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<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 1 Jun 1971. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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AGDA-A (H) (28 Apr 71) FOR OT UT 704072
1 June 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th
Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in
accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure
that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit
of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training
material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation
should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS-CS FOR 65) (R2)

CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GJOP-DT, APO 96558
CG, USAFV, ATTN: AWHC-DST, APO 96375
CD, 25th AVN BDE, ATTN: AVELSC-0, APO 96384
CG, 16th CP, ATTN: S-3 APO 96215

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

A. The Squadron continued general support of IV Corps Tactical Zone during this reporting period. Task Force Blackhawk supported the 9th Special Tactical Zone with Air Assets and with "Ranger Strike" training teams from Troop D. The Task Force also continued direct support of the 9th NVA Division with operations concentrated primarily in the Seven Mountain area (Q3225B) and in the Three Sisters Mountain area (Q5029). The FLIR New Equipment Test Force completed their test and evaluation period and departed on 29 August 1970. On 14 September 1970, the 199th TAC was inactivated and the 142nd TAC assumed the responsibility of conducting fixed wing reconnaissance for Task Force Blackhawk.

B. (G) The unit organization has changed as shown on enclosure #1 in accordance with the new NTOE as per General Order 231 dated 28 July 1970, effective 25 August 1970. Under the new NTOE the Signal Detachments and 17th Detachments have been inactivated. The Troop organization has been revised to reduce the necessary maintenance and avionic personnel.

C. (U) Changes in Command and Staff:

(1) Capt James A. Butts, 00-46-7964, W, assumed command of the Squadron from LTC John W. Goodisman, Jr., 311-21-0906, W, on 15 Oct 70.

(2) Capt Jerry H. Jones, 147-46-1836, W, assumed duties as Squadron S-1 from Capt Julian T. Wiliams, 100-50-3320, W, on 15 Aug 70.


(5) Capt Scott J. Hess, 00-55-2200, W, assumed duties as Squadron S-1 from Capt William E. Beckett, 017-43-1327, W, on 7 Sep 70.

GROUP II

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD IN 5200.10
C. (6) Changes in Command and Staff (Cont):


(7) Capt. Donald L. Bell, 100-36-5972, AR, assumed duties as Squadron Signal Officer from Capt. Collin E. Congrove, 200-30-1014, PA, on 2 Oct 70.


L. (C) (1) Unit Strength as of 31 Oct 70 (Military):

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B. (C) (2) Unit Strength as of 31 Oct 70 (Civilian):

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## E. (C) Aircraft Authorized: As of 31 Oct 70.

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## F. (C) Operational Statistics (See Enclosure #2)

## G. (D) Squadron Awards and Decorations:

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<td><strong>17</strong></td>
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Note: (*) 4 2420 TACAMS 1st MIGJ

## H. (C) Operations:

1. The 7/8 Airmobile Detachment supported the 1st Brigade and was primarily involved in airlift missions. In addition to providing airlift support, the detachment also conducted supply missions with the 3rd Brigade. The detachment conducted supply missions on a regular basis throughout the month of November. The detachment, supported by the 707th Detachment, continued its airlift missions.

Note: see attachment for "Airmobile Detachment" mission.

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II. (2) Operations (Cont.)

(2) Troop A supported the 21st AAT Division on 1 Aug 70. At approximately 1030 hours, the scout team that was conducting the visual reconnaissance received fire (XUL2909), and the aircraft was hit. Gunners were contacted in the area that resulted in seven KIA. A total of 186 AATs were expended.

(3) On 4 Aug 70, Troop A supported the 11th AAT. An insertion of 27trp at (3100597) yielded two F-11B 250's and a CP strike of F-94's resulted in three VC KIA. Later that night, a second fire from the same area, but another trp was inserted. The result of the second resulted in four more KIA. By the end of the day, over 206 were expended. Trp A.

(4) Troop A supported the 21st AAT Division on 12 Aug 70. The unit received a visual reconnaissance (YUL2909) and established one KIA. Later that night, a second fire from the same area, but another trp was inserted. The result of this attack resulted in four more KIA. By the end of the day, over 206 were expended. Trp A.

(5) A CP attack against positions at the "Ma Co" area of the 11th AAT Division on 31 Aug 70 resulted in over 206 expended. Trp A.

(6) After a nine days' operation at the "Ma Co" area, the aircraft destroyed a truck and five men in a jeep for an area (XUL2909). On 14 Aug 70, in the "Ma Co" area, a second strike resulted in two more KIA (XUL2909). The CP was given a mission at 1800 hours of supporting the 39th AAT Division, several CPs were dropped, with a total of 1,136 expended.

(7) After a nine day period for a light attack in support of the 21st AAT Division on 15 Aug 70. The first attack was to destroy a CP position at 1600 hours of the 21st AAT (YUL2909). Trp A was up to 10 knots and moved to a new position, resulting in five KIA. Black 2 was approached by the CP and was destroyed with a truck and two men. The final assault on the CP resulted in a strike for the 21st AAT (YUL2909). The first attack was at 1100 hours of the 21st AAT (YUL2909) and three CPs were dropped, with a total of 1,136 expended.

(8) On 13 Aug 70, Troop A's first attack was against the CP (2100597), in support of the 39th AAT. The CP was located in an area of fresh bunker and trucked (2100597). A CP was dropped, but it was not contacted. Trp A was up to 10 knots in the area and four CPs were dropped to the CP (2100597). The final assault on the CP resulted in the CP being destroyed, with the truck and ten men. To support the CP, another ten trp were inserted in the "Ma Co" area, the CP was destroyed, and the trp were inserted.
H. (C) Operations: (cont)

(9) FLIR provided security for the Vinh Long Army Airfield through operations in 36 boxes on Vinh Long province on 19 Aug 70. While searching a treeline area (48.972603), eight VC were sighted and engaged, resulting in three KIA. The reconnaissance was continued along the treeline to 10 more VC sighted. The results of this combat were three KIA.

(10) On 21 Aug 70, FLIR supported both the 14th STZ and the Vinh Long Army Airfield with a FLIR aircraft. The FLIR in support of 14th STZ sighted six VC along a rural line (48.9521) and engaged, resulting in three KIA. In the 14th STZ the second FLIR sighted six VC (39.812626) which resulted in three KIA. Another sighting of two personnel was not engaged.

(11) Troop A supported the 7th Army Division on 23 Aug 70. The results were quickly verified with nine KIA (48.965293). A continued search of the area produced results. The "spectrum" moved to a different area in northern Vinh Long (48.962622). Several unauthorized enemy were sighted and engaged in thin line by the scouts. Seven enemy men, mortars destroyed and three VC KIA. Other sightings of two personnel was not engaged.

(12) On 25 Aug 70, Troop A supported the 14th STZ Division in 39 line of action for the move by the 14th STZ Division (48.9612) in preparation for troop insertion. At 2300, "T" X-Ray and the "Upholder," complete inserting 1430 troops, resulted in the results of securing 1020 (48.9611) and a base strike in the area resulted in seven KIA. Other enemy were inserted to maintain contact. Later after the troops were secure, the ground forces reported 21 more KIA for Troop A, one WIA and a 23 KIA Company commander.

(13) During the period from 28 Aug 70 to 2 Sep 70, Troop D converted to the 14th Army Division (39 Line of Action). Enemy training missions with the 14th Army Division and the 14th Army Division (39 Line of Action) were undertaken. All activities were sighted by the 14th Army Division and the 14th Army Division (39 Line of Action). The ground forces reported 1140 in the same area. Later in the afternoon, a contact was made involving 1430 KIA (48.9612) that resulted in the KIA.

(14) On 21 Sep 70, the 7th Army Division was engaged by Troop A on 21 Sep 70. The original mission was against the treeline (48.939269) that resulted in KIA. The results of contact were 21 KIA in the same area. The enemy was engaged by the 7th Army Division. The enemy was engaged by the 7th Army Division. The enemy was engaged by the 7th Army Division.

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(16) On 31 Aug 70, Troop A supported the 44th STZ with operations in Base area 170. Shortly after the start of the first visual reconnaissance, the scouts received fire (KSO85855), and one of the LCH's was shot down. The pilot and observer were extracted, while the escorts covered with gun strikes that resulted in five KIA. Seven insertions of ARVN troops totaling 221 were made in an attempt to block the enemy escape. Two VC were spotted by the scouts (KSO13623) at 1530 hours and cobra strikes resulted in one KIA. The ARVN troops were extracted when contact could not be re-established.

(17) On 1 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 supported the 21st ARVN Division (KSO1339) and was credited with eight KIA, nine structures, and 13 sampans destroyed. Six insertions were conducted involving 250 troops. Ground troops were credited with 11 KIA and eight captured SKS's.

(18) Troop C supported the 7th ARVN Division on 6 Sep 70. At 0730 hours the scouts spotted an individual hiding in a bunker. The scouts immediately marked the target for the guns to put in rocket strikes. After several strikes, the machine guns hit and killed two KIA. The scouts and guns were left on station continuously to cover the area, and ground troops were inserted starting at 0930 hours with a total of 329 troops being inserted (KSO94179). During the afternoon 280 more troops were inserted (KSO93895). The gun strikes continued until 1200 hours. The two battalions and one reconnaissance company set up on the ground overnight and began a search and sweep operation of the area. Total KIA for the combined units were 61, ground troop results were seven KIA, two SA48, one DO-18 rocket launcher, one 1-60 machine gun, numerous PDAs, and 32 sampans destroyed. The enemy unit engaged was believed to be elements of the 7th NVA regiment.

(19) On 7 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 was working in support of the 21st ARVN Division (KSO1339) when elements spotted three individuals with weapons coming from a trailhead. The guns immediately engaged the individuals killing them before they could run back into the trailhead. Troops were inserted and established contact which resulted in four KIA and one PPA. The enemy unit in contact proved to be a VC firing unit armed in collective tactics. Eleven structures and three sampans were also destroyed.

(20) Between the 9th and 12th of Sep, Troop D worked in an advisory capacity with the 20th War Doi in Khan Than District of Khan Pho Province. The operation was supported by air cavalry elements of the Squadron. Total results were 10 enemy KIA, three KIA, two probable KIA and four PDAs.

(21) On 9 Sep 70, Troop C was working in support of the 7th ARVN Division, when they established contact with enemy elements. The scouts received fire from a heavy personnel in advance and immediately returned the fire killing nine enemy soldiers and destroying the bunker.

(22) On 9 Sep 70, Troop C supported the 44th STZ. Personnel from Troop C were acting as ground advisors to the ARVN element. Troop C

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H. (C) Operations: (Cont)

reacted to a Swap Fox sighting of enemy personnel (M88553) with cobra strikes and an insertion. The action resulted in two probable KIA for Troop C elements and one KIA and one WIA for Troop D elements. A small arms cache was located which contained 20 grenades, one light machine gun and numerous other items. Later in the day at approximately 1200 hours elements spotted five VC and conducted cobra strikes on the area. The ground troops confirmed three KIA and captured one turbine, 20 hand grenades, and numerous small items. Total claims for the day were four KIA, 15 structures and five sampans destroyed.

(21) On 10 Sep 70, Troop A was working in support of the 21st ACR division. The troop conducted several visual reconnaissance missions (M89889) and inserted two 481 helicopters. The scouts were successful in establishing contact, and Troop A received credit for 15 enemy KIA. The "Apache" also destroyed nine structures and extracted two POWs. The ground troops were credited with 75 KIA.

(22) On 11 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 was working in support of the 7th ACR division. The mission conducted numerous cobra strikes (M88520). Troop D 3/5 was credited with six KIA, four WIA, and 10 structures destroyed. At 1500 hours, the area of operation was shifted (M89916). The troops conducted several rescue missions and were credited with five structures and killing four VC. At 1915 hours, Troop D 3/5 began a last light reconnaissance of the Van Long Army Airfield Sensitive Zone. Cobra strikes were conducted against enemy bunker positions that resulted in two KIA and two bunkers destroyed. Totals for the day were 14 KIA, 17 structures and nine sampans destroyed.

(23) Troop B supported the 7th ACR Division starting from Van Long, on 11 Sep 70. A visual reconnaissance was performed in connection with the insertion of the troops. The ground troops confirmed four KIA as results of Troop B cobra strikes. The 481 scout force established contact that resulted in four KIA and the capture of eight prisoners. In addition, Troop B deployed 15 structures and an aircrnan.

(24) On 12 Sep 70, Troop B conducted operations for the 21st ACR division, conducting several strikes and an insertion (M88190) with performing several medevacs and inserting elements. Totals for the day were five KIA, ten structures and two prisoners destroyed.

(25) On 13 Sep 70, Troop C supporting the 21st ACR Division, started from Ch Con and operated in the vicinity of Dai Con. During the day, the ground troops conducted two strikes and one medevac and one insertion. Troop C was credited with six KIA.

(26) On 20 Sep 70, Troop D was working in support of the 21st ACR in the Van Long area. The troops were in coordination with Troop B and inserted in a most successful manner. The insertion of troops was executed.
OPERATIONS

(29) On 20 Sep 70, Troop C supported the 9th ACR Division at Chi Lang, with operations in the Seven Mountains area. The gunships supported ground troops in contact with enemy strikes and were credited with 11 KIA.

(30) On 21 Sep 70, Troop D 3/5 supported the 21st ACR Division with six KiA, 8 structures, and five surgical destroyed.

(31) On 5 Oct 70, Task Force Blackhawk supported the 9th ACR Division by airlifting two battalions onto Hau Gia (2610
26). This operation was the second major operation by the 21st ACR Division in the Seven Mountains area. Although the airlift was delayed for several hours due to weather, the Squadron Commander, LCO John E. Woodmansee Jr., skillfully conducted the entire air assault in a highly professional manner. The operation began with the arrival of 10 slicks from Troop A and the 175th AAC at the pick-up zone and a simultaneous lift of the landing zones by gunships from Troop A. Immediately following the gunship prop 33 canisters were dropped downstream from the landing zone. By this time the 10 slicks with troops were airborne awaiting the insertion into the first of the two-ship landing zones. The first insertion was preceded by a smoke ship to screen the landing zone while canisters from Troop A 3/5 and the slicks provided suppressive fire. The second company of troops was inserted into landing zone two. The third and fourth companies were inserted into landing zones one and two respectively, after completing the airlift of the first battalion. The slicks were refueled and the second battalion was systematically inserted into landing zone three. With the battalions near on Sun day, the 9th ACR Division had a strong foothold from which to continue their operation of securing the mountain.

(32) On 6 Oct 70, Troop 3 3/5 supported the 7th ACR Division and established contact (438/25) with the enemy throughout the day. The gunships and canisters were credited with six KiA and 16 structures.

(33) Operations in support of the 21st ACR division on 7 Oct
70 provided five KiA for Troop A, 3/5. Conducting a visual reconnaissance, the canisters began to receive fire (220/404). Several slicks were shot in the area, and ground troops immediately moved to the contact area. The ACR gunships engaged in close air support in Z-18, the 3-37, the 2-50, 60mm, claymore, and 1,250 rounds were fired.

(34) During the period 13-15 Oct 70, Troop D escorted vehicles of the 19th Transportation Co. from Chi Lang to the depot south for resupply. While returning to Chi Lang on 15 Oct, a truck was destroyed by a pre-arranged demolition mine (257/34). There were no injuries and the convoy continued without further incident.
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H. (G) Operations (Cont)

(35) On 17 Jul, conducted operations in Vinh Long Province on 24 Oct 70 in support of the 27th ARVN Division. Contact with the enemy was established several times during the day (Nov 38). A total of 76 ARVN troops were inserted and five KA-130s were credited to Troop D 3/6.

(36) On 23 Oct 70, Troop D was scrambled for a mission to support ARVN troops in contact (Nov 3906). The quick reaction time resulted in five enemy KIA and eight weapons for the "Company".

(37) A total of 52 operational flights comprised this reporting period.

1. (D) Aircrft and Base Activity.

(1) During the reporting period, the airfield did not receive any direct or indirect fire attacks. Ammunition was provided in the airfield via two new aircraft, and two nine-prass were provided by the air cavalry task force. Here we note significant activity in the Vinh Long ARVN airfield command, 25 Oct.

(2) The bounce, now up, in the airfield, is a constant, threat of the enemy. One plane was picked up by each of the three helicopters, one was observed. The task force of the airfield was placed under the responsibility of controlling, coordinating, and maintaining it.

(3) A forty-man reaction force is organized in the airfield. The unit is the 100-man force under the control of the airfield command center.

(4) The maintenance of the bounce, bomber, antiaircraft, and fighter planes is day-to-day. The total loss of four machines was primarily a matter of personnel and three off-duty men. One personnel was observed in the airfield. One machine was destroyed by an unknown means and one was destroyed by an unknown means.

(5) The main problem is the airfield. The bounce, bomber, antiaircraft, and fighter planes are maintained. The total loss of four machines was primarily a matter of personnel and three off-duty men. One personnel was observed in the airfield.
2. (2) Lessons Learned: Commander Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

A. (1) Personnel: None
B. (2) Intelligence: None
C. (3) Operations:

(1) Observation: Pink team, one cobra and one OH-6A, can be employed with air boats to effectively increase operational results.

(2) Evaluation: During the southern storm season, the use of pink team and air boats has proven to be an ideal relationship. The mobility and firepower of the air boats coupled with visual reconnaissance by the OH-6A helicopter provide for the rapid development of an enemy contact.

(3) Recommendation: When utilizing the pink team and air boat combination the following concept of operation has been quite effective. The OH-6A is utilized as a command and control platform and provides a visual reconnaissance capability to exploit enemy contacts. Two to ten air boats are used to rapidly recon the area by ground. On making contact, the OH-6A is used to direct the air boats into the enemy's inner areas and point out the strong points for airship strike. When the enemy is in position for an strike, the air boats can quickly withdraw to a safe distance while still providing the enemy with the 50 cal. machinegun on each air boat. Armed by this firepower can be brought in from other pink team and air boats operations, if the situation warrants it.

(4) Command Action: This Squadron continues to encourage the ground commanders that have air boat units available to utilize them with the pink team combination. The economy of force concept made available by aviation assets is increased even more by the use of air boats.

D. (4) Organization: None
E. (5) Training:

(1) Observation: The use of "gunner drill" advisory training teams can greatly enhance the search and operational results of AVS units.

(2) Evaluation: The results of training such units in methods of duplicative operations and night ground training have proven quite fruitful. The "gunner drill" teams are planned to provide the AVS teams with an advanced weapon fund in ground operations and in cavalry tactics. The results of training such teams in night ground (5) and ICQ (6) usually indicate the value of this training.
(1) Recommendations: To improve the working relationship between ARVN units and supporting aviation elements, the following advisory training program has been adopted in the Squadron. The operation is based on a five day period utilizing two daylight teams and two night operations teams. Each daylight team is composed of approximately 35 ARVN troops, two U.S. personnel, and one interpreter. The night teams each consist of 20 ARVN troops, two U.S. personnel, and one interpreter.

a. The first day, classes are conducted in daylight patrolling, night ambushes, aircraft safety, air support, intelligence gathering, and the use of specific targets for the next day's operations.

b. The second day's operations consist of employing the instructions received on the first day. Intelligence gathered during the day operations is used to plan the night operation. As the daylight teams are extracted, the night teams are inserted for ambushes in the same area.

c. On the third day of operation, the night teams are extracted, and a critique of the operation is held. The rest of the day is spent preparing for the next day's operation.

d. The fourth day of operation is conducted the same as day two.

e. On the fifth day, the night ambush is extracted and a critique is held.

(2) Lessons learned: The Squadron has conducted four "Ranger Strike" training missions with units from the 16th Special Tactical Zone during this reporting period. Several new training missions will be conducted in the coming months.

(3) Logistics:

(1) Observations: When constructing or rebuilding airfields, special consideration should be given to the FOB and ammunition storage area to be sure that these areas are built-up enough to prevent flooding during the rainy season.

(2) Evaluations: Due to the extremely heavy rains during the past two months, field roads and damnages to the FOB and ammunition have been the result of flooding. These dams could have been pager to a minimum, and could have eliminated had they not been properly evaluated and planned out in advance.

(3) Recommendations:

To minimize future flooding, more use of sufficient height and surface area will be constructed for all new airfields or for expansion of existing airfields. The cost of constructing a levee is usually offset by the reduction in necessary maintenance costs.
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(h) Command action: This Squadron has taken steps to minimize flood damage at stagefields controlled by the 7/1 Air Cavalry Squadron by moving ammunition and POL to areas on the stagefield that are least affected by the water. However, construction of berm areas is necessary to prevent future damage.

G. (U) Communications: None

2 DICO

JAMES D. MERRITT
LTC, AR
Commanding
AVBACE-C (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS-CSFOR 65) (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 164th Combat Aviation Group, APO San Francisco 96315 23 Nov 70.

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSFOR, Washington, D.C., 20310
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC-O APO 96384

1. (U) The attached 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry ORLL for period ending 31 October 1970 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The following comments are made on the report:

   a. Para 2 A-E, G, concur with comments.

   b. Para 2 F. Surveys will be conducted of the POL and ammunition storage areas as soon as the water recedes from the affected staging areas to determine the effort required to properly protect our assets from flood damage. Necessary logistical support for the required construction will be requested through appropriate Engineer channels.

   [Signature]

   LEO E. [Name]
   Colonel, CT
   Commanding

Best Available Copy
AVBGC-0 (15 Nov 70) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 1st Air
Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS - CSFOR 65) (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 15 DEC 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific Command, ATTN: GFUP-DT,
APO 96558

(U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents
as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
GENE R. WILLIAMS
CPT, AGC
Aset AG

Best Available Copy
AVHDO-DO (Undated) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: (U) Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, for the Period Ending 31 Oct 70 (RCS-CS FOR 65) (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 2 4 FEB 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry and concurs with comments of indicting headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Turrn:
1st Avn Bde
7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

Best Available Copy
GPOP-DT (undtd) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.E.

1LT, AGC
Asst AG
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AirTarget Loss: (1) CH-13; Aircraft Damaged: (2) CH-13; (3) HR-1B

A.T. Aircraft Loss: (6) CH-1A; Aircraft Damaged: (6) HR-1B; (6) CH-6A; (7) HR-1B

B.T. Aircraft Loss: (1) CH-1A; (2) CH-6A; (7) HR-1B; Aircraft Damaged: (5) CH-1B; (5) CH-6A; (5) CH-1B

C.T. Aircraft Loss: (1) CH-1A; (2) CH-6A; (3) HR-1B; Aircraft Damaged: (5) CH-1B; (5) CH-6A; (7) CH-1B

G.T. Aircraft Loss: (3) CH-1A; (2) CH-6A; (3) HR-1B; Aircraft Damaged: (1) CH-1B; (11) CH-6A; (1) CH-1B

Includes 9C
**OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED**

HQ, 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry

**EXPERIENCES OF UNIT ENGAGED IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, 1 AUG TO 31 OCT 70**

**CO, 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry**

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**ABSTRACT**