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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 01 NOV 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General [Army]. Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 97th Military Police Battalion, 31 October 1970

The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 97TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96312

AVSGF-J8

1 November 1970


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1. (C) Operational Significant Activities

a. Mission: Provide Military Police and provost marshal type services to sub-area coordinators, tactical units, commanders without organic military police, and others as directed by the Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, utilizing personnel and equipment resources assigned or attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion.

b. Organization: (See Inclosure 1)

c. Personnel, Morale and Discipline:

(1) Decorations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Bronze Star</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Bronze Star with &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Air Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Purple Heart</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) ARCOM</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) ARCOM with &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Brigade Certificates of Achievment</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures:

FOR OT UT
704247
Inclosure

(a) Assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>JOB TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleaver, Ronald H.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>CO, 630th MP Co</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry, Jerry M.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>Plt Ldr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glisson, Patrick</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Plt Sgt</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanderford, Donald E.</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>PM, Nha Trang</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochee, Ronald E.</td>
<td>MLJ</td>
<td>Mil Pol Off</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conine, William H.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Adj</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birk, Carl C.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHugh, Thomas J.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCauley, George</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>OIC-MYCA</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, John H.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>OPNS OFF PMO</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husby, Stephen K.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>Plt Ldr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crane, James G. Jr.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>Plt Ldr</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusk, Wade F.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Plt Sgt</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren, George A.</td>
<td>1SG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk, Robert E.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Plt Sgt</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards, Bobby O.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Plt Sgt</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tada, George Y.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Plt Sgt</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whicker, James N.</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Ops Sgt PMO</td>
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(b) Departures:

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Pitassy, Richard N.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dougherty, Edward M.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>PM Nha Trang</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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(b) Departures: (cont)

Vasilios, William T. 1LT Pit Ldr August
Sam, David E. 1SG 1SG, 630th MP Co
Kolb, Richard C. SFC Opsn Sgt Bn
Henderson, Steven L. CPT OIC, MYCA Checkpt. September
McC Donald, Robert J. CPT CD, 630th MP Co
Jones, William H. SFC Pit Sgt
Conine, William H. CPT Adj October
Hadwyn, Jimmy C. CPT S-4
Potit, Henry L. CPT S-3
Uballe, Antonio M. SFC Pit Sgt
McC Cracken, Lawrence D. SFC Pit Sgt

(3) Casualties:

(a) Battle Losses OFF WO EH TOTAL
1 Killed 0 0 0 0
2 Wounded 2 0 7 9

(b) Non-Battle Losses
1 Killed 0 0 1 1
2 Injuries 0 0 2 2

(4) Reenlistments:

Eligible Reenlistments
(a) 1st Term 11 2
(b) RA Career 3 3
(c) Aus 31 0
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(4) Reenlistments: (cont)

(c) Other 0 0

(e) Total 45 5

(5) Civilian Personnel

(a) Program Six Civilization 6 6

(b) Augmentation TDA F5-WFPEA-99 and Augmentation TDA F5-WFPE9900 dated 22 May 1969 89 82

(c) Total 95 88

(6) R & R

MONTH UTILIZED
Aug 100%
Sep 100%
Oct 100%

(7) Strengths:

(c) As of 1 Aug 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>472</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>495</td>
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1 Nov 70

(7) Strengths: (cont)

(c) As of 31 October 1970

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<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASG</th>
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</thead>
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<td>OFF WO EN TOTAL</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 2 447 472</td>
<td>20 2 532 554</td>
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</table>

(8) Extensions of Overseas Tours:

(a) Total Extensions

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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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</table>

(b) Under PL, 89,735 (6 no)

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<tr>
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<th>EN</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Aug</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

(9) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) General Courts - 0

(b) Special Courts - 5

(c) Summary Courts - 0

(d) Article 15, UCMJ - 44

(10) Congressional Inquiries: 4

(11) Publications: none

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1 Nov 70


d. Operations: During the reporting period the 97th Military Police Battalion and attached units were committed to the following combat support, law enforcement and security missions throughout Military Region 2 (South).

(1) Daily, 20 Military Police Patrols are committed between 0700-1900 hours and 12 patrols between 1900-0700 hours. These patrols are primarily devoted to discipline, law, and order missions on installations or base camps and the daily patrol distribution by geographical area is as follows:

(a) Cam Ranh Bay - 10 patrols
(b) Nha Trang - 7 patrols
(c) Ban Me Thuot - 3 patrols
(d) Dalat - 2 patrols
(e) Phan Thiet - 2 patrols
(f) Phan Rang - 2 patrols

(2) a. There were 17 recurring convoyed convoys in addition to special convoys by military policemen of the 97th Military Police Battalion during the period. The breakdown of these convoys by point of origin and destination is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>NO OF CONVOYS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ Betty</td>
<td>QL-1 North</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QL-1 North</td>
<td>LZ Betty</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ Betty</td>
<td>Highway 8B</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway 8B</td>
<td>LZ Betty</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>Dalat</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalat</td>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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FROM | TO | NO OF CONVOYS
--- | --- | ---
CRB  | Bao Loc | 17
Bao Loc | CRB | 17
Ben Me Thuot | Ben Me Thuot | 20
Nha Trang | Ninh Hoa | 92
Ninh Hoa | Nha Trang | 92
CRB | Song Mao | 5
Song Mao | CRB | 5

b. Other Convoys escorted included:

CRB | Phu Hiep | 1
Phu Hiep | CRB | 1
CRB | Camp Swampy | 1
Camp Swampy | CRB | 1
CRB | Tuy Hoa | 2
Tuy Hoa | CRB | 2
CRB | Dillard | 2
Dillard | CRB | 2
Ben Me Thuot | Nha Trang | 4
Nha Trang | Ben Me Thuot | 4
Ben Me Thuot | Duc Lap | 2
Duc Lap | Ben Me Thuot | 2

These 706 convoys were escorted for a total of 53,321 kilometers.

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d. Operations: (cont)

(3) At the end of the reporting period the battalion was operating a total of 12 combined police patrols, 3 combined police checkpoints, 3 liaison teams, and 2 combined police stations.

(4) Military police of the 77th Military Police Battalion, in conjunction with USAF Security Police, operated a customs inspection facility at the 11th Aerial Port, Cam Rahn Bay Air Force Base during the reporting period. The primary function of this customs facility was to conduct personnel and baggage customs inspections for personnel departing from the 11th Aerial Port on PCS, TDY or leave. There were 9 military policemen committed to this operation at the end of the reporting period.

(5) At the end of the reporting period, the 961st Military Police Company (3D) was providing thirty-two (32) sentry posts in the battalion's area of operation. The Second Platoon of the 961st Military Police Company (3D) provided the sentry dog teams for these posts. Currently the sentry dog teams provide security for an Army Airfield, Convalescent Center, ammunition storage area, outpost facility, POL storage area, and supply dumps.

(6) The battalion also initiated two defile controls in the area of responsibility, to assist in road construction. The two projects, one by US Army Engineer units at Goodview Pass near Da Lat and the other by NHK-36J on QL-1 near Nha Trang, had fallen well behind schedule due to continued congested traffic at the sites. MPs were combined with Cenh Sat, QOs, and Korean MPs to regulate the flow of traffic through these areas. Construction immediately began to speed up and completion dates are forecast for the near future.

(7) On 5 Aug 70, the battalion completed a seven month project to assist the 11th QC Battalion in Military Police instructions. Subjects taught by a battalion NCO were MP stations and operations, patrols, accident investigation, traffic control, speed checks (operation of mirror boxes), first aid, weapons safety, search and apprehension. A total of 24 hours of instruction was taught at each of six QC detachments throughout the HZ (South).

(8) In early August, a combined police desk consisting of MPs, QOs and Cenh Sats was initiated at Phan Rang. The desk is located adjacent to the Phan Rang-Cenh Sat station and provides an excellent means of coordinating police activity throughout the area.

(9) Throughout the reporting period, Military Police support was provided to all military services and U.S. companies located on Cam Rahn Peninsula by the operations of MYCA Checkpoint. Military Police from the 97th Military Police Battalion, supplemented by personnel from the Air Force, Navy, and other Army units, provided a pass and identification section at MYCA Checkpoint that maintained records on approximately 25,000 Vietnamese civilians and 3,000 third
country nationals that work or have worked for U.S. Forces or U.S. companies on Cam Ranh Peninsula. In addition, the military police operated vehicle and pedestrian check lanes for all personnel entering or exiting Cam Ranh Peninsula.

(10) During the reporting period, the 97th Military Police Battalion utilized a helicopter to assist in detecting speeders and other violators of rules, regulations, and orders. The aircraft flew 178 hours and 30 minutes, resulting in 169 citations, 33 convoys overflowed, 15 vehicles impounded in off-limits areas, 18 personnel apprehended for off-limits, and $1,200 US Green Currency confiscated.

(11) During the reporting period, six saturation missions to outlying areas stressing selective enforcement were staged by the 97th Military Police Battalion. These missions resulted in 1,111 on-the-spot corrections, 21 citations, 37 off-limits apprehensions, 2 narcotics charges, 3 disorderly conduct, 4 larcenies, 2 wrongful appropriations of vehicles, 1 money manipulation, and 1 concealed weapon.

(12) During the reporting period there were 1,650 individuals cited on Do 1408's for various violations. Also, 2,984 Military Police Report DA 19-32 were initiated in the 97th MP Battalion's area of responsibility.

(13) During the reporting period, the Physical Security Section conducted 18 physical security surveys and 10 physical security inspections throughout MR 2 (South).

c. Training:

(1) During the reporting period, 428 enlisted men in the grades of E-2 through E-6 attended a 32 hour block of instruction of in-country replacement training. This in-country orientation is conducted by the 9th MP Battalion for all replacement personnel designated for assignment to units of the 16th Military Police Group. A total of 16 separate classes were processed ranging in size from 12 personnel to 72 personnel.

(2) During the reporting period the S-3 section, 97th Military Police Battalion, conducted inspections of all subordinate units with special emphasis on unit operations, unit training and maintenance of unit training records.

d. Intelligence-Counterintelligence:

(1) 18th MP Bde, IPPV Hq, and US Army Support Command, CRCC, continues to provide intelligence summaries on a timely basis. The information is analyzed and where appropriate, disseminated to subordinate elements. Intelligence information received is sufficient to support the battalion mission.

(2) There are no reports of security violations or compromise.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. Intelligence-Counterintelligence: (cont)

(3) Intelligence Spot Reports processed - 44.

(4) PW Operations: During the reporting period 2 PW's were processed by this battalion.

(5) Intelligence sources are:

(a) Intelligence Spot Reports

(b) Intelligence summaries from higher headquarters

(c) Intelligence summaries from USAUPC-W-ORD

(d) Review of Military Police blotters and reports

(e) National Police Reports and situation documents

g. Force Development - As directed in 97th Military Police Battalion Special order number 259, dated 25 September 1970, the 218th MP Company's Third Platoon in Company D was relieved from attachment to the 630th MP Company. The 630th MP Co assumed all convoy duties and the 3rd Platoon of the 218th assumed DLO and Checkpoint operation duties.

h. Communications:

(1) During the reporting period the battalion transmitted 690 messages by RTT and received 268 messages.

(2) The battalion began to utilize the MU/PRC-743 for communication between the battalion and detachments. The detachments report in for comms checks and to transmit messages twice daily.

i. Logistics:

(1) Mission essential equipment shortages in the battalion during the reporting period were as follows:

(a) XD-706 V-100 armored car: During the reporting period one V-100 armored car was destroyed in a traffic accident on 1 Oct 70. The vehicle was completely destroyed by fire. A replacement has not been obtained as of the date of this report, but is expected to be received within the next 2 weeks.

(b) M-16 rifles: Thirteen M-16 rifles were received by the 981st MP Company (SD), during the reporting period. A shortage still exists of 135 rifles in the Battalion.
SUBJECT: Operati, nal Report—Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFCR-63 (R2) (U)

1 Logistics (cont)

(2) The V-100 which was destroyed as mentioned above, i(1) (a), was destroyed in an accident with an AIU V-100. The US V-100 swerved to avoid hitting a 20 female who had stopped into the path of the vehicle. The US V-100 hit another V-100 traveling in the opposite direction. The impact ruptured the fuel tank in the left front of the US V-100 and spread gas immediately over the vehicle. A spark from impact apparently ignited the vehicle which immediately burst into flames. The crew had to abandon the vehicle and were unable to extinguish the fire. A Equipment Improvement Report has been initiated by this headquarters recommending a bladder of some type be constructed inside the fuel tank to decrease the possibility of rupture and explosion or gas within the tank.

(3) A critical shortage still exists in alternators and transmissions for 4 ton vehicles, and certain 3/4 ton parts. Support Command has indicated that new contracts are being met in CONUS to make more 4 ton alternators available for DX in Vietnam. The problem should be alleviated within the next 60-90 days.

(4) Replacement 4 ton vehicles are still at a premium. Presently the battalion is short one 4 ton vehicle. In the future it will be increasingly difficult to obtain 4 ton vehicles. During the reporting period 6 4 ton vehicles were received. All 6 were Keystone generated vehicles. Coordination with DSU and units preparing for deactivation provide the best means for obtaining 4 ton vehicles if available.

(5) Two reports of survey were initiated during the reporting period. These were as a result of the V-100 incident on 1 Oct 70. Both surveys are still pending.

(6) Plans are under way to provide material for civic actions projects sponsored by the battalion. S-4 will look into the availability of obtaining building material for proposed civic action projects.

1 Civic Action

(1) 2,999 lbs of fresh fruit and vegetables, canned goods, and other foodstuffs were donated to orphanages and various MACV teams to be further distributed to local orphanages, schools, etc.

(2) Material is being stockpiled by the battalion S-4 to assist the 11th QC Battalion dependent housing project in Nha Trang.

(3) The 630th MP Company is stockpiling materials for building a playground for a nursery in the Est area.
Self Help Program

(1) During the reporting period the Bn S-4 Office provided materials and 2 laborers for the complete renovation and remodeling of the Cam Ranh Bay MP desk and detention area. Materials were also provided for a combined police station presently under way in Nha Trang. The new station will be located near the city of Nha Trang and is expected to be completed by 15 November 1970.

(2) On 28 Oct 70 high winds and rain from a severe storm caused minor damage in the battalion area. The ventilator portion of the Battalion mess hall was blown completely off, and roofing was blown off a few of the buildings throughout the battalion. PA&E will hopefully repair the mess hall roof soon as a work order has been initiated. All other damage was repaired by unit personnel with available material.

(3) The 218th MP Company completely remodeled and refurnished the unit dayroom at Nha Trang. The room was repainted and redecorated using surplus materials and troop labor. A television set, stereo system, and refrigerators were installed. The 3rd Platoon located at Cam Ranh Bay renovated a building to serve as orderly room and day room using troop labor and surplus material.

(4) During the reporting period the 981st MP Co (SD) completed the following self-help and improvement projects. Both the Headquarters and Second Platoon billets were painted; the sewerage system was improved and a new drainage ditch was excavated; the roofs of all buildings were painted; concrete walks were constructed in the company area; new urinals were installed in the latrine and the arms room was renovated.

Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel:

(1) Troop Morale and Welfare

Observation: Due to 24 hour shift work in all MP units, MPs frequently come off work at odd hours. Thus, his sources of relaxation and recreation are limited. Also, enlisted men and NCO Clubs generally are located so as to provide entertainment for several different type units in the area. As a consequence, the MP is occasionally placed in a situation of being challenged by some one that he has apprehended in the line of duty for some violation. To avoid these situations, most MPs tend to avoid these clubs and therefore face limited sources of relaxation.
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(1) Troop Morale and Welfare (cont)

EVALUATION: The need for a place of relaxation and enjoyment can be remedied by the formation of a club within the company or battalion area. The facilities can be constructed with surplus materials and troop labor. By obtaining approval to initiate an Other Sundry Fund account, the club can be run by unit members and all profits can be used to provide luxuries for the facility such as stereo equipment, air conditioning, television, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: That procedures be initiated to ease administrative approval and to establish guidelines for Military Police units to initiate MP Clubs by the use of the Other Sundry Fund.

b. Operations:

(1) Use of Helicopters as surveillance units

OBSERVATION: Due to wide area of responsibility and limited accessibility to some areas in the run, many off-limits, speed, and other types of violators remain undetected.

EVALUATION: A wide area can be rapidly surveyed by the use of helicopters. Speeder and individuals in off limits areas can be detected and ground units can be directed to their location.

Excessive speed can be detected by the use of stop watches and conversion tables, converting seconds elapsed into miles per hour. Easily recognizable lines are marked on the highways throughout the area of responsibility at 176' intervals. Chase units should be placed at locations on each side of the checking zone that will enable them to easily stop all vehicles as directed by the speedchecker in the helicopter. The MP's in the chase units should be dismounted from their vehicle and prepared to flag down violators as directed.

Communications between the helicopter and the chase vehicles can be a problem without close coordination and prior planning. An AN/PRC-25 in the helicopter can be used to communicate with the AN/PRC-46 on the ground. However, better results appear to be achieved by the utilization of aviation helmets by the clockers and tying in with the helicopter's communication system. Another recommendation is to have the MP vehicles marked on the top to facilitate easy spotting by the helicopter when directing the unit to a suspicious vehicle or activity in an off-limits area.

RECOMMENDATION: That a program be actively developed for the utilization of helicopters for military police surveillance purposes.
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1 Nov 70


(2) Saturation Patrols

OBSERVATION: Due to the vast area of responsibility of the Military Police, it becomes difficult to have an adequate number of MPs at any given location to become a deterrent to the offenses committed within their area. Occasionally, MP reports reveal that certain areas may begin to have a buildup of specific types of offenses.

EVALUATION: An effective means to reduce offenses is the use of well-organized military police strike forces. Swift augmentation of military police at any location can serve immediate notice to personnel in an area that the military police are prepared for any situation. These saturation missions require close coordination with installation coordinators to provide the necessary support such as air and ground transportation, mess and billeting facilities, and the authority to act. However, preparation for the mission should be done in such a manner as to not forecast the arrival of the Military Police. By the use of aggressive patrolling, on-the-spot corrections, and citation of offenders, the saturation force can reduce the violation rate in a short time span. A further advantage is there is an uncertainty created as to when and against what targets the MPs might strike next. The keys to success are dependent upon detailed prior planning, secrecy, surprise, and speed in execution.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That well-planned strike forces emphasizing selective enforcement be utilized throughout the battalions area of responsibility.

(3) Enemy Contact Notification Procedures

OBSERVATION: Military Police convoy escorts supporting transportation units throughout MR2 (South) have encountered problems in notifying battalion headquarters of enemy contacts with the convoy. This headquarters and higher headquarters need timely notification of enemy contacts.

EVALUATION: The V-100 armored cars and "jeeps" are equipped with AN/VRC-47 and AN/VRC-46 radios for communication. Distance soon becomes a prohibitive factor in reporting enemy contacts. Also, lack of operational land line communications frequently prohibits the MP convoy escort NCOIC from notifying battalion headquarters for time periods up to twenty-four hours. The transportation convoy commanders are equipped with side-band radios and maintain communications with their headquarters at all times.

Several means may be utilized to insure prompt notification. Close and constant coordination must be maintained at all times with the supported transportation unit that monitors the convoy radio net. Also, the AN/PRC-74B radio may be utilized for monitoring purposes if immediate notification is made of the incident, the 74B can be switched to the convoy frequency to monitor for all details, or as an alternate method of direct communication, the MP convoy NCOIC may request the convoy commander switch to the MP battalion 74B net to make the notification and allow the battalion to switch to the convoy frequency for further details. Any of these methods require close working arrangements with the transportation units.

RECOMMENDATION: That MP units develop close working liaison with transportation units for notification purposes and that the AN/PRC-74B be utilized for monitoring convoy radio transmissions.

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1 Nov 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, 
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFR (R2) (U).


OBSERVATION: The importance of physical security is inversely proportional to the level of US presence in Vietnam. Physical Security inspections and surveys are the primary method by which the command may determine the adequacy of the physical security posture of its installations and facilities. These inspections and surveys are currently being conducted in Vietnam by individuals, who are required to have attended a course of instruction and graduated from a recognized physical security school. Due to the inherent flexibility of the physical security posture of any given installation or facility, an evaluation of these physical security measures in effect must itself fluctuate with each survey of inspection. At the present time each individual inspector is required to arbitrarily evaluate that posture while limited to ratings of "EXCELLENT", "GOOD" and "POOR". Because of the restrictiveness of these ratings and the individuality of the reports which are forwarded to higher commands, the commander does not attain an accurate picture of the physical security posture.

EVALUATION: The current method of evaluating physical security reports has the effect of obscuring the overall efficiency of the physical security program. This is particularly true in Vietnam where the physical security posture of installations/facilities differs greatly and the individual inspector must approach each with realistic consideration given to the criticality of the mission, permanency of the installation, resources available to the commander of the installation and terrorist activities. An evaluation rating system based on whether the overall physical security posture of an installation/facility is satisfactory or not would eliminate much of the confusion experienced by the inspector and enable the commander to be more knowledgeable of his command's physical security posture.

RECOMMENDATION: That physical security surveys and inspections be evaluated in the final analysis as "SATISFACTORY" or "UNSATISFACTORY".

o. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None

c. Logistics: V-100 Fuel System

OBSERVATION: Under certain conditions the V-100 fuel system has been found to be unsafe and dangerous to crew members because of the location and construction of the fuel tanks. The fuel tanks are extremely vulnerable to impact and ignition because they are located on the front corners of the vehicle.

EVALUATION: The possibility of the tanks exploding or igniting upon impact with another solid metal object has been found to be very likely. Of two accidents known to this headquarters involving V-100's, both have resulted in fire and injury to crew members. (One of the accidents involved a Korean V-100 which struck another vehicle and ruptured the fuel tank resulting in a fire). The metal hull of the V-100 is the skin of the vehicle and also the container for the fuel. The thin steel walls do not provide adequate protection for the fuel. Once this skin is cracked or ruptured it immediately exposes the fuel and becomes a dangerous safety hazard. Not only are the tanks vulnerable from impact, but equally so from enemy gun fire. Small arms fire properly employed against the fuel tank could possibly ignite the fuel and cause a fire.

RECOMMENDATION: Relocation of the vehicle fuel tanks would be a possible solution. This would necessitate redesign of the entire system. Another more feasible solution would be to use a strong collapsible bladder inside the fuel tanks which would give upon impact. This headquarters has recently submitted an Equipment Improvement Report (EIR) recommending the V-100 fuel tanks be investigated to determine if they do create a safety hazard. The EIR suggested the use of a collapsible bladder as a possible solution to the problem.

f. Organization: None

g. Communication:

(1) Utilization of the AN/PRC-74B NET

OBSERVATION: The AN/PRC-74B is a single-sideband AM radio designated primarily to provide communications over distances of up to 25 miles by groundwave over terrain where direct line-of-sight communication is not possible. The 97th MP BN has been attempting to use 74B's as a back-up system to maintain communications by skywave with out-lying detachments as far away as 103 miles in the event of a break-down of telephone communication.

EVALUATION: Operational testing has indicated that antenna dipole height, orientation, and configuration are not critical to the successful operation of a 74B radio net, at least over distance not greater than a hundred miles. Due to the low (15 watt) transmitting power of the 74B, successful operation demands good atmospheric and ionospheric propagation conditions and the relative absence of interference from more powerful stations on the assigned operating frequency. Careful selection of the operating frequency can provide both of the necessary conditions for successful operation, but with no assurance that such conditions will prevail for any great length of time. Unfortunately, the difficulties involved in obtaining authority to use a frequency of choice preclude changing frequencies often to meet the conditions. Quality of communications varies from poor to excellent over a period of weeks days, and even hours. The best communications are obtained during the hours around noon, and at night the ambient noise level becomes so great that radio...

contact by 74B is impossible. During a two week period of good conditions, it was found that the net could be used effectively between 0630 hours and 1845 hours each day; and during poor conditions, it is difficult to pass traffic except around noon.

The 74B does not lend itself easily to use in a radio net, since the set is not equipped with a squelch circuit or a speaker. Monitoring requires that a man sit by the set with headsets clamped over his ears, and using an external speaker is little better since the 74B's audio output is just barely adequate to drive a speaker. Also, the constant background noise tends to disturb most people, forcing them to turn the volume down so far that a radio call to their station would not be noticed. The 97th MP Bn net control station has been using an external audio amplifier and speaker to monitor continuously from 0700 hours to 1800 hours daily and requiring the detachments to come up on the air at 0900 hours and 1600 hours each day for commo checks. Thus, the detachments can reach Bn Headquarters any time between 0700 hours and 1800 hours, and Bn Headquarters can be assured of being able to pass traffic to the detachments at least once in the morning and once in the afternoon. The 74B radio net has proved to be an adequate, but not entirely satisfactory or reliable, back-up system that has required a good deal of work to put in operation and a continuing effort to keep in operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Equipping each AN/PRC-74B with an external audio amplifier and speaker would enhance the usefulness of the radio by facilitating continuous monitoring by all stations. The addition of a single-sideband linear amplifier with a 15 watt input and a 50 to 100 watt output would increase the ability of the radio to get a readable signal through under adverse conditions, thus increasing the time span each day in which the 74B can be used effectively and improving its reliability. A simpler and less costly solution would be to replace the AN/PRC-74B (basic cost $52,811 each) with the AN/GRC-106 (basic cost about $16,000 each) which has a transmitted average power output of 200 watts and sufficient audio power to drive an external speaker without difficulty.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

1 Incl
Organizational Chart

WILLIAM C. FETTERS
LTC, MFG
Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
2-Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
3-Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
5-Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, ATTN: AVBGF-B, APO 96349
AVBeF-B (1 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSFO-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96319 21 November 1970

TO: Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBUC-O, APO 96491

1. (U) The CRL for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970, for the 97th Military Police Battalion is submitted.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate. The following comments refer to the parts of the report indicated:

   a. Reference paragraph 2a(1): Concur. Clubs are essential to provide off duty MP's with leisure facilities in the unit areas. Use of profits are beneficial in purchasing equipment that can increase morale.

   b. Reference paragraph 2b(1): Concur. Aircraft have proved most effective in the traffic enforcement program and permits coverage over a wider area.

   c. Reference paragraph 2b(2): Concur. This has proved a very effective means of practicing economy of force and still providing maximum service to supported commanders.

   d. Reference paragraph 2b(3): Concur with closer liaison with transportation units, but non-concur with use of AN/PRC 7UB radios for communications in convoy operations. These radios have proved of only marginal value in communications from stable locations and their effectiveness in this type operation is questionable. Their cost is also a factor to be considered.

   e. Reference paragraph 2b(4): Concur. This rating system would be a more effective way of evaluating the security posture of a unit or facility.

   f. Reference paragraph 2e: Concur. AMC should conduct necessary tests to develop a more effective fuel tank for the V-100. The present tank is a hazard when ruptured and is vulnerable to enemy fire.

   g. Reference paragraph 2g(l): Concur.

GLEN A. HILL
COL, MPC
Commanding

CF: CO, 97th MP BN
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFRG-45 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491 19 December 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

1. Comments on Significant Activities:
   a. Page 4, paragraph 1c(5). The Authorized figures under Civilian Personnel should read:

   Program Six Civilianization 6
   Augmentation TDA P5WFPEAA-99 83
   TOTAL 89

   Unit has been notified.

   b. Page 4, paragraph 1c(7). The Authorized Strengths as of 1 August and 31 October should read:

   OFF  WO  EM  TOTAL
   23  2  567  592

   Unit has been notified.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:
   a. The listing of functional groupings in paragraph 2 (Lessons Learned) does not conform to the format set forth in the Appendix, AR 525-15. Unit has been notified.

   b. Concur with all Lessons Learned. Reference non-concurrence of 16th MP Gp on the use of the AN/PRC 74B radios in convoy operations: this headquarters has further coordinated with the 16th MP Gp and it is felt that it is feasible for the 97th MP Bn to use the AN/PRC 74B at its headquarters to monitor single sideband transmissions sent out by transportation units in the convoy. This provides immediate notification to battalion headquarters in the event of enemy attack, with the capability for undertaking reaction measures at once. Unit has been notified.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE F. PROUDFOOT
Colonel, MPC
Deputy Commander

CPT
CO, 16th MP Gp

CO, 97th MP Bn
AVHDO-ix (1 Nov 70) 3d inq
SUBJCT: Operational report-lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ACS CSFOR-u5 (K2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco, 96375 (U)

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GROK-DT,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the operational report-lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 97th
Military Police Battalion and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "N-10 rifles," page 10, paragraph 1(1)
   (b). The following action has been taken to reduce shortage of 135 N-10
riffles in the 97th MP Bn: The ICCV was directed on 6 January 1971 to
release 135 N-10 rifles to the 981st MP Co. Unit has been
so advised.

   b. Reference item concerning "Troop Morale and welfare," page 12,
paragraph 2a(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a: concur. On 26 May
1970, a request for authorization to establish an Other Sundry Fund
in the 218th MP Company, a subordinate unit of the 97th MP Bn, was returned
to the CO, 18th MP Bde, stating this Headquarters' policy of authorizing
the establishment of Other Sundry Funds only when required services are
not available through other appropriate or nonappropriated fund activities.
CO, 18th MP Bde was requested to re-evaluate the necessity for establishing
the requested sundry fund. If the requirement was determined to be valid,
CO, 18th MP Bde was requested to resubmit the request, with comments to
include his position on the necessity of segregating military police
from other club patrons. The request was resubmitted to this Headquarters
on 26 May 1970 and approved on 15 June 1970. According to records at this
Headquarters, neither the 97th MP Bn nor any of its subordinate units have
submitted a request to this Headquarters to have authorized the establish-
ment of an Other Sundry Fund. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.
Unit has been so advised.

   c. Reference item concerning "Inspector's evaluation of Physical
Security Inspections and Physical Security Surveys," page 15, paragraph
2b(4) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a: concur. An evaluation of
"SATISFACTORY" or "UNSATISFACTORY" would give the commander a more accurate
picture of the physical security posture. Unit has been so advised.
d. Reference item concerning "V-100 Fuel System," page 15, paragraph 2g and 1st endorsement, paragraph 2d: concur with the recommendation contained in the 1st endorsement, paragraph 2f. This problem has been previously addressed by the 18th Military Police Brigade. As a result of previous comments, a Vietnam Laboratory Assistance Program request is being prepared requesting Tank/Automotive Command (TACOM) to undertake a study to develop means to eliminate or reduce the incidents of crew compartment fires. Unit has been so advised.

 e. Reference item concerning "Utilization of the AN/ARC-74A, " page 16, paragraph 4a(1) and 1st endorsement, paragraph 4d: concur. The AN/ARC-100 radio would provide more reliable service than that currently being provided by the AN/ARC-74A. Also the AN/ARC-100 is more readily available in Vietnam supply channels. A 10-0 change would be necessary. Unit has been so advised.

For the Command:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
18th MP Bde
13th Inf BN

By Furn:
13th Inf Bde
12th MP Bde
GPOP-DT (1 Nov 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 97th Military Police Battalion for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 Apr 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

J. M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

22
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 97th Military Police Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.

CO, 97th Military Police Battalion

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