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AUTHORITY

23 Jan 1976, DoDD 5200.10.; ST-A AGO, D/A LTR 23 JAN 1976.

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

AGDA-A (M) (7 Apr 71)

FOR OT UT 704021

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
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14 NOV 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command

(1) During the reporting period there was one major change in the Command Group: On 11 August 1970 Major General Jack J. Magstaff became Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV, replacing Major General James W. Sutherland, who departed on 17 June 1970.

(2) During the reporting period, there were eleven major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV:

(a) On 18 September 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Rose became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Winslow.

(b) On 8 October 1970 Colonel James A. Fyock, Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, departed and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Rose as Acting G1.

(c) On 3 September 1970 Colonel George P. Tilson became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, replacing Colonel Charles F. McKee.

(d) On 17 September 1970 Lieutenant Colonel David G. Hansard became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, replacing Lieutenant Colonel William J. Lawrence.

(e) On 9 August 1970 Colonel Billy M. Vaughn became Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Colonel Elmer D. Pendleton, Jr.

(f) On 14 September 1970 Colonel William L. Lemnitzer became Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Colonel Billy M. Vaughn.

(g) On 22 August 1970 Lieutenant Colonel John R. Witherell became

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Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Lieutenant Colonel (P)
John R. Black.

(h) On 3 October 1970 Lieutenant Colonel John P. Maher became Deputy
Engineer, replacing Lieutenant Colonel James A. Stidham.

(i) On 24 September 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Clarke became
Staff Judge Advocate, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Fred R. Ball, Jr.

(j) On 11 September 1970 Colonel James A. Hyndman became Provost
Marshal, replacing Colonel Steven T. Clark.

(k) On 1 September 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Boyd D. Parsons, Jr.,
became Deputy Liaison Officer, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Albert L.
Henderson.

(3) During the reporting period there were eleven significant
personnel changes in II FFORCEV Artillery:

(a) On 14 September 1970 Lieutenant Colonel (P) James C. Barnes, Jr.,
became Deputy Commanding Officer, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Colonel
Willard W. Scott.

(b) On 10 August 1970 Major (P) Victor F. Keefe became S1, II FFORCEV
Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel William E. Hollowell, Jr.

(c) On 1 October 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Palumbo became
S1, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Major (P) Victor F. Keefe.

(d) On 4 August 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Opel became S2,
II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Major Robert A. Thompson.

(e) On 10 August 1970 Lieutenant Colonel William E. Hollowell, Jr.,
became S4, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Major (P) Thomas A. Epperson.

(f) On 5 October 1970 Lieutenant Colonel James E. Green, Jr., became
FSC, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Major Thomas M. Brown.

(g) On 14 September 1970 Colonel Willard W. Scott, Jr., became CO,
23d Artillery Group, replacing Colonel William L. Lemnitzer.

(h) On 25 October 1970 Lieutenant Colonel John L. Geraci became XO,
23d Artillery Group, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Nicola DiNardo.

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(i) On 7 August 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Nolan M. Sigler became CO, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Alvin F. Murphy.

(j) On 22 September 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Malvern R. Whitaker became CO, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Clifford F. Terry.

(k) On 17 August 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Moody M. Hayes became CO, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Alva W. Hayes.

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, and Discipline.

(1) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued by this command are as follows:

<u>AWARDS</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Silver Star	11	24	17	52
Distinguished Flying Cross	2	7	17	26
Soldier's Medal	2	12	17	31
Bronze Star Medal "V"	77	107	66	250
Bronze Star Medal	639	510	155	1304
Air Medal "V"	12	19	22	53
Air Medal	565	419	110	1094
Army Commendation Medal "V"	78	155	47	280
Army Commendation Medal	1920	1823	523	4288
Purple Heart	36	3	0	39
TOTAL AWARDS	<u>3342</u>	<u>3079</u>	<u>986</u>	<u>7417</u>

(3) The overall assigned and attached officer strength of II FFORCEV increased while the warrant officer and enlisted strengths decreased substantially during the last quarter. A comparison of the last four reporting periods follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
31 Jan 70	487	53	4209
30 Apr 70	630	82	6145
31 Jul 70	553	77	6778
31 Oct 70	612	72	6224

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(4) Postal Activities, 44th Army Postal Unit: Detection of contraband items continues to be a matter of major emphasis. During the Christmas mailing period, it is expected that volume of mail received from CONUS will increase from approximately 40 tons to 60 tons. Outgoing mail will increase from 10 tons to 20 tons. An increase in stamp sales and money order sales is also expected.

(5) During the 1st quarter of FY 71, the Army motor vehicle accident rate was reduced 28.2% and the military injury rate was reduced 25.2% compared to the 4th quarter FY 70. The decrease in the number of Army motor vehicle accidents and injuries to military personnel is a direct result of command emphasis. During this period the Commanding General notified all subordinate commanders of his desire to reduce all accidents by a minimum of 50% during FY 71 and outlined specific guidelines to be followed in order to achieve this goal. A command Safety Council was organized with the Deputy Commanding General as Chairman. A pilot traffic safety enforcement program was established. The program, which intensified enforcement for 15 days on a dangerous highway, resulted in a 50% reduction in traffic accidents with no fatalities to military or local national personnel. The unfavorable accident trend has been reversed and further reduction can be expected during the 2d quarter FY 71. The accident rates for the 4th quarter FY 70 and the 1st quarter FY 71 are shown below for comparison purposes:

II FFORCEV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND OPCON UNITS

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>4TH QTR, FY 70</u>	<u>1ST QTR, FY 71</u>
Military Personnel Injury Rate (Injuries per 1,000,000 mandays)	70.3	52.7
Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate (Accidents per 1,000,000 miles)	8.5	6.1

(6) Drug Abuse Control. During this reporting period, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam revitalized its Drug Abuse Control Program. Early in the quarter, the Commanding General designated the Deputy Commanding General to be the Chairman of the Marihuana and Drug Suppression Council. Under his guidance, the following actions were taken during the period:

(1) Members of the Council toured firebases and base camps, interviewing troops and commanders at all levels. It was learned by the members of the council that the problem of drug abuse was more widespread than generally

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appreciated. However, drug abuse was not hampering the operations of units in the field. In combat operations there was a self-police of illicit drugs by the troops themselves.

(b) The Deputy Commanding General and key members of the Council reviewed the drug abuse control programs of all the assigned, attached, and US OPCON units. Although some units had only recently started programs, the design of the programs was generally adequate. The units were encouraged to redouble their efforts in the programs.

(c) A mobile training team made up of representatives of the Chaplain, Judge Advocate General, and Medical Corps was formed. This team travelled throughout MR 3 giving presentations, primarily for officers and NCOs. The training material was designed to give a basic level of understanding and knowledge about drug abuse and the proper employment of legal procedures. Nineteen presentations were given by the team.

(d) At the base camp of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, the education program was modified. This was built around the use of a well qualified enlisted man (E5) to give lectures to the lower grades. The lectures were designed to be very informal "man-to-man", and in the language of the troops. This approach appears to be effective, particularly in motivating individuals to turn themselves in for amnesty and rehabilitation. Rehabilitated drugs users are also used to give talks in an effort to deter would-be experimenters with dangerous drugs.

(e) A "half-way" house has been established at the Plantation base camp. This facility provides a setting and counseling for assisting individuals in withdrawing from a drug habit. Ex-drug users are employed to assist as counselors. They are very effective in the exercise of peer pressure to keep users from reverting to their former habits. The full effectiveness of this program will require longer observation for evaluation. However, in its initial phases, it appears to be very promising as one approach to the drug abuse problem.

(7) Quarterly statistics for the 1st Quarter FY 71, indicated that offense rates for II FFORCEV assigned, attached, and OPCON units showed an increase in all areas over the previous quarter. Crimes against persons and property showed a significant increase. This may be attributed to the lull in fighting which allows the soldier more time to become involved in non-duty type activities. The increase in miscellaneous offenses can be attributed to the increase of larcenies under \$50.00. This increase has a direct correlation to the standdown of the 3/9th Infantry Division and the 199th LIB. Traffic offenses have shown moderate increase through the last

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three quarters. This can be attributed to greater command emphasis and increased MP enforcement.

During the period of 1-15 October, a special Traffic Enforcement and Safety Drive was conducted on Highway 316 between Newport and QL-1. The objective was to reduce traffic accidents through education, speed control, safety mechanical inspections and high police visibility. During this period, the statistical expectancy was 42 to 50 accidents with one to two fatalities. US vehicles were involved in 26 accidents with no fatalities. There were 803 traffic citations issued and 248 CMMI inspections made. The majority, (527 of 803) citations went to drivers of vehicles of 2 1/2 ton and over, nearly all for speeding. The CMMI inspection teams inspected 248 vehicles of which 196 were unsatisfactory with 141 being deadlined on the spot.

II FFORCEV Assigned, Attached, and OPCON Quarterly Offense Rates per Thousand Troops

	<u>2d Qtr 70</u>	<u>3d Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>	<u>1st Qtr 71</u>
Crimes Against Persons and Property	2.87	4.22	3.94	5.21
Miscellaneous Offenses	6.66	9.45	10.24	13.63
Traffic Offenses	15.04	20.04	25.14	26.72

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operations Report-Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Current Intelligence:

(a) At the beginning of this quarter, the reorganization of G2, II FFORCEV, went into effect. The Collection Division was eliminated, and its functions were assumed by the new Current Intelligence Division. The Current Intelligence Division encompasses the G2 Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and exercises staff supervision over the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment.

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(b) During the period, the Current Intelligence Division produced a daily summary of significant agent reports received. The summary informed the ACofS, G2, of enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength, and intentions as reported by clandestine agents. The information reported by agents was constantly evaluated by correlating the reports with actual happenings. Evaluation of agent reports enabled the agencies which employed the sources to determine agent reliability and to decide which sources should be retained.

(c) The Current Intelligence Division was also responsible for insuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) were published and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, the Current Intelligence Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific targets and informed subordinate units which SICR's were current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCEV SICR Registry which indexed all SICR's by number and by collection agency.

(d) Headquarters, II FFORCEV prepared a special collection program for the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure (VCI) which was distributed at the end of the quarter. This special collection program was designed to place a greater emphasis on information pertaining to VCI at all levels. At Headquarters, II FFORCEV, information will be compiled and maintained on the VCI at the subregion, military region, and COSVN levels.

(3) Production:

(a) The reorganization of the G2 Section mentioned above also resulted in expanding the functions of the Production Division and the elimination of the Operations Division. The Production Division encompasses the Analysis, Estimates, and Order of Battle Branches, and provides the division chief with the necessary resources to prepare estimates, assessments, studies, briefings, and special articles as required.

(b) The Analysis Branch was responsible for preparing and presenting the daily all-source intelligence briefing, oral and written all-source intelligence assessments, and for evaluating collateral material received from the Order of Battle Branch. Additionally, the Analysis Branch prepared the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) and wrote the weekly assessment for the Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) published by the Order of Battle Branch.

(c) The Estimates Branch prepared and presented intelligence estimates, assessments, studies, and briefings based on input from, and close coordination with, the other divisions and branches in the G2 Section. Additionally,

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the Estimates Branch was responsible for the G2 input to the II FFORCEV Combined Campaign Plan and Operational Report - Lessons Learned, and prepared the Quarterly Review of Enemy Base Areas.

(d) The Order of Battle Branch was responsible for the collation and evaluation of tactical and strategic order of battle information and continuously interpreted and evaluated changes in enemy organization, logistics, composition, strength, disposition, and tactics. The results of this effort provided the commander with the intelligence necessary to target enemy units in Military Region 3 and Cambodia accurately. The Order of Battle Branch was also responsible for the weekly publication of the II FFORCEV PERINTREP, which, in addition to providing a weekly up-date on enemy order of battle, contained timely and informative articles on significant enemy developments or trends in Military Region 3 and Cambodia.

(4) Counterintelligence/Phoenix

(a) Main-force and NVA activity in Military Region 3 was sporadic, and the number of enemy incursions into hamlets in the region continued to decline. However, during this reporting period, the enemy was able to make his presence known by continuing his terrorist activities. While no large increase in terrorism was detected during the quarter compared to last quarter, a significant increase in terrorist activities occurred in Long An Province. Binh Long and Hau Nghia Provinces also reported noticeable upward trends. Increased effectiveness of GVN resource denial capabilities complemented the efforts of military forces in Military Region 3 in the overall effort to hamper the enemy's Shadow Supply System. Police security checkpoint operations continued to improve, largely because of added command interest. During the period, operations resulted in the confiscation of significant amounts of medicine and foodstuffs. The number of VCI neutralized increased steadily during the quarter from a low of 68 to a high of 127 per month. This increase can be attributed to increasing GVN influence and further implementation of the pacification and Phoenix programs.

(b) Counterintelligence operations by the 219th MID in the vicinity of Headquarters, II FFORCEV generated 34 intelligence reports during the past three months. Of this number, 74 percent were rated of moderate or higher usability by user agencies; 84 percent were judged to be timely in nature; 100 percent had a validity rating of possibly true or higher; and 75 percent disclosed information reported for the first time. Combat responses were made in 17 cases. With the gradual withdrawal of US combat units from Military Region 3, increasing emphasis was placed on re-targeting the sources against local VCI and generating information reportable under the Phung Hoang Program.

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(c) The number of terrorist incidents reported in Military Region 3 continued to vary widely from week to week throughout the reporting period. The following table shows statistics for the high and low weeks compared to the weekly average:

	<u>High Week</u>	<u>Low Week</u>	<u>12 Week Average</u>
Incidents	107	22	53
Persons Killed	25	6	14
Persons Wounded	58	9	28
Persons Abducted	24	0	10

The above weekly averages show a decrease in every category, and this decrease reflects the increasing effectiveness of the GVN pacification efforts.

(5) Research and Statistics:

(a) The Research and Statistics Division continued to provide data on enemy personnel and logistical losses to the G2 Section, II FFORCEV. The data reported by OPCON units in their daily intelligence summaries (INTSUM) was consolidated and tabulated by the division and used as a basis for special briefings and reports to the Command Group, including monthly reports on progress made by II FFORCEV units toward achieving the goals of the Wet Season Strategy.

(b) The Research and Statistics Division was also responsible for preparing and publishing of the II FFORCEV INTSUM, a daily summary of II FFORCEV OPCON unit activities and other items of intelligence interest. In addition, the Research and Statistics Division maintained charts, graphs, and other visual aids used in command and special briefings.

(6) G2 Air:

(a) During the quarter there were a total of 653 Red Haze missions flown. 125 SLAR, and 471 photographic missions were flown. Of the totals, 183 Red Haze and 308 photographic missions were completed by the Air Force. The Army accounted for the balance of 470 Red Haze, 125 SLAR, and 163 photographic missions.

(b) Patterns of Red Haze were noted in and west of Base Area 354, around Snuol, in and around the Mimot area, and in the Fishhook region. During the period, SLAR detected movement was light and scattered throughout Military Region 3. Approximately 60 to 75 percent of all SLAR movers were recorded west of Cu Chi and from Nui Ba Den to the Cambodian border.

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(c) Visual reconnaissance was hampered by poor flying weather. The majority of sightings were made along the Cambodian border in War Zone C and along the western boundary of the Military Region 3. The YO3A silent airplane was employed on some of the missions during the reporting period.

(d) Unattended ground sensor activity during the quarter remained light and random in most areas. The only area of continuous activity was around Tra Cu in Hau Nghia Province. The following table indicates sensor activity for the period:

Unattended Ground Sensor Report

<u>Month</u>	<u>Sensors Active</u>	<u>Targets Detected</u>	<u>Artillery Responses</u>	<u>Ground Responses</u>	<u>Air Responses</u>
Aug	1,147	527	378	1	0
Sep	1,125	415	256	1	4
Oct	1,124	528	275	0	1

(7) G2 Targets:

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function continued to be the development and evaluation of targets for B52 strikes. With the decrease in B52 strikes during the quarter, some emphasis was shifted to the development of targets for the FSCE and the TASE. The division continued to maintain and develop an extensive visually displayed data base of enemy installations including bunkers, base camps, fighting positions, tunnels, and trench networks. Additionally, the division maintained an activity board displaying a seven-day activity period. Enemy activity, intelligence reports, agent reports, ground sensor returns, and airborne sensor returns were displayed and color-coded by day. The data was utilized in developing targets and in justifying targets to MACV.

(b) Reduced B52 sorties and the targeting of high priority targets by MACV were responsible for the noted decrease in B52 targets allocated to II FFORCEV. This quarter, targeting continued with emphasis on enemy headquarters, supply areas, and staging areas within Cambodia, all of which posed a threat to Military Region 3. II FFORCEV received a total of 125 strikes for the quarter; 101, or 74.1 percent were within Cambodia. The

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remaining 34, or 25.9 percent, were struck within Vietnam in support of friendly ground operations. The in-country targets were distributed by provinces as follows: Binh Duong, 1; Binh Long, 3; Binh Tuy 4; Long Khanh, 5; Phuoc Tuy, 1; Tay Ninh, 7; Quang Duc, 1; and Phuoc Long, 12.

(8) Radio Research: The 303d Radio Research Battalion continued to provide timely and sustained support for the combat operations of II Field Force. A direct support unit provided radio research support to each US division and separate brigade or regiment, and immediate tactical reports were provided down to brigade level. The 303d Radio Research Battalion was responsive to the requirements of this command. Specifics on support furnished are not provided due to classification.

(9) Weather Support:

(a) Detachment 32, 5th Weather Squadron, provided consistently timely and accurate weather support for planning and operations of II FFORCEV. Operational support to divisions was provided by Detachment 32's operating locations: Operating Location B with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at Phuoc Vinh, and Operating Location C with the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi. Forecasts provided to G3 Air for specified areas and times for B57 and Commando Vault operations were particularly noteworthy in that these forecasts proved to be correct 100 percent of the time. A major forecasting problem was that of accurately forecasting nocturnal thunderstorms. Exact temporal and spatial forecasts are needed by G2 Air from 12 to 18 hours in advance of scheduled reconnaissance missions throughout Military Region 3. Since most thunderstorms are of the air mass type, only the temporal requirement can be adequately forecast this far in advance. Scheduling flexibility allowed the diversion of some missions to other parts of Military Region 3 where thunderstorms were not occurring. The state of the art did not allow more precise forecasts, but periodic updates of weather forecasts helped in planning diversions when they were necessary.

(b) During the quarter, early morning stratus and fog frequently hampered first light insertions. In most cases, conditions had been forecast as much as 24 hours in advance, but operational requirements necessitated the scheduling of these missions, many of which were subsequently delayed or scrubbed. Little can be done to change procedures. Missions must continue to be scheduled with the hope that weather conditions will improve by the time the mission is flown.

(10) Enemy Situation:

(a) General: The Central Office of South Vietnam (CCCVN) remained

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the supreme political and military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army activities in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units continued to be subordinated to Headquarters, South Vietnam Liberation Army or to one of the military regions or sub-regions in GVN Military Region 3. Divisional units in Cambodia were engaged in stabilizing operations designed to secure base areas and supply routes from Laos. Enemy activity within MR 3 was characterized by avoidance of contact with allied units, counter-pacification efforts, and anti-Vietnamization operations requiring a minimum of personnel and equipment expenditures. During the period, some larger main-force units were deactivated, and their personnel were assigned to local-force units.

(b) Enemy Unit Effectiveness:

1. At the end of the quarter, there were 27 enemy main-force and 7 local-force infantry battalions, 15 main-force artillery battalions, one main-force engineer battalion, and 14 main-force and one local-force sapper battalions committed against GVN and FVMAF units in Military Region 3. In addition, there were 22 main-force infantry battalions, 6 main-force artillery battalions, 3 main-force sapper battalions, and one main-force reconnaissance battalion located in Cambodia, but traditionally targeted against Military Region 3. These figures do not include 11 main-force infantry battalions, one main-force sapper battalion, and one local-force sapper battalion which were held in a "possible" status in Military Region 3 or Cambodia. The average strength for a main-force combat (infantry and sapper) battalion at the end of the quarter was 142, varying from 30 to 400. The local-force combat battalion's strength averaged 133 men and varied from 75 to 200. The average strength for a main-force combat support (artillery) battalion was 174 and varied from 60 to 400.

2. Significant changes in enemy organization were noted during the quarter and are indicated below.

a. The 275th VC MF Infantry Regiment, 5th VC Infantry Division, is believed to have been reorganized late in the second quarter into the 275A and 275B Regiments. The 275A Regiment is probably located south of Kampong Thom, and the 275B Regiment is also believed to be located deep in Cambodia. The strength of these two regiments is unknown, but it is likely that some replacements from North Vietnam, and Cambodian recruits, have been received by the two units.

b. Information received in August confirmed that the Quyet Thang Regiment was inactivated because of logistical and personnel shortages.

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Portions of the regimental staff and cadre were sent to Cambodia, and remaining personnel were assigned to SR-1 Headquarters and to local-force units in SR-1.

c. Information received early in the quarter also indicated that the 268th VC MF Infantry Regiment was inactivated with its battalions being placed under SR-1 control. However, more recent information points to the establishment of a 268th Group, suggesting a loosely organized coalition of the three under-strength battalions which formerly made up the 268th VC MF Infantry Regiment. While it is estimated that the 268th Group is conducting operations in support of local-forces and guerrillas, the unit's mission, strength and organization is not fully understood at this time.

d. A number of documents captured in September indicated the merger of Subregions 2 and 3. It is estimated that the two subregions were merged in order to streamline command and control functions and logistical operations which had been disrupted as a result of allied cross-border operations. Additionally, the subregion has consolidated several understrength battalions: the 265th VC MF Infantry Battalion was disbanded with its personnel being absorbed by the 506th VC MF Battalion; the 3d VC MF Artillery Battalion and 520th VC MF Infantry Battalion were dropped as combat units due to personnel losses; and the 16th NVA Infantry Battalion, the 269th VC MF Infantry Battalion, and possibly the 6B NVA Infantry Battalion were merged to form the 1696 VC MF Infantry Battalion.

e. During the quarter, information was received confirming the fact that the Dong Nai Regiment, SR-5, was disbanded. The regimental headquarters personnel were assigned to SR-5 Headquarters; one maneuver battalion was subordinated directly to the subregion and two were subordinated to SR-5 districts.

3. The following tables indicate enemy personnel and materiel losses during the quarter. The figures presented include the results of ARVN operations in Cambodia.

a. Overall personnel losses inflicted by allied forces:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>HC</u>	<u>VCI</u>
August	1134	121	393	10
September	1138	108	326	0

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	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>HC</u>	<u>VCI</u>
October	<u>1008</u>	<u>107</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	3280	336	1012	15

b. VC/NVA logistical losses inflicted by allied forces:

	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>Total</u>
Individual Weapons	1,431	1,212	2,643
Crew Served Weapons	188	172	360
Small Arms Ammunition	139,530	37,027	176,557
HIG Ammunition	57,448	0	57,448
Grenades	7,281	1,281	8,562
Miner	352	330	682
Bangalore Torpedoes	109	88	197
B-40/41 Rounds	990	603	1,593
240mm Rockets	0	6	6
120mm Rockets	5	23	28
107mm Rockets	3	1	4
120mm Rockets	1,218	0	1,218
81/82mm Mortar Rounds	1,577	3,460	5,037
60mm Mortar Rounds	973	244	1,217
75mm Howitzer Rounds	24	0	24
75mm Recoilless Rifle Rounds	184	611	795
57mm Recoilless Rifle Rounds	364	24	388

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Explosives (lbs)	5,798	604	6,402
Rice (tons)	28.8	46.6	75.4
Salt (tons)	1.7	10.9	12.6
Medical Supplies (tons)	.54	.04	.58
Foodstuffs (tons)	13.36	0	13.36

4. The following tabulation shows the number and combat effectiveness of enemy main-force units traditionally targeted against MR 3 on 31 July and 31 October 1970. This tabulation does not include enemy units classified as possibly present in or near MR 3. In order to obtain a measure of conformity in evaluating enemy unit effectiveness from quarter to quarter, a new system has been instituted. Recognizing that much information about enemy units is based on subjective reporting and analysis, the combat effectiveness rating system makes use of four simple criteria: estimated enemy strength, enemy activity during the past 90 days, the estimated availability of materiel support, and a subjective evaluation by the order of battle analyst. The table below indicates the scaling system used.

EVALUATION SYSTEM

<u>Category</u>	<u>Weight</u>
Strength (x=strength)	
x ≥ 80%	2
x ≥ 40%	1
x < 40%	0
Enemy Activity	
Frequently active	2
Occasionally active	1
Infrequently active	0
Materiel Support	
Readily available	2

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Generally available 1
Not generally available 0

An enemy unit's rating is determined by adding the appropriate weights for each category of evaluation. Additionally, the order of battle analyst may weight the resulting evaluation by plus or minus 1 if he feels such action will provide a truer overall combat effectiveness evaluation for a particular unit. If the resulting total is two or less, the unit is rated "not combat effective". A total of 3 or 4 results in a rating of "marginally combat effective", and a total of 5 or higher results in a rating of "combat effective". Basing unit combat effectiveness evaluations on a constant scale will permit a more valid comparison of the enemy's overall combat effectiveness from quarter to quarter.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (31 July / 31 October)

<u>Units</u>	<u>Combat Effective</u>	<u>Marginally Combat Effective</u>	<u>Not Combat Effective</u>	<u>Total</u>
Inf Regts	4/0	10/11	2/1	16/12
Arty Regts	0/0	3/3	0/0	3/3
Sapper Regts	0/0	1/1	0/0	1/1
Inf Bns	0/0	12/10	9/6	21/16
Arty Bns	0/0	10/10	2/1	12/11
Sapper Bns	1/0	13/9	0/5	14/14
Recon Bns	0/0	1/1	0/0	1/1

(c) Summary of Recent Activity:

1. Level of Enemy Activity: The low level of enemy activity witnessed during the previous quarter continued to decline throughout this quarter, underlining the damage inflicted on the enemy by the loss of supplies and the disruption of his command and control network during allied operations in Cambodia in May and June. During the quarter, the enemy planned a number of high points. However, the lack of an appreciable increase in

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the number of enemy initiated contacts indicated his inability or unwillingness to muster the necessary resources to achieve the high points. During August, September, and October, respectively, the enemy initiated 266, 229, and 155 combat actions, compared to 427, 477, and 306 in May, June, and July. The largest number of incidents in any one 24-hour period was 15 on 3-4 September, and probably commemorated the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death. The daily average for August, September, and October was 7.0, compared to a daily average of 13.3 for May, June, and July. Not only did the number of enemy actions decline significantly, but the intensity of attacks was also considerably reduced, indicating the disruptive effect of allied operations on the enemy's personnel and logistical system. Concurrent with the reduction in enemy activity, there was a re-orientation of the enemy's tactics. In accordance with COSVN Resolution 14, the enemy has shifted from attacks on allied military forces, to guerrilla attacks against Vietnamization and the GVN pacification program. Recent communist directives call for attacks on RF/PF units, PSDF units, and pacification activities and agencies, and proselyting by cadre to develop both an overt and covert political structure at the grass-roots level. While enemy efforts during the reporting period have been concentrated against RF/PF and PSDF units, terrorist statistics do not yet indicate implementation of a planned program to eliminate any particular segment of the GVN political structure. During the quarter, 510 terrorist incidents were reported throughout MR 3 for an average of 170 per month, as compared to the preceding quarter, in which there were a total of 569 terrorist incidents for an average of 190 per month.

2. Enemy Divisional Units: During the reporting period, the 5th VC, 7th NVA, and 9th VC Infantry Divisions operated in Cambodia against FANK forces and only sporadically entered MR 3 or attacked ARVN task forces in the Parrot's Beak, Krek-Mimot, and Snuol areas. The 5th VC Infantry Division operated in Cambodia north of Binh Long Province during most of the three-month period. The last definite identification of a 5th VC divisional unit in South Vietnam occurred on 15 July. However, the increase in activity around Loc Ninh in mid-September was probably caused by units of this division. Although preoccupied with stabilization activities in Cambodia, the 5th VC Infantry Division can be expected to send reconnaissance patrols into the Loc Ninh-Bu Gia Mop area periodically in order to keep abreast of allied activities within its traditional area of operations. The 7th NVA Infantry Division remained in the Krek-Mimot area of Cambodia north of Tay Ninh Province, with the probable missions of providing security for CCGVN Headquarters, believed to be located northeast of Dambe, Cambodia; protecting enemy cache sites; and harassing GVN cross-border operations in the same region. During September, all three regiments of the division

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were identified by contacts or through ralliers in this area. Although the division was not identified in October, it is likely that it will remain in the Krek-Mimot area. The 9th VC Infantry Division has operated in Cambodia, west of the Dog's Face, with only brief forays into northwestern Tay Ninh Province in September. The division appears to have had the mission of stabilizing the communist presence in the Kampong Cham area, countering ARVN operations along QL-7 in Cambodia, and interdicting ARVN lines of communication along QL-22 in northwestern Tay Ninh Province. The missions of all three divisions have enabled them to avoid decisive engagement with ARVN forces operating in Cambodia or along the periphery of Military Region 3. Thus, the enemy has been able to minimize the effects of personnel shortages, and to devote his efforts to stabilizing communist control east of the Mekong River in Cambodia.

2. Enemy Units Within Military Region 3: Activity in MR 3 continued at a low level during the quarter as the enemy struggled to overcome severe personnel and materiel shortages by shifting from reliance on main-force units to local forces and guerrillas to defeat pacification. In SR-1, the understrength 101st NVA Infantry Regiment remained the only regimental-size force, as the Quyet Thang VC MF Infantry Regiment was inactivated to provide personnel for SR-1 Headquarters, local-force units, and cadre to aid the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The former 268th VC MF Infantry Regiment is now believed to be downgraded to a group, with a small command element controlling the local-force operations of its three understrength battalions. Activity in Long An Subregion has reflected the continued deterioration of the enemy's combat power. The enemy established Long An Subregion out of the shambles of Subregions 2 and 3 in an attempt to revitalize the communist effort against pacification, and to provide a more centralized and effective supply and administrative system. On the military front, the enemy merged ineffectual combat battalions to boost the combat effectiveness of the remaining units. Yet, during the quarter, ARVN and RF/PF units retained the initiative. Most enemy main-force units in the subregion, including the 1st NVA Infantry Regiment, remained noncombat effective. In Subregion 5, the break-up of the Dong Nai VC Infantry Regiment into three battalions with local-force status was confirmed. These battalions worked with local-force units in countering pacification by occasional attacks by fire and ground probes on RF/PF outposts and activities. Major main-force units under Military Region 7 control, the 33d NVA and 274th VC MF Infantry Regiments and the 74th NVA Artillery Regiment, have generally avoided contact with allied units. These understrength units have concerned themselves with resupply activities in an effort to remain in their traditional operational areas in the face of specific allied targeting. Thus far, they have been successful. In addition to anti-pacification and proselytizing activities in MR 3, the enemy has concentrated on self-production and resupply activities. Due to COSVN involvement in Cambodia,

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external subsidies have dropped, and enemy units have been directed to establish self-production units, conserve resources, and capture as much materiel as possible. To support the war effort, the enemy has attempted to raise needed cash thru taxation, bribery, extortion, and currency manipulation. The fact that pacification has hurt these efforts is evident in recent indications of increased VC tax rates.

4. Conclusion: The effect of allied cross-border operations continue to be felt by the enemy. While COSVN continues to attempt to stabilize the situation in Cambodia and waits for the anticipated influx of men and materiel from North Vietnam in early 1971, enemy forces in MR 3 have been relegated to an economy of force role in order to minimize the effect of severe personnel and materiel shortages. The enemy is trying to maintain his present position, while, at the same time, supporting political efforts to revitalize the cadre within MR 3. Thus, while the main-force unit's role in the communist strategy has been downgraded, the enemy objectives of defeating Vietnamization, GVN pacification, and eventually taking control of South Vietnam remain unchanged.

(d) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Assessment:

1. The enemy is capable of:

a. Launching sapper attacks at a limited number of selected points throughout MR 3, especially in the northern tier. This capability is particularly limited in Long An Subregion.

b. Conducting coordinated battalion-sized attacks on installations in Binh Tuy Province, MR-7 and against RVNAF forces operating in Cambodia, as well as against Cambodian installations and units.

c. Conducting small scale ground attacks against a limited number of selected points throughout MR 3.

d. Conducting attacks by rocket, mortar and direct fire heavy weapons at a limited number of selected targets in MR 3 and Cambodia. To a limited degree, the enemy can increase the intensity and frequency of his attacks against major population centers.

e. Intensifying LOC interdictions and ambushes throughout MR 3 for limited periods of time.

f. Continuing the present level of terrorism, sabotage and assassination activities in the Capital Military District (CMD) and populated areas

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of MR 3.

g. Avoiding contact for limited periods of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

h. Conducting propaganda, subversion, espionage and political efforts throughout MR 3.

i. Positioning main-force units in SR-1, SR-4, and SR-5 well forward toward the periphery of the CMD to support local-force efforts to subvert the population.

j. Detecting changes in the dispositions of allied forces and developing limited knowledge of allied intentions through a sophisticated intelligence organization.

2. Vulnerabilities:

a. The enemy situation in MR 3, at present, requires that the enemy depend, in varying degrees, on the local populace for financial support, concealment, and food. In some areas, this dependence is nearly complete due to an almost total lack of resupply capability resulting from friendly interdiction of his LOC. The extended supply lines and the base areas which support them have been seriously disrupted by allied operations. As a consequence, throughout the region, and particularly in Long An Subregion, the enemy must now either produce his food and supplies or procure them locally, since the severely restricted resupply system must be dedicated to those items that cannot be obtained locally, i.e., weapons, munitions and some medical supplies. This dependence renders the enemy particularly vulnerable to psychological operations which could remove or reduce the support of the populace. Current enemy efforts to reestablish his base areas should be particularly vulnerable to both visual and sensor detection.

b. Enemy supply activities in SR-1 and AR-5 are especially susceptible to interdiction on major rivers and highways. Enemy units currently operating in Michelin Plantation area are supplied with food via routes which are vulnerable to interdiction at crossing points on the Saigon River. Enemy forces operating along the Saigon River receive munitions resupply from the Bo Ba Tay and Kampong Trach areas of Cambodia over routes which are susceptible to interdiction on the Van Co Dong River and QL-22. SR-5 forces transport a large proportion of their munitions along routes from War Zone "D" which could be effectively interdicted by allied operations.

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on or near the Song Be River. Additional checkpoints established along Route 349 and other lines of communication into the area would seriously threaten Binh My Hamlet as a major source of supply.

c. Agent reports, visual reconnaissance, and sensor activations continue to indicate that infiltration activity into Long An Subregion is increasing. During the monsoon season, the many waterways and inundated areas afford easy access into the subregion. Due to the enemy's limited maneuverability, his infiltration is vulnerable to allied naval operations in Long An Subregion, assisted by heliborne assaults.

d. In MR-7, the enemy food supply system is concentrated into two areas and is therefore vulnerable. The centers of food supply activity are the Binh Son and Viet Cuong Plantations. Shutting off these sources of supply through cordon operations has forced the enemy in the past to resupply from villages along Routes 15 and 2. Since entry corridors into these villages are less protected than those into the plantations, allied interdiction operations along the roads were successful. MR-5 forces rely on War Zone "D" for munitions supply. Munitions supplies for MR-7 are transported along supply lines which are vulnerable to interdiction operations concentrating on points where the lines cross QL-1 and the Dong Nai River.

e. As in MR-7, the greatest vulnerability of the enemy in MR-6 is his logistical system. The enemy's supply routes follow the major lines of communication in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. Intensive allied security checks along the routes from Saigon and Phan Thiet to enemy base areas or enemy-controlled hamlets could severely hamper enemy supply efforts. Munitions supply routes are vulnerable to interdiction along Highway 20 near Ding Quan and along the small trails and rivers in the northern sector of Long Khanh Province and Binh Tuy Province, where bicycles, porters and sampans bring munitions to resupply points and base areas.

3. Assessment:

a. Cambodia: The continued survival of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia creates a dilemma for COSVN. An all-out attack against the FANK forces might precipitate further ARVN intrusions against communist supply lines east of the Mekong, while acceptance of the current status quo could lead to a two-front war early next year. Although COSVN is believed to have adequate materiel support to maintain its present level of activity in Cambodia, extensive operations to defeat FANK forces would cause a serious depletion of existing supplies, since the arrival of significant amounts of materiel in the COSVN area of operations is not expected.

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until February 1971. Increased enemy activity at this time would also have a deleterious effect on unit strengths. Consequently, it is likely that the enemy will take the next three months to stabilize his position in Cambodia, train Khmer Rouge forces to fight an increasingly capable FANK force in the spring of 1971, and prepare his divisions for the expected influx of men and material in late February.

b. Military Region 3. With the 5th VC, 7th NVA, and 9th VC Infantry Divisions committed in Cambodia during the next quarter, enemy activity in MR 3 can be expected to follow the guidelines of COSVN Resolution 14 by increasing emphasis on guerrilla warfare. Consequently, the enemy effort will continue to be directed against RF/PF, PSDF and GVN pacification activities and agencies. Since recently captured documents call for the development of an overt and covert cadre system in order to wage protracted war, or to form the basis for a coalition government should a cease fire be declared, the enemy can also be expected to engage in proselyting activities. A measure of the enemy's success in the coming months may be reflected in the rate of terrorist activity, an increase representing efforts by the communists to maintain some control over the populace in the face of an increasingly effective GVN pacification program.

d. Operations, Plans, and Training

(1) General

(a) II FFORCEV OPCON units continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) and the Wet Season Strategy. The Wet Season Strategy emphasized the deployment of ARVN units along the border while US units operated in the interior of MR 3. II FFORCEV units targeted airmobile, bushmaster, cordon and search, and ground reconnaissance operations against specific enemy units and enemy infiltration and supply routes. The redeployment of two major US combat units, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) and the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, required adjustments to be made in assigned areas of operations. These adjustments in boundaries within MR 3 had no adverse effects on operations. Continued progress was made toward pacification and development and the upgrading and training of GVN forces. There were no major engagements during the period, while several significant caches were found and a continued erosion of enemy forces by small unit operations was evident.

(b) Friendly Losses in MR 3. Significant results of Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang, Phase IV, during August, September, and October were 175 FWMAF killed

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(140 US, 7 Australians, and 28 Thais); 1,311 wounded (1,126 US, 39 Australians and 146 Thais).

(2) Summary of Combat Operations

(a) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang Phase IV. The 1st Cavalry Division's mission was centered on the interdiction of enemy lines of communication, location and evacuation of caches, support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program, coordinated operations with Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces, and the neutralization of main force and rear service units. The 1st Brigade continued operations in support of the division's mission in western Long Khanh Province and War Zone "C". Particular emphasis was placed on interdicting and curtailing enemy infiltration into Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy, and southern Binh Tuy Provinces. The 2d Brigade operated in northern and central Phuoc Long Province with emphasis on coordinated operations with RVN forces against enemy lines of communication and the Adams Trail. The 3d Brigade operated in western Phuoc Long Province at the beginning of the period until 1 September 1970, when it was shifted into Binh Tuy Province to assume the 199th LIB's area of operations (AO). The 5th ARVN Division assumed the 3d Brigade's AO in Phuoc Long Province. The 3d Brigade continued support of the Division's mission with emphasis placed on resource denial along QL-1 and curtailment of enemy infiltration into southern Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. The 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) became OPCON to the 2d Brigade on 15 September 1970 to assist the brigade in its mission of resource denial. On 2 August 1970 at 1300H, Company C, 2-7th Cavalry, while conducting ground reconnaissance, 10 kilometers (km) northeast of Rang Rang (YT 273614), found an enemy arms cache consisting of 5 crew served weapons, 34 small arms, and 13 high explosive rounds. On 3 August 1970 at 1005H, Company A, 1-5th Cavalry, while conducting ground reconnaissance 28 km north of Vo Dat (YT 687680), discovered 21,000 small arms rounds and 136 high explosive rounds. On 4 August 1970 at 0832H, Company C, 2-7th Cavalry, 8 km northeast of Rang Rang (YT 277614), located an enemy cache containing 151 rifles, 126 sub-machine guns, and 16 crew served weapons. On 6 August 1970 at 1750H, Company A, 1-5th Cavalry, found an enemy weapons cache in northeast War Zone "D" (YT 382672), containing 219 K-54 pistols, 8 rifles, and 322 mortar rounds. On 7 August 1970 at 1330H, Company B, 1-8th Cavalry, 25 km northeast of Phuoc Binh (YU 259324), while conducting a ground reconnaissance, observed an estimated enemy platoon and engaged them with organic weapons and supporting artillery and aerial rocket artillery (ARA), resulting in 5 enemy KIA. On 8 August 1970 at 1200H, Company D, 1-8th

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Cavalry, established contact with an estimated enemy platoon 10 km southwest of Bu Dop (XU 895251). Company D engaged with organic weapons, artillery, ARA, air strike, and a light fire team (LFT), receiving small arms, rocket propelled grenades, and mortar fire in return. Contact broke at 1505H resulting in 6 enemy KIA and 2 small arms captured. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA. On 27 August 1970 at 1500H, 13 km north of Bu Gia Map (YU 318507), a CH-47 aircraft received heavy ground to air fire. Aircraft of Troop A, 1-9th Air Cavalry, responded to the firing with artillery and air strike support, resulting in 5 enemy KIA. On 28 August 1970 at 1285H, Company B, 1-8th Cavalry, established contact with an estimated reinforced enemy company, 7 km west of Bu Gia Map (YU 227 368). Company B received small arms, automatic weapon, RPG, and mortar fire and returned with organic weapons, artillery, ARA and air strikes. Contact broke at 1555H, resulting in 13 enemy KIA; friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 2 WIA. On 4 September at FSB Snuffy (YU 336362), 5-7th Cavalry received 22 ralliers. At 0945H 15 individuals, one carrying an SKS rifle, rallied to the 2-8th Cavalry at FSB Guin (ZT100190). Nine of the ralliers were male, 13 were female, and 15 were children. On 9 September 1970 at 1620H, Company B, 1-7th Cavalry, 13 km southeast of FSB Bunard (YT 263776), while conducting ground reconnaissance, found a cache containing 48 120mm mortar rounds, 218 B-40 rounds, and 200 picks and shovels. On 12 September 1970 at 1635H, Troop A, 1-9th Air Cavalry Squadron (ACS), observed an estimated 100 enemy and engaged with organic weapons, 10 km southwest of Dinh Quan (YU 498334), resulting in 16 enemy KIA. On 13 September 1970 at 1507H, Company D, 1-7th Cavalry, established contact with an unidentified size enemy force 13 km south of FSB Bunard (YT 256764), and engaged with organic weapons with support from artillery, ARA, and air strikes. Contact broke at 1750H resulting in 11 enemy KIA and 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA. On 17 September 1970 at 1130H, 9 km northeast of Tan Uyen (YT 049315), Troop E, 1-9th ACS, established contact with an estimated enemy platoon and engaged them with organic weapons and ARA. At 1230H, one platoon of Company A, 1-12th Cavalry, was inserted to reinforce the platoon of Troop E, 1-9th ACS. Ground contact broke at 1320H, resulting in 15 enemy KIA and 5 small arms captured. On 19 September 1970, 11 km west of Bu Gia Map (YU 205392), Troop A, 1-9th ACS, while on ground reconnaissance established contact with an unidentified size enemy force and engaged them, resulting in 13 enemy KIA. On 20 September 1970 at 1445H, Company A, 2-8th Cavalry, while on ground reconnaissance 12 km west of Tanh Linh (ZT 068249), observed and engaged 3 enemy, resulting in 2 KIA. During a sweep of the contact area, 16 individuals rallied to the unit. On 27 September 1970 at 1415H, Troop B, 19th ACS, received small arms fire from the ground, 18 km southwest of Tanh Linh (YT 875094). The suspected enemy location was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, ARA, and air strikes resulting in 16 enemy KIA. On 30

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September 1970 at 1735H, the 5-7th Cavalry received 23 Montagnards at FSB Snuffy (YU 336362). On 30 September 1970, 13 km northeast of Rang Rang (YT 265666), Company D, 1-7th Cavalry, found an estimated 200 graves. Excavation of the graves found bodies wrapped in ponchos and hammocks. A B-52 strike on 15 February 1970 that impacted 600 meters from the location was credited for the 200 enemy KIA. On 10 October 1970 at 0910H, Company D, 1-7th Cavalry, 10 km southwest of FSB Green (YT 269630), located a cache containing 32 120mm mortar rounds, 277 82mm mortar rounds, and 315 60mm mortar rounds. Company A, 1-7th Cavalry, at 1645H, found a cache 13 km northeast of Rang Rang (YT 333654), containing 66 crew served weapons, 246 small arms, 50 high explosive rounds 243 rifle grenades, and 15,000 AK-47 rounds. On 14 October, 17 km northeast of Rang Rang (YT 334649), Company A, 1-7th Cavalry, found a cache containing 185 82mm mortar rounds, 214 high explosive rounds, 500 rifle grenades, and 15,015 small arms rounds. On 16 October 1970, 11 km northeast of Rang Rang (YT 268638), Company C, 1-7th Cavalry, found 78 120mm mortar rounds, 152 82mm mortar rounds, and 165 60mm mortar rounds. On 17 October 1970 Troop A, 1-9th ACS, supporting ground action of Company A, 5-7th Cavalry, 23 km south-east of Duc Phong (YT 704982), observed 3 small groups of enemy in the area and engaged them with organic weapons, resulting in 22 enemy KIA in the combined operation. On 20 October 1970 at 1205H, an aircraft of Troop E, 1-9th ACS, observed 19 enemy 14 km south of Dong Xoai (YU 0596615), and engaged them with organic weapons resulting in 10 enemy KIA. On 29 October 1970 at 1115H, the reconnaissance platoon of the 1-7th Cavalry while on ground reconnaissance located a cache 4 km southwest of FSB Connel (YT 276617), containing 309 82mm mortar rounds, 108 120mm rounds, 20,635 .51 cal rounds, and 21,600 7.62mm rounds. Further exploitation of the cache site on 30 October revealed 16 75mm rounds, 4,470 lbs of TNT, 300 lbs of C-4, and 1,200 Chi Com grenades.

(b) 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The Division continued its operations in Military Region 3 (MR 3), emphasizing small unit coordinated and combined operations with ARVN and Territorial Forces, airmobile and bushmaster operations; interdiction of enemy routes of supply and troop movements; security for routes LTL-8A, QL-4, LTL-5A, and QL-1; and neutralization of main force and rear service units. The 1st Brigade operated in eastern War Zone "C" and the Saigon River Corridor in support of the division's mission. The 2d Brigade continued to operate in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces, conducting small unit ground operations in coordinated and combined operations with the 18th ARVN Division, RTAVF and the 1st ATF. Primary emphasis was placed on operations against the 274th NVA Regiment. The 3d Brigade was located

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in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces in the vicinity of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, conducting airmobile, bushmaster, and small unit actions. Elements of the brigade worked with RF/PF units as part of the division's overall program to upgrade Territorial Forces. The 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (OPCON to the 25th Division) conducted operations in Long An Province until its standdown on 22 September. Elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry, also conducted coordinated operations with the 51st ARVN Regiment and with the RVN Navy along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers. The units of the brigade began their standdown on 1 September 1970, with the 6-31st Infantry, 2-60th Infantry, and the 3-60th Infantry standing down at Di An and the 2-47th Infantry (M) standing down at Bearcat. The battalions stooddown in phased sequence between 1 September and 22 September 1970. The brigade became OPCON to USARV on 22 September 1970 and was subsequently redeployed to Ft. Lewis, Washington. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) (OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division from 15 September 1970 until the end of the period) was deployed with the 2-11th OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division. The regiment emphasized ground reconnaissance, lines of communication security, and interdiction of enemy supply routes and troop movements. On 8 August 1970 at 1750H, Company D, 2-14th Infantry, along S-239 in the Michelin Plantation (XT 572495), engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons, claymores and artillery, resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 4 AK-47 rifles and 1 K-54 pistol captured. On 22 August 1970 at 2047H, 14 km north of Cu Chi (XT 602320), Company A, 2-22d Infantry, while on ground reconnaissance made contact with an unidentified size enemy force and engaged it with organic weapons resulting in 7 enemy KIA. On 21 August 1970 at 1930H, Company A, 2-27th Infantry, 14 km north of Cu Chi (XT 604320), while on ground reconnaissance engaged an unidentified size enemy force with organic weapons and support from artillery. The action resulted in 6 enemy KIA. On 26 August 1970 at 1145H, 6 km west of Minh Thanh (XT 572688), engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons and claymore mines while conducting ground operations. The contact resulted in 10 enemy KIA. On 27 August 1970 at 2115H, 14 km southwest of Dau Tieng (XT 405395), Company B, 25th AVN Bn, while supporting the 872d RF Company, engaged an estimated enemy platoon with organic weapons resulting in 9 enemy KIA and capture of 3 AK-47 rifles. On 6 September 1970 at 0830H, Company C, 2-47th Infantry, while on reconnaissance located and engaged 5 enemy with organic weapons resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. On 9 September 1970 at 1910H, 10 km west of Ben Cat (XT 628329), Company D, 4-9th Infantry, found an underground bunker complex while on ground reconnaissance, resulting in the evacuation of 10 60mm mortar tubes, 3 M-3 machine guns, 66 60mm mortar rounds, 3 mines, and 500 small arms rounds. On 26 September 1970 at 0030H, 4 km southeast of Katum (XT 850359), Troop K, 2-11th ACR, reacted to a ground and mortar attack on the 110th PF camp.

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The contact resulted in 11 enemy KIA, (6 of which were credited to Troop K), and the capture of 3 AK-47 rifles, 1 K-54 pistol, and 2 B-40 rounds. Friendly losses were 1 PF KIA and 6 PF WIA. On 29 September 1970 at 1948H, Company D, 4-9th Infantry, engaged the enemy with a mechanical ambush 11 km north of Cu Chi (XT 605264), resulting in 5 enemy KIA and 2 AK-47 rifles captured. On 11 October 1970 at 0730H, 7 km southeast of Dau Tieng (XT 551425), Company A, 1-27th Infantry, engaged an unknown size enemy force with claymore mines and organic weapons. There was no return fire. Results were 6 enemy KIA, 1 PW, and 2 AK-47 rifles captured. On 25 October 1970 at 1750H, Company B, 2-22d Infantry (M), 12 km northeast of Cu Chi (XT 717245), a mechanical ambush was detonated resulting in 4 enemy KIA and 3 AK-47 rifles captured.

(c) 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The regiment was OPCON to II FFORCEV until 15 September 1970 when it became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. During the quarter the regiment emphasized ground reconnaissance, lines of communication security, interdiction of enemy supply routes and troop movements, and maintained a ready status as a mobile reaction force for II FFORCEV. The period was generally characterized by small and scattered contacts by the squadrons operating in various independent areas of operation. On 7 August 1970 at 1524H, Troop A, 1-11th ACR, and the 185th RF Company, while on a reconnaissance operation 4 km northeast of Trang Bom (YT 239136), observed and engaged an unidentified size enemy force. The enemy returned fire with small arms. The contact resulted in 4 enemy KIA and 3 AK-47 rifles captured.

(d) 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). The Brigade continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) conducting combined and coordinated operations with ARVN and Territorial Forces until its standdown on 15 September 1970. Until it stooddown on 15 September 1970, the 2-3d Infantry in coordination with ARVN forces, conducted combined and coordinated platoon size ground reconnaissance, and platoon and squad size ambushes in concurrent combat and upgrading training for Territorial Forces in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. The 3-7th Infantry conducted operations, ground reconnaissance, and airmobile operations. It also participated in combined operations with ARVN and Territorial Forces until its standdown on 9 September 1970. The 4-12th Infantry participated in upgrading of Territorial Forces training and conducted ground operations until the unit's standdown on 15 September 1970. The 5-12th Infantry continued to support the brigade's mission until its standdown on 1 September 1970. During the period, fighting was characterized by many sporadic contacts involving small number of enemy. On 6 August 1970

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at 0925H, the 5-12th Infantry at FSB Guin (ZT 100190), accepted 14 Montagnard ralliers. On 19 August 1970 at 1115H, Company B, 5-12th Infantry, detained 30 Montagnards and 17 Hoi Chanh rallied to the unit 18 km east of Tanh Linh (ZT 134239). On 22 August 1970 at 1505H, Company D, 5-12th Infantry, 13 km southeast of Tanh Linh, engaged 7 enemy at 75 meters with small arms and automatic weapons. The enemy returned fire with small arms until 1525H, when contact broke. A sweep of the area found 5 enemy KIA, 2 AK-47 rifles, 2 SKS rifles and 1 K-54 pistol.

(e) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF) continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) in its assigned area of operation in Phuoc Tuy Province. The three battalions along with the armored cavalry squadrons, conducted reconnaissance and ambush operations throughout the province, with emphasis placed on key areas of enemy activity such as the Long Hai Mountains, along Route LTL-2, and the northwestern portion of Phuoc Tuy Province. The 1st ATF conducted combined operations with Regional and Popular Forces as part of its overall Territorial Forces upgrading program. The 2d Royal Australian Regiment/New Zealand (RAR/NZ) continued small unit ground operations and ambushes in western Phuoc Tuy. The 7th RAR Bn conducted operations in the eastern portion of the province. The 8th RAR Bn conducted operations in central Phuoc Tuy in the vicinity of Nui Dat. Squadron A, 1st Armored Regiment, and B Squadron, 3d Cavalry Regiment, continued to be OPCON to the infantry battalions and assisted in road security. The period was generally characterized by small and scattered actions by the battalions operating in various independent areas of operations. On 3 August 1970 at 1540H, Company A, 8th RAR, while in an ambush position 11 km northwest of Phuoc Le (YS 347727), contacted three enemy who approached from the north. The contact resulted in 3 enemy KIA and 1 .45 cal pistol captured. On 12 August at 0315H, 3 km northeast of Phuoc Le, Company C, 8th RAR, later assisted by 1st Troop, B Squadron, 3d Cavalry Regiment, contacted an estimated 50 to 60 enemy. The enemy approached in 2 groups of 25-30 men, each spread 50 meters apart. Contact was initiated with claymores, M-79's and small arms. The enemy returned a small volume of fire and withdrew to the southeast. The second enemy group made no attempt to support the first. The action resulted in 19 enemy KIA, 6 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh, 9 small arms, and 650 lbs of rice captured. On 14 August 1970 at 2029H, 7 km southeast of Dat Do (YS 501537), a joint patrol of Company A, 7th RAR, and Regional Forces contacted 9 enemy who entered their ambush from the southwest, resulting in 4 enemy KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. On 17 September 1970 at 0430H, the Assault Platoon of the 7th RAR contacted 5 enemy moving from the village of Dat Do. The ambush resulted in 4 enemy KIA and 2 AK-47 rifles and 2 K-54 pistols captured. On 28 September

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1970 at 0800H, 11 km north of Mui Dat (YS 425800), the 2d RAR contacted an estimated enemy platoon. The engagement resulted in 5 enemy KIA, 1 PW and 3 small arms captured.

(f) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) continued its participation during the period in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The force conducted ground operations against the 274th NVA Regiment which included: interdiction of enemy routes of supply and troop movements, search and clear operations, cordon and search operations; and participation in the GVN pacification program. The 1st Brigade continued to operate in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces conducting airmobile and ground reconnaissance operations. The 2d Brigade conducted small unit and search and clear operations in Bien Hoa Province. The period was characterized by small and scattered contacts and the discovery of small caches. On 26 August 1970, Company D, 2-1st Infantry, 12 km northeast of Bearcat (YT 254062), found 20 enemy bodies in 5 graves at a bunker complex. On 3 September 1970 at 1610H, 15 km southeast of Long Thanh, Company D, 3-2d Infantry, while on ground reconnaissance located approximately 10 enemy and engaged them. The contact resulted in 5 enemy KIA and 2 AK-47 rifles captured. On 5 September 1970 at 1140H, Company B, 2-2d Infantry, 10 km east of Long Thanh (YS 252899), engaged an estimated 20 enemy with organic weapons. The enemy returned fire with small arms. The contact, which broke at 1235H as the enemy withdrew to the east, resulted in 4 enemy KIA and 1 Thai KIA. On 24 September 1970, 10 km east of Long Thanh (YS 220883), Company A, 3-2d Infantry, contacted an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 4 enemy KIA and 2 small arms captured. On 26 September 1970 at 0630H, Company C, 2-1st Infantry, while on ground reconnaissance 3 km southeast of Bearcat (YS 167950), engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons resulting in 4 enemy KIA. On 19 October 1970 at 1500H, 13 km southeast of Long Thanh (YS 227877), Company A, 3-2d Infantry, while on ground reconnaissance located an enemy bunker complex. The following engagement, supported by gunships and artillery support, resulted in 12 enemy KIA. On 19 October at 1500H, Company A, 3-2d Infantry, while on ground reconnaissance and a bomb damage assessment, made contact with 10 enemy, 9 km southeast of Long Thanh (YS 220889). The ensuing engagement and airstrike resulted in 25 enemy KIA, 3 AK-47 rifles and 12 high explosive rounds captured. Friendly losses were 1 Thai WIA.

(3) Air Operations

(a) Resources: The following non-divisional resources of the 12th Aviation Group (Cbt) were under OPCGN of II FFORCEV during the complete reporting period.

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1. Helicopters

8 Assault helicopter companies.

1 Aerial weapons company

2 Assault support helicopter companies (medium)

1 Assault support helicopter company (heavy) (-)

1 Aviation company (corps)

1 Air cavalry squadron (-) one air cavalry troop which was attached
to XXIV Corps 31 July 1970

2. Airplanes

1 Utility airplane company

1 Reconnaissance Airplane company (+)

(b) At the end of this reporting period, seven of the eight assault
helicopter companies continued to provide 2,700 hours of support time per
month. One company stooddown for inactivation on 30 October 1970. Com-
panies are allocated daily as follows:

2 companies of 12 slicks, 4 gunships, each. Special classified
missions and general support missions.

1 company of 12 slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assault plus 7 slicks
for general support.

4 companies of 1 C&C, 8 slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assaults.

(c) Requests for UH-1 helicopters for airmobile operations and general
support continued to exceed available resources. The continuing positive
management of these aircraft provided maximum utilization consistent with
operational resources.

(d) With the turnover of one CH-47 Assault Support Helicopter Company
to VNAF, 12 CH-47 aircraft are committed daily for II FFORCEV operations.
Only through judicious scheduling have commitments continued to be met.

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(k) Force Structure.

(a) Gains:

1. II FFORCEV Arty

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| 2. 6th FA Det (Radar) | 1 Aug 70 |
| 3. 277th FA Det (Radar) | 1 Aug 70 |
| 4. 278th FA Det (Radar) | 1 Aug 70 |

(b) Losses as result of Increment IV:

1. 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div:

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| a. 5th Bn, 60th Inf | 1 Sep 70 |
| b. 2d Bn, 47th Inf | 15 Sep 70 |
| c. 39th Cav Plt (ACV) | 1 Sep 70 |
| d. 45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog) | 1 Sep 70 |
| e. 65th Inf Det (Combat Tracker) | 1 Sep 70 |
| f. 39th Chem Det | 1 Sep 70 |
| g. 6th Bn, 31st Inf | 8 Sep 70 |
| h. Btry A, 2-4th Arty | 1 Sep 70 |
| i. Btry B, 2-4th Arty | 15 Sep 70 |
| j. Btry C, 2-4th Arty | 9 Sep 70 |
| k. Btry D, 2-4th Arty | 9 Sep 70 |
| l. HHB, 2-4th Arty | 22 Sep 70 |
| m. 571st Engr Co | 17 Sep 70 |
| n. 2d Bn, 60th Inf | 22 Sep 70 |

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<u>o</u> 276th FA Det	22 Sep 70
<u>p</u> 56th Sig Co	22 Sep 70
<u>q</u> Co E, 75th Inf (Ranger)	27 Sep 70
<u>r</u> 99th CS Bn	28 Sep 70
<u>s</u> 493d MI Det	29 Sep 70
<u>t</u> HHC, 3d Bde 9th Inf	5 Oct 70
<u>u</u> 19th MH Det	5 Oct 70
<u>v</u> 19th PI Det	5 Oct 70
<u>w</u> 483d MP Plt	6 Oct 70
<u>z</u> 199th LIB:	
<u>a</u> 5th Bn, 12th Inf	1 Sep 70
<u>b</u> HHB, 2-40th Arty	25 Sep 70
Btry A, 2-40th Arty	25 Sep 70
<u>d</u> Btry B, 2-40th Arty	9 Sep 70
<u>e</u> Btry C, 2-40th Arty	17 Sep 70
<u>f</u> Btry D, 2-40th Arty	1 Sep 70
<u>g</u> 503d Chem Det	1 Sep 70
<u>h</u> 2d Bn, 3d Inf	27 Sep 70
<u>i</u> 76th Inf Det (Combat Tracker)	1 Sep 70
<u>j</u> 49th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	1 Sep 70
<u>k</u> 3d Bn, 7th Inf	9 Sep 70
<u>l</u> Co M, 75th Inf	9 Sep 70

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<u>m</u> 87th Engr Co	12 Sep 70
<u>n</u> 179th MI Det	15 Sep 70
<u>o</u> 4th Bn, 12th Inf	15 Sep 70
<u>p</u> Trp D, 17th Cav	15 Sep 70
<u>q</u> 152d MP Plt	24 Sep 70
<u>r</u> 313th Sig Co	25 Sep 70
<u>s</u> 7th CS Bn	2 Oct 70
<u>t</u> 44th MH Det	4 Oct 70
<u>u</u> 40th PI Det	5 Oct 70
<u>y</u> HHC, 199th LIB	5 Oct 70
<u>z</u> II FFORCEV:	
<u>a</u> Btry D, 25th FA	1 Aug 70
<u>b</u> 249th FA Det (Radar)	31 Aug 70
<u>c</u> 247th FA Det (Radar)	31 Aug 70
<u>d</u> 231st FA Det (Radar)	31 Aug 70
(c) Losses as result of I&M or Increment V:	
<u>1</u> 12th CAG:	
<u>a</u> 190th Aslt Hel Co (I&M)	1 Sep 70
<u>b</u> 205th Aslt Spt Hel Co (I&M)	30 Sep 70
<u>c</u> 195th AHC (Increment V)	30 Oct 70
<u>d</u> 184th Rec Apl Co (Consolidated with the 74th Recon Apl)	15 Sep 70

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(5) Training.

(a) II FFORCEV assigned and OPCON units continued to conduct individual and unit proficiency training and to provide specialized "on the job training" (OJT) to adjacent ARVN units in MR 3. Special emphasis was placed on the mission of upgrading Territorial Forces through OJT and joint combat operations.

1 1st Cavalry Division (AM) conducted over 1200 hours of OJT training for the 5th ARVN Division on a broad spectrum of subjects. Tactical OJT for graduates of the 5th ARVN Division NCO Academy continued through this reporting period.

2 25th Division, 199th Infantry Brigade, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry, and the 11th ACR conducted OJT in the following subjects:

- a Patrolling.
- b Night ambush and counter-ambush techniques.
- c First Aid.
- d Medical evacuation procedures.
- e Ground sensor operations.
- f Rigging of helicopter sling loads.
- g Use of AN/PVZ Starlight Scope.
- h Platoon leaders refresher course.
- i Search and ambush tactics.
- j PPS-5 Radar employment.

(b) The mission to upgrade the effectiveness of the Territorial Forces RF/PF is being accomplished by several methods:

1 The 25th Division initiated an RF/PF training program in Binh Duong Province, Tri Tam District, on 15 September 1970 with one rifle company. The company sent one platoon to each RF compound for a 10 day training period. Upon completion, the instructing unit and the trained unit then conducted a joint combat operation for 3 days. The training program improved the

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operational ability and self confidence of the units trained. To date 4 RF companies and 4 PF platoons have completed the program.

2 The 32 hour RF/PF leadership course taught at the 25th Division Tropic Lightning Academy was expanded, and a total of 916 RF/PF NCO's from Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces completed the course as of 31 October 1970. It concentrates on tactics, land navigation, weapons, intelligence, detection and destruction of mines and booby traps, communications and maintenance. Classes are conducted in Vietnamese by US trained and supervised Vietnamese instructors who are assigned to the academy.

3 The 199th Infantry Brigade, prior to its inactivation, conducted an extensive RF/PF training program in Binh Tuy Province. One rifle company was dedicated to train RF/PF in each of the province districts and a Brigade Mobile Training Team conducted continuous training for the RF/PF in the provincial capitol of Ham Tan. Training was conducted for 5 day periods and concluded with a 2-3 day joint combat operation. 11 RF companies and PF platoons in Binh Tuy Province completed this training prior to standdown of the 199th LIB.

4 The 1st Australian Task Force assists the RF/PF in Phuoc Tuy Province through combined operations and on-the-job training. A "Pilot" course is scheduled for late November to train territorial cadre and staff.

(c) 25th Division continued the Tunnel Rat and Demolitions Course. The school trained 10 RTAVF soldiers in September 1970.

(d) Grenade Launcher, M-203, training was conducted by the USARV New Equipment Training Team (NETT) at the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A 4 hour block of instruction on familiarization, assembly/disassembly, and weapon maintenance was given to 511 men. In addition, the NETT gave separate classes to instructors and company armorers.

(e) The 11th AGR Replacement Training School continued to conduct a 7 day course of instruction on all general military subjects for newly assigned personnel. A total of 838 EM and 66 officers were trained during the reporting period.

(f) II FFORCEV continues to allocate quotas to the MACV Recondo School. During the reporting period 72 allocations were received, all 72 were filled for training and 50 students successfully completed the course. The RTAVF enrolled 24 people during the period with all 24 graduating.

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e. Logistics

(1) Programs and Projects

(a) Logistic Readiness Program

1 The first quarter of FY 71 Logistic Readiness Meeting for II FFORCEV assigned and attached units was held on 10 October. Topics discussed included the major CMMI areas of interest, Temporary Loans, Lateral Transfers, Reports of Survery, and cannibalization of equipment.

2 The average II FFORCEV helicopter operational readiness (OR) rates were consistantly above the corresponding USAFV averages and DA Standards during the quarter.

3 The LOH OR experienced a gradual decline throughout the quarter, attributed primarily to a requirement for an increasing number of high demand parts for the OH-58, and also the engine changes required by the original 300 hour TBO life on the OH-58 T63-A-700 engine. Because the OH-58 is relatively new in the Army inventory, there has been no previous experience data to support maintenance and parts problems encountered in the field.

4 The CH-47 OR was adversely affected by the grounding of all CH-47C (Super) aircraft during the month of September. Conversion of the CH-47 from the T55-L11 to the T55-L7C engine configuration is expected to be completed by 15 November and thus restore the CH-47 OR to its normal range.

5 During the quarter, the aircraft maintenance and supply system, to include organizational and support levels, was tasked with the additional burden of preparing aircraft to meet transfer standards on 12 UH-1D's transferred to KOREA, and one company of UH-1H's and one company of CH-47A's transferred to VNAF under the I&M Program.

6 Unit fill levels have been maintained at 95percent or better for all helicopters except the UH-1B/C gunships which have run between 65-75percent throughout the quarter.

(b) Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Centers

During the past quarter, II Field Force units have been involved in providing technical assistance to the Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Centers (SM&DSLIC) which provide administrative and logistical support to territorial forces. A Combined Logistics Improvement Committee (CLIC) was established in III Corps consisting of the Commander

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and Senior Advisor, III Area Logistics Command, the Senior Military Advisor to DEPCORDS, the III Corps Deputy for Territorial Forces, and DSA G4 Advisor, and II Field Force G4. After Territorial Force, ARVN, and MACV resources have been exhausted, those problems considered appropriate for US/FWMAF assistance are passed to the CLIC. US/FWMAF are tasked by II Field Force to assist the SM&DSLIC when possible. Technical assistance has been rendered on ammunition storage and maintenance, POL storage and equipment maintenance.

(2) Ammunition

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continue to be managed through the use of available supply rate (ASR) allocations to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all II FFORCEV units.

(b) High dollar ammunition, such as 105mm, 155mm and 175mm, expenditure rates were reduced over the period by the use of the ASR and command emphasis being placed on the reduction and control of H&I firing.

(c) During the quarter, the number of conventional munitions under available supply rate control was:

AUG	30
SEP	24
OCT	24

(3) Transportation

(a) United States Air Force C-123/C-123/C-7 sorties flown from the Common Service Airlift System in support of II FFORCEV are summarized in Inclosure 7.

(b) II FFORCEV had ten dedicated C-7A aircraft during the reporting period. These were reallocated as shown:

7	1st AIR CAV DIV
1	25th INF DIV
1	5 SFGA
1	II FFORCEV Artillery

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(c) The amount of airlift required by II FFORCEV units declined from a weekly average of 578 to 200 tons. This was in large measure due to the reduced intensity of conflict and the opening of additional roads.

(4) Base Transfer

(a) In keeping with the Improvement and Modernization Program and realignment of US units, turnover of major bases as well as minor bases and fire support bases has progressed in a satisfactory manner during the reporting period.

(b) Major bases turned over include the following:

1 Tay Ninh Base Camp transfer completed on 4 September to Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). It consisted of 1,689 facilities valued at \$3,650,500.

2 Camp Keaton was transferred on 10 September to ARVN. It consisted of 43 buildings at a cost of \$196,100.

3 Tan An Main was transferred to Long An Province on 15 September at a cost of \$606,500. 145 facilities were transferred.

4 Tan An Airfield also was transferred to Long An Province on 20 September at a cost of \$606,511. It consisted of 112 facilities.

5 Minor bases and fire support bases transferred or closed are as follows:

a Fire Support Base (FSB) St. Barbara (XT276679) of the 25th Infantry Division (Inf) was transferred to Tay Ninh Province on 20 August.

b FSB Silver (XT 829052) of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Light) (LIB) was closed on 15 September.

c FSB Dot (YT 740336) of the 199th LIB was closed on 15 September.

d FSB Apache (YT 733255) of the 199th LIB was closed 15 September.

e FSB Deeble (YT 949265) of the 199th LIB was transferred to Tanh Linh District on 1 September.

f FSB Dreamer (YT 925267) of the 199th LIB was closed on 28 August.

g FSB Kau (ZS 143998) of the 199th LIB was closed on 8 September.

h FSB Martinez (ZS 175981) of the 199th LIB was closed on 8 September.

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i FSB Chamerlain of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (3/9th Inf) (XS 554984) was transferred to Hau Nghia Province on 10 September.

j FSB Thu Thua (XS 547701) of the 3/9th Inf was transferred to the Thu Thua Sector on 4 August.

k FSB Ben Luc (XS 629764) of the 3/9th Inf was transferred to Ben Luc District on 23 August.

l FSB Washington (XT 145568) of the 25th Inf was transferred to Tay Ninh Province on 12 August.

m FSB Grant (XT 387265) of the 25th Inf was closed on 20 October.

n FSB Timber (YT 692687) of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (1st ACD) was closed on 12 September.

o FSB Bradley (YT 207647) of the 1st ACD was closed on 14 September.

p FSB Barry (YU 170311) of the 1st ACD was closed on 20 August.

q FSB Nancy (YT 565384) of the 1st ACD was closed on 10 October.

r FSB Victory (XT 896317) of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) was closed on 20 August.

s FSB Bandit II (XT 908294) of the 11th ACR was closed on 10 September.

t FSB Concord (YT 033174) II Field Force Artillery was transferred to Bien Hoa Sector on 26 October.

(C) Plans for the transfer of Cu Chi and the remainder of Lai Khe and Dau Tieng are being developed. The transfer of the three camps should be accomplished by the end of the next reporting period. The transfer of Quan Loi Base Camp should be completed in November 1970.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

(1) Psychological Operations. During the reporting period, psychological operations (PSYOP) were conducted in support of tactical operations, pacification, redeployment of US military forces, and special campaigns.

(a) Implementation of the Wet Season Strategy. The Wet Season Strategy initiated last quarter was implemented during this reporting

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period. PSYOP objectives in support of the strategy included maintaining maximum psychological pressure on enemy forces, Viet Cong families, and civilians under VC control. Psychological operations promoted disaffection, induced rallying and surrendering, and lowered the morale and combat effectiveness of main force units. Psychological operations were also directed at the Vietnamese people to create a psychological wedge between enemy local forces and the populace. The civilian population was encouraged to identify, locate, and report members of the VC Infrastructure and to induce them to rally. Emphasis was placed on decentralized operations, exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities, and face-to-face communications with the civilian populace. In support of these programs, over 140 million leaflets were disseminated in MR 3 by the OPCON units, 9th Special Operations Squadron, and off-shore resources. The combined aerial and ground loudspeaker effort of the 9th Special Operations Squadron and OPCON units exceeded 2,400 hours.

(b) In a continuing effort to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and increase Hoi Chanh rates, PSYOP support was intensified subsequent to B-52 bomb strikes in September and October. Leaflets that emphasized nostalgia, family ties, and superiority of allied firepower were dropped in the target area by the 9th Special Operations Squadron after B-52 strikes.

(c) Two programs were initiated to promote closer coordination among PSYOP agencies, with emphasis on Vietnamization.

1 As the result of a proposal to turnover US printing presses to the Army of Vietnam, G3 II FFORCEV and the 6th PSYOP Bn initiated a training program for Vietnamese pressmen, photo technicians, and press maintenance personnel. The 6th PSYOP Bn provided qualified instructors and texts for the program. On-the-job training was conducted from 0800-1630, Monday through Saturday. The consolidation of the 6th PSYOP Bn with the 4th PSYOP Gp, begun in September, did not impact on the training program.

2 The second program consisted of six orientation tours of PSYOP facilities in Bien Hoa, including the Combined PSYWAR/PSYOP Operations Center and the 9th Special Operations Squadron. The purpose of the tours was to familiarize PSYOP personnel of subordinate units with available support, promote closer coordination, and encourage more effective PSYOP by OPCON units. Future tours will be conducted to orient incoming G5/S5 personnel.

(d) Psychological operations in support of US troop redeployment were initiated and monitored by the G5 Section, II FFORCEV.

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1 Psychological campaigns stressing the strength of Vietnamese Armed Forces and the improved security conditions in the Military Region were executed in conjunction with the withdrawal of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, and 199th Infantry Brigade.

2 To counteract enemy claims of moral, political, and military victory resulting from the standdown of the 25th Infantry Division, new psychological programs were introduced to enhance the image of the GVN and its Armed Forces, particularly the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

3 G5 II FFORCEV directed and monitored redistribution of PSYOP-associated equipment which became available as a result of the withdrawal of US forces.

(e) G5 II FFORCEV provided psychological support for a joint Vietnamese-US traffic safety campaign aimed at reducing the excessive number of accidents involving military vehicles. Some 10,000 copies each of six multicolored safety posters were produced for distribution through National Police and Vietnamese Information Service channels. A 5x8 inch dual-language handbill stressing traffic safety was also printed, and approximately 50,000 copies were distributed to Vietnamese drivers at checkpoints along Highway 316 between the Newport Bridge and the intersection of Highways 316 and 1. Distribution to US drivers was made at gates to military installations in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Plantation area.

(f) Psychological operations supporting resource denial and population control were initiated. OPCON units were given exploitable themes, psychological objectives, and dissemination methods for the campaign. Viet Cong taxation was attacked by designing four special leaflets with anti-taxation themes. 700,000 copies of each special leaflet were produced. Taped messages with instructions to counter black market activities and illegal money transactions were furnished to the Military Police transfer points for broadcasting during the periods when Vietnamese employees process in and out of military installations.

(2) Civil Affairs.

(a) During late July and August, in accordance with the Wet Season Strategy, US units were repositioned, causing some disruption of civil affairs programs. The ensuing readjustment caused a sharp curtailment in military civic action projects.

(b) Civic action projects sponsored by II FFORCEV units continued at a reduced level of activity due to redeployment of the 199th Infantry Brigade and 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in September. Continued

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emphasis on Vietnamizing pacification efforts has also been a factor in the reduction of US effort.

(c) The 2d Civil Affairs Company, working with province and district advisors, GVN officials, and local Vietnamese, was engaged in 19 major projects throughout MR 3 and the northeastern portion of MR 4. Principle projects completed were: 30 ARVN dependent dwellings, 17 sanitation projects (latrine), 4,000 meters of road repairs, and 13 schools. Special emphasis was placed on developing Vietnamese self-sufficiency by encouraging the GVN to use its own channels to procure supplies.

(d) The 1st Australian Civic Action Unit continued to be active in promoting civic action projects in Phuoc Tuy Province. The most significant undertaking was construction of a sports stadium at Dat Do.

(e) As the level of combat declines, and US units continue to operate in close proximity to densely populated areas, increased efforts are being made to improve US relationships with the Vietnamese. Programs such as traffic safety assume ever increasing importance. Community relations councils, established at key US installations, serve as a sounding board for problems encountered by US units and frequently produce practical solutions.

g. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

(1) Pacification and Development. Phase II of the 1970 Pacification and Development Campaign ended 31 October 1970. The most recent available HES data (as of 30 September) indicates that MR 3 has 98.9 percent of its population living in A, B or C hamlets (3,426,000 people). This has been a two percent increase since 30 June. The ambitious goal of providing 100 percent of the population with an ABC level of pacification has not been attained and it is not anticipated that the October HES will show any substantial improvement. Also, 3,178,100 (91.63 percent) of the population now reside in hamlets with a pacification rating of A or B. This figure represents a substantial increase over the 86.9 percent of the population residing in A or B rated hamlets at the end of June. The goal of 96 percent does not appear obtainable for some time to come. The reporting period is best described as an interval of steady progress in pacification brought on by the inability of the enemy to re-establish effective supply and personnel replacement systems. The climate for pacification in the future was enhanced during the period by emphasis placed on operations directed towards blocking attempts by the enemy to re-establish himself. This effort was highlighted by effective resource control operations and successes in the neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Progress toward Vietnamization was highlighted by the efficient and apparently fair senatorial elections conducted

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during the reporting period.

(2) Territorial Security.

(a) Training. During this reporting period, a total of 2,274 RF and 1,308 PF completed basic recruit training. A total of 131 mobile advisory teams were employed in efforts to upgrade RF, PF and PSDF. Vietnamese Postal Message #33115/TM/TCQH/DHHL/6, dated 31 August 1970, directed the establishment of RF/PF Mobile Instruction Teams to be utilized for in place training of the PSDF. This program of "Vietnamese training Vietnamese" should result in a better-trained PSDF.

(b) Operations. Combat operations were conducted further away from the population centers and were longer in duration. RF mobile operations continued to demonstrate the success of the Territorial Forces in the pacification effort. The current plan to replace RF and PF performing static security with National Police and PSDF will release additional Territorial Forces to perform mobile operations. However, this concept includes the possible conversion of selected RF to National Police which will place an additional burden on the already strained manpower requirements for RF.

(c) Logistics. RF and PF logistical support activities received much needed command emphasis. Joint Vietnamese and US improvement committees began inspecting provincial logistical activities to determine if the logistical procedures were adequate to meet the tactical needs of the RF and PF.

(d) Organization. Long Bien Special Zone (LBSZ) was officially dissolved on 25 September 1970. The 57th, 58th RF Bns and one ARVN Battalion reverted to the control of the Bien Hoa Province Chief. The former mission of LBSZ is now the responsibility of Bien Hoa Province.

(3) Chieu Hoi.

(a) The number of returnees totaled 1,041 for this quarter (August-October). The returnee classifications were: Military 472; Political 353; Other Elements 216. The returnee breakdown by province and autonomous city is: Bien Hoa 84; Binh Duong 53; Binh Long 79; Binh Tuy 83; Gia Dinh 46; Hau Nghia 184; Long An 136; Long Khanh 37; Phuoc Long 125; Phuoc Tuy 39; Tay Ninh 146; Vung Tau 3; and Saigon 26.

(b) There has been a steady decline in the returnee rate during this

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period. This may be attributed to several factors. The VC have returned to guerrilla warfare aimed at disrupting pacification. This type of operation reduces the size of units and leaders obtain more control over the lower level cadre from which the majority of ralliers come. Military operations, which have been the major factor in producing returnees, were at a reduced level this quarter. Military operations and pacification programs have reduced the number of VC in Military Region 3. Consequently, fewer ralliers are expected unless the VC are able to rebuild their personnel structures. Should such an increase in VC strength occur, the returnee rate will depend upon the source; infiltration from North Vietnam or locally recruited. Past experience has indicated a continued low rate of returnees should VC replacements arrive from North Vietnam.

(c) Instructor training courses in carpentry, house wiring and plumbing were completed at the Regional Vocational Training Center. A total of 48 returnees completed the courses and were transferred to other Military Regions in the country to teach courses in their area of competence. Presently, 154 returnees are enrolled in vocational training at the Regional Training Center.

(d) The Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) increased their activity following psychological warfare training at the National Training Center in Vung Tau. Despite the increased activity on the part of the APT, however, the returnee rate continued to decline.

(e) Two terrorist attacks were reported during the quarter: one attack by indirect fire was against the Chieu Hoi Center in Gia Dinh Province; the other was an infiltration into the Chieu Hoi Hamlet of Dac Dinh, Binh Tuy Province. No deaths or injuries were reported and property damage was light.

(f) All agencies showed more interest in the exploitation of returnees for intelligence and psychological purposes. Payment of weapons awards increased as more returnees led task forces to small weapons caches.

(5) Development.

(a) Significant progress has been made during the quarter in fulfilling the local administration goals of the Special 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

(b) Village and hamlet election goals have been fulfilled with the exception of two hamlet elections. This raised the number of elected

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village and hamlet governments to 97 percent of the regional total.

(c) The training at Provincial Training Centers of village and hamlet officials was 86 percent completed; 1,468 (76 percent) of the 1,909 village officials and 1,510 (96 percent) of the 1,557 hamlet officials scheduled for basic training were trained. Refresher training was accomplished for 445 (86 percent) of the 517 programmed to receive training.

(d) The personnel strength of village and hamlets continued to be good with 97 percent of the authorized village positions and 95 percent of the authorized hamlet positions filled. Recruitment of village technical cadre, however, continued to be difficult with only 309 (58 percent) of the 532 authorized cadre assigned.

(e) The most significant activities in education during the last quarter were the opening of the new school year, the training of 687 new elementary school teachers, distribution of 22,308 textbooks for classes in English in the public high schools, and construction of Village Self Development and Ministry of Education funded additional classrooms. In addition, at a conference during the later part of the period, the national objectives of education and projected reforms in the system were discussed.

(f) In Youth Affairs, the most significant activities were: the organization of youth councils; the program to obtain more involvement in youth affairs on the part of the PSDF; and the establishment of a foundation for accelerated inter and intra-provincial competition in volleyball.

(g) During this quarter, there was a re-assignment of Rural Development Cadre to Village Information Service Cadre as the result of an agreement between the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Rural Development to strengthen the personnel-deficient Information Service with RD Cadre. There will be 1,500 RD Cadre affected throughout Vietnam in a two-phase re-assignment which is to be completed by 31 December 1970. MR 3 will have 126 RD Cadre affected in Phase I. No information pertaining to Phase II is currently available.

(h) Road building programs in MR 3 progressed slowly toward established goals during the third quarter of 1970. The Lines of Communication (LOC) program reached 75 percent of the original goal of 379 km. Due to the fact that the paving of Route QL-1, Gia Ray to the MR 2 and MR 3 border,

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will not begin until 1971, the 1970 program will not exceed 82 percent of the 1970 goal. The 1970 Secondary Road Program executed by US and ARVN Engineer battalions was terminated during the third quarter with 87 percent of the goal of 49 km of road upgraded. US Engineer battalions are presently working on the rehabilitation of tactical roads in Binh Tuy Province and Phuoc Long Province. The Central Pacification and Development Councils roads and bridges program showed a decided increase in the rate of completion of projects during the third quarter. Of the original 63 road and bridge projects in the 1970 program, 5 have been canceled, 43 have been completed, and 15 are under construction. It appears that this completely Vietnamese developmental program will approach 100 percent completion by the end of the year.

(i) The survey of Public Works capabilities and responsibilities undertaken jointly by MAC-DC-LOC and USAID Engineering was a positive step in improvement of the capabilities of the Public Works. The survey is an attempt to determine what the road maintenance responsibilities of the Public Works will be when the US road building programs are terminated and to determine the capabilities in manpower and equipment of the Public Works to meet these requirements.

(j) The USAID contract with the American firm, Asia Wells, for drilling deep wells in Long An Province neared completion during the quarter. Four of the wells have been turned over to village committees for operation and maintenance, and the remaining two will be completed in early November.

(k) As of 30 September, 3,600 VSD projects were approved in MR 3 with a completion rate of 47.42 percent or 1,700 projects. The minimum expectation regarding the completion of approved projects is 75 percent by 31 December 1970.

(l) The Land-to-the-Tiller (LTTT) program was not initiated until 1 September 1970. To date, 20 percent of the 28,420 hectare LTTT goal has been distributed with an additional 22,542 hectares identified with paperwork in process. The declaration period for landlords and farmer-owner-operators ended on 30 September 1970. During this period, 19,102 farmer-owner-operators declared 57,294 hectares for retention, and 2,019 landlords declared 12,987 hectares for expropriation and compensation. A large portion of these applications are still being processed at the Province level. The Expropriated and Former French Land Distribution Program accounted for the distribution of 572 hectares of land. This represents the attainment of 79 percent of the 718 hectare program goal. The Squatter Land Distribution Program completed 68 percent of its goal

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by distributing 1,822 of 2,650 hectares. The Resettlement and Development Program completed 95 percent of its goal by distributing 2,559 of 2,670 hectares.

(m) Some of the early plantings of the high yielding varieties of rice reached maturity and were harvested during the reporting period. The rainy season started with spotty localized rains and included dry periods which created anxieties and concern for this year's rice crop. However, rains continued in sufficient quantities and present forecasts are for a good crop. Expansion of the percentage of the total rice land planted to the high yielding varieties of rice continued and an acceleration of this expansion is expected in the second crop this year. The new varieties, IR-20 and IR-22, have been enthusiastically accepted and seed multiplication accomplished to such an extent that there should be no shortage of this choice seed for the second crop planting.

(n) Experimental planting of grain sorghum produced varied results. Some of the plots produced exceptionally well, while others were complete failures. Additional seed and fertilizer kits have been secured and planting continues with the hope of isolating and identifying some of the causes of failure. There is every indication that grain sorghum can, and will be produced profitably in MR 3; however, questions remain regarding the reaction of this crop to local soil and ecological conditions and the optimum fertilizer treatment and cultivation practices necessary to produce a profitable agricultural venture. Farmer acceptance can, perhaps, best be described as cautious, though some of them did plant fairly large plots. Unfortunately, lack of knowledge and proper methods of crop care resulted in reduced crops on these plantings. Programs and procedures have been initiated that will correct some of the above problems, however, results will not be available this planting season.

h. Artillery.

(1) General. II FFORCEV Artillery units, since returning from Cambodia, have been employed throughout Military Region 3. While a preponderance of heavy artillery support is along the western border, units are also located in Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy Provinces; providing support to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 1st Australian Task Force.

(2) Tactical Developments. Current locations of II FFORCEV Artillery units are listed in inclosure 10. Heavy artillery coverage for Military Region 3 is portrayed graphically in inclosure 11.

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(a) Across border fires in support of ARVN operations have been a primary mission of II FFORCEV Artillery units during the reporting period.

(b) Summary of unit moves during the reporting period.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
9 Aug 70	Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to Thien Ngon (XT 081825) from Ben Soi (XT 087472)
	Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (175mm platoon)	Moved to Ben Soi (XT 113495) from FSB Blue (XT 256289)
	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32 Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to Thien Ngon (XT 081825) from FSB Lanyard (XT 075895)
11 Aug 70	Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Illingsworth (XT 037792) from Thien Ngon (XT 081825)
	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Illingsworth (XT 037792) from Thien Ngon (XT 081825)
14 Aug 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (one tube 8")	Conducted a raid at YS 5052 closed FSB Horseshoe (YS 494621)
15 Aug 70	Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to XT 023784 from FSB Illingsworth (XT 037792)
	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32 Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to XT 023784 from FSB Illingsworth (XT 037792)
	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Lanyard (XT 075888) from XT 023784; battery intact
16 Aug 70	Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495) from XT 023784
	Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (one tube 175mm)	Moved to FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495) from FSB Lanyard (XT 075895)
	Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (one tube 175mm)	Moved to FSB Blue (XT 256289) from Ben Soi (XT 113495)

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22 Aug 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (one tube 8")	Conducted a raid at YS 497527 closed FSB Horseshoe (YS 494621)
24 Aug 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to YS 140917 from FSB Horseshoe (YS 494621)
25 Aug 70	Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (battery intact)	Conducted a raid at YT 664037 closed Blackhorse (YS 443978)
	Btry C, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (one tube 8", one tube 175mm)	Moved to FSB Blue (XT 256289) from Blackhorse (YS 443978)
26 Aug 70	Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (one tube 8", one tube 175mm)	Moved to Blackhorse (YS 443978) from FSB Blue (XT 256289)
	Btry C, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (one tube 8", one tube 175mm)	Moved to FSB Blue (XT 256289) from Blackhorse (YS 443978) battery intact
27 Aug 70	Btry B, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (battery intact)	Moved to FSB Cladwell (XU 435045) GSR to 1st Cavalry Division
30 Aug 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Horseshoe (YS 492622) from Long Thanh (YS 140917)
8 Sep 70	Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty battery intact	Moved to FSB Katum (XT 333902) from FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495)
	Btry B, 2d Bn, 32d Arty battery intact	Moved to NDP (XT 2778). from FSB Katum (XT 333902)
9 Sep 70	Btry B, 2d Bn, 32d Arty battery intact	Moved to FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495) from XT 2778
14 Sep 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to Long Than (YS 140920) from FSB Horseshoe (YS 494621)
25 Sep 70	Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty battery intact	Conducted a raid at YT 664037
3 Oct 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Horseshoe (YS 492622) from Long Than (YS 140920)

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8 Oct 70	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty battery intact	Moved to FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495) from FSB Lanyard (XT 075888)
17 Oct 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Bruiser (YS 645653) from FSB Horseshoe (YS 492622)
18 Oct 70	Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty battery intact	Moved to FSB Elizabeth (XU 853148) from FSB Wade (XU 728087)
	Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (four tubes 175mm)	Moved to FSB Wade (XU 728087) from Bu Dop (XU 971288)
19 Oct 70	Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty battery intact	Moved to Bu Dop (XU 971288) from FSB Elizabeth (XU 853148)
21 Oct 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to Nui Dat (YS 430677) from FSB Bruiser (YS 645653)
	Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (175mm platoon)	Moved to Phuoc Vinh from Blackhorse (YS 443978)
24 Oct 70	Btry C, 7th Bn 8th Arty (175mm platoon)	Moved to FSB Hull (XT 263380) from FSB Blue (XT 256289) Closed back into FSB Blue after one day raid
	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (175mm platoon)	Moved to FSB Hull (XT 263380) from FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495) Closed FSB Elsenburg after one day raid
25 Oct 70	Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (two tubes 175mm, two tubes 8")	Moved to XU 713176 from FSB Wade (XU 728087)
26 Oct 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Horseshoe (YS 495622) from Nui Dat (YS 430677)
27 Oct 70	Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Strike (YS 813966) from FSB Horseshoe (YS 495622)
30 Oct 70	Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" platoon)	Moved to FSB Buell (XT 225535) from FSB Elsenburg (XT 113495)

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Btry C, 7th Bn, 8th Arty Moved to FSB Buell (XT 225535)
(one tube 8") from FSB Blue (XT 256289)

(c) At the close of the reporting period, heavy artillery batteries were positioned primarily along the western border of Military Region 3. These units support maneuver elements of the 5th, 25th, and 18th ARVN Divisions, ARVN Airborne Division, as well as the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Located in the southeastern portion of the region is one heavy artillery battery that is GSR to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Artillery.

(d) The reporting period was characterized by frequent repositioning of II FFORCEV Artillery units in order to provide the required support for maneuver units. These short notice changes required a constant state of readiness by all personnel. As a result of diligent efforts by the members of II FFORCEV Artillery units, all assigned tasks were effectively and expeditiously accomplished.

(e) Continuing emphasis was placed on the management of artillery expenditures. Special attention was given to the accurate evaluation of potential targets. These expenditures were closely monitored throughout the period to determine any significant trends. Each month was marked by a decrease in total expenditures by II FFORCEV Artillery units. Careful attention to the prudent use of artillery has brought expenditure totals to the lowest level in 22 months.

(f) Individual batteries continued to be placed OPCON to specific battalions. This method of control, instituted at the end of the Cambodian offensive, has proven to be extremely effective in meeting all operational requirements. The current task organization under this plan is at Inclosure 14.

(3) ARVN Artillery

(a) Overall training during the reporting period decreased as the goals set forth under the Artillery Dong Tien (Forward Together) Plan were realized.

(b) Studies are now being done to assist ARVN in the employment of Territorial Force Artillery units in the near future.

d. Intelligence

(1) AN/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radar (CMR)

(a) Operational Effectiveness - The continued program of evaluation and analysis of the effectiveness of AN/MPQ-4A CMR's employed throughout MR

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3 for the months of August, September and October revealed the statistics discussed below. These figures include attacks which could not be observed due to mechanical down time and sectors other than the sector of fire being observed at the time of the attack.

(b) Analysis of Operational Statistics - Of the 78 indirect fire attacks occurring within range of a countermortar radar, 8 attacks occurred during a period when the radar within range was inoperative, 14 attacks occurred during normal Radar off time, and 46 attacks occurred out of the Radar sector of search. In 10 instances, acquisition was made, resulting in 10 weapon locations.

(c) Location of AN/MPQ-4A Radars - See Inclosure 12 for the location of AN/MPQ-4A's as of 31 October. (II FFORCEV Artillery resources are indicated by an X).

(2) AN/TPS-25A Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR)

(a) Operational Effectiveness - The AN/TPS-25A Radar continued to be successfully employed in an offensive role throughout MR 3. During the period of 1 August to 31 October, a total of 1885 target sightings were reported. Of these, 1006 were engaged.

(b) Radar Locations - During the reporting period, there were seventeen relocations of the AN/TPS-25A Radars for ground surveillance coverage of critical areas of MR 3 and portions of Cambodia. The locations of the seven AN/TPS-25A GSR's in II FFORCEV as of 31 October are depicted in Inclosure 13. (II FFORCEV Artillery resources are indicated by an X).

(3) Improvement of Radar Effectiveness.

(a) Radar Quality Control Inspection Team - In a continuing effort to upgrade the operational and maintenance standards of the Radar detachments in MR 3, a Radar Quality Control/Inspection Team consisting of a qualified radar Warrant Officer and a maintenance technician inspected nine AN/MPQ-4A Radar sites and ten TPS-25A Radar sites during the reporting period. Inspection reports were submitted to the parent organization for corrective action.

(b) Radar Operator Training - During the reporting period of August, September and October, 12 enlisted operators from divisional and II FFORCEV Artillery Radar Detachments received a three day course which presented the operational and maintenance problems peculiar to the employment

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of radars in Vietnam; additionally, in August, a 5 day operator and maintenance course was initiated to train ARVN personnel. This course is held twice monthly.

(4) Survey

(a) Extension of Survey Control - During the reporting period, 28 fourth order survey control points were established within MR 3.

(b) Control Point Recovery - During the reporting period, 12 points were successfully recovered while 27 points could not be located or were found to be destroyed.

(c) Survey Quality Control - The II FFORCEV Artillery Survey Quality Control Team visited all seven Artillery Battalions of II FFORCEV Artillery, in an effort to determine the capability of each battalion survey section to accomplish its mission. Reports were submitted to each battalion for information and appropriate corrective action.

i. Communications. Significant changes in communications in support of II FFORCEV operations during the reporting period are outlined below:

(1) COMMUNICATIONS CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

(a) On 8 September 1970, a secure teletype circuit was activated to the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company.

(b) On 15 September 1970, teletype circuits to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) were deactivated.

(c) The II FFORCEV Signal Section COMSEC account received a RRU inspection on 13 October 1970. No discrepancies were found.

(d) In the month of October, informal visits were made to each OPCON unit's communication center. An annual command COMSEC inspection was conducted of the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) and a courtesy COMSEC inspection was made at the 11th ACR.

(e) During the period, all II FFORCEV Address Indicating Groups (AIG) were reviewed and revised.

(2) WIRE COMMUNICATIONS

(a) On 4 August 1970, the AN/TRC-24 radio relay system from II FFORCEV to 1st Air Cavalry Division (ACD) rear at Bien Hoa was deactivated.

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(b) On 6 August 1970, a second AN/TRC-24 radio relay system to the 1st ACD at Phuoc Vinh was activated to replace the AN/TRC-97B system which was deactivated on the same day.

(c) On 15 August 1970, a 4-channel radio relay system was established to maintain communications from Tay Ninh West to Tay Ninh East in support of the 18th ARVN Forward, 187th Armed Helicopter Company, and the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery.

(d) On 15 September 1970, the AN/TRC-24 radio relay systems to the 11th ACR at Di An and the 199th LIB at FSB Macé were deactivated.

(e) 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) made a physical inventory to determine the exact number of main lines and extensions from the Hurricane switchboard on 15 October 1970.

(f) On 19 October 1970, all general officer quarters were removed from Hurricane intercept.

(g) On 20 October 1970, the radio relay systems to Cu Chi and Xuan Loc were reconfigured due to the relocation of the 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division.

(h) On 24 October 1970, the radio relay system to FSB Lynch was deactivated.

(i) On 25 October 1970 two circuits were installed from the 1st ACD to the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

(j) Additional telephone mainlines, extensions, and ringdown trunks were installed in October to support redeployment activities.

(3) RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

(a) On 15 September 1970, the 1st ACD assumed responsibility for Nui Chua Chan (Hill 837) and all 53d Signal Battalion equipment was removed. Multichannel systems that had been relayed through Hill 837 were rerouted.

(b) On 30 September 1970, a secure automatic FM retransmission station was established on Nui Ba Den (Hill 986) in support of MR 3 advisors.

(c) On 1 October 1970, an FM radio station was established in the II FFORCEV TOC for the G2 Air to receive in-flight intelligence reports.

(d) On 22 October 1970, a monitoring program was established to monitor

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one FM net each day for security violations and continuing incorrect RTO procedures.

(e) On 30 October 1970, the 53d Signal Battalion provided an automatic FM retransmission station at Di An for 25th Infantry Division convoy control.

(4) TURN OVER OF BASE CAMPS

(a) On 30 August 1970, Tay Ninh base camp was turned over to the GVN. Perimeter telephone wire, buried cable and the main distribution frame were hand-receipted to the ARVN.

(b) On 12 September 1970, Quan Loi base camp was turned over to GVN. Perimeter telephone wire and buried cable were hand-receipted to ARVN.

(c) On 20 September 1970, Tan An base camp and Tan An airfield were transferred to GVN. Perimeter telephone wire, buried cable, for AB-105 communications towers, and two distribution frames were hand-receipted to ARVN.

(5) COMMUNICATIONS AUSTERITY

(a) Communications economy measures were re-emphasized by a 16 September 1970 COMUSMACV message. Wherever possible, reductions have been made in systems and circuits.

(6) CONTINGENCY TEAM OPERATIONS

(a) 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) and the II FFORCIV Signal Section exercised the signal contingency team by participating in two airmobile exercises where the equipment was airlifted to Cu Chi and placed into operation providing secure FM and radio teletype, and Single Side Band (SSB) voice radio communication. A long range communications test was conducted on 26 October 1970 where secure radio teletype communications was established with the 63d Battalion at Phu Bai, RVN.

(b) The contingency VHF radio relay teams were exercised by the 52d Signal Battalion on 21 October 1970 through 23 October 1970. Systems were established between Cu Chi, Di An, Phu Loi, Phuoc Vinh and Plantation.

j. Information

(1) During the reporting period, the Information section including the II Field Force Vietnam Information Office and 16th Public Information Detachment, was notified to cease publication of "The Hurricane" on a monthly

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basis. On 11 August, a letter signed by the Chief of Staff, II Field Force Vietnam, was forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam. Later, a letter from the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, was forwarded requesting an exception to policy. USARV continues to gather background data, and a reply to the CG's letter is expected during the second week of November.

(2) Two issues of "The Hurricane," August and September, were published. They continued to emphasize pacification and Vietnamization in Military Region 3. There were 18 feature articles ranging from a look at the "World of Saigon Tea" to special coverage of the 60-day Cambodian Operation.

(3) The September 1970 issue of "The Hurricane" -- Cambodian Special -- was submitted for consideration in the "special achievement" award category of the Keith L. Ware Award, sponsored by the Department of the Army. The August 1970 issue was submitted for consideration in the overall "outstanding magazine" category as well.

(4) The Information Section continued to prepare and file news and hometown releases to all news media. There were 137 press releases published and 133 hometown releases processed during the period.

(5) With the reduction of available airtime by AFVN and the reduction of radio personnel assigned to the Information section, the weekly radio program, "Dateline III Corps" was discontinued. The Radio/TV Section continued to prepare and present the national and international news roundup to the Commanding General and his Staff at the evening briefings. With the addition of new personnel, this area is expected to expand in the coming reporting period.

(6) The Information section continued to conduct bi-monthly press update briefings for the civilian news media every second and fourth Mondays. These featured the regular briefers from the G2, G3 and CORDC, presenting an update of the Military Region 3 and III Corps situation. Attending the August, September, and October briefings were 71 press and media representatives. Briefings were well received with many questions answered for the press. Press relations remained excellent during the reporting period.

k. Engineer Support

(1) General: Engineer support during this quarter included a wide range of combat and operational support missions. The major effort was expended on construction of fire support bases to support realignment of forces after the Cambodian Operation and due to the draw-down of US

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forces. Most significant was the expansion of FSB Mace to accommodate the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Additional significant effort went to FSB's Lanward, Katum, Wade, Bu Dop and Duc Phong to support elements of II FFORCEV Artillery. Other tasks included MSR construction and upgrade, bridge construction and maintenance of forward airfields. Of significance in this area was the upgrade of LTL-14, Routes 333, 334, and 335, and LTL-1A north of Song Be.

(2) LOC Program: The 20th Engineer Brigade, ARVN Engineers and the civilian corporation RMK-BRJ were engaged in restoring principal roads in MR 3. The 20th Engineer Brigade had units on QL-20 from Gia Kiem to the MR 2/MR 3 border which is now 60 percent complete, QL-1 from the junction of QL-20 to Gia Ray which is now 96 percent complete, QL-13 from Lai Khe to An Loc which is now 98 percent complete and TL 2A/LTL-1A from the junction of QL-13 to Phuoc Vinh which is complete except for minor shoulder work. RMK-BRJ is 59 percent complete on QL-15 from Bearcat to Vung Tau.

(3) Tactical Road Program: Almost no work was accomplished on the Tactical Road Program due to commitments to support the II FFORCEV Wet Season Plan and poor construction weather. This project remains approximately 90 percent complete. Planning for the 1971 program is almost complete, with construction expected to start 1 December 1970. First priority in this program will be completion of the 1970 program.

(4) Land Clearing Program:

(a) Clearing operations were only slightly affected by the rainy season. A Total of 20,042 acres were cleared by elements of the 62d Engineer Battalion, with significant areas cleared in the Trapezoid, Binh Tuy, Binh Duong and Trang Bom.

(b) The 318th Land Clearing Company (ARVN) cleared a total of 14,827 acres in the Long Khanh and Trang Bom areas.

(5) The 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) continued its support of HQ, II FFORCEV and OPCON units with continuous aerial and ground reconnaissance, preparation of trafficability studies for LOCs and MERS and evaluation of roads, bridges and forward airfields. A major terrain analysis study was conducted in support of future ARVN operations.

1. Inspector General. During the reporting period, the Inspector General completed ten inspections and conducted three investigations/inquiries.

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m. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period, personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate Section continued to make visits to the subordinate units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters.

(2) Five general courts-martial and four BCD special courts-martial were conducted during the reporting period.

(3) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

(4) Claims processing remained at a high level during the quarter.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Source Payment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Increased awareness concerning type of currency utilized in making cash payments to sources is required on the part of US agent handlers.

(b) EVALUATION: US agent handlers, in some instances, have been paying their sources with brand new piaster notes, in areas where new GVN currency is seldom seen. In addition, they were paid with bills of large denominations in localities where currency notes in excess of 100 piasters are seldom in the possession of the populace. This practice will inevitably focus undue attention on US agents and may identify them to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That US sources be paid with used banknotes.

2 That banknotes used to pay sources be of small denomination.

(2) Security Procedures.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Individuals involved in the transporting and handling of classified material must be continuously aware of the proper methods of safeguarding the material.

(b) EVALUATION: In one case, a messenger who was delivering a classified document stopped to have a steam bath. The document was left in the messenger's trousers while he had his bath. Upon dressing, he realized that the document was missing. This is a classic example of how classified information falls in the hands of the enemy due to poor security practices on the part of the individual.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That personnel be continuously made aware of good security practices, and use them until they become good security habits.

2 That personnel be instructed never to leave a document unattended while transporting it.

3 If many deliveries are to be made, the courier should carry all documents with him to each delivery site. If traveling in pairs, one courier can guard material while the other makes the delivery.

(3) Sensor Implantation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rotary-wing aircraft are not always available for use in aerial implantation of sensors.

(b) EVALUATION: The 25th US Infantry Division has successfully dropped Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Devices (ADSIDs) from an Army fixed-wing aircraft, the U6A Otter. A high degree of accuracy was obtained by dropping the ADSID from an altitude of 1500 feet with an aircraft speed of 80 knots. A drop team of three men is required: a spotter, a feeder, and bombardier. The drop procedures are the same as for drops from helicopters. The correct location of the sensor, marked by an attached CS grenade, is obtained through photography taken from another aircraft trailing the drop aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to the use of fixed-wing assets for sensor implants when rotary wing aircraft cannot be used.

c. Operations

(1) Close coordination of village/hamlet defense plan.

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(a) OBSERVATION: A strong VC attack was successfully defeated due to an effective well conducted village defense plan.

(b) EVALUATION: At 260015 September 1970, Tanh Binh outpost, Phu Giao District, Binh Duong Province, was attacked by a VC force estimated as a battalion (-). The outpost was occupied by the 110th PF platoon, a PSDF Key Interteam and some Rural Development Cadre. The outpost received approximately twenty 82mm mortar and B40 rounds supporting multiple ground attacks. US and ARVN Artillery fired in support and the 11th ACR provided a reaction force. Results were: Friendly: 1 PSDF KIA, 4 PSDF WIA; 4 PF WIA; Enemy: 14 VC KIA, 4 AK-47, 1 B40, 1 K-54 and 10 bicycles CIA. This action was significant for the following reasons:

1 Close cooperation had been established between the PF/PSDF/RDC in the village.

2 The defense was led by the village chief who rallied his forces against the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That village/hamlet defense plans continue to emphasize the employment of all available village/hamlet forces in a coordinated effort under the leadership of the village chief.

(2) Overgrown Perimeter Wire and Fields of Fire

(a) OBSERVATION: Vulnerability of outposts to infiltration and ground attack is increased due to overgrown perimeter wire.

(b) EVALUATION: On 8 October 1970, the VC were successful in gaining access to a PF compound resulting in 1 friendly killed, and 10 wounded. In this sapper attack, supported by 61 mm mortar fire, the VC penetrated the outpost from two directions. Routes through the wire into the outpost were marked with white paper.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Outposts with overgrown perimeter wire that cannot be cleared due to unmarked mines and booby traps should be relocated. Such outposts cannot detect approaching enemy forces.

(3) Basic Security Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: The VC are using ARVN uniforms to disguise their activities and are often undetected until their mission is completed.

(b) EVALUATION: On 22 September 1970, a friendly element, while

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returning from a night operation, was ambushed by a VC squad wearing ARVN uniforms. Friendly losses were five weapons. There were no enemy losses. The VC were able to accomplish their mission through deception as they were accepted as friendly soldiers due to the uniforms.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That training in passive security measures be re-emphasized. All persons, including supposedly friendly soldiers, must be identified before being allowed freedom of movement.

d. Organization. None

e. Training. None

f. Logistics.

(1) Standdown and Turn-in of Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: The standdown and turn-in of aircraft and associated equipment during the Phase IV redeployment of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was unnecessarily delayed. This delay placed an unwarranted work load on the 34th General Support Group unit designated to provide direct maintenance support.

(b) EVALUATION: The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, did not schedule the operational standdown of unit aircraft well enough in advance so that the final aircraft turn-in could be accomplished prior to the standdown of the direct support aircraft maintenance detachment organic to the Brigade Support Battalion. The aircraft were by-in-large operationally committed up until the standdown of the organic DS Detachment. When the aircraft were finally stoodown, there was insufficient time for remaining organizational maintenance personnel to do an adequate job of preparing them for turn-in. Additionally, all support level maintenance had to be accomplished by the 34th Group unit accepting the aircraft for turn-in.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders and G3/S3's of redeploying units give consideration to the operational standdown of organic aircraft so as to provide sufficient time for organizational and organic support maintenance personnel to prepare the aircraft for turn-in. If operational requirements dictate a need for aircraft that conflicts with the aircraft standdown schedule, then a request for aviation support should be forwarded to higher headquarters.

(2) Traffic Congestion and Regulation in MR 3.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the opening of additional roads and the increasing number of civilian vehicles, traffic congestion is occurring more frequently within MR 3. The number of ARVN convoys is also increasing, adding to the

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overall problem. This congestion is directly responsible for many accidents and deaths.

(b) EVALUATION: There is a constant volume of heavy traffic on many roads in MR 3. Military convoys, both US and ARVN add to this congestion. Investigation has revealed that at no time during daylight hours is the traffic reduced to the extent that convoys should be scheduled to pass through the areas of congestion. In addition, there is no single agency organized to coordinate and issue highway clearances for both ARVN and US military convoys. As a result, each clearance authority for ARVN and US convoys frequently schedule convoys over the same route and the same time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

(1) When possible, convoys be scheduled over the busiest and securest highways during the hours of darkness.

(2) A joint US/ARVN Highway Traffic Center be established which would have authority to coordinate and issue highway clearances to both US and ARVN units.

g. Communication. None

h. Material.

(1) ENSURE Items.

(a) OBSERVATION: The turn-in and/or transfer of ENSURE items during Increment V Redeployment was not timely.

(b) EVALUATION: Standdown units experienced delays in receiving disposition instructions for ENSURE items because they were not provided by USARV at an early date. Meetings held between USARV and standdown units revealed USARV did not have an accurate inventory of above items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Close-held information on phase down planning be passed earlier to ENSURE action officers to allow adequate time to coordinate with remaining units to determine if they have a need for such equipment. The quarterly printout listing ENSURE items should be changed to monthly, and subordinate units should be required to update the type and number of items on hand.

(:) AN/TPS-25A GSR

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(a) OBSERVATION: Video fluttering at all ranges.

(b) EVALUATION: This caused difficulty in detecting moving targets from stationary targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Check CR 606 and CR 607 in the high voltage power supply as these diodes may be breaking down under heavy load. The same symptom can be caused by a faulty generator. Therefore, it is necessary to use a USM 117 to check the 400 Hz wave form from the generator, for a clear undistorted signal.

i. Psychological Operations. None

j. Civil Affairs.

(1) Restricted Use of Wet Garbage for Civic Action Projects.

(a) OBSERVATION: A recent GAO decision requiring the USARV Property Disposal Agency to sell wet garbage resulted in the awarding of garbage haul contracts to Vietnamese commercial concerns. The implementation of the GAO decision abruptly shut off the main food supply source for CA hog-raising programs. Such projects were initiated by US units in MR 3 in partial compensation for the acquisition of farm land on which US bases were built. Wet garbage from these installations has been the primary source of feed for these hogs.

(b) EVALUATION: This action, taken without adequate advance notice, impacted unfavorably on the CA hog-raising projects and posed a serious threat to the economy of the area. The adverse effects of the GAO decision could have been mitigated by extensive preplanned announcements and phased implementation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That changes to existing policy which materially affect civic action programs receive maximum early dissemination and wide distribution.

(2) Rural Development (RD) Cadre detached to villages for the Village Self Development (VSD) Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: In MR 3, through observation and inspection, it has been learned that many of the RD Cadre detached to the VSD Program are making significant contributions to the VSD Program and others are accomplishing very little.

(b) EVALUATION: Many of the RD Cadre detached to the VSD Program

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at village level are left to plan their own work and work schedules with little or no supervision. Others are being used as clerks or doing similar tasks.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: In order to receive maximum utilization of the abilities possessed by the VSD Cadre, the following are recommended:

1 Establish a clear-cut chain of command.

2 There must be command emphasis on the program at province, district and village levels.

3 Specific tasks for VSD Cadre must be established at each village, after which there must be supervision and inspection of those tasks during and after completion.

4 Priorities must be established for the BSD Cadre and they must be followed.

(3) Community Development Officer (CDO) and CD Assistants (CDA).

(a) OBSERVATION: In accordance with US government policy, the phasing-out of Community Development Officers was started on 30 September.

(b) EVALUATION: With the decreasing number of CDO personnel assisting in village self development implementation, it has become increasingly necessary to improve the proficiency of local community development assistants who will assume the responsibility for supporting and monitoring the Village Self Development Program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Community Development Assistants be given intensive academic training on the basics of Community Development.

(4) Village Technical Cadre.

(a) OBSERVATION: Only 58 Percent of the 532 authorized cadre have been assigned.

(b) EVALUATION: With the increased emphasis on quality and effectiveness of local government administration, it is essential that each village administration be able to utilize the technical expertise of a village technical cadre.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Ministry of Interior be requested to vigorously pursue the recruitment of village technical cadre.

(5) Mounting a Promotional Campaign for Feed Grain Production Without Sufficient Back-Up Data.

(a) OBSERVATION: The introduction and promotion of an agricultural crop that is either new or unfamiliar must be preceded by production research so that valid recommendations can be given. Grain Sorghum had been grown in this region but only on a small scale and, to the general farmer, it was new. The sorghum that was grown was used locally as either feed or for the production of alcohol and no market channels had been established linking the producer with the consumer (feed millers). Fertilizer requirements and plant response to the soils of the region had not been researched nor had the plant growth cycle been correlated with the seasons of rain to determine optimum planting dates. The need for a greatly expanded production of feed grains to support the increasing livestock and poultry industry is recognized by GVN officials. The production, in-country, of feed grain as an import substitute to help improve balance of payment problems is vital. Milling and mixing plants are presently constructed and in operation with sufficient trained personnel. Livestock in sufficient numbers as an ultimate consumer market is assured. These factors indicate that a successful, worthwhile project in feed grain production can and should be implemented.

(b) EVALUATION: There was sufficient justification for mounting a program for the increase in feed grains and particularly sorghum. Such a program was implemented and is presently underway; however, results have not reached expected levels. Several factors have influenced this lack of results:

1 Ministry of Agriculture support and concurrence was obtained prior to project initiation; however, this support was at a very high echelon in the Ministry and was not transmitted to the operation personnel who would actually do the field work. Recent directives have been issued to the effect that field personnel would support the program and would plant "X" number of hectares in their respective provinces. However, the attitude of the field personnel is best described as condescending rather than one of enthusiasm. A publicity campaign to acquaint field personnel with project plans and objectives and solicit their participation would have produced more favorable results.

2 Adaptive trials and fundamental research were not completed prior to farmer contact and in preparation for training programs for field personnel.

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3 GVN support in the regulation of imports and pricing was not assured and phased into the project progress. The major motivating factor for the farmer is an assured market and a reasonable profit. The present situation places farmers in a very disadvantageous position and they are reluctant to assume this position. Farmers are, therefore, concentrating their efforts on crops that appear to be more secure.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the activities of this program be consolidated and available data assembled and evaluated. Research and investigation data presently available should be collected and disseminated. The second-generation problems of drying, handling and storage should be investigated thoroughly so that positive recommendations can be given. Market outlets should be identified and secured to the maximum extent possible. Production costs should be determined so that an economical basis for production can be used as a guide for calculating returns for the farmers. A soil survey should be conducted to locate those areas most promising for sorghum production. Such areas should include soils not suited for rice, vegetables or other high value crops. A program aimed at educating the feed producer in the possibilities of feed mixture using sorghum should be initiated. Such a course should also include methods and mixtures for the preparation of various mixtures designed for specific poultry and swine situations.

FOR THE COMMANDER


W. C. BARTEL, JR.
CP, AGC
Asst AG.

- 14 Incl
1. II FFORCEV Order of Battle
 2. II FFORCEV Troop List
 3. II FFORCEV Area of Operations
 4. Close Air Support
 5. B52 Strikes
 6. Aviation Statistics
 7. C130/C123 Sorties
 8. Enemy Organization in MR 3
 9. Disposition of Enemy Forces
 10. Artillery Unit Locations
 11. Heavy Artillery Coverage
 12. Location of AN/MPQ - 4A CMR
 13. Location of AN/TPS - 25A GSR
 14. Artillery Task Organization

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AVHDO-DO (14 Nov 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JAN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GOPP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Standdown and Turn-in of Aircraft," page 61, paragraph 2f(1): concur. USARV OPLAN 183-70 provided adequate guidance which if followed would have prevented difficulties encountered by some units who were stood down. All units to standdown are encouraged to follow guidance outlined in USARV OPLAN 183-70. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Traffic Congestion and Regulation in MR 3," page 61, paragraph 2f(2). There is a definite need for a joint US/ARVN highway regulation system throughout RVN. In May 1970 a proposal was submitted by this Headquarters to MACV requesting establishment of joint US/ARVN highway regulation offices whereby personnel of the USARV Highway Traffic Center would provide on-the-job training to their ARVN counterparts. The ultimate goal of the proposed action was the establishment of ARVN regulatory agencies capable of regulating both ARVN and US convoys. In July 1970 MACV forwarded this proposal to RVNAF/JGS for evaluation and in August 1970 that headquarters directed all of its Military Region Commanders to:

(1) Review activities of all locally available combined US and Vietnamese traffic patrol teams.

(2) Coordinate with allied forces at the regions to organize additional combined traffic patrol teams on stations with special attention to the locations of established USARV Highway Regulating Points.

As of this date neither the USARV Highway Traffic Center nor any of its Regulating Points have been contacted by any ARVN unit concerning the discussed subject. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Restricted Use of Wet Garbage for Civic Action Projects," page 63, paragraph 2j(1): concur. Action has been taken recommending changes to MACV directives which will allow the withdrawal of

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approved material for civic action prior to sale. Maximum dissemination of policy changes and impacts of redeployments on civic action are being disseminated, consistent with security restrictions. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
II FFORCEV

GPOP-DT (14 Nov 70) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam for Period
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
OPT, AGC
Asst AG

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
II FFORCEV	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051111	COMUSMACV
1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	II FFORCEV
1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT990130	1st Cav Div (AM)
1-7 Cav	PHUOC LONG	GREEN	YT334745	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-12 Cav	LONG THANH	ARES	YT515665	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-7 Cav	LONG KHANH	PERSHING	YT151405	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	PHUOC LONG	BUTTONS	YU140070	1st Cav Div (AM)
1-8 Cav	LAM DONG	DRAGON HEAD	YT687964	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-12 Cav	PHUOC LONG	AUDIE	YU435294	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
5-7 Cav	PHUOC LONG	SNUFFY	YU337362	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH TUY	MACE	YT628125	1st Cav Div (AM)
1-5 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-8 Cav	BINH TUY	SILVER	YT829043	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-5 Cav	LAM DONG	CHEYENNE	YT928536	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962490	1st Cav Div (AM)
2-19 Arty	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT026156	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-20 Arty (ARA)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT968490	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-21 Arty (105T)	BINH TUY	MACE	YT628125	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-30 Arty	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT972492	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-77 Arty (105T)	PHUOC LONG	BUTTONS	YU140070	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
E-82 Arty (AVN)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT968490	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-9 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	1st Cav Div (AM)
8th Engr	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT954488	1st Cav Div (AM)
11th Avn Gp	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	1st Cav Div (AM)
11th GS Co	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
227th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
228th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
229th Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT990130	11th Avn Gp
13th Sig Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT965486	1st Cav Div (AM)
Co H (RANGER)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT966492	1st Cav Div (AM)
11th ACR (Sep)(-)	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	II FFORCEV
1-11th ACR	BIEN HOA	HENDERSON	YT185126	11th ACR
2-11th ACR	BINH TUY	BOLAN	YS982968	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
3-11th ACR	BINH DUONG	BANDIT II	XT908295	11th ACR
Air Cav Trp	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903073	11th ACR
919th Engr Co	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903073	11th ACR
25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	II FFORCEV
1st Bde, 25th Inf Div	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT491473	25th Inf Div
Provisional Co	TAY WINH	NUI BA DEN	XT283582	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-12 Inf	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT491473	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-22 Inf (Mech)	BINH DUONG		XT603348	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
2-34 Armor (-)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
4-9 Inf	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
2d Bde, 25th Inf Div	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT455078	25th Inf Div
1-27 Inf	BINH DUONG	KIEN	XT522414	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1-5 Inf (Mech)	BIEN HOA		YS118954	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
4-23 Inf (Mech)	PHUOC TUY	LYNCH	YS460835	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	25th Inf Div
2-14th Inf	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT491473	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-27 Inf	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
3-22 Inf	LONG KHANH	SCHWARTZ	YS381991	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
3-4 Cav	TAY NINH	RODRIGUES	XT452447	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
25th Inf Div Arty	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
1-8 Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	FRENZELL-JONES	YS067122	25th Inf Div Arty
7-11 Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	FRENZELL-JONES	YS067122	25th Inf Div Arty
3-13 Arty (155/8" SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650150	25th Inf Div Arty
2-77 Arty (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650150	25th Inf Div Arty
25th Avn Gp	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
65th Bnqr	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
Co F (RANGER) 75th Inf	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
125th Sig	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
HQ, II FFORCEV Arty	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051112	II FFORCEV
5-2 Arty (40mm ANSP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	II FFORCEV Arty
D-71 Arty (NG)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty
I-29 Arty (SLT)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty
7-8 Arty (8"/175 SP)	BIEN HOA	ECHO	YT024154	II FFORCEV Arty (Btry A + B 23 Arty (C))
HQ, 23 Arty Gp	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867162	II FFORCEV Arty
2-12 Arty (155T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	23d Arty Gp
6-27 Arty (8"/175 SP)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT850150	23d Arty Gp
1-27 Arty (155 SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	23d Arty Gp
2-32 Arty (8"/175 SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	23d Arty Gp
2-35 Arty (155 SP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT047079	II FFORCEV Arty
5-42 Arty (155T)	BIEN HOA	CAMP PRICE	YT047118	II FFORCEV Arty
12th Cbt Avn Gp	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT059118	II FFORCEV
11th Cbt Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	12th Cbt Avn Gp
128th Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
173d Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT780380	11th Cbt Avn Bn
213th Aslt Spt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
145th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT995102	12th Cbt Avn Gp
68th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT988129	145th Cbt Avn Bn

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
118th Aalt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT990128	145th Cbt Avn Bn
334th Aerial Wpas Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	145th Cbt Avn Bn
210th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	12th Cbt Avn Gp
25th Avn Co(Corps)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050105	210th Cbt Avn Bn
54th Util Apl Co	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	210th Cbt Avn Bn
73d Surv Apl Co	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	164th Avn Gp, 1st Avn Bde
74th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865155	210th Cbt Avn Bn
222d Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YS145982	12th Cbt Avn Gp
117th Aalt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT068113	222d Cbt Avn Bn
240th Aalt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YS145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
269th Cbt Avn Bn	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656157	12th Cbt Avn Gp
187th Hel Co Aalt	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT178521	269th Cbt Avn Bn
242d Aalt Spt Hel Co	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT662152	269th Cbt Avn Bn
3d Sqdn 17 Air Cav	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	1st Cav Div (AM)
A Trp, 3-17 ACS	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	3-17th ACS
B Trp, 3-17th ACS	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	3-17th ACS
D Trp, 3-17th ACS	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903073	11th ACR
53d Sig Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050110	II FFORCEV
Co A, 5th SFGA	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT007123	II FFORCEV
CMAT	GIA DINH	SAIGON	XBB47915	II FFORCEV

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
RTAVF HQ	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT160005	II FFORCEV
1st Bde HQ	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT160005	RTAVF
1/1 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	TANEE	YS280934	RTAVF
1/2 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	BULSAK	YS207933	1st Bde RTAVF
1/3 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	PRATIAB	YT218048	1st Bde RTAVF
2d Bde HQ	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	RTAVF
2/1 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	SIRAN	YS276861	2d Bde RTAVF
2/2 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	AOYUTASARN	YS264803	2d Bde RTAVF
2/3 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	HIRAN	YS213856	2d Bde RTAVF
RTAVF Div Arty	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165000	RTAVF
1st 105mm Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT167007	Div Arty RTAVF
2d 105mm Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT166002	Div Arty RTAVF
4th 155mm Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT166005	Div Arty RTAVF
Armd Cav Sqdn	BIEN HOA	AOKAROON	YS328942	RTAVF
Sig Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT162998	RTAVF
Engr Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT161006	RTAVF
Lt Avn Co	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT154015	RTAVF
HQ 1st ATF (Sep)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	II FFORCEV
2d RAR	PHUOC TUY	GAIL	YS433667	HQ 1st ATF
7th RAR	PHUOC TUY	HORSESHOE	YS494624	HQ 1st ATF
1st SAS Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS436676	HQ 1st ATF
A Sqdn 1st Armd Regt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS445664	HQ 1st ATF

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS429669	HQ 1st ATF
4 FD Regt RAA(105T)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
1st FD Sqn RAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
17 Const Sqn RAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433680	HQ 1st ATF
104 Sig Sqn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433668	HQ 1st ATF
161 (Indep) Rec FLT	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443682	HQ 1st ATF

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II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

As of 31 October 1970

OPCON UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1st Cav Div (AM)	26 Oct 68	Phuoc Vinh
25th Inf Div	22 Mar 66	Cu Chi
CMAT	25 Mar 70	Saigon
1st ATF	24 May 66	Nui Dat
RTAVF	22 Jul 68	Bearcat
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	Long Binh
Co A, 5th SFG	17 Jan 66	Bien Hoa
3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav	1 Dec 69	Di An

TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	Long Binh
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ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	Long Binh
HNB, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	Long Binh
HNB, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	Long Binh
2d CA Co	7 Dec 66	Long Binh
5th Bn, 2d Arty (AMSP)	5 Feb 70	Long Binh
7th Mil Hist Det	1 Jun 66	Long Binh
9th Trans Co (CAR)	23 Aug 66	Long Binh
16th PI Det	4 Jun 66	Long Binh
16th Sig Det	16 May 66	Long Binh
23d Arty GP	5 Feb 70	Phu Loi
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	Long Binh
44th APU	1 Oct 66	Long Binh
53d Sig Bn (CORPS)	4 Jun 66	Long Binh
D Btry, 71st Arty (AM)	5 Feb 70	Long Binh
219th MI Det	20 May 66	Long Binh
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	Long Binh
552d MP Co	23 Sep 66	Long Binh
I Btry, 29th Arty (SLT)	27 Mar 67	Long Binh
7th Bn, 8th Arty	17 Oct 69	Bien Hoa
2d Bn, 32d Arty	17 Oct 69	Cu Chi
6th Bn, 27th Arty	17 Oct 69	Phu Loi


ATTACHED UNITS

11th ACR	20 Jun 68	Di An
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	Long Binh
303d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	Long Binh
101st RR Co	1 Apr 70	Long Binh

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As of 31 Oct. 1970



II FORCEV-
III CTZ
AREA OF OPERATIONS

Inclosure 3

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

1 August 1970 - 31 October 1970

1. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in MR 3 and adjacent Cambodia by:

	Subtotal	Total
USAF/RAAF	3044	
VNAF	3066	6110

2. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of III Corps Forces by:

USAF/RAAF	859	
VNAF	2977	3836

3. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of II FFORCEV OPCON Units by:

USAF/RAAF	2185	
VNAF	89	2274

4. (C) Distribution of FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of:

III Corps	3836	
25th Inf Div	558	
1st Cav Div (AM)	1026	
RTAVF	256	
1st ATF	140	
199th LIB	166	
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div	60	
11th ACR	68	6110

5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat Sky Spot) Sorties in Support of:

III Corps	7	
25th Inf Div	3	
1st Cav Div (AM)	35	
1st ATF	2	
199th LIB		
11th ACR		
RTAVF	3	50

6. (C) Results (As Reported by USAF FAC's to III DASC)

KDa (Body Count)	188
KDa (Estimated)	90
Structures (Destroyed)	603
Structures (Damaged)	63
Bunkers (Destroyed)	3478
Bunkers (Damaged)	150
Sampans (Destroyed)	17
Sampans (Damaged)	11
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B-52 STRIKES IN ER 3

1 AUG - 31 OCT 70

UNIT	/												TOTAL
	BIEN HOA	BTNH DUONG	DINH LONG	BINH THY	CHA BINH	HAU NGHIA	LENG AN	LONG KHANH	PHUOC LONG	PHUOC TUY	THAY HINH	QUANG DUC	
1st Cav Div	1		4				3	12			1	22	43
25th Inf Div									1	3		38	42
199th Inf Bde													0
RTAVF													3
1st ATF													0
III Corps			2							4		8	14
5th JFG													0
MACV												5	5
II FORCEV			1				2					33	36
TOTAL	1	3	4				5	12	1	7	1	106	140

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AVIATION STATISTICS

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
<u>ROTARY WING</u>			
HOURS	33,082	30,876	34,633
TROOPS LIFTED	138,487	128,855	112,900
TONS OF CARGO	18,969	14,979	11,280
<u>FIXED WING</u>			
HOURS	3,890	4,113	3,772
TROOPS LIFTED	3,265	3,584	3,256
TONS OF CARGO	178	174	145
<u>PERSONNEL</u>			
CREWMEMBERS WIA	28	12	14
CREWMEMBERS KIA	8	1	6
VC KBA	27	54	101

ROTARY WING TOTALS

HOURS	98,591
TROOPS LIFTED	380,242
TONS OF CARGO	42,508

FIXED WING TOTALS

HOURS	11,775
TROOPS LIFTED	10,105
TONS OF CARGO	497

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
STATISTICAL SUMMARY
USAF C130/C123/C7A SORTIES
1 AUG 70 - 31 OCT 70

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TACTICAL EMERGENCY</u>	<u>EMERGENCY RESUPPLY</u>	<u>COMBAT ESSENTIAL</u>	<u>PRIORITY # 1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
II FF Arty	0	0	3	441	444
I ACD	0	0	45	243	288
25 INF DIV	0	0	7	160	167
199 LIB	0	10	0	137	147
II ACR	0	0	0	95	95
5 SFGA	0	0	0	20	20
<hr/>					
TOTAL	0	10	55	1096	1161

TOTAL SHORT TONS: 4705

TOTAL PASSENGERS: 11,169


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


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ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, MR 3

INFANTRY REGIMENTS



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**Artillery Unit Locations
as of 31 October 1970**

HQ, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (Bien Hoa YT 024154)

Battery A

175mm platoon	FSB Flower	ZS 004984
8" Platoon	FSB Strike	YS 813966

Battery B

175mm platoon	Phuoc Vinh	XT 958490
8" platoon	Blackhorse	YS 443978

Battery C

175mm Platoon	FSB Blue	XT 256289
8" platoon	FSB Buell	XT 225535

HQ, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (Phu Loi XT 850150)

Battery A

175mm Platoon	Bu Dop	XU 971288
8" platoon	Bu Dop	XU 971288

Battery B

175mm platoon	Duc Phong	XU 435045
8" platoon	Duc Phong	XU 434045

Battery C

175mm Platoon	FSB Mateel	XU 713176
8" platoon	FSB Mateel	XU 713176

HQ, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (Cu Chi XT 655150)

Battery A

175mm platoon	Katum	XT 333902
8" platoon	Katum 86	XT 333902

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Battery B

175mm platoon

Lanyard

XT 075888

8" platoon

Lanyard

XT 075888

Battery C

175mm platoon

FSB Elsenburg

XT 113495


8" platoon

FSB Buell

XT 225535

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II FORCE V III CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS
LOCATION OF
AN/MPQ-4A CMR'S




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II. FORCE V III CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS
PHUOC LONG
LOCATION OF
AN/TPS 25A GSR'S



CAMBODIA

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TASK ORGANIZATION

6-27th Arty	OPCON to 23d Arty Gp
A Btry	GS POF 5th ARVN D/A
B Btry	GSR 1st Cav Div OPCON 2-12th Arty
C Btry	GSR 5th ARVN D/A
2-32d Arty	OPCON to 23d Arty Gp
A Btry	GS (OPCON 1-27th Arty)
B Btry	GSR 18th ARVN D/A OPCON 1-27th Arty
C Btry	GS
7-8th Arty	Remains under control of II FFORCEV Arty
A Btry	2T-8" GSR 1st Cav Div (AM) Arty (OPCON 2-35 Arty)
B Btry	2T-175 GSR 1st Cav Div (AM) Arty (OPCON 2-35 Arty)
C Btry	2T-8" GSR
	2T-175 GSR 1st Cav Div (AM) Arty (OPCON 5-42 Arty)
	GS (OPCON 2-32d Arty)
2-12th Arty	Remains under control of 23d Arty Gp
A Btry	GS
B Btry	GSR 5th ARVN Div (OPCON 6-27th Arty)
C Btry	GSR 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-27th Arty	Remains under control of 23d Arty Gp
A Btry	GSR 5th ARVN D/A (OPCON 6-27th Arty)
B Btry	GSR 18th ARVN D/A
C Btry	Preparation for standdown
5-42d Arty	OPCON II FFORCEV Arty
A Btry	GS (OPCON 7-8th Arty)
B Btry	3T GS POF Bau Ca District
C Btry	3T GS POF Dinh Quan District
	GSR 1st Cav Div (AM) Arty (OPCON 2-35th Arty)
2-35th Arty	OPCON II FFORCEV Arty
A Btry	GSR 1st ATF 4th Fld Regt (OPCON 7-8th Arty)
B Btry	GS POF Binh Tuy Province
C Btry	GS (OPCON 23d Arty Gp)
5-2d Arty	OPCON II FFORCEV Arty - GS
I-29	Attached 5-2d Arty (GS)
D-71	Attached 5-2d Arty (GS)

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NOTE:

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AGDA-A (M) (7 Apr 71) DAMO-ODU 704021 12 Nov 74 30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations & Plans ATTN: DAMO-ODU within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Verne L. Bowers
 VERNE L. BOWERS
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96286

14 Nov 1970

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

1. WITHDRAWN

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Source Payment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Increased awareness concerning type of currency utilized in making cash payments to sources is required on the part of US agent handlers.

(b) EVALUATION: US agent handlers, in some instances, have been paying their sources with brand new piaster notes, in areas where new GVN currency is seldom seen. In addition, they were paid with bills of large denominations in localities where currency notes in excess of 100 piasters are seldom in the possession of the populace. This practice will inevitably focus undue attention on US agents and may identify them to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That US sources be paid with used banknotes.

2. That banknotes used to pay sources be of small denomination.

(2) Security Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Individuals involved in the transporting and handling of classified material must be continuously aware of the proper methods of safeguarding the material.

(b) EVALUATION: In one case, a messenger who was delivering a classified document stopped to have a steam bath. The document was left in the messenger's trousers while he had his bath. Upon dressing, he

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31 Oct 70

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
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realized that the document was missing. This is a classic example of how classified information falls in the hands of the enemy due to poor security practices on the part of the individual.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That personnel be continuously made aware of good security practices, and use them until they become good security habits.

2 That personnel be instructed never to leave a document unattended while transporting it.

3 If many deliveries are to be made, the courier should carry all documents with him to each delivery site. If traveling in pairs, one courier can guard material while the other makes the delivery.

(3) Sensor Implantation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rotary-wing aircraft are not always available for use in aerial implantation of sensors.

(b) EVALUATION: The 25th US Infantry Division has successfully dropped Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Devices (ADSIDs) from an Army fixed-wing aircraft, the U6A Otter. A high degree of accuracy was obtained by dropping the ADSID from an altitude of 1500 feet with an aircraft speed of 80 knots. A drop team of three men is required: a spotter, a feeder, and bombardier. The drop procedures are the same as for drops from helicopters. The correct location of the sensor, marked by an attached CS grenade, is obtained through photography taken from another aircraft trailing the drop aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to the use of fixed wing assets for sensor implants when rotary wing aircraft cannot be used.

c. Operations

(1) Close coordination of village/hamlet defense plan.

(a) OBSERVATION: A strong VC attack was successfully defeated due to an effective well conducted village defense plan.

(b) EVALUATION: At 260015 September 1970, Thanh Binh outpost, Phu Giao District, Binh Duong Province, was attacked by a VC force estimated as a battalion (-). The outpost was occupied by the 110th PF platoon, a PSDF Key Interteam and some Rural Development Cadre. The outpost received approximately twenty 82mm mortar and B40 rounds supporting multiple ground attacks. US and ARVN Artillery fired in support and the 11th ACR provided

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a reaction force. Results were: Friendly: 1 PSDF KIA, 4 PSDF WIA; 4 PF WIA; Enemy: 14 VC KIA, 4 AK-47, 1 B40, 1 K-54 and 10 bicycles CIA. This action was significant for the following reasons:

1 Close cooperation had been established between the PF/PSDF/RDC in the village.

2 The defense was led by the village chief who rallied his forces against the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That village/hamlet defense plans continue to emphasize the employment of all available village/hamlet forces in coordinated effort under the leadership of the village chief.

(2) Overgrown Perimeter Wire and Fields of Fire

(a) OBSERVATION: Vulnerability of outposts to infiltration and ground attack is increased due to overgrown perimeter wire.

(b) EVALUATION: On 8 October 1970, the VC were successful in gaining access to a PF compound resulting in 1 friendly killed, and 10 wounded. In this sapper attack, supported by 61 mm mortar fire, the VC penetrated the outpost from two directions. Routes through the wire into the outpost were marked with white paper.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Outposts with overgrown perimeter wire that cannot be cleared due to unmarked mines and booby traps should be relocated. Such outpost cannot detect approaching enemy forces.

(3) Basic Security Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: The VC are using ARVN uniforms to disguise their activities and are often undetected until their mission is completed.

(b) EVALUATION: On 22 September 1970, a friendly element, while returning from a night operation, was ambushed by a VC squad wearing ARVN uniforms. Friendly losses were five weapons. There were no enemy losses. The VC were able to accomplish their mission through deception as they were accepted as friendly soldiers due to the uniforms.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That training in passive security measures be re-emphasized. All persons, including supposedly friendly soldiers, must be identified before being allowed freedom of movement.

d. Organization. None

e. Training. None

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f. Logistics.

(1) Standdown and Turn-in of Aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION: The standdown and turn-in of aircraft and associated equipment during the Phase IV redeployment of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was unnecessarily delayed. This delay placed an unwarranted work load on the 34th General Support Group unit designated to provide direct maintenance support.

(b) EVALUATION: The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, did not schedule the operational standdown of unit aircraft well enough in advance so that the final aircraft turn-in could be accomplished prior to the standdown of the direct support aircraft maintenance detachment organic to the Brigade Support Battalion. The aircraft were by-in-large operationally committed up until the standdown of the organic DS Detachment. When the aircraft were finally stooddown, there was insufficient time for remaining organizational maintenance personnel to do an adequate job of preparing them for turn-in. Additionally, all support level maintenance had to be accomplished by the 34th Group unit accepting the aircraft for turn-in.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders and G3/S3's of redeploying units give consideration to the operational standdown of organic aircraft so as to provide sufficient time for organizational and organic support maintenance personnel to prepare the aircraft for turn-in. If operational requirements dictate a need for aircraft that conflicts with the aircraft standdown schedule, then a request for aviation support should be forwarded to higher headquarters.

(2) Traffic Congestion and Regulation in MR 3.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the opening of additional roads and the increasing number of civilian vehicles, traffic congestion is occurring more frequently within MR 3. The number of ARVN convoys is also increasing, adding to the

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overall problem. This congestion is directly responsible for many accidents and deaths.

(b) EVALUATION: There is a constant volume of heavy traffic on many roads in MR 3. Military convoys, both US and ARVN add to this congestion. Investigation has revealed that at no time during daylight hours is the traffic reduced to the extent that convoys should be scheduled to pass through the areas of congestion. In addition, there is no single agency organized to coordinate and issue highway clearances for both ARVN and US military convoys. As a result, each clearance authority for ARVN and US convoys frequently schedule convoys over the same route and the same time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

(1) When possible, convoys be scheduled over the busiest and securest highways during the hours of darkness.

(2) A joint US/ARVN Highway Traffic Center be established which would have authority to coordinate and issue highway clearances to both US and ARVN units.

g. Communication. None

h. Material.

(1) ENSURE Items.

(a) OBSERVATION: The turn-in and/or transfer of ENSURE items during Increment V Redeployment was not timely.

(b) EVALUATION: Standdown units experienced delays in receiving disposition instructions for ENSURE items because they were not provided by USARV at an early date. Meetings held between USARV and standdown units revealed USARV did not have an accurate inventory of above items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Close-held information on phase down planning be passed earlier to ENSURE action officers to allow adequate time to coordinate with remaining units to determine if they have a need for such equipment. The quarterly printout listing ENSURE items should be changed to monthly, and subordinate units should be required to update the type and number of items on hand.

(2) AN/TPS-25A GSR

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(a) OBSERVATION: Video fluttering at all ranges.

(b) EVALUATION: This caused difficulty in detecting moving targets from stationary targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Check CR 606 and CR 607 in the high voltage power supply as these diodes may be breaking down under heavy load. The same symptom can be caused by a faulty generator. Therefore, it is necessary to use a USM 117 to check the 400 Hz wave form from the generator, for a clear undistorted signal.

i. Psychological Operations. None

j. Civil Affairs.

(1) Restricted Use of Wet Garbage for Civic Action Projects.

(a) OBSERVATION: A recent GAO decision requiring the USARV Property Disposal Agency to sell wet garbage resulted in the awarding of garbage haul contracts to Vietnamese commercial concerns. The implementation of the GAO decision abruptly shut off the main food supply source for CA hog-raising programs. Such projects were initiated by US units in MR 3 in partial compensation for the acquisition of farm land on which US bases were built. Wet garbage from these installations has been the primary source of feed for these hogs.

(b) EVALUATION: This action, taken without adequate advance notice, impacted unfavorably on the CA hog-raising projects and posed a serious threat to the economy of the area. The adverse effects of the GAO decision could have been mitigated by extensive preplanned announcements and phased implementation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That changes to existing policy which materially affect civic action programs receive maximum early dissemination and wide distribution.

(2) Rural Development (RD) Cadre detached to villages for the Village Self Development (VSD) Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: In MR 3, through observation and inspection, it has been learned that many of the RD Cadre detached to the VSD Program are making significant contributions to the VSD Program and others are accomplishing very little.

(b) EVALUATION: Many of the RD Cadre detached to the VSD Program

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at village level are left to plan their own work and work schedules with little or no supervision. Others are being used as clerks or doing similar tasks.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: In order to receive maximum utilization of the abilities possessed by the VSD Cadre, the following are recommended:

1 Establish a clear-cut chain of command.

2 There must be command emphasis on the program at province, district and village levels.

3 Specific tasks for VSD Cadre must be established at each village, after which there must be supervision and inspection of those tasks during and after completion.

4 Priorities must be established for the BSD Cadre and they must be followed.

(3) Community Development Officer (CDO) and CD Assistants (CDA).

(a) OBSERVATION: In accordance with US government policy, the phasing-out of Community Development Officers was started on 30 September.

(b) EVALUATION: With the decreasing number of CDO personnel assisting in village self development implementation, it has become increasingly necessary to improve the proficiency of local community development assistants who will assume the responsibility for supporting and monitoring the Village Self Development Program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Community Development Assistants be given intensive academic training on the basics of Community Development.

(4) Village Technical Cadre.

(a) OBSERVATION: Only 58 Percent of the 532 authorized cadre have been assigned.

(b) EVALUATION: With the increased emphasis on quality and effectiveness of local government administration, it is essential that each village administration be able to utilize the technical expertise of a village technical cadre.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Ministry of Interior be requested to vigorously pursue the recruitment of village technical cadre.

(5) Mounting a Promotional Campaign for Feed Grain Production Without Sufficient Back-Up Data.

(a) OBSERVATION: The introduction and promotion of an agricultural crop that is either new or unfamiliar must be preceded by production research so that valid recommendations can be given. Grain Sorghum had been grown in this region but only on a small scale and, to the general farmer, it was new. The sorghum that was grown was used locally as either feed or for the production of alcohol and no market channels had been established linking the producer with the consumer (feed millers). Fertilizer requirements and plant response to the soils of the region had not been researched nor had the plant growth cycle been correlated with the seasons of rain to determine optimum planting dates. The need for a greatly expanded production of feed grains to support the increasing livestock and poultry industry is recognized by GVN officials. The production, in-country, of feed grain as an import substitute to help improve balance of payment problems is vital. Milling and mixing plants are presently constructed and in operation with sufficient trained personnel. Livestock in sufficient numbers as an ultimate consumer market is assured. These factors indicate that a successful, worthwhile project in feed grain production can and should be implemented.

(b) EVALUATION: There was sufficient justification for mounting a program for the increase in feed grains and particularly sorghum. Such a program was implemented and is presently underway; however, results have not reached expected levels. Several factors have influenced this lack of results:

1 Ministry of Agriculture support and concurrence was obtained prior to project initiation; however, this support was at a very high echelon in the Ministry and was not transmitted to the operation personnel who would actually do the field work. Recent directives have been issued to the effect that field personnel would support the program and would plant "X" number of hectares in their respective provinces. However, the attitude of the field personnel is best described as condescending rather than one of enthusiasm. A publicity campaign to acquaint field personnel with project plans and objectives and solicit their participation would have produced more favorable results.

2 Adaptive trials and fundamental research were not completed prior to farmer contact and in preparation for training programs for field personnel.

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3 GVN support in the regulation of imports and pricing was not assured and phased into the project progress. The major motivating factor for the farmer is an assured market and a reasonable profit. The present situation places farmers in a very disadvantageous position and they are reluctant to assume this position. Farmers are, therefore, concentrating their efforts on crops that appear to be more secure.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the activities of this program be consolidated and available data assembled and evaluated. Research and investigation data presently available should be collected and disseminated. The second-generation problems of drying, handling and storage should be investigated thoroughly so that positive recommendations can be given. Market outlets should be identified and secured to the maximum extent possible. Production costs should be determined so that an economical basis for production can be used as a guide for calculating returns for the farmers. A soil survey should be conducted to locate those areas most promising for sorghum production. Such areas should include soils not suited for rice, vegetables or other high value crops. A program aimed at educating the feed producer in the possibilities of feed mixture using sorghum should be initiated. Such a course should also include methods and mixtures for the preparation of various mixtures designed for specific poultry and swine situations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W. C. Bartel Jr.
W. C. BARTEL JR.
CP, AGC
Asst AG

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2. II FFORCEV Troop List
3. II FFORCEV Area of Operations
4. Close Air Support
5. B52 Strikes
6. Aviation Statistics
7. C130/C123 Sorties
8. Enemy Organization in MR 3
9. Disposition of Enemy Forces
10. Artillery Unit Locations
11. Heavy Artillery Coverage
12. Location of AN/MPQ - 1A CMR
13. Location of AN/TPS - 25A GSR
14. Artillery Task Organization

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