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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (H) (22 Apr 71) 20 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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[Signature]

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFDR-65 (KZ) (U)

THRU: CG, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Chu Lai Base (BT 555035), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General Albert E. Mclloy
Prepared by: Captain William H. Offutt, Jr., 3d Military History Detachment.

I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. The 23d Infantry Div. continued to conduct combat operations throughout the division Tactical Area of Interest (T AOI) during the reporting period. Contact with enemy units ranged from light to moderate throughout the T AOI. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, Pennsylvania Square and Iron Mountain continued throughout the period. Operation Elk Canyon terminated on 26 August at which time Operation Elk Canyon II commenced. Elk Canyon II terminated 19 September. On 5 September, the 196th Infantry Brigade initiated Operation Nebraska Rapids, a joint operation with the 1st Marine Division. The operation terminated on 8 September. On 2 October the 1-1 Cavalry and the 2-1 Infantry formed Task Force Saint. The task force was placed O P O N to the 1st Marine Division for Operation Tulare Falls, which lasted thru 15 October. On 21 October, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was placed in direct support of the 2d Marine Brigade for an indefinite period. Task Force Burnett, composed of units from 1-1 Cav and 2-1 Inf was formed on 27 October and placed O P O N to the 1st Marine Division for participation in Operation Hoang Dieu. Joint operations with the 2d ARVN Division, rice denial and pacification continued successfully.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. Colonels.

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(1) COL Hugh F. T. Hoffman, Jr., assumed command of the 198th Brigade on 15 August 1970, vice COL W. B. Richardson, who was wounded (non-evac).

(2) COL Paul B. McDaniel assumed command of the DISCOM on 18 August 1970, vice COL Hoffman.

(3) COL William B. Richardson assumed command of the 198th Brigade on 9 September 1970 from COL F. T. Hoffman, Jr.

(4) COL John L. Insani assumed command of the 11th Brigade on 11 September, vice COL K. B. Barlow.


b. Battalion Changes.

(1) CO, 66th Inf, LTC R. W. Fell assumed command from LTC W. C. Hogan on 7 September 1970.

(2) 5th Bn, 46th Inf, LTC J. R. Henry assumed command from LTC H. J. Wereszynski on 9 September 1970.

(3) 3d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC C. J. Landry assumed command from LTC R. A. Culbertson on 11 September 1970.

(4) 1st Bn 14th Arty, LTC R. L. Ray assumed command from LTC B. Pogoloff on 21 September 1970.

(5) 4th Bn, 31st Inf, LTC W. O. Hammell assumed command from LTC T. A. Brun on 26 September 1970.

(6) 4th Bn, 3d Inf, LTC A. F. Coast assumed command from LTC P. D. Grimm on 5 October 1970.

(7) 23 S&T Bn, LTC S. R. Levenson assumed command from LTC J. F. Senna on 7 October 1970.

(8) CO, Combat Center, LTC J. R. Wheaton, Jr., assumed command from Major C. I. Clark on 7 October 1970.

(9) 1st Bn, 52d Inf, Major C. E. Getz assumed command from LTC J. E. Clites, Jr. on 7 October 1970.
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(11) 1st Sqd, 1st Cav, LTC S. J. Burnett assumed command from LTC C. E. Saint on 24 October 1970.

(12) 1st Bn, 46th Inf, LTC W. Doyle assumed command from LTC R. Carvella on 25 October 1970.

3. (U) Staff Changes.

a. Colonels. COL Alphus P. Clark assumed duties as Chief of Staff on 11 September 1970, vice COL John L. Insani.

b. Other

(1) CPT Johnson assumed duties as Division Information Officer, vice Major W. F. Gabella who was medevaced on 20 August 1970.

(2) Major J. S. Peppers assumed duties as Acting ACoS, G3, vice LTC L. J. Stottle who turned to CONUS on emergency leave and PCS on 23 August 1970.

(3) Major T. D. Cox assumed duties as Assistant Chief of Staff, vice CPT Q. W. Dutson on 20 August 1970.


(5) LTC W. H. Weressynski assumed duties as ACoS, G3 from Major J. S. Peppers on 9 September 1970.

(6) Major W. E. Gabella returned to duty and assumed duties as Division Information Officer, on 14 September 1970.

(7) LTC L. W. Roberts assumed duties as ACoS, G1, vice LTC W. E. Henschel on 7 October 1970.


4. (U) Distinguished Visitors.
AVDF-HL

5 November 1970

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<td>MG Toan</td>
<td>CG, 1st ARVN Division</td>
<td>14 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Anderson</td>
<td>Outgoing Dir. USO RVN</td>
<td>15 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss Smith</td>
<td>Public Relations, USO RVN</td>
<td>15 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Hathaway</td>
<td>Incoming CG, 196th Inf Bde,</td>
<td>16 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Division</td>
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15 November 1970
15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CEFOR—65 (R2) (U)

| NAME                          | POSITION                     | PERIOD  
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------
| COL Woods                     | Northern District Engineer   | 17 Oct  
| MG Baldwin                    | DCO, XXIV Corps              | 17 Oct  
| Chap (COL) Stegman           | USARV Chaplain               | 18 Oct  
| Mr. Hadley                    | Correspondent                | 18 Oct  
| COL Cook, COL Oberley,        | MACV IG Team                 | 18 Oct  
| CDR Stohr, & MAJ Stalman     |                              |         
| LTC McCarthy                  | DCO, USARV                   | 19 Oct  
| BG Hume                       | Dep CofS (P&O), USARV        | 19 Oct  
| MG Baldwin                    | DCO, XXIV Corps              | 19 Oct  
| Mr. Willet                    | Asst Dir, Service to         | 19 Oct  
|                               | Military Instl, S. E. Asia   |         
|                               | Office                       |         
| BG Davison                    | Dir Enlisted Personnel, DA   | 20 Oct  
| Mr. Lazar                     | IMR Dep for CORDS            | 21 Oct  
| Mr. Dean                      | IMR Asst Rep for CORDS       | 21 Oct  
| Chap (LTC) Brooks             | USARV Dep Chaplain           | 21 Oct  
| LTC Sutherland                | GG, XXIV Corps               | 21 Oct  
| COL Vance                     | CO, DNG Support Command      | 21 Oct  
| Mr. Steinberg                 | Staff Member, Senate Sub- committee on Juvenile Delinquency |         
| CMDR Lofarno                  | Chief of S.E. Asia Dept of Defense Information | 26 Oct  
| COL Meinsen                   | ACoSs, G3, XXIV Corps        | 28 Oct  
| COL Doyle                     | ACoSs, G1, XXIV Corps        | 28 Oct  


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B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.
   a. During the period, Military Justice/Military Affairs continues to comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter Aug-Oct 70, this command tried 7 general courts-martial, 6 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge was authorized, 121 special courts-martial, and received 126 special courts-martial and 3 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 1,251 Article 15, UCMJ proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USARPSSC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions during this quarter included 39 Line of Duty determinations; 45 Article 15, UCMJ appeals for advice; 66 Reports of Survey; 141 Reports of Investigation; 33 elimination proceedings; 24 Congressional inquiries, and 11 Collateral Investigations forwarded to DA.

   Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were .30, .26, .526, and .13 respectively.

   b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2,303 cases during the quarter, including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, and general counseling and advice.

   c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the 23d Infantry Div. Combat Center; and to the Division Combat Center Leadership course. Instruction is also given on the Military Justice Act of 1968. In addition, unit instruction is provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior NCOs.

   d. During the quarter 90 claims were received for payment for loss or damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

   e. During this quarter this section has presented 57 classes on Drug Abuse at the Combat Center and at the various units to promote the drug amnesty program and awareness of the problems of drug abuse.

2. (U) Division Chaplain.

   a. During the period, the normal schedule of religious services and
counseling was held in the field and division rear. The Character Guidance Council was reactivated, and a Drug Amnesty Program activated. Support continued for the Catholic and Protestant orphanages in An Ton and the Catholic school and orphanage in Binh Son. The 23d Infantry Div. participated in World Prayer Day, held 21 October 1970 with special prayer services observed. Morning Devotions were begun at the Division Chapel along with regular Saturday evening Fellowship and sports movies program.

b. Chaplain (CPT) Phillip Nichols, 1-52 Infantry, was killed in action 13 October 1970. A memorial service was held for him Sunday 18 October 1970 at the Stella Maris Chapel. USARV and XXIV Corps Chaplains were present. On 21 October, a monument in front of the Division Chapel was dedicated to the memory of Chaplain Nichols at a special memorial service. Brigadier General Atteberry, ADC (S), gave the dedication address.

3. (U) Division Finance Office.

Conversion Day was held 7 October 1970 to change series 681 MPC to series 692 MPC. The operation concluded, 1030 hours, 9 October 1970.

4. (U) Provost Marshal.

a. The hazards of driving on Highway QL-1, the only major road in the 23d Infantry Div. AOR, were brought to light by the increasing number of traffic incidents and accidents. In response to the problem an aerial military police patrol was inaugurated in July 1970.

(1) Preparations were first made on the ground by marking the highway with white blocks 176 feet apart and visible from the air. In this manner the aerial patrol could clock vehicles on the ground and in coordination with patrols located in advantageous positions, apprehend speeders.

(2) During this reporting period approximately 107 hours flight time was logged in the operation. Widest dissemination of the program was made to the command to warn speeders of the consequences. Flyers were distributed in the Division Daily Bulletin and articles were placed in the division newspaper.

(3) Another aspect of the patrol was its use along beach areas of Chu Lai Base in an effort to stop individuals from swimming in unmarked and unguarded beaches. Too frequently in the past, swimmers use of the unaccessible areas resulted in fatal consequences. The patrol was able to spot these personnel and quickly notify the Military Police Desk.
A third aspect of the patrol was the utilization of the aircraft to check the countryside for black marketeering or illicit activities. Normal sanctuaries for criminal activity were thus denied.

b. In September 1970 a solution to combat the growing drug abuse problem within the 23d Infantry Div. TAOR was put into effect. A drug amnesty program was formulated under the auspices of the Office of the Provost Marshal with goals of education, rehabilitation and medical care for drug abusers. A team, composed of the Division Provost Marshal, Division Surgeon, Division Chaplain and Division Staff Judge Advocate compiled a lesson plan and toured the Division area explaining the drug problem and amnesty program. No location was considered too remote and consequently the team found itself at brigade base camps and forward firebases talking with soldiers fresh from the field. Training aids consisted of a sample of illicit drugs, handbooks and educational films.

(1) The cross-section of experiences which the team members possess was invaluable. A daily seminar was held for newly arrived troops at the Division Combat Center, with each member contributing his view of the problem.

(2) Operation Amnesty was given wide coverage in the classes, and since the program was initiated approximately 5,000 soldiers have been exposed to its advantages, with eighty-seven (87) signing up for assistance.

5. (U) Division Surgeon.

a. The following figures represent the malaria statistics for the 23d Infantry Div. during the period, 1 August through 31 October 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No Cases</th>
<th>Rate Malaria*</th>
<th>Rate Vivax*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Per 1000 troops per year

b. Both total malaria and vivax malaria rates have remained at a relatively high level during the last quarter. This reflects the increase in mosquito population due to the intermittent rainfall during the period resulting in increased mosquito breeding grounds. The vivax rate is about one-third of the malaria rate reflecting relatively good anti-malaria tablet discipline.
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C. Intelligence.

1. (C) Intelligence Summary

a. Quang Tin (P)

(1) During the past quarter, enemy activity has been moderate in relation to the previous quarter and has only been harassing in nature. Although reports were received indicating that the enemy was planning an offensive (H-25) for this period, it failed to materialize for several reasons: Operation Elk Canyon, the follow-up sweeping operations, and in conjunction with these, the enemy's inability to obtain enough food to sustain an offensive.

(2) Operation Elk Canyon, which was designed to disrupt the enemy's supply lines in his rear area, began on 12 July and caused the enemy extreme difficulty. An indication of how much difficulty was the relocation of K-80 NVA Battalion from Kontum province to the Kham Duc area, with the objective of forcing Allied troops out of the area. Nguyen Nhanh, a PW lieutenant from the rear services of Quang Nam (Quang Tin) (P) Headquarters stated that the Allied operation at Kham Duc had cut his supply line, preventing him from supplying the various provincial units with food. On 25 August, Operation Elk Canyon I ended and Operation Elk Canyon II began. The latter was a sweep operation conducted along the Dak Rose supply route which further disrupted enemy supply channels.

(a) During these two operations, enemy activity was directed toward the removal of Allied troops from Kham Duc. In what may have been an attempt to draw Allied forces from Kham Duc, the enemy launched several harassment type attacks, usually attacks by fire, on isolated outposts in Eastern Quang Tin (P). In line with these harassment attacks, reports were received that the enemy was planning an offensive for the fall and winter months. This offensive was to be in two phases: The first phase was to last from 16 August until 31 October. The targets of this offensive were to be resettlement hamlets, the GVN pacification program, and GVN officials. The first phase of the offensive was to be directed against isolated outposts, RF and PF units, with the probable intentions of drawing ARVN and US troops away from the lowlands. Once the Allied troops were away from the populace, the second phase was to begin. It appears now that the harassing attacks that were underway at this time were part of the first phase. The second phase was to bring the people back under VC control by using terrorism, kidnapping, and the destruction of district and province headquarters in an effort to show the people that the South Vietnamese Government could not protect them.
Reports indicate that the offensive was postponed due to supply problems. Various reports stated that the enemy had a severe food shortage, and that all major attacks were being delayed. Each week new reports stated that major attacks were to begin the following week. However, when that time came, the attacks failed to materialize. New reports came in stating that the next week would be the big one, and this continued throughout the quarter.

Recent reports have indicated that immediately after the Kham Duc operation, the enemy began to rebuild his supply lines. Visual reconnaissance of the area west of the Song Tranh River indicated extensive enemy activity. Trails showed signs of heavy use, new defensive positions were built, numerous areas were under cultivation, and new supply points were being formed. Along with this activity, numerous units were reported to be sending transportation elements to K-7 supply area. This area, along the Song Tranh River, has long been a VC logistical area. It contains numerous munition factories, storage areas, hospitals, and detention camps. Reports were also received stating that Quang Nam (Quang Tin) (P) units were sending elements into Quang Ngai (P) to obtain food. The enemy also received instructions from higher headquarters advising them to devote at least 16 per cent of their total strength to food production because sufficient food could no longer be supplied to them through normal channels. Since the withdrawal of Allied troops from Kham Duc, the enemy has been searching for food. Recently, numerous cultivated fields have been sighted in Base Area 117 and Hiep Duc.

In August, the province received a directive from MR-5 that reorganized the province force. This force now includes three infantry battalions. The units mentioned were the 70th LF Battalion, 72d LF Battalion, and D-11 Infantry Battalion. The 70th and 72d LF Battalions have always been province units, but D-11 was new. It is now felt that D-11 Battalion is one of the two battalions that made up the 36th NVA Regiment of Front 4. The 36th Regiment has normally operated in the mountains along the Que Son/Duc Duc (D) border in Quang Nam (P) and was probably disbanded so that its units could be distributed among the province force to build up these units.

D-11 Infantry Battalion is currently held at BT 2410 with a strength of 200 men. Since this unit is new, little is known about it. Three PW's, who are from units identified as possible NVA's for D-11 Battalion, stated that their unit has four companies numbered 1, 2, 3 and 6. The 6th Company is the heavy weapons company, and the other three are infantry companies. The battalion has a probable strength of 200 men. The only confirmed contact with D-11 occurred on 17 September when RF #195 at BT 255145 engaged an estimated VC company resulting in 13 killed and one document captured. The captured document was roster for D-11 Battalion. Since that time, agent reports have
stated that the unit was staying in this general area and had no mission at
the present time. Visual reconnaissance of this area during the past quarter
has indicated a significant amount of enemy activity such as heavy trail use,
numerous bunkers, spider holes, and .51 caliber positions. This type of
activity usually indicates a base area.

(b) V-16 Sapper Battalion has been downgraded to two separate
companies, V-16 Sapper Company and V-17 Sapper Company. V-17 is operating
in Northern Quang Tin (P) with the 70th LF Battalion. During this quarter
there has been only one confirmed contact with V-16 Sapper Company. On 3
October, Nui My outpost at BT 218171 was overrun. A Hoi Chanh from V-16
Sapper Company was taken to the outpost where he identified the enemy dead
as being from V-16 Sapper Company.

(c) There were also indications of possible movement of the 3d NVA
Regiment, 2d NVA Division, into Northern Quang Ngai (P). The 3d NVA Regiment
disappeared approximately the same time D-11 Battalion appeared. Agent
reports have stated that D-11 Battalion has taken the place of the 3d NVA
Regiment in Quang Tin (P). Not enough information has been received to sub-
stanciate the fact that the 3d Regiment has relocated in Quang Ngai (P).
A PW from the 3d Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment, who was captured at BT 1125,
states that the regiment moved into Laos after the Hiep Duc campaign and
left a small element in Quang Tin (P) to obtain supplies for the return of
the unit in January 1971. The last location confirmed for the 3d Battalion,
3d NVA Regiment was BT 0620 on 29 June. It is possible that the unit did
move into Laos.

(d) At the beginning of August, the 70th LF Battalion was located
at BT 1226 with a strength of 145 men. By the middle of August, the 70th
Battalion was moving westward, probably into a base camp area. Visual
reconnaissance of the area on 12 August indicated numerous huts. It appears
that the unit spent a few weeks in one area, then moved a few kilometers
one direction or another, and then remained there for a period of time.
On 11 October, the 70th Battalion was located at BT 0727 with a strength
of 251 men. The unit has spent this time avoiding contact with Allied units.
Information received indicated that there has been only one confirmed contact
between the 70th Battalion and Allied units. This contact was an Allied
ambush which killed 5 VC, including the Commanding Officer of the 3d Co., while
capturing 2. Reports indicate that this unit has been resting and refitting
for the past three months. These reports have also indicated that morale
is low due to the lack of food supplies.

(e) The 72d LF Battalion was located at BT 1720 with a strength of
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160 men at the beginning of August. The unit has remained in this area for the past quarter and is currently held at BT 1819 with a strength of 130 men. Allied units have had several contacts with the 72d Battalion, the most significant occurring on 6 September and 15 September. The contact on 6 September was enemy initiated and resulted in 7 NVA killed and one detainee. The detainee was from the heavy weapons company of the 72d LF Battalion. The contact on 15 September was US initiated and resulted in 20 NVA killed and one PRC-25 radio captured. Documents and one PW indicated that the unit was the 72d Battalion. Since these contacts, the battalion has been refitting and awaiting replacements. This unit is also experiencing morale problems due to recent losses.

(f) The 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion is the province artillery unit. Whenever a province unit needs fire support, an element is sent from the 74th Battalion to that unit for support. Elements of the 74th Battalion have been reported throughout the province. Therefore, definite proof of contact with this unit is extremely difficult to confirm. The only confirmed contact with this unit was on 31 August when a mechanical ambush killed 2 VC and wounded a third. The wounded VC was the Executive Officer of the 2d Company, 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion. The headquarters of the 74th Battalion is currently located at BT 1717 and has been in this area for the past quarter. One element is believed to be in Northern Quang Tin (P) providing support for the 70th LF Battalion. Another element, possibly the 2d Company, is believed to be operating with the 72d LF Battalion. A third element is believed to be in Southern Tam Ky (D) with D-11 Battalion.

(4) The 78th Rocket Battalion, the 402d Sapper Battalion, and possibly the 409th Sapper Battalion are thought to belong to the Chu Lai Front. Chu Lai Front headquarters is directly subordinate to MA-5 and its mission is to harass Chu Lai Combat Base. The headquarters of the Chu Lai Front is apparently colocated with the 78th Rocket Battalion at BT 3901. One report stated that the Front had been disbanded and the 78th Rocket Battalion had been downgraded to a company-size unit. However, until more information is received to verify this, it will be assumed that these two units are still operational.

(a) The 78th Rocket Battalion has been unlocated for most of the quarter in Southeastern Quang Tin (P) with a strength of 150 men. Allied forces have not had direct contact with the 78th Battalion since May 1970. However, Chu Lai Base has been rocketed twice during the quarter, and Fat City received an attack by fire. These incidents were probably caused by the 78th Battalion, since it is the only unit in the Chu Lai area with
the capability to fire rockets. The 78th Rocket Battalion is currently held at BT 3901 with a strength of 150 men as of 18 October. During the quarter, agent reports have stated that the 78th Battalion has been located on both sides of the Quang Tin (P), Quang Ngai (P) border. Like most other units, the 78th Battalion has several base camps and spends a few weeks at one location before moving to another. Visual reconnaissance during the quarter indicated very little activity in the 78th Battalion area. The activity sighted was usually small groups of personnel carrying supplies.

(b) The 402d Sapper Battalion was located at BT 3508 on 1 August with a strength of 210 men. Since that time, the unit began moving south in an attempt to obtain supplies. By the end to August, the 402d Sapper Battalion was located at BT 3802, where the unit remained for a month. It then continued south, stopping in the vicinity of BS 3196, where it is believed they received supplies from Quang Ngai (P). On 22 October, the 402d Battalion was reported to be back in Quang Tin (P) at BT 3605. It is assumed that this unit is resupplied and ready to begin offensive operations. During this reporting period, the 402d Battalion avoided contact with Allied forces, and is considered to still have approximately 200 men. Agent reports have stated that the 402d Sapper Battalion has up to 400 men, but no PW's or documents have been captured to confirm this report.

(c) At the beginning of August, the 409th Sapper Battalion was located at BT 2410 with a strength of 269 men. Agent reports during the quarter have indicated that the 409th Battalion is split into two elements. One element is believed to be operating in Northern Quang Tin (P), and the other in Southern Quang Tin (P). No PW's or documents have been captured to confirm the presence of the northern element, but several PW's and documents have confirmed the presence of the southern element. Two different PW's have stated that the 409th Sapper Battalion has had extreme difficulty in resupplying. On 25 September, an Allied ambush captured a number of a transportation unit of the 409th Sapper Battalion, at BS 539963. This PW stated that the 409th Battalion could not obtain supplies in Quang Tin (P), so he was sent into Quang Ngai (P) to obtain them. He also stated that the 409th was planning to move into Quang Nam (P) during October; however, this move has not yet occurred. Another PW, captured 25 September at AS 994779, from the 3d Company, 409th Battalion, stated that his company had moved to this area to prevent the civilians from rallying to GVN. This is in the vicinity of the K-7 supply area and this unit was probably sent there to obtain supplies from K-7, it must send one of its elements to obtain them. The two contacts mentioned were the only confirmed contacts with the 409th Sapper Battalion. The current location of the 409th Battalion is BS 2696 with a probable strength of 260 men.
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(5) The district level forces have also continued to remain in the back-country of Quang Tin (P). Tam Ky (D) units, V-12 LF Company and V-18 LF Company, have seen limited activity.

(a) V-12 LF Company is currently located at BT 1822 with a strength of 45 men as of 9 July. There have been no reports received on this unit since 23 August, when three Hoi Chanh were received who stated that V-12 LF Company has no leadership because their CO, XO and FO have either deserted or been killed. Until the unit has been refitted, it will probably remain out of contact.

(b) V-18 LF Company has been reported at BT 2812 with a strength of 100 men. This strength is probably high for this unit because the majority of the LF companies in Quang Tin (P) have less than 50 men. There has been no confirmed contact with V-18 LF Company during the quarter. Visual reconnaissance of V-18's suspected base area indicated considerable activity. Several .51 caliber positions, spider holes bunkers, trench-lines, and trails have been reported during the past three months.

(c) V-15 LF Company and C-9 LF Company were located at BT 1331 and P' 0834, respectively with strengths of 35 men and 40 men at the beginning of August. Since that time both units have been involved in numerous small contacts that have reduced their strengths considerably. V-15 LF Company was located at BT 1330, and C-9 was located at BT 1328.

(d) C-7 LF Company, which is a Tien Phuoc (D) unit, was located at BT 0909 with a strength of 10 men. The mission of this unit is to secure the road from Phuoc Tien (V), BT 155115, to Phuoc Thanh (V), BT 015105. A Hoi Chanh, Nguyen Chi Than, who returned on 27 September, stated that C-7 LF Company had lost 25 men from contacts with ARVN units. He also stated that the only contact that the unit initiated was in September when C-7 attacked Hamlet #1, Phuoc Tien (V) at BT 174127. The unit is currently providing security for the Tien Phuoc (D) committee. C-7 LF Company is located at BT 1310 as of 10 September.

(e) The 74th LF Company has remained in the vicinity of BT 3807 with a strength of 66 men. Agent reports have indicated that this unit has been buying rice from nearby villages for province units; therefore, they have not been involved in any offensive activity. The 74th LF Company is held at BT 3707 as of 23 October.

(6) The enemy has initiated 152 contacts with Allied forces during this quarter. Of the 152 contacts, 74 have been attacks by fire, with the remainder...
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being ground attacks/contacts. Significant incidents include:

(a) On 5 August, 2-1 Infantry at Kham Duc airfield vicinity ZC 001092 received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 10 rounds of RPG fire, small arms fire, satchel charges, and sapper attacks from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 16 NVA killed, 5 individual weapons, 3 crew-served weapons, 16 packs, 32 satchel charges, and miscellaneous military equipment captured.

2-1 Infantry at Kham Duc airfield, vicinity ZC 001092, received 7x122mm rockets from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in no casualties or damage on 6 August.

On 7 August, 2-6th ARVN Regiment vicinity VC 846006, engaged an estimated VC company resulting in 20 VC killed. C/3-16 Arty at Fat City, vicinity BT 435079, received 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 60mm mortar fire, an unknown number of RPG rounds, small arms fire, and a ground probe from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC killed and 4 satchel charges destroyed.

On 15 August, 4-4th ARVN Regiment vicinity ZC 118016 received 100 rounds of RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force.

RF #722 at BT 126282, engaged 2 platoons of VC, resulting in 14 VC killed on 25 August.

On 26 August, RF #102, vicinity BT 110300, engaged an estimated 15 VC resulting in 14 VC killed and 4 detainees.

(b) On 5 September, RF #928, vicinity BT 232188, received 30 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force.

D/1-1 Cavalry, at BT 307158, received heavy small arms fire from an estimated VC platoon. They returned fire, resulting in 7 NVA killed, 1 crew-served weapon captured, and 1 detainee. The detainee stated that he was from the heavy weapons company, 72 LF Battalion on 6 September.

On 9 September, the Chu Lai Combat Base, at BT 56 received 9x122mm rockets, resulting in no casualties or damage.

RF #195, at BT 255145, engaged an estimated VC Company, resulting in 13 VC killed and 1 document captured on 13 September.
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On 15 September, A/3-21 Inf, at BT 196178, engaged an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 20 NVA killed, 1 detainee, 1 PRC-25 radio, and 2 field phones captured. (possibly 72d LF Battalion)

On 27 September, C/4-31 Inf with A/26 Engineers at AT 9616, found 250 bunkers. They destroyed 170.

On 30 September, RF #722, at BT 202475, engaged an unknown size enemy force, which returned fire. Results were 21 VC killed and 5 VN detained.

(c) On 3-4 October, the Nui My OP, vicinity BT 218171, received heavy small arms, M-79, and mortar fire followed by a ground attack which overrun the OP. Results were 11 VC killed, 4 US wounded, 3 US killed and 20 - 30 PF's wounded. Reports received later indicated that V-16 Sapper Company and possibly the 72d LF Battalion were involved in the attack.

On 11 October, 4th and 5th ARVN Regiments received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at BT 156247, resulting in 1 ARVN killed and 8 ARVN wounded.

2-5th ARVN Regiment at BT 094316 received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on 12 October.

On 13 October, 3-5th ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 238495, resulting in 1 ARVN killed, 1 ARVN wounded, 31 VC killed, and 5 VN detained. (PW captured on 12 October at BT 237496 stated that he was from Q-80 Battalion).

(7) Division forces accounted for 684 killed during the quarter. Allied forces captured or destroyed 83,652 pounds of rice during the quarter.

(8) There have been 160 anti-aircraft incidents during the quarter. Of these, 146 involved .30 caliber fire with four .51 caliber incidents. All other incidents involved mortar, RPG, or miscellaneous type fire. The majority of anti-aircraft incidents have occurred in four areas: The Kham Duc airfield, base area of 117 vicinity BT 2210, the rocket pocket vicinity of BT 4006, and the 5-7 logistical area vicinity of AT 9301. The other incidents were scattered throughout Quang Tin (P). During the period, three aircraft were lost. One of these losses was especially significant. On 26 August, a CH-47 from 178th Aviation at AT 861064, while returning troops from Kham Duc airfield, received ground fire with an unknown number of hits. The aircraft crashed resulting-in 31 killed and 9 wounded.

(9) During the past quarter there have been 13 LOC interdictions, the
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majority on Highway #1 and Tien Phuoc Highway; none were significant.

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) The overall situation in Quang Ngai (P) at the end of October was not significantly different from that at the end of August. In general, the section of the province controlled by the Saigon government, largely in the heavily-populated lowlands of western Quang Ngai (P), was not greatly expanded. On the other hand, the Peoples' Revolutionary Government also failed to extend their power base out of the mountains and transportation corridors of the western half of the province.

(2) Early in August, the Quang Ngai Provincial Forward Front outlined their plans for a Fall-Winter offensive to begin in mid-month and run through an unspecified date. This campaign, which was to be conducted on the military, economic and political fronts, was the major event of the quarter and the guidelines in this plan, to a great extent, determined enemy activity. The first two objectives of the Forward Front's plan for the Thu-Dong (Fall-Winter) campaign indicated the enemy's overall aim. Their first goal was to penetrate organizations of the Saigon government by dispatching cadre, and the second was to penetrate the Regional and Popular Forces units. The plan's third goal was to penetrate American and ARVN units through utilization of legal security cadre and military intelligence spies. The order of importance of these objectives indicates that both on the political and military fronts, "penetrating" (as opposed to "defeating") tactics were to be conducted, suggesting that the Provincial Headquarters would attempt to set the stage for a victory to be achieved in the future. The major political thrust would be directed against GVN organizations and installations (which would include district headquarters and administrative officials) and the major military thrust would be against the Regional and Popular Forces elements.

(a) Politically, the enemy attempted to lay groundwork for a province takeover by strengthening the infrastructure in villages and hamlets. Training courses for party secretaries and economic cadre were organized, primarily in Mo Duc (D), Son Tinh (D) and Binh Son (D). Reorganization meetings for village and hamlet cadre were held under the auspices of provincial administrators. Building secret bunkers for meetings and model villages as counterparts of GVN resettlement areas were also among the political tasks accomplished.

(b) The military phase of the Thu-Dong campaign became known as the T-30 campaign, the overall aim of which was to disrupt the Pacification Program.
By weakening the Regional and Popular Forces strength and will to fight, the campaign would pave the way for political takeover by the provincial headquarters. The offensive was subdivided into two phases, each with a preparation and execution period. Agents' collection of information at enemy meetings disclosed the major strategy of the campaign would be to (a) Absolutely apply guerrilla warfare; priority use of sapper units and (b) Establish an uprising in each district. The widespread attacks during late September and early October, and the use of sapper tactics in the major enemy thrusts (especially in the 8 Sep Tra Bong attack) were evidence that these principles were followed. Seize-and-hold tactics were not used extensively during the campaign, nor was a prolonged set-piece battle with ARVN or American units attempted. Most of the attacks by fire against American units were directed against NDP's rather than firebases.

(1) The preparation period for the first phase of the T-30 campaign probably began during the first week of August. During the preparation period, two guidelines were set down by the Provincial Headquarters. These were to "Develop sapper activities by establishing more sapper units" and to "Strengthen one artillery unit in each district". The first guideline was followed by the enemy's attempt to transfer promising youth from village guerilla forces to local forces units, and by strengthening the 406th MF Sapper En. The second guideline was followed by units rebuilding their supplies of ammunition.

(2) The attack period of the first phase was to begin on National Liberation Day, 19 August, run through the GVN Senate elections on August 30, and climax on the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September. While this period was one of increased activity, the major incidents of the period took place after 4 September. The first notable attack occurred on 24 August, when in Mo Duc (D), B/1-20 was mortared and RF #144 received a sharp contact. The province was then quiet until the 30th, when LZ Stinson, Mo Duc (D) HQ and Binh Son (D) FF #1 were mortared, the RF/PF Training Center in Quang Ngai City rocketed, and Kai Loc (H) assaulted. B/1-20 and RF #492 killed ten enemy in an incident in Mo Duc (H). On 31 August, Tr My (V), FSB 411, Nui Ong Do OP and An Son OP were all mortared, and Nghia Hanh RF's and PF's received a ground attack. On 2 September, 3-1 Bn received the first of six contacts and 15 mortar attacks which occurred over a three day period in northeast Minh Long (D). On 3 and 4 September, RF's in Binh Son (L) received three mortar attacks from enemy units using 82mm mortaring fire. On 5 September, LZ Stinson was mortared again, and on 6 September, Son Ha (D) HQ received 50 82mm rounds. The major attacks of the period took place on the morning of 8 September, when Tra Bong (D) HQ was mortared and assaulted, and on the night of 8-9 September, when Tra Binh (H), Dai Loc (H) and LZ Stinson received attacks.
by fire and combined ground and sapper attacks. Both hamlets received mortar fire and ground probes again on the night of 10-11 September. Following these attacks, activity tapered off.

(3) Agents' reports indicated that the enemy began preparation for Phase II of the campaign around 10 September. Twelve days were to be spent rebuilding forces, eight days in preparation, and ten days in operations. Starting date for the second attack period was to be 29 September. On this day, Tra Ca (V) in No Duc (D) was assaulted, and on 30 September, Tri Binh (H) in Binh Son (D), received a ground attack from an estimated enemy company. On 2 October, Nui Tho OP in No Duc (D) was mortared. On 4 October, Vinh An (H) in Duc Pho (D) was assaulted, and An Loc (H) and Phu Hau (H) in Son Tinh (D) received large combined fire and ground attacks. On 6 October, Nui Trui OP in Nghia Hanh (D) was mortared. Activity then tapered off, reaching a normal level on 10 October. The second phase of campaign proved to be less intense than the first, as fewer attacks by fire were conducted. Figures for the two attack periods indicate the difference between the two Phases.

### Fall—Winter Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phase I 30 August—12 September</th>
<th>Phase II 27 September—10 October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total attacks by fire</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against US</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against RFs, PFs and GVN installations</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ground attacks/contacts</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Against US</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against RFs, PFs and GVN installations</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total antiair incidents</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft forced to land</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar attacks over 25 rounds</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar attacks 10-25 rounds</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) Probably the major result of this campaign was that it demonstrated the enemy's capability to conduct an offensive throughout the province, as targets were hit in all ten districts. That the enemy hit some targets (such as Tu My (V), LZ Stinson, Tra Binh (H)) two or three times indicates the enemy still has staging areas near important installations in which they are safe from Allied attack for at least a short period of time. The incidents involving 3-1 Inf Bn (2-5 Sep) near Nghia Hanh (D)--Minh Long (D)--Son Ha (D) border showed the 21st NVA Bde had the capability of conducting an effective series of ambushes and harassing mortar attacks. However, the withdrawal of the 60th Battalion after three days indicated the enemy may not have the equipment or will to engage in a prolonged struggle.

(3) The enemy not only used the attacks of the T-30 campaign to attempt to increase their base of influence, but also relocated their main units in critical areas to place pressure on the pacification program. Shifting the locations of major forces not only permitted the enemy to threaten friendly forces in different areas, but also allowed them to retrain guerrillas in use of boobytraps, mines and terrorism to keep pressure on pacification efforts.

(a) The most important move of a major unit involved the shift of half of the 48th LP Bn from eastern Binh Son (D) to western Son Tinh (D) in early August. The element, approximately 100 men, remained in the area around LZ Stinson throughout the quarter. An initial reason for this move was given by two returnees who stated the 48th was retraining and resupplying. Another report stated that the road improvement and landclearing operations of the American engineers in eastern Binh Son (D) made it hazardous to keep the entire 200-man unit in the eastern area. But the possibility that the 48th assisted in attacks on Tra Binh (H) and Qui Loc (H) in the first phase of the Thu-Deng campaign and the identification of the 48th as the unit which assaulted Phu Hau (H) in the second phase indicated the 48th moved west for offensive reasons. The resettlement areas in western Son Tinh (D) are, in part, where the struggle between pacification and infrastructure elements was most intense during the quarter, and the shift of the 48th west to this area indicated the enemy's intention of building a power base in this area. The shift coincided with numerous reports of meetings by provincial level cadre with local communists in the area.

(b) The 406th Sapper Battalion, reclassified as a Main Force unit during the quarter on evidence that the unit is subordinate to 65-5, shifted east into Son Tinh (D) for a period of time. During the relatively quiet month of August, the 406th was unlocated in Son Ha (D) west of the Horsethree. During the first phase of the Fall-Winter campaign, part of
the unit was believed to be operating with the 48th LF Bn and an element of the 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn in western Son Tinh (D). However, the identification by prisoners of the 406th as the attacker of Tra Bong (D) headquarters indicated that the whole battalion, possibly reinforced by NR5, probably moved from northern Son Ha (D) up to Tra Bong (U) for the attack. After the attack, the unit returned to Base Area 118. During mid-September, the 406th moved to the Vinh Tuy area, where most reports stated they retrained with the 48th. However, this retraining was apparently not intended to prepare the 406th for the second attack phase, since the unit was not reported in connection with any of the attacks at that time. After the second phase of the campaign, the 406th moved to Base Area 118.

(c) The 38th LF Bn and the 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn did not undertake major relocations during the quarter, but remained in their traditional AOs. The 38th may have been the attacker of the Chau Ho OP, the Nui Ong Do OP and Ho Duc (D) HQ during the first phase of the T-30 campaign, and the Thach Tru (H) and Nui Tho OP during the second, but confirming evidence was lacking in all cases. The 38th spent much time providing security for rice-gathering activities during the period.

(d) The 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn, as usual, operated in elements throughout the northern half of the province during August, September, and October. The headquarters of the unit was held near Quang Ngai City at the beginning of August, and may have been the unit which rocketed the provincial training center. In late August, this element moved to Base Area 121, remaining there until after the second phase of the Fall-Winter campaign, when it relocated near the Horseshoe. One element of the 107th operated in western Son Tinh (D) in support of the 48th and 406th during the first phase of the campaign, and then moved to Base Area 118 with the 406th. After the headquarters moved to Base Area 121, an element remained near Quang Ngai City, and after the headquarters moved to the Horseshoe, an element located near the Minh Long—Nghia Han—Son Ha border, possibly moved east to attack the Nghia Hanh (D) headquarters in mid-October. The 107th, like the 38th, was not identified with any of the attacks during the campaign, but rather, provided support to the province headquarters' sapper units.

(e) The 403d NVA Sapper Bn remained inactive through most of the quarter. The unit was located in Base Area 124 during August and September, and then split into companies to conduct ground probes in Duc Pho (D). Toward the end of October, the 403d returned to Base Area 124. The threat of an attack in Duc Pho (D) was present throughout the quarter, because of the 403d's presence in the second phase of the Thu-Dong campaign. Documents captured on 19 October contained a roster, battle plans, notes on the unit history, and strength figures for the 403d. During the quarter, the 403d's
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strength decreased from 279 to 256 men.

(f) At the beginning of August, the 21st NVA regimental CP and 80th Bn were in Base Area 128, the 60th Bn was in the Yen Ngua area, where it was to remain through most of the period, and the 70th Bn was in the Song Ve Valley. The units remained in these areas until the end of the month, when the entire regiment moved to the Nghia Hanh-Minh Long border to attack An Son CP in Nghia Hanh (D). The attack itself was made by the 1st Co, 60th Bn and the 23d Sapper Co of the regimental headquarters, with the 70th and 80th Bns taking up positions to block friendly reinforcements. Following this attack and the three days of engagements with 3-1 Inf, the 60th Bn moved back to the Yen Ngua area, the 70th to the eastern edge of Base Area 128, and the regimental CP and the 80th Bn along the Nghia Hanh border to the Song Ve Valley. The 80th moved into Base Area 123 and began a long period of rice collection that lasted through October.

(g) The 21st NVA regimental CP stayed on the west bank of the Song Ve River for a week, and then moved west along the Minh Long-Ba To border in early October. The regimental headquarters returned to the western Song Ve Valley at the end of the quarter.

(4) As most of the major units were operating in the highlands west of the coastal plains, the enemy transportation battalions in the western sections of the province were concerned almost exclusively with the economic phase of the campaign. While the major units and local forces in Nghia Hanh (D), Mo Duc (D) and Son Tinh (D) were attempting to obtain rice from these production areas, the main economic policy of the enemy seemed to be toward developing self-sufficiency in the west. This policy was developed as part of the Quang Ngai (F) Forward Front's campaign whose guidelines were:

"Construction of an effective transportation line system; construction of strategic supply reserve caches; construction of modern farm production areas; and establishment of a market price control and black market organization in GVN areas."

(a) In fulfilling the first objective, the enemy continued their heavy use of the Nuoc Ong, Dak Drinh, Song Re and Dak Selo transportation corridors. Visual reconnaissance noted heavy use of the trails along these rivers practically every week during the quarter. Numerous sampans were also observed at various points along the river. The enemy also attempted to develop agricultural areas in the valleys in the western part of the province. VNs often detected areas of extensive cultivation, but defoliation
missions were reported to have taken a heavy toll of crops in the area. In the eastern and central areas of the province, local and provincial forces delegated production details to the troops. In some districts, entire units were converted into production elements as the Provincial Headquarters ordered lower-ranking members of military units to become self-sufficient.

(b) The construction of strategic supply caches was undertaken not only in the enemy's base areas and in the western sections of the province, but also in the eastern areas where food had to be procured for cadre and soldiers. In the east Division units operated effectively against attempts to gather rice, capturing over 280,000 lbs of rice during the quarter. Flood damage following the heavy rains of 29 September--2 October also reportedly damaged much of the enemy's rice supply.

(5) Significant incidents include:

(a) On 2 August, the Quang Ngai Training Center, BS 604721, received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, 2 rounds of 122mm rockets and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were three Vietnamese trainees killed, eight Vietnamese trainees wounded, and 15 VC killed.

F/8 Cav engaged an UNSEF from BS 531449 to BS 305618 north of the river, killing 26 NVA, and engaged an UNSEF from BS 230643 to BS 305615 south of the river, killing 7 NVA on 10 August.

From 30 August to 4 September, Tu My (V), BS 547738, received a ground attack, an attack by fire, and a combined mortar and RPG attack. Total results were 1 PF, 1 RF and 1 civilian KIA, 1 PF WIA (M), 2 RF WIA, 2 civilians WIA (M) and 11 VC KIA.

On 8 September, Tra Bong (D) HQ and the ARVN Ranger compound at BS 342879 and BS 347881 respectively received over 100 rounds of mortar fire, heavy SA and AW fire, and a coordinated ground and sapper attack from the 406th MF Sapper Bn. Official results from the Quang Ngai (P) SIA list 21 friendly killed (including the subsector CO), 31 friendly wounded (including two officers), 1 American advisor killed and three wounded. 2L VC were killed and 6 were detained. Reports state the district HQ was 75% destroyed, the CIDG compound 25-30% destroyed, the RF camp 30-75% destroyed, and the RD cadre area 50% destroyed.

From 8 September to 9 September, LZ Stinson, BS 538824, received 82 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar (including 7 CS rounds), heavy SA and AW fire, and a sapper attack from an unidentified UNSEF, resulting in 2 PPs killed, 18 wounded.
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and 2 structures destroyed. Dai Loc (H), BS 598809, received 20 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar, an unknown amount of RPG, SAF and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were 4 PFs, 1 PSDF and 1 civilian killed, and 3 PFs, 1 PSDF and 12 civilians wounded, and 115 structures destroyed.

(b) On 4 October, Phu Nau (H), BS 606863, received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were 6 PFs and 2 VC killed.

From 11 - 12 October, B, C and D/1-20 Inf received heavy SAF, Chicom H/Grenades, RPG and mortar fire at BS 670590. Results were 3 US KIA, 1 US MIA, 11 US WIA (E), and 4 US WIA (M). On 13 October, Nghia Hanh (D) HQ and the MACV compound at BS 616644 received two 122mm rockets, 25 rounds of 82mm mortar and 4 B-40 rockets. Results were: 11 US KIA, 4 US WIA (2 evacuated), 1 PF WIA, 1 RF WIA, 1 interpreter WIA, 1 generator operator WIA.

D and R/1-52 Inf, BS 494830, BS 500860 and BS 517873 respectively engaged a company size VC force, resulting in 26 enemy killed and 10 detained on 19 October.

On the Tra Dong Road, BS 451873 and BS 555893, there were 28 incidents of LOC interdiction. Total results were 15 Vietnamese civilians KIA, 7 US KIA, 12 US WIA (E), 1 PF WIA (E), 3 RF WIA (E), 1 Vietnamese civilian WIA (E), and 1 US WIA (M) from 12 August to 16 October.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. As of 31 October 1970, the 23d Infantry Div. Sensor Unit (Target Mission Force) had a personal strength of six (6) officers and sixty-two (62) enlisted men. TMF continues to operate as reported on 31 July 1970. A total of 221 radio-linked and seventy-two line sensors are being monitored in the AO. Orientation and familiarization training on Phase II equipment was completed on 27 August 1970. Forty-four US and one ARVN attended this training. During the reporting period, 1,907 intruders were detected and 692 actions were initiated, resulting in 1 VC/NAV KIA, 1 VC/NAV WIA, and five IWC.

b. The G-2 Air section's reconnaissance missions continue to obtain timely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period, 338 Infrared missions, 112 APD missions, 191 Photo missions and 856 VR missions were flown. The infrared missions produced a total
of 561 targets; of these, 210 were engaged by artillery fire.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities
   
a. Counterintelligence Section.
   
(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion, or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a marked increase during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period this office conducted 217 investigations, as compared to 50 reported last quarter. Of this number 45 involved separate investigations of prostitutes, apprehended for unlawful entry into the Chu Lai Base.

(3) This office provided the following CI services:

   Announced CI Inspections 37
   Unannounced CI Inspections 40
   Courtesy CI Inspections 10
   DANE Assists 63
   Miscellaneous Investigations 36
   PSI 17
   AOI 14

(4) During the reporting period the CI Section Case Officers conducted 113 Source Meetings and turned in 461 Information Reports. During the previous quarter there were 192 Source Meetings and 542 Information Reports prepared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Unrated</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>252</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVDF-HL
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§- (1) Interrogation Section

(1) During the reporting period, the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1,177 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification in comparison to the previous period reveals that there were significant proportional changes in detainee levels in the categories VC/PW and Civil Defendant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May 70 - Jul 70</th>
<th>Aug 70 - Oct 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA/PW</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/PW</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Defendant</td>
<td>698</td>
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<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilian</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Forty-six (46) man days were spent in support of tactical, cordon and search, and screening operations and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field. Of the 46 man days, thirty-five (35) were spent in support of operation Elk Canyon.

(3) Information from 129 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The breakdown by classification of detainees providing such information is as follows:

Returnee          | 25
FW                | 37
CD or IC          | 67

Tactical units reacted to such information as locations of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemy base areas.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section.

(1) The Imagery Interpretation Section was relocated to the Chu Lai West
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Airfield, next to the passenger terminal. Although all the aerial surveillance assets from the 131st RAG were consolidated at Phu Bai no degradation of support is anticipated.

(2) During the reporting period, this section conducted the following missions:

- Visual Reconnaissance Missions: 90
- Hand held missions: 10
- Infrared missions: 54
- Photomissions: 39

(3) In addition the II Section completed several special projects such as area and fire support base studies, overlays, trail studies and mosaics.

d. Order of Battle Section.

(1) The Order of Battle Section has made no major changes during this reporting period. The only change that has been made dealt with expanding weekly summaries. This expansion provides a complete weekly recap of enemy activity by unit throughout the Division TAOR.

(2) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle Section was tasked through the G-2, by order of the Commanding General, with two major projects:

(a) The first dealt with a detailed study of sapper attacks against Allied forces and installations in the Division TAOR. This study presented information collected from documents, FW reports and other intelligence gathering sources. It's purpose was to show the increasing emphasis the VC/NVA units are placing on sapper tactics and the subsequent need for background knowledge to aid in the prevention and early detection of future sapper attacks. As a result of the study, a briefing was prepared and presented to ADC-X and all CLLD Sub-sectors. A training film of sapper techniques is also being produced in order to provide commanders with a teaching aid for their units.

(b) The second project concerned VC Infrastructure in the TAOR. The sources used to obtain the data required are as follows:

- OB files for the past 6 months of Agent Reports, FW reports and ARVN summaries.
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(2) Questionnaires from the Kit Carson Scout Section and Chieu Hoi Center.

(3) Liaison visits with Province Hqs, XXIV Corps, and MACV-J2.

The information obtained from these sources was compiled and presented to CG 23d Infantry Div. and General Staff; G-3 and CSF's Adv. from XXIV Corps, the boi w's of the 198th and 11th Bn., and the 1st 1st Cav. These briefings are continuing. The purpose of this study is to bring to light the important role that VCI play in the enemy's overall operational plans. As a result of the information obtained, specific areas in the Division TXOR were targeted in order of priority.

b. (C) Kit Carson Scout Section

(1) KC3 Training Center graduated three classes of 20, 11, and 8 Scouts, respectively, during this period. The number of Scouts per class was substantially reduced to provide for more intensive individual training. Recent reports indicate the Scouts are extremely effective as interpreters and interrogators.

(2) During the month of October, possible infiltrators with false Chieu Hoi papers were discovered. The two suspects were turned over to Vietnamese authorities for further questioning.

(3) During the month of August, 2 Scouts received Bronze Stxs. Terminations during the past three months were for the following causes:

(a) 8 unsatisfactory performance
(b) 7 excessive AWOL
(c) 7 KIA
(d) 3 VC suspects
(e) 2 WIA (amputees)
(f) 1 resigned
(g) 1 joined PF
(h) 1 failure in class
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(1) 1 marijuana violation

4. (C) Co G (RANGER), 75th Infantry: Summary of Significant Activities

During the period 1 Aug – 31 Oct 1970 there were 50 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed within the Division AO including 28 area reconnaissance missions and 11 observation post missions. These patrols accounted for 152 sightings of 497 personnel. Results were 18 enemy KIA, 1 US KIA and 11 US WIA. On numerous occasions, the LRRP teams adjusted artillery on enemy locations with unknown results.

5. (C) Enemy Unit Locations and Movements: Based on PW interrogations, documents, and other reliable sources, the following locations are given for major enemy units in the 23d Infantry Div. (PL):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>C/O</th>
<th>STR</th>
<th>LOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MB-5 HQ</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>TRI-BORDER AREA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d NVA Div HQ</td>
<td>(C)</td>
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<td>GK-30 NVA Signal Bn</td>
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<td>GK-32 NVA RR Bn</td>
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<td>GK-33 NVA Mortar Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>GK-35 NVA Sp/Recon Bn</td>
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<td>GK-37 NVA Trans Bn</td>
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<td>UNLOCATED</td>
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<tr>
<td>GK-38 NVA Medical Bn</td>
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<td>GK-40 NVA Engineer Bn</td>
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QUANG TIN (P) FORCE

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D. Operations.

1. Operations Summary:

   a. General: 23d Infantry Div. forces continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970 with contact ranging from light to moderate throughout the AO. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain and Pennsylvania Square continued throughout the period. Operation Elk Canyon terminated on 26 August at which time Operation Elk Canyon II commenced. Elk Canyon II was terminated on 19 September. On 5 September, the 196th Bde initiated Operation Nebraska Rapids, a joint operation with the 1st Marine Division. The operation terminated on 8 September. On 2 October the 1-1 Cavalry and the 2-1 Infantry formed Task Force Saint. The Task Force was placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for Operation Tulare Falls and terminated on 15 October. On 21 October, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was placed in direct support of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade for an indefinite period. Task Force Burnett, composed of Headquarters, A and D Troops 1-1 Cavalry and B, C, D, R/2-1 Infantry was formed on 27 October and placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for participation in Operation Hoang Dieu.

   Severe tropical storms and Typhoons Kate and Joan seriously curtailed military operations during the period 15 October to 26 October as 23d Infantry Division Troops and materiel assets were diverted to engage in disaster relief operations with the 2d ARVN Division.

   b. Major Engagements: During the three month reporting period, Division forces were not included in any major engagement with enemy forces. The majority of the operations were pre-emptive in nature to offset enemy initiated actions against pacified areas during the national election campaign period. Enemy initiated RPG fires on 26 October against a troop carrying CH-47 helicopter resulted in the most significant casualty toll during the reporting period with terminal reports of 31 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E).

   c. Operations by AO:

      (1) Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period. Emphasis was on combat operations to increase the level of security of pacification operations near the coastal area and the destruction of main force and NVA units in the western portion of the
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combined TADR. Contact was light to moderate throughout the reporting period. On 4 Aug, D/4-31 found graves of 6 NVA in the vicinity of AT 911271. Later that morning D/4-31 found a weapons cache, containing 4 individual and 2x crew served weapons. The next day C/1-46 received small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M) at AS 981966.

At BT 123237, on the 6th of Aug, D/3-21 found graves of 5 NVA in the vicinity of AT 911271. On that morning D/4-31 found a weapons cache, containing 4 individual and 2x crew served weapons. The next day C/1-46 received small arms fire which resulted in 5 US KIA and 5 US WIA (E) on 8 Aug at AS 971958. A/3-21, on 19 Aug, found 10 graves with 10 VC killed by artillery fires in the vicinity of BT 167211. On the last day of the month, C/3-21 received small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M) at AS 981966.

Later that afternoon, A/3-21 engaged 10 NVA killing 4 and detaining 1 in the vicinity of BT 091272. Three days later D/3-21 observed and engaged 6 VC resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 individual weapons captured in the vicinity of BT 086235. On 15 Sep A/3-21 engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 10 NVA, capturing 4 individual weapons and detaining 1 VN at BT 196178.

Later that afternoon, A/3-21 engaged 10 NVA killing all 10 in the vicinity of BT 194177. At 1314H that afternoon 116th Avn gunships engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 9 NVA in the vicinity of BT 196178. At BT 145217 on the 19th of Sep, C/3-21 detonated an unknown type boobytrap resulting in 5 US WIA (E). On the morning of the next day, at BS 115978, C/2-1 detonated a 10 lb charge resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA (E). That evening A/3-21 received 1 RPG round which wounded 5-63 at BT 185233. On the 21st of Sep, D/3-16 engaged 20-30 VC killing 3 and sustaining 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA (E) in the vicinity of BT 232447. A/1-46 found 15 graves containing 15 NVA at BT 950052. Three days later, A/4-31 received friendly artillery fire resulting in 1 US WIA (E) at BT 817924. In the late afternoon of 28 Sep A/3-21 found a camouflaged cache along a trail at BT 102289. The cache contained 4 crew served weapons and 1 individual weapon. On the first day of October at 1100H, C/3-21 engaged 6 NVA killing 4 and capturing 2 individual weapons at BT 083295. Forty minutes later B/3-21 detonated a boobytrap and sustained 5 US WIA (E) at BT 069250. At 1300H on 5 Oct R/5 ARVN found 6 VC killed by artillery at BT 105268. On 13 Oct A/1-1 Cav found a total of 3600 lbs of unpolished rice and 300 lbs of potatoes at BT 104462 and BT 091454. At 1055H on 14 Oct 196th Bde Avn observed 7 NVA with packs in the vicinity of BT 817256. C/3-32 Artillery engaged the enemy and killed 2. Late in the afternoon the same day at BT 83242, 116th Avn engaged 6 NVA, killing 4.

On 18 Oct, the 196th Inf Bde reported light contact in their combined AO with the 5th ARVN Regt. US/GVN forces combined in one operation as D/4-31 Inf and National Police conducted search and clear operations South of Niep Duc. Light contact was reported on 20 Oct. US/GVN forces further combined in one operation as 2-1 Inf and FFI's conducted search operations vicinity BT 281159. Enemy losses were reported as 10 VC killed and three individual weapons captured. On 26 Oct D/3-21 received 3 60mm mortar rounds inside
their perimeter. As a result the unit sustained 7 US WIA (E) and 2 US WIA (M). The next day, B/2-1 on patrol, detonated a boobytrapped 82mm mortar round resulting in 4 US WIA (E). No significant contact was reported for the remainder of the reporting period. The results of Operation Frederick Hill are:

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<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52 KIA</td>
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<td>229 WIA (E)</td>
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<td>44 WIA (M)</td>
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<td>198 IWC</td>
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(2) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period as the 198th Infantry Brigade and the 6th ARVN Regiment concentrated on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City or the Chu Lai Base complex. Activity was light as Division units searched the Rocket Pocket around Chu Lai, targeted against elements of the 78th Main Force Rocket Bn and the 48th Local Force Bn. Saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushes, preplanned air strikes, scheduled artillery fires and sensor devices were used to inhibit attempts to attack the populated areas. During the reporting period Geneva Park saw light contact in their AO until 5 Aug. On that day, C/1-52 was hit by two claymores resulting in 2 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E) at BT 376072. In the morning of the next day, at BT 083328, H/17 Cav killed 3 VC and captured 3 individual weapons, in the same action detaining 18 individuals. Later that morning in the vicinity of BT 36366, C/1-52 received small arms fire sustaining 8 US WIA (E). On the 7th of Aug B/1-52 detonated a Bouncing Betty mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA (E) at BS 503863. Action remained light until the night of the 11th. F/8 Cav (Night Hawk) engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 26 of the enemy. In the early morning hours of 13 Aug, H/17 Cav killed 5 VC and captured 2 individual weapons at BS 579851. On 18 Aug LHFP Team Tennesse at BS 375638 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 24 Aug A/1-52 received and returned small arms fire resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 detainee WIA (E), 2 individual weapons captured and 3 US WIA (E). Action in the AO was
light until the last day of the month when H/17 Cav detonated a 50 lb mine resulting in 5 US WIA (E). Later that afternoon D/1-52 detonated a 155 round sustaining 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 6 Sep, at BT 307158, a B/1-1 LOH received small arms fire and returned fire killing 7 of the enemy. The LOH crashed as a result of hits received during the action causing the death of 1 US. Two days later FSB Stimson received an unknown amount of mortar fire and a ground attack resulting in 7 US WIA (E) and 5 US WIA (M). On 9 Sep a OH-1C from 176th Avn received small arms fire and crashed at BS 408804 killing the 4 US aboard. On 15 Sep F/8 Cav gunships killed 5 VC in the vicinity of BS 515822. Five days later, C/1-52 engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 6 at BS 533895. On the 26th of Sep C/1-52 received small arms fire resulting in 6 VC KIA, 2 individual weapons captured and 1 US WIA (E). On 29 Sep R/8 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 273117. Two of the enemy were killed and one detainee was wounded. F/8 Cav sustained 1 US WIA (E). On the 4th of Oct, C/5-46 engaged 7 VC killing 3 and capturing 3 individual weapons. Two days later, 123d Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 297133 killing 14 of the enemy. On 7 Oct, C/5-46 detonated an unknown type boobytrap resulting in 8 US WIA (E). That afternoon, A/1-52 received small arms fire, mortar, RPG's and a ground attack, in which 2 VC were killed and 5 US wounded. On the 9th of Oct, C/75th (Rangers) engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 US WIA (M) and 2 NVA KIA at BS 456891. C/1-52 with 174th Avn engaged a VC platoon on 12 Oct, resulting in 11 VC KIA, 2 crew served weapons captured and 1 US WIA. C/1-52 on the next day, found a cave containing 5 VC KIA. They also found 3 hand grenades, 1 SKS and 14 RPG rounds at BS 569855. In the early afternoon of the same day C/1-52 found and evacuated a 60mm mortar tube with baseplate, a baseplate for an 82mm mortar and 7 82mm mortar rounds. At 1940H that evening, B/1-52 sustained 8 US KIA, 5 US WIA (E) and 1 ARVN KIA when an unknown type mine detonated in their NDP. On an Eagle Flight in the early afternoon of 19 Oct, R/1-52 was inserted into an LZ at BS 494836, where they engaged two VC, killing one and detaining the other. On a later insertion, at 1430H, R/1-52 engaged 6 VC killing four and capturing another with an individual weapon. Later the pilot of the AMC aircraft observed 30 VC with weapons and packs at BS 517873. Company D and R/1-52 were inserted while 174th Avn gunships engaged the enemy force. The ground elements made contact with the enemy force killing 21 of the enemy, capturing 8 individual weapons and detaining 8 VN. There were no significant activities for the remainder of the reporting period. Results for Operation Geneva Park were:

**US**

- 36 KIA
- 216 WIA (E)
- 24 WIA (M)

**ENEMY**

- 341 KIA (CONF)
- 0 KIA (PRON)
- 3 DET

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AVDF-ML

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O MIA
8 PW/VC
3 PW/NVA
4 RTNE/KVC
0 RTNE/NVA
105 CIV DEF
87 IN CIV
23 IWC
7 CSWC

(3) Operation Nantucket Beach was conducted on the Batangan Peninsula in the 196th Infantry Brigade TAOR by elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment and the 1-6 Infantry targeted against elements of the 48th Local Force Bn. Operations were conducted on a continuing basis throughout the reporting period in support of the GVN pacification program. Contact remained light and scattered as numerous casualty-producing boobytraps and mines were reported. Operation Nantucket Beach saw light action until 11 Aug when A/1-6 detonated an unknown type mine resulting in 13 US WIA (E) at BS 703904.

On 30 Aug at BS 639966, 176th Avn engaged 15 VC killing 6. Light action prevailed until the 20th of Sep when C/1-6 ambushed 7 VC at BS 687306 killing 4, detaining 1 WIA and capturing 1 individual weapon. Operation Nantucket Beach again saw light action until the 19th of Oct. One US was killed and three wounded when B/1-6 detonated an unknown type boobytrap at 1815H on 27 Oct, HHC/1-6 received fourteen rounds of 82mm mortar. All rounds impacted to the East and West of the perimeter. There were no further significant activities for the remainder of the reporting period. Results for Operation Nantucket Beach for the reporting period were:

US
2 KIA
81 WIA (E)
1 WIA (M)
0 MIA

RIVAL
105 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PHOB)
1 DET
16 PW/VC
0 PW/NVA
18 RTNE/KVC
0 RTNE/NVA
40 CIV DEF
41 IN CIV
37 IWC
0 CSWC
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AVDP-HL

15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROC CSPOR—65 (R2) (U)

(4) Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting period as the 11th Infantry Brigade and the 4th ARVN Regiment concentrated on security of major lines of communication and supply as well as combat operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations being conducted along the coast. Enemy activity ranged from light to heavy during the reporting period. Two major engagements with enemy forces occurred. One on 1 Sep near Nghia Hanh (BS 617643) and the other on 12 Oct in the Song Ve Valley (BS 668587). In the early afternoon of 3 Aug, 17th AVN engaged an unknown size enemy force, at BS 140770, resulting in 16 VC KIA. Later that night D/3-1 engaged a company killing 6 VC in the vicinity of BS 145759. On the morning of the next day, B/3-1 detonated an unknown type boobytrap, killing 1 US and wounding 7 US at BS 140785. Action was light in the 11th Bde AO until the night of 9 Aug. F/8 (Night Hawk) engaged an unknown size enemy force, killing 6 NVA at BS 252622. Later that evening, F/8 (Night Hawk) killed 8 more NVA at BS 272620. On 14 Aug, 174th AVN engaged 5 VC at BS 560824. However, at BS 771438, C/1-20 detonated an unknown type mine which resulted in 1 US KIA and 30 US WIA (E). 3 days later, C/4-3 received mortar rounds from D/4-3 resulting in 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA. Action remained light until the early morning hours of the 30th. A total of 15 VC/NVA were killed before 0400H. F/8 Cav (Night Hawk) accounted for 5 VC at BS 713581. 174th AVN engaged and killed 5 NVA at BS 751502 while B/1-20 killed 5 VC and captured 2 individual weapons after receiving hand grenades and RPG fire. On 1 Sep, A/4-3 had one of their mechanical ambushes detonate resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 3 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon captured at BS 725337. A short time later at BS 556633, B/123d AVN engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, and 2 US WIA (E). On the morning of 2 Sep, D/2-1 and B/1-1 Cav received 50 RPG rounds which resulted in 2 US WIA and 2 US WIA (E) at BS 559639. That evening, C/3-1 received 1 unknown mortar round resulting in > US WIA (M) at BS 616643. In the afternoon of 3 Sep, C/3-1 suffered 9 US WIA (E) due to small arms fire and RPG fire at BS 561634. On 7 Sep, B/4-21 engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS 908299 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 detainees, 1 individual weapon captured and 3 US WIA (E). On 11 Sep, B/3-1 found 10 NVA killed by gunships at BS 561636. On 15 Sep, B/3-1 engaged a large engaged small arms fire and RPG fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 2 individual weapons captured, 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and 2 US WIA (M). The AO saw light action until 28 Sep when a rocket from a supporting gunship fell short onto A/3-1's location at BS 519658. Casualties were 5 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M). Action was light until 2 Oct when B/4-21 found a large base camp at BS 742308. In the ensuing battle, 1 NVA was killed and 5 US were wounded. The next day, C/1-20 with 123d AVN killed 7 VC at BS 785506. On 4 Oct, there was an increase in enemy activity directed towards GVN outposts and villages. Seven villages and outposts were attacked. An RF outpost at Nu My was attacked.

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resulting in 3 US KIA, 4 US WIA (E), 2 RF KIA and 10 RF WIA (E). On 5 Oct, B/1-20 killed 5 VC, capturing 3 individual weapons and sustained 2 US WIA at BS 758629. Two days later B/1-20 detonated a 60mm mortar round resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M). On 11 Oct, D/3-1 with 174th Avn killed 5 VC at BS 447730. On the following day, B/1-20 engaged an unknown size enemy force at 1230H resulting in 3 US KIA, 7 US WIA (E), 1 US MIA and 1 NVA KIA. During a surge operation on 12 Oct, elements of B/1-20 were inserted into a hot LZ vicinity BS 665867. During the insertion, one helicopter was shot down. The 3rd platoon of D/1-20 was inserted into a hot LZ vicinity BS 665867. As the 3rd platoon with company command elements swept toward the down helicopter, they received intense small arms and RPG fire resulting in 4 US KIA (including the "copy" commander), 1 US MIA, 11 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M). At 1045H 19 Oct, B/1-20 while on patrol, uncovered a cache containing 1000 lbs of unpolished rice in four sacks marked Connell's Extra Long Grain and Sugar Co, INC, Dallas, Texas. Three tags were marked "Fertilizer Donated by the U.S." In the early evening of 20 Oct, C/1-20 found a tunnel complex in the vicinity of BS 728623, containing six 155mm artillery rounds and two RPG rounds. In the afternoon of 23 Oct, A/3-1 on a search mission, found a base camp with indications of recent use. Further searching revealed a cache consisting of 2000 lbs of rice, two unknown type foreign rifles, two AK-47's, two Thompson Sub-machine guns, 2 105mm rounds, 1 B-40 rocket and miscellaneous small arms ammunition, blasting caps, medical supplies and clothing and an NVA flag, red with gold lettering and a gold star in the center. There were no further significant contacts during the remainder of the reporting period. The results of Operation Iron Mountain were:

**US**

| 30 KIA | 210 IN OVC |
| 205 WIA (E) | 5 WIA (M) |
| 53 WIA (M) | 0 MIA |

**ENEMY**

| 397 KIA (CONF) | 27 KIA (PROB) |
| 336 CIV DEF | 210 IN CIV |
| 15 PW/VC | 123 IWC |
| 1 PW/NVA | 5 CSW |
| 5 RT Nex/VC | |

(5) Operation Pennsylvania Square continued throughout the reporting period, concentrating on security of major lines of communication and supply as well as combat operations to increase the level of security of the pacif-
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3d Infantry Division
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

Identification operations being conducted along the coast. Enemy activity continued to be light throughout the reporting period as the 1-1 Cavalry continued its operations. On 6 Aug, A/1-1 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and 2 individual weapons captured at BT 083328. In the early evening of the next day, F/17 Cav detonated a 40 lb nitro starch mine resulting in 7 US WIA (E) in the vicinity of BT 232229. B/1-1 Cav on the morning of the 8th, engaged 8 NVA killing 6 and capturing 6 individual weapons. The next morning at BT 103305, A/1-1 Cav detonated a nitro starch mine resulting in 4 US KIA and 8 US WIA (E). Operation Pennsylvania Square saw light action until 17 Aug when C/1-1 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 172237 which resulted in 1 NVA and 2 VC KIA, 2 individual weapons captured and 4 detainees. They also received 1 Hoi Chanh in the action. On the morning of the 21st, F/17 Cav detonated a 30 lb mine at BT 203236 resulting in 5 US WIA (E). On the 27th, B/1-1 Cav detained 3 VN received 4 Hoi Chanh and captured 1 individual weapon. On 30 Aug, A, D/1-1 Cav in the vicinity of BT 272126 engaged 17 NVA. The action resulted in 14 NVA KIA, 3 detainees and 5 individual weapons captured. The first day of September witnessed D/1-1 Cav kill 2 NVA and detain 7 individuals in the vicinity of BT 216115. The following afternoon, D/1-1 Blues engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 083326, killing 9 of the enemy, detaining 4 wounded VN and capturing 3 individual weapons. On the 14th of Sep, B/1-1 Cav detonated a boobytrap hand grenade wounding 5 US at BT 175224. At midday on the 17th, 71st Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 7 VC and capturing 3 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon in the action. On 25 Sep, F/17 Cav detonated a mine at BT 130323. Casualties sustained were 4 US WIA (E) and 6 US WIA (M). On the first day of Oct, in the vicinity of BT 138328, F/17 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 4 Oct., a combined 1-1 Cav/RF outpost received a ground attack from an estimated VC Company in which 3 US were killed and 4 wounded. The next morning an AGAV from E/1 Cav hit a 65 lb petna mine resulting in 5 US WIA (E) at BT 255187 On 9 Oct D/1-1 observed and engaged 5 VC. Four of the enemy were killed by gunships and 3 individual weapons were captured. Two US were wounded. There were no significant activities until the morning of 21 Oct around 1120H near BT 200300 when a Sheridan from E/1 Cav detonated an 80 lb mine resulting in four soldiers WIA (E) and 1 Kit Carson Scout WIA (Z). The Sheridan was a combat loss. Later at 1155H, at the same location, another Sheridan detonated an 80 lb nitro starch mine. Two US were wounded and again the Sheridan was a combat loss. On 27 Oct, Task Force Burnett was organized as follows: HQ/1-1 Cav; A Troop, 1-1 Cav and D/2-1 Infantry. The Task Force is under operational control of the 5th Marine Regiment, First Marine Division. B/1-1 Cavalry and E/1 Cavalry continue operations in Pennsylvania Square. Both Troops are under operational control of the 196th Infantry Brigade. There were no further significant activities for the remainder of the reporting period.
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Results for Operation Pennsylvania Square were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 KIA</td>
<td>143 KIA (CONF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126 WIA (E)</td>
<td>3 KIA (PROW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 WIA (W)</td>
<td>0 DET</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 KIA</td>
<td>5 FWVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 RVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 RTNEX/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66 CIV DEF</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71 IN CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 CSW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Operation Elk Canyon continued with operations to interdict the enemy's lines of communication and the destruction of main force units. On 26 Aug, the initial phase of the operation was terminated, redesignated Elk Canyon I and Elk Canyon II was initiated to continue operations in a new AO until it was terminated on 19 Sep. 'In the Elk Canyon AO, vicinity YC 845009, in the early afternoon of 2 Aug, A/1-82 Artillery firing in support of 2/1 ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force and accounted for 15 enemy KIA. In a mortar and rocket attack on 4 Aug at 0610H, A/1-82 received seventy to eighty rounds of 82mm mortar rounds, 10 60mm rockets and 3 120mm mortar rounds coupled with a sapper attack. The results of the action were 16 NVA KIA, 5 individual and 3 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 2 US KIA, 9 US WIA (E) and 5 US WIA (M). Later contacts were light until 1200H on 11 Aug when D/3-1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The results of this contact were 4 NVA KIA and 1 individual weapon captured. There was 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). The contact was made in the vicinity of YC 998111. On 13 Aug, D/2-1 again made contact at ZC 012102 when they received 10 60mm mortar rounds and an unknown amount of small arms fire. The results of this action were 2 NVA KIA, 2 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured while our losses were 1 US KIA, 9 US WIA (E) and 3 US WIA (M). On 16 Aug at YC 993100, at approximately 1650H, A/2-1 was engaged by an unknown size force. Enemy losses are unknown. Friendly casualties were 8 US WIA (E). Operation Elk Canyon terminated at 2400H 26 Aug 1970 as units redeployed from Kham Duc to vicinity landing zone Judy (AT 961064). While making an air move from Kham Duc to LZ Judy on 26 Aug, a CH-47 helicopter received RPG ground fire causing the helicopter to crash with a terminal report of 31 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E). There were no further significant events until 4 Sep at AS 798996 in the early morning hours, A/3-82.

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Artillery engaged an enemy force, resulting in 6 NVA killed by artillery fire. D/1-62 detonated two M-16 mines on 12 Sep, vicinity BS 048978 at 1500H with 4 US WIA (E). Elk Canyon II was terminated at 2400H on 19 Sep 70.

Cumulative totals for Elk Canyon and Elk Canyon II will be included in the cumulative totals of Operation Frederick Hill, 166th Infantry Brigade.

Results of Operations Elk Canyon I and Elk Canyon II for reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36 KIA</td>
<td>78 KIA (CONF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 WIA (E)</td>
<td>0 KIA (PROB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 WIA (M)</td>
<td>1 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 MIA</td>
<td>0 FW/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 RTNEX/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 RTNEX/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 CIV DEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 DN CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 CSWG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total results of Operations Elk Canyon I and Elk Canyon II for period 121200H July - 192400H Sep 70 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 KIA</td>
<td>107 KIA (CONF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 WIA (E)</td>
<td>0 KIA (PROB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 WIA (M)</td>
<td>1 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 MIA</td>
<td>0 FW/VC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 FW/NVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 RTNEX/VC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 RTNEX/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 DN CIV</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56 IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 CSWG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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2. (C) Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effect or initiated during this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 6-70 (Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan) was published on 5 Aug 70, OPORD 7-70 (Elk Canyon II) was published on 21 Aug 70, OPORD 8-70 (Nebraska Rapids) was published on 2 Sep 70, OPORD 9-70 (Combined Fall-Winter Campaign Plan) was published on 9 Oct 70.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley—Relief/Reinforcement of CIDG Camps), OPLAN 5-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation and Evacuation), OPLAN 11-69, OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsal), OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction), OPLAN 14-69 (High Threat Countermeasures), OPLAN 1-70 (Security for High Ranking Officials), OPLAN 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 7-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan) and OPLAN 20-70 (Reinforcement of MR 1) remained in effect as published contingency plans. OPLAN 5-70 (FW Recovery Operations) was published on 16 Aug 70.

(3) Numerous Frag Orders applicable to Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain and Pennsylvania Square have been published.

b. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) continued.

3. (U) Organization

Effective 20 September 1970, Troop E, 1st Cav was relieved from attachment to 11th Brigade and attached to 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry.

4. (C) Training

a. The Division Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of O3 who are assigned or attached to the Division. During the reporting period, 85 courses were completed for 8,963 personnel.

b. The Division Combat Center completed 3 Combat Leadership Courses for 143 students and 2 Support Leadership Courses for 44 students.

c. 2 Unit Reconnaissance Courses were completed, graduating 70 personnel.

d. The Division Sniper School graduated 3 classes totalling 70 students.

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e. Training of Territorial Forces Junior Officers continued. 5 classes were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 141 RF/PF Junior Officers completing the course.

f. The Division Combat Center continued support of a Mine and Boobytrap Mobile Training Team that conducted classes oncountering enemy mines and boobytraps for units of the division.

g. The 16th Combat Aviation Group conducted CH-47 Operations classes during the month of August for interested personnel.

h. Instructors from the Division Sniper School conducted marksmanship refresher training for elements of the 1st BN, 6th Infantry and the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cavalry.

i. The Division Support Command continued to conduct a monthly PLL Clerks Course for all elements of the division. A total of 76 personnel attended this course.

j. The Division Support Command also conducted its monthly TAHMS Course during the period with a total of 84 students attending.

k. 23d Infantry Div. Artillery conducted 4 classes in Advanced Fire Direction Techniques for Division Artillery personnel.

l. A Marksmanship Training Clinic was conducted by the Division Sniper School in order to improve marksmanship in division units with 54 students attending.

5. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 Aug through 31 Oct 1970, 720 close air support (CAS) and 387 Combat Sky Spot (CSS) missions for a total of 1701 air missions utilizing 1701 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the 23d Infantry Div. This is a decrease from 1,815 missions utilizing 2226 aircraft sorties flown during the previous quarter.

(1) CSS Missions

During the reporting period, 387 CSS mission utilizing 309 aircraft sorties were flown. The USAF flew 40 missions utilizing 64 sorties; the USN flew 3 missions using 6 sorties; and the USMC flew 344 missions using 239 sorties. This is a decrease from the previous quarter when 1057 CSS missions utilizing 1175 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Division.
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The decrease can be attributed to the Marine ASRT sky spot control facility being removed from Chu Lai.

(2) CAS Missions

A total of 720 close air support missions were flown using 1392 sorties. This is a slight decrease in missions and a slight increase in sorties from the previous quarter in which 794 CAS missions using 1051 sorties were flown. The decrease in missions can be attributed to the Marine air wing being removed from Chu Lai and bad weather. The USAF flew 368 missions using 689 sorties, an increase of 183 missions and 328 sorties. USMC flew 243 missions using 482 sorties, a decrease of 309 missions and 539 sorties. VNAF flew 13 missions using 30 sorties, a decrease of 21 missions and 46 sorties. USN flew 96 missions using 201 sorties.

(3) Ordnance Expended

There was a total of 47,974 tons of bombs used during the reporting period. This was a decrease of 1,996 tons of bombs from the last reporting period. Two hundred and one (201) tons of napalm and 58 rockets were used, a decrease of 99 tons of napalm and 168 rockets. The sharp decrease in rocket expenditures can again be attributed to the increased control of their use by I DASG.

b. There were no Arclight strikes flown in support of the 23d Infantry Division in the last three months.

c. Bomb damage assessments made by forward air controllers (FAC's) during the period indicated the following: 327 structures destroyed, 155 structures damaged, 99 secondary explosions, 132 secondary and sustained fires, 15 fighting positions and spider holes destroyed, 32 tunnels destroyed, 8 caves collapsed and 26 enemy killed by air strikes (KEAS).
6. (C) Artillery: Division Artillery continued to support the entire Division AO, providing fire support to all operations. Artillery was required to perform moves to support these operations. Artillery moves during the period are as follows:

a. The direct support unit of the 196th Infantry Brigade remained the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. On 29 September the Battalion fire direction center moved from W7ST (AT 990250) back to HAW (AT 225312) to rejoin Battalion Headquarters.

(1) A/3-82 was split, with the Battery HQs and four howitzers on MARY ANN (AT 961979) and two howitzers at TAM KY (BT 292232). On 26 August the howitzers on MARY ANN moved to JUDY (AT 8b1015) in support of operation ELK CANYON II, which was being conducted by elements of 1-16 and 2-1 Infantry and 5th ARVN Regiment. On 8 September the two howitzers at TAM KY moved back to HAW, continuing support to 1-1 Cav. On 13 September the howitzers remained at JUDY with two moving to HAW and two joining B/1-14 on MARY ANN to continue support of forces in ELK CANYON II.

On 13 September the howitzers were moved from HAW to HAW HILL (BT 048043), from which they could support elements of 2-1 Inf in an operation to reopen LZ BOXER (BS 116978). The next day these two howitzers and two from MARY ANN moved to LZ BOXER in support of 2-1 Infantry which was operating in the area until 4 October. On this date the four howitzers moved from BOXER to Grid BT 048507 in support of Task Force Saint, which was engaged in operation Tulare Falls in the 5th Marine Regiment area. On 15 October Tulare Falls ended and the howitzers returned to HAW HILL, consolidating the battery at that location. On 17 October four howitzers moved to LZ TAN (BT 133453) to support Task Force Burnett. At present the battery FDC and four howitzers are at LZ TAN and two howitzers are at BALDY.

(2) B/3-82 continued to support 3-21 Infantry from split locations, with the HQ and three howitzers at LZ CENTER (BT 050250) and three howitzers on PREP (AT COY 148). On 10 August, one howitzer was moved from PREP to TAN PHUC (BT 102410) to support 3-21 Inf operations N-NE of TAN PHUC. On 12 August, the two remaining howitzers were moved to CENTER clearing PREP. When the operation ended at TAN PHUC on 15 August, the howitzers returned to CENTER consolidating the battery. Between 17 August and 21 August, two howitzers were again moved to TAN PHUC to support operations. On 24 August, two howitzers were moved to HAW (BT 225312) to support operations to the West; on 9 September, they returned to CENTER from HAW. From 9 September to 23 September, two howitzers were again moved to TAN PHUC on 23 September the battery was consolidated at CENTER.

(3) At the beginning of the period, B/3-82 provided support to 4-31 Infantry. Its HQ and three howitzers were at SIBERIA (AT 903232), with two howitzers at KIMON (AT 802181) and one howitzer at LZ PREP (AT COY 148) adding support to B Btry. Between 7 August and 15 August, the howitzer from PREP moved to
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TAN PHUOC (BT 102140) and then to SIBERIA (AT 903232). On 24 August, the battery was consolidated at SIBERIA, with the arrival of the two howitzers from HELON, and remained consolidated for the rest of the period.

(a) B Btry, 1st Bn, 14th Arty remained attached to 3-82 Artillery, and provided support to 2d Bn, 1st Inf, initially from FSB KHAN DUC (2C 009095). On 26 August, as operation ELK CANYON I ended, the battery moved to MARY ANN (AS 961998) and has remained at that location supporting 1-46 Inf during ELK CANYON II and subsequent operations west and east of MARY ANN.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery remained in direct support of the 198th Inf Bde in the Geneva Park and Nantucket Beach Areas of Operation. The battalion headquarters and fire direction center remained at BAYONET (BT 558003) until 17 October, when they moved within the Chu Lai perimeter.

(1) A/1-14 continued to provide support to 1st Bn, 6th Inf from split positions. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at LZ BAYONET, and four howitzers were at BOTTLE (BS 630853).

(2) C/1-14 remained evenly split between PAT CITY (BT 440077) and KY TRA (BT 310037), supporting 5th Bn, 46th Inf.

(3) D/1-14 continued to provide support to 1st Bn, 52d Inf. At the start of the period the battery headquarters and three howitzers were located at STINSON (BS 539821), and three howitzers were at CHIPPEWA (BS 469867). On 6 August, as 1-52 completed operations south-southwest of CHIPPEWA, the howitzers returned to STINSON. On 13 August, the two howitzers were moved to TRA BONO (BS 343983), and a third was moved on 19 August to support 1-52 Inf in operations south of TRA BONO. These weapons returned to STINSON on 2 September as operations ended. Two howitzers again were moved to TRA BONO on 9 September to support 1-52 Inf, and returned as operations terminated on 20 September. The last move was conducted on 27 September and 1 October. Between 12 October and 17 October, two howitzers were again moved to TRA BONO, this time to support operations by 4-3 Inf north-northeast of TRA BONO. On 20 October, two howitzers were moved to NUI PHO DINH (BS 614956) from STINSON. At present the battery remains split between STINSON and NUI PHO DINH.

(c) The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery continued to provide direct support to the 11th Inf Bde at BRONO (BS 812396).

(1) A/6-11 provided support to 4th Bn, 21st Infantry from DEBBIE (BS 869319) with its headquarters and four howitzers, and from CAMEL BROWN (BS 928220) with two howitzers. On 2 September, two howitzers were moved.
from DEBBIE to NGHIA HANH (BS 616642) to support District Forces during a period of increased enemy activity, returning on 12 September. On 4 September, the two howitzers at CHARLIE BROWN moved to DEBBIE as operations ended. On 14 September, two howitzers returned to CHARLIE BROWN. On 28 September, the two howitzers from CHARLIE BROWN and on 30 September two from DEBBIE moved to RALD (BS 761277) to support 4-21 operations around FSB REED. These four howitzers departed REED on 14 October as operations ended, and returned to DEBBIE and CHARLIE BROWN.

(2) B/6-11 provided artillery support to 4th Bn, 3d Inf from SAN JUAN HILL (BS 634380). On 7 August, three howitzers moved to DWARF (BS 731328) in support of 4-3 operations to the west and southwest, and returned to SAN JUAN HILL as operations ended on 23 August. On 3 September, two howitzers moved to BS 453443 to participate in a mini- Artillery Raid in support of CIDG forces; they returned on the same day. On 5 September, two howitzers moved to MINH LONG (BS 537512) in support of 1-20 Inf, which was operating to the east. This operation ended on 11 September and the howitzers returned to SAN JUAN HILL. From 29 September to 6 October, two howitzers again were located at MINH LONG. On 10 October, four howitzers were placed under operation control of 1st Bn, 11th Arty when they moved to OP GEORGE (BS 470866) to support 4-3 Inf in operations to the northeast.

(3) C/6-11 provided support to 1-20 Inf, initially with its headquarters and four howitzers at BRONCO (BS 812395), and two howitzers at SNOOPY (BS 708610). On 20 August, the battery headquarters and four howitzers moved from BRONCO to LIZ (BS 757432) to establish a new fire base. The battery provided support from LIZ and SNOOPY for the remainder of the period.

(4) D/6-11 supported 3d Bn, 1st Inf initially from HILL 411 (BS 539731). Between 11 August and 16 August, two howitzers were moved to MINH LONG (BS 537512) in support of operations west-southwest of NGHIA HANH. From August to 25 August, three howitzers were located at BS 458763 in support of 3-1 operations west of OP 1. On 28 August, two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HANH to support paramilitary forces during a high threat period. The howitzers returned to HILL 411 on 26 September. On 28 September, two howitzers were moved to DRAGON (BS 730529) to support 1-20 Inf operations west of DRAGON, and returned to HILL 411 on 3 October as operations ended. On 28 October, two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HANH (BS 616642) in support of 3-1 Inf operations west of NGHIA HANH.

d. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support reinforcing fires for the southern half of the AO (Iron Mountain, Nantucket Beach and Geneva Park Operations), with its battalion headquarters and operations center located at HURRICANE (BS 537033).
(1) A/1-82 Artillery reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery from FAT CITY (BT 440077) with four howitzers, and from DOTTIE (BS 680853) with two howitzers.

(2) B/1-82 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to both 1-14 Artillery and 6-11 Artillery, with its headquarters and four howitzers at SNOOPY (BS 708610) and two howitzers at STINSON (BS 539321). On 3 September, two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HANH (BS 616642) to increase supporting fires for units west of NGHIA HANH. The howitzers returned on 15 September as operations ended.

(3) C/1-82 Artillery reinforced the fires of 6-11 Artillery, with its headquarters and four howitzers at LIZ (BS 747332) and two howitzers at DWEA (BS 869319). On 7 August, two howitzers moved from DWEA to DWARF (BS 731328), providing fire support to 4-21 Inf. The howitzers returned on 22 August as operations ended.

(4) D/1-82 Artillery (8-inch) provided support to both 1-14 and 6-11 Artillery from DOTTIE (BS 680853) and BANCO (BS 812396). On 13 September, the two weapons from BANCO were moved to DAMON (BS 730529) for a one-day operation to destroy a VC-infested swamp.

The 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery on Frederick Hill No, and provided direct support to forces operating in Pennsylvania Square. Initially the headquarters and fire direction center were located at ARTILLERY HILL (BT 515040), and on 30 August moved within the Chu Lai perimeter.

(1) A/3-16 Artillery provided both direct support and reinforcing fires from its split locations. The headquarters and two howitzers, which are located at HAWK HILL, provided direct support to 1-1 Cav. Three howitzers located at WEST (AT 990250) provided reinforcing fires. The remaining howitzer was co-located at SIBEA (AT 903232) with one howitzer from C Btry. On 20 August, the two howitzers moved from SIBEA to HAWK HILL to increase support for combined operations of 1-1 Cav and 3-21 Infantry. At present the battery is split between HAWK HILL and WEST.

(2) B/3-16 Artillery provided fire support from split locations at TIEN PHUOC (BT 102140) and NEW HAU DUC (BT 070052). On 3 September, a shift of personnel was conducted between NEW HAUS and MARY ANN (AS 961998). The battery currently is evenly split between TIEN PHUOC and MARY ANN.

(3) C/3-16 Artillery initially provided reinforcing fires to operation ELK CANYON I with three howitzers at KHAM DUC (2C 099085). Two howitzers were co-located at MARY ANN (AS 961998) and one at SIBEA (AT 903232). On 24
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August, the CMU DET moved to JUDY (L 541015) as HMK CANYON I ended and JMK CANYON II was initiated. These houitzers were initially in direct support of 1st Batt, 5th ARM Regt, which was operating to the West. As the front moved near their new supporting 105mm coverage, the 155mm howitzers of C Btry reverted to a reinforcing role. On 29 August, the howitzer on SIBERIA moved to HAK HILL (BT 253112), adding support to A Btry. On 12 September, this howitzer was moved to MARY ANN (AS 081968), increasing the number of howitzers there to three. On 13 September when JMK CANYON II ended, the three howitzers on JUDY moved to NEW HAU DUC (BS 724777), and on 18 September, there was shift of personnel between MARY ANN and NEW HAU DUC, consolidating the battery to that site.

f. The 3d Batt li-n, 5th Artillery provided general support fire for the Amatralp TAO, with its headquarters and operations center located initially at ARTILLERY HILL (BT 515040), and then at Chu Lai beginning 8 October.

(1) A/3-18 Artillery supported operations in the 198th Brigade AO from LZ CRUSH (BS 312384) during the period. It also provided direct support to ARVN Ranger Operations conducted in and around THA BONG and HA THANH.

(2) B/3-18 Artillery remained at TAJI PHUOC (BT 102140) supporting operations in the 196th Brigade AO. It also provided support to Special Forces operations in the TINH PHUOC and HAU DUC areas and responded to numerous sensor missions in the area.

(3) C/3-18 Artillery continued to support the 11th Brigade AO from LZ CRUNCH (BS 536515) and provided support to ARVN Ranger Operations in the GIA VUC, HA TO, and KINH LONG areas.

g. Ammunition expenditures by caliber for the period 1 August to 31 October were:

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<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>15,024</td>
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<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Countermortar Radar Detachment

(1) The 251st FA Detachment (CM Radar) was initially located at OP 1 BS 518778 where it covered LZ STINSON and FSB 411. On 2 September, the
radar was moved to FAT CITY (BT 1400771) to provide coverage for the Northern Rocket Pocket, thereby providing protection for the northern portion of Chu Lai Base. The detachment also participated in registration for artillery units that were within range.

12) The 252d FA Detachment (CM Radar) initially provided support for ARTILLERY HILL (BT 519040) with a primary sector of scan to the west into the Northern Rocket Pocket. On 29 August, the detachment moved to the vicinity of QUANG NGAI (BS 613735) where it is manned jointly by 23d Infantry Division Artillery personnel and 2d ARVN Division Artillery personnel. The radar continues to assist ARVN and Americal artillery units within range to conduct registrations.

1. Ground Surveillance Radar Detachment

1) The organic AN/TPS-25 continued surveillance from OP 1 (BS 516778) with a primary sector of scan to the west over the Song Tra Khuc River.

2) The 271st FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP 3 (BS 754421). Its primary sector of search was west covering the primary infiltration routes into the districts of NO DUC and DUC PHO.

j. Quadr. 50 Machineguns

Battery G, 55th Artillery (MO) continued to be deployed throughout the 23d Infantry Div. MO in support of ground defensive plans of fire bases. In addition, the unit provides security on all road convoys.

k. Meteorological Stations

1) Initially, the meteorological section of 3-18 Artillery provided metero data for the north and central coastal area from ARTILLERY HILL (BS 519042). On 10 October, the station moved to Chu Lai and continues to provide support from that location.

2) The meteorological station of 3-16 Artillery remained at TIEN PHUOC (BT 102140), providing metero data to the northwestern portion of the AO.

3) The 2-11 Artillery meteorological station remained attached to the 6-11 Artillery until 8 October, and was located at DUC PHO (BS 814382) where it provided metero data to the southern portion of the AO. On 8 October, the section was returned to the 101st Airborne Division, and the 23d Infantry Div. Artillery organized a section which continued to operate from DUC PHO.

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7. (U) Aviation—A separate OML for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 10 November 1970.

8. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1970, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities.

a. 130 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 12 E-158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed for temporary denial of terrain to the enemy.

c. 114 AGD missions were flown.

d. 3 FSB's were defoliated by ground spray of 935 gallons of agent Blue.

e. 5 FSB's were defoliated by helicopter spray of 220 gallons of agent Blue and 1420 gallons of diesel.

f. Approximately 16,825 acres of enemy crops were destroyed by helicopter spraying using 13,830 gallons of herbicide.

g. 354 drums of thickened fuel were dropped on suspected enemy positions and minefields.

h. 640 drums of thickened fuel were dropped for land clearing operations.

9. (C) Engineer

a. Activities for the quarter consisted of the divisional engineer effort being devoted primarily to direct combat support of the division, while non-divisional units devoted primary efforts to the construction of secondary LOC's and operational support construction. One change in engineer troop disposition occurred during this reporting period. CBM 301 redeployed to the United States in September.

b. LOC Program. During the reporting period paving of QL-1 was completed in the Division TOI. Maximum horizontal effort remained committed to the construction of tactical and "FARM to MARKET" roads; and to road opening operations to support tactical convoys.

(1) QL-1
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(a) The 26th Engr Bn continued to provide tactical bridge support for restoration of QL-1 within the TML.

(b) The 39th Engr Bn provided expedient maintenance from the II Corps boundary (BS 07150) to Tam Ky (BT 310225). The battalion continued construction of concrete headwalls on QL-1 between Binh Son and Duc Pho.

(c) Elements of the 32d NCR completed paving operations north of Tam Ky to the northern AO boundary and paving of the Tam Ky City Streets during this reporting period.

(d) Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 301 continued to provide mineral products for engineer construction until their redeployment 27 Sep.

(2) Secondary LOC's

(a) Increased commitment of engineer effort on the tactical LOC's continued through this reporting period; however, construction was hampered due to heavy rains during Oct. 10 km were completed during this reporting period bringing the total kilometers completed in the Tactical Road Program to 54 km. 83 km are still under construction.

(b) The 39th Engr Bn continued to be the primary unit committed to upgrade of secondary LOC's, with significant contributions being made by the 26th Engr Bn, 103d ARVN Engr Bn and Ministry of Public Works, Quang Ngai Province.

(c) Land Clearing

(1) The 26th Engr Bn Land Clearing Team conducted Mo Duc Phase III clearing operations 5–30 Aug in an area west of Mo Duc Village. 957 acres were cleared.

(2) The 26th Engr Bn Land Clearing Team initiated clearing operations in conjunction with road construction operations along the Tra Bong Road on 5 Sep 70. 650 acres were cleared prior to 30 Sep when the operation was suspended due to inclement weather.

(3) Clearing operations on the Batangan continued during this reporting period. On 21 Aug, a 3d platoon joined the 59th Land Clearing Company, a 45th Engr Gp Unit. 11,555 acres were cleared during this reporting period.
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d. Airfield Rehabilitation

(1) Duc Pho. Approximately 60 ft of runway was rehabilitated during
this reporting period.

(2) Ha Thanh. On 23 Oct, 32d NCR completed this airfield to Type II,
C-123 standards.

(3) Ba To. The 32d NCR completed work on the subgrade of the airstrip
at Ba To on 20 Oct. An ARVN transportation unit is presently hauling NGAI
matting to FSB Bronco. The matting will be airlifted to Ba To by CH-54
aircraft.

e. Combat Support

(1) FSB/LZ Construction. During this reporting period twelve (12)
FSB/LZ's were opened. Numerous FSB/LZ's were upgraded during this reporting
period.

(2) Minesweep Activities. Transfer of QL-1 minesweep responsibilities
to Territorial Forces was completed during this reporting period. Thang
Binh District assumed responsibilities on 8 Aug and Duc Pho District on
14 Aug, to complete the turnover. Prior to turnover, the 26th Engr Bn
conducted a training program for the respective districts.

(3) Road Opening Operations. During this period HL 579, from Binh Son
to Tra Bong was opened to support seven (7) Division/Province Convoy
HL 516/517, from Ngai Hinh to Minh Long was opened once. The 26th Engr Bn
provided technical assistance, equipment and material support to the 2d ARVN
Engr Bn for a road opening operation to convoy foodstuffs to Hiep Duc. Five
(5) MACV Convoys were conducted from Tien Phuoc to FSB Pleasantville
and New Hau Duc. HL 573 from Tan Ky to Tien Phuoc was opened six (6)
times during the reporting period.

f. Engineer Operations in the TAI

(1) 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat)

(a) Combat Engineer Support:

1. LZ Preparation. Twelve (12) LZ/P2's have been constructed during
this period employing engineer A, B, and C teams. C teams utilizing the

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Case 450 air mobile dozer were employed at five (5) locations and expanded
LZ's into fire support bases to support multi-battalion sized operations
such as those at FSB Boxer.

2. Minesweps.

a. Daily minesweeps of Liz, Fat City and Sniper Range access roads
   continued.

b. CI-1 minesweap responsibilities were transferred to Territorial
   Forces in Thang Bing and Duc Pho on 8 and 14 Aug 70 respectively. Prior to
   this turnover, A/26 and G/26 conducted extensive training on sweep techniques
   and demolitions for the District Forces. This training included joint sweep
   operations for a period of ten (10) days.

1. Operation Elk Canyon. The requirement for engineer
   support was terminated on 24 Aug 70. During the operation, A/26 supported
   by Mcb-62 maintained Kham Airfield to allow continuous C123 and C130
   traffic. Engineer commitments also included protective construction at the
   Kham Duc Artillery FSB, clearing LZ's and FSB's for the 6th ARVN Regiment,
   and direct combat support to the 2-1 Infantry Battalion.

2. Mo Duc Phase III. This operation was conducted by G/26 during the
   period 5-30 Aug 70 and was directed at denying use of a known base area for
   the 38th Local Force Battalion. Totals for the operation included: 957
   acres cleared, 190 bunkers and 815 m of tunnel destroyed, 59 mines/boobytraps
   found and destroyed and 21 detonated. Casualties were: six (6) US, two (2)
   PF and one (1) civilian wounded.

2. Tra Bong Route Clearing. Route clearing was initiated by H/26 on
   5 Sep 70 and was conducted in conjunction with road construction operations.
   Clearing was to enhance security along Hl 529 and to reduce mining incidents
   directed at US and GVN forces by the 48th Local Force Battalion and local
   guerrillas. Totals for the operation were: 650 acres cleared, 65 m of tunnel
   destroyed and seven (7) mines and boobytraps found and destroyed. There were
   no accidental detonations during the operation and no US casualties sustained.
   On 20 Sep 70, five (5) dozers were employed in a combined cordon and search
   operation vic An Dinh (2) along with elements of 1-52 Inf, Binh Son District
   Forces and 4/17 Cav. During the operation, enemy strongholds were destroyed
   including 440 m trenches and tunnels, fifteen (15) spider holes and five (5)
   mines. On 30 Sep, land clearing operations along the Tra Bong road were suspended
   due to inclement weather.

(c) Road Construction:

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1. Tra Bong (HL 529). D/26 in conjunction with B/103 ARVN Engr Bn continued upgrade operations of this vital Secondary LOC. During the reporting period 12,620 cu yds of laterite and 8,610 cu yds of 2" (-) baserock were hauled upgrading 11 km of road from QL-1 west. In addition, 393 lin ft of CMP were installed. During this period there were 45 mine/boobytrap incidents resulting in two (2) US and seven (7) VN civilian KIA and nine (9) US WIA. Work has suspended on this road due to weather.

2. Hawk Hill Access Road. On 24 Sep 70 upgrade of the access road from QL-1 to Hawk Hill was initiated by A/20 supported by HHC, B, C and D/26 and the 103d ARVN Engineers. A total of 0.85 miles of road have been graded and ditched 2,680 cu yds laterite fill hauled, 420 lin ft of CMP installed and 2,300 cu yds of 6" (-) baserock hauled from Da Nang, placed and compacted. Rock haul was completed on 24 Oct.

3. Tien Phouc - New Hau Duc Road. This 14 km road was completed by D/26 to a Dry Weather standard on 17 Sep and the first convoy to LZ Pleasantville conducted on 21 Sep. Upgrade operations will continue during the monsoon season. On 23 Oct, one (1) platoon D/26 moved from LZ Pleasantville to Tien Phouc to consolidate construction forces. Also on that date, a 23'4" M476 Dry Span was airlifted and placed across a break in the Tien Phouc River Bridge to allow resumption of both civilian and limited military traffic. Subsequent to the 1 Oct flood, effort was diverted to assist the 39th Engrs in the repair of HL 533.

4. Duc Hai Road. Construction continued on this Dry Weather pacification road during the reporting period. The 10 km road was completed on 24 Sep 70 by C/26 after hauling 5,330 cu yds of fill, 200 cu yds of rock and installing 264 lin ft of CMP. The completed road has facilitated the rapid development of the Duc Hai new settlement area.

(d) Road Openings:

1. Tra Bong. Seven (7) Division/Province resupply convoys were conducted during this period. B/26 supported each of these convoys with minesweeps and upgrade, as required. Casualties from B/26 include five (5) US KIA and seven (7) US WIA. One (1) CHV and one (1) M48 with mine roller were combat losses due to mining.

2. Minh Long. On 12 Aug 70, C/26 commenced road opening operations from Ngia Hanh to Minh Long. Supported by airmobile equipment from HHC/26 and MCB-62, the road was upgraded to allow passage of a Division convoy on 15 Aug. There were one (1) US KIA and three (3) US WIA during this operation.
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3. Hiep Duc. On 2-6 Sep 70, A/26 provided technical assistance and equipment and material support to the 2d ARVN Engr Bn during the road opening and 6 Sep convoy movement to Hiep Duc. This marked the first opening of that road since Nov and provided vital food supplies to the civilians in the area. Assistance by the 1st Engr Bn (Marine) from Ross to the Division AO boundary facilitated the 3 Sep move to Nui Lac Son from which ARVN effort was initiated. There were no incidents.

4. Pleasantville. Beginning with the initial convoy on 21 Sep, D/26 supported with minesweeps and general upgrade five (5) combined DIVARTY/MAV convoys to LZ Pleasantville and to New Hau Duc. These convoys resupplied both US Artillery and VN civilians with necessary ammunition and foodstuffs allowing critical airlift assets to be diverted to priority division combat support missions.

5. LZ Young. On 17 Oct, E/26 assisted by D/39 Engr minesweep teams employed two (2) AVLB's to open the road from Tam Ky to LZ Young. This operation was conducted in support of a rapid move to that location by elements of the 1-14 Arty Bn to support combat operations. There were no incidents.

(e) Tactical Bridging Support:

1. On 6 Oct, C/26 supported by E/26 installed a 70 ft DS Bailey Bridge on Q-1 at coordinates B5 685858 to replace a timber bridge that had burned. Removal was conducted on 22 Oct after reconstruction of the timber bridge by the 39th Engr Bn.

2. On 13 Oct, B/26 initiated bridging operations vic My Lai to support extraction of 39th Engr personnel and equipment from LZ Minuteman. This operation included the installation of a 45 ft M4T6 Dry Span with trestle bent and a 4-float normal M4T6 raft. The latter was airlifted from Chu Lai on 18 Oct. Rafting operations were completed on 21 Oct and all elements returned to Chu Lai on 24 Oct. Highlight of the operation was the raft movement of two (2) 290M tractor-scrapers rated Class 52.

(f) Contingency Operations:

1. Flood Damage/Civilian Relief. On 1 Oct a 19.5 inch rain resulted in the first flood of the year. Due to this, priority battalion operations were directed toward civilian relief, flood damage recon and repair, and extraction of the land clearing team from the Tra Bong Road. Assault boats, outboard motors, and operators were dispatched to Binh Son, Tu Nghia and Nghia Hanh and conducted civilian rescue operations for a period of four (4) days.

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"First-light" ground recon augmented aerial V/Ke2 for early warning of critical areas. Engineer repair teams performed culvert repairs on HL 518, HL 533 and the Diz access road; one (1) 23'4" Dry Span was installed on QL-1 at BS 635804, in support of 39th Engr expedient repair/maintenance operations and general upgrade was conducted on the Duc Hai and Hai Mon Roads, as well as interior roads at all accessible firebases.

2. Typhoon Preparation.

a. On 15 Oct, assigned projects and missions were discontinued due to warnings of Typhoon Joan. Companies prepared for emergency evacuation of the area and emergency rescue/relief missions in accordance with Division OPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan). On this date, B/26 operating in conjunction with H/17 Cav and supported by E/26 conducted an emergency road opening operation to extract the Land Clearing Team from the Truong Road. Operating under adverse weather conditions, and at night in a VC/NVA infested area, this difficult operation was successfully completed without incident and serves as a tribute to the professionalism and competence of all personnel involved.

b. On 24 Oct, preparations were again made, this time for Typhoon Kate and as of this date emergency evacuation teams and equipment are ready for rapid employment.

(g) Firebase/OP Construction

1. Nui Yon. On 5 Sep, D/26 supported by HHC/26 commenced clearing operations for a Duster position at Nui Yon. The project included clearing for placement of two (2) tracks, and construction of an access road from HL 533 for land resupply. As of this date final grade work is being conducted to maintain the road during the monsoon season.

2. LZ Pleasantville. This project commenced on 5 Aug 70 in support of 3-16 Artillery Bn and suspended on 23 Oct when the D/26 work force was relocated to Tien Phuoc. To date construction has included: seven (7) living bunkers, one (1) FDC, six (6) ammo bunkers, six (6) 155 Howitzer emplacements, one (1) messhall, two (2) helipads and emplacement of tactical wire.

3. Ky Tra. On 19 Oct, B/26 supported by HHC and E/26 commenced clearing operations for the 5-46 Inf Bn forward FSB at Ky Tra. Since initiation the area has been cleared, helipads and gun pads constructed, and tactical wire installed. This FSB provides security for the populated area and fire support for combat operations in the vicinity.

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A. Dai Loc. During the period 6-12 Oct, B/26 supported by HHC/26 and elements of 1-6 Inf Bn cleared and constructed a berm vic Dai Loc, BS 570014, for a PF outpost. The outpost will provide security for the valley settlements in the area as well as the planned road construction into Stinson.

(h) Firebase Upgrade. Upgrade of existing firebases during this period included bunker construction at West, Siberia, Mary Ann, Liz, Debbie, Hawk Hill and Chu Lai; road construction at Liz, Debbie, Mary Ann, Hawk Hill and helipad repair at Bronco using sand-cement and sand-asphalt stabilization.

(i) Support of Unit Relocation. With the turnover of Bayonet and Artillery Hill to ARVN and the resettlement of the Chu Lai Units, B, D and E/26 have been engaged in relocation of units within the Chu Lai area. Supporting projects have included rehabilitation of the 198th Inf Bde Hqs, construction of an FDC/TOC for the 1-14 and the 3-18 Artillery Bns, construction of aircraft rearm revetments and refuel pads for the 16th CAG, and assistance in relocating seventeen (17) SEA Huts.

(j) The Battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows.

1. HHC, B Co, D Co, E Co - Chu Lai
2. A Co - FSB Hawk Hill
3. C Co - FSB Bronco

2. 39th Engineer Battalion

a. LOC Upgrade.

1. The priority of the battalion continued to be concentrated on LOC’s. The majority of the effort was committed to HL 533, HL 521, HL 522, HL 524/523 and HL 525.

2. A total of 123 km were tasked to the battalion. 14 km (HL 525) were completed during the reporting period and another 54 km are under construction.

b. Maintenance and Upgrade of QL-1.

1. A major repair effort was required during the month of Oct due to the heavy rains received in Southern I MR. During this reporting period, 1,65C meters of washed out shoulders were repaired and upgraded, six (6) bridges repaired, two (2) culverts and headwalls replaced and a multi-culvert complex initiated.

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2. The construction of a 60 foot Timber Bent Bridge at bridge 1-B-100 was accomplished in Oct. The bridge was accidentally burned by Vietnamese civilians on the night of 5 Oct.

c. Land Clearing Operations.

1. The battalion withdrew its dozers and personnel from the Provisional Land Clearing Company during operation No Duc III to prepare for an equipment turnover to the 118th ARVN Land Clearing Company.

2. The 59th Land Clearing Company continued clearing operations on the Batangan Peninsula with 5,176 acres being cleared, 186 bunkers destroyed, 6,505 lin meters of tunnels destroyed, 33 mines and boobytraps were found and destroyed and 15 mines and boobytraps detonated.

d. Airfield and Helipad Rehabilitation.

1. The airfield at FSB Bronco was repaired during Aug. This included the removal of 75 pieces of M19 matting, the subgrade reworked and new matting replaced.

2. Welding of the airfield matting at Minh Long is still in progress.

3. Five (5) refuel pads for the 178th Assault Helicopter Company at Chu Lai were rehabilitated during this reporting period.

e. Vertical Construction.

1. The battalion completed construction of the messhall for the 23d Med Bn and began construction of a Class I Warehouse at FSB Bronco.

2. Living and ammunition bunkers at Tien Phuoc were completed during this reporting period.

3. The battalion provided material support and technical assistance for the construction of a TOC bunker at Son Ha District Headquarters.

4. Construction was begun on three (3) bunkers and a latrine for the Tra Bong District Headquarters during this reporting period.

f. Well Drilling Operations. The 49th Well Drilling Detachment completed the drilling of a second well at FSB 411.
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5 November 1970:

The battalion's disposition at the end of this reporting period was as follows:

1. HHC, A Co, C Co, 137th (LE), 522 (PB) - Chu Lai
2. B Co - FSB Dottie
3. D Co - Tam Ky
4. 59th Land Clearing Company - Batangan Peninsula
E. Logistics.

1. (U) General: The period 1 August 1970 – 31 October 1970 was highlighted by intensive preparation for the monsoons, stocking of forward fire support bases, increasing the capacity of road transport, increased emphasis on economy with numerous items coming under allocation, continued reduction of excesses and further improved maintenance posture.

2. (U) Services Division: a. On 18 July 1970 the division was assigned an allocation of small-sized lumber and plywood. A request for an increased allocation was submitted on 4 August 1970. The division received an allocation greater than the original but still about 35% below that requested on 4 September 1970. The final allocation was particularly small for 4x lumber widely used in bunker construction. The division has had sufficient material for tactical construction. A request for additional material was granted for construction of new tower bunkers on Chu Lai West. This was to fill the gap left by LZ Bayonet.

b. The division allocation of lumber was based on tactical use only. Philco-Ford is tasked with Repairs and Utilities for Chu Lai, LZ Hawk Hill and LZ Bronco. This headquarters received numerous requests for material from units who could not be met by Philco-Ford. Division assets were used if the request was deemed urgent.

c. USARV released 600,000 sandbags above the monthly allocation of 500,000 on 10 August 1970. One-half of these have already been issued and the remainder are being issued during the monsoon season in addition to the monthly allocation.

d. During the quarter the division accumulated a large number of unsupported rations. This can be reduced by combat-losing rations when appropriate. Units must also submit headcounts that correspond with the rations required.

e. Beginning with the second quarter FY 71, USARV allocated bulk POL down to corps level. As of 21 October, the division had not received its allocation. The division's request was based on past usage of JP-4, DF-2, and Mogas. The division will be reimbursed by a like amount for POL issued to non-divisional units if proper accounting is maintained.

3. Supply Division: a. Preparation for the monsoon season highlighted the supply activity during the quarter. Wet weather suits, ponchos, field jackets, blankets, poncho liners, nylon rope, and snap links were ordered and available for all units prior to the rainy season. Distribution of the
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new footgear for inundated areas was made to all Infantry Battalions and to the Artillery Battalions for Forward Observers.

b. An additional step taken to prepare for the monsoon season was to increase the stockage levels at Fire Support Bases resupplied exclusively by air. Increased stockage levels were as follows:

Class I: Minimum 6 days; maximum 12 days.
Class III: 6 days.
Class IV: For all known projects.
Class V: (1) Artillery: Double basic load.
(2) Infantry: Basic load plus operational load.

c. Emphasis on the tactical resupply of forward units by fixed wing aircraft and road convoy continued in order to release helicopters for direct support of maneuver battalions. During Operation Elk Canyon I, the Tien Phuoc JP-4 refuel point was successfully resupplied by road. Resupply of JP-4 at Minh Long is now being accomplished by fixed wing aircraft.

d. DISCOM furnished a Forward Support Element (FSE) at Kham Duc to support Operation Elk Canyon I. This FSE furnished a shower point, GR Point and received and distributed over 5,773,000 lbs of cargo delivered by fixed wing aircraft. A re-arm point and JP-4 refuel point which dispensed 392,000 gallons was established by 16th Aviation Group (Combat).

e. A new item of equipment received was the M203 Grenade Launcher. 23d Infantry Div. received 807 of the authorized 1207 during the third week in September. After assembly by the 723d Maintenance Battalion, these were distributed to units prior to 1 October. The remaining 400 M203's will be received during the next quarter. A M-79 Grenade Launcher is being turned in for each M203 Grenade Launcher received.

f. Status of JP-4 refueling equipment continues to remain critical. At the end of the quarter the division was short four 5,000 gallon tankers, four 350 GPM pumps, thirteen 350 GPM filter separators and fourteen 10,000 gallon bladders. All shortages are on CCIL and request for assistance has been submitted to USARV.

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AVIF-HL

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

Support provided by the Chu Lai Self Service Supply Center continues to be unsatisfactory. Constant coordination with 57th Transportation Battalion yielded negligible results. Requests forwarded directly to Da Nang Support Command alleviated a few critical shortages but did not materially improve the overall support. The ADC/S presented this as a support problem area to the USARV G4.

Supply actions processed by G4 remained at a high level. Accountability for previous unreported equipment valued at $39,257.00 was established in accordance with the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Program. Equipment valued at $7,718.00 was reduced from authorization levels under the provision of USARV Regulation 310-32. Forty-nine Reports of Survey were processed on equipment valued at $86,735.00. Ten initial requests and ten renewal requests for temporary loans were forwarded to USARV. Fifteen items were submitted to USARV on the Division CG’s COIL.

Headquarters, USARV, directed reduction of ASL stockage has reduced the number of lines on hand at the 23d S&T and 723rd Maintenance Battalions. The new requirement of 6 demands in 180 days has reduced the on hand quantities as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PREVIOUS # LINES</th>
<th>CURRENT # LINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23d S&amp;T Bn</td>
<td>1,248</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>723d Maint Bn</td>
<td>8,841</td>
<td>4,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maintenance Division: a. The 23d Infantry Div. CMK Team conducted 17 courtesy and 11 record inspections during the quarter. Two units received a satisfactory rating on the second inspection. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 627 Roadside Spot Check Inspections during the quarter.

b. The installation of M13A1 Belly Armor Kits was completed.

c. A complete 100% M16A1 muzzle bore erosion check was initiated. As of 31 October 1970, the check was 74.7% complete with 16081 of 21,528 weapons checked. 2,932 barrels were changed.

d. Excessively high failures of 20H: 10KW generator engines indicate a need for increased operator training. Commanders should insure:

1. That only properly trained and licensed operators operate equipment.

2. That equipment is not operated continuously for long periods without backup and rotation to permit cooling, maintenance, and oil change.

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3. That generators are not overloaded.

4. That sufficient TM's are on hand and used.

5. That requests for replacements are submitted in accordance with TB 5-6100-201-15.

6. That echelons of repair are not exceeded in the using unit.

During the quarter, the division retrograded a total of 429.3 serviceable tons excess and 1,448.7 unserviceable tons excess which amounted to a 37.65 million dollar value shipped.
F. Civil Military Operations

1. (U) Organization

a. During the month of August the following persons were assigned to the G5 Section: MAJ Richard A. Murchison, G5; CPT John L. Lansdale, Deputy G5; CPT Royd M. Nuckols Jr., CA/CA Officer; ILT Allen R. Polachowski, Assistant PSYOP Officer; ILT Paul S. Minarik, Assistant PSYOP Officer. In September 2LT Billy C. Boyd was assigned as the Assistant CA/CA Officer and in October CPT Joe L. Hill was assigned as the PSYOP Officer and 2LT Walter S. Thayer as Administration Officer.

b. The 23d Infantry Div. continued their active participation in Community Relations. Friendship Councils are currently operating in the Chu Lai Installation area and in each Brigade, A.O. The purpose of the council is to foster better relations and understanding between the 23d Infantry Div. and the local communities and provide a common ground for discussion of problems affecting both parties. At Council meetings, problems are discussed and solved which if otherwise ignored could possibly generate friction and seriously damage U.S. relations.

2. (U) Operations:

a. In order to improve US/VN relations and promote civil affairs/civic actions, units have been assigned responsibilities for villages surrounding the Chu Lai Installation. To adjust for unit redeployment, responsibilities have been realigned and are now as follows:

(1) Ly Tin District

Ky Khuong (V) - 26th Engr Bn
Ky Sanh (V) - 5/46 Inf Bn
Ky Lien (V) - 5/46 Inf Bn
Ky Ha (V) - DIVARTY
Ky Hoa (V) - DIVARTY
Ky Xuan (V) DISCOM
An Tan Protestant Orphanage - 16th CAG
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Chu Lai Catholic Orphanage - Headquarters Commandant

(2) Bin Son District:

Binh Thang (V) - 1/52 Inf Bn
Binh Nghia (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn
Binh Sa (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn

b. Rice Denial: The 23d Infantry Div. continues to support the program to deny vital resources to the enemy. During the reporting period, 132.76 tons of rice were captured.

c. Refugees: The refugee population in the 23d Infantry Div. TAOL numbers approximately 84,000 as of 31 October 1970.

d. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) material

This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to Quang Ngai (P) and Quang Tin (P) during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Medical Supplies</td>
<td>550 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>278 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin Sheets</td>
<td>402 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>64 gals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Civil-Military Actions: During the reporting period, the 23d Infantry Div. solicited civic action projects from Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. The provinces submitted a total of 228 projects and assigned each a priority for completion. An OORD was published tasking each major subordinate command with the mission of assisting GVN Authorities in the completion of these projects in their respective A.O.

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification:

a. The 23d Infantry Div. continues to support the GVN Pacification and Development Program throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai province.
b. Progress in the pacification program in the Division TAOI during the reporting period:

(1) Security of Population (as of 30 September 1970, A, B, and C status):

(a) Quang Tin 358,100 94.9%
(b) Quang Ngai 576,200 83.4%

* Sept HES Shows 83.4%. Quang Ngai Deputy Province Chief reports 88.1%

(2) VCI Neutralized (as of 24 October 1970):

(a) Quang Tin 1620
(b) Quang Ngai 1274

(3) Peoples Self Defense Force (as of 23 October 1970):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Organized</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Armed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Quang Tin</td>
<td>92,436</td>
<td>92,336</td>
<td>14,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Quang Ngai</td>
<td>104,760</td>
<td>89,459</td>
<td>16,005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The 23d Infantry Div. is continuing its support of pacification and development through MSWAP II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MIDCAPS</th>
<th>PERSONS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 196th Bde</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>15,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 198th Bde</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>10,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 11th Bde</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>9,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DIVARTY</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>11,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 26th Engr Bn</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1/1 Cav</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>6,084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. PSYOP Activities (Aug - Oct 70):
   
a. Leaflets dropped by aircraft by campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>6,842,000</td>
<td>12,892,000</td>
<td>7,078,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>477,000</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC/NVA</td>
<td>2,758,000</td>
<td>3,322,000</td>
<td>1,324,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>1,427,000</td>
<td>6,592,000</td>
<td>6,262,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunion</td>
<td>2,591,000</td>
<td>3,897,000</td>
<td>4,387,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Denial</td>
<td>572,000</td>
<td>2,067,000</td>
<td>1,530,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by 9th SOS in support of the 23d Infantry Division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Aerial Loudspeaker Targets during this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerial type targets</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial type time</td>
<td>179:47</td>
<td>127:50</td>
<td>36:49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Word Targets</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Word Time</td>
<td>6:20</td>
<td>4:40</td>
<td>3:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliborne Targets</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliborne Tape Time</td>
<td>93:00</td>
<td>92:15</td>
<td>55:18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:
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15 November 1970

AUG SEP OCT

Missions 41 67 44

Broadcast hours 162 hr 30 min 199 hr 30 min 105 hr 45 min

c. Water borne Loudspeaker broadcast:

AUG SEP OCT

2 2 0

3 hr 3 hr 0

f. Movie missions conducted during period:

AUG SEP OCT

Movie Missions 41 20 17

Movies shown 25 40 18

Movie hours 21:30 24:40 9:00

Attendance 10,150 11,000 3,500

g. Number of Hoi Chans in the 23d Infantry Div. TAOI:

AUG*** SEP** OCT**

229 167 128

** Includes only Hoi Chans processed through Chieu Hoi Centers at Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.

5. (U) Recent Developments:

a. During the reporting period, the 23d Infantry Div. has revised targeting procedures to improve efficiency. PSYOP planning is closely coordinated with G2 to insure that specific enemy units are targeted. In addition, a system using the HES report has been initiated to improve the targeting of the local population throughout the Division TAOI.
b. There has been increased emphasis on night PSYOP aerial missions flown by organic helicopters. A total of 1,500 missions were flown disseminating 15,269,000 leaflets and broadcasting 240 hours. This organic support expanded the PSYOP program over the entire Division Tac.

c. To offset the loss of aerial PSYOP missions during periods of inclement weather, two methods of leaflet dissemination were employed. Command and control aircraft dropped 1,762,000 leaflets while conducting daily inspection tours. In addition, artillery propaganda rounds were used for preplanned targets against VC and NVA units. A total of 153 propaganda rounds were fired disseminating 76,500 leaflets.

d. The 7th PSYOP Battalion Detachment #3 Team has made a major contribution to the success of the VIP program. NE teams have increased VIP broadcasts by 50%. In addition, special leaflets have been produced instructing inhabitants to turn in munitions to the broadcast teams.

e. A questionnaire has been distributed to the Chieu Hoi centers in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin to determine why Hoi Chans have rallied and to evaluate the effectiveness of the division's PSYOP program.
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II. Section II. LESSONS LEARNED: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Small Unit Leadership

a. Observation: Although there has been an improvement in small unit leadership as a result of a considerable increase in the assignment of junior officers, there is still a shortage of qualified non-commissioned officers to fill leadership positions. Graduates of the non-commissioned officers candidates course are technically proficient, but generally lack the leadership experience necessary to perform the duties of platoon sergeants and squad leaders.

b. Evaluation: The main problems are the lack of experience in graduates of the non-commissioned officers candidate course and too few promotion allocations for E-4’s or E-5’s who have demonstrated both leadership ability and technical proficiency.

c. Recommendation: Every effort should be made to identify and insure experienced NCO’s with MOS 118 in the grades E-6 or E-7 are assigned to maneuver battalions and that an increase of E-4 and E-5 allocations are made available for 11 series MOS’s.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Finance Operation: Conversion Day

a. Observation: Units serviced by the Division Finance Office were generally unprepared for the 7 October 1970 conversion day operation.

b. Evaluation: (1) Americal Regulation 37-10 requires a semiannual Military Payment Certificate Conversion Readiness Report to be submitted to ACOSS, GI on 1 March and 1 September each year. This report reflects the state of readiness to accomplish conversion of MPC’s to include the following:

(a) Conversion officers and alternate conversion officers are currently appointed on orders.

(b) Conversion day SOP’s of subordinate units are written, current, available and have been reviewed.

(c) An adequate supply of blank conversion forms are on hand.

(d) Conversion officers have been oriented on conversion day procedures.
(2) Despite the foregoing, the early hours following the announcement of conversion day were spent in acquiring forms, briefing conversion officers and taking action to overcome inadequate unit SOP's.

   c. Recommendation: (1) Recommend emphasis be given to conversion day readiness during unit inspections, staff visits and command visits to subordinate units.

   (2) Sub-Zone Coordinator Regulations should govern conversion day operations to insure coverage is extended to all units.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Excess MPC

   a. Observation: Individuals serviced by the Division Finance Office generally had substantial sums of MPC in their possession.

   b. Evaluation: Recognizing that conversion day followed close upon payday, many personnel converted sums in excess of $150.00, requiring special certificates.

   c. Recommendation: (1) That commanders emphasize to their men the pitfalls connected with holding large sums of money on their person or in unit safes.

   (2) Finance Offices should prepare and distribute a handout explaining the options available to members for safe handling and transmission of funds.

4. SUBJECT: Handling of Funds

   a. Observation: Some conversion officers failed to exercise due care in the collecting and handling of funds.

   b. Evaluation: Conversion officers reported to the Division Finance Office with old series MPC and conversion records that were not in agreement. Consequently, these officers made up shortages from personal funds or spent needless hours attempting to reconcile overages.

   c. Recommendation: Finance Offices should reproduce and distribute the conversion readiness checklist printed in MACV Directive 37-10 to assist unit conversion officers.

5. SUBJECT: Conversion Status Report

   a. Observation: Current procedures do not provide timely status reports.
b. **Evaluation:** Status reporting during the conversion period was unresponsive to the needs of the command because procedures were not established to provide the information required. Status reports were collected on an exceptions basis by several agencies resulting in confusion and duplication of effort.

c. **Recommendation:** That reporting procedures be incorporated into appropriate regulations.

6. **(U) SUBJECT:** Utilization of Finance Building during Conversion Day

a. **Observation:** All transactions, conversions, and processing replacements/losses were handled in the Main Finance Building.

b. **Evaluation:** There were too many transactions taking place in the Main Finance Building at the same time. This caused a great deal of traffic and confusion in a location already at a high level of activity. Processing and paying all replacements/losses in another area would tend to equalize the traffic flow and workload within the Finance Office.

c. **Recommendation:** Recommend that an additional building be used for processing and paying all financial transactions, other than conversion, during the conversion period.

7. **(U) SUBJECT:** Procedures for Transient Personnel

a. **Observation:** Procedures with regards to transient personnel were not clearly understood and were slow in being disseminated to conversion officers.

b. **Evaluation:** Detailed procedures regarding transient personnel were received in the message announcing conversion day. These procedures were passed, but did not always reach all unit conversion officers. Consequently, a great deal of confusion surrounded the MPC conversions associated with transient personnel.

c. **Recommendation:** Procedures pertaining to transient personnel be incorporated into the conversion day regulation.

B. **Intelligence**
SUBJECT: Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)

b. Observation: Spending under the VIP continued at the level of the 4th quarter FY 70 until late August or early September. The FY 71 budget was not received until mid-August, and it was reduced by 50% of the FY 70 budget. This caused problems in administration and disbursement of the FY 71 allotment. To afford maximum use of the FY 70 funds, accounts were established down to battalion level. Prior to receipt of the FY 71 budget, a change had begun to reduce the number of accounts to brigade and equivalent size units. By 1 September 1970, the changeover was generally completed, with the new system in effect to control the funds by having accounts with the Brigade S-2's and reducing the amount to 12,000 NVA to be maintained on a reimbursable basis.

c. Recommendation: (1) The program continued to be administered through intelligence channels.

(2) That VIP officers clear the account immediately upon transfer to another job, prior to going on leave outside of Vietnam, or for any other reason that would not permit him to fully control the fund.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Investigation of Prostitutes

a. Observation: Approximately two - man hours every other day are being used in interviewing prostitutes who are of no counter-intelligence interest.
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b. Evaluation: One or two prostitutes every other day are apprehended inside the Chu Lai Base perimeter. During the month of October, 13 prostitutes were interrogated, half of whom were repeaters, and none were of CI interest. Since September 1969, none of the prostitutes interviewed has been found to be of CI interest.

c. Recommendation: A brief interrogation should be conducted by the Military Police and if nothing of intelligence interest is uncovered, the prostitute should then be turned over to the National Police.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Marking and Location of Rice Cache

a. Observation: During the evening an element heard digging in the vicinity of their location. In the morning the element located 8 barrels of rice which had been partially uncovered by unknown persons. A more detailed search located another 18 buried aluminum cylinders, 4 feet wide by 3 feet deep, covered with approximately 12 inches of dirt. The cache site was in an area of sandy soil and scattered vegetation. In the area were numerous small knolls 14 inches to 30 inches in height. It was discovered through digging up all knolls that the caches were located in a random fashion. Since some knolls contained rice while others did not, it was noticed that the knolls which contained rice also had a shrub growing near the center of the knoll. This shrub was marked near the base of the trunk with three cut notches. The marked shrubs did not blend with the area and were obviously unnatural to the surroundings. These shrubs were approximately 4 feet high and 3 feet in diameter and from 6 to 8 months old. The area also contained numerous trails which led into the vegetation and suddenly terminated.

b. Evaluation: Although it is understood that in other areas the VC may use very divergent techniques to mark and place caches, it is hoped that this information may assist other units in locating rice caches.

c. Recommendation: That all units be informed of how these caches were located and instruct their personnel in the techniques used.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Trail Systems Data Base Record

a. Observation: Numerous requests from tactical units for specific information concerning enemy trail and waterway transportation use has prompted the need for a system which provides for the recording and rapid and accurate dissemination of this information to requesting units.
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b. Evaluation: Previously used methods for the dissemination of trail and waterways activities were found inadequate. Information was entered without segregating the reports from various agencies. Chronological data concerning date of entry were not included and degree of transportation system use was not noted.

c. Recommendation: That the solution found by this unit, described below, be considered by other units. The Imagery Interpretation Section has initiated a database system specifically for recording information concerning enemy transportation systems to include trail systems and waterways. Intelligence derived from this database will include: (1) Exact coordinates of trails and waterways; (2) The degree of use of trails on a varying scale from light to heavy; (3) The exact date of the entry and dates of subsequent activities noted. Information will be disseminated by means of a clear acetate overlay to include all activity recorded within the requested coordinates. Overlays will be keyed to 1:50,000 scale maps compatible with those used by tactical units.

5 (C) SUBJECT: Mosaic Construction of Photographs

a. Observation: The construction technique used in making photographic mosaics in some cases did not allow for the degree of accuracy required by units conducting fire support base studies and such specialized projects as power line tracings for engineer units.

b. Evaluation: The method used in mounting the photographs of the mosaic hindered the overall clarity of the finished product. The previously used construction technique in certain cases (large area coverage) caused a notable loss of overall accuracy and lack of coverage.

c. Recommendation: That the technique now used by this unit, described below, be considered by other units. The uncontrolled construction technique was adapted with the addition of rubber cement adhesive to mount the photographs. The resolution benefits greatly increased readability for the untrained interpreter. Increased accuracy of ground detail on the finished product caused a general lessening of the APPARENT photo distortion which occurs in large area coverage (those requiring more than 3 flight lines).

6 (C) SUBJECT: VCI Neutralization Element

a. Observation: There is no agency within the Division specifically charged with targeting the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

b. Evaluation: In October 1970, a study was conducted on the organization
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and operation of the VCI within the Division AO. Information relative to VCI strengths, locations, activities, and personalities was obtained from numerous sources both from within and outside of the Division. In order to properly focus attention on VCI activity, the establishment of a Division VCI neutralization element was initiated. The functions of this element are:

1. To establish a system for maintaining and updating information relative to VCI strength, locations, activities and personalities.
2. To establish coordination and liaison with DIUCC's, PIOCC's and ARVN units to facilitate flow of VCI information and coordination of operations.
3. To provide recommendations concerning likely VCI target areas.
4. To assist in planning and conduct of VCI programs. The VCI Neutralization Element, consisting of two officers and one EM, operates under the staff supervision of the ACofS, G2 and serve as the focal point for counter-VCI activities within the Division.

C. Recommendation: The VCI Neutralization Element has been organized as the Division coordinating agency for counter-VCI operations. Subordinate units retain responsibility for active VCI neutralization operations in their respective AO's and should closely coordinate with DIUCC's, PIOCC's and the Division VCI Neutralization Element. A similar element may prove useful to other units.

C. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Actions taken in negotiating stream crossings

   a. Observation: Due to the Armored Cavalry Squadron's maneuverability, all natural streams and river crossing sites in the Squadron's TAOR have been used. Once a stream crossing site has been used, use at a later date can not be considered safe.

   b. Evaluation: When a crossing site is approached that has been previously used, it should be assumed that the crossing and its approaches have been mined.

   c. Recommendation: When the tactical situation requires that a stream must be crossed, previously used crossings and their approaches should be avoided, if at all possible. If this is not possible and an old crossing site must be used, the following steps should be taken:

      (1) Approaches should be cleared with either 152 cannister rounds or
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Bangalore Torpedoes and swept with organic mine detectors.

(2) The crossing proper should be cleared with demolitions or Bangalore Torpedoes.

(3) Only the driver should be in the first and second vehicles to cross the stream. Other crew members should be dismounted.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Casualties During Medevac Operations

a. Observation: During operations in an area where numerous boobytraps are employed by the enemy, an incident occurred which resulted in a large number of casualties. An infantry platoon moved to an area near an old NDP for resupply. An individual of the platoon stepped on a pressure-release boobytrap that wounded him and four other soldiers. A command and control helicopter flying in the vicinity of the incident landed in the area to conduct the medevac. Personnel from the command and control aircraft got off to assist in loading the wounded. One of the individuals detonated another pressure-release boobytrap resulting in fifteen additional wounded.

b. Evaluation: Fewer casualties would have resulted if evacuation of the wounded had been more closely controlled, and if personnel from the medevac ship had been informed of the situation and guided by someone on the ground.

c. Recommendation: (1) Maintain dispersion of 15 to 20 meters between men at all times.

(2) When medevac helicopters land in the area of a boobytrap or mine incident, personnel from the aircraft should not get off to assist the wounded unless the area has been cleared by someone in control of the LZ.

(3) Specific individuals should be designated to load the wounded and also to control the flow of personnel to and from the medevac aircraft. "Safe lanes" should be established and one casualty brought forward at a time to avoid large groups forming around the helicopter.

3. (C) SUBJECT: VC use of smoke grenade fuses

a. Observation: The VC are removing fuses and percussion caps from used smoke grenades and reusing the assembly as a fuse for their boobytraps.

b. Evaluation: At least 15 boobytraps recently found and destroyed have been fused with M201A1 fuse assemblies from U.S. smoke grenades. A box of
tools have been captured which appeared to be used for making boobytraps. It contained 10 M201A1 fuse assemblies and 10 blasting caps which could be fitted on the smoke grenade fuse.

c. Recommendation: The M2-1A1 fuse assembly for the smoke grenade be replaced by a device which is consumed or destroyed when the grenade has been used. Units should habitually remove the M201A1 fuses from used smoke grenades and destroy them.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Action to be taken when a vehicle detonates a mine

a. Observation: A cavalry platoon returned to an area where it had employed mechanical ambushes the previous night. As the Commander moved into the area, his ACAV detonated a mine. While attempting to secure the damaged vehicle, two more anti-tank mines were detonated by individual soldiers, resulting in numerous casualties. A mine dog team was brought in and a careful search of the area was conducted with organic mine detectors. Two additional mines were discovered.

b. Evaluation: VC/NVA units are aware of the American Soldier tendency to rush to the aid of wounded personnel. This characteristic is exploited by employing anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in groups.

c. Recommendation: Only the minimum number of personnel necessary to evacuate injured should enter a mined area. Footsteps and tracks made by personnel and vehicles that have already entered the area should be used. Mine Dog Teams, scout dogs and mine detectors should also be employed to the maximum extent possible.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Equipment and Personnel losses from enemy mines and boobytraps emplaced in vicinity of friendly Mechanical Ambushes.

a. Observation: Incidents have occurred where the area around friendly Mechanical Ambushes has been boobytrapped and/or mined.

b. Evaluation: Mechanical Ambushes are emplaced early in the evening and retrieved the following morning. This procedure is known by enemy units and if a mechanical ambush is detected, it is a logical place for boobytraps or mines to be employed.

c. Recommendation: Personnel responsible for emplacing and retrieving mechanical ambushes should be briefed on the possibility of encountering mines and boobytraps. Movement to the mechanical ambush site should be accomplished in a slow, deliberate manner with each member of the unit being alert for
boobytraps and signs of mine emplacement. If the area immediately surrounding the mechanical ambush yields signs that the device may have been tampered with, the mine should be destroyed in place.

D. Organization: None

E. Training: None

F. Logistics

1. (U) SUBJECT: Mobile TOC/CP Organization

a. Observation: During the disengagement/Vietnamization period infantry battalions will rely less upon permanent home fire bases and will, by necessity, assume a more mobile role, moving to areas of greatest need.

b. Evaluation: Multiple battalion level missions, involving successive operations in widely separated areas and requiring the construction of successive fire bases requires a compact TOC/CP Kit, able to be airlifted to a site and made operational in minimum time. Lack of such pre-planned and pre-loaded kits delays the command/control of combat operations.

c. Recommendation: A kit consisting basically of four modified CONEX containers, augmented by a standard load of PSP/RPG screen/engineer stakes, offers a highly flexible air-mobile CP/TOC set up. Two CONEX's, fitted with medical stretchers arranged in a bunk-bed configuration, provide living quarters for the TOC personnel; one CONEX, containing two cots, houses the commander and operations officer. The fourth CONEX, containing a built-in counter unit with radio racks, battery-powered emergency lighting, wall map boards, seats, storage boxes, and control power terminal box, houses a TOC capable of operation immediately upon landing at a forward site. The unit may be arranged in a number of configurations depending upon terrain and availability. Most suitable is an arrangement in which the CONEX's face each other in pairs, two to a side, with 8 foot separation. The gap may then be spanned with PSP, creating a central briefing area.

2. (U) SUBJECT: FEMA Reconciliation

a. Observation: A problem exists in getting complete FEMA reconciliation from ICC-V.

b. Evaluation: In an attempt to get a complete FEMA reconciliation, our DSU submitted punched cards for all open requisitions to ICC-V. ICC-V was
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to bounce these cards against their deck and furnish the 23d Supply and Transportation Battalion with complete status. The reconciliation has not been returned. Sixty days have elapsed during this period, this time is extremely critical, as DSU’s can not submit AFI cards and the monthly status provided by ICC-V is incomplete and inaccurate for the majority of the lines.

c. Recommendation: Quarterly reconciliation be compiled by ICC-V and the time between the cut-off date and the printout not exceeding fifteen days. If this is not feasible, it is further recommended that units be authorized to submit AFI cards.

G. Communications

1. (U) SUBJECT: Power for communications sites

a. Observation: This unit has been experiencing excessive system down time at outlying sites.

b. Evaluation: This situation occurs at the outlying sites served principally by air. The monsoon season has caused increasing difficulty in getting serviceable generators to the sites and evacuating the unserviceable items. One of the primary causes is the cancellation of fixed wing and helicopter flights due to inclement weather.

c. Recommendation: Three recent actions by the Division Signal Battalion have, to a great degree, alleviated the problem.

(1) A minimum of five generators are maintained at each site which is served primarily by air.

(2) Replacement and evacuation procedures have been consolidated so that serviceable generators are flown to the site each time unserviceable generators must be evacuated.

(3) Consideration is being given to installing rotary converters at the sites to provide an additional method of emergency back-up power. With the rotary converters installed, any 24 volt vehicle may be used to supply power to sites using the AN/MRC 112 or AN/GRC-163 configuration.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23rd Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970. AO3 CSFOR--c5 (IC) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
23d Infantry Division Troop List
Abbreviations and Terms
Incl 2 wd HQ DA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 CINCUSAJCOC, ATTN: HUH-DT
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1 CC, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
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- CC, 122d Arv Bn
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12 CC, 3d Med Hist Det
1-CCFSS, G1
10-CCFSS, G2
10-CCFSS, G3
1-CCFSS, G4
1-CCFSS, G5
1-Chemical
1-Engineer
1-Signal
1-Aviation
1-Provost Marshall
1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-Information Officer
1-Inspector General
1-Surgeon
1-Chaplain
1-Adjutant General
1-XXIV Corps LNO
2-TACP (D0), 23d Inf Div

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AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 8 DEC 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned, for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division, and concurs except as indicated in paragraph 2g below.

2. (C) Comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning "Excess MPC," page 73, paragraph II A3: concur. Information should be provided personnel prior to departure on R&R or out-of-country leave reminding them that all monies must be taken with them when leaving country. Many instances arose where personnel were out-of-country on C Day, and upon arrival in RVN were requested to appear before a board in order to convert the MPC left in-country. This overburdened the boards, and could have been prevented had R&R and leave instructions indicated not only the minimum amount of money to be taken on R&R/leave, but that no MPC could be left in-country.

   b. Reference item concerning "Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)," page 75, paragraph II B1: Administration of VIP funds is the responsibility of military intelligence personnel, since the funds are provided by the Intelligence Contingency Funds. Intelligence personnel should continue to provide guidance to Brigade SIP's concerning use of the VIP funds and should emphasize collection of information above collection of ordnance.

   c. Reference item concerning "Trail Systems Data Base Record," page 76, paragraph II B4: concur. The best source of this type information is photography. To cope with the anticipated increase in frequency of missions, a system of individual route folders is suggested. The folder could consist of a 1:50,000 map (cut down) to show route alignment and a log to show route history. If frequent VR is available it can be used to pinpoint areas of most current interest along selected routes to provide a better indication of route status. A more accurate portrayal is provided by plotting directly on terrain features of a map instead of an acetate overlay, thus avoiding the possible mis-alignment inherent in the use of overlays.

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AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (B2) (U)

d. Reference item concerning "VCI Neutralization Element," page 77, paragraph II B6: concur. The involvement of all tactical units in the neutralization of the Vietcong Infrastructure is both desirable and necessary. The present Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program requires careful coordination of all intelligence input to assure successful targeting. All similar elements which are established in military units should stress the necessity of establishing coordination and liaison with the appropriate DIoCC and/or PIOCC, to permit the proper flow of VCI information and coordination of operations. Every effort should be made to keep the appropriate PIOCC informed as to the status of all neutralization operations. Information on enemy prisoners of war and enemy killed in action, should be immediately reported to Phoenix/Phung Hoang offices, to assist in the identification and neutralization of known VCI.

e. Reference item concerning "Equipment and Personnel losses from enemy mines and boobytraps emplaced in vicinity of friendly Mechanical Ambushes," page 80, paragraph II C5: concur. Personnel should also avoid using the same routes to and from mechanical ambush sites. A boobytrap/mine symposium will be held at XXIV Corps to assist in dissemination of information on enemy techniques and ways to counter them.

f. Reference item concerning "Mobile TOC/CP Organisation," page 81, paragraph II F1: concur. However, serviceable CONEX containers should not be withdrawn from the transportation system for any purpose other than specifically authorized by competent authority. USARV Regulation 55-7 states that CONEX containers will be emptied and expeditiously returned to the transportation system. The regulation also authorizes the CO, THA, MACV, to make appropriate disposition of unacceptably repairable CONEX containers. Many of these could be returned to useful service as mobile TOC/CP's. Other material that meets the requirements for a mobile TOC/CP should also be examined.

g. Reference item concerning "FEMA Reconciliation," page 81, paragraph II F2: nonconcur. USARV unclassified message 210907Z Nov 70
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AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSFOR-65 (H2) (U)

establishes policies for US Army depots and ICC-Y to provide timely
printout of requisition status to DSV/GSU's every 30 days from which
the DSV/GSU's will furnish status to the units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. H. SMITH
Capt., AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:

CG, 23d Inf Div
AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23rd Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR--65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 28 JAN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOY-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 23rd Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "PEMA Reconciliation," page 81, paragraph II F 2 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2g. The authority to release and backorder PEMA items has now been changed to the depot level. USAV Reg 700-35 dated 5 October 1970 prescribes the procedures for performing backorder reconciliations with the Direct Support Units. This regulation incorporates the suggestions of the 23rd Infantry Division. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furrn:
XXIV Corps
23rd Inf Div
GPOP-DT (15 Nov 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 23d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacfic, APO San Francisco 96558 2 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.W. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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23d INFANTRY DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 31 October 1970)

1. HEADQUARTERS 23d INFANTRY DIVISION

HHC, 23d Infantry Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)
Trp E, 1st Cav
Trp F, 17th Cav
26th Engr Bn
523d Sig Bn
COMSEC CONTACT TEAM #2
23d MP Co
146th MP Plat, 504th MP Bn
328th RR Co
635th MI Co
3d Mil Hist Det
OL 7, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

2. 23d INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Div Arty
6th Bn, 11th Arty
1st Bn, 14th Arty (-)
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
1st Bn, 82d Arty
3d Bn, 82d Arty
Btry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty
Btry G, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)
251st FA Det (Radar)

-Inclusion-

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252d FA Det (Radar)
271st FA Det (Radar)

3. 23d INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND
   HHC and Band
   23d Med Bn
   23d S&T Bn
   723d Maint Bn (-)
   23d Admin Co
   Co G, 75th Inf (Ranger)
   63d Inf Plat (CTT)
   23d Infantry Division Combat Center (PROV)
   Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
   HHC, 16th CAG
   14th Combat Avn Bn
     71st Avn Co (Aalt Hal)
     116th Avn Co (Aalt Hal (OPCON))
     132d Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal)
     174th Avn Co (Aalt Hal)
     176th Avn Co (Aalt Hal)
     178th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal)
     196th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal) (OPCON)
     534th Med Det
     756th Med Det

   123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)
     Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
     Trp F, 8th Cav
     Co E, 723d Maint Bn

   335th Trans Co
   362d Avn Det

   Inclosure 1
5. **11th Infantry Brigade**

HHC, 11th Inf Bde

3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
31st Public Information Det
90th Chem Det
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 1

6. **196th Infantry Brigade**

HHC, 196th Inf Bde

2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
1st Bn, 46th Inf
48th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
10th Public Information Det
27th Chem Det

7. **198th Infantry Brigade**

HHC, 198th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 6th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
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1st Bn, 52d Inf
Trap/II, 17th Cav
87th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

6th CA' Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
Det 3, 7th PSYOP Bn (DS of Div)
USASSG, ACSI, DA
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 23d Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.

CG, 23d Infantry Division

15 November 1970

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310