<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD515989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
28 June 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to ensure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Commander In Chief, US Army, Europe
Commanding Generals
US Army, Alaska
Deseret Test Center
III Corps, ATTN: Director, Project MASSTER
US Army Flight Training Center
Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Gyrodyne Company of America, Inc.
USAF Project RAND
Defense Documentation Center
Commanding Officers
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Aviation Test Activity
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
US Army Land Warfare Laboratory

CONFIDENTIAL
AVBACH-AE

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG: CSFOR-65(R2)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

   a. Historical Events

   (1) During the period 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion provided the majority of aviation assets utilized by units in the seven southern provinces of VIETNAM. The major units supported were as follows: Task Force South until 3 October when support terminated due to its deactivation, 9th (White Horse) ROK Infantry Division, 23rd Infantry Division (ARMY), Task Force Vietnam (TRAF), "Helmet", the seven USA of Region 2, 18th Engineer Brigade, "C" 75th Rangers, and 5th Special Forces Group.

   (2) On 3 August, the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion augmented by eight (8) UH-1H's and two (2) CH-47's from the 526th Battalion lifted elements of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division (ARMY) from Phu En Yang into LZ landing zones in the vicinity of FP 197779. A task force of 17 UH-1H's, eight (8) UH-1C's, and six (6) CH-47's inserted 350 troops, two (2) fire support bases, and 79 tons of cargo. Forward refuel and rearm points were established at Phu En Yang by the Battalion S-6. On 13 August 1970, the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company relocated to Phan Rang Air Base from Phan Thiet. The area of operations for the 192nd "PG" remains substantially unchanged. On the 17th of August, the 158th Assault Helicopter Company aided by the 21st Assault Helicopter Company and the 243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company staged an operation out of Phu En Yang for the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division (ARMY). 625 troops were inserted into "Happy Valley" in the vicinity of FP 3080. Ground force operational results are unknown.

   (3) The 9th ROK Infantry Division initiated operation Do Rok Rm 18 on 1 September in the vicinity of BO 990 550. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion inserted elements of the 26th Regiment into mountains N.W. of Tru Hoc. 925 troops and 1114 tons of cargo were inserted from 6 LZ's into 6 LZ's. Initial simultaneous gunship probe and insertions were made into five of the LZ's by a task force of 33 UH-1H's, 12 UH-1C's and seven (7)
CH-47's. Gunship rear and two POL points were established by Battalion S-4 and functioned throughout the operation. After completion of the troop insertion, specific targets were attacked by UH-1C aircraft using 2.75in flechette rockets and by CH-47's dropping sling loads of frag from 2000 foot OI. This was the first time that the Battalion had dropped frag on enemy cave and tunnel complexes. Target hits were accurate but results were unknown. Operation results included the following: 28 enemy KIAs, 13 small arms captured, and two (2) crew served weapons captured. Friendly forces sustained nine (9) wounded. Battalion gunships were credited with five (5) WGI killed by air, 10 VC wounded, one 40 mm mortar destroyed, and two R-40 rockets destroyed. The 4th Assault Helicopter Company and 223d Assault Support Helicopter Company assumed the role of rear until the extraction was performed on 21 September. On 3 September, the 155th Assault Helicopter Company augmented by ten (10) WUR UH-1H's began an insertion of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division (AOR) into the vicinity of HPA 500. The total task force consisted of 18 UH-1H's, 6 UH-1C's and 4 CH-47's. Insertions were completed into only three landing zones of the proposed nine landing zones due to weather. Difficulties with WUR aircraft caused by continued bad weather delayed the completion of this operation until 10 September. Operations were conducted in an area west of Phu Trang when intelligence revealed an enemy buildup in that area. On the 8th of September, the 22d Ranger Battalion (AOR) from Pleiku augmented by "C" 76th Rangers were inserted into the mountains west of Phu Trang. 15 UH-1H's, six (6) UH-1C's and two (2) CH-47's inserted 537 troops, 22 Ranger En (AOR) 163 troops "C" 76th Rangers (VH), and one artillery support base. Twenty-eight orbit results were flown in support of these troops through 17 September 1970. The 9th ROK Infantry Division Operation Dong Bo 12, began 18 September in an area west of Dong Ba Thin in the vicinity of RF 7830. 49 UH-1H's, 14 UH-1C's and six CH-47's were utilized to insert 1400 troops, three (3) 105 artillery pieces and 32 tons of cargo of the 30th Regiment reinforced by elements of the 29th Regiment. The operation was staged from two pickup zones into 13 landing zones. Simultaneous gunship operations and troop insertions were made into five (5) of the landing zones. Phase II of the operation began on 29 September. On that date a task force of 31 UH-1H's, eight (8) UH-1C's and four (4) CH-47's extracted 1397 troops, three (3) artillery pieces, and 65 tons of cargo from three (3) pickup zones each with a capability to accommodate only two (2) aircraft into six (6) landing zones. Preparation began ten days prior to the operation to construct landing zones on two heavily wooded mountain tops. This was accomplished by the Special Forces Company and RECON Company of the 30th Regiment, 9th ROK Infantry Division. They were assisted and advised by the Pathfinders of the 10th Aviation Battalion. Several aircraft came under fire during the operation, but only one sustained hits and incurred minor damage. Weather was marginal in the afternoon and prolonged the operation until sunset. Ground forces had compiled the following statistics by the end of the month: 82 enemy KIA's, one (1) POW captured, 36 small arms captured and five (5) crew served.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGCR-15

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS: CSFOR-65(R2)

weapons captured. Phase III, the extraction, took place on 3 October. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company inserted the 45th Regiment of the 23rd Infantry Division (ARVN) into the "Happy Valley" (coordinates BP4065) area on 29 September. The operation was staged out of Buon Bo Yang and the 45th Regiment made a search and clear sweep of the area southeast of Buon Bo Yang. Aircraft received ground fire in two of the ten (10) 12's, but no damage or injuries were experienced. Results of the operation were unknown.

(2) On 9 October, the 155th Assault Helicopter Company inserted 400 troops of the 45th Regiment, 23rd Infantry Division (ARVN) from BP 0/5295 into nine (9) landing zones northeast of Buon Ho (coordinates BC 102470) on a search and clear mission. Results were unknown. The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (-) inserted elements of the 286th Regiment, 9th ARVN Infantry Division into mountains west of Toy Pan on 12 October 1970 while supporting operation D - Fun Bi 19, a task force of 25 TL-1's, eight (8) UH-1D's, and ten (10) CH-47's inserted 900 troops, one (1) 4.2 mortar platoon and 70 tons of cargo from six pickup zones into six (6) landing zones in the vicinity of BP 0/444. Daily resupply was performed by the 43rd UH and 243 UHCC until the extraction on 24 October 1970. The operational results included 55 VC killed, 13 small arms captured, four (4) crew served weapons captured, and numerous heavy grenades and artillery rounds captured.


(6) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to support areas away from base stations with ARVN aircraft. On 25 October the 281st Assault Helicopter Company dropped an aviation package of 6 TL-1's and 2 UH-10's to support the 225th Combat Aviation Battalion at An Son for an indefinite period. The 190th Assault Helicopter Company began rotating a package of 6 TL-1's and 2 UH-10's at Phu Thiet ASK in support of the 1st BN, 50th Infantry (US) and "G" Company, 75th Ranger Battalion (19). The 52nd Assault Helicopter Company continued to support the MACV Advisory Team at Bao Loc with 15 UH-10's throughout the reporting period.

(7) The 330 LDD of Dong Bo Thin provided an air traffic control tower operator in support of large aviation battalion operations. The air traffic controller was utilized in the major pick up zone to control the heavy volume of aircraft. The battalion pathfinders did not have the training or experience to adequately control large number of aircraft entering the approach pattern from multiple directions.

(8) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion instituted two training programs during the reporting period. The Battalion Pathfinders began a three (3) phase presentation to companies engaged in providing their own perimeter defense. The classes include perimeter barriers and alert systems, weapons familiarization and General and Special Orders. The second program involved the presentation of classes to the 52nd Artillery,
CONFIDENTIAL


9th ROK Infantry Division. These classes included the techniques of cargo sling inscriptions, capabilities and limitations of different rigging components, and a demonstration of how to rig artillery pieces. All helicopter sling equipment of 30th Regiment, 9th ROK Infantry Division, was inspected in conjunction with the classes.

9) The enemy continued to make his presence felt in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion’s area of operation. During the reporting period, 28 aircraft were hit by enemy fire, fifteen (15) were hit by small arms, nine (9) by anti-igcraft weapons and five (5) were hit by a combination of small arms and anti-aircraft weapons. 42 other battlion aircraft were shot at but did not sustain hits. The same intensity of enemy fire is expected to continue. The S-2 section granted 28 secret clearances to personnel in the battalion and 62 personal received secret clearance validations during this reporting period.

b. (U) Changes in Unit Mission: There were no changes in the mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion during the reporting period.

c. (U) Organizational Changes: The 363rd Arm Div was attached to Task Force South when the 193rd VC completed its move to Phan Rang on 15 August 1970. The 193rd Utility Aviation Company was assigned to the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion effective 15 October 1970. An organizational information sheet is attached as Inclosure 1.

d. (U) Key Personnel Changes:

(1) On 1 August 1970, Major Arthur R. Griffin, 1C, 246-44-7152, assumed duties as the Battalion S-3 from Major Rodney D. Lester, 1F, 229-50-7563.

(2) On 1 August 1970, Captain Carl J. Seger, 1C, 258-40-4390, assumed the duties of the Aviation Medical Officer from Captain Stiles F. Buzzatt, 1F, 183-35-8850.


CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
Battalion Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2)


(7) On 10 September 1970, Captain Arnold C. Stever, CH, 577-24-1250 was redeployed due to re-occurring back injuries and the position of Battalion Chaplain was vacant.


(9) On 1 October 1970, Captain Thomas A. George, CH, 250-26-6118, assumed duties as Battalion Chaplain and filled the vacancy left by Captain Arnold C. Stever, CH, 577-24-1250.


(12) On 16 October 1970, Major Willis R. Hunting, FC, 221-24-0004, assumed command of the 48th Assault Helicopter Co, from Major Phillip E. Court, Inf, 541-40-6289 who was wounded on 13 October 1970.


c. Unit Strength

Authorized and present for duty: civilian and military strength as of 31 October 1970 is listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH/USG</td>
<td>AUTH/USG</td>
<td>AUTH/USG</td>
<td>AUTH/USG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th CIB</td>
<td>166/141</td>
<td>286/249</td>
<td>1510/1353</td>
<td>1971/1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130th Med Det</td>
<td>20/27</td>
<td>3/6</td>
<td>75/105</td>
<td>108/138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th MIHC</td>
<td>19/16</td>
<td>51/41</td>
<td>218/182</td>
<td>288/211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286th Med Det</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>8/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92nd MIHC</td>
<td>19/16</td>
<td>51/41</td>
<td>218/182</td>
<td>288/211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th MIHC</td>
<td>19/19</td>
<td>51/42</td>
<td>218/215</td>
<td>288/222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Med Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>7/8</td>
<td>8/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153rd RC</td>
<td>32/26</td>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>69/97</td>
<td>123/120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd MIHC</td>
<td>19/17</td>
<td>51/46</td>
<td>218/185</td>
<td>288/218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196th Med Det</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>7/8</td>
<td>8/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243rd MIHC</td>
<td>15/11</td>
<td>26/27</td>
<td>227/205</td>
<td>268/233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281st MIHC</td>
<td>15/15</td>
<td>51/10</td>
<td>218/120</td>
<td>288/216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CONFIDENTIAL

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Losses Incurred, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS: CSFOR-65(J2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DHC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>3rd Yot</th>
<th>CONTRACTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 10th CAB</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th AHC</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>10/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92d AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183rd RAG</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192d AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3rd ASHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281st AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1/0</td>
<td>13/41</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>12/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were no Technical Representatives working for Battalion at the end of the reporting period.

**f. Aircraft Status as of 31 October 1970.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>O-16</th>
<th>UH-60</th>
<th>UH-10</th>
<th>CH-54A</th>
<th>CH-46H</th>
<th>CH-47A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
<td>ALT/ASPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 10th CAB</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92d AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183rd RAG</td>
<td>24/24</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192d AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3rd ASHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281st AHC</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>16/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>24/24</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**g. Operational Statistics.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HHC</th>
<th>48th</th>
<th>92d</th>
<th>155th</th>
<th>181st</th>
<th>2/3rd</th>
<th>281st</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties Flown</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>23,007</td>
<td>5,204</td>
<td>4,393</td>
<td>6,967</td>
<td>7,411</td>
<td>13,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Flown</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td>6,122</td>
<td>5,836</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>4,278</td>
<td>9,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Lifted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27,977</td>
<td>22,510</td>
<td>27,936</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,180</td>
<td>16,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Lifted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy KRA(Sus/Confirmed)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>0/26</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures(Dest/Damaged)</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Lost</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Damaged</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Rescued</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONFIDENTIAL**

6
2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. (U) Personnel. None

   b. (C) Intelligence.

      (1) Observations:

         (a) The enemy continues to employ his forces in small unit operations in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion's Area of Operations. Many of the offenses are directed against the Vietnamization and Pacification Programs.

         (b) Capabilities: The enemy is capable of using small units to employ and direct sapper attacks and indirect fire against allied installations in the Dong Ba Thin and Cam Ranh Bay Area.

         (c) Tactics: The enemy continues to launch his attacks during periods of low illumination, and particularly during poor weather. It is believed that the enemy uses highway QL-1 as a supply route to transport materiel to enemy locations in the Dong Bo Woods (coordinates CP0045) and the Ba Gom Secret Zone (coordinates BP 7630).

      (2) Evaluation:

         The enemy has the ability to move undetected throughout the area and possesses the ability to successfully attack allied installations with both indirect fire and sapper attacks. However, the enemy will be extremely limited in his efforts if we remain aggressive and alert in our actions.

      (3) Recommendations:

         The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion units must constantly improve and modify their defense posture in order to offset enemy plans. Variations may include the use of sentry dogs, sensors, radar, searchlights, changes in perimeter fences, H&I fire, visual reconnaissance, and interior patrols.

      (4) Command Action:

         During the last quarterly reporting period, numerous improvements have been made in the battalion defenses. Sentry dogs are now being used on the perimeters. A search light team utilizing a 23" diameter searchlight mounted on a 1/2 ton vehicle is being employed. Eight duffle bag sensors have been approved and technical assistance will be received in their employment. H&I fire is employed each night with M-79 fire and a UH-1H helicopter equipped with a xenon searchlight.
detection devices and a door mounted minigun is used to provide airborne surveillance during periods of darkness in the Dong Ba Thin area. UH-1C gunships are on a two minute standby and provide fire on call to augment perimeter defense.

c. (C) Operations:

(1) (a) Observations:

Due to the language barriers between allied nations, valuable time is often lost during the execution of combat assaults and normal resupply missions. Lack of effective communications results in personnel and supplies being transported to erroneous locations.

(b) Evaluations:

During this reporting period, a requirement was imposed to have an English speaking observer aboard resupply aircraft and all flight leads on combat assaults. With an observer on board, tactical ground units can be located and resupply effected in a transitory situation. Previously such units wasted valuable time waiting at specified locations or missed resupply altogether.

(c) Recommendations:

That coordination between the aviation unit and the ground unit be made so that an English speaking observer can be aboard each resupply aircraft and each flight lead aircraft. The observer will be able to pinpoint the desired landing zone and identify colors of smoke thrown by ground units.

(d) Command Action:

Supported unit Liaison Officers have been directed to provide English speaking individuals for all resupply aircraft and for flight leads on all combat assaults.

(2) (a) Observations:

CH-47 aircraft have been employed to drop sling loads of fougasse against point targets, such as tunnel complexes and cave emplacements.

(b) Evaluations:

(1) CH-47 aircraft are lucrative targets as they fly directly over fortified enemy complexes to drop the sling loads of fougasse.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBABC-AE
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) These demolitions are not fuzed and must be ignited with tracer fire or with incendiary grenades dropped from a chase aircraft.

(3) The chase aircraft must fly low level to effectively ignite the fougasse.

(4) Aviators on low level chase aircraft have difficulty in locating exact fougasse drop zones in heavy wooded areas and hilly terrain. Additional aircraft exposure time is necessary to locate the dropped demolitions.

(5) CH-47 aircraft have no sighting devices for dropping napalm on point targets and attacking fortified gun emplacements.

(c) Recommendations:

CH-47 should not be utilized to attack targets such as well defended tunnel complexes and caves with fougasse. This type mission is normally assigned to USAF tactical aircraft. U.S. Army personnel are not trained and equipment is not designed to execute this type mission.

(d) Command action:

Coordination has been made with higher headquarters to employ CH-47 aircraft to drop fougasse in only the most closely controlled conditions against undefended areas or in tactical emergencies.

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

JACK A. WALKER
LTC, Inf
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - CINCUSARPAC
2 - CG, USARV
2 - CG, 1st Avn Bttn
10 - CO, 17th Avn Gp (Cbt)
1 - File

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, HEADQUARTERS, 10TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1970.

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96316 23 October 1970

TO: Department of the Army (ACSPOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20310
Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Robert T. Buisson
/t/ROBERT T. BUISSON
1LT, FA
Asst Adjutant

CF:
CO, 10th CAB

A TRUE COPY:

L.D. [Signature]
CPT, IM
Asst S-3
AVFA-GC-HIST (16 Dec 70) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 10th Aviation Battalion
(Combat), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-
Lessons Learned and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

RCBERT W. MAJOR
ILT, ACC
Ass AG

CF:
1 - CO, 17th AVN GP (C), (LESS ORLL)
1 - CO, 10th AVN BN (C), (LESS ORLL)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS, GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for
Period Ending 31 October 1970 and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HAROLD C. PHILLIPS
1LT, AGO
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy thru:
1st Avn Bde
10th CAB
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of HQ, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 MAR '71

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.W. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>APO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 10TH CAB</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ &amp; HQ CO, 10TH CAB</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130TH MED DET O/A</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339TH AVN DET(DIR)</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO</td>
<td>Minh Hoa, RVN</td>
<td>96240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206TH MED DET O/A</td>
<td>Minh Hoa, RVN</td>
<td>96240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92D ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO</td>
<td>Dan No Thuot, RVN</td>
<td>96247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8TH MED DET O/A</td>
<td>Dan No Thuot, RVN</td>
<td>96247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183RD UTILITY AIRPLANE CO</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192D ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO</td>
<td>Phan Rang, RVN</td>
<td>96321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198TH MED DET</td>
<td>Phan Rang, RVN</td>
<td>96321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243RD ASSAULT SUPPORT HELICOPTER CO</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin, RVN</td>
<td>96377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281ST ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO</td>
<td>Vat Tran, RVN</td>
<td>96240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.

**CO, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion**

**DATE**

13 November 1970

**TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**

18

**3. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**PROJECT NO.**

N/A

**ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(s):**

704240

**OTHER REPORT NOES (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report):**

N/A

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

N/A