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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA-A (M) (26 May 71) FOR OT UT 71B021 14 June 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Col Wallace H. Nutting, CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 22 December 70 to 5 March 71 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, dated 4 November 1966, Subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U).

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Col Wallace H. Nutting, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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AVHDO-DO

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - Colonel Wallace H. Nutting

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by COL Wallace H. Nutting. The report covers the period 22 Dec 70 thru 5 Mar 71 during which time COL Nutting served as Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. COL Nutting is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO BAY FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-CO

5 March 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AHEDO-DO
APO San Francisco 96375

Country: Republic of Vietnam
Debrief by: Colonel Wallace H. Nutting
Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Inclusive Dates: Command - 22 December 1970 to 5 March 1971
This Report - 8 December 1970 to 5 March 1971
Date of Report: 5 March 1971

1. (C) Purpose. This report fulfills the requirements of AR 1-26 and USARV Regulation 1-3, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, and more importantly records those aspects of the Regiment’s experience in the Republic of Vietnam which have assured accomplishment of the armored cavalry mission in this theater, and which will continue to shape the intricate framework of counterinsurgency warfare. The comments of the previous commander are upheld, and where appropriate, are reexamined to provide momentum for further study. The phenomenon of low intensity counterinsurgency war colore the spectrum of Regimental operations and so, where possible, conclusions and recommendations are developed in the annexes which follow this report. The fact that the Blackhorse Regiment has completed a difficult mission with such efficiency that it can now redeploy lends credence to the observations contained herein and demands their careful review.

2. (C) General.

a. Role of Armored Cavalry in RVN. Armored Cavalry as an economy force provides a well balanced response to the low intensity counterinsurgency situation present in RVN. Armored cavalry provides a highly mobile, flexible, discriminating, yet lethal variety of firepower with a minimum investment of personnel resources. The ability of the armored cavalry to conduct reconnaissance, security, and screening operations with

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air cavalry and armored cavalry troops makes it ideal for interdicting enemy supply and comms-liaison routes leading into populated areas and for supporting indigenous population and resource control measures, while simultaneously providing a major reaction capability to defend against threats to US units or installations. The organic mobility, firepower, and excellent communications available to the armored cavalry enhance its capability to upgrade the Vietnamese Regular and Territorial Forces through combined operations. The inherent versatility of armored cavalry has made it one of the most potent and productive systems employed in RVN.

b. Organization, Missions, and Command Arrangements. Major changes in the operation of the Blackhorse Regiment were seen as redeployment was directed.

(1) Pre-redeployment. Prior to redeployment the Regiment was organized with three armored cavalry squadrons and a provisional squadron, consisting of the Regimental headquarters and headquarters troop, an air cavalry troop, an engineer company, a medical company, a military intelligence detachment, and detachments providing postal, military history, public information, chemical, DS aircraft maintenance, and aircraft avionic maintenance support. The 1st and 3d Squadrons continued to operate in Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, and Binh Duong Provinces under Regimental control. The air cavalry troop continued aerial surveillance and screening operations north of Bien Hoa Sector on the 3d Squadron's right/east flank. Three of the 919th Engineer Company's platoons were under the operational control of each of the squadrons. In the Regiment's eastern AO, the 1st Squadron continued ground reconnaissance and strong point operations directed against the VC U-1 Province Headquarters and the 274th VC Regiment. A Troop, 1st Squadron, was placed under the operational control of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), to secure land clearing operations north of Song Be. In the Regiment's western AO, the 3d Squadron conducted ground reconnaissance and screening operations against the battalions of the Long Nai Regiment located in Ben Cat and Phu Giao Districts of Binh Duong Province. The Regiment's mission of upgrading the Vietnamese Territorial Forces continued at a rapid pace, especially in 3d Squadron's AO, where over 75 combined operations were conducted from 1 November 1970 to 5 March 1971. The Regiment (-) remained under the operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam throughout the pre-redeployment period. The 2d Squadron was under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in Binh Tuy Province.

(2) Redeployment. Redeployment of the Regiment began 15 January 1971 as A Company, 2d Squadron, returned to Regimental control at the DiAn Base Camp. The company commenced its standdown and was reduced to "zero" strength on 10 February. On 1 February, 1st Squadron turned over its AO to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Separate), and returned to DiAn for standdown. During its standdown, completed on 21 February, 1st Squadron
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assisted in the DiAn Base Defense. On 7 February, 3d Squadron and the Air Cavalry Troop were relieved in the Regiment's western AO by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), and the squadron moved to DiAn to begin standdown. I Troop, 3d Squadron, which was attached to the 31st Engineer Battalion to provide security in the vicinity of Tay Ninh, also returned to DiAn on 7 February. The 919th Engineer Company and the 37th Medical Company began to draw down to new authorized strengths. The 3d Squadron completed standdown by 23 February. The Air Cavalry Troop conducted reconnaissance and security operations under Regimental control and emphasized retraining and refitting in preparation for future operations. Throughout the redeployment period, 2d Squadron continued its missions in Binh Tuy Province under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). This squadron prepared for its greatly increased role in the residual force which would continue operations in RR3 with the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). From 15 February until 5 March, all the other units of the Regiment either completed drawdowns to their new authorized strengths or were reduced to "zero" strength. The Regiment minus 2d Squadron remained under the operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam, until 25 February, when it reverted to command of USARV.

(3) Residual Force. The 2d Squadron, 11th ACR, remains under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The squadron is organized with the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Troop E, F, and G, the Howitzer Battery (155mm Self-Propelled), the Air Cavalry Troop, engineer platoon, a medical clearing platoon, an aircraft maintenance detachment, and an avionics maintenance detachment. The 2d Squadron, as restructured, minus the tank company maximizes the most advantageous characteristics and aspects of armored cavalry while integrating at that level the tremendous potential of the air cavalry troop. It is organized to provide the maximum firepower, the greatest mobility, and the most effective communications possible for its relatively small number of personnel.

3. (C) Intelligence and Security. (Annex A) Intelligence and security operations during the period 8 December 1970 to 5 March 1971 remained basically unchanged with the exception of the formation of a ground reconnaissance unit organic to the Regimental intelligence section, the expansion of liaison with VC and GVN forces through the Regiment's executive monitorship responsibilities of VC Subregion 5, and the development of a viable unattended ground sensor (UGS) program.

a. The enemy effort in the Regimental AO's was characterized by small unit actions, seldom larger than squad sized elements, that were difficult to fix and destroy. The need for a ground reconnaissance force able to react to fragmented pieces of intelligence data, in order to verify or further exploit this information, resulted in the formation of the Blackhorse Aggressive Reconnaissance Force. This recon team, directly subordinate to the Regimental S2, was employed to gather intelligence on the enemy base and rest areas, routes of movement, and suspected enemy locations.
b. Liaison with US and GVN units and agencies was markedly increased during the period as a result of the Regiment's responsibility for the monitorship of allied efforts against enemy activity within VC Subregion 5. The Regiment organized an overwatching program of SR-5 which provided a joint exchange of intelligence information and discussion of common problem areas resulting in a more coordinated effort against the enemy. Periodic meetings between US and GVN organizations held at the Regimental Base Camp, enabled all participants to increasingly exploit what had now become common information.

c. The Regiment's unattended ground sensor (UGS) program developed from one of the least effective intelligence gathering devices to one of the Regiment's most valuable intelligence sources. Both hand-launched and air-delivered sensor missions were conducted to augment the Regiment's conventional armored cavalry tactical capabilities of screening, reconnaissance, and security operations. The resultant network of sensor fields not only provided early warning and timely intelligence of enemy movements, but also enabled the Regiment to implement an economy of forces, replacing people with sensors.

4. (U) Organization. The organization of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for combat in RVN was based upon the guidance provided in TOE 17-510. Numerous modifications were made both in the basic TOE for the Regiment and in the TOE's for the attached units supporting the Regiment. Although the problem of maintaining proficient infantrymen in the Regiment was addressed by the previous Regimental commander, this problem was of sufficient magnitude as to warrant some additional considerations. While reconstitution of the rifle squads of the armored cavalry platoons is desirable, the solution of replacing one of the armored cavalry troops of the armored cavalry squadron with a rifle company was examined. In addition, the merits of having a rifle company assigned to the Regiment to provide infantry support to the squadrons were also brought into question. No definite solution to this problem was apparent and study by higher headquarters is invited. This question, as well as the organization of the residual force (2/11 ACR) is discussed at length in Annex B (Organization).

5. (C) Operations. Perhaps the most important reason the Regiment can now redeploy is the reduced enemy capability and the correspondingly improved effectiveness of the Vietnamese Territorial Forces in South Vietnam. The single, most powerful tool in increasing the effectiveness of territorial forces has been the program of combined operations the Regiment employed in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh Provinces. This program not only developed confidence and esprit for the RP/FF units involved, but also gave much needed experience to the officials at district and province levels to facilitate coordination and cooperation. Annex C (Operations) contains a discussion of combined operations and offers recommendations which may prove helpful in studying the Vietnamization efforts of the Regiment.
6. (U) Training. Like any other military organization, the Regiment must be able to learn and revise tactics and techniques of combat to remain an effective unit. Of particular interest is the training the armored cavalry platoon leader receives prior to his assignment in the Regiment. The armored cavalry platoon is unique in its organization in that it combines reconnaissance, armor, infantry, and mortar support into an extremely flexible combined arms team. It is felt that the special skills and knowledge required to lead such a platoon should be imparted to future armored cavalry platoon leaders with considerably more detail than has hitherto been accomplished. The fast moving combat situation, combined with normal personnel shortages, make on-the-job training with respect to the employment of infantry and mortar support impractical. This topic and the other training programs developed by the Regiment for low intensity counterinsurgency operations are presented in Annex D (Training).

7. (U) Communications. Communications within the Regiment continued to be an extremely effective aspect of its operations. Although the Regiment was extended over very large distances, satisfactory signal support was provided. The techniques used to provide this outstanding support and maintain communications security at a noteworthy level are given in Annex E (Communications).

8. (U) Aviation. Maintaining the many aircraft organic to the armored cavalry regiment is an extremely difficult task. The internal organization of the 11th ACR to accomplish this feat is under review. In the past, the service platoon of the air cavalry troop has been attached to the 398th Transportation Detachment, the direct support aircraft maintenance unit of the Regiment. This arrangement is in question as the residual force faces its new role as a reaction force. A discussion of this problem is included in Annex F (Aviation).

9. (U) Logistics. During the past six months the Regiment has embarked upon a series of maintenance improvement programs, which had a truly outstanding effect on the Regiment's ability to complete its redeployment standdown with no serious logistical problems. The outstanding support for these programs provided from both within and outside the Regiment is worthy of scrutiny on the basis of its effectiveness alone. The benefits of attaching a direct support maintenance company to the armored cavalry regiment were examined and are felt to be substantial, especially for low intensity counterinsurgency operations. Annex G (Logistics) examines these items as well as the experience that Regiment has had with its various combat vehicles.

10. (U) Personnel and Administration.

a. Consolidation of Unit Personnel Offices. The most noteworthy accomplishment in the area of personnel and administration was the
consolidation of a regimental personnel section. The present KTOE provides for four separate unit personnel offices; one under the control of each of the three squadrons. Though these four offices provided necessary services to personnel of the Regiment, there existed a continually fluctuating disparity between the levels of efficiency found in each unit personnel office. This was largely the result of the degree of command emphasis exercised by each commander and the caliber of the warrant officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to each personnel office. Further, although the regimental personnel office provided services to a greater number of personnel (1,200) than any of the squadrons, it was authorized only six personnel, a strength altogether inadequate to perform its mission. This factor is aggravated by the fact that the Regiment operated as a major command in Vietnam with all the responsibilities this entailed. The decision to consider consolidation was taken after considerable deliberation. The disadvantages in this action were related primarily to command control at squadron level. Disadvantages are discussed in detail in Annex H (Personnel and Administration). The organizational concepts were developed, facilities selected, and implementation was initiated on 6 December 197C. Shortly after the personnel offices were consolidated, the Regiment received notification of its redeployment. Although this seemed most inopportune, the value of the decision to consolidate soon proved amply justified. The well organized and supervised effort by the consolidated personnel office provided exceptional service to each soldier departing the Regiment. Both outprocessing and shipment of personnel were remarkably well managed operations as indicated by comments from higher headquarters and the troops themselves. It is doubtful that a similar effort would have been possible under any other type of organization. No observation of the consolidated personnel office was possible over an extended period of time. It is possible, however, to generalize on the nature of the effort the consolidated personnel office was able to put forth as soon after its organization and to surmise that it would have outperformed the divided personnel activities. The Regiment’s experience supports the organization of the personnel office under the guidelines shown in Annex H (Personnel and Administration).

b. Drug Assistance Program. Regimental experience supports the continuance of an aggressive effort to control drug abuse in the Army. The ultimate goal is to ensure through education, that every soldier is dissuaded from using marijuana and narcotics drugs and failing that, to qualify company grade officers and noncommissioned officers to identify and assist those who do use drugs. Efforts in the Regiment show that a substantial number of soldiers entering the program are successfully breaking away from drug use. Though failures are inevitable, the success rates in the Regiment is particularly favorable when compared with known success rates in the United States. A more detailed discussion of new experience is contained in Annex H (Personnel and Administration).
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11. (C) Summary of Operations in RVN. At Annex I (Summary of Operations in RVN) are described those events and experiences in which the Regiment was a deciding factor. These operations will stand, not only in Southeast Asia, but throughout the world as a testimonial to the courage and compassion of those thousands of troopers who rode with the Blackhorse in the Republic of Vietnam.

12. (U) Installation Coordination: As the senior unit on post, the Regiment continued to be tasked to staff and operate the garrison type functions of US Army Base Di An. I concur wholeheartedly with the comments of the previous Regimental Commander, especially on the subject of manning levels. The problem areas addressed by him became even more critical during the standoff period as undermanned sections, required to remain operational until the last, closed out in a less than orderly fashion. Further discussion of the base transfer is included in Annex J. A detailed analysis and discussion of the garrison type functions during standoff will be presented in the Regiment's Keystone after Action Report. The recommendation of the previous Regimental Commander remains valid and requires action by higher headquarters.

WALLACE H. HUTTING
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

Annexes:

A - Intelligence and Security
B - Organization
C - Operations
D - Training
E - Communications
F - Aviation
G - Logistics
H - Personnel and Administration
I - Summary of Operations in RVN
J - Installation Coordination
Annex A (Intelligence and Security) (U)

1. (C) General. The Regiment's intelligence and security operations remained basically the same as those reported by the previous Regimental commander. The intelligence gathering assets were unchanged; however, three areas were enlarged upon: The unattended ground sensor (UGS) program; Ground reconnaissance; and liaison.

2. (C) Discussion.

a. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS):

(1) During the period of this report, the Regiment's organic UGS program matured into a complete and productive intelligence gathering source. The assignment of a qualified sensor employment officer resulted in a marked increase in the quality and quantity of sensor operations. Through monitoring of hand-implanted sensors in the Regiment's eastern area of operations, and the analysis of readings obtained, probable trail systems, avenues of approach, and times of movement were detected. Another area within the Regimental AO was air seeded with 42 sensors, 41 of which properly functioned upon impact, for an extremely favorable operational rate. This target area was selected due to its inaccessibility and the belief that it contained resupply routes leading into SR-5, and possible avenues to the Bien Hoa - Long Binh "rocket belt." A qualitative analysis of these air-implanted sensors is not available due to the Regiment's redeployment. These particular sensors were turned over to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). It was determined, however, that these sensors could be monitored from a site 20 kilometers distant with no loss of activation readings.

(2) During late January 1971 just prior to the Regiment's stand-down, the sensor equipment, both in-the-ground and on-the-self, was transferred to the US units assuming tactical responsibility for the Regimental AOs. Additionally, the monitoring site and equipment were turned over with no loss in monitoring or communications capabilities. Timely and proper liaison, accomplished by a detailed pattern analysis of recent activations, permitted the Regiment's entire UGS program to be transferred with no operational loss and with transmission of a thorough historical knowledge to the gaining unit.

(3) The maturation of the Regimental sensor program clearly indicated the tremendous possibilities of this system for extending and maximizing the characteristics and potential of armored cavalry units. Whether in reconnaissance, security, or screening operations, the integration of sensors into the scheme of maneuver and plan of supporting fires offers very significant advantages for further exploitation. Furthermore, it is apparent that a great economy of forces deployed may be realized, particularly in the performance of security missions, where air and armored cavalry units may be centrally located and be prepared
Annex A (Intelligence and Security) (U)

to respond to sensor-derived intelligence. It is in this intended role, as a measure to economize on the number of troops deployed in the defense of the Bien Hoa - Long Binh complex (particularly the "rocket belt") that the final sensor fields were implanted. Clearly, with proper organization and maintenance, this intelligence source may permit substantial force econom as units are redeployed.

b. Ground Reconnaissance.

(1) Intelligence gathering capabilities of the Regiment were increased during the period of this report with the addition of the Blackhorse Aggressive Reconnaissance Force. This small, but skilled reconnaissance unit was formed within the Regimental S2 section in order to verify intelligence data received by the Regiment and to seek out intelligence in known and suspected enemy areas. The recon force acquired as much on-the-ground intelligence about an area as possible and reported it to the Regimental S2 for the appropriate combat response. During the latter part of the reporting period, this recon team was inserted into a portion of the Regiment's eastern area of operations in response to several days of heavy sensor activations. Early on the second day of this reconnaissance mission, the team found a well-used, high speed enemy trail with very recent activity by an estimated 15 to 20 individuals. Further exploitation of this trail revealed that it could not be seen from the air because of double canopy jungle and that it led directly into the recently activating sensor field. The location of the trail was accurately plotted and the team was extracted. An infantry company was inserted into this area and registered several enemy KIA's which were identified as part of a resupply party that had been using the trail as a main supply route from the southern portion of War Zone D to elements of the 274th Regiment and the 74th Artillery Regiment located southwest of Zuan Loc.

(2) The Blackhorse Aggressive Reconnaissance Force enabled the Regiment to use stealth and instant reaction to possible small scale enemy activity beyond the normal capabilities of armor, adding to the Regiment's total potential.

(3) The experience gained through the employment of this recon force clearly emphasizes the mutually beneficial characteristics developed through close integration of long range reconnaissance patrol type organizations and armored cavalry.

c. Liaison.

(1) Liaison between the US and SVN units and agencies within the Regiment's areas of interest was expanded, primarily because the Regiment was tasked with the executive monitorship of VC Subregion 5. At the
Annex A (Intelligence and Security)

direction of II Field Force, Vietnam, the Regiment initiated and sponsored a combined, specifically targeted, enemy oriented effort, composed of all US and GVH agencies within the SR-5 boundaries or influenced by SR-5 activities. This effort was designed to emphasize Allied cooperation and coordination and to subordinate separate and individual efforts by the various Allied units involved. This combined approach to the enemy threat was mandatory because portions of eight (8) GVH districts and two (2) GVH provinces were included in the SR-5 boundaries. Monthly meetings held at the DiAn Base Camp permitted an exchange of ideas, intelligence, and discussion of problem areas. The important result of these conferences was not so much the combined Allied effort which was realized, but rather, GVH units, districts, and provinces were now exchanging thoughts and information leading to more effectively coordinated efforts.

(2) The SR-5 conference held on 9 January 1971 was the most significant to date. It was dual chaired by the Binh Duong Province and the 11th ACR S2's. The conference was geared toward Vietnamese participation rather than US, and the majority of briefings presented and the resulting discussions were initiated by the Vietnamese. Specifics were discussed rather than the usual, broad overview of the enemy situation in SR-5.

(3) Immediately prior to standdown, the Regiment was released from the SR-5 monitorship and was replaced by Binh Duong Province. All letters of instruction and records compiled by the Regiment during its monitorship were transferred to Binh Duong Province to provide a historical background and outlines for future SR-5 coordination meetings.

3. (C) Conclusions.

a. Unattended ground sensors (UGS) are an important addition to the tools available to the armored cavalry in accomplishing its traditional mission of reconnaissance, security, and screening. A UGS section organic to the Armored Cavalry Regiment extends its ability as a reaction force for the protection of US units and installations in a low intensity, counterinsurgency situation.

b. A reconnaissance force directly responsive to the Regimental S2 is invaluable in a low intensity counterinsurgency environment in order to react to the large amount of intelligence produced, especially by unattended ground sensors. Verification of such intelligence by a small reconnaissance force greatly enhances the Regiment's efforts at interdicting supply and communicaion networks.

4. (C) Recommendations.

a. That an unattended ground sensor (UGS) section be made a part of
Annex A (Intelligence and Security)

the headquarters and headquarters troop of an armored cavalry regiment, TOE 17-52H.

b. That extensive testing and employment of sensors by armored cavalry units be undertaken to fully exploit the complimentary characteristics these units and sensors have in common.

e. That a reconnaissance or patrol force or unit be under control of the Regimental S2 section when the Regiment is employed in a low intensity counterinsurgency environment.
1. (U) General. The organization of the Regiment for combat generally follows the approved MTOE for the Regiment. Certain modifications have been made to the internal organization of the Regiment to facilitate accomplishment of the missions currently at hand in a low intensity, counterinsurgency environment. Concepts with regard to a direct support maintenance company have never been tested, while those with respect to direct support aviation maintenance have been tried. Both are evaluated here in as well as the current MTOE's and the organization of the residual forces.

2. (U) Evaluation of Current MTOE. The Regiment was organized under a modification of TOE 17-51G. Applicable approved MTOE are shown on Chart I. The project to update the Regiment's authorization documents was not completed prior to the Regiment's redeployment. The new authorization documents for the residual force are updated and are discussed in paragraph 4j, below. All comments on the current MTOE made by the previous Regimental commander still apply. The following observations are made, however:

   a. The 919th Engineer Company received a new MTOE which authorized three rime plows.

   b. The Department of the Army TOE for the Armored Cavalry Regiment is found not to provide the means or the structure for achieving maximum effectiveness from available artillery resources. The basic concept of the armored cavalry squadron as a self-contained combined arms team with artillery provided at squad level is sound and requires no fundamental change. However, there are deficiencies in the Regimental TOE which have been experienced in Vietnam and which will undoubtedly be experienced in other theaters where other armored cavalry regiments are deployed.

      i. Regimental headquarters and Headquarters Troop, TOE 17-52A. The TOE does not provide personnel and equipment to operate a Fire Support Coordination Center, which is normally found at brigade level. There are requirements for tactical fire direction, fire planning coordination and clearance of all fires, posting of air warning data, and assisting and advising the three howitzer batteries organic to the armored cavalry squadrons.
Annex B (Organization)

(2) Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Armored Cavalry Squadron, ACR, TOE 17-56H. The present TOE does not provide an artillery liaison section, which is normally provided to all maneuver battalions by the direct support artillery battalion. An artillery liaison section is essential to assist the squadron commander in planning and coordinating his fire support.

(3) Howitzer Battery, Armored Cavalry Squadron, ACR, TOE 6-37H. The present TOE provides for three forward observer sections. Since the armored cavalry squadron has four maneuver units when the tank company is employed independently, a fourth forward observer section is required. In addition, personnel and equipment are required to permit splitting the battery fire direction center for operations in two locations simultaneously. This situation presented itself numerous times when the maneuver units of the squadron operated in widely dispersed locations for long periods of time. The lack of this capability makes it difficult to follow all safety procedures necessary and still provide responsive fire support.

c. Conclusions.

(1) The armored cavalry regiment has a valid requirement for a fire support coordination center in the Regimental Headquarters.

(2) The armored cavalry squadron has a valid requirement for an artillery liaison section in the Headquarters.

(3) The howitzer battery has a valid requirement for a fourth forward observer section and for additional personnel and equipment to enable it to operate two fire direction centers simultaneously.

d. Recommendations.

(1) That consideration be given to adding a fire support coordination center to the headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-52H.

(2) That consideration be given to adding an artillery liaison section to the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-56H.

(3) That consideration be given to adding a fourth forward observer section and a second fire direction center capability to the Howitzer Battery, Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 6-37H.

3. (U) Infantry within the Armored Cavalry Regiment. Infantry is
required in the armored cavalry regiment, especially in low intensity, counterinsurgency operations, to perform normal infantry missions and to provide a quick reaction force for the aero rifle platoon of the air cavalry troop. The inability to maintain a usable rifle squad in the armored cavalry platoons of the Regiment was addressed by the previous Regimental commander. This situation caused by normal personnel shortages in the field wherein shortages of other sections are filled from the rifle squad, results in a constant requirement for additional infantry troops for employment by the Regiment. There are three approaches possible to solving this deficiency worthy of further investigation.

a. Reconstitute the rifle squads of the armored cavalry platoons. To accomplish this in view of the normal shortages of personnel in the field would require a stringent personnel assignment and utilization policy that would be followed from regiment down to the troop. A ten man squad plus a driver cannot live in one M113A1 armored personnel carrier in the manner to which US troops in KVN are accustomed. It would be possible to assign two personnel carriers to the rifle squad, at the expense of one scout vehicle, and mount the squad so as to maintain fire team integrity. Initially an extensive training program would have to be conducted to elevate the proficiency of these rifle squads to permit the conduct of detailed reconnaissance and ambush patrols, with only refresher training required periodically. The small number of infantrymen in an armored cavalry platoon makes sustained operations improbable without having to compromise the stealth afforded by dismounted troops with armored cavalry support.

b. Reorganize the armored cavalry squadron to provide for a headquarters and headquarters troop, two armored cavalry troops, one rifle company, a tank company, and a howitzer battery. By replacing one of the armored cavalry troops with a rifle company, the squadron would lose one of its mounted maneuver units; however, the rifle company would offer distinct advantages. It could remain a proficient unit and provide the squadron with the dismounted capability it needs for low intensity, counterinsurgency operations. By employing the unit in cross-reinforcement or as a company, the squadron would have a readily available capability to conduct detailed searches in areas developed by armored cavalry reconnaissance.

c. Reorganize the regiment to include a rifle company under regimental control. This solution would give the regiment a limited capability for detailed searches and reconnaissance in support of its squadrons and to back up the air cavalry troop. Since all three squadrons may not be under regimental control, this solution could be satisfactory for the regiment, while it would be necessary for the squadron under the operational control of another unit to request support from that unit.
Annex B (Organization)

d. Conclusions. The armored cavalry regiment requires proficient infantrymen in its organization to conduct low intensity, counterinsurgency operations. Although the rifle squads of the armored cavalry platoons in each troop could be mustered for operations as an infantry platoon, normal combat operations wherein the armored cavalry platoons of the troop are widely dispersed, makes this technique difficult of accomplishment. Reorganization of the armored cavalry squadron to replace one armored cavalry troop with a rifle company, or reorganization of the regiment to include a rifle company at regimental level may provide a satisfactory solution.

e. Recommendation. That consideration be given to reorganizing the armored cavalry squadron or the armored cavalry regiment to insure provision of the proficient infantry support required in low intensity, counterinsurgency operations.

4. (B) Residual Force. The organization of the residual force is based upon the Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-55H, dated 30 November 1970. 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was modified to delete the tank company, and was reinforced with the Regimental air cavalry troop and units to provide medical clearing, engineer, aircraft DS maintenance, and avionics maintenance support. The authorization documents for the residual force are shown on chart II. These documents not only are tailored for the new organization, but they have also been updated where necessary to eliminate past errors and to comply with both AR 310-49 (TAALS) and USARPAC Supplement 1 to AR 310-49. The following modifications are accomplished in the new authorization documents:

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th ACR:

(1) The squadron staff is augmented for 24 hour operations.

(2) A Deputy Commanding Officer and an S5 are added to the squadron staff.

(3) Additional mechanics are added to the troop headquarters and the squadron maintenance platoon.

(4) The M114 command and reconnaissance vehicle is replaced by the M113A1 armored personnel carrier with the personnel armament subsystem (ACAV configuration).

(5) Eight M548 cargo carriers are added to the Squadron Transportation Section in lieu of ten 5 ton trucks.
Annex B (Organization)

(6) An additional M88 Tank Recovery Vehicle is added to the Squadron Maintenance Platoon.

(7) The Squadron Aviation Section is increased with four UH-1H helicopters and crews.

(8) The Squadron Evacuation Section is decreased by two 1/4 ton ambulances.

(9) The Redeye Section is deleted.

(10) A Squadron Personnel Section is added.

(11) An Air Control Team is added.

(12) The Squadron Ground Surveillance Section is equipped with the Personnel Armament Subsystem for the M113A1 armored personnel carriers.

(13) The M203 grenade launcher attachment for the M16A1 rifle is replaced by the M79 grenade launcher and the .45 caliber automatic pistol for vehicle crews.

(14) The Prefix "5" qualification requirement for officers is deleted.

b. Troops E, F, and G, 2d Squadron, 11th ACR:

(1) The M114 command and reconnaissance vehicle is replaced by the M113A1 armored personnel carrier with the personnel armament subsystem (ACAV configuration).

(2) The M203 grenade launcher attachment for the M16A1 rifle is replaced by the M79 grenade launcher and the .45 caliber automatic pistol for tracked vehicle crews.

(3) The 4.2-inch self-propelled mortar, M106, is replaced by the 81mm self-propelled mortar, M125.

(4) Additional personnel are provided to man the personnel armament subsystem on the M113A1 armored personnel carrier.

(5) The M551, AR/AAV, is not equipped with the Shillelagh weapon system.
Annex B (Organization)

c. Howitzer Battery, 2d Squadron, 11th ACR:

(1) One M578 light recovery vehicle and crew is added to the Battery Headquarters.

(2) The Forward Observer Sections are equipped with the personnel armament subsystem for their M113A1 armored personnel carriers (AGAV configuration).

(3) The Prefix "5" qualification requirement for officers is deleted.

(4) An additional Assistant Executive Officer is provided in the Firing Battery Headquarters.

d. Air Cavalry Troop:

(1) An Executive Officer is added to the Troop Headquarters.

(2) Aircraft armament repair capability of the unit is reduced.

(3) Wheeled vehicle maintenance capability of the unit is increased.

(4) An OH-6A helicopter repair capability is added.

(5) One OH-6A helicopter is deleted from the Aero Scout Platoon.

e. 919th Engineer Platoon: The engineer company was reduced to a sixty-nine (69) man platoon capable of providing four combat engineer squads, limited heavy engineer equipment, and a water point. The combat engineer vehicles (CEV) and the armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) were not retained.

f. 37th Medical Platoon (Clearing): The medical company was reduced to a platoon of thirty (30) men capable of limited medical and dental support for clearing station or dispensary missions.

g. 124th CS Maintenance Detachment (Avionics): This unit was not altered, rather the authorizations were updated to eliminate expendable items, items authorized under CTA 50-901, and to adjust the Section I (General) of the MTGGE for the unit's assignment to the Armored Cavalry Squadron.

h. 396th Transportation Detachment (Acft DS Maint):

(1) The aircraft maintenance capability of the unit was reduced commensurate with the slightly lower aircraft density in the squadron.
Annex B (Organization)

(2) A mess team was added.

(3) Certain test equipment was added to facilitate maintenance requirements.
### Annex B (Organization)

#### Chart I: **CURRENT ORGANIZATION AUTHORIZATIONS**

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* Recognized requirement, not authorized.
Annex B (Organization)

Chart II: (U) RESIDUAL FORCE AUTHORIZATIONS

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B-20
Annex C (Operations)

1. (C) Missions/Areas of Operation. The Regiment conducted operations in two AO's (see Maps 1 and 2). In the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh AO, the 1st Squadron directed its operations out of FSB Henderson against the VC U-1 Province Headquarters and the 274th VC Regiment. 1st Squadron relinquished its AO to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Separate) on 1 February 1971. In the Bien Hoa - Binh Duong AO, 3d Squadron operated out of FSB Bandit II against the Dong Nai Regiment of SR-5. The southwest portion of the AO was controlled by Binh Duong Province throughout the period. The Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, performed reconnaissance and screening operations in the northeast corner of this AO and called their portion of it "AO Thunderhorse." The 3d Squadron and the air cavalry troop were relieved from this AO by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) on 7 February 1971.

2. (C) Contingency Missions. The Regiment was directed by II Field Force to plan for two contingency missions in MR3. The first, Oplan ROME EAGLE, provided for the defense of Saigon, and the second, Oplan BLACKHORSE WEST, provided for the defense of Tay Ninh.

3. (C) Deterrent Role. The staggering firepower and the rapid response capability of the armored cavalry have developed for the Regiment a deterrent role in low intensity, counterinsurgency operations. The most advantageous target for enemy terrorism has been the Vietnamese Territorial Forces. With armored cavalry units nearby, these territorial forces have progressed from the enemy's target to his hunter. The deterrent role of armored cavalry will continue with the residual force and is expected to have a significant effect in further upgrading the valiant efforts of the territorial forces to rid their districts and provinces of the enemy menace. The same considerations may result in the deterrence of enemy attacks on residual US units and installations.

4. (C) Automatic Ambush Program. In terms of eliminating enemy, the employment of the automatic ambush remained the single, most effective technique used. In the Regiment's Bien Hoa - Long Khanh AO during 8 December 1970 to 1 February 1971, the 1st Squadron had eight (8) automatic ambushes detonated, resulting in four (4) VC/NVA KIA. This figure represents 27% of all enemy eliminated in this AO. The best results were obtained by the 3d Squadron in the Regiment's western AO in Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces, where with twenty-four (24) ambush detonations, twenty-four (24) VC/NVA were killed. Of all enemy eliminated by 3d Squadron, 77% were killed by automatic ambushes. Four (4) of these devices were removed by the enemy as he attempted to counter this tactic. The Bien Hoa - Binh Duong AO was previously noted for the enemy's ability to remove automatic ambushes without losses. However, due in part to the automatic ambush training given by the Regiment, the enemy's success in defeating this ambush has been cut in half. This training on the automatic ambush is discussed in Annex D (Training).
Annex C (Operations)

5. (U) Support Squads, Armored Cavalry Troop. TOE 17-57H, Armored Cavalry Troop, Armored Cavalry Squadron, ACR, equips the support squads of the armored cavalry platoons with 4.2-inch self-propelled mortars, M106. It was found that the 4.2-inch mortar, with its minimum range of 400 meters, could not provide close defensive fires around the troop night defensive position and strong points. As a result of this range limitation, all of the support squads were equipped by MTOE with the 81mm self-propelled mortar, M125, which has a minimum range of 75 meters and a maximum range of 4600 meters. The conversion to the 81mm mortar was completed in November 1970 and very satisfactory close fire support for the armored cavalry troops was achieved.

6. (C) Combined Operations. In July 1970, the Regiment initiated operations in operational areas overlapping Long Khanh, Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces. In addition to normal combat missions, the regiment was assigned the specific mission of upgrading and improving the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Territorial Forces.

a. After a careful study of the best way to accomplish the mission, the following factors became evident:

(1) Organization, equipment, and techniques of employment of the Regiment were incompatible with those of territorial forces.

(2) The Regiment was oriented toward mounted operations while territorial forces required training in basic dismounted infantry skills. The Regiment was not capable of forming cadre to present instruction as was the case with US infantry units in the military region. To pull troopers from their armored combat vehicles to act as cadre for territorial forces instruction would have resulted in immobilization of combat vehicles badly needed for continuing performance of operational missions.

(3) While some RF companies were in need of basic training, the majority already had received basic instruction and needed only an impetus to initiate an aggressive operational program.

b. A review of these factors revealed that the most effective way for the Regiment to accomplish the specific mission of upgrading and improving the effectiveness of territorial forces was to emphasize combined operations. When accompanied by the great firepower and mobility of the Regiment, RF/FF units were no longer reluctant to participate in operations away from their villages and hamlets. By displaying complete professionalism in the conduct of these operations, the Regiment set a very high standard for the territorial forces to observe. Operating together served as an incentive to the territorial forces to improve quickly so as not to appear as a marginal unit to the American counterpart. Using the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) Report, prepared by MACV province advisors,
as a starting point, the Regiment quickly developed its own evaluation system of territorial force units to assist in determining what type of training needed more emphasis. Each Squadron was required to submit a report after each combined operation. The report indicated the strengths and weaknesses of the territorial force unit. This report included observations on planning, preparation, leadership, esprit, tactical proficiency, and radio procedures. By evaluating these reports the unit's true combat ready posture could be determined and an attempt could be made to emphasize the improvement of weak areas during future operations with the unit. Generally, the TFES Report and the Regiment's evaluation of the unit showed a close correlation.

c. Combined operations normally took the form of reconnaissance, using blocking forces composed of a cavalry platoon or a RF company, and a cavalry platoon and RF/PF units conducting a combined sweep. When more than one RF company and more than one cavalry platoon were involved, a combined command post of US and ARVN was established to control the operation. This insured quick response to requests for artillery, helicopter gunships, and medical evacuations. During all operations sound operational techniques were demonstrated by the cavalry contingent and critiques followed operations to emphasize strong and weak points of the operation. Critiques were given to advisors only. Operations security, quick reaction to intelligence, and other proven operational procedures were emphasized from initial planning through the critique phase of each operation. Beginning with platoon and squad sized operations, the RF/PF forces improved to the point that Province and District Headquarters Control Groups could control up to ten companies on a coordinated operation. Given the impetus and encouragement by the Regiment, RF/PF learned to put into practice the techniques they already knew, but had not used. From the combined operations, the RF/PF learned they could operate with success and began conducting increasingly larger scale operations on their own. This has been especially true of the territorial forces in Binh Duong Province. Most recently, as a part of the transitional effort to turn over regimental responsibilities, operations were specifically directed into areas which territorial forces had been reluctant to penetrate previously and across political boundaries, to encourage continuing cooperation and coordination in these critical areas.

d. Combined operations not only encouraged the RF/PF to operate more often and accomplish their mission more effectively, but the RF/PF also materially contributed to the mission accomplishment of the 11th ACR by providing infantrymen familiar with local terrain and capable of conducting a detailed search of base areas once they were located by the combined force. Simultaneously, the cavalry provided firepower to back up the RF should they encounter a large VC/NVA force. From 8 December 1970 to 5 March 1971 more than forty-five (45) company or multiple-company sized operations were conducted by units of the 11th ACR and territorial forces.
Annex C (Operations)

7. (C) Conclusions:

a. Armored cavalry units provide a credible deterrent effect on the enemy's willingness to engage territorial forces in low intensity counterinsurgency operations. The ability of armored cavalry to react quickly and with devastating firepower make the enemy hesitant about attacking any territorial force which may be supported by such a reaction force.

b. Under present conditions, automatic ambushes are the single, most effective means to eliminate the enemy in interdicting his supply routes.

c. The 81mm self-propelled mortar is superior to the 4.2-inch self-propelled mortar in low intensity, counterinsurgency operations for the needs of the armored cavalry platoons due to its 75 meter minimum range.

d. There is no question that combined operations have materially improved the effectiveness of the territorial forces. As the Blackhorse Regiment phases down operations, however, in order to fully exploit the advantage gained through combined operations, consideration should be given to providing province officials with a mobile reaction force, perhaps an ARVN cavalry unit immediately responsive to their needs. Additionally, more study should be given to the development of better helicopter support for the province. Helicopter support for territorial forces was virtually non-existent, but has been made available frequently as a normal part of the training/upgrading effort.

8. (C) Recommendations:

a. That doctrine be developed to expand upon the deterrent effect that armored cavalry provides when it is used in a reaction force role in low intensity counterinsurgency operations.

b. That the importance of the automatic ambush as an offensive weapon in supply route interdiction be stressed in current doctrine for counterinsurgency operations.

c. That the 81mm self-propelled mortar be considered as a replacement for the 4.2-inch self-propelled mortar for the support squads of the armored cavalry troop, TOE 17-57H, for low intensity counterinsurgency operations.

d. That with respect to combined operations with territorial forces in low intensity counterinsurgency operations, the following actions be given careful study:
Annex C (Operations)

(1) Expanding current doctrine to include combined operations with armored cavalry to increase the effectiveness of territorial forces.

(2) Providing province officials with ARVN armored cavalry to act as a mobile reaction force.

(3) Providing province officials with better and more responsive helicopter support for territorial forces.
Annex D (Training)

1. (C) Preparation of the Armored Cavalry Platoon Leader. The armored cavalry platoon leader is in a unique position because he leads the smallest TOE combined arms organization. He must be technically and tactically proficient in the employment of reconnaissance, armor, infantry, and mortar support. Too often the new armored cavalry platoon leader has little knowledge of the particular infantry and mortar support capabilities his platoon can and must provide. Particularly in RVN, the maintenance of proficient rifle squads is difficult at best. The armored cavalry platoon leader must be familiar enough with the employment of the rifle squad so as to demand and maintain his platoon's ability to provide this dismounted element.

2. (C) CONUS Replacements to RVN. When replacements from CONUS arrive in the Regiment they are given a nine day in-country training program. Although some of the subjects taught in this course are peculiar to the Regiment's operations in RVN, the majority of mandatory subjects simply duplicate instruction given in CONUS FOR RVN-related training. These subjects, such as Escape and Evasion, Communications Security, SAIPDA Briefing, and topics related to the Rules of Engagement and the Law of Land Warfare, are given with a RVN perspective. It is felt that the instruction given replacements within RVN is preferable to FOR RVN-related training in CONUS for two reasons:

   a. RVN units have a mandatory requirement to give many of the subjects taught in RVN-related FOR courses. The duplication involved is unnecessary. The courses taught within RVN are much more up-to-date on the latest experiences of that particular unit to which the replacement is assigned.

   b. The courses given within RVN have significantly more impact upon the replacement and he has the additional advantage of being assured his instructors have recently returned from the very field units to which he will be assigned.

3. (C) Automatic Ambush Training. Although the automatic ambush is the single, most effective offensive technique employed by the Regiment, more and more of these devices were being removed by the enemy during October and November 1970. In some cases the enemy was killed after he had removed part of the ambush. Additionally, injuries were sustained by friendly units as they emplaced the ambush or removed it. Friendly injuries were not acceptable, whether they were caused by misorientation or simply unsafe practices. Because of accident experience, all employment of the automatic ambush by the Regiment was halted. The armored cavalry troops and the tank companies were required to send two persons from each platoon to a one day automatic ambush course presented at the Pierce Cavalry Training School. The instructors were augmented by members of the Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP), Air Cavalry Troop. After this refresher training these selected
personnel were the only ones permitted to employ the automatic ambush. Other methods were discussed on the basis of their relative safety. When they returned the students then instructed personnel in their units. Only after the unit and squadron commanders were satisfied that personnel trained in the field were sufficiently knowledgeable of the subject, would additional personnel emplace the ambush. Under no circumstances would automatic ambushes be disarmed in the future. All would be removed by safer methods, such as detonating them in place.

4. (C) Support Squads, Armored Cavalry Troops. Although the support squad is organic to the armored cavalry platoon, the armored cavalry troop sometimes employed the three support squads as a mortar section to provide close fire support for the troop night defensive position. It was found that the support squads required additional training and supervision to be able to function as a mortar section. Since the TOE does not provide for a mortar platoon leader or platoon sergeant, the artillery forward observer was given the additional responsibility of training and supervising the troop's support squads. To assist the Squadrons, the Regimental Fire Support Element provided personnel to evaluate the support squads of each troop. The gunner's test and the combat readiness evaluation for the 81mm mortar were used.

5. (C) Conclusions:

a. The average armored cavalry platoon leader has insufficient basic knowledge of the particular infantry and mortar support capabilities which can and must be furnished by his platoon. The program of instruction for the Armor Officer Basic Course should provide considerably more instruction on the basic skills required of the armored cavalry platoon leader to enable him to perform his duties as the leader of a closely integrated combined arms team.

b. CONUS FOR RVN-related training duplicates training which must be given in RVN for all replacements. It is preferable to give the replacements their training within RVN.

c. Continuous refresher training about the automatic ambush is required by company/troop size units to insure continued safe employment of the device.

d. When the support squads of the armored cavalry troop operate as a mortar section, additional training and supervision is required. The artillery forward observer is capable of providing the necessary training and supervision required. The gunner's test and the combat readiness evaluation for the 81mm mortar provide a good means of evaluating the proficiency of these support squads.
Annex D (Training)

6. (C) Recommendations:

a. That the program of instruction for the Armor Officer Basic Course be changed to include considerably more instruction on the armored cavalry platoon. Of particular importance are the platoon leader's duties with respect to the tactical employment, training, and maintenance of the rifle and mortar support squads.

b. That CONUS FOR RVN-related training be terminated.

c. That units employing the automatic ambush be required to conduct frequent refresher training to insure safe and effective employment of this device and to overcome complacency.

d. That, when the support squads of the armored cavalry troop are used as a mortar section, the artillery forward observer assume the responsibility of training and supervising the mortar section. Additionally, that the gunner's test and the combat readiness evaluation for the 81mm mortar be administered to the support squads quarterly.
Annex E (Communications)

1. (C) FM radio communications fully supported the Regiment's tactical operations. The FM relay on Nui Chau Chan (Hill 837) continued in operation and was used to relay for the Regimental nets and the Squadrons, when operating in sectors of the AO's that were masked. Additional relay support was provided by other units from Nui Ba Ra and Nui Ba Den to support A Troop and I Troop while they were operating in the Song Be and Tay Ninh areas respectively. Radio teletype and AM-SSB voice provided the primary means of communicating with the 2d Squadron operating in the Ham Tan area of Binh Tuy Province, at a distance of 100 kilometers from the Regimental Headquarters. The use of shared frequencies continued to be the major problem in radio communications.

2. (C) The supply and use of FM secure radio equipment was substantially increased. Increased availability allowed the conversion of the Regimental command, intelligence, administrative/logistics, and fire support nets to nearly total secure operation. Completion of the modification and installation of the KY-28 equipment in the UH-1H helicopters of the Regiment provided a secure voice capability for ground-to-air communications. The increased density of speech security equipment, 120 devices, created problems with the administration of the cryptographic classified account and maintenance. The Regimental HTEC provided for only one cryptographic equipment repairman, MOS 31S, and did not include an authorization for a cryptographic custodian. The high density of secure equipment with the related keylists, and the dispersion of the units, generated a requirement for a full time cryptographic account custodian and sufficient cryptographic equipment repairmen to provide contact maintenance support to squadron and troop level.

3. (C) The Regiment continued to operate a home-made communications center. This was accomplished by obtaining equipment on temporary loan and operating out of a M109A3 Maintenance Van. The Commcenter operated two terminals, one a sole-user to the II Field Force Commcenter to provide in-country refile service. These voice circuits were indispensable when the Regiment was designated a "Red Rocket" addressee by the JCS. This designation required that continuous secure teletype communication be maintained, a feat that would have been highly improbable utilizing the Regiment's organic radio teletype equipment. Radio teletype was used as a tertiary backup. This system was highly successful as the Regiment experienced a completion time for its "Red Rocket" tests that averaged three minutes.

4. (C) Continuous emphasis was placed on the use of proper radio telephone procedures. The major problems experienced were excessive operator chatter and failure to use authorized pro-words. In the Regiment, which communicates almost entirely on FM radio nets, both failings, compounded by the use of shared frequencies, resulted in tying up the nets excessively in passing messages. The increased use of the secure mode aggravated the
Annex E (Communications)

problem, as operators were even more prone to chatter than when operating in the clear. Command emphasis was placed on the use of prescribed reporting formats and stringent policing of the nets by the net control stations. This effort did result in an obvious improvement, but continuous emphasis is required.

5. (C) Conclusions:

a. The use of FM radio provided both effective and reliable communications.

b. The extensive use of secure voice equipment, while greatly enhancing the communications security program, does require additional manning.

c. The armored cavalry regiment does have a need for an organic commcenter utilizing standard TOE equipment and personnel authorizations.

d. Radio telephone operators require more training in the use of secure equipment and radio net operations.

6. (C) Recommendations:

a. That consideration be given to increasing the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, TOE 17-52H, with a warrant officer, cryptographic technical, MOS 721A0, and at least two additional cryptographic equipment repairmen, MOS 31S.

b. That consideration be given to adding a mobile teletype terminal to the communications platoon of the Regimental headquarters and headquarters troop, either by attachment or by modification of the TOE.

c. That radio telephone operators be given additional training in the use of secure voice equipment and radio net operations.
1. (U) General. The TOE aircraft strength of the Regiment remained the same during the period 8 December 1970 to 1 February 1971. On 1 February the 398th Transportation Detachment began to prepare twelve (12) aircraft for lateral transfer to the 1st Aviation Brigade. These twelve aircraft consisted of four (4) OH-6A and eight (8) UH-1H helicopters. During the month of January, one OH-6A was retrograded for overhaul and another was lost to enemy ground-to-air fire. These two aircraft were never replaced. This reduction in aircraft density will leave the residual force with a total of thirty-four (34) aircraft, consisting of two (2) OH-6A and six (6) UH-1H helicopters in the squadron aviation section, and nine (9) OH-6A, eight (8) UH-1H, and nine (9) AH-1G helicopters in the air cavalry troop. The organization of the 398th Transportation Detachment, to include the attachment of the service platoon of the air cavalry troop, remained in effect.

2. (U) Maintenance.
   a. The last AH-1G helicopter to receive the improved anti-torque system (tractor tail rotor) modification was sent to maintenance for the improvement on 14 February 1971. This completed the modification of all AH-1G helicopters assigned.
   b. The incorporation of the service platoon of the air cavalry troop into the 398th Transportation Detachment came under study by the Regiment to determine whether this arrangement was responsive enough to the needs of the air cavalry troop. The service platoon was designed to provide organizational maintenance for the troop. Operating within the 398th Transportation Detachment, the service platoon not only provides organizational maintenance for the air cavalry troop aircraft, but all other aircraft in the Regiment. This attachment also requires the 398th Transportation Detachment to provide a contact team to the air cavalry troop when the troop operates from a forward base. Consideration is still in progress to return the service platoon back to the air cavalry troop.
   c. Operational Readiness rates for the aircraft of the Regiment are shown on charts III through VI.

3. (U) Flying Hour Program. In December 1970, a new flying hour reduction program was instituted by II Field Force Headquarters, which allotted the Regiment forty-nine (49) UH-1 equivalent flying hours per month per aircraft. The Regiment further reduced the number of "blade hours" and, in addition to the savings initiated by II Field Force, decreased its UH-1 equivalent flying hours by approximately 1000 hours from December 1970 to February 1971, without adversely affecting the operational effectiveness of the Regiment.
Annex F (Aviation)

4. (U) Conclusions.
   a. The optimum internal organization for aviation maintenance in the Regiment has not yet been determined.
   b. The imposition of a flying hour program is a necessity regardless of the intensity of combat operations, if savings are to be realized.

5. (U) Recommendations.
   a. That continued study of the aircraft maintenance capabilities of the armored cavalry regiment proceed to determine the best organization for low intensity counterinsurgency operations.
   b. That the effects of a flying hour program be studied to determine that point at which maximum cost reduction and maximum combat effectiveness are achieved.
PERCENT OF OPERATIONAL READY AIRCRAFT

CHART III AIRCRAFT OR RATE CH-6A

CHART IV AIRCRAFT OR RATE UH-1H

CHART IV AIRCRAFT OR RATE UH-1H

100% -
90% -
80% -
70% -
60% -
50% -
40% -

10       17      24      31      7        14      21      28      4        11      17
DEC      JAN     FEB
PERCENT OF OPERATIONAL READY AIRCRAFT

CHART V AIRCRAFT ON RATE APR-DEC

CHART VI REMEDIAL AIRCRAFT ON RATE
1. (U) Maintenance Programs. The following is a summary of a series of maintenance programs and policies that were put into effect during the period September to November 1970. They were necessitated by an unexpectedly high deadline rate in September and by an appalling rate of engine and transmission failures in the M68A3 tank, the M113A1 armored personnel carrier, and the M551 AR/AV. Of the programs themselves, nothing was original. In hindsight, each corrective action should have been obvious. However, it is because they were painstakingly developed, and were successful beyond all expectations, that they are reviewed and summarized here.

   a. Engine/Transmission Usage Study.

      (1) Background. In September 1970, the Regiment made a study to determine why the Regiment used a total of five hundred two (502) engines and transmissions in the three major tracked combat vehicles of the Regiment, the M68A3 tank, the M113A1 APC, and the M551 AR/AV from 1 May to 31 August 1970. The total density of these vehicles was four hundred three (403). Data was collected and plotted against time (see Chart VII). It was not possible to determine the specific cause of each failure, that is, metal fatigue, part failure, overheating, etc., but several causes did become apparent.

      (2) Causes. The following were determined to be the probable causes for the majority of the engine/transmission failures that the Regiment suffered:

         (a) Improper or inadequate diagnostic techniques by mechanics at the troop, squadron, and direct support maintenance levels.

         (b) Lack of supervision (quality control) of crew and direct support maintenance mechanics while they assembled and installed packs.

         (c) Inadequate crew maintenance.

      (3) Programs. Three programs were developed to eliminate each of the above causes for engine/transmission failure.

         (a) Direct support mechanics were sent to a Diesel Engine Diagnostic School, conducted by Saigon Support Command. In addition, quotas for this school were obtained for troop and squadron level mechanics. This tended to raise, and validate, the diagnostic capability in, and supporting, the Regiment.

         (b) Whenever a major assembly was being installed in a vehicle, every attempt was made to have a maintenance supervisor, either from the troop or squadron, available. When possible a direct support
maintenance supervisor was also on the site.

(c) Following the adage that "Maintenance is a Command Responsibility," a program was established to emphasize command interest. Once or twice a week, an NCO and an inspector were provided to the Regiment by the 185th Maintenance Battalion (DB). They were flown to troop locations in the field and inspected vehicles for those aspects of operator maintenance, which if not properly performed, led to a major assembly failure. This inspection included such items as oil and coolant levels, air cleaners, etc. The inspection team filled out duplicates of DA Form 2404, leaving one copy with the vehicle crew, and sending the second copy to the Regimental S4. These reports were analyzed and summarized and forwarded to the Regimental commander. On his next visit to the squadron's field location, the inspection reports for the squadron were discussed with the squadron commander, thus putting the really critical aspects of operator maintenance in command channels.

(4) Results. This study tended to focus attention on a problem and forced the development of some useful solutions. The results that were obtained by these and other maintenance programs were significant. Chart VII depicts subsequent engine/transmission failures. The Regiment, during the period 1 October 1970 to 31 January 1971, reduced its major assembly failure rate by sixteen percent (16%). This resulted in an actual savings of about $670,000. This result must also be measured in light of the fact that, during July and August, one squadron was at DiAn Base Camp on a maintenance standdown. Thus the latest sampling period represents twelve (12) squadron-months of field activity, while the original sample represented ten (10) squadron-months in the field, or an overall increase of twenty percent (20%) in field activity after the maintenance programs were put into effect.

b. Quarterly Services (Q-checks). Prior to September 1970, units had attempted to perform modified Q-checks in the field. In early October, a policy was established requiring the Squadrons to formalize their quarterly services, to insure they were as complete as possible, and to report the status of these services weekly to the Regimental S4. The commander was then briefed weekly on the progress of the Regiment. In general, the Squadrons chose to pull Q-checks by platoon. The vehicles were moved to the squadron fire support base for a five to seven day period. This allowed squadron maintenance personnel, and the squadron commander, to closely supervise these quarterly services. This was a major step toward developing a "preventive maintenance" program instead of a major program to repair vehicles after they became inoperable.
CHART VIII

CHART/TRANSMISSION USAGE TRENDS
1 MAY THRU 31 AUG 70

- M113A1 ENGINE
- M551 ENGINE
- M4A3 ENGINE

TRANSMISSION

30 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG
c. Warning Lights. In mid-October 1970, the Regimental commander discovered that many vehicles had inoperable warning lights. In some cases, the sending units had never been hooked up, because tactical conditions in War Zone C and Cambodia prevented the crew from paying attention to the warning light when it came on. This of course was an after-the-fact additional cause of the high incidence of engine/transmission failure. All units were required to conduct a daily inspection of all vehicle warning lights, and to report the results to Regiment. Again, progress in this area was briefed weekly. Requirements were submitted and command emphasis maintained until all warning lights were operable.

d. Field Maintenance and Training. In mid-October 1970, LTG McCaffrey visited the Regiment. After being briefed on the deadline status he commented that the Regiment did not have a maintenance problem, but a training problem. Action had already been taken to improve the diagnostic capabilities of mechanics, so a program was developed to increase the training of vehicle crewmen. Essentially, each squadron was directed to spend 25% of its field time performing vehicle maintenance. Specifically, each troop and company was directed to spend one full day per week solely on maintenance and maintenance training. This day included a period of maintenance instruction for crewmen on some aspect of crew preventive maintenance. Also included was a requirement for refresher driver training. This program paid particular dividends with our M551 Sheridan crewmen as many of them had not been formally trained on this very complex vehicle. Again, the Regimental commander made a point of visiting units during their particular day of maintenance, thus emphasizing his interest.

e. PLL Improvement Program. In late October 1970, the Regiment requested an inspection of the squadron PLL's. The inspection was conducted by a team from DCSLOG USARV. Although the unit PLL's were not in bad shapes, a thirty day "get well" program was developed. It consisted of the following steps:

1. A four man team was formed. Each squadron provided one man, and the Regimental S4 provided a man. This team traveled daily to Headquarters, USARV, and used the DCSLOG Maintenance Reference Library. Using the latest technical manuals and our vehicle density, they determined what PLL stockage the Regiment should have, without regard to actual demand data. Lists of this PLL data were prepared and provided to each squadron.

2. Each squadron reviewed the list and adjusted the stockage level using demand data. Based on guidance received from LTG McCaffrey, common sense was applied to this data, as not all demands had always been posted. This gave the Regiment a complete list of what it should have on hand.
Annex G (Logistics)

(3) Meanwhile, each unit conducted a 100% inventory of what items of PLL they had on hand. When this was compared against the newly computed PLL requirements, what was needed became obvious.

(4) A special procedure for a "one time fill" from Long Binh Army Depot was established. Requisitions were prepared for all items that were below stockage level or at zero balance. These requisitions were forwarded to depot and about 35% were filled immediately, and the remainder were filled when the parts became available. As a corollary to this action, a review was made in each unit of the various technical manuals that were needed. A consolidated special requisition was submitted by the Regimental S4 through AG channels. Within one month an adequate supply of -10, -20, and -20P manuals was available.

f. In late September, in an effort to reduce accidents, the Regiment started a daily vehicles "Safety Spot Check Inspection." This was conducted by a team of two mechanics, who were stationed inside one of the gates to DiAn Base Camp. They stopped Regimental vehicles and checked primarily for safety items, such as the horn, lights, brakes, etc. In addition, they checked the drivers' licenses and dispatches. Lastly, they checked obvious operator maintenance items, such as oil, water, and battery. Duplicate copies of DA Form 2404 were prepared, with one copy for the vehicle driver, and the other copy for the Regimental XO. The XO reviewed the inspection forms and passed them on to the unit commander or squadron XO for review and action. This program supplemented the Regiment's CMMIs and contributed to the increased standard of wheeled vehicle maintenance by keeping it daily in the commander's eye.

2. (C) Equipment Suitability. The following paragraphs give an evaluation of the various items of equipment within the Regiment, and where appropriate, conclusions and recommendations are provided.

a. M551, AR/AAV

(1) The M551 Sheridan vehicle has not lived up to expectations and this command has not been entirely satisfied with the vehicle. On the other hand, it must again be recognized that the M551 Sheridan was not developed or intended for use in dense jungle and in the extreme climate of Southeast Asia. There are faults which limit the combat effectiveness of the M551, the electrical turret system being the single most serious ones.

(2) Problems with the turret range from inoperable or marginal traversing capability to loss of firing capability. All of these problems are aggravated during the monsoon season and lessen during the dry season. The constant dampness, exposure to torrential rains and mud, and rough treatment that accompanies combat in South Vietnam, lead to a deterioration of the firing system. This has often resulted in not getting a ready light when the crew is counting on the main gun, or getting a ready light, but still not being able to fire the main gun.
(3) Even with an operative firing system, the time lapse between rounds is considered excessive, when it takes more than 10 seconds. Because of the time lag to ready an unloaded gun for firing, it is common practice to conduct patrols with a round in the chamber, despite the obvious safety hazard.

(4) Lack of a mobile, relatively simple, turret troubleshooting device has hampered effective, on the spot analysis and return to service of Sheridan turrets. While repairmen are available, they require four to five months of actual "hands on" training before they become proficient in troubleshooting techniques. A shortage of turret parts plagued the Regiment during most of 1970, but this shortage has been largely alleviated for direct exchange (DX) assemblies. A requisition for almost any turret wiring harness, however, is passed to CONUS and takes a minimum of three weeks to be filled.

(5) The suspension system of the Sheridan has been, for the most part, satisfactory. Torsion bars hold up well even in severe terrain; sprockets are lasting longer than a year ago; track, once in critically short supply, is now available, as are adequate quantities of roadwheels. The only area that needs significant improvement is the manner of issuing roadwheel arms. Presently, only the arm itself is available. Much valuable time could be saved if the entire hub, with bearings, seals, and races, was attached to the arm and issued as one item. Roadwheel hub bearings and seals are not available in the direct support technical supply nor in the Long Binh Army Depot.

(6) The M551 engine and transmission, in all likelihood, make up an ideal powertrain for the European theater. It is an inadequate powertrain for jungle operations, however, because of the severe strain placed upon both the engine and transmission during jungle busting, convoy security, and recovery operations.

(7) A majority of Sheridan engines fail because of overheating. While improper driving techniques contribute to the problem, the fact that the engine overheats cannot be ignored. This problem is further complicated because of the fragile nature of and the difficulty in thoroughly cleaning the radiator.

(8) Recovering inoperative Sheridans is done with an M88 or M578 recovery vehicle, or a tank, whenever possible, because the Sheridan transmission is not strong enough to recover another Sheridan without risking damage. This recovery is possible if a hard surfaced road is utilized. Overheating and subsequent breakdown of lubricating oil is experienced particularly in the dry season, where external temperatures approach 100 degrees.
Annex G (Logistics)

(9) Three important design criteria for the Sheridan - air drop-pability, swim capability, and missile employment - have never been used in Vietnam.

(10) Conclusions The M551 AR/AAV offers speed, mobility, and versatile firepower when it is able to perform. In Vietnam, its ability to perform has been hampered, primarily because of design shortcomings which limit the Sheridan's performance in a jungle environment.

(11) Recommendations:

(a) That the Sheridan turret be changed to a hydraulic system similar to the system on the M48A3 tank, or that the electrical system be simplified and made more reliable.

(b) That the engine and transmission cooling capability be increased so that jungle operations will not result in engine damage.

(c) That engine horsepower be increased, if the Sheridan is to be used in jungle environment.

(d) That a turret fault tester be developed, which can be transported to field locations and employed by direct support turret mechanics.

b. M48A3 Tank:

(1) The M48A3 tank has performed very well in contrast to the M551 Sheridan. Relatively few supply problems exist for this vehicle. Major assemblies and small Class II repair parts are usually available. Seldom is it necessary to go out of country to find a needed part for a tank.

(2) Basically unchanged since the late 1950's, the M48A3 turret is reliable, and maintenance MOS's and warrant officer maintenance technicians are familiar with it. The effects of weather on the hydraulic system of the tank are negligible.

(3) Equipped with a powerful V12 aircooled engine, the tank is able to bust jungle and recover like vehicles with little difficulty. To a lesser degree than the Sheridan engine, the M48A3 tank engine is susceptible to overheating, but this usually be avoided by observing four rules:

(a) Keep cargo, leaves, and grass off the engine louvers.

(b) Keep the oil cooler screens free from oil, which can be combined with dust to form sludge.
(c) Straighten the vanes of the rear compartment doors.

(d) Avoid lugging the engine.

(4) A recurring problem during the last four months has been early engine failures. These failures have been repeatedly experienced with engines rebuilt at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama. The average life of these engines during the last four months has been about 90 hours, compared with approximately 600 hours on other rebuilt tank engines. All engines were subjected to the same operating conditions. Crews were switched to see if they were a contributing factor. When switched to a tank that had an engine rebuilt at a depot other than Anniston, the crew had no problems keeping their tank running. TACOM representatives believed the fault to be a piston ring problem. There have been several instances of engines failing between 25 and 50 hours of operating time. Compression checks have shown one or two cylinders with virtually no compression.

(5) Conclusions:

(a) The M48A3 tank is a reliable vehicle with an established parts supply. It is well suited for combat in tropical areas, with only the expected limited maneuverability of any tracked vehicle of such weight during the monsoon season. It can recover itself, pull convoy security, bust jungle, and operate in mountainous areas better than any other tracked vehicle, with the exception of the M113A1 APC.

(b) Rebuilt engines from the Anniston Army Depot were below the standard of other rebuilt engines.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) That the M48A3 tank be considered as a replacement for the M551 Sheridan in the armored cavalry platoon in future counterinsurgency operations in jungle areas.

(b) That further studies be conducted of the quality of tank engines rebuilt at Anniston Army Depot, to determine if the proper standards are being maintained.

o. M109 Howitzer:

(1) The M109 howitzer combines accurate artillery firepower with the mobility of other tracked vehicles in the regiment. The M109 stands up well in sustained combat operations, but there are several shortcomings, which, if corrected would increase the operational readiness of the vehicle.
Annex G (Logistics)

(2) Supply of metal hydraulic lines are ordered from CONUS, virtually none have been available in the direct support technical supply.

(3) There is a tendency for the elevating cylinder to leak after a short time in service. Rebuild kits are not holding up well.

(4) Charge seven firings will occasionally crack either the fuel cell or the batteries, resulting in a very limited firing capability or a deadlined vehicle.

(5) Recently, all howitzers in the 2d Squadron were exchanged for newly rebuilt vehicles. All had severe burring problems on the breech block hinge. One, in addition to burring, also recoiled erratically damaging the cam arm and carrier assembly. After repeated trips to the field by WECOM technical representatives and warrant officer technicians, the burring problem was solved by reducing the number of leaf springs in the breech block hinge.

(6) Conclusion: The M109 howitzer performs its mission in a satisfactory manner and has relatively few maintenance problems.

(7) Recommendations:

(a) That the elevating cylinder rebuild kits be improved to provide longer life.

(b) That the stowage of batteries and the design of the fuel tanks be changed to preclude damage during charge seven firings.

(c) That responsible rebuilding depots closely scrutinize the installation of leaf springs in the breech block to preclude further damage to the interrupted threads.

d. M113A1 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV):

(1) The backbone of the Regiment, the ACAV is the most versatile of all the tracked vehicles with respect to overland movement. Overloaded by some three tons, with belly armor, commander's cupula, M60 gunshields, thousands of rounds of .50 caliber and 7.62mm ammunition, repair parts, and personal gear, the M113A1 is still able to go over ground that no other vehicle outside the M113 family is capable of crossing.

(2) Well established demands for repair parts plus ease of maintenance combine to make the M113A1 the most successful vehicle in the Regiment's inventory. The only noticeable shortage of parts for the M113A1 are of final drives, track adjusters, idler wheels, and, occasionally, wiring harnesses and roadwheel seals.
Annex G (Logistics)

(3) The powerful GM diesel engine is less susceptible to overheating than the Sheridan engine. This is due to the ample power of the engine, a more suitable low range transmission gear, and a very effective fan tower, which forces large quantities of air through the radiator.

(4) Conclusion: The M113A1 ACAV is a rugged combat vehicle capable of enduring sustained combat operations.

(5) Recommendations:

(a) That efforts be made to increase the supply of track adjusters for the M113A1.

(b) That the on hand quantities of final drive assemblies for the M113A1 be increased, since it is the same final drive that is used on the M577, command post vehicle, and the M548 cargo carrier. Zero balances of this item can, in effect, undermine large quantities of different vehicles.

e. M548 Cargo Carrier: This vehicle is essentially the same as the M113A1 ACAV. The only weak area of the M548 cargo carrier is continual bearing failure on the transfer. This transfer will not inter-change with the one on the M113A1, and is almost always extremely difficult to obtain.

f. M578 Light Recovery Vehicle:

(1) The light recovery vehicle is worked extremely hard in all troops and represents the only organic lift capability in the line troops. The auxiliary drive and the M578 has a relatively short service life and has been in critically short supply. In the last 90 days, M578 engines have been virtually impossible to obtain. Because of the severe handicap a troop experiences when its recovery vehicle is deadlined, the Regiment's contact team has on several instances converted an M109 or M107 engine to meet the M578 specifications. Mentioned in the past, but still required, is the need for an active boom for the M578. Currently the M578 does not have crowd capability and this complicates pulling power packs, a relatively simple procedure when a wrecker is used.

(2) Conclusion: The light recovery vehicle, when operating properly, is invaluable to a troop as it performs all essential lifting tasks, such as refueling, moving pallets of ammunition, pulling power packs, and towing all vehicles, except M88 recovery vehicles and M28A3 tanks.

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Annex 6 (Logistics)

(3) Recommendations.

(a) That a more durable auxiliary drive be developed for the M578, and until the receipt of such assemblies, additional auxiliary drives and engines should be made available throughout Vietnam.

(b) That an active boom be developed and made available at the earliest opportunity.

g. M88 Recovery Vehicle:

(1) This vehicle is satisfactory in every respect, except for the lack of a diesel power pack. If a diesel engine was adapted for the M88, mixed fuel requirements in the field could be eliminated, resulting not only in a simplified POL resupply mission, but in a safer vehicle as well. This command has recently experienced fires which destroyed two M88's. These incidents probably would not have happened had the vehicle used diesel fuel.

(2) Conclusion: The M88 is an excellent vehicle. It is versatile enough to pull power packs, load and unload POL and ammunition, and retrieve vehicles of all sizes. The present engine is satisfactory from a power standpoint, but it causes supply and safety problems.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That the M88 continue to be employed as a medium recovery vehicle.

(b) That the gasoline engine be converted to a diesel engine.

h. M151A1 1/4 Ton Truck: The 1/4 ton utility truck has been a satisfactory vehicle. It performs its primary mission of a rear area vehicle very well. Since the cut back in funds, however, there has been a noticeable drop in the availability of all 1/4 ton major assemblies. No new 1/4 ton's have been available to this command in the last year.

i. M37B1 3/4 Ton Truck: The 3/4 ton truck is a fine vehicle and is one of the best light trucks the Army has in its inventory. A relatively slow vehicle, its rough riding, and hard steering qualities are typical of the 3/4 ton. Its rugged flat head engine, which develops a large amount of torque at low rpm, and the ease of maintenance, more than offset the faults of this truck. Engines, transmissions, and water pumps have been in short supply for over 6 months.
Annex G (Logistics)

j. M35A2 2-1/2 Ton Truck: The 2-1/2 ton truck is the workhorse of the wheeled vehicles and is a very dependable truck. The only problem of any consequence is the high failure rate of clutches. High mileage, heavy loads, and some driver abuse contribute to the problem. There is no evidence to indicate manufacturing defects within the clutch. Availability of wheel cylinders, tires and tubes has been sporadic, and at an unsatisfactory low level during the past 6 months.

k. M54A2 5 Ton Truck/M52A2 5 Ton Tractor: The 5 ton cargo truck and the 5 ton tractor are similar in performance to the M35A2. They are used primarily for hauling fuel bladders and ammunition. Little trouble has been experienced with these vehicles. When certain parts were needed, however, there was usually a 10 day to 2 week waiting period. Transfers and torque rods were two hardest parts to obtain for the 5 tons. Tires and tubes have also been in short supply.

l. M54A2 5 Ton Wrecker: Most of the 5 ton wreckers in this command have been old vehicles with hundreds of hours on them. Since new wreckers were unavailable for several months, turn in of the old wreckers was unacceptable, due to the poor condition of those in the depot inventory. Four rebuilt wreckers have been issued to the Regiment within the last four months. Bevel gear boxes, transfers, torque rods, and boom pumps have been the major cause of deadline time for the wreckers.

3. (U) Support.

a. Relations with the headquarters of all support elements continued to improve, and support elements were always ready to respond quickly and effectively to logistical or maintenance problems faced by the Regiment.

b. The 135th Light Maintenance Company has been dedicated to supporting the Regiment. Elements of the three teams supporting the 11th ACR were retained in small numbers at Dl An, while other elements were positioned at each fire support base. Most of the individuals were rotated between Dl An and the field every two to three weeks. A small number of mechanics enjoy field duty and have volunteered for continuous field duty.

c. For a long period of time, the men at the field locations were not effectively supervised. Occasionally, the team leaders or team NCOIC's would visit the fire support bases, but generally speaking, supervision was lacking. Within the last 60 days, maintenance NCOIC's have been in the field, not only to supervise the men, but to insure the quality of work was of a professional nature. Since then, there have been fewer instances of improper mating of major assemblies. Diagnosis of engine trouble has improved, and fewer major assemblies are being replaced.
Annex G (Logistics)

d. The 135th Light Maintenance Company is in the process of being deactivated. Support of the 2/11 ACR residual force is now under the control of the Headquarters and Main Support Company, 185th Maintenance Battalion. The best qualified personnel from each of the other two teams that formerly supported 1st and 3d Squadrons have been transferred to the 2d Squadron's Team, and undesirable personnel have been transferred out. The result of a team of above average mechanics, who are mission oriented and who required little supervision.

e. The flow of major assemblies has improved and they are readily available, except for those items mentioned above. Headquarters and Main Support Company tried to keep a small number of major assemblies for each of the combat vehicles available for immediate issue. This is of primary importance to the 2d Squadron, due to the distance from Di An to its forward supply area adjacent to FSB Race.


(1) In September 1970, a joint study was conducted by the Regiment and Saigon Support Command to determine the personnel and equipment for a direct support maintenance company to be attached to the Regiment. Because of a 72 man differential between what the Regiment felt was required and what Saigon Support Command could provide, the 11th ACR recommended that the unit not be formed and attached.

(2) In late November, MG Woolwine, Deputy for Material, USAVI, directed the unit be formed and attached effective 1 January 1971. Plans were finalized and preparations well along when the Regiment received standdown orders on 20 December. This stopped the action.

(3) The basic idea of having a direct support maintenance company attached to the Regiment is sound and warrants review by higher headquarters for future deployments. Had a DS maintenance company been attached when the Regiment prepared for deployment in the summer of 1966, it is felt that many of the Regiment's maintenance problems would have been reduced. The major advantage would be the fact that the Regiment would be a direct customer of the supporting depot and would not have to go through a "middle man."

(4) Conclusion: The attachment of a direct support maintenance company, properly structured, would have been of significant benefit to the Regimental maintenance program.

(5) Recommendation: That a study be conducted to determine the feasibility of attaching a direct support maintenance company to the armored cavalry regiment when it is deployed in a counterinsurgency environment.
Annex H (Personnel and Administration)

1. (U) Consolidation of Regimental Personnel. The decision to consolidate the regiment's unit personnel offices was accomplished after a total review of both advantages and disadvantages. These are shown below with further discussion of other factors affecting this decision.

   a. Advantages:

      (1) Command supervision is streamlined and improved upon through the consolidation of all personnel functions under one commander rather than four. Command priorities are more easily established, implemented and controlled.

      (2) The quality of personnel service rendered is easily managed through the more effective use of qualified personnel to operate one office, as compared to the fragmentation of personnel assets which occurs under the four separate unit personnel offices.

      (3) Span of control is reduced for each of the personnel technicians, who under the centralized concept, are able to devote their entire effort to one specific area of personnel operations rather than four.

      (4) Under the decentralized system, all unit personnel technicians at squadron level reported through the regimental Personnel Officer, he being the one link with higher headquarters. Under the centralized system, a commissioned officer assumes overall control, establishing the primary channel of communication with higher headquarters. Likewise each of the actions, records, and management personnel technicians establish communications with their counterparts at higher headquarters. The increased level of communication serves to the benefit of the command, as became particularly evident during standdown operations.

      (5) Training of personnel (due to the shortage of trained personnel specialists) is accomplished much more easily and with less impact upon operations under the consolidated personnel system. This is due largely to the reduced impact of losses/new replacements on 'an activity large enough to absorb losses, and the increased capability of warrant officer and noncommissioned officer supervisors to focus greater attention on the training of personnel to fill the need.

      (6) The proposed organization (Chart IX) allows for eventual mechanization (ADP) without requiring a major overhaul in the system. Procedural changes within each section are all that would be necessary. This is particularly advantageous where ADP equipment is available for use.

      (7) The management of personnel assets is more easily accomplished from one management office rather than four.
b. Disadvantages:

(1) The squadron commander loses control over his personnel office. This is the greatest single objection to the consolidation of personnel activities.

(2) The consolidated personnel office may periodically be required to furnish a personnel team to support a squadron attached to another unit for an extended period of time.

(3) The fear that the consolidated personnel office could conceivably operate at a great distance from squadrons in the regiment, thereby reducing the availability of personnel services for the troops, and perhaps the concern of personnel specialists for the welfare of the troops.

c. Conclusions: From a purely managerial standpoint, the advantages of a consolidated personnel office hold up well under scrutiny. The final product will always be governed by the quality of the personnel managers. The personnel office, if it is to produce the results desired by the commander, must provide service to the lowest ranking man in the Regiment. To fail to do so is an immediately identifiable problem, hence one which can be controlled. The question which exist in the minds of commanders are best resolved by their own continued interest in the personnel operation. The consolidated personnel office is considered the advantageous modification of the armored cavalry regiment TOE.

d. Recommendation: That action be initiated to alter the TOE for the armored cavalry regiment (17-51H) to provide for a consolidated regimental personnel office.

2. (U) Drug Program. The Regiment's drug rehabilitation program was elaborated upon at length in the previous senior officer's debriefing report. Experience at that time remains true as of the moment, with the exception of two new observations which are described below.

a. Use of the Chain of Command. Initially, the tendency in the Regiment was to treat the drug disease outside the chain of command in the mistaken belief that, due to their positions in the chain of command and as part of the "establishment", officers and noncommissioned officers would serve as a deterrent rather than an asset to personnel entering the amnesty program. The flaws in this action soon became apparent. The bulk of leader opposition to the drug culture was ameliorated to one of greater understanding of the culture through some of a comprehensive education program aimed at providing a balance between assistance measures and enforcement of the laws regarding drug abuse. The net effect of this effort was to create a greater degree of understanding and in some case tolerance for and of the drug user. This paved the way for many senior personnel to become more active in assisting personnel previously using or suspected...
of using drugs. Consequently, a greater willingness to turn oneself into the amnesty program developed and grew. The leaders themselves became more interested in providing help and a greater increase in rapport was established. This participation is especially important in the follow-up phases. The procedure is clear and must include the following:

(1) Education of officer and noncommissioned officer leaders must occur.

(2) Proper reporting to the medical facility of suspected and known drug users must occur, up and down the chain of command.

(3) Representatives of the chain of command must demonstrate understanding and compassion to those in need of assistance.

(4) Those who fail to abstain from the use of drugs must be dealt with firmly, fully utilizing all administrative, non-judicial, and judicial tools available.

b. Treatment of Personnel under the Drug Amnesty Policy. Much thought has been given in the Regiment to the manner in which personnel entering under the drug amnesty policy should be handled. Understanding and compassion are obviously two essential factors for all parties—medical, chain of command, or contemporaries used in the rehabilitation program. The question of degree comes into play here. The normal connotation of these terms implies sincerity and a willingness to provide assistance in a genuine and meaningful way. The Regiment has generally followed these guidelines, however, many variations occurred due to the experimentation necessary to determine the most effective solution to the problem. In those cases where there existed a tendency to allow privileges, not normally given a soldier, to an individual on amnesty, the number of successful efforts was reduced. Subsequent to withdrawal, those personnel who were granted special privileges more often than not took advantage of the situation. The psychological difficulties which led these individuals to seek the "out" provided by drugs showed that they do not have the maturity to handle special privileges to begin with. The tendency to abuse these privileges is only a reflection of the human failures which led to drug abuse. What is necessary is compassion, understanding, and a firm hand to encourage, not to further weakness, but to develop strength in the individual. Consideration is essential of the attitude created among the productive men who perform well daily and observe unproductive men who are rewarded for not performing. The gap created here detracts from the overall effort, not to mention the resentment created by other soldiers toward the program. The sham aspect of the program also becomes an attraction to soldiers who have no intention of ceasing the use of drugs, but seek only to escape from their duties.
Annex H (Personnel and Administration)

c. Conclusions:

(1) The chain of command is an inherent and necessary part of a successful drug rehabilitation program, including implementation of an amnesty policy.

(2) The compassion and understanding required to insure proper treatment of individuals entering the drug rehabilitation program is easily exaggerated to a point where it could extend to privileges, which are harmful to the basic aims of the program.

(3) The advisability of permitting reformed addicts/users as lay counselors cannot be determined.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That a Department of the Army developed training program for company grade Army leaders be implemented Army wide. The wide variety of presentations now in use create a degree of variation from unit to unit, which harms rather than helps the amnesty program.

(2) That clear-cut guidelines regarding the handling personnel entering the drug rehabilitation program be published for commanders' use to insure that programs achieve the desired end in the most efficient manner possible, while at the same time retaining the support of those who in the final analysis determine the program's success or failure - the soldier, the noncommissioned officer, and company grade officer.

(3) That sufficient study be devoted to counseling in rehabilitation programs to determine advisability of employing reformed addicts/users.
ANNEX H (PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION)

ORGANIZATION OF PROPOSED REGIMENTAL PERSONNEL OFFICE

CHART IX

PERSONNEL OFFICE

1 OFF  2 EM

PERSONNEL ACTION BRANCH

1 WO  11 EM

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT BRANCH

1 WO  16 EM

PERSONNEL ACTIONS BRANCH

1 WO  26 EM

ADMIN. SUPPORT UNIT

7 EM

MSG CTR

COURIER

REPRODUCTION ORDERS SUPPLIES

* Add 3 EM if awards and decorations are included.
Annex I (Summary of Operations in RVN)

1. (U) On 7 September 1966, the Blackhorse Regiment arrived in Vung Tau, Vietnam. Upon arrival the regiment quickly adapted itself to the war in Vietnam. The 3d Squadron and elements of the 919th Engineer Company were the first units of the regiment to make contact and inflict casualties on the enemy during Operation HICKORY (7 - 15 October 1966) in the vicinity of Phu Hoc. Numerous tunnels and bunkers were destroyed and 215 tons of rice were captured and evacuated to government warehouses. ATLANTA was the code name used during the establishment of the Blackhorse Base Camp located at Long Giao, 10 miles south of Xuan Loc on Route 2. This action commenced on 20 October and was completed by the 3d of November 1967.

2. (U) From January through May 1967, the Blackhorse Regiment conducted three major search destroy operations (now called reconnaissance in force).

a. During Operation CEDAR FALLS, (8 - 24 January 1967) the 1st and 2d Squadrons, operating in the Iron Triangle Region near Ben Cat, demonstrated the regiment's flexibility by combining rapid movement, search and destroy tactics, screening and blocking, and security in attacks on successive objectives.

b. Following Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 1st and 3d Squadrons conducted Operation JUNCTION CITY I and II designed to destroy the headquarters of the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) believed to be located in Binh Duong Province. During the operation lines of communication and fire support bases were secured and extensive search and destroy operations were conducted in conjunction with the 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF).

c. Operation MANHATTAN (23 April - 11 May 1967), was a thrust by the 1st and 2d Squadrons into the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, a long suspected regional headquarters of the VC. The discovery of 60 tunnel complexes, destruction of 1884 fortifications, and the evacuation of 621 tons of rice during this operation attested to the 11th ACR's ability to conduct effective search and destroy operations.

3. (U) In addition to search and destroy operations, the Regiment worked continuously to secure and pacify Long Khanh Province. Operation KITTYHAWK (April 1967 - January 1968) was the name of this mission. Operation KITTYHAWK achieved three significant objectives: Travel on main roads was kept free of VC interference; Significant numbers of Vietnamese were treated in MEDCAP and DENTCAP operations; and, reconnaissance in force operations kept VC forces off balance and unable to conduct significant offensive operations during the period.
Annex I (Summary of Operations in i;VIJ)

a. From July 1967 until December 1967, the 11th ACF participated in several diversified operations which once again demonstrated the Regiment's flexible mobility. Operations EMPORIA I and II (21 July - 14 October 1967) were road clearing and limited search and destroy missions conducted by 1st and 3d Squadrons in Long Khanh Province. The clearing operations denied the VC cover for ambushes and taxation sites, and it cut down on the time required for reaction forces to move the aid of Vietnamese Territorial Forces outposts.

b. Operations VALDOSTA I and II (1 - 6 September, 20 - 24 October 1967) were Regimental size operations involving approximately 3000 men. The mission of both operations was to insure free participation of the local civilian population in the Vietnamese general elections. The Regiment accomplished this mission by protecting polling places, routes to and from polling places, conducting search and destroy missions along routes of VC movement, and maintaining a reaction force to counter any VC initiative. The significance of the operation is evidenced by the fact that 84.7% of the eligible voters in Long Khanh Province cast ballots in the first general election and 78% in the second election.

c. Operation SANTA FE (3 November - 3 December 1967) was a search and destroy operation conducted by the Regiment in the May Too Mountain Area. Three significant results were achieved: A region once thought secure enough for a VC Division Headquarters with two hospitals, the province headquarters and an entire rear service group was denied the enemy; Documents captured at the provincial headquarters exposed the entire VC organization in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces; and the operation produced significant intelligence concerning the area.

d. Operation QUICKSILVER (4 - 21 December 1967) was conducted by the 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 11th ACF as a route security mission for the movement of logistical convoys of the 101st Airborne Division between Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces. In addition to route security, limited cordon and search and reconnaissance in force missions were carried out.

e. From 21 December 1967 to 21 January 1968, the Regiment executed operation FARGO. This was a regimental size reconnaissance in force operation in Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces. The most significant aspect of the operation was the opening of route 13 to military traffic for the first time.

4. (U) Operation ADAIRSVILLE began suddenly on 31 January 1968. The Regimental Headquarters received a call from II Field Force Headquarters to move to Long Binh/Bien Hoa area to relieve installations threatened by the TET Offensive. The 1st Squadron was notified at 1400 hours and moved from south of the Michelin Rubber Plantation to II Field Force Headquarters;
Annex I (Summary of Operations in RVN)

the 2d Squadron moved from north of the Michelin to the III Corps POW Camp; and the 3d Squadron moved from An Loc to III Corps ARVN Headquarters. The Regiment's mobility was proven by the fact that the Blackhorse after a road march of 80 miles was in position to provide support 14 hours after its alert. The TET Counteroffensive was underway.

a. Operation ALCORN COVE (22 March - 9 April 1968) consisted of security missions in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area and in the vicinity of the Blackhorse Base Camp by the 1st and 2d Squadrons. Demonstrating the Regiment's ability to be cross attached, the security operation was combined with a reconnaissance in force operation in coordination with the 18th and 25th ARVN Infantry Division.

b. Operation TOAN THANG (8 - 3 April 1968) was a reconnaissance in force operation and finally a security operation in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area by the Regiment. The operation was conducted with the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions.

c. The enemy increased his activity in Long Khanh Province; however, by the end of 1968, the Regiment was assigned the mission of destroying these enemy forces and interdicting their supply routes. In accomplishing this mission, the 11th ACR fought its way through 115 miles of dense jungle.

d. Later, in 1968, with the enemy again threatening Saigon through the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Complex, the Blackhorse was called back from Long Khanh Province. After two days of fierce fighting, the Regiment had forced the enemy to withdraw, defeated many of its major units, and quelled the threat to this critical area.

5. (U) From the latter part of 1968 and into the first part of 1969, the major portion of the Regiment's attention was directed toward the Cambodian border. In contrast to the Regiment's past operation around Lam Son, the Catcher's Mitt, and the Iron Triangle, the Blackhorse was given the responsibility of destroying the enemy's staging areas.

a. During Operation MONTANA RAILER, in April and May 1969, the Regiment's reconnaissance in force maneuvers were extended into the area northwest of Dau Tieng, south of the Cambodian Fishhook, and around the Minh Thanh Rubber Plantation. The tactic of employing air cavalry with armored cavalry to strike lethal blows against the enemy was instrumental in the Regiment's success.

b. By August 1969, the pressure of the Regiment's operations was beginning to tell and the enemy attempted to stall the progress being made by the Blackhorse by a series of sapper attacks and counter-attacks upon the Regimental Forward CP at Quan Loi and its squadrons along Route 13. The attempt proved costly to the enemy as the Blackhorse reacted quickly.
Annex I (Summary of Operations in RVN)

by throwing back the attackers and inflicting heavy casualties.

c. Keeping the initiative, the Regiment proceeded to interdict the enemy's infiltration routes through War Zone C with a series of land clearing operations. Rome plows protected by the Blackhorse tracks were used to cut extensive swaths through the jungle along Route 246, exposing the enemy's trails to Allied surveillance and interdiction.

d. While land clearing operations were getting under way, armored cavalry units of the Regiment were airlifted to Bu Dop to relieve enemy pressure on a special forces outpost there. This novel insertion of the cavalry was undetectable. It was done to avoid the delays of busting jungle, which would have given the enemy time to ambush the advancing armor or to slip away without contact.

6. (U) By May 1969, the M551 Sheridan, Armored Reconnaissance Airborne Assault Vehicle (AR/AAV) was incorporated into the Armored Cavalry Troops of the Squadrons. On 24 October 1969, the Regiment transferred the Blackhorse Base Camp to the ARVN. This was the first such base camp to be turned over to our Allies in Military Region 3. The Regiment had previously moved its forward CP to Quan Loi in June.

7. (U) From June 1969 to February 1970, the Regiment participated in Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The operation was designed to interdict enemy supply routes and counter his infiltration into Vietnam. The squadrons were deployed from Loc Ninh across War Zone C. Time after time they made contact with the enemy and daily increased his cost in men and equipment. Later, Operation FRESH START during April continued this pressure on the enemy from the Cambodian border to Tay Ninh.

8. (U) At the end of April 1970, the Regiment was given 72 hours to prepare to attack north into the Kingdom of Cambodia on 1 May 1970. At midnight on 1 May, the 2d Squadron followed by 3d Squadron pushed across the border under Operation DONG TINH II. Contact with the NVA was achieved a short time later. After a brief exchange, the Regiment caused the enemy to flee his positions. A link up with the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade, which was inserted earlier, was made. A change in plans resulted as the Regiment was ordered to continue the attack to the city of Smuol in an attempt to block the escape of the fleeing NVA units. When the 2d and 3d Squadrons reached the outskirts of Smuol, a series of contacts lasting five hours were made with a reinforced NVA battalion. After severe losses were sustained by the enemy, the city was secured. Operation TOAN THANG 43 consisted of the finding and destruction of the enemy's bases in the Fishhook area of Cambodia. Enemy activity remained light as the 1st Squadron joined the Regiment in this operation. During June, Rome plows assisted the
Annex I (Summary of Operations in RVN)

Regiment in its operations, which by 28 June, resulted in the capture and destruction of tons of munitions and the evacuation of tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies. The Regiment's role in Cambodia had a major effect in crippling the enemy's capabilities for operations in Military Region 3.

9. (U) Upon completion of the Cambodian operations the Regiment was ordered to assume two AO's east and west of Bien Hoa. The Regimental CP was relocated to Di An and each of the Squadrons took turns in returning to Di An for a maintenance standdown. By September 1970, the Squadrons assumed permanent AO's. The 1st Squadron operated in an AO including portions of Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces; the 2d Squadron operated in Binh Tuy Province under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AN); and the 3d Squadron operated in an AO including portions of Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces, north of Di An. In its new AO's, the Blackhorse initiated an accelerated program of combined operations with Vietnamese Territorial Forces. Combined reconnaissance and security operations provided needed experience and confidence to these territorial forces, who rapidly progressed in their ability to defend the Republic of Vietnam. The Regiment aided the National Police Field Force by securing strong points and population and resources control check points. These operations helped reduce contraband traffic and netted a number of VC suspects.

10. (U) The long range goal of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's Vietnamization efforts has continuously been to develop strong, active and responsive indigenous forces and agencies to cope with the enemy threat. The Regiment's combined operations have been supplemented by a civic action program designed to help the people of Vietnam, thereby enabling them to play an increasingly significant role in the pacification effort. During its stay in Vietnam, the Blackhorse Regiment has been a successful contributor to the establishment of GVN control over large geographical areas of the nation.
Annex J (Installation Coordination)

1. (U) As the senior unit on Di An Army Base, the Regiment was responsible for installation coordination. With the turnover of the base to the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), the Regimental staff was further taxed with the Keystone base transfer process.

2. (U) Throughout the redeployment period, base defense was a critical area. Early in December 1970, USAV inspected the Di An Base Defense. The preparation for that inspection and the correction of those deficiencies found did much to improve the defenses prior to standdown. As a result, when personnel became critically short, the reduction in the total positions manned on the perimeter, done only after a thorough intelligence evaluation, did not seriously reduce the defensive capability of the base. Because no combat unit could be freed to secure the base during the Regiment's standdown, the nightly assemblage of 280 men to man all positions became impossible to muster. During the last three days prior to the VNMC assumption of the Di An base defense, only one-third of the total defensive positions were manned.

3. (U) Internal security of the base camp was equally critical. Just before standdown commenced, the military police company stationed at Di An departed, replaced only by a small detachment of less than twenty MPs. Although it was later augmented by a patrol dog team, the Provost Marshall lacked the necessary assets to adequately patrol the base. Augmentation by troopers from the Regiment was required to provide a valid deterrent to persons attempting to vandalize or strip buildings vacated by departing units.

4. (U) Conclusion: A unit that is standing down and transferring a base camp at the same time cannot adequately secure itself and accomplish its dual mission. The manning of one-third of the defensive perimeter was acceptable only due to the relative security of the Di An area. If the area had more enemy activity, assistance would have been required.

5. (U) Recommendation: That units required to standdown and transfer their base camps simultaneously not be required to secure themselves.
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel Wallace H. Nutting

Col Wallace H. Nutting

5 March 1971

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