the division of its requirement for Phu Bon/Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. On 20 August 1970, FRAGO 57-70 was published. This FRAGO outlined new objective areas for 2nd Brigade in northeastern Base Area 226, where the 1-12 Infantry was already situated, gave 2nd Brigade 1-14 Infantry to conduct operations to the west of 1-12 Infantry, and brought 1-22 Infantry back to Camp Radcliff for a training standdown under division control. This action firmly placed the 2nd Brigade into Base Area 226, an action the division was considering anyway. The mission of the 2nd Brigade was to locate and destroy the 2nd NVA Regiment which recent intelligence had as operating in that area. The division also received OPOON C-75 Ranger (-) to assist in performing its mission. The 1st Brigade had been conducting operations in the Fishhook area and along the I/II Corps boundary. The American Division elements had conducted a west to east sweep along the border and other than a few minor contacts, no significant activity had developed. Therefore, 1st Brigade was ordered to begin moving their elements south down the An Lao Valley into objective areas that had been previously designated. The object was to make a relatively clean sweep of the An Lao Valley area to include the high ground both to the east and west of the valley. The 1st Brigade was ordered to commence these operations on 21 August 1970. The addition of 1-14 Infantry to 2nd Brigade and the movement of 1-22 Infantry to Camp Radcliff was also effective on 21 August 1970. As of 21 August 1970, the division...
task organization for combat was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
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<tr>
<td>3-12 Infantry</td>
<td>3-8 Infantry</td>
<td>1-22 Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-35 Infantry</td>
<td>1-12 Infantry</td>
<td>2-8 Mech (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-14 Infantry</td>
<td>C (-)/1-10 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-F Mech</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-10 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-75 Rangers</td>
<td></td>
<td>A/2-F Mech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>K-75 Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>C-75 Rangers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. On 22 August 1970, FRAGO 58-70 was published. It terminated C-75 Ranger (-) operations in Base Area 226 effective 24 August, and effective 25 August released OPCON of C-75 Ranger (-) to I Field Force.

11. On 25 August 1970, division published FRAGO 59-70. This order terminated 1st Brigade operations in the Fishhook area and ordered the 1st Br to return to Camp Radcliff. Effective dates were 26 August for termination and 28 August for completion of the move to Camp Radcliff. It also gave 1st Brigade OPCON of 1-22 Infantry effective 25 August and placed 2-35 Infantry under division control the same day. 2-35 Infantry would replace 1-22 Infantry as the training standdown battalion. The FRAGO also gave 1st Brigade a warning order to be prepared to conduct operations south of Camp Radcliff on or about 30 August 1970. Plans were in the mill to initiate operations southeast of An Khe targeted against the 6th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment.

12. On 26 August 1970, FRAGO 60-70 was published outlining the division plan for providing non-visible security support for the upcoming GVN elections on 30 August 1970. It basically called for elements of the division to conduct screening operations around the populated areas of An Tu District and Vinh Thanh Sub-District.

13. On 27 August 1970, OPLAN 24-70 was published by the division. This plan outlined the concept for operations against the 7th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment and the 90th Sapper Battalion, both reported to be operating southeast of An Khe. The 90th Sapper Battalion had recently moved from Base Area 226 across Highway 19 and was reported to be joining the 6th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment with the mission of interdicting Highway 19. The plan envisioned a two battalion operation under 1st Brigade control. The tentative implementation date was 30 August 1970, a date chosen because it coincided with the elections and would serve to disrupt enemy attempts to move into the populated area from the southeast.
14. On the morning of 28 August 1970, enemy elements initiated harassing actions and an attack by fire against a convoy on Highway 19, east of Km 2, and against division elements detaining Highway 19 and Bridge 19. To counteract the enemy’s attack, 1-22 Infantry, under control of 1st Brigade, was counter assailed into the area. FRAGO 61-70 was published the same day implementing OPPLAN 24-70 and the original objectives of 1st Brigade were relocated closer to Highway 19 but in the same general area. In addition, all of the 1-10 Cavalry elements located along the highway in 1st Brigade’s area of operation were placed OPCON to 1st Brigade. Those forces were returned to their parent unit on 29 August as 1st Brigade forces moved south of the highway. Operation WAYNE FORGE was underway.

(c) Operations 1-30 September 1970:

1. With the advent of the enemy highpoint at the end of August, the threat to Highway 19, and especially the critical bridges, increased considerably. To prevent further attempts by the enemy to interdict the highway, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry (-), which had closed Camp Radcliff on 25 August, was given the mission of operating south of Highway 19 west of the Mang Giang Pass. This mission was outlined in FRAGO 62-70, published and effective on 1 September 1970. The concept was for 2-8 Mechanized Infantry (-) to operate from platoon size patrol bases basically in a dismounted role. The 1-10 Cavalry retained responsibility for security of Highway 19, but was also ordered to intensify its ambush and patrolling operations both north and south of Highway 19. To accomplish its mission to the south, A/2-8 Mechanized Infantry was left under OPCON of 1-10 Cavalry.

2. During the interim period, 2nd Brigade was continuing its operations in Base Area 226. The enemy forces which had been concentrated in the northwestern and western portion of the base area had moved generally into the Suoi Ca Valley, probably to avoid contact with our elements. Additionally, the area within the Suoi Ca Valley belonged to the CRID and for our forces to pursue into that area a temporary area of operation would be required. This area of operation was obtained by the division on 1 September, and on 3 September, FRAGO 63-70 was published reorienting 2nd Brigade towards the Suoi Ca Valley. Also during this time period, I Field Force had obtained permission from ROK Field Force for the division to operate in the Phu Bon/Phu Yen Province area. Coordination was once again established with the Phu Bon Province GVN officials and the US advisors, as the division formulated plans to initiate operations there with one battalion. 1st Brigade would be tasked with the mission, so 2-35 Infantry was placed under OPCON of 1st Brigade effective 5 September. Also, 2nd Brigade was ordered to move 3-8 Infantry to Camp Radcliff for a
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The division task organization for combat effective 5 September was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
<th>2nd Brigade</th>
<th>Division Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-12 Infantry</td>
<td>1-12 Infantry</td>
<td>3-8 Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-22 Infantry</td>
<td>1-14 Infantry</td>
<td>2-8 Mech (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-35 Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-10 Cav (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/2-6 Mech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>K-75 Rangers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. On 4 September 1970, OPLAN 25-70 was published. It outlined the division concept for operations in Phu Bon/Phu Yen Province area. Basically the plan called for one battalion, with range support, to operate in the area where the Phu Yen Provincial unit was suspected of being located, and to simultaneously interdict suspected enemy infiltration corridors traversing into Phu Yen Province. Another mission outlined in the plan was the conduct of operations with the RF of Phu Bon Province. This was visualized and coordinated as being two RF companies at one time, with the companies rotating approximately every seven days. The tentative date for implementing this plan was 9 September 1970.

4. On 5 September 1970, OPLAN 64-70 was published, placing D/1-10 Cavalry under OPCON of division. D Troop had, in actuality, been working under division control for sometime, and this was done to allow the division to exercise greater control over its only air cavalry asset.

5. On 7 September 1970, OPLAN 65-70 was published implementing OPLAN 25-70, effective 9 September 1970. It also directed 1st Brigade to continue operations southeast of An Khe with priority to objectives further south. 1st Brigade operations had definitely uncovered evidence of 6th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment and this directed then towards the areas where it was felt that some companies of the 6th Battalion were located. All other units continued their current mission.

6. During the middle of August, negotiations had taken place between II Corps Headquarters and I Field Force for the turnover of responsibility for security of Highway 19 west of the Xang Gieng Pass to ARVN. Toward the end of August, a decision was finally reached and 15 September was set as the date that the division would be released from responsibility for that portion of the highway. The ARVN 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment was tasked by II Corps for the security mission. Coordination between division and II Corps and between 1-10 Cavalry and the ARVN 3rd Armored Cavalry
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had been effected during the early part of September and on 11 September
division published FRAGO 66-70, which outlined the concept for the con-
duct of the relief in place to be conducted by 1-10 Cavalry and the ARVN
3rd armored Cavalry. The relief was visualized as a two phase operation.
The first phase would be the actual relief in place conducted by 1-10
Cavalry and the 3rd armored Cavalry, and the second phase would be the
termination of 2-8 Mechanized Infantry (-) operations south of the high-
way, to be accomplished two or three days later. This FRAGO also placed
3-8 Infantry OPCON to 2nd Brigade effective 13 September and ordered 1st
Brigade to move 3-12 Infantry to Camp Radcliff for a training standdown
under division control on 20 September. The 2nd Brigade had been pushing
with its two battalions into the Suoi Ca Valley from the northwest and
east and currently occupied the high ground both east and west of the
Suoi Ca. Intelligence indicated the enemy had moved into the valley and
on the high ground to the southeast of the valley. The 2nd Brigade plan
was to insert 3-8 Infantry into the southern portion of the valley, thereby
having its forces in a loose configuration around the enemy forces. It
was hoped that once the enemy forces realized that the division had
elements both north and south of his locations that he would make an attempt to
extract himself from the area and thereby become vulnerable to our ambush
and patrolling operations. Area 226 had become the most lucrative
target in the division area.

7. With the turnover of Highway 19 west of the Nong Giang Pass to
ARVN, one armored cavalry troop of 1-10 Cavalry was released for other
operations within the division area of operation. Since the cavalry
squadron had been operating on the highway for the better part of seven
months, it was decided to get at least one troop at a time operating in
an area of operation so that the personnel could improve their skill
levels. Therefore, FRAGO 67-70, published 17 September, ordered the
cavalry squadron to move one troop into an area of operation north of
the highway and conduct both mounted and dismounted operations. It
was visualized that the troop would operate in a mobile configuration, being
resupplied by overland transportation only, and conduct continuous opera-
tions throughout their area of operation. The basic purpose of the exercise
was to retain the troop as a combat force and allow it to operate in a
combat configuration.

8. On 19 September 1970, I Field Force placed a requirement on the
division to provide a flame track to support EME work parties upgrading
Highway 1 in Song Cau District, Phu Yen Province. On 19 September 1970,
FRAGO 68-70 was published tasking 2-8 Mechanized Infantry with the mission.
Effective date for deployment of the flame track was 20 September and this
was accomplished without any problems.
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2. At the beginning of July, I Field Force had assigned the division a mission of conducting operations in the Tiger Mountains. Although the division had formulated plans twice since that time for operations in the Tiger Mountains, both times other priorities emerged which took precedence over operations there. Around the 1st of September, I Field Force once again reiterated its desires for the division to initiate operations in the Tigers. However, with the advent of the Phu Bon/Thu Yen operation, and the priority placed on Base Area 226, it was not feasible at the time to terminate other operations in favor of the Tigers. Around the 15th of September, another look was taken at the possibility of commanding operations in the Tigers. Because of the nature of the mission, it was necessary to have at least a brigade headquarters controlling the operation in the Tigers, although forces employed could be anywhere from a company to three battalions. Since 2nd Brigade Headquarters was currently located at FSB Uplift, on the coast, it was decided that this was the time to prepare for operations in the Tigers. On 20 September 1970, OPLAN 26-70, a general plan for operations in the Tiger Mountains, was published. This plan was relatively general in nature since the size force to be used had not yet been determined. The basic concept called for the employment of forces in a manner which would allow for the capture of enemy personnel and equipment, and the plan visualized having immediate reaction forces available to exploit enemy contacts or sightings. The size of force to be utilized would depend on the situation at the time of execution, tentatively set for 24 September 1970.

10. On 17 September, 2-8 Mechanized Infantry (-) had terminated its operations west of the Nang Giang Pass and moved to Camp Radcliff for a maintenance standdown. By 24 September 1970, the unit was prepared to initiate new operations; so FRAGO 69-70 (MURRAY BLUE) was published on 24 September. The mission of 2-8 Mechanized Infantry was to move north of an NVA and operate in an area of operation generally in vicinity of Kamnak. Both mounted and dismounted operations were to be conducted as the force in this area generally consisted of VC local force units.

11. FRAGO 70-70, published on 24 September 1970, implemented OPLAN 26-70 for operations in the Tiger Mountains. It placed K-75 Ranger OPCON to 2nd Brigade, since it had been decided that this unit had the best chance of achieving success. This method also allowed the division to continue its operations in Base Area 226 and south of in the Khe without a reduction of effort. The 3-12 Infantry was placed OPCON to 2nd Brigade effective 27 September and in turn 1-14 Infantry was moved to Camp Radcliff for a training standdown under division control. The division task organization for combat on 27 September was as follows:

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As the end of September approached, it became apparent that the 1st Brigade operation out of Khe and in Phu Bon/Phu Yen Province area had accomplished its mission. Both the 1-22 Infantry and 2-35 Infantry had good success within their area of operations. The 2nd Brigade operation in Base Area 202 continued to produce results, but mainly it was denying the enemy use of his longtime sanctuary. Therefore, the enemy was forced to seek ways out of the area in order to avoid contact with our forces which were constantly pursuing him. This made him vulnerable to both RVN forces and 173rd Airborne Brigade elements operating on the periphery of the division area of operation. Both of these forces made substantial contact with enemy elements attempting to maneuver around 2nd Brigade forces. An area of increasing interest to the division were the two major north-south infiltration corridors, the Song Ba and Song Con Rivers, that passed through the division area of operation. The Song Con River was the major corridor from the north leading into Base Area 226, while the Song Ba corridor crossed Highway 19 into Base Area 202. Toward the end of September, the division formulated plans to attack these two corridors simultaneously. It was felt that an attack against the enemy’s two major corridors, in conjunction with operations in Base Area 226, would materially assist the pacification efforts in eastern Binh Dinh Province as it harassed an enemy sanctuary and interdicted his major infiltration corridors simultaneously.

(d) Operations 1-30 October 1970.

1. On 1 October 1970, division FRAGO 71-70 was published. This FRAGO was designed to serve two purposes, namely: to invest the division into the Song Con and Song Ba River corridors while continuing operations in Base Area 226, and to tactically realign the maneuver battalions under their administrative brigade headquarters. To accomplish this, a phased movement and redeployment of the division infantry battalions was developed for the period 3 to 15 October. FRAGO 71-70 covered the first half of this schedule and called for:

2. Termination of 1st Brigade operations in Phu Bon/Phu Yen on 2 October 1970 with movement of 2-35 Infantry to Camp Radcliff on 3 and 4 October.
b. The movement of 1-12 Infantry to Camp Radcliff on 5 October for a training standoff under division control, and the replacement of 1-12 Infantry in the field by 2-35 Infantry under 2nd Brigade control on 5 October.

g. The redeployment of 1-14 Infantry under control of the 1st Brigade into the Song Con River corridor to interdict that enemy infiltration corridor.

d. The movement of 3-8 Infantry to Camp Radcliff on 7 October and the subsequent deployment on 10 October of 3-8 Infantry under 1st Brigade control into Song Ba River corridor to interdict that enemy infiltration corridor.

The above actions would place the division in the posture of interdicting the enemy's two major infiltration corridors, while simultaneously attacking Base Area 226. The division task organization for combat as of 7 October was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
<th>2nd Brigade</th>
<th>Division Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-6 Infantry</td>
<td>3-12 Infantry</td>
<td>1-12 Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-14 Infantry</td>
<td>2-35 Infantry</td>
<td>2-8 Mech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-22 Infantry</td>
<td>K-75 Rangers</td>
<td>1-10 Cavalry (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D/1-10 Cavalry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. During the interim time of realigning the infantry battalions, 2nd Brigade would only have two infantry battalions available for operations in Base Area 226, until approximately 19 October. Therefore, it was decided to augment the brigade's forces with one armored cavalry troop from 1-10 Cavalry. This troop would be deployed in the Suoi Ca Valley under 2nd Brigade control. FRAGO 72-70, published 3 October 1970, accomplished this task with an effective date of 6 October 1970. However, as seen below, other events took priority over this mission.

3. On 4 October 1970, FRAGO 73-70 was published. It rescinded FRAGO 72-70 and moved one troop of 1-10 Cavalry into an area of operation south of Highway 19 between Schueller and Action with an effective date of 5 October 1970. Intelligence revealed a possible enemy attempt to interdict the highway and this was done to prevent that interdiction. The enemy had launched attacks by fire against Camp Radcliff, Schueller, and Action on 4 October 1970, and there were indications the enemy might attempt additional attacks against the highway.
On 9 October 1970, FRAGO 74-70 was published. It field force had given the division a mission of operating within the immediate periphery of the populated areas of An Tuc District and Vinh Thanh Sub-District. The division cancelled its plans for operations in Base Area 226 and the Tiger Mountains. 1st Brigade was given responsibility for the area around An Tuc District and 2nd Brigade the area around Vinh Thanh Sub-District. The concept to be employed was one of operating around the immediate periphery of the populated areas to increase the security of these areas, and to conduct combined operations with territorial forces to upgrade their operational capabilities. The effective date for initiating this operation was 10 October 1970.

On 13 October 1970, FRAGO 75-70 was published. It, in effect, complimented division FRAGO 74-70 but made minor changes in areas of operation and the units that would operate within them. It gave the division more flexibility which at this particular time was required. For all practical purposes, FRAGO 75-70 was the last tactical order of the division. On 12 October 1970, ORLAN 183-70 was issued and subsequently implemented on 16 October as OPORD 183-70, Redeployment of US Forces Prior to the cessation of hostilities.

(3) Chemical Activities.

(a) The Division Chemical Section continued to function in the dual capacity of a staff and operating section. The Division Chemical Section and 43rd Chemical Detachment supported extensive aerial and ground employment of riot control agents, ground employment of diesel fuel for control of vegetation, and operated and maintained the airborne personnel detectors of the division.

(b) There were numerous crop destruction and defoliation missions flown in the 4th Division area of operation. Although the Division Chemical Section continued to have the limited capability of crop destruction utilizing AGMOVCO, the Air Force performed all herbicide operations in the area of operations.

(c) Riot control agent munitions were used in support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and demoralization of enemy targets and troops detected and located by special intelligence. Persistent CS was employed extensively by the brigades to deny the enemy unrestricted use of numerous cave and bunker complexes. Non-persistent CS was used to support the air force in tactical air strikes. The amount of non-pulverized persistent CS employed during the period increased...
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slightly over the last period. The Chemical Section employed 192-55
1 g lon drums of persistent CS against targets throughout the area of
operation. Drums were employed by air drop from CH-47 helicopters. The
drums were employed to contaminate infiltration routes and deny the enemy
unrestricted use of the terrain.

(d) The Division Chemical Section performed several flame drops
during the period. An advisory team was sent to the Qui Nhon Support Com-
mand to advise on combat flame drops. At that time, approximately 20
missions were flown against a suspected mortar position. Flame drops will
continue to be flown in support of the division.

(e) Airborne personnel detector operations are now controlled by the
division G-2 Air and the OIC of the Airborne Personnel Detectors Program.
Total of 110 missions were conducted during the period for a total of
237 hours flown.

(4) Organization and Training.

(a) Organization.

1. Selected units of the 4th Infantry Division prepared detailed
MTOE's as the first step in implementing AR 310-49 (The Army
Authorized
Documents System).

2. The Commanding General required all commanders to turn-in those
authorized items of equipment which were not mission essential.

(b) Training.

1. The 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment trained a total
of 6,826 personnel during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement Training</th>
<th>Enlisted: 5,923</th>
<th>Officers: 402</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luc Luong (Scouts)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Combat Leadership Academy</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/FF</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snipers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN OJT</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Standdown Training Program. During the reporting period, the
maneuver battalions to the brigades underwent a seven day standdown.
During the standdown, each unit conducted 33 hours of refresher training oriented toward improving combat effectiveness.

d. Logistics.

(1) Logistic Operations.

(a) Weather conditions during this reporting period had little adverse effect on logistical activities. The primary land lines of communication, QL 19E from Qui Nhon to An Khe and QL 1 from Qui Nhon north to FSB Uplift/LZ English and south to Huu Hiap/Thuy Hoa were used extensively to move supplies and equipment from Qui Nhon Support Command depot into the division area of operation. These land lines of communication were secure and trafficable throughout the period and were traveled almost daily by convoys. Favorable weather throughout the period also permitted uninterrupted resupply by air lines of communication from division fires support elements to forward battalion fire bases. The movement of troops and supplies during the period was accomplished in an efficient and timely manner.

(b) The 45th General Support Group, LSh. (province) An Khe and the 593rd General Support Group, Qui Nhon continued to provide logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division during Operation HIEAS. The 45th GSG LSL at Camp Radcliff provided the bulk of the logistical support to the division while LSh 593-1 at LZ English and LSh 593-2 at Huu Hiap provided support to brigade operations.

(c) During the reporting period, the division base camp remained at Camp Radcliff, An Khe. Logistical support for forward elements was provided by:

1. A Division Support Command forward support element (FSE) at FSB Armageddon in support of 2nd Brigade. The FSE stocked limited items of Class I, II, III, IV, and V. All other classes of supply were provided by permanently established facilities at Camp Radcliff.plist, water, maintenance, medical, and a rearm/refuel point were also established and operational at Armageddon. Back-up services were provided from Camp Radcliff.

2. A second Division Support Command FSE was established and operational at FSB Uplift in support of the 1st Brigade. Emphasis was placed on throughout of supplies from Qui Nhon to the FSE at Uplift. Class I, fast moving Class II, Class III, limited Class IV and Class VI (sundry...
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Packs and other classes of supplies were issued to Division Support Command at Camp Radcliff to
unit FSUs. The FSE provided bath services from two mobile shower units. Laundry service was provided by a civilian contract laundry at Qui Nhon. Graves registration was provided by 243rd Field Service Support Company with
cumulation of personnel from Division Command Support. Maintenance
support was provided by a contract team from Company D, 704th Maintenance
Battalion at FSB Uplift. A light clearing company of the 4th Medical
Battalion provided units with medical support. The 4th Supply and Trans-
portation Battalion augmented the refuel point at FSB Uplift with per-
sonnel and equipment.

(d) On 8 August, the FSE in support of 2nd Brigade at FSB Uragedden
was closed out concurrent with termination of the tactical operation.
Logistical support personnel and equipment returned to Camp Radcliff.

(e) On 28 August, the FSE in support of 1st Brigade at FSB Uplift
was closed out concurrent with termination of the tactical operation.
Logistical support personnel and equipment returned to Camp Radcliff.

(f) On 8 September, FSE of similar composition to the proceeding
one was re-established at FSB Uplift to support 2nd Brigade operations
in this area. Additionally, a rearm/refuel point was established at
FSB Crystal to support gunships from C Troop, 7-17 Cavalry. This facility
was required because loaded gunships were unable to take off from FSB
Uplift.

(g) On 7 September, a FSE was established at Phu Xuan in support of
1st Brigade (2-35 Infantry) operations in the Phu Bon/Phy Yen Province
border area. Phu Xuan (3Q 910705) was selected as the site of the FSE
due to the availability of an all weather airfield capable of accepting
C-130 aircraft and also because of its close proximity to the center
of the area of operation. Division Command Support established Class I,
III, IIIA, IV, and V supply activities at Phu Xuan. Other Class V
items were throughout to the unit trains from ASP 1 at Qui Nhon. LSA
593-2 at Phu Hiep was in support of the FSE. Division Support Command
calso established bath and shower facilities, a medical clearing station
and a maintenance contact team. 4th Engineer Battalion operated a potable
water point. Dustoff and graves registration was provided through LSA
593-2 with backup support from Qui Nhon SUPCOM. Resupply from the FSE/
brigade Trains at Phu Xuan into the forward fire support base was ac-
complished entirely by OH-1H Slicks and OH-47 Chinook Aircraft. The op-
eration in Phu Bon/Phu Yen terminated on 4 October and all logistical
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support elements returned to Camp Radcliff.

(h) On 12 October, 2nd Brigade terminated operations in the area of
operation southwest of FSB Uplift. All logistical support activities at
FSB Uplift and FSB Crystal closed out and returned to Camp Radcliff.

(i) Class IIIA and VA activities were established at FSB Hardtimes
for brief periods of time.

(j) On 10 October, the division was given official notification that,
according to a pre-planned phasedown from offensive operations, it
would standdown the combat, combat support and service units; prepare all
TOE/MTCE, TDA and PCS property and equipment for retrograde and turn-in
to designated processing facilities; and return unit colors to CONUS for
inactivation.

(k) Logistical activities from 10 October until the end of the re-
porting period were concentrated in three areas:

1. Keystone robin standdown, retrograde and turn-in activities.

2. Continued logistical support of the divisional elements which
continued offensive operations throughout the division area of operation.

3. Logistical support in support of the three units designated as
I Field Force residual forces.

(l) On 24 October, 1-22 Infantry moved by tactical convoy to Tuy Hoa
for new mission as a residual force. Division continued to provide
logistical support throughout the move.

(m) Division continued to provide logistical and maintenance sup-
port to 1-10 Cavalry and 5-16 Artillery (residual force units) throughout
the period.

(n) Supply and Service.

1. Division Supply Office.

Requisitions received: 1,147
Requisitions passed: 1,147
Requisitions filled: 5,392
Total due out releases: 2,587

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2. Class I Issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>A RATIONS</th>
<th>C RATIONS</th>
<th>SUNDAY PACKS</th>
<th>LER EPIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>1,055,150</td>
<td>157,651</td>
<td>2,673</td>
<td>30,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Class III Issues.

2. Bulk FOL Issues in gallons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>JP-4</th>
<th>AVGAS</th>
<th>NOGAS</th>
<th>DF-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>1,533,700</td>
<td>29,700</td>
<td>818,100</td>
<td>3,136,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Crystal</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Haritines</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Uplift</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Two Bits</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Xuan</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,913,700</td>
<td>29,700</td>
<td>849,100</td>
<td>3,177,427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Radcliff</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td></td>
<td>825</td>
<td>2,345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Class V Draw. (Selected major ASR Items)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODIC</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TOTAL ALLOCATION</th>
<th>TOTAL DRAMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A165</td>
<td>7.62 Minigun</td>
<td>701,500</td>
<td>339,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13560</td>
<td>40mm HE</td>
<td>157,624</td>
<td>114,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C256</td>
<td>81mm HE</td>
<td>34,864</td>
<td>25,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C445</td>
<td>105mm HE</td>
<td>47,900</td>
<td>32,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C705</td>
<td>4.2&quot; HE</td>
<td>17,356</td>
<td>10,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D544</td>
<td>155mm HE</td>
<td>19,264</td>
<td>9,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D680</td>
<td>8&quot; HE</td>
<td>2,939</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H items</td>
<td>2.75&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>13,110</td>
<td>9,278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Baths: 35,500

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGCS GSPB-65 (R2) (U)

a. Human remains processed: 62.

b. Personal property shipments processed: 78.

c. The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III in support of operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class III</th>
<th>Series</th>
<th>Quantity (lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>26,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52's</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class V in support of operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fighters/AC17</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>4,469,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B52's</td>
<td>3 (sorties)</td>
<td>123,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Transportation services.

(a) The division controlled Highway 19W from Camp Radcliff to FSB Blackhawk and Highway 19E from Camp Radcliff to An Khe Pass. During operations from FSB Armageddon, the division controlled Highway 508 from Camp Radcliff to FSB Armageddon. Division also utilized Highway 1 between LZ English and Tuy Hoa and Highway 19E from An Khe Pass into Qui Nhon, all routes being under ROK/173rd Airborne Brigade control.

(b) Company B, 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion hauled both supplies and personnel from Camp Radcliff to forward support areas throughout the period. When the need occurred, augmentation of transportation requirements was received from elements of the 8th Transportation Group.

(c) A total of 216 convoys consisting of 4,157 total vehicles hauled logistical supplies and personnel throughout the division area of operation during the period.

(d) Aircraft support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE REQ</th>
<th>No OF Req</th>
<th>L/C Type</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRI 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>C123</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Art -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

20 November 1970

TYPE Req | No Of Req | A/C Type | Sorties
--- | --- | --- | ---
Dedicated | 1 | C130 | 14
Scheduled | 2 | C7A | 53
S MK | 1 | C130 | 3
| | | C123 | 4
TOTALS | 5 | | 252

(3) Medical services.

(a) The 4th Medical Battalion, with Companies B and C supporting
the 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively and Headquarters and Company A
supporting the division base camp, provided the following patient ac-
tions during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PATIENTS SEEN</th>
<th>PATIENTS ADMITTED</th>
<th>RETURNED TO DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; Co A</td>
<td>5604</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B</td>
<td>3626</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>9802</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Optometry Clinic.

1. Total number of patient visits: 725.
2. Total number of eyeglasses dispensed: 2,212.

(4) Materiel Readiness.

(a) The operational readiness rates of all categories of materiel
showed improvement during the reporting period. The greatest improve-
ments were shown in radar (from 50% to 89% OR), aircraft (from 72% to
83% OR), and heavy engineer equipment (from 74% to 90% OR). The improve-
ments noted in radar and aircraft availability can be directly attributed
to the increased emphasis on maintenance during the period, and, during
the last two weeks of the period, to reduced operational requirements.
The increased OR of heavy engineer equipment is directly attribut-
table to the amount of unserviceable equipment turned in as unneeded MTOE
equipment.

(b) This reporting period was characterized by a significant change
in the logistical posture of the division, from one of emphasis on filling shortages to bring the division to its authorized strength levels, to one of emphasis on repairing equipment on hand and turning in all unneeded MTOE equipment.

c. Civilian affairs.

(1) Civic Action.

(a) The major civic action project was the emergency aid provided 18 Vietnamese families of An Dan Hamlet that had been burned out by an accidental fire. Captured rice, vegetables, and non-returnable foods from unit messes were used as emergency rations for the people. A concentrated effort made by the Civic Action Team secured enough tentage to provide temporary shelter until GVN sources could assume full support of the fire victims.

(b) Another major project that was a complete success was the ARVN Housing Project. A bulldozer was supplied by the 4th Engineer Battalion to clear the land for this project. Five buildings were given to the FF by PA&E. The FF moved the buildings to the location of the cleared land and with US technical assistance erected eight structures for 38 families.

(c) The An Tuc Market is almost completed. The culverts and ditches were repaired; the road was graded and rolled. The only remaining action is the actual pouring of asphalt. The asphalt is on hand and can be poured under favorable weather conditions.

(d) The An Son Piggery was completed in the month of September. The hamlet association is now financially solvent and is able to be classified as self-sufficient.

(e) An Tuc Dispensary is near completion of turnover to GVN. There are currently six ARVN medics and two ambulances under the operational control of the District Chief. The US effort has been reduced to one doctor three times a week in the morning only. A dentist is provided on Friday afternoons for emergency dental treatment. The projection for the future month is that one doctor will be provided An Tuc Dispensary on an "on call" basis only in the event of natural disaster, enemy attack, or emergency life-saving procedure is required.

(f) A project of humanitarian interest was initiated by the 1st Brigade Civic Action Team when a small Vietnamese child was observed suffering...
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
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from a severe birth defect and was unable to walk. The child was taken to the 8th Field Hospital where corrective surgery was performed. Two more children were discovered with birth defects and were treated at 8th Field Hospital.

(2) Psychological Operation.

(a) During the first month of the reporting period, the division PSYOP section launched a series of PSYOP campaigns encompassing all the target audiences in the division's area of operation. The first week in August witnessed a new emphasis on the Voluntary Informant Program. At the request of the division, Company B, 8th PSYOP Battalion, had designed a new Voluntary Informant Program leaflet which was disseminated on 4 August 1970 and may have been responsible for the value of war material reported in August, doubling that of July. Closely related to the Voluntary Informant Program, a Viet Cong infrastructure campaign was initiated in Le Trung District on 16 August 1970. Because the Viet Cong infrastructure is a GVN security problem, the division PSYOP section had closely coordinated with the Le Trung District officials in preparing this campaign. At the request of 2-8 Mechanized Infantry, special "Panther" leaflets and tapes were created and disseminated in tactical support of the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry's operations during the first days of August.

Commencing 8 August, an extensive GVN image program was conducted. The program was culminated on 30 August 1970 with the election of the GVN Upper House representatives. Common concern over these elections spurred the division PSYOP section to join together with Vietnamese Information Service and MACV in Le Tuc District to bring out the vote. The PSYOP team members were active throughout the month in publicizing the achievements of the GVN and in encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral process. The casting of ballots by 85% of the electorate may reflect the success of their combined efforts. A highly persuasive Armed Propaganda Team working in the Cuu Tu area capped off the last six days of the campaign.

(b) During the first week in September, the Province Cultural Drama team entertained and politically educated the citizens of An Khe. Also during this week, the division PSYOP personnel renewed the brigade movie program in the hamlets of An Tuc District. Based on the report established during the August election, a series of coordination sessions between division ACOS, G-5, district and MACV personnel climaxd in an agreement for the An Tuc District Polwar platoon, Vietnamese Information Service members, and division HS and Civic Action Teams to conduct joint operations on a daily basis. The first of these joint operations was successfully conducted in An Cu Hamlet on 17 September 1970. Although September was
plagued with inclement weather, several tactical PSYOP missions were flown. Beginning on 20 September 1970, a six day PSYOP campaign supported 1-10 Cavalry's maneuvers northwest of Corp Radcliff. Benefitting from prior coordination by the division PSYOP section, the 1-10 Cavalry's S-5 was able to direct from the field daily 02B broadcasts onto specific targets of opportunity. On 25 September 1970, USARV announced that due to operational costs, the use of organic aircraft for PSYOPS would be greatly reduced. USARV recommended that the US Air Force C47's and O2B's primarily conduct division PSYOP missions. On 28 September 1970, FSB Auguste received an enemy broadcast declaring that an attack was imminent. The division PSYOP section responded with leaflets and taped broadcasts.

(c) Enhancement of GVN image has dominated the PSYOP media during October. A corollary of this program has been an emphasis on the fighting effectiveness of Regular and Popular Forces and especially the importance of the People's Self-Defense Force. To complement these objectives, an Armed Propaganda Team embarked for the Cuu An area on 12 October 1970. Also, during the week of 12 October 1970, the Province Cultural Drama Team performed for the local citizens of An The District.

(3) Luc Luong 66 Scout Program.

(a) During the period covered by this report, the scout program abandoned the name of Kit Carson and adopted the name "Luc Luong 66," Vietnamese for "Force 66." In so doing, it gave the scouts greater meaning to their work for they have never really gained an appreciation for who Kit Carson was or what he accomplished.

(b) During September, 23 scouts were recruited from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade which activated that month. An additional 19 scouts were recruited from the Can The Chieu Ho Center in August.

f. Personnel.

(1) Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized-Organic units</th>
<th>OPP</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>AAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>872</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>12,965</td>
<td>14,021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned-Organic units:</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>12,423</td>
<td>13,368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) End of Period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized-Organic units</th>
<th>OPP</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>AAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>872</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>12,917</td>
<td>13,973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned-Organic units:</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>10,592</td>
<td>11,466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1970, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Replacements. The division received a total of 329 officers and 3,514 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 428 officers and 5,951 enlisted men rotated out of the division.

(3) Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HOSTILE</th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>MIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVARTY</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8 Mech</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-75</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Trps</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Reenlistment. Monthly reenlistment statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Morale and Personnel Services.

Awards and decorations during the period were presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECORATION AWARDED</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Service/Achievement)</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (S/L)</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>4178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(6) Promotions. A total of 3,383 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

(7) Postal. The division APO provided daily postal services to base camp personnel and, in addition, operated a sub-unit to support a brigade size operation at FSB Uplift. A daily courier service was initiated to the 6th Convalescent Center, Cam Ranh Bay, and to the 67th Evacuation Hospital, Qui Nhon, in order to expedite the delivery of mail to 4th Infantry Division personnel confined to these hospitals.

(8) Special Services. The division Special Service Office provided 11 USO shows and military touring shows during the reporting period. In addition, 494 In Country allocations and 2,858 out of country R&R allocations were utilized. The Special Service Film Library circulated 494 films, and the Special Services Library circulated 3,682 books during this period.

(9) Health.

(a) The state of health of the command has been satisfactory. The Surgeon's Office, through education and supervision, has attempted to decrease the ill effects of diseases to help maintain a medically fit combat unit.

(b) Malaria has fluctuated from 52.1 cases/1000 men/year to 96.5 cases/1000 men/year with the rate increasing in the latter portion of the period due to the beginning of the monsoons. To combat the increase in the malaria rate, several policies were initiated by the Surgeon's Office. First, the preventive medicine section stressed and tightened control on the chemophylaxis of malaria to include a periodic check of the unit malaria roster and an increased emphasis for a more aggressive urine testing program. The Division Surgeon personally contacted various commanders and discussed proper malaria discipline in an attempt to broaden their understanding of the problem. The Surgeon's Office has also conducted several classes oriented to educate the average soldier in malaria prevention.

(c) Skin disease, which has the highest outpatient rate of any disease in the division, has also been a target for improvement. Due to improved clothing resupply, longer standdown periods, and rigorous emphasis on the personal hygiene of the men, the rate of disease has dropped for the first time in approximately six months from an average of 1500 cases/1000 men/year to an outpatient rate of 1126 cases/1000 men/year. Respiratory
Infections have increased in its severity as the change of weather occurs in the latter period of October. This rise to an outpatient rate of 695 cases/1000 man/year in September had been anticipated, for the trends of respiratory diseases are much the same as found in OCSUS. In previous months, the rates were averaging approximately 400 to 500 cases/1000 man/year. The rates of venereal disease in the division have fluctuated between 140 to 170 cases/1000 man/year in an unpredictable manner; but even at the highest rate, the division remains under the USRV average of approximately 190 cases/1000 man/year.

(d) The general sanitation conditions of the division have improved in the past quarter. When EEO contractors were relieved of their responsibility to collect garbage, the units in conjunction with civilian contractors provided adequate trash pickup. Unit field sanitation teams, receiving the responsibility of insect and rodent control, have developed satisfactory programs. There has been an extensive training program to train these teams in the proper procedures of their jobs with the effect of a generally more satisfying condition in individual units.

(e) The division is adequately staffed with medical and paramedical officers. Although there has been an excess of the lower grades of enlisted medical personnel, the division has had a shortage of senior enlisted specialists.

(10) Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order.
(a) General Courts-Martial: 2.
(b) Special Courts-Martial: 103.
(c) Summary Courts-Martial: 7.

(d) During the period, the Provost Marshal established courtesy patrols for standdown units at Camp Pendleton. These patrols consisted of E-6's or higher from each standdown unit, Military Police, and scout dogs with handlers. These combined courtesy patrols patrolled in and around the standdown area. A sharp reduction in the number of assaults and larcenies occurring in this area was realized following initiation of the courtesy patrol.

Engineer.

(1) Engineer activities during this period were characterized by
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Continuous combat support in conjunction with renewed emphasis on base
camp and firebase upgrade in anticipation of impending monsoons. Support
of combat operations primarily involved construction of temporary
fire support bases, with occasional clearing of landing zones, destruction
of enemy fortifications and clearing and maintenance of lines of com-
minication.

(2) Company B provided direct support to the 1st Brigade. Engineer
assistance was provided upon request for construction of fortifications
and sanitation facilities, clearing of landing zones and destruction of
bunkers. On three occasions, demolition teams repelled into otherwise
inaccessible areas near FSB Lincoln and FSB Winnie to clear company size LZ's.

(3) In addition to direct support of combat operations, Company B
continued the task of upgrading FSB Schueller. Up to two full platoons
were employed to construct 10 living/fighting bunkers, fortify the aid
station and construct four 3-inch gun pads. Other construction tasks
included the drainage upgrade along four miles of the perimeter road,
construction of a helicopter wash-point, construction of athletic and
recreational facilities and rehabilitation of the division standoff area.

(4) Company C provided direct support to the 2nd Brigade. Missions
included mine sweeps, firebase construction and demolition of extensive
bunker complexes in base area 226. The Case 450 mdozer was used
extensively to upgrade defenses at fire support bases. Such employment
usually entailed clearing fields of fire, dozing berms, cutting slots
for living/fighting bunkers and snaking timber for overhead cover.

(5) In addition to direct support of combat operations, Company C
completed several construction projects at Camp Radcliff. A platoon (-)
installed an 850 foot anti-personnel barrier across the Song Dr. dier
during August. Improvements to An Khe Army Air Field defense involving
installation of concertin and tanglefoot obstacles were completed in
September. Construction of new drainage facilities on the Golf Course
heliport and along the perimeter road received continuous attention throughout
the period. The company was also employed to rehabilitate two bridges,
and make structural repairs to defective base camp towers.

(6) Company D remained in general support of the division while
providing direct support for combat operations of independent battalions
under division control. The first platoon was placed in direct support
of 2-8 Mechanized Infantry and 1-10 Cavalry for Operation BALZER'S BLUE
in VC Valley. Engineer support amounted to a constant struggle to keep
the LOC's open for resupply and eventual extraction of the armored vehicles. The platoon conducted daily minesweeps, installed several culverts, and prepared bridge abutments.

(7) For most of September, the 2nd Platoon operated with 2-35 Infantry at FSB Washington as part of Operation Poth. PLT. The platoon conducted minesweeps each morning and then proceeded with the continuous upgrade and maintenance tasks required to keep the LOC open for resupply. A forward element at FSB Washington cleared fields of fire, cut overhead cover and provided technical advice during bunker construction.

(8) Within the base camp, Company D constructed two anti-personnel river barriers across the Song Re, corrected drainage problems at the CPT's hook pad, refurbished the Ward Room and Commanding General's Mess, and installed a security fence at the entertainers' compound. The Hon Cong Mountain road was upgraded by removal by nudcapping of numerous protruding boulders from the roadway and ditch lines.

(9) Company E continued to provide the division with engineer equipment, tactical bridging, and transportation support. In early August, the Commanding General directed the lateral transfer of the Enerme 202 mine-roller to 1-10 Cavalry so that the battalion could utilize the CEV in its proper role. The armor platoon's CEV's and AVLB's were extremely active, supporting the 1-10 Cavalry in operations to the north and south of QL-19, and the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry in VC Valley in August and along Route 508 in September and October.

(10) The bridge platoon recovered two M4T6 dry-spans from Route 508 during the second week of August. On 19 August, a M4T6 dry-span was emplaced by helicopter in VC Valley to facilitate the withdrawal of the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry.

(11) The Heavy Equipment Platoon performed in direct support of combat operations. Dozers were used to clear fields of fire, replace culverts, prepare abutments, break trail and maintain roads in Base Area 226, in VC Valley and on Route 508.

(12) Major construction projects assigned to the platoon included land clearing along the base camp perimeter (using a box plow and disc harrow), extensive contouring, shaping anding of the Golf Course heliport, ditching and shaping of Hon Cong Mountain road and sections of the perimeter road, and resurfacing of the elevator pad at the main base camp water point.
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(1) The dump truck section hauled most of the fill during the upgrade of the Golf Course road net, preparation of the new heliport pad, installation of culverts on the perimeter road, and raising-to-grade at FSB Schueller. The section also performed sand and aggregate hauls from Qui Nhon to support operations requiring concrete.

h. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) The 4th Aviation Battalion supported both brigades and attached units. The division aviation assets have been reinforced by the 57th AHRC and 119th AHRC on a recurring basis, to accomplish the mission. Elements other than the two brigades receiving 4th Aviation Battalion support include Division Chemical, Engineers, Artillery, S-5, and Project Left Bank. The 4th Aviation Battalion AH-IG gunships provided fire support elements to both brigades. The LOH's provided visual reconnaissance and command and control aircraft. Support was accomplished by combat assault preparations and gunship cover for LUTP insertions and extractions, resupply, Medivacs, and ground forces in contact. Loopy and Scorpion teams consistently provided invaluable intelligence. Results were numerous bunker complexes and fortifications destroyed.

(2) The battalion continued to have responsibility for security and police of the Golf Course Army Air Field. A continuous program of repair and upgrading of the defense system of the Golf Course has been pursued. Upgrading tactical wires, defoliation, moving old fighting positions, constructing new fighting positions, repairing gates, and removing and burying trash, are some of the various efforts at improving the Golf Course.

(3) Pathfinders provided support for both brigades and attached units in fire support bases, resupply installations and the operation of air traffic control, visual reconnaissance missions for possible LZ's, and fire support bases. Pathfinder support was used occasionally for rigging of downed aircraft. In addition, they assisted in training of personnel in rigging and extraction of equipment.

(4) During the month of August, September, and October, the following aviation support was provided to the 4th Infantry Division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>4,886</td>
<td>4,325</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>12,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>8,672</td>
<td>9,795</td>
<td>6,823</td>
<td>25,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pax</td>
<td>9,309</td>
<td>10,301</td>
<td>7,684</td>
<td>27,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (tons)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Aircraft Damaged (accidents and combat).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor Accidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Accidents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor C o m b a t</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Average daily organic and non-organic support to the division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L N T</th>
<th>U R - 1 H</th>
<th>A H - 1 G</th>
<th>U R - 1 G</th>
<th>U H - 4 7</th>
<th>G H - 5 8</th>
<th>G H - 6 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Co</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Trp/1-10 Cav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Co 704th Maint</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd Cav</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV-WITY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Inspector General Activities.

(1) During this period, the Inspector General's office emphasized preparation for the USARV Annual General Inspection. To accomplish this, a total of 17 courtesy AGI's were conducted for divisional units. Four pre-AGI's were conducted for divisional units. These inspections and informal inspections of divisional units and staff sections were also used to check areas listed as Department of the Army Special Subjects for Inspection. Consequently, 46 arms rooms and 26 ammunition storage sites were inspected for proper security of arms and ammunition. Division procedures to process financial data records and military personnel records jackets for newly assigned personnel were also checked.

(2) Since an area of complaint in past months had involved forward areas, 19 visits to forward field locations on fire support bases were accomplished during this period. The goal was to have at least one visit per week to a forward field location and the final result was nearly two visits a week. The number of complaints from men at forward locations was considerably lower than before.
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(3) The majority of complaints during the period involved unit administration with assignments and transfers second in number. Three next highest areas were: signal, promotion/demotion, and personnel service.

(4) As of 31 October, only 12 justified complaints had been received by the Inspector General's Office, out of 356 total number of complaints and requests for assistance. This included 32 complaints and requests for assistance from non-divisional units.

J. Signal.

(1) General. Operations of the Division Signal Office and Signal Battalion focused on providing communications support to the Division Headquarters and each post of major subordinate units.

(2) FS3 Amogden. The 2nd Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, B Company, continued to support the 2nd Brigade command post at FS3 Amogden. The platoon provided and operated the switchboard (AN/MRC-10), communications center, radio-teletypewriter (R.TT) station (AN/GRC-142) as well as VHF terminal (AN/VMC-69) over which multi-channel telephone and teletypewriter communications were maintained with Division Headquarters, as R.Y. Operations at Amogden were terminated on 6 August.

(3) FS3 Uplift. The 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, B Company, continued to support the 1st Brigade command post at FS3 Uplift with C Company providing a VHF relay (AN/MMC-54) and FM secure retransmission station at Phu Cat APO. The platoon provided switchboard, communications center, radio-teletypewriter station, and VHF terminal over which multi-channel telephone and teletypewriter communications were maintained to Division Headquarters through the relay at Phu Cat. The FM retransmission site at Phu Cat provided automatic retransmission of the Division Secure FM command net between an R.Y. and FS3 Uplift. Operations terminated at FS3 Uplift on 27 August.

(4) FS3 Frustration. C Company continued to provide VHF multichannel telephone communications (AN/MMC-69) and radio-teletypewriter (AN/GRC-142) support to the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry. During the course of operations the battalion command post moved several times necessitating displacement and reestablishment of VHF and radio-teletypewriter communications. Operations in vicinity of FS3 Frustration terminated on 16 August.

(5) FS2 Blackhawk. On 1 September, C Company deployed on AN/MMC-69 and AN/GRC-142 to provide multichannel telephone and radio-teletypewriter communications, respectively, in support of 2-8 Mechanized Infantry.
Operations at FSB Blackhawk terminated on 17 September.

(6) FSB Uplift. On 6 September, the 2nd Brigade established a forward command post at FSB Uplift. The 2nd Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, B Company, deployed with the brigade and provided VHF multichannel telephone and teletypewriter communications with Division Headquarters, the communications centers, and switchboards. 2nd Brigade operations at FSB Uplift terminated on 12 October.

(7) FSB Aquarius. On 25 September, the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry deployed to FSB Aquarius. Support elements from C Company deployed with the battalion and provided radio-teletypewriter and VHF multichannel communications with Division Headquarters, An Khe. Operations terminated on 11 October.

(8) FSB Schueller. C Company continued to provide radio-teletypewriter (AN/GRC-142) and multichannel telephone communications (AD/MRC-69) in support of 1-10 Cavalry.

(9) FSB Washington - Phu Xuan/Thu Hiep. On 9 September, the 2-35 Infantry deployed 85 kilometers south of An Khe to FSB Washington in Phu Yen Province. Three days earlier, on 6 September, the battalion combat trains and elements of DISCOM deployed to Phu Xuan, Phu Yen Province, 15 kilometers east of FSB Washington, along with additional elements from DISCOM deploying to Thu Hiep Logistical Support Agency (LSA), 45 kilometers southeast of Phu Xuan. Since the 2-35 Infantry deployed under control of 1st Brigade, with command post at An Khe, the brigade was responsible for establishing necessary command and control communications to the battalion fire base on FSB Washington. The trains area at Phu Xuan and the LSA at Thu Hiep were composed in part of DISCOM elements, hence, the responsibility for providing logistical support communications between DISCOM Headquarters, An Khe, Phu Xuan, and Thu Hiep fell into C Company, 124th Signal Battalion.

(a) Planning the communications support for the operation presented the division and brigade signal staff with a challenging task. Analysis of the intervening terrain between locations, revealed that VHF multichannel communications was only marginally feasible between Phu Xuan and Thu Hiep. Terrain and distance between FSB Washington and An Khe made the establishment of a direct FM radio link impossible, only through the use of a retransmission site somewhere in between was FM radio communication considered possible. Hence, initial planning centered on the use of SSB voice and radio-teletypewriter as primary means with FM radio and VHF.
multichannel as a secondary means, if it could be established.

(b) On 8 September, a SSB voice net was established between An Khe, Phu Xuan, and Phu Hięp for logistical traffic. The An Khe station operated from the division MA. station where a phone patch capability existed. The Phu Xuan and Phu Hięp stations used AN/GRC-106 tactical SSB radios. In addition, every effort was made to establish a four-channel VHF system between Phu Xuan and Phu Hięp, using AN/GRC-163 four-channel multiplex units, in order to provide trains telephone access into the Vietnam telephone system through Phu Hięp. Although radio contact was established, it was so marginal that multichannel communications was not possible. Instead, a reliable FM radio link was established between Phu Xuan and Phu Hięp through a retransmission station, placed in the MACV advisory compound at Dong Xuan 10 kilometers north of Phu Xuan.

(c) The brigade established a SSB voice and radio-teletypewriter link from An Khe to FSB Washington using AN/GRC-142 radios. Marginal FM voice radio, both plain and secure, was established to FSB Washington from An Khe through a retransmission station placed at FSB Lincoln. At division request, the 1st Signal Brigade provided two U-21 Aerial retransmission aircraft to provide more reliable FM plain and secure radio communications between FSB Washington and An Khe. The aircraft was on station for about 12 hours per day from 14 to 23 September, the originally planned termination date for the operation. The aircraft provided reliable FM communications while on station and valuable experience for operating personnel in working with an airborne retransmission station.

(d) The great distances and rugged terrain between locations presented difficult command-control, logistics, logistics and communications problems during the operation. However, these problems were in the most part successfully overcome as the operation proceeded. The operation terminated on 4 October.

(k) Information activities.

(l) News Media Correspondents. During the period 1 August through 20 October, a total of 10 civilian news correspondents visited the division area of operations, covering a variety of subjects ranging from hometown and human interest material to the active combat operations of the division. Correspondents from Associated Press, United Press International, and Dispatch News Service visited the division area of operation during the reporting period. A special team from German National Television also visited during this period.
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(2) Radio/Television Activities.

(a) Although there are no broadcast facilities at Camp Radcliff at the present time, the Information Officer found it expedient to coordinate with ARVN affiliates in Pleiku and Qui Nhon. Command Information messages (spots lasting 30 to 60 seconds) are given to these stations telephonically with the hard copy mailed simultaneously. This procedure is usually necessary as rapid dissemination of the information is required. A notable example was the urgent warnings concerning the river flowing through Camp Radcliff and the distinct possibility of swimmers contracting hepatitis from the contaminated waters and continued dissemination of safety tips. Obvious success of the announcement of the contaminated waters was noted when no reportable violations were received after the river was officially placed off limits to personnel.

(b) There was a relatively small number of broadcast hours concerning command and public information, due to lack of facilities at Camp Radcliff. A total of 304 news items and 152 photographs were released. These included combat and combat-related activities. All were prepared and processed by this office.

(3) Command Information Program.

(a) Improvements in the distribution and dissemination of command information continue. Surveys indicate that division personnel are receiving all informational materials on a timely basis. Command Information Fact Sheets prepared by this office for troop dissemination for this period included facts concerning Drug Addiction and Redeployment Criteria.

(b) The winter issue (1970) of the division quarterly magazine, Emissary, was prepared, published, and distributed. A total of 16,000 copies were to be made available to division members and former division members. Distribution includes medical facilities elsewhere in Vietnam and in Japan. All incoming personnel, processing through the 4th Replacement Company, also received a copy.

(c) The most useful and effective tool available for the Information Officer to provide widest dissemination of command and public information continues to be The Ivy Leaf, the weekly division newspaper. Twelve issues of The Ivy Leaf were distributed during this period. The material provided for the paper comes from all units and activities in the division and coverage is given to all action stories, human interest items, and...
general news concerning personnel and events occurring within the division. Additionally, articles from the Commanding General, the Adjutant General, Surgeon, and Staff Judge Advocate offer timely and professional advice and guidance for commanders and troops. Special articles which are deemed to be of interest to troops are occasionally reprinted in whole. These articles are taken from Department of the Army and Department of Defense information channels. The Ivy Leaf also publishes periodical information concerning and reenlistment program with materials provided by division career counselors. Present circulation of The Ivy Leaf, to include active and former members, is approximately 4,660 copies per week. During the latter part of October, a wide troop dissemination was placed on redeployment. Continued coverage will be afforded this area as items of interest become available. Preparations for the final issue of The Ivy Leaf, a chronology special, is being completed with an unreleaseable target date established.

(d) Distribution of the Stars and Stripes is made by the Information Office, on a basis of one copy per five men. Papers are flown in from Cam Ranh Bay and picked up at An Khe airport and delivered to AG Message Center for distribution. Occasional delays in deliveries hampered distribution procedures, but were remedied.

(e) Frequently, the 4th Division receives coverage in other publications within Vietnam and also the Army Times. During this reporting period coverage received in other publications is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Column Inches</th>
<th>Photos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stars and Stripes</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Times</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV Observer</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA RV Reporter</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) 4th Division Association and Scholarship Fund.

(a) This office assumed the responsibility for Custodian, 4th Division Association and Scholarship Fund on 4 July 1970. Memberships added in August (488), September (490), and October (350) brought the composite membership total to 6,176. During the same period $11,296 in contributions to the Scholarship Fund raising the balance of the fund to $334,697.

(b) The upgrading of the 4th Division Association Artifacts Sales store, located in the Camp Radcliff Post Exchange, was completed. Vietnamese and Montagnard artifacts, all hand made, are offered for sale to division and visiting personnel. Supplies are acquired through the
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ACofS, G-5 and various Civic Action Teams. Items are then retailed at
the store with all profits going to the 4th Division Association Fund.

1. Highway Coordinator Activities.

(1) During the reporting period, the Highway 19 coordinator's office
continued to respond directly to the Assistant Division Commander-Maneuver
in effecting coordination between the maneuver in effecting coordination
between the division, the Capital ROC Infantry Division, the US Army Supp-
port Command, Qui Nhon, the 191st Military Region, the 16th Military
Police Group, and other units concerned with security, traffic control
and engineer efforts along Highway QL 19 east. Major operational pro-
blems that confronted the Highway Coordinator were:

(a) Defoliation and land clearing.

(b) Upgrading and repairing the highway, bridges, shoulders, and
culverts.

(c) Communications procedures.

(d) Fire fighting responsibilities.

(e) Security.

(f) Safe driving.

(g) Disabled vehicle recovery.

(2) Approximately 600 flight hours were logged performing reconna-
sance, convoy monitoring, and control, liaison, resupply, and other related
missions along the road.

(3) A total of 1,407 convoys consisting of 34,459 vehicles were mon-
tored and controlled by the three convoy control stations. A statistical
summary of all Highway 19 activities follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convoys</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles in convoys</td>
<td>14,780</td>
<td>12,016</td>
<td>7,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambushes (convoy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Activity Log

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack on Bridges, FC2, etc</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolition Damage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open road</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Loss (MS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Losses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Loss (accident)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Losses (accident)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Lessons Learned. Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.
   
a. Personnel.

   Replacement flow.

   (a) Observation. During the first part of the reporting period, a critical shortage of aviators was experienced. During the last three weeks of the period, 11 new aviators arrived.

   (b) Evaluation. The loss of aviators without getting replacements placed an extreme burden on the remaining aviators, in many cases causing them to be grounded because of excessive flight hours in a 30 day period.
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This has a snowball effect which eventually affects mission accomplishment. The assigning of many replacement aviators in a short period of time compounds the problem of placing a large training burden on the unit IP's and operations personnel, who are having to be used to fly mission requirements. Under normal conditions it required approximately three to five days of inprocessing and training before an aviator was mission ready.

(c) Recommendation. That action be taken to reduce personnel turbulence and effect a smooth flow of replacement aviators.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Air emplaced sensor devices.

(a) Observation. Accurate locations of air emplaced sensor devices was difficult to obtain.

(b) Evaluation. A number of methods have been experimented with in an attempt to accurately locate air emplaced sensor devices. Map plotting by aerial observers and hand photographers of sensor locations have been unsuccessful in locating the sensors to within 50 meters of their actual location. The use of MPQ-4 countermortar radars to detect sensors as they fall was unsuccessful. A technique that has been successful is to have the MPQ-4 radar plot the exact location of the aircraft at the moment of drop. Considering speed and altitude of the aircraft and using ballistic tables, this method produced the nearest accurate plot.

(c) Recommendation. That further experimentation be made in the development of techniques to plot air dropped sensors accurately.

(2) Prisoners of War Interrogations.

(a) Observation. Prisoners of War are normally very rank conscious and will not converse in a cooperative manner with interrogators of lesser rank.

(b) Evaluation. Interrogators who have concealed their actual rank from prisoners have been much more efficient. This has been most important when enlisted interrogators were working with enemy officers.

(c) Recommendation. Interrogators should not wear rank insignia, and every effort should be made to prevent the prisoners from knowing the rank of any interrogation personnel.

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(3) Consolidation of Ground Surveillance Radars.

(a) Observation. All AN/FFS-5 Ground Surveillance Radars in the division have been consolidated and assigned to Division Artillery Headquarters.

(b) Evaluation. AN/FFS-5 radar sections are organic to maneuver units. Because they were spread throughout the division and are complex and difficult to keep operational, they were not always as well employed or maintained as they could be. In an effort to improve their availability and utilization the radar and operators were consolidated within Division Artillery Headquarters. A five day operator's training/refresher course was established, resulting in a very high level of operator proficiency. A centralized maintenance program was established which resulted in a high rate of radar availability. The teams were supervised by field artillery radar specialists. They were employed throughout the division area of operation based on the overall intelligence picture rather than solely being dispersed based on an individual unit's location. They were, however, employed at battalion fire bases and within a battalion area of operation as requested by brigade/battalion commanders.

(c) Recommendation. That consolidation of AN/FFS-5 radar be tested further with a view toward a possible TOE modification.

c. Operations.

(1) Snoopy/Scorpion Employment.

(a) Observation. The Snoopy/Scorpion mission employs two AH-1G's and two light observation helicopters. There are two methods by which the AH-1G's give the LOH's coverage while they are hovering in one area. One method is to have two AH-1G's low in a wheel around the LOH's. The other method is to employ one AH-1G high in a wheel for immediate turret coverage and one AH-1G high in a wheel for rocket coverage to protect the rear when the three other aircraft are exiting an area.

(b) Evaluation. The second method, one AH-1G high and one AH-1G low, is considered the better of the two. Reason is that it provides the best and most complete coverage.

(c) Recommendation. That all other Snoopy/Scorpion teams be advised of the foregoing.
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RES CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Air Mobile Equipment.

(a) Observation. When air mobile equipment is transferred from one
location to another, operators are usually carried on separate aircraft,
often departing long before or after their equipment is moved.

(b) Evaluation. Experiences with the Case 450 mini-dozer reveal a
tendency for parts and/or slings to become lost once operators are sepa-
rated from equipment. Additionally, if the equipment moves first, sig-
nificant operational time is lost.

(c) Recommendation. The operator should be transported with his
equipment. The operator should be rappel-trained so that he may be inserted
when the lift aircraft cannot land. These recommendations have been
incorporated in the 4th Engineer Battalion Field SOP.

(3) Areas of Operation.

(a) Observation. During the period 1 August through 31 October, di-
vision operations were concentrated in the central and northeastern por-
tion of Binh Dinh Province. Consequently, the division conducted a majority
of its operations outside of its permanent area of operation. This neces-
sitated acquiring temporary areas of operation from a number of different
GVN, US, and FW forces.

(b) Evaluation. Conduct of operations required the coordination of
temporary areas of operation through 22nd ARVN Division, Capital ROK
Infantry Division, and 173rd Airborne Brigade. An inordinate amount of
time was spent requesting, terminating, granting and extending temporary
areas of operation for the operations, and coordinating artillery and air
strikes in these areas of Base Area 226. This was required because Base
Area 226 is split up among the four different units. This situation could
have been avoided had the base area, which for all practical purposes is
a key terrain feature in Binh Dinh Province, belonged entirely to one unit
following the axiom of not splitting key terrain features between units.

(c) Recommendation. When agreements between GVN, US, and FW forces
are promulgated for operational areas of operation or TADOR's, consideration
should be given to insure that key terrain areas, such as enemy base areas,
infiltration corridors, etc. are placed under the control of one unit
whenever possible.

(4) Employment of Mechanical Ambush.
(a) Observation. Mechanical (unmanned claymore) ambushes have been employed by single individuals and only these persons know the exact location of the device. This situation can cause friendly casualties.

(b) Evaluation. Proper planning and control for the employment of the mechanical ambush are often neglected. Leaders at the level that these devices are employed who do not know the locations of these devices are not able to properly control the battlefield.

(c) Recommendation. That a minimum of three people, including the platoon or squad leader, know the exact location of each mechanical ambush and that strict maneuver restrictions be imposed to protect both the installing unit and nearby units.

(5) Employment of Air Cavalry Support.

(a) Observation. Commanders requesting air cavalry support when in contact with the enemy frequently misuse the assets made available to them.

(b) Evaluation. Ground elements in contact frequently cease fire and allow the air cavalry units to take up the pursuit of the enemy.

(c) Recommendation. That all ground commanders be recognized that they are responsible to close with the enemy to destroy him. The air cavalry support should be used to scout ahead of the fleeing enemy and seal off the escape routes while the infantry pursues and maintains contact. This type of combined action will lead to greater successes for both elements by keeping pressure on the enemy.

(6) Adjustment of Indirect Fire.

(a) Observation. Indirect fire adjustments are frequently continued when the anticipated impact location to a previous adjustment is not attained.

(b) Evaluation. Many times adjustments are made when rounds impact in an area other than that which the observer felt should have been the impact area. Some observers then continue making adjustments thereby jeopardizing themselves and the personnel or units around them.

(c) Recommendation. That all personnel be indoctrinated with the requirement that, when adjusting indirect fire, if the response to a change is not close to that anticipated, make no further adjustments, but rather refire that round or previous rounds and double check procedures being used.
SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (P2) (U)

(7) Booby Traps an Indication of Enemy Presence.

(a) Observation. The presence of enemy booby traps in an area may be for harassing purposes, but they also are an indicator that an enemy force or installation is in and around that location.

(b) Evaluation. Booby traps are not employed by the enemy simply to harass, but more often indicate that a worthwhile target is in the area.

(c) Recommendation. That units institute a more deliberate search and security techniques where the presence of enemy booby traps is detected.

d. Organization. See paragraph 2b(3).

e. Training. None.
f. Logistics.

(1) Aerial Resupply of Water.

(a) Observation. When resupplying a firebase accessible only by air with water that collapsible water drums are awkward to use and water trailers are unnecessarily heavy and bulky.

(b) Evaluation. When set up on the ground, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to extract all of the water from a collapsible water drum. A water trailer with chassis and wheels is not only unnecessary on a small hilltop firebase, but can also constitute a safety hazard. In order to more efficiently carry and dispense water, 600 gallon tanks were used instead of 400 gallon water trailers, eliminating the need to carry the trailer chassis' dead weight and allowing half again as much water to be lifted per sortie as well as allowing better and safer utilization in the firebase. Organic water trailers were then spared the wear and tear to which they had been subjected during almost daily air lift.

(c) Recommendation. That the use of 600 gallon water pods for aerial resupply be considered.

(2) Repair Parts.

(a) Observation. Unavailability of repair parts for low-density, high-use items (such as M728 C&V, M88 VTR, 2 ton rough-terrain crane,
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SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

rough-terrain forklift, 250 cfm compressor) considerably degrades the
engineer battalion's capacity to accomplish combat support and con-
struction missions.

(b) Evaluation.

1. These low-density items are in constant demand for combat sup-
port and construction. The combat vehicles are subject to damage of
parts that are not easily available through normal supply channels. The
forklift and forklift are of such low density that adequate stocks of es-
sential parts are seldom maintained. Consequently, the vehicles remain
deadlined for inordinate periods of time. For example, during most of
this reporting period, this battalion has been without a fully operational
rough-terrain crane; progress has been delayed on projects requiring a
dragline, clamshell or heavy-lift capability.

2. Close contact with other engineer units helps to alleviate the
problem. Occasionally, they are willing to provide the desired parts;
sometimes parts can be obtained from similar vehicles deadlined for other
reasons. However, direct support units discourage this practice.

Since the low-demand repair parts usually come from CONUS depots,
Red Ball requisitions are of little help as long delays are still experi-
enced.

(c) Recommendation. For those critical vehicles, greater responsiv-
eness is required of the PLL system, and adequate stocks must be main-
tained at in-country depots. One solution to the unusual repair part
problems is to establish additional maintenance floats for these low
density end items. Thus the end items could be DX'ed and the depot could
request and install the repair parts.

5. Communications.

(a) Observation. Due to the non-availability of authorized AN/VSC-3
radio-teletype sets mounted in M-577 tracked vehicles for mechanized units,
The 124th Signal Battalion has been required to provide the radio-tele-
typewriter sets to support the Division-Gurol Squadron and Mechanized
Battalion. The only sets available for this purpose are the AN/RC-122
and 142 radios mounted in a shelter: on a M-37, 3/4 ton truck. Attempting
to support rapidly moving mechanized units with equipment mounted in
wheeloed vehicles proved to be an impossible task. To support these units
adequately, a comparable degree of mobility must exist for the communi-
cations equipment.
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LVDDH-GC-MH 20 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ORS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Evaluation. To provide the required mobility, LN/GRC-142 shelters have been dismounted from the M37 trucks and mounted in M548 cargo tracks. Sufficient space remained in the rear of the track for two 5 kw generators to operate the radio. A layer of sandbags was placed in the bottom of the track to cushion the shelter, wood blocks inserted to prevent lateral movement, and the shelter tied down into cables using D-rings on the shelter corners.

(c) Recommendation. That the above substitute be used until radios-teletype sets mounted in M-577 tracks become available.

(2) Multiple Communications.

(a) Observation. The amount of traffic between brigade and battalion levels made existing FM radio nets inadequate, particularly for administrative and logistical functions.

(b) Evaluation. Introduction of the LN/GRC-163, four-channel multiplex produced a more viable means of communications. With the LN/GRC-163 interconnecting brigade and forward battalion switchboards, four-channels were available providing the flexibility of a telephone system rather than the point-to-point limitation of FM radios.

(c) Recommendation. That this type of communications equipment be added to the TOE's to enhance the communications capability between brigade and forward battalions.

(3) SSB Radios.

(a) Observation. Continued use and reliance on FM radio as a primary means of communications has resulted in a decrease in utilization and training on SSB voice radio.

(b) Evaluation. With the decrease in forces in RVN, units are conducting operations at greater distances from their central headquarters, in many cases exceeding the range of FM radios. Continuous operations of a division SSB net would not only provide training in its use, but also provide excellent backup for FM nets. The effectiveness of a SSB system would be enhanced by operation directly from the DTC with radio wire integration capability.

(c) Recommendation. That units consider the use of SSB systems when possible.
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, AGS GSP03-65 (R2) (U)

h. Materiel.

(1) Ensure 202 Expandable Mine Roller.

(a) Observation. A suitable vehicle is required for mounting of the Ensure 202 mine roller.

(b) Evaluation. The only appropriate TOE vehicles available to the division engineer battalion are the M728 CEV and M88 VTR. Both are equipped with a hydraulic system in which the roller could be mounted and an A-frame hoist which is invaluable for installation/replacement of the roller. However, restriction of the available CEV's and VTR's to mine sweep duty would be an unfortunate, if not unacceptable, misuse of the equipment. Additionally, the VTR is not equipped with adequate armament. During June and July, the 4th Engineer Battalion utilized one M48A3 tank to mount the roller. Because the M48A3 tank has no hoist, a 5 ton wrecker had to accompany each sweep.

(c) Recommendation. Whenever a major and continuing mine clearing mission is given the division, the division engineer battalion shall be authorized additional combat vehicles for the purpose of mounting the mine roller. One vehicle is required for support of each brigade. Recommended configurations are:

   1. M728 CEV with standard 105mm main gun.
   2. M48A3 tank modified with A-frame hoist (essential) and front hydraulic system (desirable).

(2) Concrete Mixing Capability.

(a) Observation. The division engineer battalion requires an organic concrete mixing capability.

(b) Evaluation. This battalion has had a substantial continuing requirement for concrete. Construction at base camp, at semi-permanent firebases and along lines of communication often requires building pads, concrete footers and headwalls. During this reporting period alone, the battalion has placed over 1,500 cubic yards of concrete. So far, mixing requirements have been satisfied by the acquisition of 165 units on 180-day loan, or by arranging use of transit mixers assigned to local non-divisional engineers. These arrangements have at times been less than satisfactory and have frequently resulted in project delays.
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) **Recommendation.** Recommend that 16S mixers be part of the division engineer battalion's TOE as stated in 4th Infantry Division recommended TOE. Based upon experience of this division, a level of two for the equipment platoon and one per line company can be justified.

(3) Corrugated Metal Pipe Culverts.

(a) **Observation.** In conjunction with the program to speed firebase construction, the battalion evolved a design for an airmobile battalion TOC that featured a corrugated metal pipe arch frame believed to be superior structurally and economically to the CONEX containers normally used.

(b) **Evaluation.** Available pipe arch components permitted assembly of a 40-foot continuous tube. The design envisioned cutting the tube into two 20-foot sections; lumber end panels and metal sling guides would be added to form an enclosed, liftable unit. Gross weight of the configuration is estimated to be less than seven ton. — within the capacity of the CH-47 "Super-C" or CH-54. Because of higher priorities, a working prototype could not be produced.

(c) **Recommendation.** That a prototype be fabricated and tested. Further studies should be conducted to obtain an end-panel design using a material lighter than wood.


(a) **Observation.** There has been a failure to inform adequately the Montagnard hamlets of the nature, achievements, and the goals of the GVN. Without this understanding the Montagnards are more susceptible to the pressures of the Communist.

(b) **Evaluation.** This lack of communication with the Montagnard is attributed to the fact that many Montagnards have not been instructed on how to read. Consequently, many leaflets designed for the Montagnards are beyond their comprehension.

(c) **Recommendation.** More pictorial leaflets messages of an informative nature should be created which will offer specific alternatives to the VC/NVA way of life. A series of actual photographs on the leaflets is a promising means of communicating with the Montagnards. Since the majority of the Montagnard audiences are unable to read, there should be no writing on the
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AIDEN-CC-85

20 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report — Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Leaflets. The Montguard is unable to correlate the caption with the picture; therefore, he tends to disregard the entire leaflet.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incal
1. Task Organization
2. Key Personnel
3. Abbreviations
4. Maps 1, 2, and 3
5. Locations

Incl. 2 thru 4 w/d HQ DA

DISTRIBUTION:
1-CG, 4th Inf Div
1-AGSFOR, DA
1-00CS, DA
1-USACDC
1-USCOMARC
2-CINCUSARPAC
2-DPG, USARV
6-CG, I FFORDEV
1-Comdt, CGS College
1-Comdt, Armor School
1-Comdt, Artillery School
1-Comdt, Avn School
1-Comdt, Eng School
1-Comdt, Inf School
1-Comdt, Sig Sch & Gen
1-Comdt, USA Chem Gen & Sch
1-USMA Library
1-CO, CGC, CBR Agency
1-CO, 52d Arty Gy
1-CO, 52d CA bn
2-CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf Div
2-CO, 2nd Bn, 4th Inf Div
1-CO, 173rd Abn Bn
2-CO, DIVARTY
2-CO, JICCCN
2-CO, 1-10 CAV
1-CO, 2-3 Inf (Mech)
1-CO, 3-8 Inf
1-CO, 1-12 Inf
1-CO, 3-12 Inf
1-CO, 1-14 Inf
1-CO, 1-22 Inf
1-CO, 2-35 Inf
1-CO, 5-16 Arty
1-CO, 6-29th Arty
1-CO, 4-42 Arty
2-CO, 4th Eng Bn
2-CO, 124th Sig Bn
2-CO, 4th Avn Bn
2-CO, 4th SRF Bn
2-CO, 4th Med Bn
2-CO, 704th Maint Bn
2-CO, 7-17 Cav
1-CS, 4th Inf Div
1-ACoS, G-1
1-ACoS, G-2
1-ACoS, G-3
1-ACoS, G-4
1-ACoS, G-5
1-TACP, ALCO, 4th Inf Div
1-CO, 4th ProvDET
1-Provost Marshal, 4th Inf Div
1-G
1-G, 4th MI Co
1-CO, 39th MED
1-Chen Off
1-AG File

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AVP-3C, LIT (20 Nov 70) 1st Inf
SUBJ: OLR: Operational Lessons Learned, 4th Infantry Division,
Perod Ending 31 October 1970, C. L., ORO-165 (12)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIC-3C-RST
D/T 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational
   Report Lessons Learned and concurs with the following ex options:

2. Concur with contents in 1st area of responsibility except para 2 f(2).

3. Concur because: Units with low density high use items, should submit to supporting unit items with high failure rate for addition to stock-

4. Reference Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evalu-
   ations, and Recommendations: Paragraph 2e (1)(b): The tactics employed by
   the A-10 during Scoopy/Scorpion mission is a workable solution: however,
   not all missions utilize the highly maneuverable A-10. The Scoopy mission
   is characterized by having an armed escort gun team that is in position to
   provide support. This support is greatly dependent upon the teamwork, pro-
   ficiency and state of training of the crews.

FOI: US QMIL D...:

ROBERT W. NAYLOR
ILT, AGC
ASST AG

CF:
2 - C.POL, D.
1 - Cl, 4th Inf Div (LESS OCL)
AVHDO-DO (20 Nov 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 21 MAR 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Repair Parts," page 58, paragraph 2f(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2. Units should identify required repair parts as mission essential and thereby cause them to be retained on the supporting unit's ASL. The Red Ball Expanded System is designed to requisition repair parts required for ASL to prevent combat/mission essential equipment from reaching a NORS condition. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furn:
I FFORCEV
4th Inf Div
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GPOP-DT (20 Nov 70) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 MAY 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(C) This headquarters concurs with the subject ORLL as indorsed with the following comment: Reference paragraph 2b(1), page 54: Accurate determination of location of aerial emplaced sensors may be made in several ways. Aerial photography missions can more accurately plot locations of sensors than hand photography. In some cases artillery registration may be used to tie in location with known artillery data. In all aerial applications, use of the LORAN navigational system instead of the MPQ-4 radar to plot aircraft location at time of drop may provide more accurate position data.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.H. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst A:

Cy furn:
CG USARV
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 31 July 1970:

1st Blc, 4th Inf Div

- 3-12 Inf
- 2-35 Inf
- 3-8 Inf (Ren OPCON 503rd Abn)
- A/6-29 Arty DS 3-8 Inf
- B/6-29 Arty DS 3-12 Inf
- A/4-12 Arty DS 2-35 Inf
- C/704 Maint
- B/4th Med
- B/4th Engr
- Plat/124th Sig
- Plat/4th KP

2nd Blc, 4th Inf Div

- 1-12 Inf
- 1-14 Inf
- 1-22 Inf
- B/4-2 Arty DS 1-12 Inf
- C/4-12 Arty DS 1-22 Inf
- C/6-29 Arty DS 1-4 Inf
- D/704 Maint
- C/4th Med
- C/4th Engr
- Plat/124th Sig
- Plat/4th KP

Division Troops

- 2-8 Mech (A/2-8 Mech OPCON 1-10 Cav)
- 1-10 Cav
- K-75 Egr
- 1/5-16 Arty DS 2-8 Mech
- C/5-16 Arty DS 1-10 Cav
- B, D/5-16 Arty GS
- 704th Maint (-)
- 4th Med (-)
- 4th Engr (-)
- 124th Sig (-)
- 4th KP (-)
- 4th NI
- 4th S&T
- 4th War Dog (Prov)

2. (C) Task organization change effective 2 August 1970:

1-10 Cav RELEASE C (-)/1-10 Cav 2-8 Mech RECEIVE C (-)/1-10 Cav

3. (C) Task organization change effective 5 August 1970:

503rd Abn RELEASE Ren/3-12 Inf 3-12 Inf RECEIVE Ren/3-12 Inf

4. (C) Task organization change effective 7 August 1970:

503rd Abn RELEASE Ren 3-8 Inf 3-8 Inf RECEIVE Ren/3-8 Inf
1st Blc RELEASE 3-12 Inf Div RECEIVE OPCON 3-12 Inf
2nd Blc RELEASE 1-14 Inf (-) 1st Blc RECEIVE 1-14 Inf (-)

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (cont'd)

5. (C) Task organization change effective 8 August 1970:
   2nd Bde RELEASE D/1-14 Inf
   1-14 Inf RECEIVE D/1-14 Inf

6. (C) Task organization change effective 9 August 1970:
   1st Bde RELEASE 3-8 Inf
   2nd Bde RECEIVE OPCON 3-8 Inf

7. (C) Task organization change effective 14 August 1970:
   Div RELEASE 3-12 Inf
   1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON 3-12 Inf

8. (C) Task organization change effective 19 August 1970:
   IFFV RELEASE C/75 Ranger
   Div RECEIVE OPCON C/75 Ranger

9. (C) Task organization change effective 21 August 1970:
   1st Bde RELEASE 1-14 Inf
   2nd Bde RELEASE 1-22 Inf
   2nd Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14 Inf
   Div RECEIVE OPCON 1-22 Inf

10. (C) Task organization change effective 25 August 1970:
    Div RELEASE C/75 Ranger
    IFFV RECEIVE C/75 Ranger
    2-8 Mech RELEASE C/1-10 Cav
    1-10 Cav RECEIVE OPCON C/1-10 Cav

11. (C) Task organization change effective 28 August 1970:
    Div RELEASE 1-22 Inf
    1st Bde RECEIVE 1-22 Inf

12. (C) Task organization change effective 29 August 1970:
    2-8 Mech RELEASE Sct/2-8 Mech
    1-10 Cav RECEIVE OPCON Sct/2-8 Mech

13. (C) Task organization change effective 30 August 1970:
    1st Bde RELEASE 2-35 Inf
    Div RECEIVE OPCON 2-35 Inf

14. (C) Task organization change effective 5 September 1970:
    Div RELEASE 2-35 Inf
    1st Bde RECEIVE 2-35 Inf
    2nd Bde RELEASE 3-8 Inf
    Div RECEIVE OPCON 3-8 Inf

15. (C) Task organization change effective 6 September 1970:

CONFIDENTIAL
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (cont'd)

16. (C) Task organization change effective 13 September 1970:

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<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Release</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav</td>
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17. (C) Task organization change effective 20 September 1970:

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<td>Release</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-8 Mech</td>
<td>Release Flame/2-8 Mech</td>
<td>IFFV RECEIVE OPCON Flame/2-8 Mech</td>
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18. (C) Task organization change effective 27 September 1970:

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<td>RELEASE 3-12 Inf</td>
<td>2nd Bde RECEIVE 3-12 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Div</td>
<td>RELEASE 1-14 Inf</td>
<td>2nd Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Div</td>
<td>RELEASE K-75 Ranger</td>
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19. (C) Task organization change effective 2 October 1970:

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<tbody>
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<td>2nd Bde RECEIVE 2-35 Inf</td>
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20. (C) Task organization change effective 3 October 1970:

| IFFV | Release Flame/2-8 Mech | 2-8 Mech RECEIVE Flame/2-8 Mech |

21. (C) Task organization change effective 4 October 1970:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Div</td>
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<td>1st Bde RECEIVE 1-14 Inf</td>
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22. (C) Task organization change effective 5 October 1970:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>RELEASE 1-12 Inf</td>
<td>Div RECEIVED OPCON 1-12 Inf</td>
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23. (C) Task organization change effective 6 October 1970:

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<td>1-10 Cav RECEIVED 3B/2-8 Mech</td>
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24. (C) Task organization change effective 7 October 1970:

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<td>RELEASE 3-8 Inf</td>
<td>1st Bde RECEIVE 3-8 Inf</td>
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25. (C) Task organization change effective 10 October 1970:

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<td>RELEASE 3B/2-8 Mech</td>
<td>2-8 Mech RECEIVE 3B/2-8 Mech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>RELEASE OPCON K-75 Ranger</td>
<td>Div RECEIVED OPCON K-75 Ranger</td>
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</table>

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (cont'd)

26. (C) Task organization change effective 11 October 1970:
   2nd Bde RELEASE 3-12 Inf 1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON 3-12 Inf

27. (C) Task organization change effective 14 October 1970:
   Div RELEASE 1-12 Inf 2nd Bde RECEIVE 1-12 Inf

28. (C) Task organization change effective 14 October 1970:
   1st Bde RELEASE 1-22 Inf 2nd Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-22 Inf

29. (C) Task organization change effective 15 October 1970:

   1-10 Cav RELEASE C/1-10 Cav 1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON C/1-10 Cav
   3-8 Inf RELEASE B/3-8 Inf 1-10 Cav RECEIVE OPCON B/3-8 Inf
   Div RELEASE K-75 Ranger 1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON K-75 Ranger

30. (C) Task organization change effective 16 October 1970:

   2nd Bde RELEASE 1-22 Inf Div RECEIVE OPCON 1-22 Inf

31. (C) Task organization change effective 20 October 1970:

   2-8 Nesh terminated combat operations with 4th Inf Div.

32. (C) Task organization change effective 24 October 1970:

   1-22 Inf terminated combat operations with 4th Inf Div.

33. (C) Task organization change effective 26 October 1970:

   3-8 Inf RELEASE Reno/3-8 Inf 3-12 Inf RECEIVE OPCON Reno/3-8 Inf
   3-12 Inf RELEASE B/3-12 Inf 3-8 Inf RECEIVE OPCON B/3-12 Inf
   2-35 Inf terminated combat operations with 4th Inf Div.

34. (C) Task organization change effective 30 October 1970:

   1st Bde RELEASE K-75 Ranger Div RECEIVE OPCON K-75 Ranger
   1-10 Cav RELEASE B/3-8 Inf 3-8 Inf RECEIVE B/3-8 Inf
   3-8 Inf RELEASE C/1-10 Cav 1-10 Cav RECEIVE C/1-10 Cav
   3-8 Inf RELEASE B/3-12 Inf 1-10 Cav RECEIVE OPCON B/3-12 Inf

35. (C) Task organization as of 31 October 1970:

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CONFIDENTIAL
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (cont'd)

1st Bde., 4th Inf Div
3-12 Inf
3-5 Inf
1-14 Inf

Division Control
1-10 Cav
K-75 Rangers

2nd Bde., 4th Inf Div
1-12 Inf
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<tr>
<td>AN LAC VALLEY</td>
<td>BR 685430 N to BR 6264</td>
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<td>ZA 8007 E to ZA 9007</td>
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Incl 5

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CONFIDENTIAL
LOCATIONS OF LZ'S, VILLAGES, FSB'S (cont'd)

LZ ACTION                BR 264470
LZ AQUARIUS               BR 457600
LZ ARMAGEDDON            BR 420645
LZ ARNOLD TRAIL          BR 726607
LZ AUGUSTA               BR 801727
LZ BLAXTER               BR 185719
LZ BIG WIND              BR 158244
LZ BLACKHAWK             BR 035535
LZ BRIGIT                 ZA 015164
LZ BUCKEYE               BR 078276
LZ BURGESS               YA 901386
LZ CAJUN                  BR 372921
LZ CHALLENGE             BR 628822
LZ COMANCHE              YA 432631
LZ CONQUEST              YA 601401
LZ COURAGE               CR 023725
LZ CUPHAWEE              YA 427525
LZ DENISE                BR 520512
LZ DORIS                 BR 061342
LZ DRAGON                YA 443059
LZ EVELIA                BR 477595
LZ ENGLISH               BS 877077
LZ Frustration           BR 273462

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
LOCATIONS OF LZ'S, VILLAGES, FSB'S (cont'd)

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CONFIDENTIAL
LOCATIONS OF LZ'S, VILLAGES, FSB'S (cont'd)

LZ SCHUELLER BR 367458
LZ SHERRY BR 490690
LZ SNIPE BR 693613
LZ SOPER BR 331273
LZ SPEARHEAD YA 519471
LZ ST GEORGE AR 854144
LZ SUSIE BR 478908
LZ TERRACE BR 572753
LZ TOUGHIE BR 555680
LZ TRACER LR 846592
LZ TWO BITS BR 845945
LZ UPLIFT BR 927757
LZ UTE BR 355705
LZ WARRIOR BR 322553
LZ WASHINGTON BQ 672705
LZ WELSH BR 494679
LZ WILDCAT YA 595525
LZ WINNIE BR 524334
MANG GIANG PASS BR 2251
PHU MY BR 9467
Plei Mrong ZA 113673
Plei Trap Valley YB 8815 to YA 6347
ROCKET BOX ZA 145535

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LOCATIONS OF LZ'S, VALLEYS, FSB'S (cont'd)

SONG BÂ RIVER  BR 4745 SW to BR 345285 S to PHU NHON
VC VALLEY  BR 1339
VINH THANH VALLEY  BR 6251
**OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, HQ, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION**

**EXPERIENCES OF UNIT ENGAGED IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, 1 AUG TO 31 OCT 70.**

CG, 4th Infantry Division

20 November 1970

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N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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