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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 7/1 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON  
APO San Francisco 96357

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 7th Squadron,  
1st Air Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS-CS FOR 65)  
(R2)

CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558  
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCD-DST, APO 96375  
CG, 1ST AVN BDE, ATTN: AVBAGC-O, APO 96384  
CO, 164th GP, ATTN: S-3 APO 96215

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

A. The Squadron continued general support of IV Corps Tactical Zone during this reporting period. Task Force Blackhawk supported the 44th Special Tactical Zone with Air Assets and with "Ranger Strike" training teams from Troop D. The Task Force also continued direct support of the 9th ARVN Division with operations concentrated primarily in the Seven Mountains area (V39258) and in the Three Sisters Mountain area (V6029). The FLIR New Equipment Test Team completed their test and evaluation period and departed on 25 August 1970. On 15 September 1970, the 199th BAC was inactivated and the 221st BAC assumed the responsibility of conducting fixed wing reconnaissance for Task Force Blackhawk.

B. (U) The unit organization has changed as shown on inclosure #1 in accordance with the new MTOE as per General Order 231 dated 28 July 1970, effective 21 August 1970. Under the new MTOE the Signal Detachments and TR Detachments have been inactivated. The Troop organization has been revised to absorb the necessary maintenance and avionics personnel.

C. (U) Changes in Command and Staff:

(1) LTC James R. Marrett, 212-46-7096, AR, assumed command of the Squadron from LTC John W. Woodmanson Jr, 311-34-0886, AR, on 15 Oct 70.

(2) CPT Jerry G. Jones, 467-46-1336, AD, assumed duties as Squadron S-1 from CPT Julian T. Marsh, 402-50-2332, IN, on 11 Aug 70.

(3) CPT Thomas A. Smith, 416-46-2117, AR, assumed duties as Squadron S-1 from CPT Jerry G. Jones, 467-46-1336, AD, on 12 Oct 70.

(4) CPT Colin B. Coagrove, 003-20-1014, BA, assumed duties as Squadron S-2 from CPT Gary E. O'Connell, 402-70-4929, IN, on 1 Nov 70.

(5) LT Scott B. Wood, 564-58-3704, AR, assumed duties as Squadron S-4 from CPT William C. McCreary, 217-34-1327, SC, on 7 Sep 70.

GROUP 1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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C. (U) Changes in Command and Staff: (Cont)

(6) MAJ John R. Crist, 404-32-4579, AR, assumed duties as Squadron Maintenance Officer from CPT Larry R. Kolar, 408-64-1672, TC, on 8 Oct 70.

(7) CPT Donald L. Bull, 100-36-5972, AR, assumed duties as Squadron Signal Officer from CPT Colin S. Cosgrove, 003-30-1014, FA, on 2 Oct 70.

(8) CPT Julian T. Marsh, 422-50-2332, IN, assumed command of HQ and HQ Troop from CPT James P. Bracewell, 258-62-3426, AR, on 23 Aug 70.

(9) CPT Gordon W. Tingle, 253-56-5797, AR, assumed command of A Troop from CPT William J. Staffa, 433-70-0856, FA, on 1 Oct 70.

D. (C) (1) Unit Strength as of 31 Oct 70 (Military):

UNIT	OFFICERS ACTR/CH		NO AUTH/CH		EM AUTH/CH		TOTAL ACTR/CH	
HQ&T	24	27	7	15	181	186	212	228
A	23	23	31	24	182	141	231	195
B	18	19	31	24	182	147	231	190
C	18	21	31	25	182	160	231	206
D	5	4	0	0	127	104	152	108
D B/S	15	19	30	24	208	175	253	218
53rd SQ Det	0	0	0	0	8	10	8	10
83rd Sq	1	1	0	0	7	9	8	10
261st Sq	0	0	1	1	8	10	8	11
TOTAL	22	111	131	113	1085	952	1315	1176

D. (U) (2) Unit Strength as of 31 Oct 70 (Civilian)

UNIT	TECH ENTS AUTH/CH		V.S. CIV AUTH/CH		V.N. CIV AUTH/CH		3D BATT ACTR/CH	
HQ&T	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	0
A	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0
B	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0
C	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0
D	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
D B/S	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
53rd SQ Det	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
83rd Sq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
261st Sq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	21	21	0	0

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E. (C) Aircraft Authorized/On hand as of 31 Oct 70.

UNIT	UH-1H AUTH/OH		AH-1G AUTH/OH		OH-6A AUTH/OH		TOTAL AUTH/OH	
	HQHT	7	5	0	0	0	0	7
A	8	8	9	9	10	9	27	26
B	8	7	7	7	10	10	27	26
C	8	7	9	9	10	10	27	26
D 3/S	8	5	9	9	10	9	27	23
TOTAL	39	32	36	36	40	38	115	106

F. (C) Operational Statistics (See Inclosure #2)

G. (U) Squadron Awards and Decorations:

	RECOMMEND	APPROVED	DOWNGRADED	UPGRADED	DISAPPROVED	PEND.
DSC	1	0	0	0	0	1
SS	21	1	0	0	0	25
LTJG	1	1	0	0	0	1
LT	33	18	4*	0	0	36
LTJG	5	3	0	0	0	8
RE/1	13	10	0	0	0	4
RE/2	34	17	0	0	0	19
RE/3	46	23	0	0	0	27
RE/4	103	31	0	0	0	132
RE/5	27	16	0	0	0	113
RE/6	19	22	0	0	0	39
RE/7	142	81	0	0	0	97
RE/8	222	153	0	0	0	75
PH	7	4	0	0	0	7
CM	9	4	0	0	0	26
CM	0	0	0	0	0	3
TOTAL	1,106	636	4	0	0	516

NOTE (\*) 4 DFC's downgraded to RE/1

H. (C) Operations:

(1) The 7/1 Air Cavalry Squadron supported the ground commanders with the valuable and coordinated helicopter maintenance and mobility. In addition to establishing numerous small camps, two major encampments were made with 101st Air Assault Division. The ground cavalry, Troop B, has conducted 10 major convey escort missions of 101st Air Assault Division to various areas throughout the IV Corps area. Troop B has also conducted four "Bomber Strike" advisory training missions with 101st Air Assault Division in the 101st Special Tactical Zone.

NOTE (\*) See section H for "Bomber Strike" missions.

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H. (1) Operations: (Cont)

(2) Troop A supported the 21st ARVN Division on 4 Aug 70. At approximately 1030 hours, the scout team that was conducting the visual reconnaissance received fire (L4412668), and one aircraft was hit. Gunstrikes were conducted in the area that resulted in seven KBA. A total of 106 ARVN troops were inserted.

(3) On 6 Aug 70, Troop A supported the 14th BTZ. An insertion of 36 troops (L39242937) yielded one POW, and a gun strike resulted in three VC KBA. Late in the afternoon a contact (L3639706) was established that resulted in seven KBA.

(4) Troop A supported the 21st ARVN Division on 12 Aug 70. The scouts conducted a visual reconnaissance (N850769) and obtained one KBA. Later the scouts received fire from the same area, and ground troops were inserted. The resulting contact resulted in four more KBA. By the end of the day, seven KBA were credited to Troop A.

(5) Scouts conducted night operations in the "H rough" area of the 14th ARVN Division on 14 Aug 70. Night operations were initiated in the open (L1805011) during the initial hours of the night. After determining that the suspects were still in the area, a contact was initiated in the same area later during the night resulting in four more KBA.

(6) Troop A was assigned to support the 7th ARVN Division on 15 Aug 70. During a visual reconnaissance in the morning, the scouts destroyed a bunker and reported an initial KBA (L3512197). By mid-afternoon the "H rough" was searched with three more KBA (L351719). The troop was given a mission at 1400 hours of assisting the 335th ARVN with gunships. Several aircraft were shot down (L351757) but with no visible results.

(7) ATR conducted a search for a night mission in support of the 9th ARVN Division on 17 Aug 70. The first mission was to conduct a reconnaissance of an area south of Hai Ho (L391141). Twenty troops were spotted and immediately engaged, resulting in four KBA. Black Panthers and Navy SEALs were called for support. The quick response for gun assistance resulted in 11 KBA for the Black Panthers and the Navy SEALs. An ATR searched for the first contact area, but no support was obtained (L391415) and the KBA resulted from the contact.

(8) On 18 Aug 70, Troop A/C conducted operations in the "H rough" area in support of the 14th ARVN. The scouts began work in an area where fresh tracks and tracks had been sighted (L1127). A gun strike was conducted in this area resulting in one KBA. Troops were inserted in the area and four more KBA were credited to the "H rough" area. As the ground troops swept through the area, they killed three VC and returned to the area and the weapons.

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### H. (C) Operations: (Cont)

(9) FLIR provided security for the Vinh Long Army Airfield through operations in Sa Dec and Vinh Long Province on 19 Aug 70. While searching a tree line area (WS972203), eight VC were sighted and engaged, resulting in three KBA. The reconnaissance was continued along the tree line and 10 more VC sighted. The results of this contact were three KBA.

(10) On 21 Aug 70, FLIR supported both the 44th STZ and the Vinh Long Army Airfield with a FLIR aircraft. The FLIR in support of VLAAP sighted six VC along a canal line (WS9523) and engaged resulting in three KBA. In the 44th STZ the second FLIR sighted six VC (XSCh2602) which resulted in three KBA. Another sighting of two personnel was not engaged.

(11) Troop A supported the 7th ARVN Division on 23 Aug 70. The scouts were quickly credited with one KBA (WS949493). A continued search of the area produced no results. The "Apaches" moved to a different area in mid-afternoon (XSCh6272). Several motorized sampans were sighted and engaged in this area by the scouts. Seven sampans and motors destroyed and three VC KIA were the results of this contact.

(12) On 26 Aug 70, Troop A conducted operations for the 44th STZ. A visual reconnaissance was conducted (XSCh2446) in preparation for troop insertions. At 10:00 hours the "Dutchmaster" completed inserting 370 troops. During the 30 minutes the scouts received four (XSCh1951) and cobra strikes in the area resulted in seven KBA. Ground troops were inserted to maintain contact. Later after the troop was released the ground force reported 21 KIA for Troop A, one of which was a VC Company Commander.

(13) During the period from 26 Aug - 2 Sep 70, Troop B conducted the first of several "Younger Strake" advisory training missions, with two AF companies in Bien Hoa Province. The results of the two daylight operations and two night missions were three VC KBA, two VC KIA, one POW, one ARVN KIA, and nine WIA.

(14) Troop B supported the 7th ARVN Division on 29 Aug 70. ARVN ground troops reported making contact (XSCh3113) and the "Comanche" moved to support them. There were cobra strikes in the area throughout the morning resulting in 31 structures destroyed, 16 sampans, and five KBA. The ground troops captured five rifles in the same area. Late in the afternoon contact was again established (XSCh3113) that resulted in three KBA.

(15) On 30 Aug 70, the 7th ARVN Division was supported by Troop B 2/5. During the morning the scouts made contact with nine structures and six sampans destroyed. The scouts conducted a visual reconnaissance during the afternoon (XSCh30259) that resulted in one KBA. One rifle and some documents were also captured. As the trees continued to work the area, cobra strikes and tankers resulted in three KBA. A total of 100 ARVN troops were inserted. The scouts continued to search and report on the air operations and credit for two KBA. The ground troops reported killing 12 VC and capturing two weapons along with various documents.

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### H. (C) Operations: (Cont)

(16) On 31 Aug 70, Troop A supported the 44th STZ with operations in Base Area 470. Shortly after the start of the first visual reconnaissance, the scouts received fire (XS085655), and one of the LOH's was shot down. The pilot and observer were extracted, while the couras covered with gun strikes that resulted in five KBA. Seven insertions of ARVN troops totaling 221 were made in an attempt to block the enemies escape. Two VC were spotted by the scouts (XS013694) at 1530 hours and cobra strikes resulted in one KBA. The ARVN troops were extracted when contact could not be re-established.

(17) On 1 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 supported the 21st ARVN Division (WR3439) and was credited with eight KBA, nine structures, and 13 sampans destroyed. Six insertions were conducted involving 250 troops. Ground troops were credited with 11 KIA and eight captured SKS's.

(18) Troop C supported the 7th ARVN Division on 6 Sep 70. At 0730 hours the scouts spotted an individual hiding in a bunker. The scouts immediately marked the target for the guns to put in rocket strikes. After several strikes, the gunships were credited with two KBA. The scouts and guns were left on station continuously to cap the area, and ground troops were inserted starting at 0930 hours with a total of 345 troops being inserted (WS961579). During the afternoon 240 more troops were inserted (WS938558). The gun strikes continued until 1945 hours. The two battalions and one reconnaissance company stayed on the ground overnight and began a cordon and sweep operation of the area. Total KBA for the combined assets were 61. Ground troop results were seven KIA, two AK-47, one B-40 rocket launcher, one M-60 machine gun, numerous POW's, and 32 bunkers destroyed. The enemy unit engaged was believed to be elements of the 88th NVA regiment.

(19) On 7 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 was working in support of the 21st ARVN Division (WR3439) when elements spotted three individuals with weapons emerging from a treeline. The guns immediately engaged the individuals killing them before they could run back into the treeline. Troops were inserted and established contact which resulted in four KIA and one POW. The enemy unit in contact proved to be a VC finance unit engaged in collecting taxes. Eleven structures and three sampans were also destroyed.

(20) Between the 8th and 12th of Sep, Troop D worked in an advisory capacity with the 28th Lien Doi in Kien Van District of Kien Phong Province. The operation was supported by air elements of the Squadron. Total results were 10 enemy KIA, three KBA, two probable KBA and one POW.

(21) On 9 Sep 70, Troop E was working in support of the 9th ARVN Division, when they established contact with enemy elements. The scouts received fire from enemy personnel in sampans and immediately returned the fire killing nine enemy soldiers and destroying one sampan.

(22) On 9 Sep 70, Troop C supported the 44th STZ. Personnel from Troop D were acting as ground advisors to the ARVN element. Troop C

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### H. (C) Operations: (Cont)

reacted to a Swamp Fox sighting of enemy personnel (WS8553) with cobra strikes and an insertion. The action resulted in two probable KBA for Troop C elements and one KIA and one POW for Troop D elements. A small arms cache was located which contained 20 grenades, one light machine gun and numerous other items. Later in the day at approximately 1200 hours elements spotted five VC and conducted cobra strikes on the area. The ground troops confirmed three KBA and captured one carbine, 20 hand grenades, and numerous small items. Total claims for the day were four KBA, 18 structures and five sampans destroyed.

(23) On 10 Sep 70, Troop A was working in support of the 21st ARVN Division. The troop conducted several visual reconnaissance missions (WR6009) and inserted two ARVN battalions. The scouts were successful in establishing contact, and Troop A received credit for 15 enemy KBA. The "Apaches" also destroyed nine structures and extracted two POW's. The ground troops were credited with 75 KLA.

(24) On 11 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 was working in support of the 7th ARVN Division. The gunships conducted numerous cobra strikes (XS5520). Troop D 3/5 was credited with six KBA, four sampans, and 10 structures destroyed. At 1530 hours the area of operation was shifted (WS9946). The troop continued armed reconnaissance and were credited with five structures and killing four VC. At 1815 hours, Troop D 3/5 began a last light reconnaissance of the Vinh Long Army Airfield Sensitive Zone. Cobra strikes were conducted against enemy bunker positions that resulted in two KBA and two bunkers destroyed. Totals for the day were 13 KBA, 17 structures and nine sampans destroyed.

(25) Troop B supported the 7th ARVN Division starting from Vinh Long, on 15 Sep 70. A visual reconnaissance was performed in connection with the insertion of 30 troops. The ground troops confirmed four KBA as results of Troop B cobra strikes. The ARVN ground force established contact that resulted in four KBA and the capture of eight grenades. In addition, Troop B destroyed 15 structures and one sampan.

(26) On 18 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 conducted operations for the 21st ARVN Division. Numerous cobra strikes were made (WD1768) while performing visual reconnaissance and making insertions. Totals for the day were five KBA, three structures and two sampans destroyed.

(27) On 19 Sep 70, Troop D was supporting the 9th ARVN Division, starting from Chi Lang and moving in the vicinity of Bul Chu Mountain. Several times during the day ground troops made contact and were supported with gunships. Troop D was credited with six KBA.

(28) On 20 Sep 70, Troop D was working in support of the 21st ARVN Division in the Chi Lang region. The troop worked in coordination with 7th ARVN gunships conducting cobra strikes to support the elements as they searched the

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H. (C) Operations: (Cont)

flooded rice fields. Troop B was credited with five KBA, five structures, and two sampans destroyed.

(29) On 20 Sep 70, Troop C supported the 9th ARVN Division at Chi Lang with operations in the Seven Mountains area. The gunships supported ground troops in contact with cobra strikes and were credited with 14 KBA.

(30) On 21 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 supported the 21st ARVN Division with six KBA, eight structures, and five sampans destroyed.

(31) On 5 Oct 70, Task Force Blackhawk supported the 9th ARVN Division by airlifting two battalions onto Nui Gia (V39257). This operation was the second major operation by the 9th ARVN Division in the Seven Mountains area. Although the airlift was delayed for several hours due to weather, the Squadron Commander, LTC John W. Woodmansee Jr. skillfully conducted and executed the entire air assault in a highly professional manner. The operation began with the arrival of 10 slicks from Troop A and the 175th AHC at the pick-up zone and a simultaneous prep of the landing zones by gunships from Troop A. Immediately following the gunship prep CS cannisters were dropped downwind from the landing zones. By this time the 10 slicks with troops were airborne awaiting the insertion into the first of the two-ship landing zones. The first insertion was preceded by a smoke-ship to screen the landing zone while gunships from Troop D 3/5 escorted the slicks and provided suppressive fire. The second company of troops was inserted into landing zone two. The third and fourth companies were inserted into landing zone one and two respectively. After completing the airlift of the first battalion. The slicks were refueled and the second battalion was systematically inserted into landing zone three. With two battalions now on Nui Gia, the 9th ARVN Division had a strong foothold from which to continue their operation of securing the mountain.

(32) On 6 Oct 70, Troop D 3/5 supported the 7th ARVN Division and established contact (XSH925) with the enemy throughout the day. The gunships and scouts were credited with six KBA and 15 structures.

(33) Operations in support of the 21st ARVN Division on 7 Oct 70 provided five KBA for Troop A. While conducting a visual reconnaissance, the scouts began to receive fire (V2956206). Cobra strikes were made in the area, and ground troops immediately moved into the contact area. The ARVN ground forces captured one M-16, one AK-47, one M-60, grenades, claymore mines, and killed five enemy.

(34) During the period 13-15 Oct 70, Troop D escorted vehicles of the 120th Transportation Co. from Binh Thuy to the cement plant for resupply. While returning to Binh Thuy on 15 Oct a truck was destroyed by a command detonated mine (V374133). There were no injuries and the convey continued without further incident.

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H. (C) Operations: (Cont)

(35) Troop D 3/5 conducted operations in Vinh Long Province on 25 Oct 70 in support of the 9th ARVN Division. Contact with the enemy was established several times during the day (Xk1128). A total of 168 ARVN troops were inserted and five KBA's were credited to Troop D 3/5.

(36) On 28 Oct 70, Troop C was scrambled for a mission to support ARVN troops in contact (33931300). The quick reaction time resulted in five enemy KBA and eight sampans for the "Comanches".

(37) A total of 72 operational days comprised this reporting period.

I. (C) Airfield Defense Activities.

(1) During the reporting period, the airfield did not receive any indirect or direct fire attacks. Ambushes were provided in the airfield sensitive zone by troop B, and listening posts were provided by the air cavalry troops. There was no significant activity in the Vinh Long Army Airfield Sensitive Zone.

(2) The Defense Commander is the airfield defense coordinator. Under his direction, the airfield defense plan was rewritten. The highlight of the new plan is: (a) Each of the three battalion size units have one-third of the responsibility of controlling, coordinating, and physically maintaining it.

(b) A forty-man reaction force is organized in each battalion size unit to form a 120-man force under the control of the airfield defense coordinator.

(3) Maintenance and repair of the bunkers, towers, and facility positions are still in progress. Due to the lack of material (the 40-man unit (main) maintenance force is only 20 strong). The possibility of some rubble being incorporated into the perimeter has been considered. At this time, assistance can be requested from the 13-2 for the design and implementation of this plan.

4. (C) Summary

The reporting period was a very active period for the airfield. The enemy was active in the area of the airfield during the period. The airfield defense plan was rewritten. The highlight of the new plan is: (a) Each of the three battalion size units have one-third of the responsibility of controlling, coordinating, and physically maintaining it. (b) A forty-man reaction force is organized in each battalion size unit to form a 120-man force under the control of the airfield defense coordinator. (c) Maintenance and repair of the bunkers, towers, and facility positions are still in progress. Due to the lack of material (the 40-man unit (main) maintenance force is only 20 strong). The possibility of some rubble being incorporated into the perimeter has been considered. At this time, assistance can be requested from the 13-2 for the design and implementation of this plan.

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2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander Observations, evaluations, and Recommendations:

A. (U) Personnel: None

B. (U) Intelligence: None

C. (U) Operations:

(1) Observation: Pink teams, one cobra and one OH-6A, can be employed with air boats to effectively increase operational results.

(2) Evaluation: During the southwestern monsoon season, the use of pink teams and air boats has proven to be an ideal relationship. The mobility and firepower of the air boats coupled with visual reconnaissance by the OH-6A helicopter provide for the rapid development of an enemy contact.

(3) Recommendation: When utilizing the pink team and air boat combination the following concept of operation has been quite effective. The OH-6A is utilized as a command and control platform and provides a visual reconnaissance capability to exploit enemy contacts. Five to ten air boats are used to rapidly recon the area by ground. On making contact, the OH-6A is used to direct the air boats into the enemies weaker areas and point out the strong points for gunship strikes. When the cobra is in position for gun strikes, the air boats can quickly withdraw to a safe distance while still engaging the enemy with the 50 cal. machinegun on each air boat. Added firepower can be brought in from other pink team and air boat operations, if the situation warrants it.

(4) Command Action: This Squadron continues to encourage the ground commanders that have air boat assets available to utilize them with the pink team combination. The economy of force concept made available by aviation assets is increased even more by the use of air boats.

D. (U) Organization: None

E. (U) Training:

(1) Observation: The use of "Ranger Strike" advisory training teams can greatly enhance the morale and operational results of AAVN units.

(2) Evaluation: The results of Training AAVN units in methods of daylight operations and night ambush techniques have proven quite fruitful. The "Ranger Strike" teams are designed to provide the AAVN troops with an advanced working knowledge of ground operations and air cavalry tactics. The results of these operations as described in section III (13 and 20) readily indicate the value of this training.

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(3) Recommendations: To improve the working relationship between ARVN units and supporting aviation elements, the following advisory training program has been adopted in the Squadron. The operation is based on a five day period utilizing two daylight teams and two night operations teams. Each daylight team is composed of approximately 36 ARVN troops, two U.S. personnel, and one interpreter. The night teams each consist of 20 ARVN troops, two to four U.S. personnel, and one interpreter.

a. The first day, classes are conducted in daylight patrolling, night ambushes, aircraft safety, air support, intelligence gathering, and the use of specific targets for the next day's operations.

b. The second day's operations consist of employing the instructions received on the first day. Intelligence gathered during the day operations is used to plan the night operation. As the daylight teams are extracted, the night teams are inserted for ambushes in the same area.

c. On the third day of operation, the night teams are extracted and a critique of the operation is held. The rest of the day is spent preparing for the next day's operation.

d. The fourth day of operation is conducted the same as day two.

e. On the fifth day, the night ambush is extracted and a critique is held.

(4) Summary Action: The Squadron has conducted four "Ranger Strike" training missions with units from the 11th Special Tactical Zone during this reporting period. Several more training missions will be conducted in the coming months.

### (F) (B) Logistics:

(1) Observation: When constructing or rebuilding airfields, special consideration should be given to the FOL and ammunition storage areas to insure that these areas are built-up enough to prevent flooding during the southwestern monsoon season.

(2) Evaluation: Due to the extremely heavy rains during the past two months, flood losses and damages to FOL and ammunition have cost the South of millions. These losses could have been reduced to a minimum and possibly eliminated had these storage areas been properly evaluated when planned and constructed.

### (3) Recommendations:


To minimize future flood losses, construction of sufficient height and surface areas should be restricted for all air and ammunition storage at each airfield. The cost of constructing storage areas will easily be offset by the reduction in losses in future years.

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(4) Command action: This Squadron has taken steps to minimize flood damage at stagefields controlled by the 7/1 Air Cavalry Squadron by moving ammunition and POL to areas on the stagefield that are least effected by the water. However, construction of berm areas is necessary to prevent future damage.

G. (U) Communications: None

2 ENCL

  
JAMES D. MURRETT  
LTC, AR  
Commanding

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AVBACE-C (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry,  
for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS-CSFOR 65) (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 164th Combat Aviation Group, APO San Francisco 96215 23 Nov 70.

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSFOR, Washington, D.C., 20310  
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC-O APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry ORLL for period ending 31 October 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.
2. (U) The following comments are made on the report:
  - a. Para 2 A-E, G, Concur with comments.
  - b. Para 2 F. Surveys will be conducted of the POL and ammunition storage areas as soon as the water recedes from the affected stagefields to determine the effort required to properly protect our assets from flood damage. Necessary logistical support for the required construction will be requested through appropriate Engineer channels.

  
LEO E. [unclear]  
Colonel, CF  
Commanding

AVBAGC-O (15 Nov 70) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 1st Air  
Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS - CSFOR 65) (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 15 DEC 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific Command, ATTN: GFOP-DT,  
APO 96558

(U) This Headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents  
as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
GENE R. WILLIAMS  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

AVHDO-DO (Undated) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 7th Squadron,  
1st Air Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS-CS FOR 65)  
(R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 2 4 FEB 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.  
Captain AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Avn Bde  
7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

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GPOP-DT (undtd) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period  
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
D.E. Olline  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG



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7/1 LOSS OPERATIONAL IN THE  
 (CLASSIFIED BY 30 0018B) (1976 73)

DATE START	STARTING LEVEL	OPERATIONAL LEVEL										
Host	2,672	-	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A Trp	3,511	10,410	37	66	-	-	394	178	6	12	-	-
B Trp	22,394	9,546	44	67	2	-	277	210	6	15	-	-
C Trp	13,573	12,474	115	136	43	10	423	249	5	17	-	-
D 7/1	-	-	-	-	27	4	-	4	-	-	-	-
D 3/5	7,310	13,113	06	124	-	13	323	101	8	13	-	-
TOTAL	44,886	45,553	273	415	72	27	1,417	673	26	61	-	-

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Host Aircraft Loss: (1) UH-1H Aircraft Damaged: None  
 A Trp Aircraft Loss: (5) OH-6A Aircraft Damaged: (6) AH-1B; (6) OH-6A; (7) UH-1H  
 B Trp Aircraft Loss: (1) AH-1G; (1) OH-6A; (1) UH-1H; Aircraft Damaged: (2) AH-1B; (2) OH-6A; (5) UH-1H  
 C Trp Aircraft Loss: (1) AH-1G; (1) OH-6A; (3) UH-1H; Aircraft Damaged: (5) AH-1B; (5) OH-6A; (7) UH-1H  
 D 3/5 Aircraft Loss: (3) AH-1G; (2) OH-6A; (3) UH-1H; Aircraft Damaged: (1) AH-1B; (1) OH-6A; (1) UH-1H

Inclusive '2

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