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AD 515 370

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY: AGC, D/A

LtS.
9 May 75
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
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US Continental Army Command
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US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
FADAC

(1) Observation: Memory disks for the M-18 computer are repaired in CONUS by the contractor and returned to the field. The 578th LEM Co is limited to three (3) disks per month. This is insufficient for the supported equipment density.

(2) Evaluation: Lack of sufficient memory disks within the supply system causes an unnecessary delay in repair of unserviceable computers. With additional disks or a faster replacement of unserviceable ones the repair could be accomplished and the equipment returned to service in a more reasonable period of time.

(3) Recommendations: That additional memory disks be procured and/or provisions be made to insure faster turn around time for disks sent to CONUS for repair.

ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE

(1) Observation: During the reporting period the organization deadline has increased to an unacceptable level.

(2) Evaluation: Reasons for the increased deadline are due to inadequate organizational maintenance programs, a lack of trained operators, and a lack of trained supervisors.

(3) Recommendations: That commanders place more emphasis on a daily preventive maintenance program. That the quality and scope of organizational maintenance programs be re-evaluated and revised as appropriate. That operators be instructed in proper operating procedures. That more officer and NCO supervision be used. That Battalion and Group Materiel Officers spot check the daily motor stables. That each command level develop inspection teams to detect poor operator techniques and maintenance.

TECH SUPPLY

(1) Observation: Posting of requisitions is significantly delayed when program changes are required on ADP Equipment.

(2) Evaluation: During the reporting period, the tech supplies with automatic data processing capability were required to change the stockage criteria. One unit ceased the processing of requisitions and let a posting backlog accumulate. The other unit used a manual processing method and did not let a backlog accumulate.

(3) Recommendation: When a program is run which will interfere with the normal daily posting of requisitions for a period exceeding four days, the unit should revert to a manual posting procedure.
AVCD A SPO  15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Da Nang
APO San Francisco  96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.  20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant activities.

   a. Command: During the reporting period, a total of 64 officers were assigned to the 26th General Support Group from in country and out of country sources. The command experienced a loss of 57 officers due to reassignment or rotation.

      (1) On 11 August 1970, MAJ Maurice J. Orlando, Jr. was assigned as Security, Plans and Operations Officer.

      (2) On 15 August 1970, CPT Albert J. Hartlage was assigned as Catholic Chaplain of the 26th General Support Group.


      (4) On 12 September 1970, LTC William A. Glenn, Jr. was assigned as Group Logistics Officer.

   b. Personnel and Administration:

      (1) Promotions: No significant changes were noticed during the reporting period. Promotions were stable and morale remained at a high level.

      (2) U.S. Mail: A continuous problem has been encountered in the timely distribution of U.S. Mail to individuals within this command, especially during periods of inclement weather.
c. Base Development:

(1) There was considerable improvement in the 26th General Support Group's sector of the Phu Bai Base Defense Perimeter. Two bunkers were completely renovated.

(2) Most of the bunkers have been cemented to prevent erosion and deterioration during the monsoon season.

(3) A new mess hall was constructed to provide for messing of personnel assigned to the perimeter.

(4) Extensive work has been accomplished and efforts are continuing to improve the condition of the perimeter road to provide access along the line. Recent monsoon rains caused a wash-out of approximately 35 feet to occur in the area. A self help project has been initiated to repair the damage.

(5) Revetments have been erected in all billet areas within the 26th Group compound and approximately 65% are completely filled with earth to protect personnel.

(6) A contingency of nine (9) personnel have been trained to operate fire fighting equipment located on Camp Holmes, in the event civilian personnel are unavailable during an emergency.

d. Organization:

(1) On 1 August 1970, the 863rd Transportation Command (Provisional) was redesignated as US Army Port Tan My (Provisional).

(2) On 20 August 1970, the 533rd Engineer Detachment was transferred from the 63rd Maintenance Battalion to the 80th General Support Group and the 196th Engineer Detachment was assigned to the 63rd Maintenance Battalion.

(3) On 11 September 1970, the 571st Ordnance Company (Ammunition) was assigned to the 26th General Support Group for all purposes less inventory accounting to operate 3 Ammunition Supply Points in Northern Military Region 1. The Company (-) was further assigned to the 2nd Maintenance Battalion to operate ASP 101 and 103. The Ist Magazine Platoon was attached to the 63rd Maintenance Battalion to operate ASP 101.

e. Other:

PROJECT BUDDY

(1) The 26th General Support Group Operation Buddy Category II Training
Program started on 1 September 1970 with 12 Vietnamese soldiers being trained by the 2nd Maintenance Battalion in various maintenance fields. These soldiers were trained for two weeks and a new class then started training with the 2nd Maintenance Battalion. As the program was extremely successful, the 26th General Support Group strived to increase the number of Vietnamese soldiers in training, at one time. The US Army Port Tan My took on five Vietnamese soldiers for documentation training in Cargo Movement Control. The 39th Transportation Battalion then started training 19 Vietnamese soldiers in various maintenance skills. The 26th General Support Group unit that will begin training of Vietnamese soldiers.

(2) To date the 26th General Support Group has completed the training of 74 Vietnamese soldiers; 63 soldiers in Category II Training and 11 soldiers in Category I Training. The 26th General Support Group currently has 43 Vietnamese soldiers in Category II Training and as of 16 November 1970 will have 63 Vietnamese soldiers in Category II Training.

(3) The 26th General Support Group has had excellent results with the Operation Buddy Program. All of the 26th General Support Group personnel are extremely receptive to the idea of training the Vietnamese soldiers and the Vietnamese soldiers are very eager to learn all that they can from the 26th General Support Group. When the Vietnamese soldier completes the training program set up by the units of the 26th General Support Group he is in most cases, as proficient in the skills taught to him, as is the American soldier. Increased Operation Buddy training programs are now being set up for all 26th General Support Group units and will commence shortly.

(4) In anticipation of the Arvnization/Vietnamization of the Vietnam War, plans are being made to facilitate the ARVN take over of the US Army Port Tan My FOL and ramp facilities at Colco Island. The 26th General Support Group has recommended that an ARVN unit be formed to train at the US Army Port Tan My Facility with the idea in mind that the ARVN unit becomes proficient in controlling port operations. They will assume complete responsibility of port operations upon withdrawal of US troops from Colco Island.

(5) To facilitate training and to make more training time more available Vietnamese soldiers have been integrated in the American units for training. The Vietnamese soldiers eat with and are billeted with their American counterparts. Recreational facilities are also shared. This integration has significantly contributed to the success of the 26th General Support Group Operation Buddy Program.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel:
      (1) Observations: US Mail delivery to the units of the 26th General Support Group is not satisfactory.
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSFCR-65 (R2)

(2) Evaluation: Mail destined for the 26th General Support Group enters RVN at Da Nang. It is sorted and placed on pallets for air-delivery to the APO in Phu Bai for further distribution. During periods of inclement weather, especially in the monsoon season flights are cancelled thereby causing as many as 3 days delay in delivery to Phu Bai.

(3) Recommendation: That US Army Postal authorities investigate the possibility of utilizing an all purpose pallet or type container which could be loaded either on an aircraft or placed on a vehicle for daily transport to Phu Bai.

b. Intelligence: None.
c. Operations: None.
d. Organization: None.
e. Training:

(1) Observation: There has been an extremely high Material Handling Equipment deadline rate.

(2) Evaluation: There appears to be two factors contributing to the deadline rate. The first being operator negligence and abuse, and second, shortage of repair parts. These factors, compounded by less than ideal weather and terrain conditions, contribute to the equipment failure.

(3) Recommendation: A formalized driver training and preventive maintenance program be initiated combined with supervised daily maintenance performed by trained specialist assisted by the drivers.

f. Logistics:

TRANSPORTATION

(1) Observation: The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) organic transportation combined with the light truck company providing exclusive support for the division was not sufficient to meet the division's increased requirement resulting from the loss of the aircraft capability during extended periods of inclement weather.

(2) Evaluation: Since it is necessary for the Support Command to provide a light truck company for the exclusive use of the Airmobile Division and even augment that company with additional vehicles during long periods of inclement weather it appears that the division is not properly equipped to operate in a monsoon area.

(3) Recommendation: That the Airmobile Division be provided an organic light truck company.
RAIL TRANSPORTATION

(1) Observation: Use of the Vietnamese Railroad transporting US supplies between Da Nang and Phu Bai has proved to be a valuable addition to the Army Internal Transportation System.

(2) Evaluation: The Vietnamese National Railroad is being used to transport greater quantities of supplies between Da Nang and other MRL supply points. During the period monthly tonnage moved in this manner has steadily increased. Total quantity received for the quarter was 16,492 tons by rail. Rail shipments were extremely valuable during the early monsoon season when roads were temporarily washed out and highway line haul could not be accomplished.

(3) Recommendation: Continue efforts to make maximum use of the Vietnamese Railroad in order to reduce requirements for highway line haul and to increase availability of this additional transportation made during periods when highway movement is impossible.

ICE CONSUMPTION:

(1) Observation: Management data collected by subordinate units and this headquarters indicated little reduction in ice consumption during the monsoon season even though the temperature had declined greatly.

(2) Evaluation: When ice consumption figures were questioned it was found that Class I Officers had attempted to reduce quantities of ice delivered from commercial vendors, but contractual commitments prevented reduction.

(3) Recommendation: That data be maintained by the contracting officer which will enable him to make allowances for rapid or automatic changes to ice delivery quantities based on actual ice requirements.

g. Communications:

(1) Observation: During monsoon, several severe tropical storms can be expected. Experience to date has been that communications interruptions due to storm damage can greatly hamper operations and could be critical in event of emergencies.

(2) Evaluation: During a recent severe storm, telephone communications, to subordinate units as well as higher headquarters were out of order for several days. During the same period, roadways were impassible and air transportation was unavailable. For all practical purposes, communication for normal operations outside the local area was limited to radio.

(3) Recommendation: That arrangements be made to employ Military Affiliate Radio System for communications between headquarters at distant locations during such critical periods.
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AVCD-A-SPO
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

FADAC

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(3) Recommendation: When a program is run which will interfere with the normal daily posting of requisitions for a period exceeding four days, the unit should revert to a manual posting procedure.
FIRE AND SAFETY

(1) Observation: There is a definite fire and safety hazard present during the monsoon/winter season in Vietnam.

(2) Evaluation: With the advent of monsoon rains and cooler/damp weather, several instances of fires occurred damaging property and causing serious injury to US Military personnel. In most cases the fires were found to have originated from personnel using unauthorized stoves/heaters inside buildings.

(3) Recommendation: An effective safety program be initiated by each commander to include frequent safety/fire inspections throughout their respective areas, especially during the cooler periods. Command information programs stress the dangers inherent in the use of unauthorized electrical appliances or stoves just prior to the seasonal change.

EFFECT OF ADVERSE WEATHER ON OPERATIONS

(1) Observation: Severe rains and flooding during the monsoon season have hampered operations within the 26th General Support Group.

(2) Evaluation: Rising waters and heavy rains have had a detrimental effect on the MSR in Northern MRL. Several bridges were undermined from rushing waters; roads were in some cases under as much as five (5) feet of water making them impassable; rock and mud slides caused by excessive rains covered portions of the Hai Van Pass closing it to all traffic for periods up to three days. Movement of critical supplies virtually came to a halt causing excessive deadline rates on equipment for lack of repair parts and major assemblies not arriving on time. Class I stockage levels decreased considerably due to road closings.

Movement of POL tankers to and from Tan My Island by road was halted for a three day period due to a washout in the causeway causing a reduced operating level of Diesel and Mogas for combat units.

(3) Recommendation: That additional storage facilities be made available and located at strategic points to increase days of supply of POL products. That a fueling point for helicopters be established at the Tan My location to be used for contingency purposes. That careful consideration be given to stockage levels at each level of command to insure an adequate supply stockage is maintained to support operations for the anticipated period of isolation. It is important that General Support Groups consider each base that it supports and not just its entire area of responsibility as a whole.
AVCD-A-SPO

SUBJECT: Operation Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

RADIO RESEARCH UNIT SUPPORT

(1) Observation: Radio Research Unit support to the 26th General Support Group is considered adequate.

(2) Evaluation: Quarterly reports on communications security and inspection of cryptofacility have resulted in increased emphasis on communications security.

(3) Recommendations: Support given 26th General Support Group in this area continue.

1 Incl
Organization Chart

E.M.L. [Signature]
Colonel, OD
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCD-GO-MH (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)(R2)

Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, APO SF 96349

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO SF 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 26th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Page 3 and 4, para 2a(1). Concur in part. The pallet presently used meets all the requirements of the recommendation and may be placed into a sealand type van.

   b. Page 4, para 2e(1). Concur. No further comment required.

   c. Page 4, para 2f(1). Concur. Organic truck units of USASUPCOM, DNG should not be dedicated to field support of divisional tactical units.

   d. Page 5, para 2f(2). Concur. No further comment required.

   e. Page 5, para 2f(3). Nonconcur. The Director of Food requested all supply points to provide the quantity of ice to be decreased during the monsoon season. This information was never furnished; however, delivery quantities were reduced by coordinating with the Contract Officer Representative. The supply point at Quang Tri attempted to reduce delivery through contact with the vendor.

   f. Page 5, para 2g(1). Concur. Greater use of the AN/GRC-142 at the 26th GSG location during critical periods without conventional telephone service would also be very beneficial. The USASUPCOM, DNG RATT Net has eight stations within MR 1 and two additional stations proposed. Arrangements with the 501st Signal Battalion Communications Center facility could also be made to facilitate communications outside of Phu Bai when telephone service is not available.

   g. Page 6, para 2g(2). Concur. No further comment required.

   h. Page 6, para 2g(3). Concur. No further comment required.

   i. Page 6, para 2g(4). Concur. No further comment required.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVCD GO-MH (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJET: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (RCS GSPOR-65) (R2)

j. Page 7, para 2h(1). Concur. No further comment required.

k. Page 7 and 8, para 2h(2). Concur. Increased consideration should be given to Class III stockage levels. USARV has established the present stockage objectives for 26th GSG, and approval must be granted by USARV to change the present level. A separate request has already been initiated to increase the fuel storage capacity. The 26th GSG will be responsible for establishing a fueling point for helicopters at Tan My. If additional equipment is needed, a request with appropriate justification will be forwarded thru channels.

l. Page 8, para 2h(3). Concur. No further comment required.

ARTHUR H. SWEENY, Jr.
brigadier general, USA
commanding
AVHD-DO (15 Nov 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 26th General Support Group, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 6 MAR 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 26th General Support Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Personnel" page 3, paragraph 2a: concur in the observation that in the past monsoon weather caused delays in mail delivery to the Phu Bai area. In an effort to provide for mail service during inclement weather, this Headquarters, in September 1970, requested CG USASUPCOM-DNG to develop contingency plans for surface movement of mail to preclude potential mail backlog problems. CG USASUPCOM-DNG implemented our request and parcel post mail has been moving by line haul means since October 1970. Airlift of letter mail continues but procedures have been established whereby this mail is diverted to land transportation when inclement weather or other factors threaten air delivery. With respect to the recommendation concerning utilization of a multipurpose pallet, the one presently used meets the requirements of the recommendation. It can be placed either on an aircraft or loaded into a transport van. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "RAIL TRANSPORTATION" page 5, paragraph 2f and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d: concur. The following action has been taken to increase the availability of rail transportation:

(1) This matter has been brought to the attention of the Joint Operating Railway Coordination Committee (JORCC) at their regularly scheduled meetings.

(2) The JORCC has requested that the Vietnamese National Railway System increase emphasis on the hauling of cargo, repair of interdicted track and restoration of the rail in this area.

Unit has been so advised.
c. Reference item concerning "ICE CONSUMPTION" page 5, paragraph 2f and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e. Ice requirements are determined IAW USARV regulation 31-5. Issues are 3 pounds per man per day, but do not increase or decrease based on weather conditions. All decreases in ice requirements are done on a voluntary basis by individual units. Decreased requirements will be noted by contracting officer and ice procured from local sources should be reduced accordingly. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

d. Reference item concerning "FADAC" page 6, paragraph 3g and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2g: concur. The following action has been taken to improve availability of FADAC memory disks in the 26th General Support Group: HumCOM has been requested to increase USARV input of FADAC memory disks from 5 and 7 to 12 and 12 during 3rd quarter, FY 71. If this request is approved the allocation of memory disks to the 26th General Support Group will be increased from 3 to 6. This headquarters will reevaluate the need for memory disks in USARV during March 1971. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

e. Reference item concerning "TECH SUPPLY" page 6, paragraph 2g and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2i. Chapter 5, ST 10-38-711-1, states that if the NCR 500 system is down for more than 48 hours, the DSU should revert to the manual system as outlined in publication. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain
AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Ccy furtn:
USASUPCOM-DNG
26th GS Gp
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 26th General Support Group for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.W. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
1 Attached for Admin, Qtrs and rations
2 Attached for Rations and Qtrs
3 Attached for all Purposes less Inventory control
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 26th General Support Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.