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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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TO: AGSFOR, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20301

Attached is the 2d Infantry Division Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period 1 August 1970 through 31 October 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incl
1. Table of Contents
2. Operational Report - Lessons Learned
3. Organization of 2d Infantry Division
4. List of Distinguished Visitors
5. Change of Command & Staff Assignments

Inclosure

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Inclosures:

1. Organization of the 2d Infantry Division - 31 October 1970.
2. List of Distinguished Visitors. w/d HQ DA
3. Changes of Command and Staff Assignments. w/d HQ DA

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities
   
   a. (U) Command:
      
      (1) Mission: The 2d Infantry Division has been assigned four missions by I Corps (Group).
         
         (a) Defend in sector in event of hostile attack.
         
         (b) Implement US Responsibilities under Armistice Agreement of 1953 in sector.
         
         (c) Conduct anti-infiltration, anti-raiding, counter-espionage, counter sabotage activities.
         
         (d) Implement 2d Infantry Division portion of EUSA Cold war Program.
         
      (2) Organization: Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division is organized under MTOS 07-0045 by authority of USARPAC General Order 634, dated 17 October 1968, and supplemented by TDA P8 WAM-99 02. 2d Infantry Division Task Organization at the close of the reporting period is furnished at Inclosure 3.
         
      (3) Visitors:
         
         (a) During the reporting period 135 personnel visited the 2d Infantry Division. A list of distinguished visitors is furnished at Inclosure 4.
         
         (b) A program designed to insure the safety of distinguished visitors was initiated in September 1970. Commanders of units assigned or attached to the 2d Infantry Division reviewed records of all personnel assigned to their units to identify those individuals who present a possible threat to distinguished visitors. The ACofS, G2 has initiated a master file of all individuals who present a possible threat to distinguished visitors. All commanders are required to update their initial input to this program on a continuing basis.
         
         (4) Command and Staff: MG Gilbert H. Woodward assumed command of the 2d Infantry Division on 19 October 1970. Changes of command and staff assignments are furnished at Inclosure 5.
         
   b. (U) A summary of operations involving North Korean forces in the 2d Infantry Division during the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 70 follows:
         
         (1) At 2823551 Aug 70, three (3) UI's were engaged by personnel of B Company, 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry as they attempted to penetrate the ROK through the 2d Infantry Division sector by cutting a hole in the chain link barrier fence. One (1) of the three (3) UI's was wounded in the fire fight which commenced immediately after friendly personnel initially engaged the intruders. Hostile fire was received from a wood line approximately 100 meters from the fence as the three (3) UI's fled to the north. Footprints found by a tracker team the following morning indicate that as many as eight (8) hostile personnel were involved in the attempted penetration and that one (1) individual was wounded. There was no penetration of the ROK.
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(2) At 002301 Aug 70, one (1) UI threw a hand grenade into a foxhole in the 97th KCT (ROK) sector manned by personnel of 1st Platoon, 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 97th RCT (ROK). Blocking positions were immediately established and at first light a sweep was conducted which produced two (2) hastily concealed equipment caches in the vicinity of the initial incident. At 0005 hours personnel thought they observed two (2) UI's floating in the river and prepared to take the UI's under fire when 20 rounds of heavy caliber machine gun fire were received from a NK guard post. The UI's in the river were subsequently engaged by 50 caliber machine gun and 81 and 60mm mortar fire, with undetermined results. From available information, it has not been determined if the two (2) UI's, believed to be NK escort agents, were exfiltrating after guiding an agent into the ROK or if the UI's had attempted to rendezvous and exfiltrate with an agent who had completed his mission in ROK.

(3) At 011123 Oct 70, a UH-1U helicopter flying in the vicinity of BS 962387 in the 97th RCT area, was fired on by North Korean 14.5mm machineguns located at BS 947389. Personnel of 97th RCT returned fire with 50 caliber machineguns. There were no friendly casualties or damage to helicopter. As a result of the firing incident, a no fly line was established for 2d Infantry Division aircraft from coordinates BS 990901 south to BS 993884, southwest to BS 997869, south to BS 969808, north and east along the south bank of the Imjin River to BS 990901. It was recommended that the no fly line be recognized by I Corps (GP) and 8th Army aviation units. The Division recommendation was accepted and now applies to all aircraft in Korea. Request for emergency medical evacuations and tactical missions in the 97th RCT must be cleared through the Division G-3.

(4) At 070625 Oct 70 two (2) UI's were observed floating in the Imjin River by personnel from 1st Platoon, 98th Reconnaissance Company, 97th RCT (ROK) and were engaged with small arms fire. Immediately after friendly fires commenced, several NK guard posts began firing heavy caliber machineguns into the 97th RCT sector. The 97th RCT returned that fire with 50 caliber machineguns. At 0635 hours the UI's were again observed and were taken under fire with 50 caliber and light machinegun fire. The two (2) UI's were observed at 0730 hours on a mud flat, one (1) crawling and dragging the other. The one (1) crawling individual released the other, suspected to be dead from friendly fire, when again taken under fire by 97th RCT personnel and fled toward the river and was lost from sight behind a ridge. It is believed the two (2) UI's involved in this incident were NK escorts agents exfiltrating the ROK.

c. Signal:

(1) During this period work was completed in extending the spiral-four cable links of the DMZ underground cable system from points along Barrier command to the Guard Posts. The DMZ underground cable system provides a distribution system for the Dial Exchanges serving units in the Camp Young and Camp Dodge/Greaves and JSA areas. In addition it provides telephone circuits to interconnect GP's with adjacent GP's, GP's with Battalion TOC's and GP's with Barrier Gates.
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(2) The dial exchange located at Camp Custar was expanded from a 1000 line to a 1400 line capacity. The expanded facility became operational on 1 August 1970. The new equipment that was installed provides universal dialing capability within the I Corps area and throughout Korea on a selected subscriber basis.

d. (U) Aviation:

(1) During the reporting period, the 2d Aviation Battalion received 7 OH-58 (Kiowa) aircraft to replace the OH-23 (RAVEN) which were being phased out of our inventory. In conjunction with this acquisition, 8 aviators of B Company were transitioned into the OH-58 in July by the New Equipment Training Team from Bell Helicopter. Other aviators with the battalion, as well as new arrivals, are continuously being transitioned into the OH-58.

(2) With the acquisition of the OH-58, a training program was established at I Corps (Gp) to familiarize aviators with the XM-27 ARMAMENT Subsystem. The individuals involved had previously received classroom instruction from the New Equipment Training Team at ASCOM. The actual weapon firing was conducted in I Corps. A total of seven (7) Aviation Battalion personnel were familiarized with the XM-27 subsystem. As personnel turnover occurs, additional aviators will be trained with the subsystem.

(3) The 2d Aviation Battalion continued its M-23 armament subsystem (door gunner) qualification for the crew chief and door gunners of the UH-1D's. The training program includes assembly, disassembly, maintenance, safety and firing techniques in the M-23 subsystem. After the ground classes were completed, the individuals were flown to Nightmare Range where the actual firing was conducted. During the reporting period 5 crew members were qualified in the M-23 subsystem.

(4) During the reporting period, the 2d Aviation Battalion began operating with a 4 point hot refueling system for aircraft utilizing JP-4. The system is set up on the Northeast side of the runway at A-112, utilizing a 10000 gallon bladder, 350 GPM pump and other necessary attachments. This hot refueling system allows the aircraft to be refueled without shutting down. This adds flexibility to the Aviation Battalion's operations and has improved our mission-ready status.

(5) During the reporting period, 2d Aviation Battalion provided the 2d Infantry Division with more than 2500 hours of aviation support in conjunction with operational and training requirements. This support was broken down into approximately 1000 hours of Light Observation aircraft (OH-23) (OH-58) and 1500 hours utility aircraft. These aircraft were utilized by the 2d Infantry Division on command and control (airmobile) training and administrative flights.

(6) During August, the Readiness Evaluation Teams (R&T) within the 2d Aviation Battalion began their inspections. The purpose of the R&T program is to insure a high degree of logistical readiness through quarterly inspection of applicable areas. All 24 teams inspected each company during
the quarter and instilled a new awareness of the battalion’s logistical readiness status within the members of the battalion. This awareness has resulted in increased efforts to improve logistics readiness. As the R&T program moves into the 2d quarter, it is expected that the battalion’s logistical status will improve substantially.

e. (U) Training.

1. In late August of this year the mission of the Advance Combat Training Academy (ACTA) was changed and instructions were issued for ACON to initiate a preliminary (P) training course for the entire division. The mission of this course is to give all newly assigned personnel in the grade of O-3 and below an orientation of the 2d Infantry Division, its mission, organization and TACR. The course has since been expanded to include several mandatory training requirements. The “P” training course now consists of four (4) days of instruction and orientation for all 2d Infantry Division replacements O-3 and below. Since the start of the “P” training course on 6 September, thirteen (13) classes have been conducted with approximately 1300 personnel attending.

2. On 24 Oct 70 the ACON training mission was expanded to include a similar course for all KATUSA replacements. This course is a two (2) day orientation on the 2d Infantry Division with instructions on US weapons and equipment also included. The KATUSA receives this course before he reports to his unit.

f. (U) Anti-infiltration:

1. On 1 August the occupation of positions along the south bank of the Imjin River forward of the Civilian Control Line by personnel from the 2d Infantry Division was suspended. This action was taken due to the improvement of the barrier fence and barrier operations. It also assisted the division in efforts to cope with the continuing reduction of personnel levels. At the present time the Homeland Reserve Force occupies 27 positions in the same vicinity as the positions formerly occupied by 2d Division personnel. This operation is coordinated with the Korean National Police. The 2d Infantry Division remains prepared to occupy the positions should the need arise.

2. The installation of a lighting system utilizing sealed beam lights and 10KW generators was begun on 19 August. This system is to be installed on the barrier fence across the entire 2d Infantry Division sector of the DHZ. The system increases visibility along the barrier fence during hours of darkness and is being installed by the VAKO corporation. At the close of the reporting period 22 kilometers of the lighting system had been installed and was operational.

3. During the reporting period, rear area search operations within the Division were evaluated. The evaluation pointed out that rear area searches south of the Imjin River were discontinued in November 1969 primarily due to a lack of results, reduced North Korean agent activity, and economy of force measures. It was concluded that the resulting absence of rear area searches in the Division had the effect of leaving a gap in the coverage of the 1 Corps (Gp) area; a situation which could be potentially exploited by
the enemy and politically embarrassing to U.S. forces in Korea. Periodic rear area searches were reinstituted on 2d October 1970. Appendix 7 (Periodic Rear Area Searches) to 2d Division UI was prepared to provide necessary guidance for the conduct of the searches. Distribution of this appendix will be completed during the next reporting period.

g. (U) Logistics:

(1) Between 15 August and 25 September, the 2d S&T Battalion moved from Camp Jessup and Camp Adams to the new S&T compound vicinity Kumchon-Ni, Korea.

(2) On 7 October the 2d Infantry Division received the last of the M60A1 tanks. This gave the division a total of 118 M60A1 tanks. At the close of the reporting period 99 of the 121 M60A2C tanks formerly utilized by the division had been retrograded.

h. (U) Engineer:

(1) Since August 1970 the 2d Engineer Battalion has committed nearly all of its resources — three engineer line companies — to completing the rehabilitation of the U.S. Guard Posts. Guard Posts Jane (562), Merry (661), Katie (567), Dessert (563), and Seiler (561) were completed during the period August through October 1970. This makes eight out of a total of eleven Guard Posts that have been rehabilitated as of 31 October 1970. The three remaining Guard Posts vary between ninety-five percent and ninety-nine percent complete. A typical Guard Post complex consists of a 16' X 32' sleeping bunker, a command post, an alternate command post, a varying number of 5' X 5' or 8' X 8' fighting bunkers, a shower, latrine, and supply and ammunition storage bunkers. These facilities are connected by a revetted trench and most of the Guard Post complexes had perimeter fences constructed around them.

(2) Spoonbill Bridge is installed twice a year by the 2d Engineer Battalion — once in the Spring and once in the Fall. The bridge is a combination of a 300' span of M4T6 float bridge extending from the South shore of the Imjin River to a series of four AVLB bridges supported on rock islands, and terminates in a rock causeway leading to the north shore of the River. This fall, deep water and high water velocity from a late monsoon delayed the start of work on rebuilding the rock islands and causeway until mid-September 1970. Subsequent heavy rains destroyed portions of rock islands and causeway and further delayed completion of the bridge. The bridge was opened to traffic on 19 October 1970 and is expected to remain open and in the water until the middle of December 1970.

i. (C) Exercises:

(1) The 2d Infantry Division participated in the I Corps (Gp) CRP OPPOSING FIRE II during the period 10 through 12 September 1970. The primary division objectives for this exercise were:

(a) To refine procedures for displacing to and operating from field locations.

(b) Familiarize new command and staff personnel with tactical operations and procedures.
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(c) Exercise the division communications system and the submission of required reports.

(d) Serve as a training vehicle in preparation for the UNC. Exercise FOCUS LENS.

All of the objectives of the exercise were accomplished.

(2) The 2d Infantry Division participated in the UNC CFX FOCUS LENS FY 71 during the period 12 through 22 October 1970. The primary division objectives for this exercise were:

(a) To evaluate procedures as stated in the 2d Div TAC SOP and Operating Instructions.

(b) To refine procedures for operating from field locations.

(c) Exercise Tactical Operations Center procedures.

(d) To detect shortcomings in existing plans and procedures, and to initiate corrective action where necessary.

All of the objectives of the exercise were accomplished.

j. (U) Legal:

The assignment of legal officers to brigade and equivalent headquarters has increased the potential for rendering legal services to subordinate units and experience has indicated that this potential is being actualized, especially in the fields of military justice, military affairs, and legal assistance. A brigade legal officer is more accessible to both summary and special court-martial convening authorities than a staff officer at Division Headquarters. Thus criminal law expertise is available to those commanders who must make initial determinations regarding the appropriate disposition of criminal charges. Appointing authorities and officers appointed either as investigating or survey officers likewise have expertise readily available to them. Legal assistance is administered on a geographical rather than a command basis, i.e., an individual desiring legal assistance may seek such from the nearest legal officer without reference to the unit of assignment. The assignment of legal officers to five different geographical locations, each of which is centrally located in a brigade area, as well as to Division headquarters, permits individuals to obtain legal assistance from a legal officer in close proximity to him. In addition, legal assistance is furnished at four other locations within the division area on a regular, weekly basis. The degree of accessibility is a factor in the use of available legal services and experience indicates that increasing numbers of personnel are availing themselves of legal assistance.

k. (C) Reorganization of the 3/23 Infantry: Due to personnel shortages within the 2d Infantry Division it was decided to reduce the 3/23 Infantry to caretaker status effective 10 September 1970 in line with the drawdown of troops in Korea. It was then directed by USA that one battalion of the 2d Infantry

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Division be brought to zero strength NLT 31 October 1970. In accordance with this the 3/23 Infantry was selected to be brought to zero strength. Personnel from the 3/23 Infantry were redistributed to other divisional units. The equipment of the 3/23 Infantry was utilized to upgrade equipment in other divisional units. The remainder of the equipment was turned into KINCAR.

1. Army Audit Agency: A team from the U.S. Army Audit Agency operated in the division during most of the quarter. The audit was directed primarily in the area of supply and maintenance management with some work done in personnel management and readiness reporting to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency with which the division used its resources. The team visited the primary staff, AD and the following commands:

   (1) 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry.
   (2) 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry.
   (3) 1st Battalion, 72d Armor.
   (4) 1st Battalion, 12th Artillery.
   (5) 7th Battalion, 17th Artillery.
   (6) 702d Maintenance Battalion.
   (7) 2d Supply and Transportation Battalion.
   (8) 122d Signal Battalion.
   (9) 2d Aviation Battalion.
   (10) 2d Engineer Battalion.

Tentative Statements of Condition and Recommendation (TSOCAR) are in the process of being submitted to the division for comment. It is anticipated that the audit and resulting TSOCARs should be completed by the first of December.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's observation, Evaluations and Recommendations:

   a. Personnel:

      (1) Status of officers and warrant officers:

         (a) Observation: On 1 Aug 70 the Division officer and warrant officer strength was 75% and 93% respectively. These figures represented the lowest officer/warrant officer strength since early this year. During the report period, however, more officers came in than departed. As of 23 Oct 70, the Division had 93% of authorized officers and warrant officers respectively. Currently projected officer gains are sufficient to maintain that strength. In addition, the Division anticipates an influx of officers from the 7th Division as the personnel drawdown continues. The officer influx should bring the total officer/warrant officer strength to MTOE/TDA authorization and probably exceed it.
(b) Evaluation: The Division has maintained an acceptable experience level even though middle grade officers, assigned vs authorized strength, remains at 54% of majors and 51% of captains. Additionally, the large number of lieutenants we received in April and May now have five to six months of solid experience in troop leading.

(c) Recommendation: That in view of the mission of this command, the present assignment priority of the Division be maintained.

(2) Status of Enlisted Personnel:

(a) Observation: Senior enlisted personnel continue slightly below 100% strength. As a whole, however, the Division is approximately 2200 enlisted men below the NEXT authorization. This shortage is slightly less than the Sep 70 figure, which was the lowest level reached in 2 years. Much of the shortage occurs in the middle grades.

(b) Evaluation: The number of enlisted personnel has begun a slight upward movement. A continued increase in the number of enlisted personnel assigned is necessary to insure the Division's ability to accomplish its mission under prolonged combat conditions.

(c) Recommendation: That the assignment priority of the Division remain unchanged, and that actual enlisted strength be increased to the NEXT authorization and maintained at that level.

(3) Judicial Actions:

(a) Observation: Few Company Grade Officers are familiar with the proper procedures for preparation of Court Martial and Board Actions.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of knowledge has resulted in error and delay in processing necessary documentation for such judicial or administrative action. In some instances, Court Martial cases have been dismissed on the basis of speedy trial motions.

(c) Recommendation: That service schools include more military justice training in programs of instruction for Officer Basic and Officer Advanced Courses.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) DTAC Operations:

(a) Observation: The G3 section formerly maintained the 24 hour operation of the DTAC. Intelligence related reports were processed by the G3 representative or G2 personnel on an on call status were contacted. During the reporting period the G2 section initiated a program that provided a G2 representative in the DTAC on a 24 hour basis.
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(b) Evaluation: The addition of a G2 representative in the JTOC 24 hours a day has increased the speed of dissemination of intelligence related reports received from lower, adjacent and higher headquarters. It has also released the G3 representative to concentrate on operational matters.

(c) Recommendation: That various commands that maintain a tactical operations center have representatives from both operations and intelligence staffs on a 24 hour basis.

(2) Collocation of Support Command S-3/S-4 Complex during Tactical Operations:

(a) Observation: The Division Support Command S-3 and S-4 sections have related functions in both garrison and tactical situations. However, under tactical conditions the S-3’s responsibilities in the areas of security, communications, and operations increase far above their garrison levels, and all sections must operate on a 24 hour per day basis while authorized personnel and equipment remain the same.

(b) Evaluation: Both the S2/3 section and the S4 section of the type Support Command organic to active army divisions operate from 23 ton vans in tactical situations. By backing the two vans to within six feet of each other and connecting the vehicles with a prefabricated ramp, it is possible to establish an S3/S4 complex. The advantages of such an arrangement are:

1. The S3 as Division Logistical Operator has the expertise and assistance of the S4 for execution of supply and maintenance operations.

2. Area Damage Control Operations and other areas which call for joint action between the S3 and S4 are better coordinated.

(c) Recommendation: That consideration by other army division Support Commands be given to operating an S3/S4 complex under tactical conditions for better coordination of logistical operations.

d. Organization:

(1) Observation: During September 70 it became necessary to reorganize four maneuver battalions due to shortage of personnel. The reorganization was directed in order that units could maintain tactical integrity for training as well as for operational missions. The units involved were 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry; 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry Mechanized; 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 72d Armor. Commanders were directed to utilize the following steps in accomplishing reorganization:

(a) Step #1. Commanders will, as practicable, reduce or eliminate functions which are not essential to combat readiness.

(b) Step #2. Commanders will reduce headquarters administrative sections to the minimum manning level at which they can still perform required duties in an acceptable manner. Unit mess halls will be consolidated when feasible.

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(c) Step #3.

1. Rifle Companies: If the assigned strength of infantry and mechanized infantry battalions decreases or is below a point where squads no longer have sufficient personnel to constitute an effective force and maintain equipment, commanders will delete a maximum of one rifle squad per platoon and reassign personnel from these squads to other elements of their unit. Rifle squads of less than four men are considered to be ineffective. Therefore, when the strength of a rifle platoon reaches the point where four man rifle squads can not be maintained, the platoon will be reorganized as follows:

   a. Delete one rifle squad and assign personnel to the two remaining rifle squads.

   b. Attach weapons squad personnel and weapons to the two remaining rifle squads. Assistant gunners may be designated as riflemen or grenadiers if required to maintain the two fire team concept.

   c. In mechanized infantry platoons, one driver will be assigned to maintain the deleted rifle squad and weapons squad carriers.

2. Infantry battalion HQ & HQ Company: In conjunction with the reorganization of infantry companies effected in para 2d(c)(1), commanders will take the following actions to reorganize the battalion headquarters and headquarters company.

   a. Delete the rifle squad from the battalion reconnaissance platoon (not applicable to mechanized units).

   b. Reduce the strength of the Heavy Mortar Platoon by reassigning the following personnel to other positions.

      (1) Three radio telephone operators.

      (2) Three ammunition bearers (not applicable to mechanized units).

      (3) Three assistant mortar gunners.

(d) Step #4. If the assigned strength of infantry and mechanized infantry battalions further decreases or remains below the point where squads have sufficient personnel to constitute an effective force and maintain equipment, commanders will delete a maximum of one platoon per rifle company in addition to the measures initiated in Step #3. The actions taken under step #3 will provide two rifle squads in each rifle platoon reinforced with a M60 machinegun and a 90MM recoilless rifle. Based on the rationale that the basic rifle squad should not have less than four men to be effective, and considering the attachment of weapons squad weapons, the squads organized under step #3 must be maintained at not less than six men to be effective. Therefore, when the actions taken under step #3 will not provide six man squads, the rifle company will be reorganized as follows:
1. Delete one rifle platoon and assign personnel to the remaining two platoons.

2. Delete the assistant gunner in the mortar squads of the weapons platoon.

(2) The three Infantry Battalions reorganized line companies with 2 platoons each and 2 squads per platoon. The Tank Battalion reorganized line companies with 3 platoons each, 5 tanks per platoon and 2 men per tank. At the end of the reporting period all units except 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry had received adequate personnel to return to MEU2 organization. The 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry continued to be organized as discussed above.

(3) Evaluation: The reorganization allowed maneuver battalions to maintain tactical integrity for training as well as for operational missions.

(4) Recommendation: That a reorganization plan as discussed above be considered for adoption when units require reorganization due to personnel shortages.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics:

1. Readiness Evaluation Teams Inspections:

(a) Observation: Each Readiness Evaluation Team was allotted 14 hours to inspect a company in a particular area of concern. Three teams would inspect each Saturday alternating between the companies.

(b) Evaluation: It became readily apparent that the time allotted was insufficient for some of the inspection teams. Such areas as flight operations, vehicles and aircraft maintenance could not be adequately covered.

(c) Recommendation: The Readiness Evaluation Teams which require more time will inspect only one company a day. Weekday inspections will be conducted to ensure that all companies are inspected.

2. Heavy Engineer Equipment:

(a) Observation: Due to the diversity and low density of heavy engineer equipment, many repair parts are not readily available causing excessive deadine.

(b) Evaluation: In maintenance and repair of such equipment, it is found that much of it may be kept in operational condition by substitution of similar repair parts. The following examples illustrate problems overcome by substitution. Tubeless tires (17.5 x 25) used by scoop loaders were a constant problem because "O" rings were not in stock. It was found that 5/16" surgical tubing would do the job. Inner tubes for road graders will also work well in
scoop loader tires. Spare plugs for the M151 4-ton truck work well in bridge erection boats, wheel seals and brake return springs from a 5-ton dump truck are workable on the front brakes of a scoop loader. Most hydraulic hoses can be hand made with available bulk hose, by using the old fitting and affixing it to the new hose. The air cooled engine for a 7.5kW Generator can be utilized in some concrete mixers.

(c) Recommendation: That direct and general support units having deadline of low density, heavy engineer equipment investigate substitution and fabrication of repair parts to maintain such equipment in an operational status.

3) Illegible DA Form 1348-1 Copies from Depot:

(a) Observation: This command receives many shipments of spare parts which are accompanied by the 6 & 7 copies of DA Form 1348-1.

(b) Evaluation: The number 6 & 7 copies of DA Form 1348-1 are illegible and difficult to read by receiving direct support units.

(c) Recommendation: That Eighth Army Depot Command pack the number 2 copy of DA Form 1348-1 with the item and place the number 6 & 7 copies on the outside of the pack.

g. Communications: NONE.

h. Material: NONE.

i. Other: NONE.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division for period ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters 1 Corps (Group), APO 96358

TO: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, ATTN: EAGO-T, APO 96301

1. (U) The Operational Readiness Lessons Learned Report for 2nd Infantry Division is forwarded for your information.

2. (C) The following comments concerning the 2nd Infantry Division's OhLL report are submitted:

   a. Reference para 2a(3): Concur. Much of this problem could be solved through assignment to technically qualified legal clerks to all Special Courts - Martial jurisdictions.

   b. Reference para 2c(1): The composition of the Tactical Operations Center at any particular level of command must be geared to the operational requirements of that level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1LT. AGC
Asst AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and forwarding endorsement. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (U) Reference item concerning Status of Officers and Warrant Officers, page 7, para 2a(1). Concur.

3. (C) Reference item concerning Status of Enlisted Personnel, page 8, para 2a(2). Concur. However, as of 6 January 1971, overall enlisted strength of the 2d Division was 91.4 percent of authorized. This reflects a shortage of only 967 enlisted personnel. It is anticipated that by 31 March 1971, the 2d Division will be overstrength in enlisted personnel as a result of assimilation of some 7th Division personnel.

4. (U) Reference item concerning Judicial Actions, page 8, para 2a(3); and 1st Ind, page 13, para 2a. Concur. Additional training of company grade officers in court-martial and administrative board procedures is warranted.

5. (U) Reference item concerning Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC) Operations, page 8, para 2c(1); and 1st Ind, page 13, para 2b. Concur. FM 101-5 states that the composition of the TOC is to be determined by the commander based on the organization and mission of the command.

6. (C) Reference item concerning Collocation of Support Command S3/S4 Complex During Tactical Operations, page 9, para 2c(2). Concur. This arrangement agrees with those considerations for the Support Command Command Post outlined in FM 54-2.

7. (U) Reference item concerning Organization, page 9, para 2d. Concur. The principle of maintaining tactical integrity for training and operational purposes greatly enhances the capability of the unit to accomplish its mission during austere manning periods. The drawback of having less than MTOE organization is offset by providing greater training opportunities and tactical viability to the reduced structure. It should be noted, however, that retention of sufficient personnel for maintenance of equipment is a primary consideration in any reorganization when elements reach zero strength. With reference reference to para 2d(1)(c).
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

the one driver assigned to maintain deleted rifle squad and weapons squad carriers in the mechanized infantry platoon should have no other duties except that of performing maintenance.


10. (U) Reference item concerning Illegible DA Form 1348-1 Copies from Depot, page 12, para 2f(3). Concur, providing that this copy of the 1348-1 is not needed for further administrative processing.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copies furnished:
CG, I Corps (Gp), APO 96358 (Ind only)
CG, 2d Infantry Div, APO 96224 (Ind only)
GPOP-DT (16 Nov 70) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CFO, AGC
Asst AG
## Organization of the 2d Infantry Division - 31 October 1970

### 1st Brigade
- 2-38 Infantry
- 2-72 Armor

### 2d Brigade
- 2-9 Infantry (M)
- 1-38 Infantry
- 1-72 Armor
- 4-7 Cavalry

### 3d Brigade
- 1-9 Infantry
- 2-23 Infantry (M)

### 4th Brigade
- **3-32 Infantry**
- 1-23 Infantry

### 97th (ROK) HCT
- 1st Bn 97th RCT
- 2d Bn 97th RCT
- 3d Bn 97th RCT
- 298th Arty Bn (105) (T)
- 97th Recon Co
- 98th Recon Co
- Engr Co
- Combat Support Co
- Service Co
- Med Det
- QM Det

### Division Artillery
- 1-15 Arty (105) (T)
- 7-17 Arty (105) (T)
- 5-38 Arty (105) (T)
- 6-37 Arty (155) (T) (8") (SP)
- 1-12 Arty (HJ)

### Support Command
- HHC and Band
- 2d Admin Co
- 2d S&T Bn
- 2d Med Bn
- 702d Maint Bn
- 2d Avn Bn

### Division Troops
- 2d Engr Bn
- 122d Sig Bn
- 2d MP Co
- Counter Agent Co
- 2d MI Det
- 3d MP Det
- HHC 2d Inf Div

* H-3d Bde, 7th Inf Div under operational control of 2d Infantry Division.

** 3-32 Inf from 7th Inf Div under operational control of 4th Bde 2d Inf Div.

*** 97th (ROK) RCT from 32d ROK Division under operational control of 2d Inf Div.

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**Inclusion 1**
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.

CG, 2d Infantry Division

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310