<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD514771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FROM:                  |
| Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 AUG 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGO D/A ltr, 2 Apr 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 2 Apr 1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY
MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. The US Army Combat Developments Command is evaluating the flame drop technique discussed in paragraph 1b(4)(d), page 17 of the inclosed report. Pending final results of this evaluation, Army-wide use of the flame drop technique is not recommended.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

1 Incl as

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Civil Affairs School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Combat Surveillance School
US Army Electronic Warfare School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Commanding Generals
Deseret Test Center
III Corps, ATTN: Director, Project MASSTER
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
OPERATIONAL REPORT—LESSONS LEARNED
HEADQUARTERS FIRST FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. Intelligence

(1) General: During the quarter, intelligence operations were conducted in support of allied units engaged in pacification and military operations. Particular emphasis was directed toward providing intelligence for operations in the Cambodian sanctuaries adjacent to MR 2 and to determining the effects on the enemy in MR 2 as a result of those operations. Continuing emphasis was placed on locating elements of the 3d NVA Division in BINH DINH Province, and in supporting TF South in the Southern Region.

(2) ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:

(a) Disposition of NVA/VC Main Forces is shown in Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in Order of Battle holdings during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>STR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th Local Force Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263d Trans Battalion</td>
<td>Possible 300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2 Trans Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5 Trans Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6 Trans Battalion</td>
<td>Possible 280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7 Trans Battalion</td>
<td>Possible 380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-11 Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Probable Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-16 Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-21 Convalescent Battalion</td>
<td>Probable Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-22 Convalescent Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-23 Convalescent Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-25 Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>Confirmed 180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNIT

K-26 Signal Battalion
K-27 Guard Battalion
K-44 Artillery Battalion
9th Local Force Battalion

UNIT

K-26 Signal Battalion
Confirmed

K-27 Guard Battalion
Probable

K-44 Artillery Battalion
Probable

9th Local Force Battalion
Possible

2 Units Removed:
22 NVA Regiment
K-25A NVA Battalion
K-25B NVA Battalion
K-GI Artillery Battalion
K-42 Artillery Battalion

2 Unit designation Change:
300 (405) LF Sapper Battalion to:
405th (300) LF Sapper Battalion

(3) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques: The period May through July 1970 saw enemy tactics in MR 2 characterized by seasonal campaigns, conducted during periods of reduced lunar illumination. This time span saw the enemy engaged in the last two phases of his summer campaign. The second phase of this campaign occurred in Mid-May and another took place in the last 10 days of June when there was a slight increase in enemy activity throughout MR 2. During the month of July, the number of enemy incidents declined significantly from earlier levels. The allied incursions into enemy Cambodian sanctuaries in May and June appear to have had strong repercussions on enemy activity in MR 2. Except for the 3 battalion attack on DaLat City and Duc Trong, 30 May to 1 June, the enemy has reverted to small unit actions. In the highlands there has been a marked decrease in standoff attacks employing 107 and 122mm rockets, while in BINH DINH Province there has been a steady increase in terrorist activity. Late June and early July also saw C/N North target by increasing numbers of standoff attacks and sapper actions, a further impression of the apparent effect of the allied Cambodian operations on enemy activity in MR 2 can be gained from the enemy's directives to his units to conserve ammunition and food.

(4) Enemy losses and Strengths:

(a) Total enemy military losses in MR 2 for May, June and July 1970:
(Dow is 35% of KIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY 70</th>
<th>JUNE 70</th>
<th>JULY 70</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/S</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL
## Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force

### Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. **Enemy strengths at beginning and end of the quarter:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 April 1970</th>
<th>31 July 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>15,355</td>
<td>19,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF/LF</td>
<td>9,121</td>
<td>11,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMIN</td>
<td>5,245</td>
<td>4,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUERRILLA</td>
<td>9,936</td>
<td>9,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>12,554</td>
<td>11,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52,211</td>
<td>56,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (5) Enemy Capabilities; vulnerabilities and probable courses of action.

#### (a) Enemy Capabilities:

1. **B-3 Front and MR 10:** The overall capability of enemy forces to conduct limited stand-off attacks, small scale ground actions, and other economy of force operations remains unchanged. Enemy units in the B-3 Front and MR 10 areas are also capable of conducting coordinate highpoints throughout the region of 1-2 days in duration. It is estimated that enemy units in these areas are not capable of supporting a prolonged offensive similar to DAK SEANG within the next few months. Specifically, in the B-3 Front area, the enemy’s capability is enhanced because of the nearness of some friendly installations to his border base areas. His forces are capable of launching up to a two-regiment size attack against the border camps in western KONTUM Province, and up to a three battalion size against the border camps in PLEIKU Province. Reinforcements in the tri-border region probably consist of three battalions, while reinforcements in the PLEIKU border area are probably limited to two battalions. Farther inland enemy forces are capable of conducting stand-off attacks, generally of less than ten rounds of rockets/mortars, against major installations near KONTUM, PLEIKU, and BAN ME THOUT Cities. Units operating near major LOC’s are capable of harassing traffic along these routes through the use of mines, B40 rockets and small arms fire. Enemy units are capable of conducting up to company sized attacks against district headquarters and RF/PF secured hamlets and villages utilizing small arms, B40’s and 60/82mm mortars. In MR 10, enemy forces are capable of attacking CIDG camps, district headquarters, and hamlet/village security units with platoon to company size forces. A limited capability exists for rapid reinforcement in this area; it is estimated to be from one platoon to a company sized element. The enemy units in this area have demonstrated a limited capability to interdict traffic along LOC’s, and they are capable of employing small arms, B40 rockets and 60/82mm mortars. As a result of the prolonged offensive in northwestern KONTUM and the cross-border operations in May–June, enemy capabilities in the B-3 Front and MR 10 regions have been significantly reduced. Past experience indicates that enemy forces usually require from 4-6 months to conduct resupply, refitting, and training activities. After a major offensive has been terminated. The Cambodian operations probably upset the enemy’s timetable for future operations, as time will be required to establish new base areas or to rebuild present bases. Additionally, allied operations have probably caused some delay in the infiltration of men and supplies from the north, and arrival times should be further delayed because of the monsoon rains.
2. MR 5: In KHANH HOA Province, the enemy can conduct standoff attacks against allied installations in the GAM RANH BAY area, the NHA TRANG area and other district and province installations throughout the province. He is capable of delivering rounds up to 140mm, and he can conduct sapper attacks against these installations as well as lightly populated areas. He has a significant sapper capability in GAM RANH BAY and NHA TRANG areas. Terrorist activities are a logical line of action for the local force units in this province. The enemy retains the capability to interdict lines of communications by ambushes, minefields and sabotage. In PHU YEN Province, the enemy is capable of conducting small-scale harassing actions targeted mainly against GVN pacification efforts. The enemy can conduct attacks by fire and sapper attacks against installations in TUY HOA, PHU RIEP and VUNG ROY BAY areas, as well as district headquarters. He can terrorize the population and interdict Highways 1 and 7D. In BINH DINH Province, the enemy has the capability to attack the population centers as well as US, GVN, and ROKA installations and can restrict movement on Highways 4L 1 and 19 by employing ambushes, mines or sabotage against bridges. The enemy is capable of conducting sapper and terrorist activities against friendly installations along the coast. With the presence of the 3RD NVA Div, the enemy in BINH DINH has the capability to stage large scale attacks.

2. MR 6: In Military Region 6, the enemy is capable of conducting multi-battalion attacks against selected targets for a duration of 1-2 days as was seen during the tri-battalion attack against SONG MAO in April and the tri-battalion attack in DALAT during May. The enemy is also capable of utilizing 60 and 82mm mortars, recoilless rifles and RCL, and 107mm rockets during the attacks by fire. The enemy can interdict traffic along the major LOCs in the region via small ambushes, sniping and mining. He can use action arrow teams and other local force units to impress military age male in order to replenish his forces. He can also attempt to disrupt GVN pacification in the area by continuing to target the civilian populace through terrorism, assassinations, and extortion. The enemy has limited capability to reinforce his elements with less than company-size force. Since the recent cambodian operations, we have received reports that the infiltration of supplies into the MR-6 region has been hampered, but to what extent is not known at this time. It is also believed that the monsoon season will hamper the enemy's resupply efforts to a limited extent for the next three months.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

1. Enemy supply lines are generally insecure, rendering supply caches vulnerable to friendly search and destroy operations.

2. The enemy has limited logistical support and cannot conduct extended offensive operations unless he is near sanctuary areas.

3. He is vulnerable to superior allied fire-power when he masses near an objective and during withdrawal from the same.

Continued food shortages, sicknesses and heavy losses among the enemy may lead to low morale, a situation that can be exploited by friendly psychological operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, AGS GSFOR-65 (R2)

5. Enemy reliance on impressed local civilians as a labor source is a vulnerability that may alienate them from the populace.

(c) Probable Courses of Action:

1. B-3 Front and MR 10: Enemy probable courses of action in B-3 Front and MR-10 will probably remain the same for the coming quarter. For the most part, the enemy is expected to continue harassing attacks along major LOC'S, particularly QL 11 and 18, conduct periodic stand-off attacks against major cities and RF/FF Allied installations, and launch attacks of from platoon to company size against district headquarters and RF/FF secured hamlets and villages. One possible course of action is to continue acts of terrorism in a continuing effort to disrupt the pacification program and the Vietnamization process.

2. MR-5: In BINH DINH Province, enemy objectives are to disrupt and destroy the GVN Pacification Program. To accomplish this, the enemy can be expected to initiate sapper attacks, limited ground attacks and attacks by fire against Allied/GVN installations, RF/FF posts and populated centers. Terrorist activity and LOC interdiction can also be expected in this province. The greatest number of attacks will occur in the 6 coastal districts with periods of increased activity as frequently as once a month. In PHU YEN Province, overall enemy activity should remain light during the next three months. Although the main enemy effort will consist of anti-pacification activities such as assassinations and abductions, he will probably conduct ground attacks of up to 2 platoon size against RF/FF units as well as attacks by fire and sapper attacks on larger targets. During periods of increased activity, in KHAM HOA Province, the enemy may conduct attacks by fire combined with sapper attacks on major installations within the province. However, his continuing effort will be directed against local GVN officials and the pacification program. The DINH HOA area and the CAM RANH BAY area are expected to be the main targets in the enemy's plans. RF/FF units can expect to receive ground attacks and attacks by fire.

3. MR-6: In the southern provinces, attacks by fire combined with ground probes are the enemy's main and most effective courses of action. RF/FF units in the defense of the GVN pacification program probably will continue to be the primary targets for these attacks. PHAN RANG AB probably will be the enemy's target for attacks by fire, while the population center to the south of PHAN RANG CITF will continue to receive harassing stand-off attacks and sniping fire. In TUYEN DUC Province, the enemy will probably continue to conduct stand-off attacks and ground probes against the key installations in DALAT and DUC TRONG Training Center, along with interdiction of the LOC'S by sniping and ambushes.


(a) Changes in Sources, Agencies and Techniques: Continued use of all available reporting channels, particularly close coordination with local personnel, has enhanced the exchange of intelligence. This has in turn provided a more current picture of the enemy situation and more timely dissemination of intelligence to the interested consumer.
AVFA-C?-HIST


(b) G-2 Collection: During the period 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970 all captured weapons and materials were processed and evacuated through SL/SL channels. During the period, IFW Teams screened and classified 42 Ho Chi Minh's, 43 innocent civilians, 41 civil defendants and 86 prisoners of war. As a result of these interrogations a total of 76 FIRs and 24 IRA's were produced and distributed. IFW teams translated a total of 80 allied reports from Vietnamese or Korean to English.

(c) Detachment D, 1st MI BN (ARS): During the reporting period 1 May through 31 July 70, Detachment D, 1st MI BN (ARS) interpreted 622 photographic objectives, (240,728) frames and prepared 590 reports which contained 1148 new items. The reproduction section processed 950 prints to meet the requirements of 23 reproduction requests. The delivery section flew 215 sorties in support of all Free World Military Forces in MR 2 transporting 7,335 pounds of cargo. Hand held missions continued to receive emphasis within the detachments overall operations. It flew 3 hand held missions resulting in 250 developed prints.

(d) Imagery Interpretation, 55th Military Intelligence Detachment: For the period 1 May 70 through 31 July 70, the Imagery Interpretation Section, 55th Military Intelligence Detachment (Corps) received 266 in country missions and processed 209.

1 Production:

a There were 62 photo interpretation reports produced and disseminated during the quarter.

b There were 24 special projects (includes Mosaics, trail studies, overlays, confirmation of other reports, etc) completed for requesters during the quarter.

2 There were numerous missions interpreted covering roads and the border area and providing current information on these areas to the G-2 Air, II DASC and 64th Engineer Detachment (T).

3 In addition to the MR 2, this Section's mission was temporarily expanded to include support of recent allied military operations in Cambodia.

4 Current master plates were maintained covering the MR 2 in support of the Tactical Data Overprint (Map) Program accomplished by the 64th Engineer Detachment (T).

5 There were 14 visitors briefed during the quarter.

(e) Company C, 75th Inf (Ranger): On 4 May 1970, Company C became OCPON to the 4th Inf Div, and established a FOB at Pleiku. Operations were conducted in and around BA 702, terminating on 24 May 70. This operation resulted 26 enemy sightings, and 23 contacts; accounting for 30 enemy KIA (BC), five enemy KIA (F), and 15 weapons captured. From 28 May to 13 June 1970, Company C, was OCPON to TF5, and conducted operations in the DALAT area. This operation resulted in seven enemy sightings and four contacts. The enemy sightings and contacts resulted in six enemy killed (KIA), and an enemy medical site was found containing 2390 lbs of rice and foodstuffs, 1400 lbs of rice, and 1400 lbs of foodstuffs.
AVFA-GG-HBT

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG GSFOR-65 (R2)

Lbs of medical supplies, 50 lbs of documents and other items of uniform and equipment. In addition, five small arms were captured. From 14 June to 23 July 1970, Company C continued under the OPCON of TPG, establishing a FOB in PHAN THIET and operating along the MR 2/MR 3 border. Operations in this area accounted for 34 enemy sightings, and 20 contacts; resulting in 15 enemy KIA (BC), 3 enemy KIA (P), 2 FVs and 11 weapons captured and 5 suspects detained. Also, numerous documents and items of clothing and equipment were captured.

(f) The 64th Engineer Detachment (T) has accomplished the following tasks:

1. Received the updated tactical data overprinted map sheets (1:50,000) from the 66th Engr Co (TOPO) (Corps) for the MR 2.

2. Updated and forwarded 6 each tactical data map sheets (1:50,000) to the 66th Engr Co (TOPO) (Corps) for overprinting.

3. Completed compilation of the MR 2 deposits of construction materials study. This information will be available in tabulated booklet form by 31 August 1970.

4. Received and compiled 90 percent of the required feeder reports for the MR 2 infiltration route study update. It is estimated that the 64th EDT will complete the compilation and drafting of study to forward it to the 66th Engr Co (TOPO) (Corps) for overprinting by 15 August 1970.

5. Completed 3 in depth terrain studies and initiated work on 3 additional terrain studies for G-2 Operations.

6. A total of 26 map-product and production requests were processed by this office.

(g) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron: During the period the following types of weather support were furnished to agencies and units in II MR:

1. I FFORCE: Forecasting, Weather Warnings, Staff Support, Climatological Support and Mobile Observation Teams.

2. 4th Infantry Division: Forecasting, Weather Warnings, Staff Support, Observing and Climatological Support.

3. AN KHE: Observations, Forecasts, and Weather Warnings as required.

4. DALAT (GAM LX Airfield): Observations, Forecasts and Weather Warnings as required.

5. ENGLISH AI: Observation, Forecasts, and Weather Warnings as required.

6. PHAN THIET AI: Observations, Forecasts, and Weather Warnings as required.

7. TASK FORCE SOUTH: Forecasts, Climatological Support, and Weather Warnings as required.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST 15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 70, MACV CSFOR-65 (R2)

(h) G-2 Air:

1. During the quarter the G-2 Air continued to make available one OV-1 Mohawk aircraft from the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company to the 4th Infantry Division daily. Other units are furnished Mohawks upon request.

2. During the reporting period the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company continued to provide SIAR coverage along the border areas in accordance with the MACV Reconnaissance requirements.

3. The preponderance of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets were concentrated along known or suspected infiltration routes and base areas. Extensive reconnaissance and surveillance was also scheduled in areas selected by the OG for intensified reconnaissance efforts. During the period, ten intensive reconnaissance areas were covered. These areas were covered by OV-1 Mohawk SIAR and infra red sensors and Air Force infra red and photography. Visual reconnaissance was provided twice daily in each area by O-1 aircraft of Division, Brigade and/or province as directed by the headquarters.

4. During the period 1 May through 31 July the OV-1 Mohawk completed 301 photo, 5,179 infra red and 370 SIAR targets. The Air Force completed 503 infra red and photo targets in 251 sorties. The results of the completed missions were furnished to the commanders concerned.

(7) Deviations from current intelligence doctrine: None

(8) Recommendations for New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization: None

(9) Comments and Explanation of Significant Changes in Variance with the Previous report: None

(10) Weather:

(a) General: Light southerly flow prevailed over 2d Military Region through May with southwest monsoon setting in by 3 June. The onset of the southwest monsoon resulted in cloudy wet weather for interior sections while good weather prevailed over the coastal area.

(b) Coastal: Skies were generally fair to partly cloudy with isolated to few rainshowers and thunderstorms forming over the mountains and occasionally moving over coastal stations from 1500H to 2200H. During brief periods of southeast flow in May, rainshowers would move over coastal areas from the ocean during the early morning hours. During periods of moderate to strong southwesterly flow (13-14 Jun., 19-21 June, and 2-17 July), mostly cloudy skies prevailed over the coastal regions. There was also increased afternoon and evening shower activity during these periods. In May surface winds were generally light and variable except for a 10-20 knot southwesterly sea breeze from 1100H to 1800H daily. In June and July winds were westerly at 5-15 knots except in areas sheltered by coastal mountains where winds were light.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST
15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CEFOR-65 (R2)

and variable with a 10-15 knot easterly sea breeze. During periods of increased
southwest monsoonal flow, westerly winds as high as 40 knots were reported at RVN
HOA as winds were funneled down the valley.

(c) Interior: During May, prevailing skies were partly cloudy with few rain-
showers and thunderstorms during the afternoons and early evenings. Patchy fog
and stratus formed by 0200 and usually dissipated by 1000H. After the onset of the
southwest monsoon in early June, skies were mostly cloudy during the mornings becom-
ing partly cloudy in the afternoons. A few rainshowers and thunderstorms occurred
in the afternoons and evenings. During periods of moderate to strong southwest flow
(13-14 June, 19-21 June and 2-17 July) skies were cloudy with rain, drizzle and fog
reducing visibilities to 1 - 2 miles between 2100H and 1200H daily. A few rain-
showers and isolated thunderstorms occurred primarily during the afternoons and
evenings. Surface winds were light and variable through May becoming southwesterly
at 5 - 15 knots after June. During periods of increased flow, wind gusts up to 50
knots were reported in areas where topography caused channeling.

(d) Effects on Operations: There were 602 TAC sorties cancelled due to weather
and 1558 reconnaissance targets cancelled due to weather during the period. No other
effects are known.

b. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Plans: During the reporting period 2 OPLANs and 5 studies were published.
In addition the 2d Quarterly Review was hosted by ROKV-FC in HIA TRANG on 29 July 1970.

(a) Plans:

1. OPLAN 107-70 was published on 14 May 1970. The plan provides for Armor Support
for ROK Forces.

2. OPLAN 190-70 was published on 18 June 1970. The plan provides Guidance on
Repatriation of US Prisoners of War.

(b) Studies:

1. A study concerning the security assignment in the Highlands border Province
and disposition of DAK SEANG Camp was prepared on 14 May 70. The study concluded
that the DAK SEANG Camp should be closed.

2. A study concerning the three major border battles in the past year, Binh HST,
BO PRANG/DUC LAP and DAK SEANG was prepared on 25 June 1970. The study was oriented
toward determining how the border battles had been fought. Conclusions drawn indicated
that ARVN Commanders did not aggressively engage the enemy with forces avail-
able.

3. A study concerning the disposition of the DAK PEK CIDG Camp was prepared on
3 July 1970. Conclusions drawn indicate that the camp should be closed.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

A study was prepared on 14 July and forwarded to the field on the concept for the
security of the MR 2. The study was forwarded to the field for comments on 16
July 1970.

(c) Quarterly Summary: The Second Quarterly Summary on the attainment of goals
of the 1970 CCP in the MR 2 and the activities of the MR 2 units was submitted to
MACV on 15 July 1970.

(d) The Quarterly Measurement of Progress Report was prepared on 12 July 1970
and forwarded to MACV.

(e) The 2d Quarterly Review on the Progress toward attaining the 1970 CCP goals
and the problems encountered was hosted by the ROV-FC on 29 July 70 in AHA TRANG.
Major areas of interest reviewed at the conference included ARVN, ROK and US operations,
intelligence and status of pacification and the implementation of the area
security concept in the 22d and 23d Division TAOR's.

(2) Summary of Ground Operations: (MAY, JUNE, JULY)

(a) Major Operations: (see Inc 2) During the reporting period, the disposition
of allied units in the 2d Military Region (MR 2) remained relatively constant with
emphasis placed on the employment of regular force units in combat operations, and
the use of Regional and Popular force elements to continue the intensified pacification
program. CIDG assets were reduced to two Mobile Strike Force Battalions of three com-
pa nies and 36 Camp Strike Force (CSF) Companies. The conversion of CSF elements into
Regional Forces Companies to supplement local security and pacification programs con-
tinues throughout the highland provinces. The objectives of ground operations continue
to be the destruction of enemy main force units, elimination of VCI/guerrilla
forces and the protection of the population.

US Operations: 4th Infantry Division initiated five brigade size operations
during the reporting period, conducted one joint US/ARVN operation in Cambodia util-
izing six maneuver battalions and support elements, and conducted six battalion size
security and combat operations under divisional control. BINH TAI I, a combined US/
ARVN combat operation was initiated on 5 May in the Cambodian Province of RATTANAKI
bordering PLEIKU Province. US forces were withdrawn from the operation by 16 May with
results of 30 friendly killed and 72 wounded, 150 enemy killed, 6 detained, 23 small
arms and 34 crew served weapons and 574 tons of rice captured. 1st Bde commenced
Operation WAYNE JUMP, on 16 May in PLEI TRAP Valley of western KONTUM Province and
terminated on 26 May. Results from this operation were 3 friendly killed and 16
wounded. On 1 June the 1st Bde 4th Inf division initiated operation WAYNE HURDLE
in the DAK PHIAU (Tri Province area of PLEIKU, BINH DINH and PHU BON) which terminated
on 26 June with results of 6 friendly killed and 21 wounded, 53 enemy killed, 4 de-
tained, 6 small arms and 4 crew served weapons captured. 1st Bde commenced Operation
WAYNE FAST, on 20 June in northern BINH DINH Province targeted against infiltration
routes and terminated on 14 July with 1 friendly killed and 16 wounded, 6 enemy killed,
3 detained and 9 small arms captured. On 18 May 2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div commenced operation
PUTNAM PARAGON in BINH DINH Province targeted against elements of the 3d NVA
Div. This operation continues with results of 6 friendly killed and 27 wounded, 115
enemy killed, 26 detained and 43 small arms captured during the reporting period.
Operation WAYNE SPAN was initiated by Ist Bde on 17 July in BASE AREA 236 of BINH DINH Province and continues with period results of 1 friendly killed and 3 wounded.

Three road security operations under 4th Div control were conducted during the period.

PAUL SILVER with 1-10 Cav which began on 1 March continues security of QL-17 between PLEIKU and the ROK boundary in BINH DINH. Operation FREEDOM GOLD with 2-1 Cav (-) provided road security for QL-19 from Camp Enari to PLEIKU in BINH DINH Province during the period 19 to 26 May. The 2-3 Inf (Mech) provided security on QL-19 from PLEIKU to DOG 00 in Operation WRIGHT BLUE from 24 to 28 June. Three combat operations with 2-8 Inf (Mech) were conducted during the period under 4th Division control.

Operation CHEMICAL BLUE, 14 - 28 May in BINH THUAN Province, Operation ROBERT WHITE, 2-9 June in BINH DINH Province and Operation BRANDS BLUE, 2-22 July in BINH DINH Province. Total results for these operations were 2 friendly killed and 13 wounded, 3 enemy killed, 3 detained and 1 small arms captured. The 173d Airborne Brigade has continued Pacification Operation WASHINGTON GREEN throughout reporting period with five battalions in BINH DINH Province. Total results since 20 April were 38 friendly killed and 355 wounded, 459 enemy killed, 142 small arms and 15 crew served weapons captured. Task Force South (TFS) has conducted numerous operations against the local/main force enemy in BINH THUAN Province and operated jointly with the ARVN 44th Regt and the local Regional and Popular Force units. The 3-506 Abn Inf Abn became OPCON to TFS on 16 June to conduct an operation in northern BINH THUAN Province against local force enemy. The operation, HANGCOCK HAWK, terminated on 30 June with negative results. On 5 July operation HANGCOCK GOLD commenced in the Tri Province area of BINH THUAN, LAT DOONG and BINH TUY (MR 3). The AO extension into BINH TUY Province was in coordination with a simultaneous operation conducted by elements of the 199th Infantry Bde in the MR 3. These operations were targeted against the enemy HQ elements of MR6. HANGCOCK GOLD terminated on 21 July with results of 6 friendly killed and 23 wounded, 17 enemy killed, 7 detained and 7 small arms captured. Total results for TFS since 30 April are 17 friendly killed and 90 wounded, 99 enemy killed, 31 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured.

2 ROK Operations: During the reporting period the ROK Forces conducted two major operations and deployed their units into the field on numerous occasions for short duration operations aimed at supporting the overall campaign goals. Operation OK SURI 70-1 which commenced on 22 April continued into the month of May. The 26th and Cav Regiments of the GRIDL withdrew from the operation on 3 May, and the 28th and 29th Regiments of the WGRID continued their mission against the Local Force En's and local VC/VCI in PHU YEN Province until 18 May at which time the operation was terminated. Final results were 18 friendly killed, 53 wounded, 545 enemy killed, 12 detained, 303 small arms and 40 crew served weapons captured. On 16 July, the 1st, 26th and Cav Regiments of the GRIDL initiated Operation RO BANG 1 in BINH DINH Province (Base Area 226). Targeted against the 18th NVA Regiment this operation terminated 31 July 70 with results of 11 friendly killed and 39 wounded, 98 enemy killed, 99 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured.

3 ARVN Operations: During the reporting period ARVN forces conducted four highly successful large scale operations in Cambodia and 38 battalion size combat operations within the MR 2. By utilizing short term operations on the fringes of populated areas, ARVN units were able to increase their role as a combat force yet still contribute...
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GG-ILIT


August 1970

significantly to the pacification mission. BINH TAY I, a combined ARVN/US CBT operation, was initiated on 5 May in the Cambodian Province of RATANAKIRI bordering PLEIKU Province. The 40th Regt (4) continued operations within their AO until 25 May with final results of 10 friendly killed and 88 wounded, 116 enemy killed, 19 small arms, 3 crew served weapons and 23 tons of rice captured. Operation BINH TAY II was initiated on 13 May in the Cambodian Province of RATANAKIRI with 40th Regt, 27th Regt and elements of the 93rd and 14th ARVN Cav Sqdn. The operation terminated on 28 May with results of 7 friendly killed and 34 wounded, 73 enemy killed, 476 small arms, 136 crew served weapons and 39 tons of rice captured. On 20 May, a two phase operation, BINH TAY III, began in the Cambodian Province of WONGOLKIRI bordering QUANG NGO Province. Elements of the 44th Regt, 45th Regt, 53rd Regt, 8th ARVN Cav and four ARVN Scout Co's participated. Phase 1 ended on 12 June and Phase 2 covered the period 20-27 June. Final results were 26 friendly killed and 74 wounded, 141 enemy killed, 587 small arms, 133 crew served weapons and 412 tons of rice captured. On 30 May, the 1st Bn 53rd Inf and 1st Bn 44 Inf initiated CBT operation TU CUONG 43 in TUYEN DUONG Province. This operation terminated on 6 June with 1 friendly killed and 12 wounded, 14 enemy killed, 3 detained and 4 small arms captured. The 40th and 41st Regiments on their return to BINH DINH Province initiated operation DAN NAM 5 on 5 June. The operation terminated on 20 June with results of 16 friendly killed and 49 wounded, 47 enemy killed, 19 detained, 26 small arms and 2 crew served weapons captured. BINH TAY IV, a joint ARVN/US operation, was planned and conducted in coordination with Cambodian government officials for the purpose of evacuating military and civilian personnel from the areas of BA KEV and LE BAN SIEK, Cambodia. ARVN forces provided highway and airfield security with USAF and VNAF aircraft conducting extraction. During the 3 day period 24-26 June, 7,589 personnel were evacuated bringing with them 3,256 small arms and 362 crew served weapons. Operation DAN AN 6 with the 3rd and 4th Bn's 40th Inf and 1st Bn 41st Inf commenced on 17 July in BINH DINH Province and continues with results for the period of 2 friendly killed and 11 wounded, 14 enemy killed and 6 small arms captured. (Cont'd Incl 9)

(b) Highland Provinces (MAY, JUNE, JULY)

Enemy initiated activity in the Highland Provinces (KONTUM, PLEIKU, PHU DON, DARLAC and QUANG NGO) represented an overall decrease of approximately 12% from the prior reporting period. The most significant changes involved KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces. The former had a total of 562 enemy initiated incidents from Feb thru April and 315 from May thru July which represents a decrease of approximately 44%. PLEIKU on the other hand showed an increase of approximately 44%. Friendly initiated incidents showed an overall decrease of 28% and was relatively consistent throughout all five provinces.

ARVN Operations: The 42d Regiment conducted 6 battalion sized operations in KONTUM Province, directed against the local VC. None of these had significant results. The 14th ARVN Cav maintains the responsibility for road security on Hwy 14 between KONTUM and TAN CANG. The 47th Regt and the 2nd Ranger Group operate in PLEIKU Province and have conducted 9 battalion sized operations against elements of the 95B NVA Regt, LE Bn's and local VC/VCI. The 45th Regiment operates primarily in DARLAC Province and conducts both pacification and combat operations. The 3rd Bn 53rd Regiment conducted one operation in QUANG NGO Province during July which terminated without significant results.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST
15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters 1 Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSF08-65 (82)

2 RF/PF Operations: During the reporting period RF/PF units in the Highland Provinces increased their role in the security and pacification of local populated areas and contributed to an 8% decrease in terrorist activity. A significant contact occurred on 08 May at 1318 hours when the 752 RF Co engaged an estimated enemy company at 5Q08864 in PHU DON Province. TAC Air supported the engagement which lasted 25 minutes. There were no friendly casualties while 8 enemy were killed, 2 PW's and 5 small arms captured. On 03 June at 0300 hours, an unknown size enemy force entered DA NHOA Hamlet and burned the village office. The 11 RF and 125 RF reacted and engaged the enemy. There was 1 friendly killed and 8 wounded, enemy casualties were 11 killed, 24 small arms captured and 1 crew served weapon destroyed.

(c) Coastal Provinces: (MAY, JUNE, JULY)

Overall activity in the Coastal Provinces (BINH DINH, PHU YEN, and KHAHN HOA) showed a decrease of approximately 18% during the reporting period. PHU YEN and KHAHN HOA Provinces demonstrated a slight increase in enemy initiated incidents while BINH DINH Province had a decrease of 25%. In contrast, friendly initiated incidents remained at a relatively constant level. The large numbers of civilian abductions which prevailed during the previous reporting period in PHU YEN Province was not recurrent from May thru June.

1 ARVN Operations: The 40th and 41st Regiments continued pacification and combat operations in BINH DINH Province during the reporting period. On 06 May at BR5824/2, in BINH DINH Province a 27 Trans En convoy received small arms and B-40 fire from an unknown size enemy force. Gunships supported the contact and the 405 ARVN Scout Company reacted and swept the area. 1 ARVN was killed, 3 US wounded and 13 enemy killed by reacting forces. On the 15th of May at BR910510 in BINH DINH Province an element of the NCO's and cadre from the PHU CAT Training Center while on bivouac received small arms and B-40 fire. ROK artillery supported the hour long contact, which resulted in 3 ARVN killed and 26 ARVN wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown. The 2/41 ARVN operating in PHU NY District of BINH DINH Province engaged an unknown size enemy force at BR370634 on 22 May. The contact broke 40 minutes later resulting in 3 ARVN killed and 3 wounded, while 7 enemy were killed, 1 PW captured and 4 small arms captured.

2 US Operations: The 4th Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) continued operations in BINH DINH Province. The 4th Div maintains security on Hwy 19 and conducts brigade and battalion size operations against the 3d NVA Div, 95 B NVA Regt, 18 NVA Regt and various local force and VC elements. Three significant contacts occurred during the month of June involving US elements. On the 2nd of June at BR124316, D/1-11 Inf observed an estimated enemy company in relatively open ground. Gunships from C/7-17A Cav and D/2-1 Cav reacted immediately and killed 28 enemy with no friendly casualties. Two unrelated contacts took place on 20 June, one at BR994814 in which B/1-22 Inf supported by gunships engaged an estimated enemy company throughout the morning. Results were 1 US killed and 2 US wounded with 25 enemy killed, 2 small arms and 30 rucksacks captured. At BR966688 on the afternoon of the same day elements of the 173d Bde found a company size base camp and engaged an unknown number of enemy. There were no friendly casualties and 21 enemy killed, 10 small arms and 3 crew served weapons captured.
AVFA-GG-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROCS GSPOR-65 (R2)

1. ROK Operations: The two Republic of KOREA Divisions are employed almost exclusively in the Coastal Provinces. The ROK's conduct an average of 150 small unit actions each day to include ambushes, search and clear operations and the responsibility of securing the areas around the major installations. Their most significant results are reflected in the major operations of which two were conducted during this reporting period.

2. RF/FF Operations: The number of company size operations conducted by RF/FF units in the Coastal Provinces increased 50% over the previous reporting period. In BINH DINH Province they have compiled a 1:2.4 Friendly to Enemy kill ratio and accounted for approximately 25% of all friendly initiated incidents. On 15 May at BR997656, in BINH DINH Province an element of the 732 RP Co was engaged by an enemy company. Elements from the 400, 277 RP and 44 and 39 FF reacted to the contact. ARVN artillery supported combined with gunships. The day long contact broke at 1745 hours and resulted in 7 RF killed, 9 wounded and 2 missing with 16 enemy killed and 1 small arms captured. On 20 May at BR920361, the 230 and 78 PF platoons at KHANH LE Hamlet received small arms, B-40 and mortar fire from an estimated 2 enemy companies. Elements of four RF Co's reacted and were involved in sporadic contact throughout the day. Artillery and gunships supported and final results were 9 friendly killed and 24 wounded, 19 enemy killed and 3 small arms captured. PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces RF/FF units were involved primarily in small contacts and skirmished throughout the period. Few units were able to effectively react against enemy elements which had already entered small hamlets for terrorist activities, although their physical presence in populated areas combined with screening operations, night ambushes and outposts significantly reduced the frequency of such acts.

(d) Southern Provinces: (MAY, JUNE, JULY)

Of the three geographical regions of the 2d Military Region, the Southern Provinces (NIEN THUAN, BINH THUAN, TUYEN DUC and LAM DONG) have consistently had a lower level of enemy activity. During the reporting period this area showed an increase of enemy initiated incidents by almost 7%. BINH THUAN Province continues to carry the brunt of activity and is the base for the 44th ARVN Regt and Task Force South. The number of friendly initiated incidents has decreased approximately 43% from the previous period and is partly due to the absence of ARVN units during the Cambodian Operations.

1. ARVN Operations: The 44th ARVN Regiment operates primarily in BINH THUAN Province and has conducted 8 battalion sized operations during the reporting period. Three of these were conducted with US elements of Task Force South. One significant contact occurred at AN771095 on 26 May in which 1/4/44 Regt engaged an unknown number of enemy during a sweep. There were no friendly casualties and 7 enemy were killed with 2 small arms captured. The 53d Regiment operates primarily in LAM DONG and TUYEN DUC Provinces and has conducted 6 battalion sized operations targeted against local VC. The majority were of short duration and none had significant results.

2. US Operations: Task Force South has operated with as few as one battalion (1-56th Inf Mech) and as many as three battalions (1-50th Inf, 2-1 Cav, 3-506 Abn Inf) under its control. The implementation of H & G (Special Training and Advisory
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-SC-HIST

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFDR-65 (R2)

Group) operations has provided a close working relationship between US and GVN military forces. This is especially important in the training of RF/FF units in their role of security and pacification. TPS is responsible for security of Hwy 1 and normally the 2-1 CAV is utilized for this purpose. D/2-1 CAV located at LZ Betty bore the brunt of a sapper attack on 3 May. An unk number of enemy penetrated the perimeter and were repulsed by local forces. Artillery and gunships supported the contact which left 6 US killed and 35 wounded, 7 helicopters destroyed and 6 damaged. Enemy casualties were 14 killed and 1 FW captured.

2 RF/FF Operations: With only two ARVN Regiments operating in the Southern Provinces and US forces primarily centered in Binh Thuan, the RF/FF units carry a greater role in the combat and pacification effort. Emphasis has been placed on the prompt reaction of RF/FF elements in assisting any contacts in their vicinity. The practice of frequent changes in night locations and ambush positions has increased the effectiveness of these units. During a night ambush at BN26&402 on the 24th of May, the 118 RF engaged an enemy platoon. In the 15 min fire fight, 3 RF's were wounded, and 6 enemy were killed with 5 small arms captured.

3 (3) Organization, Training and Security Activities.

(a) All units that were assigned, attached or under the operational control of this headquarters as of 30 June are listed at Inclosure 3.

(b) The command relationship between 2d Military Region, ROKFV-PC and I FFORCEV is at Inclosure 4.

(c) Increment 4 redeployment commenced on 1 July.

(d) Training. Assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions are inspected semianually by a representative of G3 Plans Division, who is a member of the AGI Team. A total of three units were inspected during the quarter and all were rated SATISFACTORY.

(e) Research and Development (R&D) Activities. Requests for information on R&D items for USARV and ACTIV are monitored by this headquarters. During this quarter there were no requests for ENSURE (Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) items submitted by this headquarters or its assigned, attached or OCON UNITS.

(f) Security. During the reporting period the security branch continued to exercise staff supervision for highway, railroad, pipeline and installation security. The following activities were accomplished during the quarter.

1 Semiannual security inspections were conducted at three critical and key installations. The installations inspected were CAM RANH BAY, NHA TRANQ and AN SHE. The defensive posture was found to be satisfactory at all three installations.

2 The branch continued to provide representation for the I FFORCEV/OORDS Command Inspection Team. The security portion of the inspection is designed to evaluate the
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RLS USCGR-65 (12)

overall operational capability and defensive posture of Province and District Advisory Teams. During the quarter, PLEIKU Province and CAM RANH Special Sector advisory teams were inspected. Overall, the teams were found to be performing their mission in a satisfactory manner.

3 The branch continued to review plans and monitor progress to upgrade the defensive posture of critical bridges within the MR 2.

4 During the quarter the branch continued to pursue an aggressive OPSEC program to include the publishing of bulletins and posters for distribution to US and FVMAF in the MR 2. Members of the OPSEC Team attended briefings conducted by visitors from MACV and CINCPAC. The team also held monthly meetings for the purpose of discussing ways to improve the program. Numerous messages were dispatched to insure that units were informed of OPSEC procedures and policies for denial of enemy foreknowledge and forewarning. The OPSEC team conducted surveys/visits of five major installations. Continued improvement in OPSEC procedure was noted at all facilities visited.

(a) Chemical

Due to the fact that no UC-123 missions were flown between 8 May and 20 July 1970, only 7 missions of 3 sorties each were flown through MR 2 during the reporting period.

1 The results of US Air Force UC-123 missions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>SORTIES FLOWN</th>
<th>HECTARES</th>
<th>HECTARES HECTARFS OF CORPS SPRAYED</th>
<th>HECTARFS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daklac</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninh Thuan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Duc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Units in MR 2 continue to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters and truck-based power spray apparatus to spray small areas. The results of these spray operations are as follows:
The 4th Infantry Division continued to employ diesel fuel for foliage control at Camp RADCLIFF, where proximity of friendly crops precluded use of herbicides. Diesel was applied by both helicopter and ground spray equipment.

(b) Riot control agents (RCA) are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations. Offensive employment of non-persistent CS, mainly E-158's, was in conjunction with gunships, artillery and TAC Air. The 4th Infantry Division continues to use helicopter CS drum drops, both alone and as a complement to CBU-42A mine fields, for terrain restriction in enemy staging areas and lines of communication in BINH DINH Province. The 173d Airborne Brigade has used bulk CS, hand emplaced and dispersed by means of detonating cord, to contaminate numerous cave, tunnel and boulder complexes in north-eastern BINH DINH Province.

(c) Personnel detectors operating within 2d Military Region are providing a continual source of intelligence concerning enemy locations. In most instances CS, gunships, TAC Air, artillery fire, or troop insertions were employed against the locations of the heavy reading (hot spots). All readings were submitted to the appropriate G2/S2 for evaluation. The summary of personnel detector operations in MR 2 is as follows:

(d) Flame continues to be used extensively in MR 2, both in offensive and defensive roles. Flame fougasse have been employed in defensive positions by TF SOUTH, 173d Abn Bde and 4th Inf Div. Test and evaluation of the XM191 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon continues in the 4th Inf Div and 173d Abn Bde. The 173d Abn Bde and TF South have used flame drops (55 gal drums of thickened fuel dropped from CH-47 helicopters) in support of ARVN units as well as assigned and attached organizations.
Missions have included support of troops in contact, attacks on known and suspected enemy locations in tunnel, bunker and cave complexes, clearing and neutralisation of abandoned fire support bases and future operational areas. Verified results have included 6 confirmed KIA and numerous secondary explosions and small arms cookoffs.

(5) G3 Air Operations

(a) There were a total of 6488 sorties flown in support of US, RVNAF and ROK forces in the 2d Military Region during this reporting period. Significant BDA consisted of 135 enemy KIA and 397 secondary explosions reported.

(b) In accordance with the Vietnamization program, more responsibility for providing tactical air support in the 2d Military Region is being handled by the Vietnamese with the US acting in an advisor capacity only. The control of US/FWMAF preplanned requests and all requests for special missions remains with I FFORCEV G3 Air. All other control of TAC air assets in the MR 2 is the responsibility of the Vietnamese.

(6) Army Aviation Operations

(a) The major objective in employing the tactical aviation assets available to I FFORCEV remains as stated in operational reports.

1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of FWMAF in the MR 2.
2. Provide air mobility to combat elements of ARVN in the MR 2.
3. Provide aviation support to the province senior advisors and CORDS personnel in MR 2 for tactical operations, C&S administrative missions and resupply.
4. Support the MACV and I FFORCEV aerial reconnaissance and surveillance programs.

(b) Resources available from 17th AG (G).

Assault helicopter assets (UH-1H):

SUPPORT MISSION

UNIT                  GS Southern Coastal Region; GS
10th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
25th AHC               Southern Highlands; Task Force
26th AHC
58th AHC
16th AHC
36th AHC

GS Northern Highlands; Praire
52d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
17th AHC
26th AHC
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG CSPOR-65 (R2)

UNIT

52d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
179th AHC
189th AHC
268th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
61st AHC
129th AHC
134th AHC

SUPPORT MISSION

GS Northern Highlands; Prairie Fire
Company B; 5th SPG (A)
GS Northern Coastal Region;
173d Abn Bde; CAP ROK Inf Div;
22d ARVN Div.

2. The 7-17th Air Cav Sqdn is assigned to 17th AG (C), OPCON to IFFORCEV. The entire squadron supported ARV and FWAF during Cambodian operations. "A" Troop supports ARV forces in MR 2nd and is conducting training for ARV Aerial Rifle Platoon personnel. "B" Troop primarily supports 4th Infantry Division operations. "C" Troop, 7-17th Cav continues to support the 173d Abn Bde.

3. Heavy Helicopter assets (CH-54):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>355th HHC</td>
<td>268th AB (C)</td>
<td>3 MR 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Assault Support Helicopter assets (CH-47):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>179th ASHC</td>
<td>52d AB (C)</td>
<td>GS Northern Highlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268th AB (C)</td>
<td>GS Central Coastal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d AB (C)</td>
<td>GS Northern Coastal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th AB (C)</td>
<td>GS Southern Coastal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Armed Helicopter Companies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
<th>SUPPORT MISSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>268th Avn Co (E)</td>
<td>268th AB (C)</td>
<td>GS MR 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261st Avn Co (E)</td>
<td>52d AB (C)</td>
<td>GS MR 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The 183d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the I FFORCEV visual reconnaissance program and provide GS throughout the MR 2. 185th and 203d were designated as units to be redeployed as part of the force reduction.

7. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the MR 2 in an aerial reconnaissance and surveillance role.

8. The 18th Utility Airplane Company provides GS throughout the MR 2 and in

CONFIDENTIAL
addition supports 5th Special Forces Group (A), and JUSPAO.

(c) Major accomplishments:

1 Cambodian operations: ARVN and FMAF conducted extensive operations in areas of Cambodia adjacent to MR 2 during the months of May and June. These operations required most of the aviation assets available to effect the required maneuver, supply and extraction of captured material. Extensive damage to the enemy's base area and supply complexes was accomplished.

2 US forces are normally allocated flyable assets of 3 AHC's per day from General Support assets. Major combat operations in MP 2 and Cambodia were provided support as required.

3 ROKA Forces were normally allocated the flyable assets of one AHC per division on a daily basis. In addition, average hook allocations were 2 to 3 daily to each division. Airmobile assets supported all ROKA operations conducted during the period indicated.

4 ARVN forces in MR 2 received approximately two AHC daily to support their operations. Numerous small scale operations were conducted in support of pacification. During the months of May and June the Cambodian operations had first priority and received the greater portion of the aviation assets allocated to ARVN forces.

5 Airmobile assets were provided for the following special operations as directed by MACV: Prairie Fire, CCS, Recondo School.

6 Airmobile assets provided to the following units or agencies on a general support basis:

- HQ I FFORCEN
- I D C - Nha Trang
- II ALC (ARVN)
- 21st Signal Group
- US Navy Spt Fac
- 18th Engr Bde
- 100th Log Cmd (ROK)
- Cam Ranh Bay Spt Ctl
- Qui Nhon Spt Ctl
- MACV
- IFFV Arty

(c) Logistics Activities

(1) Supply

(a) The overall supply of assigned, attached and OPCON units continues to be satisfactory. There are no shortages of supplies or equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of the command.

(b) There has been a marked increase in the number and types of ammunition under ARS control, specifically, from seven (7) DODIC's, as indicated on the previous report to thirty-four (34) DODIC's.
During the report period this HQ instituted an aggressive program to turn-in excess and non-mission essential supplies and equipment. Initial results of this program indicate that supplies and equipment having a total dollar value of $618,295.77 have been turned in; outstanding requisitions for equipment having a total dollar value of $1,206,647.13 have been cancelled, and authority to stand short of authorized NFPE equipment having a total dollar value of $670,510.18 has been requested from USARV.

(2) Transportation:

(a) Routine cargo movement in MA 2 decreased slightly over the past quarter. Passenger movement remained constant. Emergency movement of cargo and passengers rose from previous levels as a result of the Cambodian maneuvers. All modes of transportation were utilized.

(b) Air: The discussion of air movements is restricted to movements processed by Headquarters I FFORCEV.

There was an increase of cargo and a significant increase in the number of passengers moved by Emergency Airlift during this reporting period.

### EMERGENCY AIRLIFT: 1969-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>C-130*</th>
<th>C-123*</th>
<th>C-74*</th>
<th>FAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 69</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,105</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69-70</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,238</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 70</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 70</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,210</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

Special Air Missions involved the movement of passengers and cargo for unit moves. Passenger movement increased significantly accompanied by a substantial increase in cargo movement. The increases are explained by the Allied initiative in Cambodia and the positioning of US combat units with MA 2 during this period.

### SPECIAL AIR MISSIONS: 1969-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>C-130*</th>
<th>C-123*</th>
<th>C-74*</th>
<th>FAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 69</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,399</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69-70</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,476</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1970

PROJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, with GFOR-65 (R2)

2 Movements made by II FFORCEV dedicated OMA aircraft were slightly lower than last quarter. One reason is the loss of one of the dedicated aircraft and half flying schedule resulting from decreasing service demands on weekends.

OMA DEDICATED AIRCRAFT: 1969-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>FAX</th>
<th>S/T Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 69</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>35,707</td>
<td>3,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug - Oct 69</td>
<td>5,519</td>
<td>30,928</td>
<td>2,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Jan 69-70</td>
<td>4,985</td>
<td>20,245</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - Apr 70</td>
<td>4,679</td>
<td>23,922</td>
<td>1,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May - Jul 70</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>23,634</td>
<td>1,169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Maintenance: During the reporting period thirteen (13) I FFORCEV units received their Annual CMMI. Four (4) units were rated unsatisfactory (31 per cent failure rate) because of failures in material and/or maintenance management and operations. The overall average scores attained are as follows:

CMMI RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical &amp; Support Vehicles</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics and Communications</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose Equipment</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Material</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT & OPERATIONS: TAMAS records continue to be the weakest area in the Maintenance Management and Operations portion of the inspection.

1 Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

1) Agriculture

(a) The first crop planting of the improved rice varieties TN-8/5 now exceed 45,000 hectares toward a goal of 38,800 hectares. More plantings are evident in the highland provinces than in previous years, primarily due to the assistance of agricultural advisory personnel and availability of CPDC funds for purchase of commodity inputs for the Montagnards. The new improved varieties TN-20/22 are more disease resistant and are of better eating quality than TN-8/5.

(b) Demonstrations of Japanese sonar equipment and use of lights to increase the catch of fish have been conducted in Cam Ranh and Khan Hoa. The use of this equipment has emphasized the need for refrigeration on boats and efforts are being made to assist the fisherman on this problem. The lifting of restrictions in Binh Dinh and Cam Ranh have helped to increase the off shore catches.
The Rinderpest vaccination campaign continues throughout the region. However, many cattle are not being vaccinated because many farmers remain reluctant to take the time or make an effort to bring their cattle to the vaccinating point. Twenty seven trainees received certificates for animal health and protein program.

(2) Village Self Development

(a) The VSD program has been slightly interrupted by the holding of village/hamlet and province council elections. There were 269 villages out of 582 participating in the VSD program that held their elections during the reporting period. There were changes in the Village Administrative Committee that is vital to the VSD, especially the position of finance commissioner. New personnel had to be recommended, appointed and trained before imprest funds could be established and checkbooks issued in the name of the accountable managers. Up to the end of the reporting period there are still villages which could not disburse the VSD funds because of this delay.

(b) All the provinces have organized Mobile Training teams to conduct information and training campaigns for the VSD program. Darlac includes technical personnel in their training teams to assist the villagers in the paperwork and in the technical requirement of their projects. There has been considerable improvement in the operation in the highlands as compared to last year. This has been made possible through the employment of training teams which go out to the villages. Phu Bon has been using school teachers to do this job.

(c) Despite some delay the number of projects reported approved has reached over the 1000 mark as of June. About 15% of the 512 million piaster budget has been obligated. Of the completed projects a hundred have been reported.

(d) Land Reform in Tuyen Quang Province took a step forward when 138 land titles covering 254 hectares were issued in Klong Hamlet and 182 titles, 274 hectares, were issued in Hiep Thanh Hamlet. An increase in land surveys and issuance of titles were noted in most of the Province Land Service offices. Plans are proceeding for implementation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program.

(e) The 1970 CPDC irrigation construction program involving 13 projects valued at 90,000,000 $VN is progressing on schedule.

(3) Education

(a) During the three months of this reporting period the schools of Vietnam have been in their three month period of vacation. No new figures on numbers of teachers, students, or classrooms are available. The observations expressed in the preceding ORLL report remain unchanged.

(b) It should be noted that several classroom projects under the Province Development Fund are being finished this summer, and these should be reflected in the new educational statistics available in the full.
The 2d Military Region (MR) reported a total of 681 VCI neutralizations during the second quarter of CY 70. The total number of neutralizations reported for CY 70 stands at 1180. The provinces reported capturing 442 VCI suspects during the quarter, bringing the total number of captures for the year to 795. The average number of neutralizations per month is 196, which represents approximately 65% of the assigned monthly goal of 350 VCI. Of the 795 VCI reported as captured, only 242 (30%) have been legally processed to a final determination. The legal processing of detainees showed a marked increase during the month of June, with 143 VCI suspects being legally processed. A total of 126 VCI received "AN Tri" sentences and 19 suspects were released. During the previous five months, only 95 of the VCI captured in 1970 were sentenced and four were released by Province Security Committees. Legal processing appears to have improved as a result of high-level command interest in this aspect of the PHUNG HOANG program. In circular 1206, issued on 24 April 1970, Prime Minister Khiem prescribed definite time limits for the completion of the various stages of legal processing. This circular informed all province and city chiefs that VCI detainees were to be legally processed within 46 days of their arrest. On 16 May 1970, LTG Lu Lan, CG MR 2, issued further instructions to the MR2 province and city chiefs, reinforcing the instructions contained in Circular 1206. Despite increased emphasis, however, legal processing is not keeping pace with captures. Province Security Committees must meet more often to eliminate increasing backlogs of detainees. Efforts to improve the training of PHOENIX personnel continue, with 30 PHUNG HOANG advisors, four DSAs and two ROKA officers attending the PHOENIX orientation course at Vung Tau during the quarter. The 14th class graduated from the Regional PHUNG HOANG School on 17 July 1970, increasing the number of P/DIOCC personnel who have received such training to 532. MR 2 PHUNG HOANG P/DIOCC operations are presently rated as follows: 0 Provinces and 0 districts 76-100% effective, 7 provinces and 19 districts 51-75% effective, 4 provinces and 27 districts 26-50% effective, and 2 provinces and 6 districts 0-25% effective.

(a) During the quarter the RD Cadre strength dropped from 361 to 342 groups, for a total manpower reduction of 314. The STRD Cadre increased from 166 to 177 groups for an increase of 33 personnel. RD Cadre strength at the end of the reporting period was 5,884 and STRD strength was 5,558.

(b) Combined cadre losses (KIA, WIA, MIA) was KIA 90, WIA 204, MIA 4. Enemy casualties for the same period was 92 KIA, 79 WIA (est.), 6 captured, in addition cadre induced 43 Ho Chanh to rally.

(c) During the reporting period there was a marked increase in the activity of the cadre in the field of politics and pacification. This was caused by an increase in interest in the program by the GVN and US advisors and increased training conducted by the different ministries and service chiefs at province level.

(6) Psychological Operations (Civ)
A/FIA-JO-HIST
15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period ending 31 July 1970, JCS CMFR-65 (R2)

(a) Support of pacification and development objectives was accomplished by all
Province VIS during the period 1 April through 30 June 1970. During the month of
April primary emphasis covering the objectives of the 1970 Pacification and Develop-
ment Plan was concentrated in most provinces in the support and publicizing of vil-
lages and hamlet elections. Reaching the population of MR 2 with the GWI interpre-
tation of the Cambodian military operations and the flight of Vietnamese refugees
generated thereby was the major VIS effort during the month of May. Publicizing the
June 28 Province Council elections was the major effort in June. All provinces dem-
onstrated that the support for the elections rendered by VIS both during the month
of April and June was well planned, coordinated and executed. As evidence by the
operations of the VIS in support of these elections, when motivated and when given
proper guidance and support by the Province Chiefs, the VIS can and does conduct
effective and coordinated campaigns.

(b) There were changes in two of the Province VIS Chiefs during the quarter.
Mr. Dang Van Nguyen was reassigned from Binh Dinh Province to Minh Thuan Province in
April and was again reassigned to Binh Dinh reporting to Minh Thuan. A Mr. Nguyen
Khac Ngo, former VIS Chief in Quang Tin Province, replaced Mr. Nguyen in Binh
Dinh Province. He has proven to be a very effective information chief and has main-
tained the high standards of VIS operations in that province. Mr. Tran That Sau
was assigned to Minh Thuan Province as VIS Chief during the month of June. Thus
far he has been characterized as being very domineering toward his subordinates and
he does not delegate responsibility. Due to these characteristics and Mr. Sau's
absence from the province during the greater part of the month of June, VIS activities
in Minh Thuan Province dropped in effectiveness.

(7) Military Psyop

(a) PSYOP activities during the second quarter included aerial dissemination of
over 207 million leaflets and over 494 hours of Aerial loudspeaker time. The 8th
PSYOP Battalion produced over 39,603,516 leaflets with organic printing equipment.

(b) During this quarter approximately 30% of the total leaflet production pertained to the operations conducted in Cambodia. The Cambodian operation received
top priority on all printing and aerial assets and required tapes as well as printing
media to be produced in Cambodian, Vietnamese and Montagnard languages.

(c) Local elections were held throughout the 24 Military Region during this
reporting period and considerable PSYOP effort was expanded to support elections in
the region. Posters, leaflets, banners, and slogans were produced for use in Kontum,
Pleiku, Dariac and I Hau Bon Provinces. The PSYOP support is impartial publicity and
directed towards supplying election information and getting the maximum number of peo-
ple to vote.

(d) The quarterly MACV PSYOP Conference was held in Saigon on 15 July 1970. The
most important information to come from this conference was the announced phase down
to US PSYOP support commencing October 1970. The present ARVN POLWAR Battalions will
be beefed up with additional resources to help compensate for the reduction in US
PSYOP support. Each province will gain one RF/FF POLWAR Company to further increase
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CPUSA-65 (R2)

the PSYOP/POLWAR assets in the 2d Military Region.

(8) Civic Action

(a) PF Dependent Housing Program. Nearly all commodity units of PF housing materials programmed for FY 69 have been delivered to the participating provinces in 2d Military Region during this reporting period. Some construction has begun and delivery of remaining materials is expected to be accomplished by August 1970.

(b) Coordination and control of all civic action within 2d Military Region is being accomplished through the use of Province Coordinating Committees, in most cases, and in District Council meetings to preclude duplication of effort. United States units continue to provide advice and technical assistance to the people involved in civic action projects and the emphasis continues to be on letting the GVN contribute in the actual work while involving the people as part of the village self development program and improve the image of the GVN.

(c) Elements of Task Force South continued to do small scale civic action activities consisting of supplying blackboards and school equipment, playground equipment, paint, and construction materials to various schools, orphanages and community centers throughout Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan provinces. A successful English teaching program has been started using American soldiers as teachers.

(d) Elements of the 4th Infantry Division assisted in the development of a community pig project, small bridge construction, and other projects throughout their TAOR. A Montagnard community of six hamlets was moved and resettled in a more secure location with the help and assistance of the Division in the construction of perimeter wiring and defense fighting positions, wiring, and family dwellings. The District is furnishing the Montagnard consolidated village with weapons to defend themselves against harassment by the VC. The 4th Infantry Division civil affairs/civic action personnel refer to this project as the "Montagnard Heights project".

(e) The 173d ABN Brigade assisted in the construction of a school and the repairs and renovation of existing structures during the reporting period in addition to providing materials to build rice bins throughout their TAOR. The Brigade assisted in the construction of a soccer stadium in Phu My town and units of the brigade are disposing of edible garbage by taking it to the pig sties of orphanages located in the area.

(f) The ARVN Civic Action school in 2d Military Region at Pleiku graduated 194 RF/IF students during this reporting period. Another class which started in July is scheduled to graduate 15 August 1970. The 47th Regiment of the 22d Division (ARVN) has been allocated 500,000 $VN from GVN funds to conduct civic action projects within their area of responsibility.

(g) Two requests for CORDS Contingency Funding for projects in Khanh Hoa were disapproved by NAGV. One was for resettlement of a village in Binh Hoa district with proposed road building and irrigation projects to be conducted by the 9th ROK Division and the other for the building of a school for dependents of CIDG personnel in Binh
Trang. Complete computer read-out figures on Advisory Pacification Fund expenditures for this reporting period are not available. The United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces Fund (US/FWMAP) of 60,000 $VN, administered by the Civil/Military Operations Division and used almost exclusively by Task Force South was programmed to be decreased to 30,000 $VN for the remainder of the year starting in June 1970, but MACV has directed that it remain at the 60,000 $VN monthly ceiling. Other units in 2d Military Region authorized to have such a fund under the provisions of MACV Directive 37-13 will continue to operate with their present monthly ceiling.

(9) Regional and Popular Forces

(a) During the month of May, 25 PF platoons completed training and became operational. The two CIDG camps in Quang Duc and Kontum converted to RF status. Overall, RF companies began redeploying from static positions to mobile operations.

(b) Throughout the month of June a decrease in the number of enemy initiated activities occurred. Friendly initiated actions by RF's yielded the highest kill ratio since August 1969. The new 2d Military Region RF/FF Commander, COL Tuong, completed visits to all provinces. Expectations are that COL Tuong, a dynamic individual, will provide the direction needed to elevate RF/FF units to a higher level of performance.

(c) During the month of July RF/FF showed progress in adapting to a mobile defense. RF/FF are continuing to benefit from in-place training being conducted within each unit.

(10) National Police

(a) The National Police conducted a total of 2,702 independent and combined operations during the quarter. The number of VC KIA, VC captured, VC suspects detained, deserters apprehended and other arrests are less than the previous quarter but represent an average for this period of time. During the months of May and June, the National Police concentrated their efforts on providing security for election candidates as well as election sites. They are partly responsible for the small number of VC initiated incidents directed against candidates and voters. National Police Narcotic Elimination Sections placed greater emphasis in this area and conducted operations which resulted in the location and destruction of 2,139 marihuana plants and approximately 3,000 marihuana cigarettes. They also increased their seizure of opium and heroin. The National Police Field Forces performed poorly in comparison to their potential. There are 46 platoons throughout 2d Military Region and each is capable of conducting two or more operations per week but failed to approach that figure. The National Police Field Forces do not have organic intelligence gathering capabilities and are dependent upon the Police Special Branch and the Phoenix organization for intelligence. These two intelligence agencies consistently fail to give timely information to the NPF. Furthermore, province and district chiefs frequently direct the use of NPF personnel to perform static security and guard functions, which constitutes improper utilization. In addition, NPF leaders, province and district officials show a lack of interest in the proper utilization of the NPF. The Field Operations Division, Public Safety Division, Saigon, is conducting a study of
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST
15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
          Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS-GSFOH-65 (R2)

NFFF operations. One recommendation will be to make the NFFF responsive to the National Police. The present chain of command is from the platoon leader directly to the Armed Support Block in Saigon. The actions of the NFFF Support Team Commander for 2d Military Region are seldom productive.

(b) National Identification Registration Program. National Police ID card teams registered 150,959 Vietnamese during this quarter and represents an increase of 36,022 over the figure for the previous quarter. The National Police will reach the CT 70 registration goal of 562,000 provided they continue at their present rate. Quang Due Province has 6,000 refugees subsequent to the military activities in Cambodia. The ID card teams will register these people as part of the VCI Tracking System.

(c) Correction and Detention. An overcrowded condition exists at the Binh Dinh Correction Center. As a means of correcting this situation the G&O advisor recommended the construction of a 400 man facility in the province. The DEFCOND decision is pending.

(11) Peoples Self Defense Force

(a) On 25 May 70, Class 3-70 of the Key Inter-Team program commenced with 621 students in attendance. The duration of the class was four weeks. Overall, enemy initiated action against the FSDF decreased from the previous month.

(b) During the month of June a major portion of the FSDF effort was directed toward planning and providing protection for the provincial council elections. NSA's reported that FSDF were effective and added to the success of the elections. Training and aiming of KITS progressed satisfactorily.

(c) Progress made during the month of July reflected the increased emphasis being placed by provinces on the training phases of the FSDF program. One additional Hard-Core FSDF training class 4-70 was completed and several provinces directed US MAI teams to assist in training programs.

(12) Chieu Hoi

(a) On 3 May 1970, a VC District company commander, Main Force, rallied to an RF outpost in My Tuong Hamlet, Ninh Thuan Province. He was the first high ranking VC to rally in this province.

(b) On or about 2030 hours 7 May 70, the new Catholic Church and 3 houses at Pleiku Chieu Hoi hamlet were destroyed by rockets and satchel charges by an estimated VC platoon. There were no deaths but there were eight Chieu Hoi dependents wounded. At 1030 hours 3 May 70, an Armed Propaganda Team (APT) squad operation near Plei Con Xo at Phuoc An District, Pleiku, was attacked by an estimated VC platoon. The APT members fought back and the VC platoon retreated leaving 2 VC KIA and several blood trails. One APT member was slightly wounded. There were no weapons captured.

(c) On 12 May 70, 5 APT members, the Chieu Hoi Chief, and the Chieu Hoi Advisor
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST
15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report-LeaJona Lsaned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS Q0991104-65 (R2)

guided by Hoi Chanh Nguyen Thai To, recovered 2 K44, 2 Claymore mines, 720 rounds
of AK-15 ammunition, 10 kilograms of rice and assorted VC documents at Phu Ny
Hamlet, My Lai village, Phu Ny District, Binh Dinh Province.

(d) In Phu Yen province, on 20 May 1970, a Montagnard rallier named Y-Than,
led the elements of an AF/FF reconnaissance unit to an enemy base. The operations
results were 33 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA; 1 BMG, 22 SM, 2x60 mortars, 1 extra barrel
of HMG, 10 AR mines, 10 REM magazines, 1 mortar elevation knob, and assorted documents
captured.

(e) From 10 to 19 May 1970, a series of Hoi Chanh (HC) kidnappings were reported
in Binh Thuan Province. There were 4 Hoi Chanh and a HC's wife verified kidnapped
by VC. The HC abduction occurred at night, while the HC's wife was abducted in the
morning, on her way to work.

(f) Fourteen APT members on a propaganda mission in Chieu Hoi truck were mined
at the vicinity of Cat Le Hamlet, Phu Cat District, Binh Dinh Province. Two APT
members were seriously wounded and 4 APT members received superficial wounds. One
M1 carbine was destroyed and the vehicle was 60 percent damaged. In 9 July 1970,
a composite team headed by the An Nhơn District Chieu Hoi Service Chief departed at
0330 hrs for Van Canh District. While enroute to Van Canh the Chieu Hoi composite
team encountered an undetermined number of enemy. Result of the encounter: One
enemy KIA, 1 WIA; 1 AK-47, 1 M1 Carbine captured. One APT member was
wounded. The composite team was later reinforced by AF/FF units and helicopter sup-
port was utilized. The campaign terminated at 1740 hrs 9 July 1970 with overall
results of 2 enemy KIA, 1 CIA; 3 AR-47, 1 M16, 1 .45 Cal. pistol, 2 claymore mines
and assorted documents captured. One APT member was wounded in action.

(g) On 11 July a VC propaganda platoon leader rallied with an M1 carbine at Phu
Thien District, Phu Bon.

(h) On 16 July, 4 APT members were wounded by a grenade thrown by a VC terrorist
while the APTs were showing a propaganda movie at Phu My hamlet, Tuy An District,
Phu Yen Province. There were also 4 RF/FF soldiers wounded in the incident.

(i) On 18 July, in Pleiku Province, a released Hoi Chanh, who is an incumbent
hamlet chief, effected the rally of VC senior Lt. Ksor Luong, assistant commandant
of a VC school in Klang Ngai Province. On the same day a squad of APT proselyting
at Pleiku Bo Dak, Thuan An District, effected the rally of 16 VC classified as follows:
1 VC village deputy for female group, 5 VC village guerrillas, and 10 members of VC
Cultural and Drama team. One VC village chief with his village guerrilla command
rallied to elements of sector S-2 at Le Chi AR8369505. They were joined by their wives
who were both VC production cadres of Plei De Klang Village, AR8393690.

(j) On 21 July 1970, the VC company commander of C-24/K-72, Region 2-35 main
force, rallied at An Phuoc District, Binh Thuan Province.

(k) Public Health

CONFIDENTIAL
During the present reporting period the PHF staff have continued the advisory effort relative to their respective branches. Overall, progress was noted in all areas.

Approximately 8,400 Cambodian refugees, military and civilian, were placed in an abandoned US military camp near Pleiku, medical and preventive medicine service were provided mostly by the Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPAP) teams located there. The MILPAP did an outstanding job in the initial site selection, organizing the camp medically for reception, and administering health care during occupancy. Most of the refugees have departed and the work has been turned over to ARVN sources.

Renegotiation of the contract for the construction of the impact hospital at Gia Nghia, Quang Duc Province is in its final stage. MINK has agreed to complete the facility pending conclusion of negotiation with present contractor. Once work starts MINK estimates the facility would be completed in 30 or 40 days.

Joint utilization is progressing very well. The Ministry of Health (MOH) thru the activities of the Military and Civil Health Coordinating Program Management Committee (HCUPMC) has expanded the program to district level with Di Linh District being assimilated into the program under the province hospital in Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province.

All provinces of 2d Military Region with the exception of Quang Duc, now have at least one sanitary hamlet. Packets giving guidelines for initiating and completing a sanitary hamlet were completed and distributed to each province. This program is progressing rapidly in all areas of 2d Military Region.

This quarter has shown a tremendous increase in the responsibility and initiative taken by the MOH/GOV Regional office. The advisors were pleased to observe the leadership displayed during a regional seminar.

The National Mobile Health Poster Exhibit has been in the region for five weeks and has been enthusiastically received. In Khanh Hoa Province over 10,000 people visited the exhibit. It is scheduled for seven provinces of the region.

War Victims

During the quarter ending 31 July 1970 funds became available enabling payments to be made to in-camp and out-of-camp refugees. As a result, the out-of-camp refugee population was decreased by 51,785 to a total of 44,897, all in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Province.

The Directorate has been requested to urge the Ministry to stress completion of resettlement and return-to-village payments during the 3rd quarter. Present data show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Camp Refugees end 1st quarter 1970</td>
<td>22,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Camp Refugees end 2nd quarter 1970</td>
<td>17,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled during 2nd quarter</td>
<td>12,083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG2 CFOR-65 (R2)

Returned to village as of end 2nd quarter 1970 182,428
Returned to village as of end 1st quarter 1970 172,702
Returned during 2nd quarter 10,286

Statistics from the ARS report show: (Automated Reporting System)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>End of 1st Quarter 1970</th>
<th>End of 2nd Quarter 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Refugees</td>
<td>6,822</td>
<td>8,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Resettlement Process</td>
<td>24,935</td>
<td>38,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Refuge centers</td>
<td>96,682</td>
<td>44,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>128,439</td>
<td>62,679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Between 14 Jul and late June, Montagnards fled from VC oppression in Cambodia to Quang Duc and Ia Drang provinces. About 97 per cent of the people who left Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 to escape VC harassment. Previously 4,069 are located at 3 sites in Quang Duc Province and 227 in Ia Drang. These people have been recognized as refugees by the GVN and are being provided benefits in accordance with directives issued by the Ministry of Social Welfare. Indications are that these people will remain in Vietnam.

(d) From 24 to 28 June ARW evacuated 7,589 Cambodians (3,199 military and 4,390 civilians) from Northern Cambodia to Camp Shani, former US 4th Division base, in Pleiku. Despite the fact that only two days notice was given the evacuation, reception and care of these refugees was accomplished in a most efficient manner.

(15) Management Support

(a) Communications. During the period, 2 two week formal courses were conducted for 8 Vietnamese radio operator trainees. The operators were assigned to provinces throughout MR 2 to operate the CORDIS SSB radio net. Recruitment for three radio operators to be assigned to the provinces continues. Production and distribution of Signal Operation Instructions (SOI) and Standing Signal Instructions (SSI) continued. KAC Codes and Authentication Tables continued to be distributed by this office. These items are distributed by the Communications Branch to support operations by all provinces and districts within the MR 2 Zone of responsibility. Continuing coordination with I FFOR Signal Section, the 2lst Signal Group and FSC was in effect to complete the NESTOR program which is being delayed due to lack of equipment and associated cabling. Coordination visits to all FSCs were completed by the Signal Officer, 1st Field, Commanding Officer, 21 Signal Group, and the Chief of Communications, CORDS MR 2 Headquarters. A communications security presentation was given to all FSCs and the 101st Radio Research Company continued to make visits to all province headquarters to assist in the continuing communications security program. Efforts to upgrade the long distance communications service to Kontum, Binh Than and Camp Pace continues through the coordinated efforts of the 2lst Signal Group.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-H1ST  15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, R3S GSPOR-65 (R2)

(b) Personnel. Emphasis has been placed on local recruitment to fill vacant positions throughout II-III. This action was prompted by MAWV recall of 100 I-2 positions from CORDOR; each region provided spaces. MB 2 provided the 20 spaces from unallocated R2C positions. At that time it was determined that all vacant and uncommitted spaces in the provinces would have to be recalled to headquarters to (a) provide positions in other essential categories and (b) preclude the possibility of further reductions due to the vacancy rate of approximately 15%. The MAWV authorized ceiling is therefore reduced to 1,250 positions; the imminent base transfer of 51 Facilitation Research Program positions will further reduce MAWV ceiling to 1,229.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

The Military Personnel strength declined during each month of the report period. Losses in strength pertains primarily to the enlisted grades with critical shortages of radio operators, clerks, security guards, and medical personnel. A detailed breakdown of strength figures is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct.</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth.</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>1062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CIVILIANS PERSONNEL

Performance Evaluation Reports
Promotions/Periodic Step Increase
Awards – Decorations
R&R Requests
Time & Attendance Reports (Amar/Lv/TON)
IF and TON Actions
Miscellaneous Personnel Actions

(c) Material Support Branch. A series of field trips and courtesy inspections were conducted at province level which greatly aided the advisory teams in overcoming problem areas in records accountability and various fields of management. A construction supervisor was added to the staff of MCB and his influence has expedited many projects at both province and district level. A series of conferences was initiated between property book officers and their supporting elements. It is felt that these conferences will be beneficial in solving many support problems.

(a) Personnel and Administration

(1) Plans and Operations.

(a) Judge Advocate General officers are required in greater numbers than authorization documents provide for. MAWV's augmentation of 6 JAG officers has grown.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force

Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG700-HIST-65 (R2)

insufficient to allow proper service to subordinate and OPCON Commands, most particu-
larly the defense council requirements. In the past, it was generally possible to
maintain a complement of 6 non-JAG officers, qualified as attorney's, to assist.
With dwindling strength resources however, this is no longer possible and it is
necessary to compete for the few which are being made available from USARV with
other commands. On 1 August, only two of the complement of 6 non-JAGs formerly as-
signed will remain.

(b) The reduced officer resource situation is also making it difficult to main-
tain 'extra' Lt Colonels in positions not authorized by MTOE. An example is the
Special Liaison Group to the ROks. MTOE authorization calls for five of the liaison
positions to be filled with majors. In the past, because it was possible, and because
the ROks preferred it, Lt Colonels were assigned to these positions. Now that no
'extra' Lt Colonels are being made available, fill into these positions denies fill
into TOE positions. Similarly, support of five positions allocated to CORDS to sup-
port the G-5 function as a result of the G-5 section being deleted from the HQ I
FFORCEV MTOE as part of space drawdown (and the function transferred) is difficult.
One difficulty is that captains' spaces were allocated to CORDS and the requirement
there includes Lt Colonels. In time of plenty, the grade authorization was virtually
immaterial, but now that fill to I FFORCEV is closely held to authorizations, real-
location of spaces is necessary, or support must be reexamined.

(c) Dwindling resources are making it more difficult to support Nha Trang
station complement requirements. In the past, excess assigned to HQ I FFORCEV and
to carrier units located in Nha Trang was easily sufficient to support a complement
of 90. Now that enlisted personnel are not filled to authorization, and little if
any excess is assigned, each station complement requirement denies fill to an MTCE
position. Since MTOE positions have also been reduced, carrier units and Headquarters'
elements are not as agreeable to having personnel charged against them and working
in station complement jobs as they once were. Accordingly, station complement require-
ments are under review.

(d) Mr Barber, Crypto Technician for the 54th Signal Battalion departs on 15
August. One crypto technician is authorized in all of I FFORCEV. No replacement
has yet been made available by USARV and it has become necessary to turn over the
crypto account temporarily to a junior officer.

(e) USARV responded well to I FFORCEV shortages of Armor captains in 2/1 CAV.
I FFORCEV has been brought up to authorization in this branch. Armor lieutenants
remain seriously short however, with 10 assigned of 20 authorized in the 2/1 as of
1 September and no relief promised by USARV. It has been necessary to assign other
branches to the 2/1 to compensate.

(f) Infantry Majors continue to be critically short. Of 22 authorized in I
FFORCEV, (20 in HQ I FFORCEV are branch immaterial requirements and 2 in 1/90 Inf
are branch material) only 6 will be assigned on 1 September 70. Infantry Branch has
been concerned over short COMUS-Vietnam turn around times (now at about 12 months
for Majors Infantry) and has been reluctant to fill branch immaterial requirements.
Accordingly, action has been taken by I FFORCEV to adjust requisitioning for branch
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report-lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R2)

immaterial requirements, deleting Infantry and substituting Field Artillery and Air Defense in which branches support is more readily available. Infantry Captains and Lieutenants are supported adequately.

(g) Artillery Majors continue to be supported at authorization figures, but no extras are available to compensate for no-fill in infantry. However, fill in Artillery Captains has fallen off sharply. Of 130 authorized in I FFORCEV, 83 are projected to be assigned on 1 September 70. Of 175 Artillery Lts authorized in I FFORCEV, 140 are projected to be assigned on 1 September.

(h) On 31 July 70 BG Bowers, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, USARV visited Nha Trang to brief the CG and staff on topics in his area of interest. From the topics discussed, the following were of special importance in the area of personnel.

1 Enlisted fill is expected to support 97% of MTOE authorization across the board, with substitution in grade being common. Relief in October is expected, but only as a result of decreased authorizations.

2 Officer fill is expected to support 95% of MTOE authorization across the board, with less support in certain branches and grades, particularly infantry field grade.

3 Command recommended assets are not available to support battalion command turnover on a 6 month cycle as was previously possible. USARV is barely meeting requirements to replace battalion commanders rotating to CONUS on DEROS.

(2) Personnel Management

(a) Strength accounting remained an item of emphasis at HQ, USARV and, at this headquarters. Effective 25 June, a new format was introduced by HQ, USARV for the Daily Command Strength Report.

(b) As a result of the new DCSR format, strength accounting has been able to keep better track of assignment gains. Many units had previously failed to pick up many EM on EDGSA, which clearly showed on HQ, I FFORCEV strength projections. Effective 25 June, all units were directed to call this Headquarters for telephone input information. Orders have been forwarded to units by message, but many units were not receiving assignment instructions until after EDGSA, and others were not picking up individuals on EDGSA. Telephonic input to units has resulted in improved strength projections for the command as a much higher percentage of EM are picked up on EDGSA.

(c) The new DCSR has also made possible identification of unprogrammed gains and losses and resultant strength projections which take into account these changes. Thus, strength projections henceforth will have EDGSA assignment gains and EDGSA DEROS losses as the only variables, allowing tighter control of projections and identification of discrepancies.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-OC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(3) Awards and Decorations

Numerous awards were received by this headquarters which contain identical narratives, citations, and in the case of valor awards, identical witness statements. A message was sent to the field giving guidance on future policy for submitting awards on 21 Jul 70. Awards received which have identical citation, narratives, and/or citations will be returned by this headquarters for rewrite.

(4) Rest and Recuperation

(a) The new in-country R&R Center, located at China Beach, Da Nang, began operations on 1 June 1970. I FFORCERV continues to receive three officer allocations and twenty enlisted allocations for China Beach per month.

(b) An average of 727 allocations were used per month during the quarter.

(c) The R&R center at Cam Ranh Bay was closed effective 1 July. R&R participants in this command are now departing from Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon. A I FFORCEV R&R Liaison representative at Camp Alpha, Tan Son Nhut, has been appointed to assist all I FFORCEV personnel. His primary duties are to brief I FFORCEV personnel on R&R procedures, meet returning R&R personnel, and book in-country flights back to assigned units.

(5) Career Counseling

(a) I FFORCEV continued to drop in first term and AUS personnel during the fourth quarter FY 70. During this period there were 20 first term RA and AUS reenlistments. A battalion reenlistment NCO training conference was held 24 June 70 to provide necessary training for unit counselors. Increased command emphasis was employed and should show results in the future.

(b) The April monthly reenlistment award went to D Co, 1st Bn, 50th Inf, and the May award was made to SVG Btry, 7th Bn, 13th Arty. In June, the honors went to HHC, 54th Bn.

(c) The fourth quarter FY 70 award was won by the 7th Bn, 13th Arty for achievements during this period.

(d) Effective 1 July 70 a 1 percent objective was instituted by USARV.

(6) Administrative Services

(a) During the quarter, the Administrative Services Section sustained normal operations with little significant reportable activity.

(b) The Nha Trang Special Service Club located at Camp McCormack was formally opened on 17 May as scheduled. Additionally, a survey was conducted throughout the 2d Military Region to determine the quantity, type and quality of recreation equipment and facilities. The survey was necessary for evaluation of those areas needing improvement.
Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFO a 65 (R2)

(7) Civilian Personnel

(a) Direct Hire Program: Direct Hire Management during the quarter was satisfactory. Close coordination has been maintained with the Area Civilian Personnel Officers (ACPOs) at Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Pleiku, and Cam Ranh Bay. During the quarter USARV allowed an increase of two (2) direct hire spaces from 248 to 250. Nine (9) more spaces should be authorized shortly to be used for hiring guards for the Grand Hotel Compound. A new Table and Allowance (TDA) was submitted on 27 May 70 to USARV. A slight delay in approval was incurred due to insufficient justifications. This has been rectified and if approved the TDA would be increased by approximately seventy-five (75) positions. Breakout Authorization for Direct Hire:

HQ, I FFORCE
I FFORCE Arty
54th Sig Bn
167th Sig Co
297th Trans Co
C/75 Rangers
2/1 Cav
HQ, Task Force South
1/50th Inf

* Includes HQ, I FFORCE, HHC and HQ Comdt.
** Total Allocation for all battalions.

(b) Daily Hire Program: Assistance in Kind (AIK) allocation for the last quarter was 2,543,000 $VN, a slight increase over last quarter. Breakout of last quarter allocation were:

HQs Comdt
1/50th
TFS
237th MP
54th Sig
297th Trans
2/1 Cav
C/75th
55th MID
I FFORCE Arty

(c) Command emphasis continues in the areas of civilian hire and whenever it is possible, civilians should be used in place of military personnel. As there are future US troop reductions more civilians will be used in place of military personnel.

(8) Morale and Services

(a) Clubs and Messes: The club system in Nha Trang has become more established. At the present time there are three (3) officers clubs in operation and six (6) NCO/EM clubs. The Tuy Hoa Club System has been closed out within the last quarter.
command emphasis is being placed on facilities which are illegally operating and presently many units are applying to USARV to establish "Other Sundry Funds".

(b) PI facilities: Class VI, beer, and soda facilities have been consolidated at Camp McDermott. To further consolidate central shopping facilities, the PX was moved so as to be co-located with Class VI and the Bank of America. The PX opened for business at its new location 3 July 70.

(9) ARVN Interpreters

At present time there are no critical shortages in ARVN interpreters. The shortages that do exist will be altered as there are further troop redeployments allowing interpreters to be transferred to new locations.

(10) ARVN Replacement System

A satisfactory replacement system is still of great concern. Personnel replacement actions have improved, but not to the degree that is desired. Various studies are underway at JG3 in cooperation with COMUSMACV that may lead to further improvements in the system.

(11) Provost Marshal

(a) The 272d MP Company provided security on 6 occasions during the period for distinguished visitors and flag officers or civilian equivalent personnel. Some visitors worthy of mention are Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Stanley R. Resor; Members of the President's fact finding tour; the Honorable Congressman Robert H. Mollohan, E. Ross Adair, Augustus F. Hawkins.

(b) The MA representative on the G3, I FORGEV Security Inspection Team during this quarter inspected two (2) installations in the 2d Military Region, and there were a number of separate compounds inspected. Areas of interest were the indentification and control of Local National employees, protective fencing, protective lighting and clear zones, key control for sensitive areas, overall security for all ASP's and POL tank farms and the general physical security plans. A common deficiency found at all installations is that the Local Nationals (LN) employed are not wearing the USARV Standard Pass on the front of their outer garments as required by USARV Regulation 190-20.

(c) Statistical Data of Military and Non-Military Crimes for the Period Jan 69 - Jun 70 in Nha Trang was compiled by this office for review and analysis by the G1, I FORGEV.

(d) Prisoners of War

1 Enemy captured during the period:

4th Inf Div

OFF MO FM UNK

0 0 12 3

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL REPORT-LESSONS LEARNED
Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R2)

OFF       WO
b 173d Abn Bde 0 0 7 0
q Task Force South 0 0 4 0

To reduce the 2d Military Region PW Camp population to an acceptable level, a total of 109 PW's were evacuated. 4 were evacuated to Bien Hoa from the Pleiku Camp. 5 were evacuated to Bien Hoa. 50 were evacuated to Phu Quoc, and 50 were evacuated to Pleiku from the Phu Tai Camp. Throughout the past three months no prisoners of war have been repatriated. During this same period 3 prisoners of war died from fever at Pleiku.

Quarterly PW strengths at the ARVN camps are as follows:

a Pleiku camp strength increased from 1,041 on 1 May 70 to 1,066 on 31 Jul 70.

b Phu Tai camp strength increased from 1,201 on 1 May 70 to 1,236 on 31 Jul 70.

Chaplain Activities

(a) Adequacy of Catholic Religious services has improved due to two assigned Catholic Chaplains in the Nha Trang Area and one English speaking civilian clergymen under contract.

1 The Jewish chaplain is planning to have Jewish High Holy Days conducted in Nha Trang for all Jewish personnel in MR 2. Presently he is conducting a liaison visit throughout 2d Military Region in an effort to assure an adequate religious program for all Jewish personnel in MR 2.

2 The following services are now scheduled in the Nha Trang area:

a Sundays: 12 Protestant, 9 Catholic, 1 Episcopal, 1 Church of Christ and 2 Mormon services.

b Weekday, daily: 1 Mass daily, Protestant discussions Monday through Saturday, 1 Jewish Sabbath Service on Saturdays. In addition there are various discussion classes and Bible study groups throughout the Nha Trang area.

Surgeon

(a) This has been the first full quarter of operation since the 43d Medical Group was deactivated and an imaginary line drawn across MR 2 from the Cambodian border to the sea. With the area of MR 2 north of this line assigned to the 67th Medical Group in Da Nang and the area south of the line to the 68th Medical Group, Long Binh, for non-organic medical support — the ease, facility and thoroughness of coordination has suffered. The mission is being accomplished, with no apparent impact to patients, however it might be questioned whether or not the relatively few spaces "saved" by deactivation of the 43d Medical Group was justified.
The 93rd Med Det (KO) departed Nha Trang in June 1970 for Da Nang. This leaves one (1) Army psychiatrist and one (1) NI Social Worker for the entire MR 2 South and that resource at Cam Ranh South in the HMG. Efforts up to this time to have the USAF medical resources assume a portion of the outpatient load have not been successful. It is expected that with the formulation of an Inter-Service Agreement in the future better psychiatric outpatient services will be available to the troops.

The 8th Field Hospital formally closed its doors for the treatment of patients on 9 July 1970 in anticipation of turning the hospital, physical plant and assets over to the ARVN on 1 Aug 70. The workload and responsibility for medical support of the area was to be assumed by the 575th Med Disp. at Camp McDermott.

The 575th Med Disp. which has been operating with no holding capability and the responsibility for medical support of the Nha Trang area, though supplemented with both professional and enlisted personnel, is operating amid problems that could have been alleviated with more complete planning. It is expected that the physical plant will have been adequately adapted to current operating needs and a helipad will be available in the area, in the next 45-60 days.

During the quarter the movement of the 254th Med Det (IL) from its present quarters in order to vacate the WNAF side of the Nha Trang airfield has been discussed. A projected move to Phan Rang AB was delayed to the point where facilities are no longer available. A request for availability of facilities to move the unit to Cam Ranh Bay AB made on 2 Apr has not yet been answered by the Air Force.

Artillery

(a) Enemy artillery expenditures for MR 2 is illustrated in Table 1 for the period 1 May to 31 July 1970. A high point occurred the week ending 8 May and moderate activity the weeks ending 15 and 22 May. Between 23 and 29 May, activity returned to a low level. A sharp increase occurred on 31 May, causing the level of activity for the week to return to a moderate level. In the remaining eight weeks of the quarter, expenditures by enemy artillery units remained at a low level.

(b) The moderate to high level of activity occurring the first three weeks of May appeared to be in response to allied operations in Cambodia. However, it may have been more a continuation of the spring offensive which reached a high throughout the military region in April. A sharp increase in activity was predicted for 18-19 May to commemorate Ho Chi Minh's and Buddha's birthdays. However, a significant change in the level of activity did not occur on these dates. Standoff attacks were launched in the Southern Provinces on 30 and 31 May and on 4 June throughout the military region as enemy activity reached a high point. Agents reports were received during June indicating that a major offensive would be launched all over Vietnam on or about 28 June when provincial elections were to be held. Activity was to be directed at RF/FP units and civilians supporting the GVN. By disrupting provincial elections, enemy forces hoped to gain a major political victory. Although a minor increase in
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters 1 Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSF0ft-65 (R2)

activity did occur on the 28th, provincial elections were held on schedule without being harassed by VC/NVA units. Credit is given to Vietnamese forces for preempting enemy plans to disrupt the elections. Enemy artillery expenditures from 5 June through the end of the quarter have been held to a low level. An average of 231 rounds have been fired per week compared to an average of 884 rounds per week for the period 2 May - 5 June. The decrease in activity is attributed to logistical problems confronting enemy forces in our AO. Sustained attacks in April accounted for 7,417 rounds while losses incurred in Cambodia and other areas of the MR 2 accounted for 4,268 rounds of artillery ammunition in May. To prevent critical shortages of ammunition enemy forces are believed to be restocking ammunition dumps. In the next quarter, enemy offensive activity will probably increase when all units have brought ammunition supplies back to a working level.

TABLE 1 - Enemy Artillery Expenditures for 1 May - 31 July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week Ending</th>
<th>Total No. RKT, MTR &amp; RR Exp</th>
<th>Week Ending</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 May</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>08 May</td>
<td>1,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>05 Jun</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jun</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>19 Jun</td>
<td>1,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>03 Jun</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>17 Jul</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>24 Jul</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Radar Operations: During the last quarter, there were 5 enemy movements detected by radars. Countermortar and counterbattery radars made 74 locations of enemy firing positions. Ground surveillance radars made 864 sightings. 476 of the total were fired upon with 5,825 artillery and mortar rounds.

(3) Survey: 97,838 meters of fourth order survey were completed during the quarter. 7,856 meters at Qui Nhon, 9,948 meters at Nha Trang and 80,034 meters at Phan Thiet. To date, 4,965,216 meters of fourth order survey have been completed in RVN by the Survey Platoon, 8/26th Arty.

(4) During the reporting period artillery units with I FFORCEV continued support of ARVN, ROK, RP/PP, RD Teams and USSF/CIDG forces in MR 2. I FFORCEV Artillery units continued support of I FFORCEV maneuver forces in providing maximum participation in pacification, fire planning, and artillery protection for the greatest number of villages and hamlets in the MR 2. On 9 May, 52d Artillery Group terminated its support of the defense of the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp.

(5) Fire Support Coordination Element.

(a) Naval gunfire support for MR 2 was provided by an average of one ship per day. The following is a summary of naval gunfire support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>11,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFA-GC-HI3T
15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS, GSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) During the month of April, the FGCE relinquished its targeting mission to achieve a more decentralized targeting responsibility. There were no immediate reactions for hangfire targets developed for this reporting period and in future ORL's this paragraph will be omitted.

(c) The area harassment program was discontinued 15 July 70. No support has been provided this program this quarter. This paragraph will be deleted from future ORL's.

(d) A total of 192 B-52 targets were struck with 599 A/C during the quarter. The following is a summary by province of support by type of target.

**PRIMARY TARGETS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Duc</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECONDARY TARGETS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Ngai</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) During the quarter, IFFV FGCE computed and issued 752 175mm gun suppressions for a daily average of 8 suppressions.


(a) Non-Divisional

I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8" SP)
4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (SP)
Battery B, 7th Battalion, 29th Artillery (SLT)
Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)
Headquarters Battery, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery (TAB)
54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Surveillance Radar) (L-AN/FPS-5)
77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MPQ-4A)
237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MPQ-4A)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROE CPFIB-65 (N2)

241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
253d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
254th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
255th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
256th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (AN/MQ-4A)
270th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (1-AN/THS-25)
272d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) (1-AN/THS-25)

52d Artillery Group
7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8" SP)
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8" SP)
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

IFFORCE Provisional Artillery Group
2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T)
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175/8" SP)
5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)

(b) Divisional, Brigade and Separate Battalions

4th Infantry Division Artillery
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155/8" SP)
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade
3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Division (A)
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

(7) Artillery Strength: The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for RVN, ROK, US and USSF/CIDG artillery units in MR 2 at the end of the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>105mm</th>
<th>155mm</th>
<th>8inch</th>
<th>175mm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Force Artillery</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other US (Div, Bde, Sep Bn)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Divisional</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Artillery</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSF/CIDG</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>603</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) Ammunition Statistics for US Force Artillery During the Reporting Period.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(a) Ammunition expenditures by target category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET CATEGORY</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFIRMED</td>
<td>9,970</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACQUIRED</td>
<td>34,044</td>
<td>11,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERBATTERY</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERDICATION</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL PURPOSE</td>
<td>10,805</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>59,056</td>
<td>13,331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Ammunition expenditure by caliber:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>21,364</td>
<td>19,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>14,680</td>
<td>6,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>5,949</td>
<td>5,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>127mm</td>
<td>12,963</td>
<td>6,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>59,056</td>
<td>50,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>19,546</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>6,934</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>127mm</td>
<td>6,818</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,221</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>19,546</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>6,934</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>127mm</td>
<td>6,818</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,221</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL 134,417

(9) Personnel

(a) Personnel strength of HQ & HQ Battery, I FFORCEV Arty on 31 July 1970 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>35*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for duty</td>
<td>48**</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes one Colonel assigned to HNB for duty with Prov Arty Group; one Lieutenant
assigned to HHB for duty with Open Mess activity; and one Lieutenant assigned to HHB attached to Task Force South. **Includes one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, four Captains and three Lieutenants attached to HHB for duty with Prov Arty Group.
**Includes seven enlisted men assigned to HHB for installation support activities.
***Includes thirty enlisted men attached to HHB for duty with Prov Arty Group.

(b) Overall strength of Command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5565</td>
<td>5588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Enlisted personnel status has increased during the reporting period with the overall command strength currently at 100.3%. Critical shortages exist in the following MOS's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASIGNED</th>
<th>SHORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05B20 Radio Operator</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E40 Section Chief</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13F40 FA Cpl &amp; Intel NCO</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13Z50 150/155/155/155 NCO</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16F10/20 ADA Crew NCO</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16F20 ADA Crew Chief</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25E20 Radar Repairman</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36K20 Wireman</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63C40 Motor Sergeant</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63P20 Recovery Specialist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71T20 THERS Clerk</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76Y40 Supply Sergeant</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82C10 Arty Surveyor</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93F40 Metro NCO</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The following accidents were recorded during this period for I FFORCEV Artillery units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Fatal 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Non-fatal 8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 19 16 8

(e) Morale and discipline continued to be excellent throughout the period.
CONFiDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST
15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters 1 Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

g. Engineer.

(1) The Engineer Section continued to plan and coordinate all engineer activities in MR 2. Engineer construction effort was coordinated for fire bases, helicopter rearm/refuel points, and forward logistical support areas for US Forces in support of ARVN operations in Cambodia during May and June 1970. Additional engineer effort was required for modification and upgrade of existing base locations in conjunction with force redeployment and in-country shifting of forces. This required extensive coordination by the First Field Force Engineer Section with the principle FFORCEV staff, Central District Engineer and 18th Engineer Bde. A detailed evaluation of the impact of possible major reductions in the LOC program were also coordinated with CORDS and DSA MR 2 advisory personnel. The limited engineer capability available in the MR 2 was strained to meet all urgent demands for improving lines of communication, base development and combat support requirements.

(2) The IFFV land clearing program was terminated in the highlands areas of MR 2 and shifted to clearing in coastal provinces. Clearing in the northern highlands (538th Land Clearing Co) ceased in early May and a shift of base to An Khe with a maintenance standdown was accomplished. Clearing in the vicinity of An Khe included 40 km of road and approximately 260 acres of selected area clearing around and within Camp Radcliff. Land clearing in the southern highlands (687th Land Clearing Co) continued until 20 June; approximately 50 km of QL-14 and Rte 344 were cleared in Quang Duc Province as well as 200 acres of selected area clearing around New Camp Bu Prang. After a move to Cam Ranh Bay and maintenance standdown, area clearing was started on 13 July 70 in the vicinity of Dong Ba Thin at a rate of approximately 50 acres per day. Areas for indirect fire attacks on the DBT/CRB were cleared.

(3) Construction of New Camp Bu Prang (CIDG Camp) at coordinates YU681508 was brought to a successful conclusion. Facilities reached a sufficient state of completion by the end of June permitting all CIDG personnel to be moved into the new camp and the old one to be dismantled. The airfield (TYPE II C123) constructed at the new camp was opened on 5 July 1970 and supplies for the camp, as well as most of the remaining construction materials, were moved to the camp by fixed wing aircraft. Projects associated with reinforcing and repair of selected bunkers, completing access roads and improvement of the camp drainage continued until the end of July.

(4) MACV advisory Facilities Upgrade Program. During the reporting period construction for MACV Advisory Facilities reached an all-time high with the completion of 18 sites and construction underway on eleven. The majority of projects underway need only to have a water well dug and purification equipment installed in order to complete individual site construction programs. During July the last directives were issued for the construction of four water wells and one septic tank. The FY-71 Construction Program for MACV Advisor Facilities started with twenty-four uncompleted projects, fifteen of which were under construction and the remaining unstarted. As of 31 July 1970, five have been completed, eleven are underway and eight are not yet started.

h. Signal Operations

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG SFOR-65 (R2)

(1) The continuing upgrade of communications systems and circuits within the 2d Military Region was the major concern of the Signal Section during the last quarter.

(2) The Signal Section was deeply involved in providing communications in support of operation Binh Tay I through IV that occurred during the quarter, both to US combat elements and to ARVN advisors. On 15 May, radio teletype and multi-channel equipment were provided to the 4th Infantry Division to extend communications from An Khe to Pleiku and Plei Djereng in support of operation Binh Tay I. Using a combination of 54th Signal Battalion VHF equipment and 124th Signal Battalion VHF equipment, 24 voice channels were extended thru a relay on Dragon Mountain to the 4th Infantry Division Forward CP at Plei Djereng. Additionally, radio teletype equipment was provided to RSA MR 2 to establish a station in their net at Da Nang, Headquarters of the 22nd ARVN Division Forward for Operations Pinh Tay I and II from 5 May through 28 May. In support of the Senior Advisor, 23d ARVN Division during Operation Binh Tay III, two radio teletype terminals and a four channel VHF system were installed and operated by the 54th Signal Battalion to extend communications from Ban Me Thuot to Dac Lap during Phase One from 20 May to 21 June, and then to Trang Phuc during Phase Two from 20 June to 27 June. During Operation Binh Tay IV from 24 June to 26 June, a radio teletype terminal was again provided at Duc Co to extend communications from Pleiku for RSA, MR 2.

(3) Communications support was also provided to the Senior Liaison Officer, Capital ROK Infantry Division during operations Dok Sur 75-1 from 24 April through 8 May, and Ho Rang 1 from 16 July through 31 July. Communications were provided to the Division Tactical Command Post via radio teletype equipment installed and operated by the 54th Signal Battalion.

(4) Communications support was provided to the 3rd Bn, 506th Inf Infantry, and 2nd Sqdn, Ist Cav, while these units were OPON to I FFORCES during the Binh Tay operations, communications were extended to Daklak Province, first to the 3rd/50th Inf, and later to the 2d/1st Cav engaged in road security operations along Highway 21. Communications support was in the form of multi-channel VHF and radio teletype equipment was attached for an indefinite period and support continues through the end of this reporting period.

(5) During the reporting period there was a reduction of communications support required, and as a result, two 12 channel VHF systems were deactivated and one re-located in a consolidation of requirements. An AN/TRC-24 system, V-03, between L2 North English and the District Headquarters at Tam Quan was deactivated on 21 May based on recommendations from the 173d Airborne Brigade, the unit it primarily supported. On 24 July an AN/TRC-24 system, V-08, between Song Mao and Thien Giao was deactivated and a second 12 channel system between Thien Giao and Phan Thiet, V-07, was reinstalled from Phan Thiet to Song Mao, consolidating one of the previous circuits carried over the two systems. This resulted in the removal of 1st Bn 50th Infantry (Mech) Forward TOC from Thien Giao and a resultant elimination of communications support required at that location.
On 13 June the Signal Section relocated offices from the first to the second floor of the Grand Hotel. At the same time the project for complete telephone rewiring of the Grand Hotel was initiated by the 1379th Communications Squadron with assistance from the 54th Signal Battalion. The project will provide a complete new in-house distribution cable and drop wires, and put all telephone service in the building onto the new 400 pair cable between the Grand Hotel and Typhoon frame, as well as removal of all old wiring. At the end of the reporting period the project was 75 percent complete.

In an effort to improve long distance dialing in RVN, MACV directed by a message dated 29 March 1970 that the Class "A" fill on any dial or manual switchboard not exceed 20 percent of the total fill, a reduction from the previous level of 30 percent and an overall reduction of one third of the Class "A" lines installed. An extensive study was done by the Signal Section and 21 of the existing 64 Class "A" numbers in the headquarters were identified and reported to the 1879th Communications Squadron for removal. By use of Class "A" lines for outgoing long distance calls only, the reduction was accomplished with minimum turmoil.

The Signal Section completed a semiannual circuit review on 15 May of all Corps Area Communications System (CACS) circuits under the purview of this headquarters. Out of a total of 97 circuits reviewed, 63 were revalidated for retention and 34 recommended for deactivation, an overall reduction of 35 percent of CACS circuits.

A semiannual Defense Communications Agency Circuit review was also conducted during the quarter to study and determine which DGA circuits were required for retention by this headquarters and all OPCON units. The study was completed and the final report sent to USARV on 15 July. Out of a total of 112 circuits under the preview of this headquarters, 90 were revalidated for retention and justification submitted to USARV, and 22 were determined to be no longer required and recommended for deactivation, an overall reduction of 20 percent.

The Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) of the MJTODIN System installed in the IFFV Communications Center in April was rehomed from the Nha Trang Automatic Switching Center (ASC) to Phu Lam ASC on 10 July as part of a 1st Signal Brigade Plan to upgrade and consolidate communications. On 12 July the DSTE was further upgraded from a 150 band (approximately 175 WFM) to a 300 band terminal (approximately 350 WFM) to enable the circuit to better handle the traffic. The overall result was a marked improvement in the message reject rate.

The Signal Section under went major personnel changes during the quarter. LTC (P) John M. Mays arrived 25 May as Signal Officer to replace Col Donald E. Phinney who departed 6 June. LTC Janc A. Lucido arrived 11 May to replace LTC William R. Green as Deputy Signal Officer who departed 25 May. CPT (P) Archie B. Taylor arrived 18 July, and Sergeant Major Billy W. Jace arrived 30 July to replace Sergeant Major Fay Randal who departed 10 July.

The Signal Section continued in its efforts to resolve frequency interference problems, issue FM frequencies, publish the I FFV/SC and SOP/SSI, assist the 1G and 3-3 in AGI, OPSEC and physical security inspections, and obtain circuits to support OPCON units.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-QC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG 587-28-65 (R2)

1. Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY JUSTICE</th>
<th>MAY-JUNE-JULY</th>
<th>APR-MAI-APR</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial Cases Tried</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial Cases Authorized to Adjudicate BCD's</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial Cases Reviewed</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial Cases Reviewed</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLAIMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL CLAIMS</th>
<th>MAY-JUNE-JULY</th>
<th>APR-MAI-APR</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount Claimed</td>
<td>$60,059.00</td>
<td>$68,726.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Paid</td>
<td>$49,761.15</td>
<td>$54,573.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOREIGN CLAIMS</th>
<th>MAY-JUNE-JULY</th>
<th>APR-MAI-APR</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount Claimed</td>
<td>$23,205.66</td>
<td>$4,725.40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Paid</td>
<td>$6,413.97</td>
<td>$1,986.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGAL ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Matters</th>
<th>MAY-JUNE-JULY</th>
<th>APR-MAI-APR</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Justice Matters</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Inspector General Activities:

(1) During the period 1 May 70 to 31 Jul 70, 163 Inspector General Action Requests were received. Broken down by major category these were:

(a) Requests for assistance | 62
(b) Justified complaints | 39
(c) Unjustified complaints | 62

163

The magnitude of complaints has increased notably while the pattern remains unchanged.

CONFIDENTIAL

The rise in the number of complaints concerning reassignment/transfer and unit administration parallel the Phase III Redeployment and off limits sanction of the Trang respectively. There is no indication of problem areas which could result in conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) Inspections:

(a) Command inspections of the following units/activities were conducted on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>4 May 70</td>
<td>SAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 50th Inf.</td>
<td>6-8 May 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku Prov</td>
<td>19 May 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272nd MP Co.</td>
<td>22 May 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, IFFV</td>
<td>22 May 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 22nd Arty</td>
<td>26 May 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn, 26th Arty</td>
<td>8 Jun 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Prov</td>
<td>9 Jun 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 13th Arty</td>
<td>20 Jul 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Annual General Inspections of the following units/activities were conducted on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
<td>9-10 Jul 70</td>
<td>SAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167th Sig Co.</td>
<td>23-24 Jul 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(4) The following Acting Inspectors General were appointed during the period due to DEROS, reassignment, etc:

(a) LTC Larry H. Hunt
(b) MAJ Ronald J. Holmstrom
(c) MAJ Richard O. Roemer
(d) LTC Landon P. Whitelaw
(e) MAJ Jose A. Riccio
(f) CPT James R. Williamson
(g) MAJ Loren D. Reid
(h) LTC James N. Bell
(i) LTC Montgomery T. Spier
(j) MAJ Luther C. Boysen
(k) LTC Samuel L. Myers
(l) MAJ Raymond F. Spigarelli

52d Arty; Gp
6th Bn, 32d Arty
Task Force South
1st Bn, 92d Arty
HHC, 54th Sig Bn
5th Bn, 27th Arty
HHC, I FFORCEV Arty
HHC, I FORCENV Arty
6th Bn, 14th Arty
Task Force South
5th Bn, 27th Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGSCFOR-65 (R2)

(5) Memorandum, subject: Right of Military Personnel to Present Complaints, was published and distributed on 1 Jul 70 to all assigned and attached units.

(6) Five investigations were conducted during the period.

k. Information Office.

(1) On 1 May 1970, MAJ Guy R. Sodano, Co, 11th Public Information Detachment returned with the I FFORCEV Forward Mobile Staff (FMS) from Kontum. MAJ Sodano acted as the Information Officer for the FMS during the Dak Seang Battle from 5 April to 1 May 1970.

(2) On 7 May 70, the Pleiku Press Camp was reinforced with two officers and one enlisted man during joint US ARVN operations in Cambodia, labeled Binh Tay I, Binh Tay II, and Binh Tay III. LTC Berens assisted the 4th Infantry Division in establishing a press center at Plei Djereng for correspondents entering and leaving Cambodia from the Central Highlands.

(3) The mission to publish I FFORCEV WRAP-UP shifted to the 11th Public Information Detachment. The unit published and distributed the first issue on 23 May 70.

(4) MAJ Sodano escorted the first of a stream of correspondents to Lam Son (National) Training Center to observe and report on the training of Cambodian recruits (BCT) and veterans (BUT and ADT) by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The training is programmed through October 1970.

(5) MAJ Thomas P. Malloy assumed duties as Assistant Information Officer/Co, 5th Public Information Detachment on 11 July 1970.

(6) In coordination with other staff agencies of I FFORCEV, the Information Officer edited and published a 20 page pamphlet on drug abuse entitled "Squad Leader's Handbook on Drugs". The original manuscript was written by the surgeon and distribution was accomplished by the Provost Marshal. The pamphlet provides a ready reference on drug abuse and was distributed through Drug Suppression Councils in 2d Military Region during the last week in June.

(7) During this reporting period, a special 44 page issue of TYPHOON magazine was prepared to commemorate the 5th anniversary of I FFORCEV. The anniversary date is 1 August 70 and the magazine will be distributed during that month.

(8) I FFORCEV annual input for the Army Greenbook was forwarded to USARV IO on 20 June 1970. The material reviewed highlights of the past year in II Military Region.

(9) The "Let's Communicate" pamphlet cited in last quarters' OHLL is being printed in Japan and is scheduled for distribution throughout USARV between 1 and 15 August 1970.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel. None
   b. Intelligence.
   (1) Metro.
      (a) Observation: Excess voltage in the modulator radioonde - 4B and the
      transmitter TA35A/AMT-4B was causing the oscillator to burn out.
      (b) Evaluation: Testing revealed that the A-positive voltage of the battery
      produced an excess voltage of 7.2 to 7.7 volts. Elimination of one cell of the bat-
      tery dropped voltage to 6.8. Oscillator burn out was not experienced at the lower
      voltage.
      (c) Recommendation: That one cell of the A-positive 6 volt side of the
      battery be bypassed when installing the battery in the radiosonde - 4B and the trans-
      missioner TA35A/AMT-4B.
   (2) Crater Analysis.
      (a) Observation: The location of enemy firing position remains a difficult
      problem to solve.
      (b) Evaluation: Imagery, visual observation and detection by counter mortar
      radar are the primary means for accurately locating firing positions. These means
      should be supplemented with a crater analysis capability. When the primary methods
      of target location fail, crater analysis will assist in determining a rough plot of
      enemy firing positions. In addition, the caliber of the weapon being fired and
      damage assessment can be accurately determined.
      (c) Recommendation: That all company size units train and maintain at least one
      proficient crater analysis team.
   c. Operations.
   (1) Traffic Coordination on QL-1 at Dien Khanh Construction Site RVN.
      (a) Observation: During the month of July 1970 a conference was held at Nha
      Trang on the traffic control at a construction site on QL-1. The volume of military
      traffic warranted providing joint military police coverage to facilitate the con-
      struction progress. Despite the arrangements for the joint control two incidents
      occurred involving FMAF military convoys forcing their way thru by threatening to
      or actually firing their weapons. In one instance the military police of that country
      were not at the control point. Fortunately there were no injuries but the construc-
      tion was halted temporarily as the workers withdrew from the construction site after each
      incident.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-HIST

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CJF0A-65 (R2)

(b) Evaluation: If combined Military Police had been present and/or had exerted their authority perhaps these incidents would not have taken place.

(c) Recommendation: That combined police checkpoints continue to be established to regulate the flow of traffic at the highway construction sites in view of the presence of several armed forces and civilian population.

d. Organization. None

e. Training. None

f. Logistics.

(1) Liaison from USARV G4 and MACV J4.

(a) Observation: During 4th Division operations in Cambodia, a USARV G4 representative was TDY to I FFORCEV G4 Supply Division to assist in expediting USARV and I GCV release of combat essential requirements and, in emergency situations, authorized release of same in the name of the USARV G4. During ARVN operations in Cambodia, a MACV J4 representative performed liaison duties with I FFORCEV G4 to assist in coordination of logistical support for evacuation of Cambodian Refugees and soldiers.

(b) Evaluation: The presence of the USARV representative was extremely beneficial and enabled this HQ to insure that the 4th Division received combat essential equipment in a timely manner. The MACV J4 representative was extremely helpful and enabled this headquarters to provide timely logistical support for evacuation of Cambodian Refugees and soldiers.

(c) Recommendation: That a USARV G4 representative with similar duties and authority be assigned to liaison duty with a Field Force or equivalent HQ whenever large scale US tactical operations take place and that a MACV J4 representative be assigned to liaison duty with a Field Force or equivalent HQ whenever large scale multinational operations take place.

(2) Signature Headcount Procedures.

(a) Observation: Signature headcount procedure for ration consumption accountability are in effect in the HHC I FFORCEV mess hall.

(b) Evaluation: Implementation of this procedure has resulted in more effective control of and accountability for rations with resulting cost savings. USARV Sup1 1 to AR 30-1 makes use of the signature headcount optional in RVN.

(c) Recommendation: That the signature headcount procedure be implemented in all unit messes throughout RVN except in those tactical units which qualify for relief from ration accounting under the provision of USARV Reg 30-1.

CONFIDENTIAL

52
CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-3C-HIST

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, HQ GSWDa-65 (R2)

g. Communications. None

h. Material. None

i. Other. None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert L. Alderman

LTC, AG
Adjutant General

9 Inc1
as
Incl 5 w/d HQ DA

DISTRIBUTION:

1-DA, OCMH, ATTN: MB-HC
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GJOP-DT
5-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHEC-DST
2-CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFB-RE-H
1-CG, 4TH INF DIV
1-CG, 173D ABN BDE (SEP)
1-CG, I FFORCEV ARTY
1-30, TASK FORCS SOUTH (PROV)
1-USA, MB 2
1-ACofS, G1
1-ACofS, G2
1-ACofS, G3
1-ACofS, G4
1-DEFCORDS, ATTN: DDE
1-US Army War College, ATTN: Library Q-2149
1-Comdt, USA CWSC, Ft Leavenworth
2-13th Mil Hist Det
1-Comdt, USAIS, Ft Benning, Ga 31905
2-USAGSC LNO
1-GG 54th Signal Battalion

CONFIDENTIAL

53
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters First Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Metro," page 51, paragraph 2b(1)(c). Not enough information was provided in the ORLL to facilitate a concurrence/nonconcurrence. USAECOM personnel from HQ USARV are in contact with IFFV to identify the problem and assist in its resolution. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Liaison from USARV G4 and MACV J4," page 52, para 2f(1); concur. When liaison personnel can be provided, the expediting of supplies is a significant benefit. However, the capability of an activity to provide the necessary personnel for this type of liaison is a limiting factor. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   c. Reference item concerning "Signature Headcount Procedure," page 52, paragraph 2f(2); concur. A study is now being conducted to determine what course of action to follow in implementing the signature headcount procedure. A target date has been set for 1 October 1970. Instructions for the implementation will be issued at the earliest practical time. Unit has been so advised.

For the Commander:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: IFFV

54
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending
31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
### A/22

| HHC, 1 PPPCSEV | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 6th Bn (82/175mm) (SP) 32d Arty | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 4th Bn (32) (SP) 60th Arty | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| Btry A, 29th Arty (SCHL) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| Btry E (to), 41st Arty (AD) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| HHD, 9th Bn (T) 26th Arty | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 77th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 237th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 241st FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 242d FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 243d FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 244th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 253d FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 254th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 255th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 256th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 272d FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 270th FA Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 54th Inf Det (Radar) | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 1 PPPCSEV Prov Arty Gp | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Arty |
| 2d Bn (105mm) (T) 17th Arty | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Prov Arty Gp |
| 5th Bn (81/175mm) (SP) 22d Arty | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Prov Arty Gp |
| 5th Bn (105mm) (T) 27th Arty | Attached HQ 1 PPPCSEV Prov Arty Gp |
| 52d Arty Group | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 7th Bn (105mm) (T) 13th Arty | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 6th Bn (37/175mm) (SP) 14th Arty | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 7th Bn (81/175mm) (SP) 15th Arty | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 1st Bn (155mm) (T) 92d Arty | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 68th Inf Det (Radar) | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 167th Sig Co (HR) | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| 209th Sig Det (KA) | Attached 52d Arty Gp |
| Co C (Ranger) 75th Inf | Attached 54th Sig Bn |
| 2d Arm Sqn, 1st Cav | Attached 54th Sig Bn |
| 1st Bn (Mech) 50th Inf | Attached 54th Sig Bn |
| 1st Cal Det (GBRC) | OCP 573d Airborne Brigade |
| **OCP 753d Airborne Brigade** | OCP TF SOUTH |
| **OCP TF SOUTH** | OCP TF SOUTH |
| **OCP TF SOUTH** | OCP TF SOUTH |
ASSIGNED

5th PI Det
11th PI Det
13th Mil Hist Det
54th Sig Bn (Corps)
55th MI Det
64th Engineer Det (Terrain)
272d MP Co (Corps)(-)
297th Trans Co (Car)
HQ, Task Force South (Prov)

ATTACHED UNITS

313th Radio Research Bn

OPCON UNITS

4th Infantry Division (-)
173d Airborne Brigade (Sep)
II Corps US Army Advisory Group
CORDS
17th Combat Aviation Group
3d Bn (AM) 506th Infantry (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM))
Co B, 5th SFG
201st Aviation Company (Corps)

GS UNITS

8th PSTOPS Bn
**CONFIDENTIAL**

1 MAY 1970 - 31 JULY 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASGD</th>
<th>% ASGD/AUTH</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>VIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1 FFORCEV (1)</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FFORCEV Arty (2)</td>
<td>4307</td>
<td>4151</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Arty Gp (3)</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn (4)</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d MP Co</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297th TC Co</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div</td>
<td>14031</td>
<td>13173</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Abn Bde</td>
<td>6117</td>
<td>5806</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 75th Ranger (5)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/506th Abn Inf</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1st Cav</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/50th Inf (Mech)</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ml 2</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Avn Gp</td>
<td>8104</td>
<td>7517</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Includes HHC IFFV; 64th Engr Det (Terrain); 5th PI Det; 11th PI Det; 13th Military History Det; 1st Chemical Det.

(2) Includes HHB IFFV ARTY, 7/13 Arty Bn, 8/26th ARTY BN, 6/32d ARTY BN, 4/60th ARTY BN, 8/29th ARTY BTRY, 2/17th ARTY BN, 5/22d ARTY BN, 5/27th ARTY BN, 241st, 243d, 244th, 237th, 233d, 254th, 255th, 242d, and 77th. (FA Radar Det)

(3) Includes HHB 52d ARTY, 6/14th ARTY BN, 7/15th ARTY BN, 1/92d ARTY BN.

(4) Includes 54th Sig Bn, 167th Sig Co, and 209th Sig Det.

(5) Report initiated this office 11 Jul 70.

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report—Lessons Learned Headquarters I Field Force
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IFFV:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM &quot; V &quot;</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM &quot; V &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM &quot; V &quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1,154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **IFFV ARTY:** |     |      |      |        |
| MOH    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0      |
| DC    | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0      |
| DSM   | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0      |
| SS    | 1   | 0    | 0    | 1      |
| LOM   | 1   | 2    | 4    | 7      |
| DFC   | 1   | 0    | 0    | 1      |
| SM    | 1   | 0    | 0    | 1      |
| BSM " V " | 1 | 1    | 5    | 7      |
| BSM   | 194 | 242  | 152  | 588    |
| AM " V " | 0  | 0    | 0    | 0      |
| AM    | 58  | 86   | 32   | 176    |
| ACM " V " | 2 | 5    | 2    | 9      |
| ACM   | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0      |
| PH    | 35  | 8    | 8    | 51     |
| TOTALS | 569 | 552  | 573  | 1,694  |
**R&R UTILIZATION**

The following depicts the number of I FFORCEV personnel departing on R&R during the period 1 May 1970 through 31 July 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FFORCEV</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, I FFORCEV Arty</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn, 26th Arty</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 60th Arty</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 22d Arty</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 27th Arty</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 52d Arty Co</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 92d Arty</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 15th Arty</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Bn, 13th Arty</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn, 17th Arty</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 6th Arty</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Sig Bn</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297th Trans Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272d MP Co</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MI Det</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 50th Inf</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sqdn, 1st Cav</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS (less turn-backs)</strong></td>
<td>575</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On 9 May 1970, Operation TAT THANG 18, which commenced on 3 April 1970, as a result of the large scale attack against the DAK SEANG CIDG Camp, was terminated. Friendly forces participating in the operation were; a. ARVN Forces: 42d Regt, 3 battalions from the 47th Regt, 2 battalions from the 45th Regt, 3d ARVN CAV Squadron, 14th ARVN CAV Squadron, and the 2d Ranger Group; b. CIDG Forces: 1st MSF and 4th MSG battalions; c. US Forces: Elements of the 7-17 Air CAV Squadron. Enemy activity during the period 1-9 May 1970, was characterized by sporadic standoff attacks aimed against the DAK SEANG and DAK PEK CIDG Camps. ARVN elements began extracting from the TAT THANG AO on 2 May when the 4/42d returned to TAN CANH. The 22d Ranger battalion, 3d ACAV and 14th ACAV Squadron were extracted on 4 May. The Rangers returned to PLEIKU for standdown and the ARVN CAV units resumed their normal mission of security of QL 14 from PLEIKU to BEN HAI. On 8 May the 2/45th and 4/45th were airlifted to TAN CANH and returned to the 45th Regt at BAN ME THOT, Dalac Province, on 10 May. On their termination day of the operation, 9 May 1970, the 4/47th returned to CAMP ENARI in Pleiku Province.

| FRIENDLY | KIA | 262 |
| WIA | 1286 |
| MIA | 82 |

| ENEMY | KIA | 1979 |
| DET | 3 |
| SA(Capt) | 128 |
| GS(Capt) | 40 |
5. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, First Field Force Vietnam

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CO, First Field Force, Vietnam

11. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

N/A