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DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

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PURPOSE: To obtain approval of a proposed doctrine for personnel assignment and rotation.

DISCUSSION:
1. In connection with the decision briefing on Project STRAIT, you observed that we needed to develop a doctrine for personnel assignment and rotational procedures for the future; that we should carefully consider an 18-month short tour policy to be effective from the beginning of the conflict; and that, if this were adopted, a system of relief (point system) for the front line soldiers should be established (TAB A).

2. On 29 June 1970, an ODCSPER study on the 12-month tour in Vietnam was forwarded in accordance with your request. This study concluded that:
   a. A 12-month hostile fire area tour becomes increasingly difficult to sustain over an extended period of time.
   b. Other overseas area, non-combat tour lengths should be lengthened to exceed the length of the combat area tour, thereby promoting recognition of combat service and reducing replacement requirements.
   c. Requirements for large numbers of skills in a combat area, without comparable requirements in the sustaining base, create skill imbalance and training problems.
   d. The 12-month Vietnam tour created excessive personnel turbulence (turnover). This turbulence, in turn, affected unit readiness and effectiveness, personnel retention, and individual morale.

3. At TAB B is a follow-on study which relies heavily on the previous study of the 12-month tour and which develops the proposed statement of Army doctrine for personnel assignment and rotation (TAB C).
RECOMMENDATION. That the proposed statement of Army doctrine for personnel assignment and rotation (TAB C) be approved.

COORDINATION
DCSOPs COMM ROS COL. Russell D. Beard, Jr. X53450
ACSFOR CONCUR, James A. Franklin, LTC, GS

3 Incl
TABS A-C

WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel

NOTED. VCSA, 15 MAY 71. "The proposed statement of Army doctrine at Tab C expresses principles which are relevant to our experience in Vietnam and should be considered in future conflicts. However, the difficulty of implementing this doctrine, and the uncertainty of conditions under which Army forces may be committed militate against the inclusion of this doctrine as a part of the ASCP. Request DCSPER coordinate with CDC to insure that our experience in Vietnam with the 12-month tour is made a part of our institutional memory through inclusion in the "Lessons Learned." This area of doctrine should be further investigated, as time permits, by DCSPER in coordination with CDC, CORC, and ACSFOR."

A. DeBERARDINO
LTC, GS
Assistant Secretary of the General Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

10 August 1970

MINORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: VCoFSA Decision Briefing - Project STRAIT

1. (C) On 17 Jul 70, DCSPER presented the Project STRAIT (Short Tour Replacements from Advanced Individual Training) briefing to the VCoFSA. In attendance were: LTC Kerwin, LTC DePuy, MG Smith, MG Williams, MG Koester, MG Schroeder, COL Glisson, COL Carroll, LTC Seigel, and LTC Ament.

2. (C) The Project STRAIT Study was directed by the VCoFSA on 10 Apr 70. Its objective was to determine when assignment and separation policies can be changed to provide AIT graduates an assignment in CONUS based units prior to deployment to short tour areas.

3. (C) Upon completion of the study, DCSPER concluded that full implementation is infeasible for MOS with more authorizations in short tour areas than in the sustaining base. Deferral of Project STRAIT until FY 73, when MOS symmetry is projected to be achieved, is warranted. For MOS with balanced authorizations, there is a shortage of assets in CONUS because of overtraining in MOS for which there is a heavy requirement in Vietnam. Recent heavy Vietnam personnel requirements, the current trained strength shortfall, and reduced draft calls aggravate the situation and confirm the conclusions of the study. As a result, DCSPER recommended and the VCoFSA approved the following:

   a. That implementation of Project STRAIT be deferred until FY 73 when full implementation is feasible.

   b. That a plan be developed by end FY 72, for full implementation.

   c. That subject to the availability of resources, a pilot test for MOS 11E (Armor Crewman) be conducted in early FY 72.

4. (C) Following the briefing the VCoFSA stated that the conclusions of the study are inescapable. However, he expressed concern about plunging the 11E AIT graduate directly into combat. In this connection, he made the following observations:

   a. We need to develop a doctrine for personnel assignment and rotational procedures for the future, recognizing that we will be required to retain an individual, rather than unit, replacement system. We must assume that future conflicts will be similar to our involvement in Vietnam, and soldiers will not be retained in the service for the duration of the
conflict. We ought to consider very carefully an 18-month short tour policy to be effective from the beginning of the conflict. However, if this were adopted, a system of relief (point system) for the front line soldiers would have to be established in order to give them some relief.

b. We should look into an experimental four-week BCT for certain MOS, particularly Infantry, Artillery, and Armor, whereby the individual would learn the fundamentals of basic soldiering; e.g., discipline, personal hygiene, dismounted drill, marksmanship, etc., and then move to certain (designated) units in CONUS or Europe (if current law could be changed) where he would become proficient through unit-conducted training. It was pointed out that an individual must have 16 weeks training (service) before deployable overseas and could possibly be trained better by this technique than the current system. It is recognized that turbulence and unit readiness are major factors to consider; however, the savings that may be possible through training base reductions may offset the disadvantages. VCOFSA pointed out that this may not be possible until mid-FY 72 but should be looked into.

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CARL W. STINER
Major, GS
Assistant Secretary of the General Staff
DOCTRINE FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION

1. PROBLEM: To develop a doctrine for personnel assignment and rotational procedures for the future.

2. DEFINITION: "Doctrine" is a "fundamental principle by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (AR 310-25)

3. ASSUMPTIONS:

   a. The Army will be engaged in conflicts overseas at levels which do not permit general mobilization.

   b. The strength of the active Army at the time troops are committed to the overseas conflict area will be between 850,000 and 1,000,000.

   c. Army troop level in the conflict area will reach about 150,000 at the end of the first year and 250,000 by the end of the second year after troops are committed.

   d. The conflict will continue for five years.

   e. The strength of the Army will increase by approximately 500,000 over a period of two years and will be kept at that level for the next three years. Approximately 20,000 of the increase will be reservists called to active duty. The remainder will be made up of enlistees and draftees, as needed.

   f. The Army will be required to retain an individual, rather than a unit, replacement system.

   g. Soldiers will not be retained in the service for the duration of the conflict.

DISCUSSION:

   a. There is at present no single consolidated statement of Army doctrine concerning personnel assignment and rotation. However, policies and procedures currently in effect appear to express the following basic principles or doctrine:
(1) An assignment and rotation system should exist fundamentally to provide Army commanders with trained individuals in the proper skills and numbers in accordance with priorities established by Department of the Army.

(2) All personnel should share equally in hazardous and undesirable assignments.

(3) Forced separation of military families should be minimized.

(4) Tour lengths are based on the general desirability of the geographical area rather than the duty assignment of the individual.

(5) Unaccompanied short tours are primarily 12 and 13 months.

b. A recent ODCSPER study of the 12-month tour in Vietnam investigated the problems of meeting personnel requirements of the short tour. Increasing a 12-month tour in a combat area to 18 months would materially alleviate these problems, decrease turbulence and decrease transportation costs.

c. The 12-month tour study recognized that most personnel problems during the Vietnam war were traceable to the 12-month Vietnam tour. Because of the 12-month tour, the number of repetitive tours in Vietnam for career personnel was increased. Thus, the 12-month tour was to the advantage of the draftee, one-term enlistee and OBV officer and to the disadvantage of the careerist who was required to serve second and third tours in Vietnam. The increased personnel turbulence, family separation and repetitive tours caused by the 12-month Vietnam tour had an adverse effect on morale and retention of the careerist.

d. The Project STRAIT Study pertained to the assignment of AIT graduates to CONUS based units for approximately six months prior to deployment to short tour areas. This period of time plus the processing, training and leave time and completion of a 12-month tour in a short tour area would normally complete the active duty time for AUS personnel and the 2-year RA enlistee. In the event of engagement in a future conflict as assumed by this study, the utilization of this six-month period, at least for combat service support personnel, in the combat area rather than in additional unit training would be a significant benefit to the Army.
Nine of the 10 combat support training courses taught at the training centers are 8 or less weeks in length. Combat support training courses taught at Army service schools range from a few weeks to as much as 50 weeks. However, draftees and 2-year enlistees are normally limited to courses of less than 20 weeks. Therefore, these personnel normally would have completed between 5 and 8 months service upon assignment to a combat area with the majority being able to complete an 18-month overseas tour. Therefore, it is considered that the tour length in future conflicts of the scope indicated in the assumptions should be 18 months. A tour longer than 18 months would be hard to justify in view of the public knowledge that the tour during the Vietnam war was 12 months. An increased tour of less than 18 months for the combat service support troops and of less than 15 months for the combat support troops would be insufficient to realize significant benefits.

e. If this increase in short tour lengths were made in any future engagements, some reduction in tour length would be advisable for the combat infantryman and others engaged in active combat depending upon the period(s) of such active combat participation. A further discussion of this area with possible systems of reducing the tour for active combat personnel is at Incl 1.

f. Actual savings in terms of reduced personnel requirements in the fast moving combat skills would be minimal. However, the advantage of improved morale for these personnel by recognizing their greater combat contribution would be significant. For personnel in other than the combat skills, the number of replacements required per month for 15-month and 18-month tours as compared to a 12-month tour would be reduced by 20 percent and 33 1/3 percent respectively.

g. As indicated by Incl 1, the monthly replacement requirements to sustain an Army strength in the combat zone would be reduced by approximately 3,500 per month as the result of personnel serving an average tour length of 15 months in the combat area instead of a 12-month tour. No reduction would occur in the number of replacements required for personnel actively engaged in combat. Replacements for these combat personnel based on an estimated 28 percent of the force serving in an active combat status out of a total combat force of 200,000 would be approximately 4,700 per month. Monthly replacements for combat support personnel comprising
approximately 29 percent of the force who would be serving a 15-month tour instead of a 12-month tour would be reduced from approximately 4,900 to 3,900. Monthly replacements for personnel providing service support to the combat forces comprising approximately 43 percent of the force who would be serving an 18-month tour instead of a 12-month tour would be reduced from approximately 7,200 to 4,800.

h. A major advantage in being able to use an individual in the combat area for an 18-month tour would be the increased combat area utilization of the 2-year draftee or enlistee from 1/2 of his tour to 3/4 of his tour. Even for the 3-year enlistee who would serve an 18-month tour, the combat utilization would increase from 1/3 to 1/2. The dissatisfaction of draftees and 2-year enlistees in being reassigned to CONUS for the remaining portion of their service when not eligible for separation and the turbulence resulting in short terminal assignments would be removed.

i. An overseas area where combat forces are engaged should not normally have a longer tour than other areas. Therefore, the tour lengths in other overseas areas should be re-evaluated to determine whether they should also be adjusted. A more detailed discussion is at Incl 2.

j. An increase in tour length after deployment of substantial numbers of troops would have an adverse effect on morale and invite public criticism. The ODCSFPER study of the 12-month tour in Vietnam pointed out that consideration was given to extending the tour in Vietnam. However, it was dropped as unacceptable. Lengthening a tour is an extremely sensitive question and one having very significant political implications. Therefore, any increase in tour length in a combat area should be made as early as possible and in conjunction with the commitment of troops to the area.

k. DOD Directive 1315.7 prescribes uniform overseas duty tours for all military personnel. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the final approving authority for the establishment of, or change to, an overseas tour length. The Army cannot unilaterally establish or change the length of an overseas tour. However, in the event of a future conflict, the Army probably would have primary interest (as the Service
with the greatest personnel strength in the area) and
would be responsible for submitting the recommendation for
change of tour length.

1. If a statement of Army doctrine for personnel assign-
ment and rotation for the future is approved, it should be
included in appropriate form in Annex Q of the Army Strategic
Capabilities Plan.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Tour length for any overseas combat area in which United
States Army forces are committed in substantial numbers should
be not less than 18 months.

b. Tour lengths of other overseas areas should be re-eval-
uated to determine whether they should also be adjusted.

c. The tour length of those engaged in active combat
with the enemy should be reduced below normal depending upon
the amount of active combat participation.

d. A statement of Army doctrine concerning personnel
assignment and rotation for the future should include the
foregoing provisions.

e. The proposed statement of Army doctrine concerning
personnel assignment and rotation for the future should be
included in appropriate form in Annex Q of the Army Strategic
Capabilities Plan.

6. RECOMMENDATION: That the proposed statement of Army
doctrine for personnel assignment and rotation for the future
at TAB C containing the above conclusions be approved and
incorporated as appropriate (Incl 3) into Annex Q of the Army
Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Incl

as

5
ESTABLISHMENT OF A POINT SYSTEM
IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE TOUR
FOR THE FRONT LINE SOLDIER

1. DISCUSSION:

a. Any point system which would reduce the tour for the front line soldier should be based on the general premise that the shortest tour would be no less than 12 months and the longest tour would not exceed 18 months.

b. The specific provisions of a point system should be developed "on the ground" with DA representatives assisting. However, tours in a combat area might involve the following concepts:

(1) 12-month tour - continuous service in a combat or aviation unit of battalion level and below. In general, these personnel would be combat troops whose primary missions are to participate in combat.

(2) 15-month tour - continuous service in a brigade divisional headquarters and other divisional and non-divisional units frequently, but not routinely, exposed to combat hazards. Generally, these would be combat support troops whose primary missions are to provide combat support to the combat forces, e.g., military police, combat engineers, air defense, field artillery and advisors at a comparable level.

(3) 18-month tour - continuous service in the remainder of the combat area. Generally, these would be personnel whose primary missions are to provide service support to the combat forces, e.g., administration, civil affairs, constructions (general), logistics, medical, communications and transportation.

c. Under a point system, personnel indicated in b(1) above could be awarded 15 points for each month of duty with the type of unit indicated. Personnel indicated in b(2) above could be awarded 12 points for each month of duty with the type of unit indicated and personnel indicated in b(3) above could be awarded 10 points for each month of duty. Personnel would be considered to have completed a tour when they had accumulated 180 points.

d. In December 1968, CG USARV advised that USARV strength was distributed approximately 28 percent combat, 29 percent combat support and 43 percent combat service.
support. Using this as a basis for projecting tour lengths for a future combat area, the average tour for all of the combat area would be approximately 15 months. Based on an Army strength in the combat area of 200,000, the number of replacements required per month would be about 13,500. This compares with approximately 17,000 which would be required per month based on a 12-month tour for everyone in the combat area or a saving of approximately 3,500 replacements per month.

e. Problems could be expected in administering equitably a reduced tour for personnel in a combat area. Consideration was given to establishing a point system in Vietnam in 1968. Informal contact with USARPAC and USARV at that time revealed opposition to this proposal. Reasons given were that such a system would be difficult to administer equitably, would be an administrative burden and would have serious morale implications. One of the problems in adopting a point system for Vietnam, and possibly for a combat area in the future, is the lack of any clearly defined front lines, divisional reserve area (the "intermediate" combat zone) or in-country rear area (low-point area) such as in World War II and Korea. Even within the same unit, the varied nature of duty performed (e.g., aviation and flight crews versus helicopter mechanics) would require different tour credit criteria.

f. A reduced tour for combat personnel might not materially alleviate the problem of shortages of replacements in these skills and the need for repetitive tours. An estimated 28 percent of the one-year tours would be in the fast moving combat skills (high short tour ratio).

g. Since personnel of other Services should serve comparable tours, it would be desirable to co-ordinate any proposed reduction in the tour for combat personnel serving in a combat area with the other Services and OSD. The Marine Corps did not support a point system for RVN when it was considered by the Army in 1968. The Navy viewed a point system for their personnel as inconsistent with the stated desires of the Secretary of Defense, i.e., a 12-month tour for all service personnel stationed in RVN.

2. Advantages and disadvantages of a reduction in an 18-month tour for active combat participation.

a. Advantages:
(1) Cause a favorable morale impact on those individuals and their families whose tour is reduced because of being actively engaged in combat.

(2) Provide favorable public, press and Congressional reaction.

(3) Would not require DOD approval to grant tour credit for certain personnel who serve less than the prescribed tour length.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) Increase PCS costs.

(2) Decrease personnel continuity in the units where tours are reduced, and in the units, world-wide, that would furnish replacements.

(3) Cause adverse morale impact on those who would be required to serve the complete tour.

(4) Would be difficult to develop and administer.

(5) DEROS would be hard to predict and would require adjustment as duties changed

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That a reduction in the tour length for the combat soldier be provided based on the period of time he is actually engaged in active combat.

b. The amount of reduction be for no more than 6 months of an 18-month tour.

c. Specific provisions for the reduction in the prescribed tour be worked out by the overseas command and DA at the time substantial numbers of troops are committed to a combat area.
EXTENSION OF TOUR LENGTHS IN OTHER SHORT TOUR AREAS

1. As indicated in the 12-month tour study, there are approximately 58 countries, islands or areas where the unaccompanied tour is less than 18 months. If the minimum tour length in any future combat area is established at 18 months, consideration should be given to extending the tour length in other areas having shorter tour lengths and competing for the same critical skills so as to be at least equal to that in the combat area. This would promote recognition of combat service and reduce replacement requirements.

2. Problems would be encountered in arbitrarily extending all unaccompanied tours of less than 18 months to 18 months. In some of these locations, the "with dependents" tour is 18 months. Unless the "with dependents" tour is also increased, accompanied and unaccompanied personnel would serve the same tour. This would be inconsistent with paragraph V85 of DOD Directive 1315.7 which provides that personnel serving overseas who are not accompanied or joined by their dependents will normally be permitted a differential in the length of required service to reduce separation from their families.

3. There may be a need for certain skills in some isolated area which would not be required in the combat area. Some areas are staffed entirely by personnel of another Service and it is unlikely that the concurrence of that Service could be obtained to increase the tour length in those areas.

4. The extension of tours in other short tour areas would reduce the monthly replacement requirements for these areas. Although the number of personnel returning to the sustaining base from such areas and thus available for future use in the combat area would be reduced also, there would be more than a compensating decrease in requirements for such personnel in the combat area. In addition, a significant portion of these returning personnel would be draftees and one-term enlistees who would be ineligible for a subsequent short tour assignment regardless of the length of the short tour. Thus, a significant advantage would be realized in obtaining greater short tour utilization of the draftee and one term enlistee by increasing the length of the short tour.
5. In view of the above, consideration should be given to adjusting the tours in other overseas short tour areas.
PROPOSED ADDITION TO ANNEX Q,

ARMY STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

3. Execution

  * * * * * * * * *

  c. (U) (Added) Personnel Assignment and Rotation. Planning for personnel assignment and rotation will assume that individual, rather than the unit, rotation system will be retained, and that soldiers will not be retained in the Army for the duration of the conflict. Planning will be based on the following guidance:

  (1) The assignment and rotation system will provide Army commanders with trained individuals in the proper skills and numbers in accordance with priorities established by DA.

  (2) All personnel in the same skill, branch and grade will share equally in hazardous and undesirable assignments.

  (3) Separation from families will be minimized.

  (4) Tour lengths for any overseas combat area in which US Army forces are committed in substantial numbers (more than 150,000) will be not less than 18 months. Tour lengths in other overseas areas will be re-evaluated when United States Army forces are committed to a combat area to determine whether they should also be adjusted. DA will initiate any necessary action with DOD to adjust the tour lengths in those areas.

  (5) Within the combat area, the actual tour length will be based on what a man is doing, rather than upon the geographical location. In this connection, a point system will be developed on the ground with DA representatives assisting the Army commander. The objective of the point system will be to provide the front line soldier some relief. This point system will be developed based on the premise that the shortest tour will be not less than 12 months and the longest tour not more than 18 months.

In general, the following concepts will be included:
(1) 12-month tour - continuous service in a combat or aviation unit of battalion level and below. These personnel normally would be combat troops whose primary missions are to participate in combat.

(2) 15-month tour - continuous service in a brigade/divisional headquarters and other divisional and non-divisional units frequently, but not routinely, exposed to combat hazards. Generally, these would be combat support troops whose primary missions are to provide combat support to the combat forces, e.g., military police, combat engineers, air defense, field artillery and advisors at a comparable level.

(3) 18-month tour - continuous service in the remainder of the combat area. Generally, these would be personnel whose primary missions are to provide service support to the combat forces, e.g., administration, civil affairs, constructions (general), logistics, medical, communications and transportation.
DOCTRINE FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT
AND ROTATION FOR THE FUTURE

a. An assignment and rotation system should provide Army commanders with trained individuals in the proper skills and numbers in accordance with priorities established by Department of the Army.

b. All personnel in the same skill, branch and grade should share equally in hazardous and undesirable assignments.

c. Separation from families should be minimized.

d. Tour lengths for any overseas combat area in which United States Army forces are committed in substantial numbers should be not less than 18 months.

e. Tour lengths of other overseas areas should be re-evaluated when United States Army forces are committed to a combat area to determine whether they should also be adjusted.

f. The tour length of those engaged in active combat with the enemy should be reduced below normal depending upon the amount of active combat participation.
Doctrine for Personnel Assignment and Rotation

Lessons learned from experiences in personnel assignment and rotation.

LTC Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., DCSPER

8 March 1971

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310