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subject: Operational Report  Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 181st Airborne Division

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. The aerial flame technique discussed in paragraph 2c(1)(b) of the inclosed report is being evaluated by the US Army Combat Developments Command. Pending final results of this evaluation, Army-wide use of this technique is not recommended.

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(Continued on page 2)

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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

The inclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Hugh A. Macdonald
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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3. Department of the Army Survey Information
   None.

Inclosures

1. Operations Narrative
2. Organizational Structure
3. Key Personnel Roster
4. Field Expedition Antenna
5. Ltr, AVDG-CS, this Hq, 16 Jun 70, subj: NVA Sapper Attack Against FSB Tomahawk
AVDTCG

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) Operations,

   (1) Operation THAI STAR commenced on 1 April 1970 and has continued throughout the entire period of this report. The operation was developed in close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province and Sector officials to continue to provide territorial security for the accomplishment of pacification and development in the populated lowlands; deny the enemy access to the populace and resources in the coastal areas; and to seek out and destroy enemy forces, base areas, and cache sites.

   (a) The 1st and 3d Bdes and reconnaissance assets of the division have been employed to maintain a protective shield beyond the periphery of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province to prevent incursions of enemy forces into the populated area, and insure a secure environment for continued progress of the province pacification and development program for 1970. The bdes operated in close coordination with the 1st, 3d, and 54th Regts (ARVN), conducting extensive patrols, surveillance, and security operations in assigned AOs to deny the use of these areas to the enemy. Combat operations by infantry elements were supported by direct and general support artillery fires, provided from mutually supporting fire support bases, secured by elements of the bde and located on a broad front beyond the periphery of the lowland areas. Combined airmobile operations were conducted within assigned AOs to eliminate enemy forces, base areas, and cache sites.

   (b) The 2d Bde has been employed in the populated lowlands, piedmont and eastern edge of the canopy in coordination with the 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN), to coordinate and support the pacification and development program, conduct security operations on the edge of the canopy, and secure sustained fire support bases to provide direct support artillery coverage of the area of operations. The 2d Bde coordinated and directed assistance for the ten rural districts of Thua Thien Province and assisted in the achievement of the eight goals of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan (Reported in ORLL for period ending 30 April 1970).

   (c) An informal area coordination committee (ACC) was established, composed of the CG, 1st Inf Div (ARVN); Province Chief, Thua Thien Province; CG, 101st Abn Div (Amb), and the Senior Advisor CORDES, to insure that the efforts of all forces operating in the province are in agreement and focused toward the same objectives and goals. Through this means, priorities were established for pacification, civic action projects, and the employment of military forces required to upgrade the degree of security and promote pacification and development in specified areas.

   Group 4
   Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
   Declassified after 12 years.

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(2) The division assumed operational control of Det B-52, 5th SFG (A) (Project Delta), on 10 May 1970 at 30/20 Mal Loc, 130451P. The detachment began Operation BARBER GLADE on 15 May to conduct deep cover reconnaissance and tactical exploitation of intelligence and to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes in the Khe Sanh Plain and Da Krong River Valley areas. These operations continued until 9 June, when the detachment terminated operations in western Quang Tri Province and prepared for movement to Nha Trang, RVN, for stand down. On 25 June Det B-52, 5th SFG (A), resumed special reconnaissance operations in the Delta AO, until 30 June 1970, when Operation BARBER GLADE was terminated. The detachment conducted a total of 38 ground operations, inserting elements to perform area and route reconnaissance and bomb damage assessment of air, artillery, and ARA strikes. The detachment accounted for 15 enemy KIA, 10 enemy trucks, two bulldozers, and a large amount of supplies destroyed along Route 616. Intelligence gathered by the detachment indicated that Route 616 was the main supply route for enemy units in Quang Tri Province and the Laotian Salient area. The detachment also concluded that there was no indication of movement of major enemy units in the area of operation, although the short duration of the second phase of the operation (25-30 June) precluded a complete and thorough coverage of the AO (After Action Report submitted separately by Det B-52, 5th SFG (A)).

(3) Operation CLINCH VALLEY was initiated at 091315 July in response to the discovery of the 9th Regt, 304th NVA Division, infiltrating into South Vietnam. The mission of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) was to provide combat support and combat service support for operations by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in the KHE SANH Plateau. During the operation, elements of the 3d Bde and 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) were employed in western Quang Tri Province to locate and destroy elements of the 9th NVA Regt, discovered by armed aerial reconnaissance elements on 8 July (After Action Interview Report submitted separately). Artillery was provided by XXIV Corps, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), 1st Inf Div (ARVN), and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) to support reconnaissance in force operations by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Regt (ARVN). FRAGO 25 (CLINCH VALLEY) to OPORD 2-70 (TEXAS STAR) suspended combined operations by the 3d Bde in the vicinity of fire support/operations bases (FS/OB) AIRBORNE, GOODMAN, and BRADLEY to located and destroy enemy rear service areas.

(4) Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SOM 363, in the mountains northeast of the A SHAU Valley, was originally scheduled to commence on 10 July, but was postponed with the commitment of assets to Operation CLINCH VALLEY. The combined operation, employing elements of the 1st Bde and 3d Regt (ARVN), was rescheduled to commence on 16 July and was to be conducted in two phases. Phase I (preparation) provided for a program of intensive preparatory fires by artillery, B-52, and tactical air south of FS/OB RIFCORD, in the FS/OB AIRBORNE/BRADLEY GOODMAN area, to deny enemy use of the terrain and destroy cache sites and base
A VDQ-02


areas. Persistent and non-persistent CS munitions were employed to deny enemy use of infiltration routes, for terrain restriction, and fire suppression.

Phase II (offensive) provided for the occupation of FS/OB MAURIE on 25 July by one US battalion, occupation by artillery on 28 and 29 July, and insertion of two battalions of the 3d Regt (ARVN) on 30 July, to locate and destroy enemy cache sites, logistical facilities, and interdict routes of resupply and communication of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments.

(5) FS/OB RIPCORD was opened in April 1970 as a key forward fire support base in the division's summer offensive plan against the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The fire support base was occupied and secured on 11 April by Co C, 2d Bn (Ambli), 506th Inf. Poor weather in the division AO delayed the movement of the battalion CP and Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambli), 319th Arty until 16 April. Btry C, 11th Arty (ARVN) was positioned on the firebase on 17 April to provide support for two battalions of the 1st Regt (ARVN). The light CP, 1st Regt (ARVN) collocated on the firebase with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambli), 506th Inf on 18 April, to facilitate combined operations in the area.

(a) The 2d Bn (Ambli), 506th Inf continued security, patrol and ambush operations in the vicinity of FS/OB RIPCORD without significant enemy attacks, until 1 July 1970. The period 1-23 July was marked by increased enemy attacks by fire on and around the firebase and numerous ground attacks against units operating in the vicinity of the firebase.

(b) In early July it became obvious that NVA forces were massing in an attempt to control the RIPCORD area. Elements of the 6th NVA Regt concentrated around the FS/OB generally to the north and west, joining the 29th and 803d NVA Regiments, operating east of the A SHAU Valley, south and southeast of FS/OB RIPCORD. With the steady increase of indirect and anti-aircraft fire, and enemy ground attacks in the RIPCORD area, it became apparent, by the third week in July, that the cost and effort required for the self-defense of the firebase, placed the successful accomplishment of operations in the BRADLEY/AIRBORNE area in jeopardy.

(c) The closing of FS/OB RIPCORD would make troops available for offensive use against enemy supply caches and logistic installations to the rear of NVA forces massed around RIPCORD. The cache sites in the AIRBORNE/BRADLEY area were believed to be part of the base areas of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The concentration of NVA forces around RIPCORD would further facilitate operations in areas to the south and southeast. Therefore, the decision to extract from RIPCORD was made.

3
AVLJ-GX:

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSHFl-65 (F2) (G)

(1) HIM.PD operations were highly successful, causing heavy NVA casualties and drawing the enemy from his cache sites. His massing of forces around the firebase presented numerous targets vulnerable to heavy air and artillery fire. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was extracted, and FS/08 HIM.PD was closed on 23 July.

(2) G3 Air Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned sorties</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate sorties</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat sky spots</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunships (Spooky, Shadow, and Stinger)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Tactical air strikes expended 7818 tons of bombs and 532 tons of napalm during the reporting period.

(7) Enemy losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>KBA*</th>
<th>KHH*</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>IWC</th>
<th>CSWC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals   | 1103| 1273 | 73   | 377 | 14  | 209  | 97 |

* Killed by artillery and killed by helicopter figures included in KIA figures.
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AIDC-CC
SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(8) Friendly losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>NRD</th>
<th>NPI</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC/Div</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/1 Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/2 Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/3 Bde</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/187</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/501</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/501</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/502</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/506</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/506</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/506</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVARTY</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 Avn Grp</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/75 (Fgr)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326 Engr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 Sig</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 MP</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 269 1312 18 42 240 1881

(9) Operations Narrative. See Inclosure 1.

b. (C) Training.

(1) The seven-day program for battalion refresher training was initiated on 12 May 1970. This program provides two days for troop movement (the first and last) and five days for the conduct of training and recreation. Companies are rotated for one-day stand downs at Eagle Beach during the five-day training period, allowing one day of recreational stand down and four days of training for each company. During the reporting period, all infantry battalions conducted refresher training, and three battalions completed a second refresher training cycle. Under the previous battalion refresher training program,
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Infantry battalions conducted ten days of training on a rotational basis. A separate program for recreational stand down was conducted, allowing infantry battalions a three-day recreational period at Eagle Beach, on a rotational basis. This separate program caused the time required for a complete cycle of battalion refresher training to be excessive. The system was not flexible enough to respond to operational requirements, causing several postponements of refresher training. The new system is more responsive to operational requirements because of its decreased length and the fusion of recreational and training stand downs. It allows infantry battalions to conduct refresher training every 50-60 days. This increased frequency of training periods enables more effective integration of replacements, correction of unit tactical weaknesses, and implementation of lessons learned.

(2) A ranger strike operations course was organized at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School to train the Hoc Bao (Black Panthers) Reconnaissance Company of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in the use of air-mobile techniques during small unit raids against selected enemy targets. The training program is eight days in duration, with subject areas in map reading and land navigation, small unit air-mobile operations, patrolling, and the use of demolitions. The training program is concluded with a field exercise against a target in the division reconnaissance zone, selected from division intelligence sources. Instruction is conducted by SERTS cadre; a special cadre team composed of one officer and four enlisted men from Company L (Ranger), 75th Inf; and specialized instruction presented by the 326th Engr Bn, the 326th Med Bn, and the G2 imagery interpretation section. Interpreters are provided by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The cadre team from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf accompanies the platoon in all training, to include the field exercise. During the period of this report, three platoons completed the training, and an additional three platoons were scheduled to receive the training during the month of August.

(3) The division continued its intensified training program in the populated lowlands with one dedicated battalion and a varying number of mobile training teams. The dedicated battalion is assigned the mission of conducting operations in Phu Loc District, employing 100 percent of its assets and resources in pacification and development and upgrading the combat effectiveness of territorial forces. The district has had a long record of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) incidents. The battalion assists the district chief in all aspects of his administration, training, and operations. To accomplish this mission, the battalion headquarters is collocated with the district headquarters, and elements of the battalion conduct joint operations with Regional Force, Popular Force, and Peoples Self Defense Force units, down to and including squad level. All operations are integrated with those of the district forces. In coordination with MACV mobile advisory teams (MAT) and sector
officials, RF and PF units are rotated to Phu Loc District to receive training with the dedicated battalion. On-the-job training is provided by the dedicated battalion through coordination with the district chief and district senior advisor. Training is tailored to the specific requirements of the unit being trained and is conducted primarily with equipment on hand and available to the unit being trained. In addition to the dedicated battalion, mobile training teams are provided by elements of the 2d Brigade to train and assist RF, PF, and PSDF forces throughout the lowland area. From 20 to 22 mobile training teams (MTT) were provided during the reporting period to assist territorial force commanders in the conduct of combat/security operations and training as required. The concept of employment of MTTs was changed on 19 May 1970 at the request of GVN officials. The primary role of the MTT had been to provide formal training. This has been changed to the technique of on-the-spot corrections during the conduct of operations as the primary instructional vehicle. Formal classes are presented only upon request of and for specific instruction desired by GVN officials. Three types of MTTs are employed. District (subsector) teams are organized to assist the district staff in improving training and operational effectiveness of PF platoons and PSDF in the district. Three of these teams were deployed as of 31 July 1970. Regional Force group teams are organized to maintain liaison between RF group headquarters and US battalions. They assist the RF group commander and staff in improving the operational effectiveness of the staff and assigned companies. Emphasis is placed on MTT participation with RF companies on actual operations. Seven of these teams were deployed as of 31 July 1970. Separate regional force company teams are organized to improve the operational effectiveness of the separate RF companies by assisting and advising the RF company commander in the planning and conduct of all combat/security operations. Emphasis is placed on MTT participation during the conduct of operations. Twelve separate company teams were deployed as of the end of this reporting period. All MTTs operate in close coordination with the district chief and district senior advisor to identify weaknesses and take corrective action in an effort to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the territorial forces. A fixed, rigid program is avoided, and formal training is tailored to correct specific weaknesses of units. It is presented on a level commensurate with the skills required by the unit to perform its mission. During the three months of the reporting period, MTTs conducted training for one RF company group, 25 separate RF companies, 20 PF platoons, and 674 members of the PSDF. They also participated in seven RF group operations, 99 company-size operations, 109 platoon-size operations, and 203 squad-size operations. This program of intensified training in the populated lowlands of the division area of operation has been extremely successful. It has substantially improved the capability of local forces and, more importantly, it has established a cadre that can continue its own development.
The 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) conducted classes on pathfinder operations from 4 to 15 May and from 25 May to 5 June. A total of 30 members of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) received this training. On 22 and 23 May, a training team from the 101st Airborne Division Support Command (Ambl) conducted classes on helicopter load preparation for 166 members of the 4th ARVN Artillery Battalion at Dong Ha. Instruction included care, maintenance, and capabilities of air items and general sling load preparation procedures for artillery units. The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Ambl) provided four separate teams consisting of one officer and one NCO to train artillery units of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in fire direction and firing battery procedures and techniques. Each unit received two weeks of training, and a total of 12 ARVN artillery batteries received this instruction.

During the reporting period, a readiness report was formulated for Regional Force (RF), Popular Force (PF), and Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) elements. Data for the report are collected from Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) reports, PSDF status reports, and weekly MTT reports. The readiness report provides a concise and comprehensive evaluation of the readiness level of four major areas of development - personnel, equipment, training, and operational proficiency. Reports are prepared each month. The first two monthly reports were completed during this reporting period. Initial indications are that the report will provide an effective means of evaluating the development of territorial force units and will serve as a useful management tool for the deployment of divisional MTT resources.

c. (C) Chemical.

General. The division chemical section, with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CBRC) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (33), performed a variety of chemical missions in support of division operations during the reporting period. A discussion of each type mission follows.

(a) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations. The Airborne Personnel Detector continued to be employed as an intelligence gathering device to supplement and/or confirm other intelligence concerning enemy locations and activity. During April, all APD missions were conducted by the 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry. Beginning in May, missions were performed by the 1st and 3d Brigades as well as by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. A total of 128 missions were conducted during the reporting period. APD reading indicated several areas where enemy activity had significantly increased, assisting the ability of division units to engage the enemy during his incursions into forward base areas. Routes of infiltration were engaged with artillery and air strikes.
(b) Aerial Flame Operations. Aerial flame missions were conducted in areas believed to be booby trapped, to clear fields of fire around fire support bases, to clear and expand landing zones, and to destroy suspected enemy positions and cache sites. Both CH-47 and UH-1H aircraft were used in flame drop operations. A total of 52 flame missions was conducted during the period. As the weather in the division AO improved and division units moved deep into the canopy, several new forward fire support bases were constructed and several abandoned bases reoccupied. Extensive clearing operations were conducted around perimeters to facilitate visual observation and to provide fields of fire. Bulk flame drops, using eight to ten 55-gallon drums of thickened fuel, were conducted utilizing an external sling load from a CH-47 helicopter. In April and May, a total of 199 drums of thickened fuel were dropped in 240 sorties during clearing operations. The principal fire support bases cleared were KHOCOD, GIANITE, GLADIATO, RANASAN, FALCON, GOBIEL, ST-126, KATHRYN, BRICK, and SHOCK. A major flame project was initiated and completed for the 2d ROK Marine Brigade in an area 20 kilometers south of Da Nang during the months of April and May. The project was conducted to assist in clearing a booby trapped area, which had been chosen for resettlement by Vietnamese civilians, and to provide technical assistance and training for the ROK forces in the development of their own flame program. During the operation, 870 drums of thickened fuel were dropped in 87 aircraft sorties. A total of 13 secondary explosions was observed during the drops. The division provided a CH-47 helicopter and necessary personnel for the execution of the mission. Division chemical officers explained concepts of employment and operational techniques in briefings at the ROK brigade headquarters. ROK forces assisted in the operation by marking target areas and rigging drop nets. As a result of training provided by the division, ROK forces commenced their own flame drop program in coordination with the 1st Marine Division. During the month of May, three heavily booby trapped landing zones were cleared using flame fuel. As a result of the six sorties conducted, 27 large secondary explosions occurred.

(c) CS Operations. Bulk CS2 missions were conducted, using both organic CH-47 helicopters and Air Force high performance aircraft on routes of infiltration in the division reconnaissance zone. The drops and bombings were targeted to restrict heavy vehicular traffic, thus interdicting enemy tactical and logistic advances into forward base areas. Loads consisting of 55-gallon drums of CS2, rigged with the XM925 impact fuze and burster system, were dropped from CH-47 aircraft from an approximate height of 4000 feet. Bulk CS2 missions, using BLU-52 bombs, were conducted by Air Force high performance aircraft. These bombs were directed against roads leading into the northern A SHAU and the DA KRONG River Valley. Tactical CS missions were conducted...
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmob’l), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (h2) (U)

against suspected enemy locations, during combat assaults, in support of artillery raids, during search operations, and in support of combined US/ ARVN operations. Tactical CS was employed in support of a 1st Brigade artillery and air raid covering three distinct target areas. UH-1H helicopters delivered CS on all targets. Two aircraft carried ten E158 CS canisters, while a third dropped 16 to 20 rocket tube assemblies, each containing 20 M7A3 CS grenades. Canisters were dropped from a height of 1000 feet, while grenades were delivered at low level. A total of 80 canisters and 710 grenades were dropped during the operation.

A tactical CS mission was conducted to support a search operation of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Four E158 CS canisters were dropped on target areas along the sweep route. Weather conditions did not adversely affect the retention of CS in the canopy vegetation. No ill effects were experienced by friendly ground troops.

A tactical CS mission employing 37 E158 canisters was conducted in support of a combined US/ARVN operation in the vicinity of FS/OB HENDERSON. To support troop insertions, munitions were employed on enemy mortar and automatic weapons positions in support of the proposed landing zones. Throughout the operation, tactical CS was employed on nine separate occasions on suspected enemy locations and during combat assaults without ill effects to friendly troops.

(d) Aerial Defoliation Operations. Diesel defoliation missions were conducted around fire support bases in the piedmont area, where herbicides, such as Agent Blue, could not be used due to the proximity of friendly crops. The diesel spray retarded the growth of the foliage and assisted in burning. Targets included areas adjacent to CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANS, and FS/OB BIRMINGHAM to clear fields of fire.

Herbicide defoliation missions, using Agent Blue, to reduce foliage were executed against major NVA infiltration routes west of FS/OB RIPCORD. Areas around FS/OB BASTOGNE and VEGHEL, and Route 547 connecting them, were sprayed to create and preserve fields of fire. Plans were formulated to conduct increased herbicide operations around permanent fire support bases with the approach of the dry season.

(e) Smoke Operations. Smoke operations in support of combat assaults were conducted by the 158th Aviation Battalion (Ambl). The XM52 Integral Smoke Generator was used to create smoke screens which effectively obscured enemy observation, limiting his capability to concentrate well aimed fire on assaulting troops and aircraft.
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The M4A2 smoke pot was used by the I st Brigade in conjunction with psychological operations. A column of smoke, lasting for a five hour period, was created and used as a reference point for enemy soldiers desiring to rally.

(2) Statistics: The following statistics pertain to chemical operations during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical CS</td>
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<td>459 E158R2 and 80 M7A3 grenades</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulk CS</td>
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<td>56 drums and 76 BLU 52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fougasse Emplacement</td>
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<td>Hush Flare Emplacement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Defoliation (Herbicide)</td>
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<td>Aerial Defoliation (Diesel)</td>
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</table>
d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), local force companies were operating in their traditional areas of operation - Phong Dien Special Action Unit (PDSAU, formerly C113) vicinity Phong Dien (D), Quang Dien Special Action Unit (QDSAU, formerly C114), vicinity YD4724, C115 vicinity YD6614, and C116 vicinity YD8304. The Phu Vang Special Action Unit (PVSAU) was unlocated. The Hue City Reconnaissance Battalion (HCRB) was located vicinity YD6514. The Phu Loc Special Action Unit (PLSAU, formerly the Phu Loc Armed Battalion) and the 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate in the Phu Loc mountains. The 4th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YC9781 with the K4C Battalion vicinity ZC0193, and the K4B Battalion vicinity ZC1896. The 5th NVA Regiment was deployed south and southwest of Hue, with the headquarters vicinity YC5282; the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC8195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD5715, the 439th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC6297, the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YC7299, the Chi Thua I Sapper Battalion vicinity YC6995, and the Chi Thua II Sapper Battalion vicinity YC7290. The 6th NVA Regiment was deployed in the canopy south of Phong Dien (D), with the regimental headquarters vicinity YD3216; the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2922; the 802d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2010; the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4622; the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3423. The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were operating east of the A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA Regiment. The 29th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD4405, the 7th Infantry Battalion YD5307, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4705, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4907. The 803d NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD3415, with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3616, and 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4412, and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3310. The headquarters of the 324B Division was in Base Area 611 with MRTTH headquarters. The 675th NVA Artillery Regiment remained in Base Area 611. The 11A Reconnaissance Battalion headquarters was located vicinity YC3298. The 7th Front was located in the vicinity of former Base Area 101, with headquarters vicinity YD1931, the 808th Infantry
Battalion vicinity YD2333, the 814th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3737, the K34 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD2636, the K10 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3133, the K11 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD2842, and the K12 Transportation Battalion vicinity YD1327. The 812th NVA Regiment was engaged in logistic activity in support of the 7th Front, with its headquarters vicinity YD2025, the 4th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2428, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0023, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2025.

In the B5 (DMZ) Front, at the beginning of the reporting period, there were ten units operating in the DMZ and in western Quang Tri (P). The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division remained in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri (P). The 246th NVA Regiment was operating in the western portion of the central DMZ, with headquarters vicinity XD9371, the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9455, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8363, and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9461. The headquarters of the 27th NVA Regiment was located vicinity YD0668 with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0563, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0570, and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0459. The 75th Anti-Aircraft Battalion was operating vicinity XD9561. The 84th and 164th NVA Artillery Regiments were alternating fire support responsibility in the central DMZ area. The headquarters of the 84th NVA Artillery Regiment was located vicinity XD9874, and the headquarters of the 164th NVA Artillery Regiment was located vicinity YD1090. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located vicinity YD2189. The newly arrived 66th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD0335, with the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9841, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0138, and the 9th Infantry Battalion located in the Ba Long Valley. Forward elements of the 304th Division were operating south of the Khe Sanh Plateau vicinity XD8438. Elements of the 27th Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment were operating in the Quang Tri (P) lowlands, with the battalion and regimental headquarters in North Vietnam, vicinity YD1185. The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the Eastern DMZ vicinity YD1986. The 33d Sapper Battalion, B5 Front was operating in the vicinity of XD9939.

(b) May 1970

There was a significant increase in activity by NVA units in Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH) during the month. The 5th and 6th Independent Regiments were responsible for attacks by fire on Allied installations in the lowlands. Enemy activity and POW reports confirmed the eastward deployment of the 812th NVA Regiment. The mission of the 812th was to
protect rear areas and support 7th Front and 6th Regiment incursions into the populated lowlands of Hai Lang and Phong Dien Districts. A PW, captured on 4 May, listed as a penetration agent for MRTTH, stated that the 7th Front had the mission of reconnaissance and attack on the boundary areas of Hai Lang and Trieu Phong Districts, Quang Tri (P), in order to demonstrate the strength of the VC/NVA movement to villagers in these areas. 7th Front incursions into Hai Lang (D) later in the month confirmed this mission. A PW report on 4 May indicated that elements of the 6th Regiment had linked up with the 803d NVA Regiment in order to coordinate rear service activities vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD and Co Pung. US forces operating vicinity FS/OB GRANITE and FS/OB MAUREEN encountered heavy 12.7mm mortar, RPG, and small arms fire during the month of May. The discovery of 60mm and 82mm CS mortar rounds at YD4411 (1 KM E of FS/OB MAUREEN) and the use of chemical delay fused mortar rounds at FS/OB KATHRYN indicated that the 803d NVA Regiment received logistic priority along Route T7 during April and early May.

DMZ activity during the month of May was characterized by attacks by fire in the FS/OB FULLER/CAMP CARROLL area. The presence of the 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, in the Da Krong River Valley increased the enemy threat in central Quang Tri (P). The 66th Regiment launched two sapper attacks on Allied firebases during the month, resulting in heavy enemy losses. The 66th Regiment was the target of a B52 strike early in the month, resulting in 97 NVA KIA. Aerial surveillance in the 66th NVA Regiment area of operations indicated heavy logistic activity in the vicinity of the Laotian Salient.

In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, the 7th Front remained inactive throughout the month, possibly recovering from losses suffered in late May following incursions into Hai Lang (D). The 812th, 803d, and 29th NVA Regiments continued to occupy well established mountain base areas east of the Da Krong and A Shau Valleys. The mission of these units was to lure US and ARVN forces deep into the canopy, leaving the coastal lowlands exposed to infiltration by the 7th Front in southwestern Quang Tri (P) and by the 4th, 5th, and 6th Independent Regiments in Thua Thien (P). The 812th NVA Regiment continued to provide logistic support to the 7th Front and to support attacks against ARVN firebases in the central canopy. The 29th NVA Regiment
shifted its area of operation west to avoid detection and destruction by Allied forces applying pressure from the east. The 803d NVA Regiment showed signs of increased offensive activity and attack preparations in the FS/OB RIPCORD and FS/OB MAUREEN areas. The 4th NVA Regiment launched a coordinated attack against five allied installations in Phu Loc District on 10 June and then returned to its normal low level of activity for the remainder of the month. The 5th and 6th NVA Regiments increased the number of attacks by fire against Allied forces using 60mm and 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets.

Enemy DMZ activity during the month of June was at its lowest level since prior to April 1970. Enemy forces in the central DMZ reduced their attacks by fire in the FS/OB FULLER/CAMP CARROLL area in order to resupply and reposition in preparation for future offensive actions in July or August. During the month, there was a significant increase in activity in western Quang Tri (P) and in the Laotian Salient. There were indications that the 9th NVA Regiment, 304th Division was infiltrating into the area to join the 66th NVA Regiment. On 21 June, a map overlay was captured in the Vietnamese Salient by the HAC BAO Company, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), showing telephone lines from forward elements of the 304th Division, located in the Laotian Salient, to the 7th Front located to the northeast.

(d) July 1970

(1) In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, the majority of enemy initiated activity was recorded in the FS/OB RIPCORD area, where elements of the 6th and 803d NVA Regiments had begun to mass. On 17 July, the firebase received 120mm mortar fire. This was the first use of that weapon in the MRTTH area of operation in over 18 months. The enemy continued to intensify his mortar and ground attacks against US units operating vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD until 23 July, when the firebase was closed. There was a significant decrease in 29th NVA Regiment activity, with indications that the unit had withdrawn west. At the beginning of the month, elements of the 7th Front tried again to enter eastern Quang Tri (P) lowlands, resulting in 135 NVA KIA and 17 PWs captured. Enemy units were identified as the 806th Battalion, 7th Front, reinforced by the 1st Company, K6 Battalion, 812th NVA Regiment and a signal squad from the K4 Battalion, 812th Regiment. Activity in the 4th and 5th NVA Regiment areas of operation remained at a low level, except for attacks by fire against Allied installations in the lowlands in early July.
In the B5 (DMZ) Front, enemy initiated activity was relatively light in July, although movement throughout the DMZ continued at a high level. The number of attacks by fire declined from 67 in June to 45 in July. During the latter part of July, in the central DMZ, the 84th and 164th Artillery Regiments resumed attacks by fire on FS/OB FULLER and C-2 Combat Base. Ground contacts decreased by approximately 50%. The most significant contact during the month occurred in western Quang Tri (P) on 8 July, when Allied forces surprised elements of the 9th NVA Regiment, 304th NVA Division, attempting to infiltrate into SVN. Air Cavalry elements and troops, supported by helicopter gunships, engaged and killed 139 NVA in the Khe Sanh plains and captured four PWs. The PWs stated that the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 9th Regiment were to control the region in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and south of the Ba Long Valley. They also stated that elements of the 2d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment were operating in western Quang Tri (P). The presence of the 9th and 66th Regiments, 304th NVA Division confirmed the enemy's determination to protect his lines of communication and base areas which had been established in that area. This build-up of NVA forces in western Quang Tri (P) also threatened Allied installations and population centers north and northeast of the Ba Long Valley.

(e) At the end of the reporting period, enemy units were relocated as follows:

In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), Local force companies relocated were the Phong Dien Special Action Unit, vicinity YD3528, the Quang Dien Special Action Unit, vicinity YD5122, and the Phu Vang Special Action Unit, vicinity YC9398. The 5th NVA regiment headquarters was relocated vicinity YC6382, with the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC9398. The 6th NVA Regiment, while still deployed in the canopy south of the Phong Dien (D) piedmont, concentrated more around the FS/OB RIPCORD area. Battalions of the 6th Regiment relocated were the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3725, the 802d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3018, the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4224, the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3423. The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were operating east of the A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA Regiment. The 29th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD4306, the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4906, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4807, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4208. In late July, an unidentified transportation battalion was reported to be operating vicinity YD2914. The 7th Front was still located in the vicinity of former Base Area 101, after
having made several costly incursions into the lowlands during the reporting period. The battalions relocated in the 7th Front were the 808th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3339, the 814th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2840, the K10 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3534, the K11 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD2546. The 812th NVA Regiment continued logistical and offensive activity in support of the 7th Front. The 4th Infantry Battalion was relocated vicinity YD2834, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD1829, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2730. The K19B (AKA 20th) Sapper Battalion, 304th NVA Division, under the operational control of the 812th Regiment, was located vicinity YD1927.

2. In the B5 Front, at the end of the reporting period, there were eleven units operating in the DMZ and western Quang Tri (P) areas. The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division is no longer carried in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri (P); it is most likely located in North Vietnam. At the end of the reporting period, the 2d Infantry Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment was located vicinity XD7944. Forward elements of the 304th NVA Division moved farther south, vicinity XD9922, and were reinforced by the newly arrived 9th NVA Regiment. The 9th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity XD7738, with the 1st Infantry Battalion located vicinity XD7740, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8236, and the 3d Infantry Battalion near the western Quang Tri (P) border west of Khe Sanh. The understrength 66th NVA Regiment, 304th Division was operating in western Quang Tri (P), with the headquarters element vicinity XD9533, the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8832, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8930, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0530. The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the eastern DMZ, vicinity YD1986, with its 4th Battalion periodically making incursions south of the DMZ.

2) Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Activities in Thua Thien (P)

(a) The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased slightly from 47 in April to 42 in May. Kidnappings, sabotage, and rice collections remained at the same level as reported during April, while propaganda activity decreased sharply. Terrorism and assassinations increased during May. Enemy attacks by fire directed against ARVN and GVN installations in the lowlands increased to five attacks during May, compared to two in April. That activity was believed to have been politically rather than militarily motivated, due to the numerous Vietnamese holidays in May. NVA infiltration into the lowlands increased from three incursions in April to six in May. All of these incidents occurred in Phu Loc (D), and can be attributed to elements of the 4th and 5th NVA Regiments. This increase possibly means that NVA operations have been
extended into the lowlands to assist VC/VCI forces in disrupting the GVN pacification and development program. VC/VCI activity in Phong Dien (D) intensified during May, with increases in terrorism, sabotage, and kidnapping. Further evidence confirmed the reorganization of the C113 Local Force Company into local guerrilla units operating throughout Phong Dien (D). During the month of May 1970, a total of twenty-four VC cadre was eliminated by Allied operations in Thua Thien (P). Of this number, nine were considered significant by current MACV standards.

(b) The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 42 in May to 36 in June. Of the total incidents, 67% involved sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, or terrorist activities. The overall decrease of VC/VCI related incidents can be attributed to a lull in enemy activity from 19 to 25 June, when no incidents were reported. Enemy activity resumed on 26 June and continued through the end of the month. During June, the NVA launched a series of attacks by fire against Allied installations in the lowlands. The enemy employed 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, and 122mm rockets during these attacks. US installations shelled during June include CAMP EVANS (4, 8, and 26 June), CAMP EAGLE (twice on 26 June), FS/OB LOS BANOS (10 June), and FS/OB TOMAHAWK (10 June). FS/OB TOMAHAWK was the only installation in which the standoff attack was immediately followed by a ground assault. FS/OB ROY, an ARVN installation, was also attacked by fire on 10 June. GVN installations shelled during June include the Phu Trach Bridge (26 June), Phong Dien (D) HQ (4 and 26 June), Phu Loc (D) HQ (10 June), and Nuoc Ngot Bridge (10 June). It is important to note that the majority of the attacks by fire occurred on 10 and 26 June. It is possible that the 4th, 5th, and 6th NVA Regiments increased their offensive operations in the populated areas in order to take advantage of US and ARVN presence in the western canopy. In Phu Vang (D), on 29 June, two election officials were attacked by three VC/VCI, resulting in one election official killed, one election official wounded, and one ARVN soldier killed. The Primary VC objective was to show the populace what will become of those who actively participate in any activity which would enhance GVN control of the populace. During the month of June, a total of 31 VC cadre was eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, eleven were considered significant under current MACV standards.
The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 36 in June to 38 in July. Of the total incidents, 50% involved sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, or terrorist incidents. The overall increase of VC/VCI related activity can be attributed to an increase of enemy activity in Phong Dien and Nam Hoa Districts. An increase in rice collections was noted throughout the lowlands, indicating that enemy terrorist activity was hampered by the need for foodstuffs. VC/VCI activity in Phong Dien (D) showed increases in acts of terrorism, kidnappings, assassinations, and rice collection. The majority of terrorist incidents involved attacks by fire on GVN installations and hamlets. A marked increase in VC/VCI related incidents was noted in the resettlement areas of northern Phong Dien (D). These are the first significant incidents in the area since its founding in January 1970. During July, enemy forces operating in the lowlands launched a series of attacks by fire against Allied, APVN, and GVN installations. Allied bases shelled in July include CAMP EAGLE (7 July), CAMP EVANS (26, 28, and 29 July), FS/OF T-BONE (22 and 28 July), and the VANN TRA NH Training Center (5 July). Significantly, two of the attacks by fire on CAMP EVANS occurred during daylight hours. There were seven reported attacks by fire against GVN installations during July, compared to six in June. Attacks directed against VC installations decreased from seven in June to four in July. During the month of July, a total of 24 VCI cadre was eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, eight were considered significant under MACV standards. The following table compares the VC/VCI incidents for May (left), June (center), and July (right) by district:

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<tr>
<th>District</th>
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<th>Prop</th>
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AVDG-GC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) G2 Air Operations.

(a) Prior to 1 May, all photo and IR missions were passed to XXIV Corps for processing. The direct support concept was introduced on 1 May. All missions which Mohawk aircraft were capable of flying were assigned by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) directly to the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC). This proved to be more effective and enabled the division to establish priorities which resulted in a more responsive surveillance plan.

(b) The 01-D sorties allotted from the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (RAC) were used in a new capacity. The aircraft were tasked to fly night surveillance around fire support bases which had received indirect fire during the hours of darkness. By sighting flashes and directing air-strikes and artillery, these night surveillance missions proved to be effective in reducing the intensity of enemy indirect fire.

(4) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) On 1 June, the Dart I sensor readout station became operational. After a two week evaluation period, the responsibility for the readout and interpretation of sensors in the division reconnaissance zone passed from the BATCAT (EC-121) aircraft to the Dart I facility at Quang Tri Combat Base. Reports of sensor activations are passed immediately to the Ground Surveillance Section, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) via direct telephonic communication for quick reaction and intelligence use.

(b) During the reporting period, the number of ground monitor sites increased to eleven with establishment of sites at FS/OB RIPCORD (YD3419), FS/OB BRICK (YC8399), FS/OB KATHRYN (YD4711), FS/OB VEGHEL (YD5503), and FS/OB RAKKASAN (YD4919). These additional sites reflect the offensive posture of ground tactical units in their operations to the south and west against elements of the 6th, 29th, and 803d NVA Regiments. At the end of the reporting period, two of these sites, FS/OB RIPCORD and BRICK, were closed, with relocations planned to support future operations.

(c) During the month of June, sensor-detected activity increased in the division reconnaissance zone to over 100 activations per week. A high of 190 was reached for the period 21-27 June. The major increases in sensor-detected activity occurred along OL-9, Route 616, and Route 9222. Confirmation of increased enemy activity in these areas, by visual reconnaissance, led to the employment of aerial bombardment and insertion of ground units.
(d) During the reporting period, the number of operational RF sensor strings in the division area of operation, increased from 76 to a new high of 147, enabling the division to meet its minimum goal of one set per rifle/recon platoon. Operational USD/WIs increased from 42 to 63. Forty-two Balanced Pressure systems (BPS) and seven Infrared Intrusion Detectors (IIDs) were added to the inventory for base defense of Camp Hochmuth (Phu Bai Combat Base).

(5) Counter Intelligence Section

(a) The CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) from enemy sabotage, espionage, and subversion. IG and CI inspections of personnel, documents, and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security hazards. Technical support, in the form of fingerprinting, safe combination changes, recovery of lost combinations, and repair of security containers, was continuously provided both by division and supporting CI teams.

(b) Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, and limited investigations to insure the validity of security clearances were conducted in the division. Clearances for 1086 replacements were validated; 471 SECRET clearances were granted; 3568 local files checks were conducted; and 431 intelligence record checks were forwarded to higher headquarters by the personnel security investigations (PSI) section. Additionally, 115 BI and NAC requests were processed.

(c) The base camp security program was enhanced by the establishment of liaison with the Industrial Relations Division, Phu Bai. The intent of this liaison is to increase the number and effectiveness of informants. During the reporting period, the CI section recruited 30 new informants.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 plans/order of battle section continued to monitor and record the enemy situation throughout northern I Military Region, with increased emphasis in disseminating collected intelligence. The order of battle handbook was updated during the reporting period to maintain an accurate description of enemy units operating in Quang
Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The division intelligence collection plan was published on 1 June. The collection plan contains essential elements of information (EEI) needed on the enemy mission, organization, and area of operation. Wide distribution of the plan was made to higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting organizations with an intelligence collection capability.

(7) Interrogation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company. During the reporting period, the interrogation section, 101st Military Intelligence Company (Divisional) processed 13 prisoners of war (12 NVA, one VC), three Hoi Chanh (NVA), and 124 batches of captured enemy documents.

(8) Weather. The Air Force weather team, 5th Weather Squadron, continued to provide meteorological support for the 101st Abn Div (Ambl). The weather team provides climatological information, weather forecasts for individual flights by Army aviators, current weather reports for field commanders, weather summaries used in the evaluation of past operations, and daily weather advice and interpretation for the commanding general and his staff.

(a) May 1970

1 During May, the total rainfall was normal, approximately equal to the mean average of 4.0 inches. Due to the sporadic nature of precipitation during the month, some areas received more rain than the mean. The total rainfall was 4.04 inches and occurred on 12 days, twice the normal frequency. Thunderstorms occurred over the mountains on 20 days. Low cloudiness occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet were observed on 8 days. No ceilings less than 300 feet were observed. No fog occurred. The average high temperature was 94°F, and the average low temperature was 77°F, both of which are 2°F warmer than the averages expected for May.

2 May afforded the first full month of good weather throughout the division AO. Airmobile operations were hampered on five days during May (14-16 and 20-21 May), and one B52 air sortie was cancelled on 13 May.

(b) June 1970

1 During June, the total rainfall was 4.2 inches, 1.2 inches above the average. Precipitation fell on 11 days, twice the normal frequency.
Thunderstorms occurred on eight days over the coastal plains and on 22 days over the mountains. Ceilings below 1500 feet were observed on three days. No ceilings of less than 300 feet were reported. Fog was observed on two days. The average high temperature was 95°F, and the average low temperature was 79°F, both of which are 2°F warmer than the average high/low for June.

2. Airmobile operations during June were relatively unrestricted except during periodic afternoon thunderstorms. Tactical air moves were cancelled on five days (4, 12, 13, 14, and 18 June) three of which (13, 14, and 18 June) were significant.

(c) July 1970

1. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 2.50 inches, which was 0.8 less than expected for the period. Thunderstorm activity was normal, with six thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 12 days over the mountains. No ceilings of less than 1500 feet were recorded, and no fog days occurred in the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were 4°F higher than normal, with a mean temperature of 96°F. Mean minimum temperatures remained at their seasonal average of 78°F. Turbulence and strong surface winds occurred for a period of 7 to 14 days. The conditions were most pronounced over western portions of the area of operation, where surface winds of 40 to 80 knots were recorded, and turbulence was of moderate to severe intensity.

2. Airmobile operations were unrestricted by weather during July. High winds hampered aerial activity on 11 July, but did not significantly affect operations.

d) Precipitation Data in Inches (Coastal Lowlands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Personnel.

(1) Chaplain. During the reporting period, the division provided continuous chaplain support to all assigned and attached units. A total of 4,381 religious services was conducted with an overall attendance of 65,878. Six of the division's 24 chaplains departed during the month of July, creating a considerable personnel problem.

(2) Personnel management.

(a) During the reporting period, total division assigned strength declined from 101.4% of that authorized on 1 May to 97.3% at the end of July. Availability of 11 series MOS personnel declined by 14%, resulting in a serious depletion of line company effective strength.

(b) Prior to 1 July, the USARV reenlistment goal was placed at a monthly reenlistment rate of 0.5% of operative strength, counting only first term RA and AUS reenlistments. As of 1 July, the goal was doubled, and all reenlistments counted. At this time, a prohibition was imposed on reenlistments out of 11, 12 and 13 series MOS into non-combat MOS. The average monthly reenlistment total for the previous reporting period had been 194. May reenlistments totaled 205; June, 145; and July, under the new criteria, 64.

(3) Finance. During the reporting period, the division finance office established the 101st Mobile Finance Forward Team (MFFT) to provide full spectrum finance services to personnel located on fire support bases. The team periodically visits fire support bases, permitting personnel to benefit from services such as partial payments, allotment changes, sale of treasury checks, collection for the savings deposit program, and acceptance of pay inquiries. The team is made available to all commanders located beyond the normal service capability of the present forward finance offices.

(4) Changes in command and staff. During the reporting period the following changes in command and staff assignments occurred:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FDD</th>
<th>101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS COFOR-65 (R2) (U)</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>MG J.J. Hennessey succeeded MG J.M. Wright on 25 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC(O)</td>
<td>BG S.B. Berry succeeded BG J.J. Hennessey on 2 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC(S)</td>
<td>COL C.E. Smith succeeded COL J.C. Smith on 9 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>COL W.H. Root succeeded COL R.L. Kampe on 15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>COL B.L. Harrison succeeded COL W.J. Bradley on 23 Jun</td>
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<td>SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPGR-65 (R2) (U)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avn Gp</td>
<td>LTC(P) E.P. Davis succeeded COL C.B. Sinclair on 26 Jun</td>
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<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>COL D.E. Grange succeeded COL R.H. Slegrist on 25 Jun</td>
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<td>COL L.E. Surut succeeded COL R.S. Fye on 29 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>LTC C.A. Hoenstine, Jr. succeeded LTC G.D. Moore, Jr. on 2 Jun</td>
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<td>G3</td>
<td>LTC R.J. Young succeeded LTC C.W. Dyke on 1 Jun</td>
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<td>G4</td>
<td>MAJ P. Masterson succeeded LTC D.R. Pinney on 26 Jul</td>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>MAJ H.W. Kinnison succeeded LTC B.B. Porter on 17 Jul</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>LTC S.J. Lobodinski succeeded LTC R.D. Wood on 27 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>LTC T. Narvaez succeeded LTC J.D. Martling on 30 Jun</td>
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<td>Fin Off</td>
<td>LTC W.J. Falconer succeeded LTC W.J. McMahon on 14 May</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>LTC T.E. Minix succeeded LTC H.R. Thomas on 12 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>LTC C.J. Shay succeeded LTC R.J. Young on 6 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-501 Inf</td>
<td>LTC T.E. Aaron succeeded LTC W.B. Middlemas on 8 Jun</td>
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<td>LTC B.B. Porter succeeded LTC H.C. Holt on 17 Jul</td>
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<td>LTC J.C. Bard succeeded LTC A.C. Lucas on 23 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-187 Inf</td>
<td>LTC I.C. Bland succeeded LTC H.Y. Schandler on 25 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-506 Inf</td>
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<td>2-320 FA</td>
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<td>LTC W.N. Peachey succeeded LTC T.L. Meadows on 14 May</td>
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<td>158 Avn</td>
<td>LTC R.J. Guard succeeded LTC G.N. Stenehjem on 1 Jul</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

159 Avn LTC G.F. Newton succeeded LTC R.F. Glover on 4 Jul
326 Engr LTC C.P. Rodolph, Jr. succeeded LTC T.M. McClelland on 6 Jul
4-77 Arty LTC C.L. Nowalk succeeded LTC A.R. Pollard on 27 Jul
5 Trans LTC H.I. Small succeeded LTC J.M. Heason on 26 Mar

f. (c) Logistics.

(1) General. Logistic support for all division operations was provided through the DISCOM forward service support elements (FSSE), using the concept of area support. Throughout the period, a determined effort was made to reduce helicopter blade time whenever possible by using vehicular transportation.

(a) To more effectively support Operation CLINCH VALLEY (9-15 July), a forward refuel point was established at Mai Loc and a rearm point at Quang Tri. A forward element of the 3d FSSE deployed to Quang Tri in support of two ARVN battalions, the 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cav, and the 2d En (Ambl), 502d Inf for the duration of the operation.

(b) In support of Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAY SON 363, the 11 refuel points at CAMP EVANS were expanded to 25, while an additional 11 points were established at FS/OB BIRMINGHAM. All classes of supply were drawn from the 3d FSSE at CAMP EVANS.

(c) Super contact teams continued to provide personnel and equipment maintenance services to units returning from operations for stand down. The number of company size units supported were as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMPLETE TEAM</th>
<th>PARTIAL TEAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
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CONFLICT

AVPG-uC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCC CSM-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
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</table>

(2) DISCOM was tasked to provide civic action support in District II, Hue City and to assist Thuc Thien Province in upgrading the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center (SM&DSLC). At the end of the reporting period, five of the original 11 projects had been completed, and three more had been added to the task list. Approximately 85% of DISCOM's goal for the initial phase of the SM&DSLC project had been completed by the end of the reporting period.

(3) On 1 July 1970, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Ambl) began work on a prescribed load list (PLL) to support three UH-1M aircraft scheduled to arrive in the division on or about 1 September 1970. The PLL was completed, and all requisitioning accomplished, insuring the availability of all parts in advance of arrival of the aircraft. Special emphasis was also placed on the requisition and procurement of special equipment needed to accomplish the battalion mission. At the end of the reporting period, the current authorized stockage list (ASL) for both Company A and B totaled approximately 11,000 lines. On 1 June, the quick reaction assistance team (QRAF) provided by the 34th General Support Group arrived to assist in the pulling, packing, and shipping of approximately 8,000 lines of identified excess stock.

(4) The 5th Trans Bn (Acft Maint and Sup) (Ambl) provides direct support for repair of 424 aircraft authorized in the division. During the reporting period, 513 aircraft were repaired and released to division aviation units. Five 12th preventive maintenance periodic inspections on CH47 aircraft (Operation Hook) were completed during the period, requiring an average of 16 days and 1,132 manhours per aircraft.

(5) The 801st Maintenance Battalion (Ambl) technical supply continued to process an average of approximately 20,000 requests per month. Demand accommodation fluctuated somewhat on a weekly basis, with the average for the period at 79.5%. The beginning of the period marked a very low 45% customer satisfaction average for the month of May. At this time the technical supply activity still had a 39% zero balance. Intensive studies were initiated, and the material release expediter (MRE) teams were strengthened. As a result, receipts began to rise and have brought customer satisfaction to a 70% average for the month of July. Many lines were dropped as a result of the study, and some 150 lines have been shifted to the 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Ambl). A 100% inventory was conducted in the latter part of May and

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the first week in June, which created a work backlog. When processing started again, there was so many customer issues that several lines went to zero balance, and the percentage at zero balance started rising. The end of this period finds total receipts rising again to replenish the exhausted stockpile. The impact of the inventory was felt for a few weeks, however, and the end result was fewer warehouse demands. The beginning of the period saw 460 warehouse demands for the month of May, compared to 176 at the present time.

Technical supply is presently carrying 5,118 lines which occupy approximately 90% of available storage space.

The battalion continued to provide contact teams for the line units and maintenance stand downs. The on-the-spot contact teams have continued to increase material readiness and provide for more efficient combat units. A total of 511 technical assistance visits was conducted during the period.

The country store listing was expended to reduce further the customer unit administrative requirements for submitting parts requests.

g. (U) Civil Affairs.

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province continued at an accelerated rate throughout the reporting period. The number of projects in progress at the beginning of the period was 136. During the period, 106 new projects were initiated, 102 projects were completed, and at the end of the period, 140 projects were in progress. All the division's efforts are closely coordinated with GVN officials at province and district levels. The overall effort of the division is directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. The Province Civic Action Priority List, developed at the hamlet, village, and district levels and consolidated and approved at the province level, serves as the guideline in the selection of projects to be undertaken.

(2) On 23 June, the final refugee resettlement payment was made, thereby eliminating all registered refugees from the rolls in Thua Thien Province. The resettlement payment, which consists of 10 sheets of tin and 7,500$VN per family, normalizes a refugee camp, thus creating an official political entity. When conditions permit, the people of a normalized community have the option of returning to their original villages. When this is done, the returning families receive a return-to-village (RTV) payment, which also consists of 10 sheets of tin and 7,500$VN per family. As of 30 June 1970, 63,129 of the 85,114 refugees generated during and after the Tet offensive of 1968 had been returned to their native villages. There remain approximately 22,000 people in 26 normalized camps and an additional 15,000 people scattered throughout the province, who are entitled to the return-to-village payments upon return to their ancestral homes. Continued division assistance in the program is taking the form of limited logistic and material support.
for related civic action projects. A total of 27 projects is planned, including 15 schools, three dispensaries, three markets, and six wells. For these projects, the province is supplying cement and roofing, RF and PF cadre provide the labor, and the division supplies lumber, reinforcing steel bars, and nails. The Phase I Program achieved 136% of the Return-to-Village Program's 1970 goal.

(3) In December 1969, the division support command initiated a program to upgrade the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center (SMADSLOC) of Thua Thien Province. From its new location in Hue, the SMADSLOC will provide management, support, and services to all RF, PF, PSDF, and RD cadre and their equipment in the province. Fourteen major subprojects constitute the Division Support Command effort, with each subproject undertaken by the appropriate element of DISCOM. Of these, five have been completed, and six others are in progress.

(4) During the period of this report, a total of 405 MEDCAPs was held, and 23,465 medical and dental patients were examined.

(5) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Phu Loc District.

1. An Bang Hamlet school construction (ZD144005)
2. Thu Luu Hamlet dispensary (ZD201012)
3. Vong Tri Hamlet school addition (ZD083008)

(b) Phu Vang District.

1. Phu An Village dispensary (YD812262)
2. Phu Vang District dispensary repair (YD779277)
3. Phu Tan Village dike repair (YD816301)

(c) Phong Dien District.

1. Phong Dien Hamlet Farmers' Association Bldg repair (YD528348)
2. Pho Trach Hamlet market place (YD503424)
3. Bo Dien Hamlet school repair (YD615298)
4. Phong An Village office (YD611291)

(d) Huong Dien District.

1. Dien Loc Hamlet school repair (YD595465)
2. Ke Mon Hamlet school repair (YD568464)
3. Vinh Xuong Hamlet school repair (YD551473)
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The My C nursery school construction (YD620456)
The Chi Try Hamlet dispensary (YD620436)
Dien My Village dispensary construction (YD678680)

(a) Huong Tra District.
1 Long Ho Truong Hamlet school furniture (YD702182)
2 Long Khe Hamlet footbridge (YD618272)

(f) Huong Thuy District.
1 Huong Thuy District power line (YD819179)
2 Xuan Hop Hamlet health station (YD782239)
3 Province prison farm equipment repair (YD802215)

(g) Phu Thu District.
1 Quang Xuyen Hamlet school construction (YD895245)
2 Vich Luu Hamlet school construction (YD895215)
3 An Luu Hamlet dispensary construction (YD894572)
4 Loc San Hamlet school construction (YD873236)

(h) Hue.
1 Phu Vinh Village school addition (YD758206)
2 Phu Ho Hamlet latrine construction (YD773234)
3 Phu Hop Village reading room construction (YD769228)
4 Phu Hiep Hamlet street repair (YD770248)

(i) Vinh Hai Hamlet school repair (YD080125), Vinh Loc.

(6) During the reporting period, 102 projects were completed including 17 schools, 11 dispensaries, two village headquarters, 32 wells, 20 information boards, three bridges, two dikes, and 15 others.

(7) The division currently has 140 civic action projects underway. These include eight schools, nine dispensaries, three administrative buildings, 10 markets, 14 police stations, 77 wells, one road repair, three footbridges, and 15 other.

(8) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

- Cement 2,750 bags
- Tin 1,106 sheets
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction lumber</td>
<td>29,141 board feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>30 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>686 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>37 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crushed rock</td>
<td>19 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire</td>
<td>1,275 linear feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>685 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo boxes</td>
<td>28,317 boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>2,040 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen wire</td>
<td>8 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>220 kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culvert</td>
<td>875 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plywood</td>
<td>375 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap wood</td>
<td>4,680 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing steel bar</td>
<td>4,042 linear feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) The initial land reclamation and driver training effort in Phong Dien District was completed during the period. Two of the four Minneapolis-Moline tractors were displaced to Phu Vang District, one to Huong Thuy District, and one is presently being repaired. The program is now entirely a Vietnamese responsibility, to include the maintenance, repair and operation of equipment.

(10) On 28 May, BG Smith, ADC(6), and COL Tran, Province Chief, attended the dedication ceremony of Phong An Village Headquarters in Phong Dien District. In a speech delivered by the Phong An Village chief, it was noted that 10 years ago Phong An was a scenic and prosperous area, with a well developed economy. In 1964, the village headquarters was destroyed in a wave of disruptive activities. In subsequent years the village headquarters was relocated twice and destroyed each time. Now, 100% of the local population has resettled to its original location, irrigation canals have been constructed, and three schools have been repaired through the pacification program since early 1969.
In conclusion, the village chief pledged further development in security, economics, and education.

h. (U) Psychological Operations.

(1) Type and quantity of propaganda media employed:

(a) Total leaflets disseminated:
   Air: 23,871,000  Ground: 59,100

(b) Total loudspeaker broadcast hours:
   Air: 645:00  Ground: 1,041:30

(c) Total movies shown: 123
   Total hours: 333:45

(d) Quick reaction leaflets:
   Four missions for 290,000 leaflets

(e) Quick reaction broadcasts:
   Five missions for 17:00 hours

(f) Hoi Chanh: Eight

(2) The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 101st Airborne Div (Ambl) cooperated in the development of leaflets and tapes for employment against the 66th NVA Regiment and other NVA units in the vicinity of FS/OB HENDERSON. The operation involved 15 hours of aerial broadcast and the distribution of 360,000 leaflets. One NVA soldier rallied during the reporting period.

(3) On 29 May, an earlyword mission was conducted by the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) in support of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf. Several minor SOI compatibility problems were encountered but have since been eliminated. It is felt that this mission constituted a milestone in the division's PSYOP effort, since this was the first time that an earlyword mission was conducted under the recently directed XXIV Corps PSYOP ground communication system.

(4) In an obvious effort to counter the strong psychological impact of the accelerated pacification and development program in Thua Thien Province, the enemy increased terrorist activities in the populated lowlands during the latter part of May. VC incidents ranged from destruction of 1,000 meters of hamlet fencing and distribution of VC propaganda leaflets to the assassination of the Phong Dien District Chief. As yet, the full impact of these incidents has not been determined. No appreciable change in the attitude of
the people toward the GVN has been detected, and it is felt that the terrorist activities will serve only to alienate the people further from the NVA/VC.

(5) During the middle of June, a photography team from the 4th PSYOP Group supported the division with photographic coverage of successful civic action projects throughout the province, taking approximately 400 slides which were later developed in Saigon. A slide show, code named "Operation Building Block", will be shown throughout the province by the audio-visual teams in cooperation with Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) cadre, in order to stimulate populace participation in civic action projects, thus emphasizing the overall nation-building effort.

(6) Based on recent events and intelligence reports gathered on 20 June in the vicinity of the Vietnamese Salient, 100,000 quick reaction leaflets were printed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion, for employment against the 66th NVA Regiment and dropped by the 9th SOS on 21 June, exploiting the discovery of a large enemy hospital complex. In addition, the division PSYOP section conducted an aerial broadcast mission using tape recordings. Although concrete results could not be measured, it appears that quick reaction PSYOP missions of this nature have a detrimental effect on enemy morale due to the high credibility of the factual messages.

(7) On 8 July, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, on an armed aerial reconnaissance mission, in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, observed 150 to 200 NVA in the open. In response to an immediate PSYOP mission request from the squadron, the division provided PSYOP support to the operation. Surrender or Die leaflets and safe conduct passes were dropped, and an ARVN lieutenant made aerial broadcasts in response to the varied ground actions. Subsequent airstrikes and ground operations were exploited with Ist Inf Div (ARVN) PSYWAR broadcasts and quick reaction leaflets. Total NVA losses, after several days of operations, were very heavy. This action had a significant psychological impact on the NVA.

(8) One NVA corporal rallied on 23 July in Nam Hoa District. Utilizing the Rallier's Guide, 15,000 quick reaction leaflets were prepared and printed containing the rallier's name, rank, unit, and a statement concerning his excellent treatment by the GVN. Information obtained during interrogation was used to prepare a tape which was recorded by the Hoi Chanh for broadcast. He was later exploited by the Ist Brigade, which took him on an aerial reconnaissance over the area he had described during his interrogation to identify significant areas. Results of this effort were minimal as he could not associate the airborne view with familiar terrain.

(9) A USAF aircraft flew a timely high altitude mission in support of
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Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363, dropping six million leaflets into the A SHAU Valley and the immediate region to the northeast. Themes for this sortie were Surrender or Die, Beware of B-52 Strikes, and Allied Firepower.

1. (C) Medical.

   (1) During the reporting period, tactical deployment of companies within the 326th Medical Battalion (Ambl) remained the same as in the previous quarter, with Company A in direct support of the 1st Brigade, Company B in direct support of the 2d Brigade, and Company C in direct support of the 3d Brigade. Headquarters and Support Company continued to provide area medical support for the division's rear elements located at CAMP EAGLE.

   (2) Medical Statistical Recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO A</th>
<th>CO B</th>
<th>CO C</th>
<th>SPT CO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,073</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>8,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total patients seen at clearing station:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dental patients: 0</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>2,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admissions: 135</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total transferred: 116</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recapitulation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRHA 85</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC 304</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical diseases:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUOs 71</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea 51</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin diseases 199</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>1,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/P 5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis 30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot problems 24</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>198</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heat injuries 22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD 121</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med evac missions: 1,094</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (3) Movement of the 32d Medical Depot from Phu Bai to Da Nang increased the order and shipping time of medical supplies from eight to 15 days. This delay necessitated initiation of weekly circuit supply missions by the battalion. Due to the increased distance, any emergency supplies must be delivered by helicopter.

   (4) Company MEDCAP programs have continued, with medical companies in support of brigade civil affairs programs. Each physician is scheduled for a minimum of one MEDCAP per week.
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5) The air ambulance platoon continued to perform its mission of providing aero-medical evacuation support to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl). The majority of this support originated from CAMP EAGLE. However, for most of the period two UH-1H air ambulances have been stationed at CAMP EVANS to provide quicker response to northern sections of the AO. During this reporting period, one of the battalion's authorized twelve aircraft was placed with division flight standards, leaving eleven functional aircraft with the platoon.

6) Mandatory training required by USARV Regulation 350-1 is being actively conducted and posted to individual training records. Emphasis has been placed on OJT and MOS cross-training to increase individual proficiency and to reduce the impact of DEROS losses and temporary absences of personnel. The air ambulance platoon has taken maximum advantage of unfavorable weather during the period to improve individual aviator proficiency in instrument flight and inclement weather procedures.

j. (C) Signal.

1) The 501st Signal Battalion (Ambl) continued its mission to provide communications-electronics support for the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) throughout the reporting period. RATT teams continued to support the division, the three brigades, and DISCCOM. In Operation BARBER GLADE, secure RATT was provided in support of Project Delta at Mai Loc. Both AM and FM RFI stations continued in operation, and a jump capability was provided at all times. The battalion responded to increased requests for 4-channel communications, linking brigades to battalion CPs at forward fire support bases, by installing AN/GRC163 equipment at FS/OB RAKKASAN, SHOCK, VECHEL, KATHRYN, ERICK, GLADIATOR, and MAUREEN. Four channel systems continued to be provided at Phu Loc District Headquarters, FS/OB BIRMINGHAM, FS/OB BASTOGNE, CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANS, EAGLE BEACH, and FS/OB RIPCORD. Four channel systems were also provided at Mai Loc for Project Delta, and at FS/OBs HENDERSON, HOLCOMB and SHEPHERD, CAMP CARROL and Dong Ha in support of combined US/ARVN operations. Four channel systems were provided at FS/OBs TUN TAVERN and BARNETT in support of ARVN operations. Operational and maintenance responsibility of the 4-channel system linking FS/OB T-BONE to Hue utilizing AN/MRC68 equipment was transferred to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The battalion maintained an overall multi-channel reliability of 98.6% during the reporting period. This can be attributed to three factors: (a) the increased responsiveness of the ADAO in providing helicopter support to deliver equipment to fire support bases when equipment failures occurred;

(b) the decrease in maintenance problems with the multiplexer AN/TCC70 of the AN/GRC163 due to familiarity gained through its continued utilization; and

(c) authorization of the battalion to obtain a temporary excess of AN/GRC163 equipment, which provided reliable backup reserves.
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(2) The battalion continued its policy of direct exchange of equipment that could not be immediately repaired. Division units were further assisted by signal contact teams sent to field locations for on-site repairs. There were 921 work orders completed during the reporting period. Receipt and issue of additional crypto equipment relieved some of the past shortages and provided additional flexibility.

(3) The division's four MARS stations completed 13,84.3 phone patches during May, June and July. The division MARS stations set a UARV record with 5,253 calls during the month of May.

(4) The 63d Signal Battalion continued to provide cable, 12-channel VHF, and microwave communications support to major subordinate and higher unit headquarters. During Operation CLINCH VALLEY in July, contingency circuits from CAMP CARRUL to CAMP EVANS and CAMP EAGLE were activated in support of the 3d Brigade forward CP.

(5) The battalion began a program of training selected personnel of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) signal battalion. To date, three officers and six enlisted men have received two weeks of OJT in the theory and operation of various equipment in the battalion. The ARVN personnel spent two weeks living and working with the 501st Signal Battalion.

k. (U) Engineer.

(1) During the reporting period, the 326th Engineer Battalion (Ambl) continued to provide general and direct support to the division. One new firebase was opened and several old firebases reopened. Upgrading of the Phu Thu Estuary Road, the Jeanne-Knight Road, and the Street Without Joy projects, was completed in support of tactical and civic action requirements. Project LIFESAVER was discontinued during the reporting period after the construction or improvement of 15 landing zones in the division AO.

(2) During the last week of May, engineer support was consolidated and committed to establishing a forward line of hardened firebases in the division area of operation. The preponderance of engineer effort for the remainder of the reporting period was committed to this task. Initially four firebases were programmed for complete hardening. These hardening tasks committed A/326th Engr to FS/OB BRICK, B/326 Engr to FS/OB KATHRYN, Companies B and D of the 27th Engr to harden FS/OB VEGHEL and to complete construction of an access road to the firebase from Route 547, and Company D of the 14th Engr to harden FS/OB RAKKASAN and to complete construction of an access road to the firebase from FS/OB JACK. FS/OB RIPCORD was designated to be hardened on a selective basis. During the last two weeks of the reporting period, two additional firebases were designated to be hardened. FS/OB GLADIATOR is to be completely hardened and FS/OB MAUREEN is to be hardened selectively.

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During the summer season, with its sparse rainfall, helipad maintenance became a prime engineer mission, with upgrading projects completed at FS/OB ARSENAL, TOMAHAWK, BASTOGNE, KATHRYN, LOG BANGS and VEGHEL; at Phu Loc, Phu Thu, and Nam Hoa district headquarters; and at various base camp helipads. Potable water was provided throughout the area of operation, with purification units located at FS/OB BASTOGNE, FS/OB VEGHEL, Mai Loc, the Thuu Luu Bridge, and CAMP EAGLE.

At the beginning of the reporting period, a new firebase (FS/OB SHOCK), was created out of an existing landing zone. This firebase was constructed under the airmobile firebase concept of seven to 10 days occupation, and was closed after nine days of occupation. FS/OB KATHRYN, reopened during the latter part of the previous reporting period, continued to receive engineer support in the form of demolition and earthmoving work. The existing hill mass was leveled so as to support two artillery batteries. The task of hardening FS/OB BRICK encompassed the construction of one 20'x32', three 10'x24' and 41 8'x12' bunkers; installation of a tactical wire barrier; clearing of adequate fields of fire and preparation of logistic helicopter landing pads. During the hardening process, a system of prefabricating and airlifting bunkers to the job site was initiated with excellent results. The hardening process of FS/OB BRICK was completed by the end of the second month of the reporting period.

During the month of June two LZ cutting/bunker busting teams were inserted into western Quang Tri Province in support of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav operations. One team was inserted into the FS/OB ROBIN area to cut an LZ to permit the extraction of medical supplies and documents from an NVA hospital site and to destroy the remaining bunkers. The second team was inserted near FS/OB SNAPPER to cut an LZ to extract portions of a rice and weapons cache. This team was also used to destroy the remaining ordnance, rice, and bunkers.

At FS/OB VEGHEL, a project was undertaken to provide adequate drainage facilities for structures on the firebase, to lay wire barriers, and to clear fields of fire. The hardening process on FS/OB VEGHEL was completed by the 27th Engr bn in late June. An additional requirement to establish a 1st Brigade forward CP, consisting of one 10'x24' TOC and six 8'x12' sleeping position bunkers, was completed during the last week of the reporting period.

Maneuver elements occupying FS/OB RIPOCORD continued to receive engineer support throughout the entire reporting period. A refuel point for UHHR and LOH aircraft was constructed, and bunkers were emplaced in selected positions around the firebase. Additional support included wire barriers, fields of fire, defensive positions, and adequate drainage facilities. During the latter stages of the reporting period, additional engineer support was committed to the firebase to counter increased enemy activity.
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(a) Company B was tasked with improving the defensive posture of the firebase by constructing additional bunkers, a quad-50 position, numerous revetments, a new log pad, and repair of damaged structures and positions. A new position for a 105mm howitzer battery was built after a CH47 crashed and destroyed the existing battery, to include a massive EOD effort to deactivate and destroy the damaged artillery ammunition. Engineer elements were extracted with the closing of the firebase on 23 July.

(b) In support of increased enemy activity around FS/OB RIPCORD, FS/OB GLADIATOR was reopened. One platoon of engineers was inserted on 19 July to harden the firebase. Tasks to be accomplished included construction of 63 bunkers and two log pads, clearing fields of fire and installation of tactical wire. At present 39 bunkers have been completed.

1. (C) Army Aviation.

(1) General.

(a) Throughout the reporting period, the 101st Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile) provided aviation support to the division and non-divisional units in I Military Region. In addition to providing airlift and armed aerial escort support, the group augmented the aeromedical capability of the medical battalion and provided air traffic and pathfinder support and limited battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.

(b) Aviation requirements were met on a daily basis to provide the necessary support for combat operations, logistic resupply, and pacification and development efforts. Aviation support was also provided for Special Forces Project Delta; CCN missions; the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in conjunction with the Vietnamese Air Force.

(c) Operation LIFESAVER and its program of landing zone expansion was concluded on 5 June 1970. During the reporting period, LIFESAVER teams completed 15 LZs, thereby increasing the total number of LZs created during Operation LIFESAVER to 170. All of these LZs are functional two ship LZs with high speed routes of approach and departure. During the reporting period, pathfinders controlled air traffic on as many as 14 fire support bases at one time.

(2) The following are statistical data for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HRS FLN/W</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>ACFT RECOV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st Avn Bn</td>
<td>18,173</td>
<td>61,850</td>
<td>66,377</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158th Avn Bn</td>
<td>18,156</td>
<td>62,778</td>
<td>68,358</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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UNIT | HRS FLOWN | SORTIES | PERS | TONS CARGO | ACFT RECOVERIES
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
159th Avn Bn | 10,917 | 30,861 | 92,098 | 52,401 | 2
163d Avn Co | 5,690 | 22,686 | 8,777 | 0 | 0
GROUP TOTAL | 52,936 | 178,175 | 235,610 | 56,329 | 13

(3) The number of aircraft receiving ground fire increased by 98 over the last reporting period. The 101st Aviation Group experienced 187 incidents of ground fire reported as follows:

UNIT | AH-1G | OH-6A | CH-47 | CH-54 |
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
135 | 10 | 3 | 38 | 1

(4) The 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) conducted two airmobility classes for commanders and staff officers of the division during the reporting period. The first class (15-16 May) was attended by 39 personnel. The second airmobility class, conducted on 26-27 June, was attended by 31 personnel. Two pathfinder classes were conducted to train ARVN personnel. The first, from 4 May to 15 May, graduated one officer, two warrant officers, and 12 NCOs. The second, from 25 May to 5 June, graduated one officer, two warrant officers and 11 NCOs.

(5) Air traffic activities for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Eagle CCA</th>
<th>Eagle Tower</th>
<th>Liftmaster Tower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>59,063</td>
<td>9,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>26,183</td>
<td>10,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>28,451</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Throughout the period, the 101st Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) (Ambl) and the 158th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) (Ambl) alternated their companies in providing direct combat and logistic support to the brigades of the division. The 159th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter) (Ambl) continued to provide general support to the division for the air movement of artillery, combat troops, and supplies. Logistic support was also provided to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); the 1st Inf Div (ARVN); and Project Delta. The 163d Aviation Company (GS) (Ambl) continued to provide general support to the division, performing visual reconnaissance, photography missions, courier service, psychological operations support, airborne personnel detector missions and command and control. The company

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provided air transportation for the division general staff. During the reporting period, the 530th Transportation Detachment (Aircraft Maintenance) (Airmobile) was attached to the company and accomplished direct support maintenance on all company aircraft.

m. (U) Air Cavalry Operations. The 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry continued to perform extensive armed aerial reconnaissance throughout northern I Military Region in support of Allied operations. The squadron engaged in combat as an economy of force unit, provided immediate reaction forces for enemy contact and security of downed aircraft and surveillance and security operations for the division and subordinate combat elements.

(1) The 2d Sqdn (Airmobile), 17th Cav is one of the primary intelligence gathering agencies of the 101st Abn Div (Airmobile). With three air cavalry troops, a ground troop and Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry attached, the squadron performs extensive air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance. In the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information, the squadron works closely with US and ARVN intelligence agencies. Close coordination is maintained with the division order of battle, imagery interpretation, ground surveillance and G-2 air sections and division IFW teams. Valuable intelligence is gained through cooperation and informal coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech). Based on intelligence indicators, the squadron's combat elements are targeted against specific areas of interest in order to provide the commanding general with a clear assessment of the situation in all reaches of the division area of operation.

(2) The most significant findings attributed to armed aerial reconnaissance by the 2d Sqdn (Airmobile), 17th Cav during the reporting period were in June, when an extensive rear service area of the 66th NVA Regt was discovered in the FS/OB Leatherneck area, and in July, when air cavalry elements discovered the 9th NVA Regt, 3/4th NVA Division, infiltrating into SVN.

(3) Extensive employment of the 2d Sqdn (Airmobile), 17th Cav throughout the division AO, with particular emphasis on the division reconnaissance zone, resulted in 2,125 spot reports of enemy activity, eight crew served and 41 individual weapons captured, 396 enemy killed and five prisoners captured.

n. (U) Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades, with the 2d Bn (Airmobile), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 3d Brigade; the 2d Bn (Airmobile), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st Brigade; and the 1st Bn (Airmobile), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d Brigade.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFR-65 (R2) (U)

Battery D, 2d Bn (Airmobile), 320th Arty (105) remained attached to the 3d Bn (Airmobile), 566th Infantry in II Military Region.

The 2d Bn (Airmobile), 11th Arty (155), the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty, and A Btry (Arty), 377th Arty remained in general support of the division.

The following 108th Artillery Group units were located in the division area of operations in a general support role: Btry A, 2d Bn (8"/175) (SP), 94th Arty at C1; Btry A, 1st Bn (8"/155) (SP), 39th Arty at FS/308 BAKKASAN; Btry B, 1st Bn (8"/175) (SP), 39th Arty at FS/308 BANABARA; Btry C, 1st Bn (8"/155) (SP), 39th Arty at Camp Evans; Btry A, 1st Bn (82/175) (SP), 85d Arty at FS/308 BASTOGNE; Btry B, 1st Bn (82/175) (SP), 85d Arty at FS/308 BIRMINGHAM; and Btry C, 1st Bn (8"/175) (SP), 85d Arty at FS/308 VEGHEL.

Btry B, 2d Bn (8"/175) (SP), 94th Arty of the 108th Artillery Group was located at CAMP CARROL in Northern I Military Region and provided fires in general support of the division.

Btry D (M42), 1st Bn, 49th Arty and a section of Btry C (M55), 65th Arty of XXIV Corps Artillery were deployed in the division AO to provide fires for base and bridge security.

(2) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation to disrupt enemy lines of communication and infiltration routes. This was accomplished through artillery raids and fires in reaction to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Extensive artillery fires were employed nightly in the "rocket belt" areas on the periphery of the populated lowlands and in the area adjacent to military installations.

(3) Throughout the reporting period, JS and ARVN artillery units continued to employ coordinated fires in support of combined operations. The division artillery aerial surveillance program continued to locate and adjust fires on enemy forces and to provide observation for artillery registrations.

(4) During the period of heavy enemy contact in the vicinity of FS/308 BASTOGNE in July, Btry B, 2d Bn (Airmobile), 319th Arty suffered heavy damage when a CH47 aircraft crashed and burned in the 105mm ammunition storage area, causing a major fire on the firebase. All six 105mm howitzers of the battery were destroyed.

(5) Re-positioning of Artillery Support:

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c. (U) Information.

(1) Public Information.

(a) Number of hometown news releases: 4,935.

(b) Number of news/feature stories released to public and military media: 175.

(c) Number of photographs released: 129.

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 94.

(e) Coverage was also provided for 30 distinguished visitors to the division, including Representative William O. Cowger (R-Ky) and General William C. Westmoreland, CSA.

(2) Command Information.

(a) During the reporting period, six issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", and the spring issue of the division magazine, "Rendezvous with Destiny", were published.

(b) In support of President Nixon's proclamation of the period 24-30 May as Drug Abuse Prevention Week, the information office instituted the following:

1 A half-hour discussion program on drug abuse was broadcast over APVN-TV Quang Tri at 1550 hours 30 May. The program featured one medical officer, one legal officer, and a moderator from the division.

2 A 30 second radio "spot" announcement concerning drug abuse and the division amnesty program was broadcast daily over APVN-R, Quang Tri.

3 The "Airborne Dateline" featured drug abuse and the division amnesty program each day in the cartoon and special announcement section.

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4. A file on drug abuse prevention was attached to the daily bulletin
for distribution and posting.

5. USAFR Post Sheet 26-70, "Drug Abuse in the Military", was reproduced
and distributed with a cover letter requiring the topic to be covered during
June at all unit commanders' calls.
2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Use and update of intelligence data base information.

(a) Observation: A data base of intelligence information on the location of enemy bunker complexes, cache sites, trails, and other information gathered during combat operations and maintained at maneuver battalion level, provides valuable information for units conducting patrol, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.

(b) Evaluation: Experience has shown that when small unit commanders and patrol leaders are thoroughly briefed on previous enemy positions and activities in their area of operation, from information provided by an accurate and current intelligence data base, the information gathered by the unit and returned to intelligence personnel is much more detailed and valuable. The data base can be kept current and will provide indications of enemy trends and activities in the area. The exchange of this type of information with adjacent units or units moving into the area for the first time, increases the overall effectiveness of operations.

(c) Recommendation: That unit intelligence personnel (S2) be encouraged to aggressively pursue a program of detailed intelligence gathering, collecting the data base, disseminating the data, and updating the data base from detailed debriefings.

(2) Acoustic sensors in support of ranger teams.

(a) Observation: Acoustic sensors can be effectively used to extend the surveillance capability of ranger teams for short periods of time.

(b) Evaluation: Following the insertion of Ranger Team "Cicada" on 18 April 70, six acoustic sensors were air delivered by personnel of the ground surveillance section, supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. The primary mission of the ranger team was to monitor sensor activity and respond with artillery fire. During the seven days the team monitored the acoustic sensors, it heard metallic sounds, voices, and screaming, when artillery was employed. Conversations heard and translated by a Kit Carson Scout revealed NVA/VC plans to ambush a US unit in the area. The plan was later abandoned due to non-availability of automatic weapons. NVA/VC were also heard monitoring US radio transmissions and discussing the disposition of US forces in the area.
Recommendation: That commanders consider the use of acoustic sensors with ranger teams for target acquisition and intelligence collection.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) Territorial force operations in the jungle canopy.

(a) Observation: During the last reporting period, a program of combined operations with Regional Force elements, operating in the canopy for short periods of time, was begun. Continued combined operations during this reporting period have culminated in independent RF company operations deep in the canopy for periods of up to 15 days.

(b) Evaluation: The RF companies continue to show progress in proficiency and aggressiveness. Continued operations, farther from the populated areas, increase the responsibility and sense of urgency of the PF and PSDF forces securing the populated lowlands.

(c) Recommendation: That continued coordination be maintained with GVN officials to encourage increased RF operations, in the canopy.

(2) Sniper team employment.

(a) Observation: A five man sniper team, employed with the PPS-5 radar, has shown to be a very effective method of interdicting enemy infiltration in the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. The effective employment of snipers is generally limited to open, relatively level terrain of the lowlands.

(b) Evaluation: Upon initial employment of the radar/sniper teams into known infiltration areas, movement was frequently detected and engaged. Infiltration through these areas was greatly diminished, and indications were that the routes were effectively interdicted.

(c) Recommendation: That units be made aware of this technique of interdiction.

(3) Mechanical ambushes.

(a) Observation: The extensive employment of mechanical ambushes during the reporting period has led units in the field to recommend the use of monofilament fish line as trip wire, used PRC25 batteries as the power source, and clothespins for the trigger device.

(b) Evaluation: The monofilament fish line has been procured locally or through individual purchase and is much preferred over trip wire. Used
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PRC25 batteries are readily available and durable in all weather conditions. The clothespin firing device is sensitive and quickly employed in the field.

(c) Recommendation: That units employing mechanical ambushes consider this technique of employment.

(4) Prefabricated firebase facilities.

(a) Observation: In conjunction with the division-wide program of hardening fire support bases against enemy attack, facilities such as bunkers, latrines, showers and other structures were prefabricated or constructed in rear base areas, and airlifted to the firebase.

(b) Evaluation: This procedure reduced time, effort, and aircraft blade time required for establishing and hardening a firebase. All tools and labor were readily available in rear areas, and no excess material was delivered to the firebase requiring backhaul or destruction.

(c) Recommendation: That units establishing forward fire support bases consider the construction or prefabrication of facilities in rear areas, prior to delivery to the firebase.

(5) Local patrolling around forward firebases.

(a) Observation: During the present division operation (TEXAS STAR), an active patrolling program around forward fire support bases has severely limited the enemy's reconnaissance capability and delayed, and some times prohibited, his attack on the fire support base.

(b) Evaluation: Local patrolling around the fire support bases, from 1000 to 1500 meters out, allows the firebase defenders to employ all defensive fires and enables the patrols to locate prepositioned enemy indirect fire weapons and cache sites. An enemy ground attack against FS/OB RICORD was very likely pre-empted on 22 July, when Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was engaged by an estimated two company enemy force approximately 1000 meters southeast of the firebase.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider an active patrolling program around forward fire support bases.

(6) Use of E-158 CS canisters.

(a) Observation: Aircraft are extremely vulnerable to small arms and mortar fire while entering and leaving a landing zone during combat assaults, extractions, or resupply.

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(b) Evaluation: Tactical CS has proven to be effective in limiting the enemy's ability of placing aimed fires into an LZ during these missions. In addition, experience has shown that it requires approximately 15-20 minutes for the enemy to place the first mortar round on an LZ. Employment of tactical CS on suspected mortar and forward observer positions, shortly after the initial insertion of troops, can assist in preventing effective mortar fire in or around the landing zone.

(c) Recommendation: That units conducting airmobile combat and resupply operations consider the use of tactical CS in restricting the enemy's indirect fire capability.

(7) Tactical CS against a fortified position.

(a) Observation: The enemy's limited protective capability against riot control agent CS makes its use against entrenched and fortified positions very effective.

(b) Evaluation: Employment of tactical CS has caused the enemy to withdraw from his fortifications, thus increasing his vulnerability to other supporting fires. Employment of Ein 58s against suspected enemy locations has also proved to be an effective means of reconnaissance by fire.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider the use of tactical CS agent against hardened targets.

(8) Quadrant system of control during airmobile assaults.

(a) Observation: The use of a standard quadrant system to divide the area around landing zones during combat assaults provides for better air traffic control and allows for continuous suppression around the landing zone.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that a system, consisting of the four major quadrants, NE, SE, SW, and NW, numbered one through four, respectively, is an excellent tool in planning for suppressive fires during combat assaults. Three quadrants are allocated a type of suppressive fire while the fourth is utilized for entrance and exit of the lift aircraft. The suppressive fires as well as airborne on call assets, i.e., tactical CS, crew recovery aircraft, and C&C aircraft, can be repositioned rapidly to meet a changing situation.

(c) Recommendation: That the system be considered for evaluation and possible inclusion as airmobile doctrine by other units conducting airmobile combat assaults.
Helicopter ground-to-air incidents during BDA.

(a) Observation: During conduct of bomb damage assessment of B52 strikes, aircraft have frequently received small arms and automatic weapons fire and observed enemy activity in the strike zone.

(b) Evaluation: The frequency of these incidents indicates that the enemy expects a helicopter reconnaissance after a B52 strike and that the enemy surviving in the strike zone quickly recover to engage US aircraft. Successful countermeasures used by the division have been to employ an air cavalry team, consisting of 1 C&C aircraft, two AH-1G Cobras and a LOH, immediately after the strike. The employment of tactical CS (EC158 canisters), from the C&C aircraft, on suspected enemy locations, has reduced the effectiveness of the enemy fire.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders consider this technique during the conduct of bomb damage assessment.

Detailed studies have recently been concluded within the division in an effort to minimize friendly casualties and maximize the combat effectiveness of maneuver units. A study of the period 7 December 1969 through 9 July 1970 indicated that the majority of US casualties during the period were inflicted by enemy attacks on night defensive positions (NDP). The following lessons, some of them re-learned, have been emphasized in the division.

(a) Preventing the enemy from knowing the location and size of night defensive positions and denying him easy access into the area is extremely important. The area selected for an NDP should be located in rough terrain with thick underbrush whenever possible. This will make it difficult for the enemy to move up to the position without being detected, and the thick underbrush will often prematurely detonate RPG rounds fired towards the position.

(b) Movement into the NDP should be conducted about 15 minutes prior to full darkness, permitting personnel to establish their individual positions and begin setting up their trip flares, claymores, warning devices, and mechanical ambushes while they still have enough light to work safely. At this time, it is dark enough to prevent the enemy from observing these actions from a distance of more than 100 meters away.

(c) When establishing individual positions, personnel should avoid digging in next to trees or tree stumps. The enemy will fire his RPGs against trees and into heavy brush areas to create air bursts in order to spray the
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Area with shrapnel.

(d) An NDP should not be established on the side of a hill unless the top of the hill is reconnoitered and out posted. In a recent operation, a unit went into position on a small knoll below the top of a hill. The hill had been recently occupied by the NVA, and bunkers and cleared fields of fire had been established. When the NVA began an attack from this position, they had the advantage of cover, clear fields of fire, and dominant terrain.

(e) Mechanical ambushes and trip flares should be emplaced from 100 to 150 meters away from the individual positions of the NDP. When mechanical ambushes are tripped at this distance, early warning is provided and the NDP's location is not compromised. By employing the mechanical ambushes this far out, friendly movement near the NDP perimeter is not significantly restricted.

(f) At least two trip flares should be employed on the friendly side of the ambush. Friendly forces approaching the mechanical ambush from the NDP will be warned by tripping the flare. The flares will also provide an extra means of warning should the enemy succeed in bypassing the ambush.

(g) After the recovery of early warning devices and mechanical ambushes, squad patrols should be sent out on all sides of the NDP prior to the movement of the main body. The NVA will occupy positions as close as 20 meters from the NDP, apparently in order to provide themselves a sleeping position protected from friendly AAR, artillery, and mortar fires, and a position from which to reconnoiter the NDP. The squad patrols will seek out these positions and spoil any attempt by the enemy to ambush the unit.

(i) Ammunition allocation forecast.

(a) Observation: The division is required to submit a monthly forecast of expected ammunition expenditures for one month in advance. There are nearly 50 different types of ammunition which require forecasting and six different mathematical computations are required for each type.

(b) Evaluation: Because of the myriad of mathematical computations involved in the ammunition forecast it was considered an ideal type of program for the UNIVAC 1005 computer located at the division personnel center. The G3 section coordinated directly with personnel services branch to develop a computer program which would virtually eliminate the manual mathematical work on the forecast and reduce the chance of error considerably. The time required for completion of the report was reduced to approximately one day, resulting in an overall saving of 36 man hours of work. Further, the computer was able to print out the information and computations re-
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFGR-65 (R2) (U)

required in a useable format.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider using the inherent capabilities of the UNIVAC 1005 computer to forecast ammunition requirements.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (U) Training. None.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (C) Communications. Field expedient antenna.

(a) Observation: Communications in the canopy between companies in the field and the battalion TOC are often difficult.

(b) Units in the 3d Bde have successfully improved radio communications by using a field expedient antenna constructed from communications wire (WD1). At Tab 1 is a diagram of the field expedient antenna.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider the use of this simple, field expedient antenna to improve radio communication in the field.

h. (U) Materiel. None.

i. (C) Other.

(1) Civic action assistance by RD cadre.

(a) Observation: The success of civic action projects will invariably depend upon the leadership of the local Vietnamese officials. Although the majority of elected officials is very capable, there will always be some who are relatively ineffective. RD cadre are generally well trained, strong leaders, knowledgeable in civic action activities.

(b) Evaluation: RD cadre can provide valuable advice in the coordination of civic action projects and may be able to encourage completion of slow-moving projects.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel involved in civic action employ the assistance that can be provided by local RD cadre.

(2) NVA Sapper Attack against FSB Tomahawk. See Inclosure 5.

3. Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Commanding General, USARV, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The ORLL for 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) has been reviewed by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (C) This headquarters concurs with the report as written with the following comments.

   a. Reference the item concerning quadrant system of control during airmobile assaults, page 48, paragraph 2c(8). Using a standard reference system for all airmobile operations will assist in training of personnel and control of units. The information stated is not sufficient for adequate evaluation. However, additional information concerning techniques and control, to include examples and charts, will be provided by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) as soon as possible. Recommend either this system or a clock system of similar nature be evaluated and considered for possible inclusion in airmobile doctrine.

   b. Reference the item concerning helicopter ground-to-air incidents during BDA, page 49, paragraph 2c(9). Assessment of BDA must be rapid and complete. However, all methods of assessment must be varied to insure the enemy does not compromise the procedure of BDA used. Recommend this procedure be evaluated and considered for inclusion in BDA techniques.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. H. SMITH
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
AVHAT-OPS (15 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS (SFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 9648

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Clark W. Stevens Jr
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps
101st Airborne Div
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (P2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 MAR 71

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
ASST AG
Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, NC5 SPQR-60 (R2) (*)

terminated at dusk. A sweep revealed 15 NVA KIA, two RPG launchers, one AK-47, one M-60 machinegun, one M-79 grenade launcher and one PRC 25 radio set. Twenty-six US were wounded in the action.

At 29Z140, vicinity YD438190 (FS/GB GRANITE), Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf received an enemy ground attack supported by mortar and RPG fire. With flareships, USAF AC-119 "stinger" aircraft, ARA and tube artillery supporting the company, the enemy was repulsed and a first light sweep revealed 18 NVA KIA and one FW captured. The company suffered seven killed, seven wounded, and one missing in action.

On 30 April, FS/GB GRANITE received five separate mortar attacks resulting in 34 US WIA. ARA and tube artillery were employed on suspected enemy positions as air cavalry elements and ground forces searched for enemy mortar positions.

On 1 May, enemy indirect fire attacks continued on FS/GB GRANITE and GLADIATOR. A total of eleven attacks were directed at the fire bases as US ground units aided by counter-mortar radar and aerial reconnaissance aircraft continued to search for enemy mortar positions.

On 2 May, sixty-four 55 gallon drums of napalm were dropped in the vicinity of FS/GB HENDERSON to improve fields of fire. The 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt made heavy contact south of the firebase resulting in 18 enemy KIA. Enemy mortar attacks continued against FS/GB GRANITE. Air strikes against enemy mortar positions resulted in three NVA KIA, three secondary fires, four bunkers destroyed and one secondary explosion.

The search for enemy mortar positions in the vicinity FS/GB RIPCORD and GRANITE continued on 3 May, with heavy artillery support from FS/GB JACK. At 030330, CAMP EAGLE received seventeen 122mm rockets causing light damage to aircraft and ammunition supply points. Eleven US were wounded in the attack.

At 031130, vicinity YD511065 the 1st Plt, Co C, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf, while conducting patrol activities, received RPG and small arms fire from an enemy force at 40 meters. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA, tube artillery and air strikes on the enemy positions. A sweep of the contact area revealed 27 NVA KIA. US casualties were one KIA and 13 WIA.

On 4 and 5 May, a heavy artillery battery again moved to vicinity FS/GB JACK and was employed against suspected enemy mortar positions in the canopy vicinity FS/GB GRANITE. The battery returned to CAMP EVANS each night.

On 5 May, contacts by units of the 1st Bde, south of the THREE FORKS area of the SONG BO River resulted in 18 NVA KIA. US casualties were
(1) 29 April - 5 May 1970.

(a) On 30 April, the division commenced operations with the 54th ARVN Regiment in the area south of FS/OB HENDERSON. The 1st Bn, 54th ARVN Regt assaulted into the AO south of the FS/OB on 30 April followed by the 2d Bn which assaulted to FS/OB TUN TAVERN on 1 May. Both battalions conducted operations in coordination with the 3d Brigade. On 30 April, Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf assaulted to FS/OB HENDERSON and provided security for the insertion of Btry B(-), 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty and Btry B, 12th Arty (ARVN). The company passed to the operational control of the 3d Bde.

Also on 30 April, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf terminated operations south of CAMP EVANS and moved by air to FS/OB KATHRYN to commence reconnaissance in force operations to locate and destroy enemy anti-aircraft weapons and base camps in the area. The battalion (-) passed to the operational control of the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed OPCON to the 1st Bde at 1600 hours and continued operations southwest of FS/OB BULLET. Four US and one ARVN battalion were now conducting operations against elements of the 29th NVA Regt in the mountains, vicinity the SONG BO River.

(b) Significant Activities. At 201400, vicinity YD505077, the 2d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf received mortar and heavy small arms fire from an enemy force located in bunkers at a distance of 10 meters. The platoon employed organic weapons, tube artillery and ARA and was reinforced by the remainder of the company, Company C and the reconnaissance platoon. As the US elements maneuvered against the enemy force, supported by air strikes, ARA and tube artillery, the enemy fled to a second bunker complex at 1515 hours. At 1549 hours the enemy fled to a third bunker complex. The contact
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In this report, the 1st Bn, 54th ARVN Regt, conducted operations against elements of the 66th NVA Regt in the vicinity of YD44464 and FS/OB TUN TAVERN. On 6 May, the 4th Bn, 54th ARVN Regt, supported by US and ARVN elements, engaged two enemy platoons in bunkers 50 meters from their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. ARVN forces employed a sweep and revealed 28 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were five KIA and 26 WIA.

(2) 6 - 12 May 1970.

(a) On 6 May, the 4th Bn, 54th ARVN Regt, assaulted into an LZ northwest of FS/OB TUN TAVERN (vicinity FS/OB MINK) and joined the 1st and 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt, in conducting operations against elements of the 66th NVA Regt in the area. On 7 May, the 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt, was extracted and moved by air to CAMP CARROL and then by vehicle to DONG NAI.

In reaction to heavy enemy activity in the FS/OB HENDERSON area on 6 May, Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 401st Inf, and assaulted into the area north of FS/OB HENDERSON on 7 May to locate enemy units. A 3d Bde control element directed operations from the firebase. Companies C and D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, and continued operations south of FS/OB RIPCORD.

Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, returned to parent unit control on 9 May and the 3d Bde terminated operations in the FS/OB HENDERSON area as the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, returned to CAMP EVANS. The 2d Bn, 2d ARVN Regt, passed OPCON to the 54th ARVN Regt, to provide security for FS/OB HENDERSON.

On 9 May, the 2d Bn (-) (Ambl), 501st Inf, redeployed in the division AO vicinity FS/OB GLADIATOR and GRANITE with Co C and D returning to battalion control. Co A remained at CAMP EVANS to augment security and reequip.

On 10 May, the 1st Bn, 1st ARVN Regt, terminated operations with the 3d Bde vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD and moved to LA VANG to provide security in the area. The 3d Bde continued operations with two US and one ARVN battalion in the mountains south of FS/OB RIPCORD and PATTON.

Also on 10 May, the division assumed OPCON of Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (A). Two companies and elements of the headquarters moved by air from NHA TRANG to QUANG TRI and then by vehicle to MAI LOC. The detachment began preparations for insertion of reconnaissance teams into the division AO on 15 May.

On 11 May, the 3d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt, terminated operations with the 1st Bde vicinity the SONG BO River and moved by air to FS/OB ANZIO.

On 17 May, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, moved to PHU HAI COMBAT B-52 to conduct battalion refresher training and returned to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, returned to OPCON of the 3d Bde and continued operations against elements of the 903 NVA Regt. The CP of the
3d Bn, 5d ARVN Regt moved by air to FS/0B KATHRYN to prepare for assault of elements of the battalion into area south of the firebase on 13 May in OPCORD with the 1st Bde.

Throughout the period 6 - 11 May, A Btry (8-in), 1st Bn 39th Arty continued daily moves from CAMP EVANS to the area south of FS/0B JACK to deliver heavy artillery on suspected enemy mortar locations in the vicinity of FS/0B GLADIATOR and GRANITE. The battery returned to CAMP EVANS each night.

(b) Significant Activities. At 060505, FS/0B HENDERSON received RPG, small arms fire, satchel charges, recoilless rifle and mortar fire followed by a well organized and coordinated ground attack by the 8th Bn, 66th NVA Regt. Fires, started when the NVA employed flame throwers against the firebase, caused approximately 1000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition to explode. Defending forces supported by ARA, tube artillery and gunships accounted for 29 NVA killed. The enemy withdrew at 0720. Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air to reinforce Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, and to conduct a daylight sweep. Friendly elements received incoming mortar fire sporadically throughout the day. Artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes were employed against enemy mortar positions. The 2d Bn, 2d ARVN Regt assaulted south of FS/0B HENDERSON to locate and destroy the remainder of the enemy force. A number of friendly casualties were caused by the exploding 155mm artillery ammunition. Thirty-two US were killed in action, 33 wounded, and two missing in action. ARVN casualties were 19 KIA and 45 WIA.

On 7 May, FS/0B HENDERSON continued to receive sporadic mortar and recoilless fire throughout the day, resulting in four US and three ARVN WIA. At 070450, YD429122, (FS/0B MAUREEN) the 2d Plt, Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received 60mm mortar fire, small arms and satchel charges from an estimated enemy company. The platoon returned fire while a flareship and ARA were employed. Elements of the company moving to reinforce the platoon received small arms fire from an enemy force at 20 meters. The element returned small arms fire and the enemy fled. ARA, gunships and air strikes were employed on suspected enemy locations at 0700. 60mm mortar fire was received by the company at 0800 and again at 1500. Six US were killed in action and 12 wounded. A sweep revealed four NVA KIA.

On 7 and 8 May, the 1st Bn, 54th ARVN Regt continued to engage enemy forces in the FS/0B TUN TAVERN area accounting for 36 NVA KIA. At 080900, vicinity YD03560, the battalion discovered 30 graves containing 97 enemy bodies apparently killed by AF air strikes during the previous week.

At 091030, vicinity YD495954, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf received small arms and RPG fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated 12 - 15 enemy in bunkers. The company returned fire and withdrew as artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes were employed. A sweep of the area revealed 18 NVA KIA. Us casualties were one KIA and 12 WIA.

The period 10 - 12 May was marked by light contact in the division AO. Eighteen enemy were killed by small arms. ARA, tube artillery, sunshine, and air strikes.
Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned
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(3) 15 - 20 May 1970

(a) On 15 May, the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) moved by air from Camp 81-7 to PS/OB WEGHEL to join the 1st Bde conducting offensive operations against elements of the 20th NVA Regt in the mountains southwest of HUE. The three ARVN companies combat assaulted from PS/OB WEGHEL with Companies A and B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, into two landing zones south of the BAI LA River. The ARVN companies conducted patrols to the south and the two US companies conducted patrols north toward the river.

Inclement weather postponed the planned insertion of reconnaissance teams of Det B52, 5th SPC (2d) on 15 May. Two teams were inserted into the Vietnamese Salient vicinity XD922283 and XD881240 on 16 May.

On 18 May, in response to intelligence indicating a possible enemy attack against PHU BAI Combat Base and the DONG BA Training Center in celebration of the birthday of Ho Chi Minh, Companies B and C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of PHU BAI Base Defense. Co A passed OPCCN to the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf to screen south of PHU BAI. The division observed a cease fire and all offensive operations terminated with units assuming a defensive posture from 181200 to 191200 May.

On 19 May, the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) extracted from the 3d Bde AO and moved by air to LA VANG to refit and provide security in the area, leaving the 2d and 3d battalions conducting operations in coordination with the 5d Bde south of PS/OB RIPCORD.

Also on 19 May, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed battalion refresher training and prepared for redeployment into the division AO. Company C assaulted from PHU BAI Combat Base to PS/OB BRICK and prepared to receive artillery. On 20 May, the remainder of the battalion moved by air to PS/OB BRICK to commence search operations in the Ta TRI CH River Valley, and passed to the operational control of the 1st Bde.

On 20 May, the planned extraction of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf from vicinity PS/OB KATHRYN to PHU BAI Combat Base to conduct battalion refresher training was postponed due to inclement weather.

The 2d Bde continued to operate in the piedmont and to deploy Mobile Training Teams to increase the capabilities of territorial forces.

(b) Significant Activities. At 160428, vicinity YD487065, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf received RPG fire from an enemy location north of their night defensive position. Seven minutes later the company received RPG, automatic weapons and small arms fire from the enemy east and west of the position. The company returned organic weapons and tube artillery fire. A USAF flareship was employed to provide illumination. At 0521 hours the Recon Plt engaged enemy movement at YD490068. A first light sweep of both contact areas by the Recon Plt revealed five NVA KIA, two AK-47s and one RPG launcher captured. US losses were four KIA and 22 wounded.
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Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 150th Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG CPMH-65 (R2) (C)

At 160600, vicinity Y918236, while supporting the insertion of Recon Team 3, 852, 5th SFGA, an AHIC from Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 7th Artillery (Airmobile), received 25mm machine gun fire. Directed by the UH-1H command and control aircraft, the Cobra engaged the area killing 35 enemy and destroying two 2½ ton trucks. The 1st Plt, 2d Co, 81st Abn Bn (ARVN SP) was inserted near the target area to conduct further assessment of the ARA fires. The element made contact with an estimated 50 enemy, killing three and sustaining one KIA and one ARVN WIA. The platoon was unable to reach the target area and was extracted from a hot landing zone at 1820 hours by Co B, 150th Avn Bn (AH) (Airmobile).

At 171035, YD417996, a CH-47 from Co B, 158th Avn Bn (ASH) (Airmobile) received ground fire, crashed and burned. The aircraft was a total loss and five US were killed.

At 181645, a UH-1H aircraft from Co C, 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Airmobile) was reported missing with four crew members and two passengers aboard. The Aerial Rifle Platoon, Troop B, 2d Sqdn (Airmobile), 17th Cav was inserted at YD55236 on 19 May to conduct a search for the aircraft. The platoon was unsuccessful in locating the aircraft and was extracted prior to darkness. One member of the missing aircraft crew, who had walked from the crash site to a small landing zone, was extracted at 191400 hours by a UH-1H from Co A, 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Airmobile) on a mission for the 501st Signal Bn (Airmobile). The injured crew member stated the aircraft was hit by ground fire, attempted to make a forced landing on a landing zone, crashed and rolled down a hill into a canopy covered area. He had knowledge of the exact location of the aircraft or other crew members.

On 19 May, the 2d Co, 81st Abn Bn (ARVN) was inserted vicinity XD 907234 to conduct assessment of the ARA attack conducted on 16 May. The company photographed two destroyed 2½ - 5 ton type vehicles and was extracted on 20 May. Sporadic contact with the enemy resulted in 13 ARVN KIA during the operation.

At 201155, vicinity YD496069, the Recon 21st and Co A, 2d Bn (Airmobile), 502d Inf received intense small arms and RPG fire from three sides at 15 meters. The element returned fire, employed ARA and maneuvered against the enemy. Contact terminated at 1230 hours as the enemy filed leaving one KIA. US casualties were three KIA and nine WIA.

The 2d Bn (Airmobile), 501st Inf completed refresher training on 19 May and redeployed in the AO on 20 May. The Bn conducted a combat assault vicinity FS3 BRICK to conduct search operations in the TA TRACH River Valley and passed to the operational control of the 1st Bde.

Throughout the period 13 - 20 May elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions,

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1st Regt (ARNV) made contact with the enemy vicinity FSB BARBARA resulting in 64 NVA KIA and 11 ARVN WIA.

(4) 31 May - 1 June 1970

(a) On 31 May, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/0B KATHRYN to PHU BAI Combat Base and began preparation for battalion refresher training. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to OCPON of the 2d Bde. The 3d Bde assumed responsibility for the portion of the TINH FORES area of the SONG BO River vacated by the extraction of the 1st Bn (ambl), 501st Inf as CO B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from FS/0B KAKASKAN to FS/0B KATHRYN to provide security for the firebase and conduct local patrolling. The 1st Bde continued combined operations southwest of HUE with the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARNV) conducting operations against elements of two battalions of the 29th NVA Regt in the vicinity of FS/0B VEIGEL.

On 24 May, Companies A and D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air to FSB KATHRYN and passed from the operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf to conduct patrol operations north and south of the firebase. This movement was made in reaction to increased enemy activity in the area.

Also on 24 May, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf terminated operations vicinity FS/0B BASTOGNE and moved south to FS/0B VEIGEL to assume control of area Tango to conduct operations in coordination with the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARNV). The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf terminated operations in the vicinity of FSB VEIGEL and moved north to FS/0B BASTOGNE, assuming control of area Uniform.

On 26 May, the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARNV) terminated operations in coordination with the 3d Bde, vicinity FS/0B O'REILLY and BARBARA, and moved by air to LA VANG to conduct stand down. The 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARNV) moved by air from LA VANG to vicinity TD2433, east of FS/0B BARBARA, to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the area.

On 27 May, Companies A and D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf were released from OCPON of the 1st Bn (ambl), 506th Inf and returned by air to FS/0B BIRMINGHAM and control of the parent unit. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf terminated battalion refresher training and assumed control of area Whiskey from the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved to PHU BAI Combat Base to prepare for battalion refresher training to begin on 28 May.

The 2d Bde continued operations in the piedmont in the northern fringes of the canopy of THUA THIEN Province and conducted extensive patrol and night ambush operations in coordination with territorial forces to deny the enemy access to the population in the coastal lowlands.

The division continued to employ extensive ground and aerial sensor devices.
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to locate and monitor enemy movement and continued to engage suspected enemy locations with artillery fire and USAF aircraft. Det B52, 5th SPG(A) continued Operation BARBER GLADE maintaining reconnaissance and roadrunner teams in the division area of operation.

(b) Significant Activities. On 21 May, two OH6A helicopters from the 2d Sqdn (Amlb), 17th Cav received ground fire at 1555 hours, vicinity YC 493839, and at 1625 hours, vicinity XD781248, crashed and burned. Both aircraft were total losses and three crew members were wounded in action.

At 230940, vicinity YD499069, Co A, 2d Bn (Amlb), 502d Inf discovered twenty 4'x3'x4' bunkers containing bodies of twelve NVA killed by artillery, small arms and helicopter fire.

At 231655, vicinity XD912271, a UH1H from Co E, 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amlb), while conducting visual reconnaissance in support of Operation BARBER GLADE, received ground fire, crashed and burned. Six US and two ARVN were killed in action, including the commanding officer, Det B52, 5th SPG(A).

At 231800, and again at 2000 hours, at FSB KATHRYN, Co A, 1st Bn (Amlb), 506th Inf was attacked by fire with 60mm and 82mm mortar fire impacting inside the perimeter. Two to three 82mm mortar rounds, received during the 2000 hour attack, contained agent CS. ARA and tube artillery was employed against suspected enemy locations. Results of the two attacks were three US KIA and 25 WIA.

At 240600, vicinity YD075394 (2 KM SW of FSB HENDERSON), the 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company surrounding their night defensive position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA and tube artillery. A sweep of the contact area revealed 45 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were four KIA and 16 WIA.

At 261010, in reaction to a contact by elements of Co C, 2d Bn (Amlb), 506th Inf which resulted in two US WIA, a UH1H Medevac helicopter from Co C, 326th Med Bn (Amlb), while lowering the jungle penetrator at TD328206, received one RPG round in the fuel cell, crashed and burned. All four crew members were killed in action.

At 271045, vicinity YD436124, the Recon Plt, 1st Bn (Amlb), 506th Inf, while conducting patrol activities near FSB MAUREEN, received RPG and small arms fire from an enemy force at 35 meters. The element returned organic weapons fire and tube artillery. The enemy broke contact and fled. ARA was requested and arrived on station at 1105 hours and a pink team arrived at 1445. One NVA was killed by ARA fire. At 1806 hours the platoon engaged two enemy with small arms fire at 75 meters. An enemy force returned RPG, automatic weapons and small arms fire. ARA and gunships arrived on station.
and immediately engaged several enemy. Contact terminated at 1915 hours. A sweep of the area revealed six NVA killed by helicopter fire, six by ARA fire and seven by small arms fire. Two US were wounded in action.

At 021300, FS/OB O’HEILLY, the 1st and 2d Companies, 1st Bn, 1st Hqgt (ARVN) received mortar fire followed by a ground attack employing RPG and small arms fire. Elements on the firebase returned organic weapons fire and tube artillery. A flareship and ARA were requested and on station at 0255 and 0305 hours respectively. The enemy was repulsed before daylight and a first light sweep revealed 77 NVA KIA, two FN, 29 AK-47’s, eight RPG launchers, three Soviet RPG flame throwers and two Chicom radios. Three ARVN were killed and 15 wounded in the action.

At 211930, vicinity YD581309, the PHONG DIN District Chief was killed while driving to his home when he was attacked by Viet Cong employing B-40 rockets.

During the period 29 May to 1 June, 15 enemy were killed in sporadic activities throughout the division AO. Seven were killed by helicopter fire, four by small arms fire, two by tactical air strikes and two by artillery fire. An additional five NVA KIA were discovered in graves.

(5) 2 - 9 June 1970

(a) This period was marked by an increase in enemy contact with ARVN units and light contact with units of the division. ARVN and territorial force units accounted for 232 NVA and 20 VC killed in action. Thirty-seven enemy were killed in light contact with units of the division during the period.

On 2 June, the division provided aviation assets in support of the 2d Bn, 54th Hqgt (ARVN) in the successful defense of FS/OB TUN TAVERN against a determined attack by elements of the 66th NVA Hqgt which had moved from the BA LONG Valley area. Troops A and B, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cav provided continuous air cover in the area during the period of contact.

At 021255, the 2d Bde passed OICON of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf to the 3d Bde and assumed operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf which moved by air from FS/OB KATHRYN to CAMP EVANS to assume the mission of Division Ready Force and prepare for battalion refresher training. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/OB BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to FS/OB KATHRYN and assumed responsibility for area Sierra. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf redeployed in the AO vicinity FS/OB BIRMINGHAM to provide security for the firebase and conduct patrol and ambush operations in the area.

On 3 June, division aviation assets supported the insertion of the 51
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Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) and the extraction of the 2d Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) in the FS/0B TUN TAVERN area. The 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) passed to the operational control of the 54th Regt (ARVN). The 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) moved by air from FS/0B BARBARA and O'REILLY to LA VANG. The 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) remained in the FS/0B BARBARA - O'REILLY area and assumed the security mission for FS/0B O'REILLY.

At 060800, the 3d Bde assumed OPCON of the 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf from the 2d Bde as the battalion completed refresher training and moved by air from CAMP EVANS to FS/0B RIPCORD and GRANITE to provide security for the firebases and conduct operations in area Quebec. The 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf terminated operations vicinity FS/0B RIPCORD and moved by air to CAMP EVANS to prepare for refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force.

Also on 8 June, the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) moved by air from LA VANG to FS/0B O'REILLY to provide security for the firebase and conduct local operations in the vicinity of the firebase. The 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) moved by air from FS/0B O'REILLY to LA VANG to provide security in the area and stand down.

On 9 June, Det B52, 5th SFC(A) extracted all teams from the division area of operation and conducted stand down at MAI LOC. During the period 16 May - 9 June the detachment accounted for 50 enemy killed in action while sustaining seven US KIA, eight US WIA, 4 ARVN KIA and 36 ARVN WIA.

(b) Significant Activities. At 020430, FS/0B TUN TAVERN, the 2d Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) received an attack from all sides of the firebase by the 9th Bn, 66th NVA Regt employing 82mm mortar, 75mm recoilless rifle, RPG and small arms fire. Elements on the firebase returned organic weapons fire and employed flareships, ARA, tube artillery and air strikes. The enemy penetrated the perimeter and was able to occupy bunkers on the east side of the firebase. The situation was static at 0645 hours. At 0930 hours a renewed assault was made on the firebase from the north and northwest but was immediately repulsed. The enemy was driven from the firebase by 1115 hours although it continued to receive 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar fire sporadically throughout the day.

A sweep of the contact area revealed 81 NVA KIA and one PW. Three US from the 501st Sig Bn (Amb), in support of the 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) were casualties. Two were killed and one was wounded in action. ARVN casualties were 50 KIA and 119 WIA. Two US and one Australian advisor were wounded in action.

At 031453, vicinity YD022354 (1 KM W of FSB LANGLEY), the 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) discovered 20 NVA killed by air force and two bunkers with overhead cover destroyed by air strikes.
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At 041500, vicinity FS/OB TUN TAVERN (YD058428), the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), in a sweep conducted near the firebase, discovered 45 NVA killed by air strikes within the previous 72 hours. At 1640 hours the battalion engaged an enemy force with organic weapons fire, killing 10 NVA while sustaining two KIA. On the following day, elements of the battalion killed four more NVA that had attacked with 82mm mortar and small arms fire one kilometer southeast of FS/OB TUN TAVERN.

At 060550, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated two enemy companies with small arms fire at a range of 150 meters at YD043331. Tube artillery and ARA were employed and a sweep revealed 11 NVA KIA. At 1410 hours, vicinity YD035343, elements of the 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) discovered the bodies of 12 NVA KIA.

On 8 June, elements of the division discovered the bodies of seven NVA killed by artillery and air strikes in previous contacts and accounted for 11 more NVA KIA on 9 June as contact with enemy elements in the division AO remained light.

(6) 10 - 16 June 1970

(a) On 10 June, elements of the K4C Bn, 4th NVA Regt launched attacks by fire against units of the 2d Bde occupying FS/OB LOS BANGS, PHU LOC District Headquarters and NCOC NGOT Bridge. A simultaneous ground and mortar attack was directed at FS/OB TUMAHAWK. As part of the reaction to this contact the division provided aviation assets to the HOC BA0 Company and territorial forces for movement and assault into PHU LOC District to regain contact with the enemy after their withdrawal.

Also on 10 June, Det B52, 5th SFG(A) moved by vehicle to QUANG TRI and prepared for movement to NHA TRANG for stand down.

Poor weather conditions on 12, 13 and 14 June caused postponement of several tactical moves by air and the cancellation of 18 sorties of tactical air support. Improved weather conditions on 15 June permitted the division to continue extensive armed aerial reconnaissance in the division AO and to accomplish the repositioning of several units.

At 150900, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/OB KATHRYN and passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to OPCON of the 2d Bde. The battalion assumed responsibility for security of FS/OB RAKKASAN and initiated patrol and ambush operations in the populated areas to prevent infiltration of NVA and guerrilla forces into the populated lowlands.

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from the vicinity of FS/OB RIPCORD to vicinity FS/OB KATHRYN to assume responsibility for area Sierra.
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and conduct operations to locate and destroy elements of the 805th NVA Regt.

The 2d Bn (Airmob), 506th Inf completed battalion refresher training and redeployed to the AO moving by air from CAMP EVANS to FS/OB RIPCORD to assume responsibility for area Quebec. The battalion provided security for the firebase and initiated reconnaissance in force operations in the area.

The 1st Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN), operating in coordination with the 1st Bn (Airmob), 327th Inf, conducted a combat assault on 15 June into the area northeast of FSB GEORGE, vicinity ID4406, and began reconnaissance in force operations to the south on two axes.

(b) Significant Activities. At 100140, the 4th NVA Regt began four separate attacks on US units located in PHU LOC District. Co D(-), 2d Bn (Airmob), 327th Inf at FS/OB TONMAHAVK, received a ground attack supported by 82mm mortar, RPG and small arms fire by the 71st Sapper Company. Tube artillery, ARA, 81mm mortars, fougasse and organic weapons were employed against the enemy. Contact was broken at 0218 hours, although sporadic mortar fire continued until 0550 hours. None of the enemy, estimated to be 70 in strength, penetrated the perimeter. Twenty-eight NVA were killed and three prisoners were captured. One US was killed and two were wounded in action.

At 100144, PHU LOC District Headquarters and the command post, 2d Bn (Airmob), 327th Inf received two RPG rounds, one 122mm rocket and 20 - 25 82mm mortar rounds resulting in eight US WIA, including two US MACV advisors and one USM.

Between the hours of 0150 and 0445, Co B(-), 2d Bn (Airmob) 327th Inf, at FS/OB LOS BAMOS received approximately twelve 82mm mortar rounds, most of which impacted outside the perimeter. One US was wounded in action.

At 100158, mobile training team number 10, located vicinity NUOC NGOT Bridge (2D152010), received 15 mortar rounds, followed by three more at 0540 hours. The element employed 81mm mortar fire on suspected enemy locations.

At 100520, the 1st Co, 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN), at FS/OB ROY, received 10 - 20 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar fires were employed, no casualties were sustained.

The period 11 - 14 June was marked by light activity in the division AO. Two US were killed in action as the division accounted for 19 NVA KIA. Twelve NVA bodies were discovered KIA from earlier contacts. The bodies were found in graves or hidden from view in heavily vegetated areas. Gunships from the 2d Sqdn (Airmob), 17th Cav accounted for three NVA KIA, USAF air strikes killed two NVA, and ground action resulted in two NVA KIA.

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At 150945, gunships from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav engaged an enemy
force vicinity XD869565. At 1034 hours the Aerial Rifle Platoon, Trp A,
2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted to sweep the contact area and confirmed
twelve NVA killed by helicopter. The platoon engaged one enemy at 50 meters
at 1215 hours resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 16 June, in area Oscar, vicinity FSB GEORGIA, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt
(ARVN) made contact with enemy forces employing small arms, RPG and 60mm
mortar fire at 0945, 1030 and 1430 hours. The 1st and 2a Companies employed
small arms and artillery fire resulting in three NVA killed by artillery
and eight NVA killed by small arms. One ARVN was killed and 20 wounded in
the contacts.

(7) 17 - 25 June 1970

(a) On 17 June, at XD898316, elements of Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav,
while conducting visual reconnaissance in the FSB LEATHERNECK area, observed
10 NVA in the open, 150 – 200 log reinforced bunkers, 15 pup tents, two burning
camp fires, numerous lean-tos, 10 latrines and a network of trails leading
into the area.

Extensive visual reconnaissance by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th
Cav throughout the day on 18 June revealed heavy enemy activity and a large
number of additional bunkers in the FSB LEATHERNECK area. The area was engaged
by gunships, artillery and air strikes throughout the afternoon. There were
two incidents of ground to air fire in the area.

On 19 June, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, while conducting
bomb damage assessment of air force tactical air strikes, located an evacuated
600 man hospital complex west of FSB LEATHERNECK. Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th
Cav was inserted into the area and discovered medical supplies, rice, grenades
and miscellaneous equipment.

On 21 June, Trp D and the Reconnaissance Company (HHC BAO), 1st Inf Div
(ARVN) conducted a combined assault into the FSB LEATHERNECK - ROBIN area
to seek out and destroy enemy bunkers and cache sites. Continuous air cover
was provided by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav.

Also on 21 June, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf redeployed in the AO, pass-
ing to the operational control of the 1st Bde and moving by air to FSB BASTOGNE.
Co A secured the firebase while Companies B, C and D initiated search and
attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase.

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by vehicle from vicinity FSB BASTOGNE
to CAMP BAGUE and prepared for battalion refresher training and assumed the
mission of Division Ready Force.

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On 22 June, a task force under control of the 5d Bde, operating in coordination with the 5th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN), consisting of Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, the HOC BAO Company, and elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, conducted operations to further exploit enemy base areas and caches sites in the vicinity of FSB LEATHERNECK and SHEPHERD. Co A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed from operational control of the 1st Bde to O/C/LN of the 5d Bde and assaulted into FSB SHEPHERD. Elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty were moved by air to FSB SHEPHERD and SARCE to provide artillery support to the task force.

On 23 June, Det B52, 5th SFG(A) returned to MAI LOC and prepared to resume Operation BARBIER GLADE.

On 24 June, the 5th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) terminated operations in coordination with the 5d Bde in the FSB LEATHERNECK area and returned to DONG HA.

On 25 June, the 5d Bde Task Force was withdrawn from the northwestern portion of the division AO. Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf returned to parent unit control; the HOC BAO Co returned to HUE and was released to the control of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN); Btry A(-), 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty moved by air to FSB RIPCORD; and the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav resumed normal operations. Btry C(-), 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty remained at FSB SARCE and prepared to redeploy in the 2d Bde AO.

Also on 25 June, Det B52, 5th SFG(A) resumed Operation BARBIER GLADE with insertion of the 2d Plt, 44th Ranger Co into the vicinity of XD6344.

(b) Significant Activities. At 170340, vicinity XD441066 (Area Oscar), the light CP, 2d and 3d Companies, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), operating in coordination with the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, engaged an estimated enemy platoon near their night defensive position. Organic weapons, tube artillery, ARA, and a flareship were employed and resulted in 32 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were four with minor wounds.

On 18 June, in the Vietnamese Salient (XD8831), gunships, ARA, and air strikes were employed resulting in 26 NVA KIA. Weather precluded the insertion of Troop D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav into the area to conduct patrol and surveillance operations.

The weather cleared permitting insertion of Troop D on the 19th and a recently evacuated hospital complex was discovered. Nine enemy were killed in the Vietnamese Salient.

The insertion of Troop D and the ARP, Troop B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the HOC BAO Co into the vicinity of FSB ROBIN on 21 June to perform bomb damage assessment and to exploit B52 strikes, resulted in discovery of 62 bunkers, 50 tons of rice, medical supplies, six NVA killed by air force, a shirt identi-
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Identifying elements of the 7th Bn, 10th NVA Regt. and capture of two Pows. Three US were wounded in action when the ANG, 1/3SP (Air), 19th Cav received small arms fire and fragmentation grenades from 5-8 enemy at 15 meters. The element returned fire but the enemy withdrew and a sweep revealed no enemy casualties.

The 3d Bde combined task force, inserted into the vicinity FSB 

LEATHERNECK on 12 June, located and destroyed enemy installations and food stuffs until they were extracted on 25 June. Totals for the period 17-25 June in the area were 60 NVA KIA, two PW, 92 tons of rice, three tons of salt, 10 cases of miscellaneous foodstuffs, three individual and one crew served weapon captured; 19,500 AK-47 rounds, 2,600 12.7mm rounds, 310 RPG rounds, 45 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 15 107mm rockets. A total of 285 bunkers were destroyed.

At 221600, vicinity YD172266, (1/2 KM W of FSB JEROME), the 2d Co., 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered a training area consisting of a rifle range, 50 huts with underground bunkers, and an ammunition bunker containing 10,000 AK-47 rounds, 200 RPG rounds and 40 NVA uniforms with no markings.

At 231045, vicinity 184256, (2 KM SW of FSB JEROME), the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated two enemy platoons with organic weapons, gunships and tube artillery. The enemy returned small arms fire and fled. A sweep of the contact area revealed 47 NVA KIA and a large enemy base camp consisting of 10 DVC; 11 SWC; 158,450 AK-47 rounds, 30,300 12.7mm machinegun rounds, 750 RPG rounds, 30 anti-tank mines, 165 bunkers, two animal cages and two PW cages. The area west and south of FSB JEROME is a known rear service area supporting the 812th NVA Regt and the 7th Front. Four ARVN were wounded in action.

At 241450, vicinity YD217232, the 1st Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) discovered graves containing 43 NVA killed by an air force B52 strike approximately 10 days earlier.

(8) 26 June - 7 July 1970

(a) The division continued to provide aviation assets to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) throughout this period. Assets were also provided to Det B52, 5th SFG(A), until the termination of Operation BARBER GLADE on 30 June. There were a total of 117 incidents of aircraft receiving ground fire. One aircraft was shot down by 12.7mm machinegun fire and crashed. Nineteen other aircraft were rendered non-flyable.

The division continued extensive employment of ground sensor devices to locate and monitor enemy movement and engage suspected enemy locations with artillery and marine, navy and USAF aircraft. During the period a total of 1-49
323 activations were recorded and 3005 rounds of mixed caliber artillery ammunition were fired in reaction.

The division continued to conduct operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and lines of communication, and to prevent enemy infiltration into the populated lowlands and disruption of elections held on 28 June.

On 26 June, division aviation assets were provided for the assault of the 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) into the area vicinity FSB BRICK. The battalion CP collocated with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf to facilitate coordinated operations against elements of the 29th NVA Regiment in area Xray.

On 28 June, an artillery raid was conducted from FSB BLAZE by Firy B, 1st Bn, 8th Arty. Preplanned targets along route 546, vicinity FSB RENDEZVOUS were engaged.

On 29 June, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf completed battalion refresher training at CAMP EAGLE and redeployed by vehicle to the vicinity of FSB BASTOGNE. The battalion assumed responsibility for area Uniform, security of the firebase, and initiated search and attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from FSB BASTOGNE to PHU LOC District, passed to the operational control of the 2d Bde, and assumed responsibility for area Zulu and security of FSB LOS BANOS and TOMAHAWK. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from PHU LOC District to CAMP EAGLE and began preparation for battalion refresher training. The battalion also assumed the mission of Division Ready Force.

On 30 June, Det B52, 5th SPC(A) terminated Operation BARBER GLADE and prepared to move by air to NHA TRANG.

The period 1 - 7 July saw a marked increase in enemy activity in the 3d Bde area of operation as elements of the 603d and 6th NVA Regiments conducted daily attacks by fire on FSB RIPCORD. More than 160 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire were directed at the firebase during the first seven days of July, resulting in 21 US WIA. In the vicinity of the firebase US units engaged in 23 enemy and 14 friendly initiated contacts, resulting in 30 NVA KIA, nine IWC, and two CSWC. US casualties were 5 killed and 104 wounded.

On 1 July, the Aero-rifle Platoon, Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted west of FSB RIPCORD in reaction to the enemy attacks by fire on the firebase. When the platoon received fire on the landing zone, Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted to reinforce the ARP. These elements passed to operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf until they were extracted on 2 July, returning to parent unit control at 1810 hours.

Also on 1 July, the 1st Bde passed operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl),
501st Inf to the 2d Bde and responsibility for PS/0B BRICK and area X-ray to the
4th Bn, 547th Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved by air from vicinity
PS/0B BRICK to PHU Bai Combat Base to prepare for movement to CAMP EVAUS
and redeployment.

On 2 July, the 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf passed to the operational control
of the 3d Bde and assaulted into landing zones south and southwest of PS/0B
RIPORED. The battalion CP collocated on the firebase with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambt),
506th Inf.

On 5 July, three battalions were repositioned in support of the battalion
refresher training program. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf terminated operations
in PHU LOC District and moved to vicinity PS/0B VEGEL and passed OnCon to 1st
Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf terminated operations vicinity PS/0B VEGEL
and MBA to CAMP EAGLE, closing at 1812 hours, and began preparation for refresher
training. The battalion assumed the mission of DRF at 0607 hours. The 2d Bn
(Ambt), 327th Inf completed refresher training and returned to PHU LOC Dis-
trict and reassumed responsibility for area Zulu.

On 5 and 6 July, Troops C and D, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav moved to Quang
Tri, joining Troop A, to facilitate the concentration of airborne cavalry
elements in the northwest portion of the division AO. This movement was in
reaction to intelligence concerning infiltration of the 9th Regt, 304th
NVA Division into South Vietnam.

On 6 July, additional artillery (three 155mm howitzers) from Btry A, 3d
Bn (Ambt), 11th Arty were moved from PS/0B RAKASAN to PS/0B RIPORED in support
of operations in that area. Six 155mm howitzers of Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambt),
319th Arty and six 155mm howitzers of Btry A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 11th Arty were
located on the firebase at that time.

On 7 July, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) terminated operations vicinity PS/0B
VEGEL and GEORGIA and moved by air and vehicle to CAMP SALLY to begin re-
frresher training for future operations.

(b) Significant Activities. On the morning of 26 June, CAMP EAGLE was
twice attacked by fire. At 0009 hours approximately ten 82mm mortar rounds
impacted in the area of the 2d Bn (Ambt), 320th Arty and the 4th Bn (Aerial
Arty), 77th Arty (Ambt). One US was killed and eight wounded during the
attack. Two UH1H helicopters and one seafair were damaged, and one mainten-
ance tent was destroyed. At 0247 hours seven 122mm rockets impacted in the
areas of Co B, 159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambt), 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty
(Ambt), 265th RRU, 801st Maint Bn (Ambt), Div Arty, and G Sector of the CAMP
EAGLE perimeter. Results were four US WIA; one AH1G helicopter and one 3/4
ton M37 truck destroyed; one CH-47, one AH1G, two 2½ ton M35 trucks, two 3/4
ton M37 trucks and two M151 jeeps, damaged. Aerial rocket artillery, tube
artillery and mortar fire was employed on suspected enemy locations. Aerial
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Reconnaissance of the rocket belt and suspected enemy firing positions revealed one NVA KIA.

At 260235, vicinity YD442118, the 1st Plt, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received RPG and small arms fire in their night defensive position. The platoon returned small arms fire and employed ARA and a flareship. A first night sweep of the contact area revealed six NVA KIA, two AK-47s, two RPG launchers, two RPG rounds, and 25 1/2 pound satchel charges. US casualties were four KIA and eight WIA.

Light and sporadic contact in the division area of operation during the period 26 - 30 June resulted in eight NVA KIA and one US killed and eleven wounded.

On 1 July, at 0706 hours on FS/0B RIPCORD, the CP and Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received five 82mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from the southeast. At 0850, the firebase received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which impacted inside the perimeter. At 1345 hours, the enemy employed 16 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 6 - 8 impacting inside the firebase perimeter. At 1912 hours, four rounds of 82mm mortar fire landed on the firebase. Artillery, air strikes and organic mortar fire were employed on suspected enemy locations throughout the day. Fifteen US received minor wounds during the day, all from Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty, located on the highest point of the firebase. Most of the casualties occurred as the battery was employing counter-battery fire.

At 011045 hours, approximately 1500 meters southeast of FS/0B RIPCORD, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received fire from 75 meters west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and a pink team was employed. A sweep of the area after contact revealed one NVA KIA. Two US were wounded. At 2225 hours the company received 8 - 10 RPG rounds and small arms fire from 100 meters south of their position. Elements returned fire and the enemy withdrew. There were no friendly casualties or damage.

Also on 1 July, Regional and Popular force units joined by ARVN infantry and armored elements, and the 16th BAC Company, waged a 16-hour battle near Quang Tri with main force enemy units, resulting in 135 enemy killed and 17 captured. GW forces suffered 12 KIA.

At 020346 July, vicinity YD357172 (Hill 902), the CP and 1st and 2d Plts, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received RPG, satchel charges and small arms fire in their night defensive position. An estimated sapper company, in a well organized and executed attack, were successful in penetrating the perimeter and occupying positions inside the NDP. The enemy sappers and elements of Co C exchanged satchel charges and fragmentation grenades in a fierce battle until the enemy within the perimeter were killed, and the remainder withdrew at ap-
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approximately 0420 hours. The company commander was killed in the initial exchange of fire. The company medic immediately organized the defense of the position until relieved later by the artillery forward observer. Sporadic contact and mortar fire continued until approximately 0530 hours. Results of the action were 15 NVA KIA, seven US KIA, six US WIA and one US WIA.

On 3 July, between the hours of 1415 and 1520, in the vicinity of XD9744, seven kilometers northwest of the KHE SANH airstrip, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, conducting armed aerial reconnaissance, engaged approximately 14 enemy, killing twelve. The ARF, Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav was inserted at XD79044, engaged two enemy in bunkers resulting in two NVA KIA, one US KIA, and two US and one Kit Carson scout wounded. The platoon was extracted at 1820 hours.

At 040950, vicinity YD372170, an individual from Co C, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, while the company was conducting a search and attack operation southwest of FS/0B RIPCORD, detonated a booby trap consisting of five 82mm mortar rounds, placed along the trail and daisy chained. Three rounds were placed on the right side of the trail and two on the left. Five US were killed and five wounded.

On 4 July, FS/0B RIPCORD was attacked by fire for the fourth day in a row. A total of nine attacks were directed at the firebase, three consisting of 82mm and 60mm mortar GS rounds. Three US were wounded.

At 050010, vicinity YD377159, Co C, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, while in their night defensive position southeast of FS/0B RIPCORD, engaged three enemy with small arms fire 20 meters to the west of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and satchel charges, and appeared to flee. At 0050 hours the company was attacked with satchel charges and returned organic weapons fire. The enemy again withdrew and ARA and a flare ship were employed. A sweep under illumination revealed no enemy casualties. Three US were wounded.

At 0605 hours, the company received 8 - 10 RPG rounds and small arms fire, again from the west. This time a sweep revealed five NVA KIA, five AK-47s, twenty-eight 1-pound satchel charges and two NVA gas masks. One US was killed and 14 were evacuated for wounds.

At 051240, vicinity YD336161, three kilometers south of FS/0B RIPCORD, Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf engaged 8-10 enemy with small arms and artillery fire, killing five NVA. Two US were wounded by RPG fire.

On 6 July, enemy contact in the FS/0B MAHLEN area by elements of the 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf resulted in three NVA KIA, and 20 US WIA. At 1730 hours, three kilometers southwest of FS/0B RIPCORD, 15 US were wounded in Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, by small arms fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated enemy company on all sides of the friendly position.

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At 0615W0, vicinity TD745455, a ranger team from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf made contact with an estimated enemy company 50 meters north and west of their position. Organic weapons, ARA and a pink team were employed, resulting in 13 NVA KIA. Six rangers were wounded.

At 070940, vicinity YD334194, west of FS/CB RIFOORD, while assaulting on Hill 1000, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf received small arms fire and satchel charges from an enemy force located in bunkers, 50 meters from their position. The company employed organic weapons fire, tube artillery, ARA, and air strikes on the enemy positions. Contact was broken at approximately 1500 hours as the company moved off the hill, having suffered three KIA and 19 WIA. Six NVA were killed in the action.

Other enemy contact in the vicinity of FS/CB RIFOORD, on 7 July, by elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, resulted in 1 US KIA and 28 WIA.

(9) 8 - 16 July 1970

(a) In reaction to intelligence information indicating the possibility of infiltration by the 9th Regiment, 304th NVA Division into South Vietnam, to reinforce and replace the weakened 66th NVA Regiment, reconnaissance and surveillance efforts in the northwestern portion of the division AO were intensified. Extensive efforts to interdict the infiltration of the 9th Regt culminated at approximately 1150 hours on 8 July, as a pink team, from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed 150 - 200 enemy in the open, vicinity XD3236. The area was engaged by machinegun and rocket fire from the pink team and a command and control aircraft accompanying the team. Additional gunship and ARA support was requested, and, within 30 minutes, was on station engaging the enemy. At 1358 hours, Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted into the contact area to make a ground sweep and capture a prisoner. The troop made contact with the enemy and was extracted at 1758 hours, having captured three prisoners and a large number of enemy documents, which identified the 9th NVA Regt. Pink teams and sections of ARA from the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), providing relief on station, continued to engage the enemy throughout the day, resulting in 139 enemy killed.

In reaction to this activity, Operation CLING VALLEY, employing elements of the 3d Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN), was initiated at 091545 hours. Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty was airlifted from FS/CA VANG+ to FS/CA SAGN. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from FS/G3 BIRMINGHAM to MAJ LOC and conducted an air mobile assault into FS/CA SHEPHERD to provide security for Btry A, 48th Arty (ARVN). The battalion passed from operational control of the 1st Bde to operational control of the 3d Bde. Co B secured the firebase while companies A, C and D conducted security operations in the vicinity of the firebase. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed from operational control of the 3d Bde to
area was engaged by gunships and ARA, resulting in 50 enemy killed. Air to ground contact continued throughout the day. At 1200 hours, ten more enemy were killed by gunships in the vicinity of XD826363. Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Amb, 17 Cav) was inserted at this location, at 1538 hours and captured three prisoners. While collecting enemy equipment, weapons and documents for extraction, and sweeping the contact area, the troop was engaged by an estimated battalion size enemy force. During the engagement, 24 NVA were killed and Trp D suffered six KIA and five WIA before being extracted at 1758 hours. Aircraft screening the ground troop continued to engage enemy in the area. At 1900 hours, vicinity XD825363, aircraft from Trp A observed and engaged an active 12.7mm machinegun position, destroying the weapon, one RPG launcher, one radio and four ruck sacks lying in the vicinity. At 1745 hours, a command and control aircraft, flown by the CO, 2d Sqdn (Amb, 17th Cav), landed and extracted one wounded NVA Pr. The final contact of the day occurred at 1919 hours, when aircraft from NHQ, 2d Sqdn (Amb, 17th Cav) observed 10 - 15 enemy near an active 12.7mm machinegun position. The area was engaged with M60 machinegun fire and AH-1G gunships, resulting in the destruction of the weapon and 10 enemy killed.

Also on 8 July, vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD, the enemy again refused to be dislodged from Hill 1000. Companies C and D, 2d Bn (Amb, 506th Inf) were engaged with small arms and automatic weapons fire by an enemy in well fortified bunkers, at 1050 hours. Intensive fire from at least three mutually supporting bunkers, pinned the companies down. One bunker was neutralized with M7 LAW fire, but the other two could not be destroyed. Contact was terminated at approximately 1300 hours as the companies again moved off the hill. US casualties were two killed and four wounded.

At 091615 hours, vicinity XD825363, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav observed ten NVA bodies killed during the previous night by heavy artillery employed from CAMP CARROL by Btry B, 8th Bn, 4th Arty. Cavalry aircraft killed two other enemy in the KHE SANH Plateau area during the day.

On 10 July, beginning at 0735 hours, FS/OB RIPCORD was attacked by fire on eight separate occasions during the day. The enemy employed 60mm and 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, resulting in two US KIA and 17 US WIA.

Also on 10 July, aircraft from Troops A and B, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav killed 26 NVA in scattered air to ground contact in support of Operation CLINCH VALLEY.

On 11 July, Troops A and B killed 14 NVA in support of ARVN ground forces in the CLINCH VALLEY AO, and the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed five enemy while sweeping in the vicinity of XD823361.

At 110900 hours, vicinity XD833362, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered thirty enemy bodies killed by helicopter, and, between the hours of 1845 and 1-75.
Inclomare 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROS CSM 65 (R2) (U)

The 1st Bde, and moved by air from FS/0B KATHRYN to FS/0B BASTOW, assuming responsibility for the firebase.

On 10 July, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Regt (ARVN) assaulted into FS/0B SNAPPER and SMITH, respectively, to begin reconnaissance in force operations. The 3d Regt light CP moved by air to FS/0B SHEPHERD. The 3d Bde tactical CP moved to CAMP CARROL and maintained close coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN).

On 11 July, division aviation assets were provided to support the assault of a platoon of the MAC BAG Company, with four members of Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf, into the CLINCH VALLEY area. The assault and subsequent patrolling operations culminated an extensive training program conducted by the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS).

The 1st Bn (Amb, 527th Inf completed refresher training and moved by vehicle and air, from CAMP EAGLE, to FS/0B VEIGEL and KATHRYN. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from FS/0B VEIGEL to PHU BAI Combat Base, assumed the mission of DRF, and prepared for refresher training.

The 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf moved from FS/0B RIPCORD and vicinity, to CAMP EVANS, to refit and prepare for redeployment against elements of the 803d NVA Regt, vicinity FS/0B RIPCORD. On 12 July, the battalion assaulted into the vicinity of YD319 and YD3118 and began attacks to the south and east.

Operation CLINCH VALLEY was terminated at 151802 July, as the 1st and 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) extracted from FS/0B SNAPPER and SMITH to vicinity MAI LOC and then moved by air to CAMP SALLY. The 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf moved by air from FS/0B SHEPHERD to CAMP EAGLE, returned to operational control of the 1st Bde, and prepared for redeployment.

Results of Operation CLINCH VALLEY (Period 091315 to 151802 July) were 226 NVA KIA (188 by US, 38 by ARVN), 15 IWC (ARVN), and 14 CSWC (3 by US, 11 by ARVN). There were no Allied casualties reported during the operation.

Elements of the 803d and 6th NVA Regiments continued to conduct stand-off attacks against FS/0B RIPCORD during the period 8 - 16 July. The enemy employment of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, on 10 July, resulted in two US killed and 17 wounded, on the firebase. Ground action around the firebase, vicinity Hills 1000 and 805, resulted in ten US KIA, 52 US WIA, and 12 NVA KIA.

Between the hours of 1000 and 1600, on 16 July, the USS EDSON fired 224 five inch rounds at bunkers and caves in the mountains north of PHU LOC District, sealing four caves, and causing two secondary explosions.

(b) Significant Activities. At 081130 hours, vicinity XD826363, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Caw observed 150 - 200 NVA in the open. The
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Enclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSP0R-65 (R2) (U)

1920, discovered 100 enemy killed by air strikes within the past 36 hours.

At 122222 hours, vicinity YD362188 (Hill 805), Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, while in their night defensive position, received 30 to 40 RPG rounds and small arms fire, from an enemy force, 250 meters to the northeast. The company returned organic weapons fire, and ARA, air strikes and a flare ship were employed. Sixteen US were wounded.

At 123555 hours, vicinity XD840359 (one kilometer north of FS/DE SNAPPER), the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated 40 enemy with organic weapons fire. A sweep revealed 30 NVA KIA, one RPG launcher, four AK-47s, one 60mm mortar, complete, 100 rock macks, 35 Chicom grenades, 60 RPG and 120 60mm mortar rounds, 60 Chicom gas masks, and 15 pounds of documents.

Also on 12 July, vicinity YD175240, 3½ kilometers southwest of FS/DE SNAPPER, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered the bodies of 65 NVA killed by air strikes within the last 3 - 4 days.

On 13 July, General William C. Westmoreland visited the division.

At 140203 hours, vicinity YD362188, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, while in their night defensive position on Hill 805, again received RPG and small arms fire from an enemy force, 20 meters northwest of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed M55 .50 caliber fire (Quad 50) from FS/DE RIPCORD, and 60mm mortar fire, air strikes, and ARA. Contact terminated at 0307 hours and a first light check of the area revealed five NVA KIA. The company suffered six KIA and nine WIA. At 2253 hours, the company received small arms fire and RPG fire and satchel charges, and at 0159 hours, received thirty-seven 82mm mortar rounds, impacting around their NDP. Organic weapons, ARA, tube artillery and mortar fire was employed against the enemy. One US was killed in the action. A first light sweep revealed numerous blood trails.

On 14 July, Companies A and B and the Recon Elt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, in yet another attempt to eject the enemy from Hill 1000, was engaged by RPG, small arms and mortar fire, resulting in one US KIA and 20 WIA. Organic weapons, ARA, tube artillery and air strikes were employed against enemy positions and well fortified bunkers on the hill. Partial sweeps of the area revealed five NVA KIA. Elements withdrew to the vicinity of YD325189, where, at 1715 hours, they received 82mm mortar fire without casualties. Artillery was employed on the suspected enemy location.

Operation CLINCH VALLEY was terminated at 151802 July.

At 161815 hours, vicinity YD360186 (Hill 805), Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf discovered two NVA killed by artillery within the last 24 hours.

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Inclusion 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS OSPR-65 (R2) (U)

(10) 17 - 23 July 1970

(a) On 17 July, FS/OB RIPCORD received sporadic mortar fire throughout the day with light damage and casualties on the firebase. The enemy employed 105mm mortars for the first time since the firebase was opened in April 1970. The planned extraction of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf was postponed due to high winds in the RIPCORD area.

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air to LZ ANN (vicinity FS/OB WECHEL), staged, and conducted an assault into three landing zones south of FS/OF BLAZE. The battalion initiated search and attack operations in the TENNESSEE area.

On 18 July, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/OB RIPCORD to CAMP EVANS and then by vehicle to PHU BAI Combat Base to begin preparation for refresher training and assumed the mission of DRF.

At 181330, a CH-47 in logistical support of FS/OF RIPCORD, was shot down by enemy ground fire and crashed in the 105mm ammunition storage area, causing a major fire and extensive damage on the firebase. All six 105mm howitzers of Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 391st Arty were destroyed. In reaction, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to operational control of the 3d Bde, and assaulted into FS/OF GLADIATOR to secure the firebase for insertion of Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty. This move was made to insure adequate artillery coverage for the RIPCORD area.

On 19 July, FS/OF RIPCORD continued to receive sporadic mortar fire, causing light casualties but not interfering with damage repair and clean up operations on the firebase.

Also on 19 July, the 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) terminated operations in area Xray and moved by air from FS/OF BRICK to FS/OF ROY and ANZO.

On 21 July, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf terminated operations in search of elements of the 29th NVA Regiment, in the vicinity of TENNESSEE and extracted by air to CAMP EAGLE to refit and prepare for future operations to support insertion of Allied forces into the FS/OF AIRBORNE-BRADLEY area.

On 22 July, the 1st Bde passed responsibility for FS/OF BASTOGNE and Area Uniform to 2d Bde. Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by vehicle from FS/OF BIRMINGHAM to FS/OF BASTOGNE and assumed security of the firebase. Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by vehicle from FS/OF ARSENAL to vicinity TD6409 and began patrol and surveillance operations in the vicinity of FS/OF BASTOGNE.

Because of the enemy buildup of forces and the increased tempo of enemy attacks in the FS/OF RIPCORD area, it became apparent that the cost and effort required for the self-defense of RIPCORD placed the accomplishment of future operations in jeopardy.
operations in the enemy's rear supply and service areas, vicinity of BRADLEY and AIRBORNE, in jeopardy.

On 23 July, the 1d Bde directed the extraction of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf from FS/OB RIPCORD, and vicinity. Extraction from the firebase began at 0545 hours and was completed, despite heavy indirect and 12.7mm machinegun fire, at 1214 hours. Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was inserted vicinity YO365179 to assist the extraction of Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. Extraction of Companies A and D began at 1305 hours and was completed without damage or casualties at 1401 hours. Seventy-four USAF, marine and navy tactical air sorties and continuous ABA and tube artillery fires were employed in support of the extraction. The battalion moved to CAMP EVANS to conduct stand down and began preparation for refresher training.

(b) Significant Activities. FS/OB RIPCORD received six attacks by fire from enemy forces employing 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars on 17 July, beginning at 0704 hours. The last attack was at 1745 hours. Artillery and tactical air support was employed on suspected enemy locations throughout the day. Results were 14 US WIA and one Kit Carson scout WIA.

At 181330, a CH-47 aircraft from Co A, 159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl), carrying a sling load of 105mm howitzer ammunition to FS/OB RIPCORD, received 12.7mm machinegun fire while on approach to the firebase. The aircraft crashed into the 105mm ammunition storage point, causing a major fire. Extensive damage was caused in Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty, as well as the bunkers and TOC on the southern portion of the firebase. Five howitzers from the battery were destroyed and one damaged. An AN/MPQ4A counter-mortar radar, two 106mm recoilless rifles, and an AN/GRC-165 VHF radio set were also destroyed. The firebase continued to receive sporadic enemy mortar fire throughout the day, resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA. The crash of the helicopter resulted in one crew member killed and five crew members wounded. In spite of the fire, and exploding 105mm ammunition on the firebase, the perimeter remained intact, and by late afternoon the fires were brought under control and clean up operations began on the firebase. To assist in defending the firebase, artillery fires were increased from PS/OB BARBARA, O'REILLY and RAKKASAN until Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty was laid and ready to fire from PS/OB GLADIATOR at 1837 hours.

FS/OB RIPCORD continued to receive sporadic mortar fire on the firebase throughout the period 19 - 22 July. A total of 34 stand-off attacks were conducted by the enemy during these four days resulting in seven US KIA and 35 US WIA. All but five wounded required evacuation. A total of 51 tactical air strikes were directed into the RIPCORD area between 19 and 22 July.

On 20 July, contact by Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, east and south of Hill 805, vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD, resulted in six NVA KIA. Heavy contact at 1730 hours by the 1st Plt, Co D, 1st Bn

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Enclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CP-86-65 (R2) (U)

(Amb), 506th Inf with an enemy force employing 60mm mortar and small arms fire, vicinity YD376199, resulted in four US KIA and five US WIA. Contact terminated at 1820 hours.

At 210712 hours, vicinity YD376192, three kilometers east of PS/GB RIPCORD, Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, while preparing to leave their night defensive position, received approximately eighty 82mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an enemy force a kilometer around their position. As the company returned fire with organic weapons and employed tube artillery and ARA against the enemy, Co D, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf air assaulted from vicinity YD330240, to an LZ north of the contact area. The company attacked to the south to reinforce Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, making light contact with the enemy enroute, suffering four WIA, capturing a 12.7mm machinegun, and discovering a large bunker complex at YD372198. Co C, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf was inserted to destroy the bunker complex.

Co D, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf linked up with Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf at 1223 hours as sporadic mortar fire continued to impact in the area until 1615 hours. Air strikes and a pink team supported the contact as Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf suffered five KIA and 31 WIA, and accounted for eight NVA KIA.

At 0846 hours, a UH-1H helicopter from Co C, 326th Med Bn (Amb), while attempting to extract casualties from Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf area of contact, was hit in the tail boom by an RPG round, while in the pick-up zone, and rendered non-flyable. At 0947 hours, another medevac aircraft from Co C, 326th Med Bn (Amb) was hit by small arms fire in the same pick-up zone, resulting in one crew member killed and one wounded. The aircraft returned to CAMP EAGLE where it was found to be non-flyable. A third aircraft, from Co A, 156th Avn Bn (Aib), was hit by small arms fire at 1658 hours, while attempting to extract elements of Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf. The aircraft crashed and caught fire on the LZ. Six other aircraft received ground fire in the RIPCORD area during the day with three being hit by machinegun and small arms fire, all returned to CAMP EVANS and one was found to be non-flyable.

At approximately 1700 hours, Companies C and D, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf were extracted from a pick-up zone at YD372198 and returned to CAMP EVANS to refit and prepare for future insertion into the RIPCORD area.

At 221500 hours, vicinity YD353187, 1.5 kilometers southeast of PS/GB RIPCORD, Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf received rifle grenades, mortar and small arms fire from a large enemy force attacking from the north, east and southeast. Tube artillery, ARA and tactical air support were employed against the enemy. Contact was maintained until dark when the company consolidated their position and formed a defensive perimeter. Because of the close proximity of the estimated three-company size enemy force, extraction of the wounded was not

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Inclosure 1 (Operational Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPM-61, (N2) (O)

attempted during the night. Most of the fifty-one personnel wounded in the company were not serious. Those who had more serious wounds were made as comfortable as possible until they were extracted on the morning of the 25th. Twelve US were killed during the day and the company accounted for 61 NVA WIA.

During the night of 22 - 23 July massive artillery and air strikes were employed in the RIPCORD area against known and suspected enemy locations.

More than 2200 rounds of mixed caliber artillery ammunition were fired in support of the extraction of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf on 23 July. Fourteen CH-47 aircraft were employed commencing at 0545 hours to extract 22 sorties, which included six 155mm howitzers, two M-405 dozers, communications equipment, and one M55 (quad 50) machinegun. The CH-47 extraction operation proceeded smoothly until 0740 hours, when one CH-47 was shot down on the firebase by 12.7mm machinegun fire. The aircraft was forced to land amidst the 105mm howitzers which had been destroyed on 18 July, and thus prevented the extraction of the artillery pieces and two 106mm recoilless: rifles. The CH-47 received a direct hit by an enemy mortar round, causing the aircraft to burn and explode. Eight additional CH-47 aircraft received hits during the extraction, four were later determined non-flyable. Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf began extraction at 0745 hours by UH-1H but was delayed until 0935 hours by heavy enemy 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The extraction was conducted by infiltrating one UH-1H aircraft into the firebase at a time.

During the extraction, FS/0B RIPCORD was under continuous enemy mortar fire, with several hundred rounds impacting throughout the firebase. Air, artillery, and ARA destroyed several enemy mortar and machinegun positions. In addition, numerous enemy, driven into the open by CS were killed by US firepower.

24 - 31 July 1970

(a) With the extraction of US units from the FS/0B RIPCORD area, the division began an extensive artillery and aerial bombardment plan directed against the NVA forces massed in the area. During the period 240600 to 310600 July, over 10,000 rounds of mixed caliber artillery, 135 forward air controlled missions - for 226 sorties - 166 drums of persistent agent CS, and 130 barrels of incinerated fuel were directed against known and suspected enemy locations.

On 24 July, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed refresher training at PHU BAI Combat Base and moved by vehicle to CAMP EVANS to prepare for future operations in the vicinity of FS/0B RAKCASAN. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf began battalion refresher training at CAMP EVANS.

On 25 July, the 2d Bde passed responsibility for FS/0B RAKCASAN to the 3d Bde as division forces repositioned to increase security of the populated lowlands and support operations in the enemy’s rear service support areas, in
the mountains northeast of the A Shau Valley.

Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 began at 250700 July, as elements of the 1st Bde, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN), assaulted into the operational area at 0300 hours. The 2d Bn (Amb) 502d Inf assaulted into the FS/0B MAUREEN area, seized and secured the firebase, and began search operations to the west. Company D received fire on their LZ at YD405119. Tube artillery, ARA and tactical CS, dropped from UH/1H aircraft, suppressed the enemy fire. There were no US casualties during the assault.

The 1st Bn (Amb), 502d Inf passed responsibility for FS/0B BASTOGNE to the 3d Bn (Amb), 167th Inf and companies A and B assaulted into landing zones south of FS/0B BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to conduct search and attack patrols.

Co C, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf moved by air to FS/0B RAKKASAN and assumed the mission of firebase security.

On 26 July, the Co and Co C, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf moved by air to FS/0B RAKKASAN closing at 1615 hours. Co C assumed mission of security for the firebase.

On 28 July, the light Co, 3d. Regt (ARVN) and Btry A (155), 10th Arty (ARVN) moved by air to FS/0B MAUREEN in support of Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363.

On 29 July, Btry C, 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty repositioned, by air, from FS/0B BASTOGNE to FS/0B MAUREEN to provide additional artillery support for Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363. The battery was replaced on FS/0B RAKKASAN by Btry B, 2d Bn (Amb), 319th Arty from CAMP EVANS.

On 30 July, division aviation assets, coordinated through the 1st Bde, supported the assault by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Regt (ARVN) into the CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 area of operation to locate and destroy enemy forces, cache sites, and staging areas. Extensive preparation of the landing zones by tactical air, ARA and tube artillery from both US and ARVN batteries supported the insertion. Light ground to air fire was received during the insertion of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), which was completed at 0659 hours, with no Allied casualties. The 1st Bn was inserted at 1010 hours without incident.

On 31 July, the 1st Bde passed operational control of the 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf to the 2d Bde and assumed operational control of the 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf. The 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf moved by air from FS/0B KATHRYN to CAMP EVANS, began preparation for battalion refresher training and assumed the mission of BRF. The 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf moved by air from CAMP EVANS to FS/0B KATHRYN, assumed the mission of securing the firebase, and began search and attack operations in the vicinity of the firebase. 1-32
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Inclosure 1 (Operational Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG-339B-67 (R2) (U)

(b) Significant Activities. On 24 July, vicinity YD245295 (5\frac{1}{2} kilometers northeast of PS/CB THUNDER), the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered 54 NVA bodies killed by air strikes approximately two weeks earlier. Also found were 21 individual and five crew served weapons, including two RPD machineguns.

At 261426 hours, vicinity YD415130, the 3d Plt, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 3d Inf engaged 3 - 4 enemy in bunkers, at 35 meters, with small arms, mortar fire and ARA, resulting in the first three enemy killed during Operation CHICAGO HEAT/LAM SON 564. Nine 15'x10'x4' bunkers with 3' overhead cover were destroyed.

At 281827 hours, CAMP EVANS received four 122mm rockets impacting near the mess hall of the 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl). ARA, tube artillery and a white team were employed on a suspected enemy location. The 3d Bde security platoon was inserted in the vicinity of YD450525 and discovered four 122mm rockets in launching trenches. Results of the attack were one US KIA and 13 US WIA.

At 290905 hours, CAMP EVANS received another three 122mm rockets, impacting in the vicinity of Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), Co C, 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl), and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. No casualties or damage were caused.

The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) made contact with the enemy almost immediately after insertion, vicinity YD358097, on 30 July. The 1st Co received small arms fire from an enemy force 100 meters to the north at 0616 hours. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA and a pink team. A sweep resulted in the capture of a 12.7mm machinegun. At 1020 hours, vicinity YD358103, the battalion engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms fire at 30 meters. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the north. An air strike was employed. A sweep of the area revealed 11 NVA KIA and resulted in one RPD machinegun captured. At 1315 hours the 1st Co killed an NVA at YD358097, and, at 1500 hours, killed four more NVA.

On 31 July, the 1st Co, 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 17 enemy bodies killed by air strikes approximately three days earlier, at YD357115.
Inclosure 2 (Organizational Structure) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, KCS CSFOR-65 (K2) (U)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
43d Inf Plt (Set Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC, 2d Bde
2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
47th Inf Plt (Set Dog)

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC, 3d Bde
2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
58th Inf Plt (Set Dog)

101st Abn Div Arty (Ambl)

HHC, 101st Abn Div Arty (Ambl)
2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty
2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty
2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty
1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl)
Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (Ambl)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

101st Aviation Group (Cbt) (Ambl)

HHC, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl)
101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl)
163d Avn Co (GS) (Ambl)
759th Avn Det (DIV)

101st Abn DISCOM (Ambl)

HHC and HHC, 101st Abn DISCOM (Ambl)
5th Trans Bn (Aerial Mnt & Spt) (Ambl)
326th Med Bn (Ambl)
426th S&S Bn (Ambl)
801st Maint Bn (Ambl)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)
Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS)

101st Abn Div (Ambl) Troops

HHC, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
326th Eng Bn (Ambl)
501st Sig Bn (Ambl)
101st MP Co (Ambl)
265th Radio Research Co
10th Cal Plt (DS)
20th Cal Det (CHR Center)
22d Mil Hist Det
25th PI Det (Field Service)
34th PI Det (Field Service)
101st MI Co (DIV)
557th Inf Plt (Cbt Tracker)
20th TASS (USAF)
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Inclosure 1 (Key Personnel Roster) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

UG
AD (U)
ADX (S)
CofS
CU, 1st Bde
CO, 2d Bde
CC, 3d Bde
CO, 101st Avn Gp
CO, DISCOM
CO, DIVARTY
ACoS, G1
ACoS, G2
ACoS, G3
ACoS, G4
ACoS, G5
Chemical Off
Div Surg
FM
IG
SJA
Fin Off
Chap
AG
CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf
CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf
CO, 3d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf
CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf
CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf
CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 502d Inf
CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf
CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf
CO, 3d Bn (Amb), 187th Inf
CO, 3d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf
CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 11th Arty
CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 319th Arty
CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty
CO, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Amb)
CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 321st Arty
CO, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav
CO, 101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Amb)
CO, 158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Amb)
CO, 159th Avn Bn (Aslt Sup Hel) (Amb)
CO, 326th Sngr Bn (Amb)
CO, 326th Med Bn (Amb)
CO, 5th Trans Bn (Amb)
CO, 426th SWS Bn (Amb)
CO, 601st Maint Bn (Amb)

MC John J. Hennessey
BG Stanley F. Berry
COL (P) Olin E. Smith
COL Hugh A. MacDonald
COL D. White
COL Walter H. Root
COL Benjamin L. Harrison
LTC (P) Edward P. Davis
COL David E. Grange
COL Lee E. Surut
LTC Charles A. Hoenetine, Jr.
LTC Laverne W. Bindrup
LTC Roy J. Young
MAJ Peter Masterson
MAJ Harlen W. Rinnison
LTC James R. Klugh
LTC Robert E. Day
LTC Stanley J. Lobodinski
LTC Thomas Narvaez
LTC Carl W. Walborn
LTC Walter J. Falconer
LTC Clifford E. Keys, Jr.
LTC Thomas E. Minix
LTC Donald A. Ioder
LTC Edward F. Pickett
LTC Charles J. Shay
LTC Thomas E. Aaron
LTC Otis W. Livingston, Jr.
LTC Arvid E. West, Jr.
LTC Bobby B. Porter
LTC John C. Bard
LTC Ivan C. Bland
LTC John E. Marting
LTC Robert J. Burke
LTC William A. Walker
LTC Alvah B. Davis, Jr.
LTC Charles L. Nowak
LTC Arch A. Ely, Jr.
LTC Robert F. Molinselli
LTC William N. Peachey
LTC Robert J. Guard
LTC George F. Newton
LTC Carl P. Redolph, Jr.
LTC Robert E. Day
LTC Harold J. Small
LTC Ronald N. Bowman
LTC James F. Dunn
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Inclusion 4 (Wild Exploiter Antenna) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 31 July 1970, FCN DSPR-65 (23) (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL WIRE WD-1 TO PRC 25

SPliced AND Taped

RADIAL WIRE

5 FOOT STICKS

ROPE

PRC 25
SUBJECT: NVA Sapper Attack Against FSB Tomahawk (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) At 100140 June 1970, FSB Tomahawk (ZD811255) was attacked by the 31st (71B) Sapper Company, 4th NVA Regiment. The company had an estimated strength of 70. The enemy launched a three-pronged assault, with the main attack directed at the northwestern portion of the firebase, where one bunker (Bunker #7) protects the perimeter and covers a high speed avenue of approach to the three 155mm howitzers (See sketch at enclosure 1). Supporting attacks on the northern and southeastern sides of the firebase were directed at the 155mm howitzer position and company command post. The assault came without warning and was not preceded by preparatory indirect (RPG/mortar) fires. RPGs were employed as part of the sapper attack. Diversionary stand-off attacks were made, however, against Phu Loc District Headquarters (ZD097007), Nuoc Ngot Bridge (ZD153010), FSB Los Banos (AT183134), and FSB Roy (ZD805871).

2. (C) Results of the action against FSB Tomahawk were:

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5-7
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CS  
16 June 1970
SUBJECT: NVA Sapper Attack Against FSB Tomahawk (U)

a. Soldier was killed by a falling 81mm mortar illumination canister.

b. Ten AK-47s; two 9mm pistols.


d. One POW died at the 95th Evacuation Hospital.

3. (U) The successful defense of FSB Tomahawk is attributed to the proper application of the fundamentals of defense. If one basic principle could be isolated as the single most important factor, it would be the aggressive leadership of the battalion commander and the company commander. Strong command and control actions assured a high alert status on the part of the troopers manning perimeter fighting positions. Inclosure 2 is a resume of significant observations which reinforce lessons learned from previous sapper attacks against other firebases.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Hugh A. Macdonald
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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B

590
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(C) OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

OBSERVATION: The battalion and company commander had continually stressed the importance of soldiers manning fighting positions being awake and alert. The company commander, "King of the Hill," had instructed the platoon leader responsible for perimeter defense to have either himself, his platoon sergeant, or a squad leader continually walking the perimeter and checking the alertness of the soldiers during the hours of darkness. While checking the perimeter, the platoon sergeant detected movement in the protective wire. He killed one sapper with M16 fire as the sapper attack was initiated.

LESSON LEARNED: To successfully defend a firebase against a determined sapper attack, the attack must be detected and defeated before the sapper penetrates the inner belt of protective wire.

OBSERVATION: The communications wire (WD-1) connecting the fighting positions with the company and platoon command posts had been laid on top of the ground and was cut by the initial volley of RPG fire. Communications throughout the attack were maintained by AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRT-88 radios.

LESSON LEARNED: a. Communications wire must be buried six to twelve inches.

b. To insure adequate communications throughout the attack, dual (telephone and radio) communications must be available at each bunker/fighting position.

OBSERVATION: Ammunition storage.

a. Sufficient small arms ammunition was stored at each fighting position to defend against a determined sapper attack. For this reason, ammunition resupply was not required during the action.

b. Bulk small arms and 90mm ammunition as well as hand grenades and LAWs were stored in two widely separated ammunition dumps. Both storage areas were well protected; one below ground level, but without overhead cover, and the other, although above ground level, covered by sandbags. During the first phase of the attack, the underground storage area exploded, but caused no casualties.

c. The ammunition dump which was below ground level was located, at hand grenade range, between the line of bunkers
and the inner belt of protective wire. Although indications are that the ammunition explosion resulted from a well placed NVA satchel charge, it is possible that it was caused by a hand grenade thrown from a US fighting position.

LESSON LEARNED: a. Sufficient ammunition must be stored at primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions to defeat a determined sapper attack.

b. Bulk ammunition storage areas will be a target during a sapper attack.

c. Bulk ammunition must be protected and stored at a minimum of two locations.

d. Ammunition storage areas should not be located between the line of fighting positions and the protective wire.

OBSERVATION: The attacking force had been in a staging area reconnoitering FSB Tomahawk and preparing for the attack for a period of seven days. On the last two days (8 and 9 June) prior to the attack, one NVA soldier hid in shoulder high grass 400 to 500 meters from the perimeter and observed the position for 48 hours. At 092200 June, he determined the time was right for attack. He moved to a rally point and led the attacking force to the firebase.

LESSON LEARNED: a. Normally, the sapper will spend several days reconnoitering a firebase prior to attack.

b. Fields of fire and observation must be cleared well beyond the limit of protective wire.

OBSERVATION: The staging area used by the sappers was within a short walking distance of the firebase. The unit had not patrolled the area for a period in excess of nine days.

LESSONS LEARNED: When occupying a firebase, the unit must continually, but in random patterns, patrol to a range of 3000 meters (82mm mortar range) around the position.

OBSERVATION: During the period 31 May through 8 June, the defensive targets were fired between 2300 and 0200 hours. On 9 June, the "King of the Hill" decided to vary the pattern and conduct the firing from 0200 to 0400 hours. When the attack began, the artillery forward observer was preparing to adjust the firebase defensive targets.

LESSON LEARNED: Detailed planning is required to vary time and type of activity to avoid establishing set patterns of defense.
OBSERVATION: During the sappers' withdrawal, they moved through an area approximately 500 meters from the perimeter which had been seeded with trip flares. When the flares were activated, the area was engaged with cannon artillery to block enemy escape routes.

LESSON LEARNED: Trip flares placed well forward of the perimeter on likely avenues of approach or escape will provide early warning of attack or indicate routes of withdrawal.

OBSERVATION: An anti-sapper fence, consisting of chain link fencing four feet high and buried one to six inches, had been placed around the firebase. Examination following the attack revealed that the sappers had been unable to cut the fence. All breaks in the wire were caused by explosions.

LESSON LEARNED: Protective wire, properly emplaced, is an effective barrier to sapper movement.

OBSERVATION: Upon initiation of the attack, the "King of the Hill" ordered his artillery forward observer outside the command bunker to adjust defensive targets and ARAs. He also instructed the platoon leader to move to the point of contact to survey the situation and to submit an accurate SITREP.

LESSON LEARNED: Aggressive leadership is required to insure that proper action is taken by subordinates.

OBSERVATION: Due to a personnel shortage, LP/OPs and ambushes were not employed outside the perimeter. The "King of the Hill" stated that his defensive plans included employment of an LP/OP on the approach route used by the NVA. However, personnel shortages required him to employ all available personnel on the perimeter.

LESSON LEARNED: When determining personnel requirements for firebase defense, sufficient allowance should be made to man the perimeter and to employ early warning LP/OPs and ambushes.

OBSERVATION: During the week preceding the attack, the "King of the Hill" conducted walk-through rehearsals of the defensive plan to include the assembly and movement of the reaction force. At the initiation of the attack, the reaction force was assembled and later moved to the point of the main attack.

LESSON LEARNED: Frequent and planned rehearsals of the firebase defensive plan, to include the assembly and employment of the reaction force, insures proper and timely response by defensive forces.

OBSERVATION: The "King of the Hill" had directed that personnel
on guard occupy fighting positions rather than positions within or on top of sleeping bunkers.

LESSON LEARNED: Guard personnel are less vulnerable to RPG and sapper attack when manning fighting positions rather than positions on top or inside sleeping bunkers. Additionally, more effective fire can be delivered against the attacking sapper.

OBSERVATION: The C-130 flareship could not, for an undetermined reason, communicate directly with the "King of the Hill." Instructions for "Buckethall" were relayed from the "King of the Hill" through the battalion command post to the C-130. This is an acceptable, but less desirable, arrangement.

LESSON LEARNED: The "King of the Hill" should communicate directly with all supporting aircraft.

OBSERVATION: By a study of intelligence reports and enemy activity occurring one year ago, the battalion commander determined that FSB Tomahawk was attacked on 19 June 1969. He advised the "King of the Hill" that NVA sapper attacks against firebases are sometimes repetitive from year to year and that due to a lack of flexibility in planning, NVA operations follow definite patterns.

LESSON LEARNED: Commanders should study one year old intelligence reports and enemy activity.

OBSERVATION: The platoon responsible for defense of the firebase had been there for nine days and had rehearsed the firebase defensive plan three times during that period.

LESSON LEARNED: With proper leadership and frequent walkthrough rehearsals, the assurance of a successful defense increases the longer the unit stays on the firebase.

OBSERVATION: On 1 June 1970, the 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf received an agent report indicating the NVA would attack Lang Co Bridge on 9 or 10 June. The report also stated that the NVA would be wearing ARVN uniforms. One NVA sapper was observed wearing a US helmet and long trousers.

LESSON LEARNED: Intelligence information should be passed to the lowest echelon possible (the individual soldier) consistent with security restrictions.

OBSERVATION: Seven fougasse wires and several trip flares positioned outside the inner belt of protective wire had been cut or tied off.
LESSON LEARNED: Fougasse wires should be buried when possible, and trip flares and trip flare wires should be camouflaged.

OBSERVATION: The NVA were using an M60 machine gun during the attack.

LESSON LEARNED: Abandoned US weapons, ammunition, and equipment will be retrieved by the VC/NVA and used against US or ARVN units.

OBSERVATION: A helicopter flareship and the FAC monitored a radio transmission, the flareship on a FM and the FAC on a UHF frequency, that the sender was observing mortar flashes and NVA soldiers moving north across QL1 in the vicinity of FSB Roy. The originator and recipient of the transmission cannot be determined. However, the battalion commander did not receive the information.

LESSON LEARNED: All intelligence information must be passed to the ground commander so that he can employ available resources to counter the attack or to seal enemy routes of withdrawal.

OBSERVATION: The battalion commander requested ARA, helicopter flareships, and "Basketball" at 0141 hours. ARA arrived on station at 0225 hours, the helicopter flareship at 0220 hours, and "Basketball" at 0320 hours.

LESSON LEARNED: Arrival time for ARA and the helicopter flareships should not have exceeded strip alert time (two minutes) plus flight time (approximately 15 minutes from Camp Eagle).
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 865th Airborne Division**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, May to July 1971.

**865th Airborne Division**