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<td>AGO ltr 9 May 1975; AGO ltr 9 May 1975</td>
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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR DT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
AVCA GO-H
31 October 1970


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities:

a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

(1) In August 1970, Special Troops were authorized to hire Vietnamese bus drivers for the Transportation Motor Pool. Ten Vietnamese were hired, and after an intensive six week training program, they were qualified as bus drivers. This action enabled the TMP to establish a comprehensive bus system without regard to company duties affecting the schedule. The routes commence at 0600 hours and work in two shifts until 2200 hours. The routes have been timed to coincide with each other enabling the TMP to be utilized as a bus terminal.

(2) Base Post Office Operations: On 1 October 1970, the 39th Base Post Office initiated Operation Reindeer. This marked the beginning of the Christmas mailing period. The 39th BPO received an augmentation of personnel and equipment to cope with the increasing volume of mail. Mail Movements: See Inclosure 1.

(3) Information Office:

(a) Hometown News Releases dispatched:

   Editorial 257
   Pictorial 183

(b) News Releases dispatched:

   With Photos 63
   Without Photos 8

""
31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support Command
Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Photo Assignments: 120

(d) Radio Programs: 13 programs of 15 minutes each were aired over AFVN-AM Dong Ba Thin.

(e) Television Programs: 4 programs were aired over AFVN-TV, Nha Trang.

(4) Personnel Management: A continued decrease in Command strength is evidenced by the figures listed below. Efforts are geared toward replacing key personnel losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th></th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th></th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>369</td>
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<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>7378</td>
<td>7381</td>
<td>7345</td>
<td>7485</td>
<td>7271</td>
<td>7188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7914</td>
<td>7838</td>
<td>7881</td>
<td>7952</td>
<td>7803</td>
<td>7665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Reenlistment: The Reenlistment Program has continued the outstanding performance that was achieved in the first half of the year. USAVReenlistment Incentive Awards Program was led by Cam Ranh Bay which achieved 81.4% of its objective. The success achieved in this program is attributed to the excellent support by unit commanders, our reenlistment personnel and strong command emphasis. A total of 179 persons reenlisted during this past quarter.

(6) Chaplain:

(a) Religious Activities: Chaplain activities in the Support Command CRB have been extended into new and previously untouched areas. During the summer, due to the shortage of Chaplains, we were unable to do more than maintain the regular service program. With the assignment of a full complement of Chaplains we have extended our activities to holding field services and other new arrangements such as having Chaplains ride with the convoys.

(b) Drug Amnesty Program: Chaplains have been active in the Drug Amnesty Program and are seeking new ways to make the program more effective through better counseling techniques.

(c) Missionary Activities and Civil Affairs: Morale and welfare have been aided in a new program of involving local missionaries in religious activities and in arranging tours of surrounding villages and towns.

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Civil affairs have been aided by involvement of Chaplains in coordinating some of the local projects.

(8) Promotions: See Inclosure 3.
(10) Visitors: See Inclosure 5.

b. ACOs, Flats and Operations

(1) Improvement and modernization of Vietnamese military forces

(a) The number of RVNization projects throughout the Support Command increased to rise during the reporting period.

2. On 1 September 1970, Small tugboat M77 was officially turned over to the Vietnamese. The tugboat was originally assigned to the 10th Marine Air Support Battalion and was inspected and prepared for turnover by LAMAV. The tugboat is currently in operation in the Salerno-Can Gio area.

3. On 8 September 1970, as Vietnamese completed training, helicopter H-16s operate. The training included basic operations as well as landing and lifting. No loss was incurred. This training precedes the turnover of equipment and mission responsibility which is expected to take place prior to 5 November 1970.

4. On 15 August 1970, the capacity of Nha Trang was officially turned over to the Vietnamese. The US is transferring small tugboats to assist in the role of barges and the movement of tankers. The new mission of the port has switched to shallow draft. The US still assists in the areas of port documents and transfer of Vietnamese power ships.

4. Current Projects: Some of the projects currently undergoing coordination include:

- Nha Trang USA - In April 1970, actions were initiated to turn over the COMA facility at the Nha Trang USA to the Vietnamese. The plan was to have this completed to take over the facility. The first phase of the turnover was completed by training of two Vietnamese officers on COMA from the US at PCL 12. The objective of this training was to acquire
the Vietnamese with US POL operating procedures as well as to prepare the facility for turnover. At this time, no formal agreement has been signed concerning the "how" or "when" the facility will be transferred, but a message is being prepared requesting instructions from MACV.

b. Mini-ports - On 7 September 1970, 15 Vietnamese from the 36th POL Depot (ARVN) completed 30 days of OSF for helicopter refuel operations at the Bia Nghia, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, Dalt and Can Beuc oil points. A message was dispatched to USAF on the 19th of October 1970 requesting instructions on turning the refuel point over to the Vietnamese. USAF forwarded the message to MACV on 13 October 1970 and we are presently awaiting final implementing instructions.

c. Future projects under the Improvement and Modernization Military Forces Program include:

d. Small Tug #2107 - Small Tug #2107, currently located in Nha Trang, is scheduled to be transferred to the 5th Air Force Base in the near future. Repair work has been completed on the tug, and the vessel is ready to work. The Vietnamese, however, have stopped the availability of a tow to bring it back to Cam Ranh Bay. The tug will be used by the Vietnamese for port operations at Phu Quoc. Although no deep draft cargo vessels are planned to be used at the base, the tug will require more work and support.

e. Tug Annie Area - The 71-Ct tanker of the Yankee Area, initially transferred to the Vietnamese, has been transferred to the Vietnamese. The tanker was not yet identified to begin training or assume ownership of the vessel following a SWITC transfer. The tanker is now closed.

f. Yankee Ammunition Area - All US ammunition operations in the Yankee Ammunition Area have been closed out. Concurrently, the Vietnamese are preparing the construction of a large ammunition storage area. The Yankee Ammunition Area was located in the area of the proposed construction of the new ASP or for use until the new ASP was completed. The Vietnamese have notified us that they do not want the Yankee Ammunition Area at all. Therefore, Yankee Ammunition Area is now closed.

g. Duffel Bag - The Cam Ranh Bay Duffel Bag Facility is programmed for transfer to the Australians. Since the first of the year, two Vietnamese operators have been working at the facility under Project BUDDY. At this time, we have approximately 5 Vietnamese operators training with a projected total of 10 by the end of the year. The facility is planned to be transferred by October 1971.
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e. Project "HIT" (RF/FF Family Housing) - Following a recommendation by USARV to MACV that future issues of project HIT materials emanate from the Vietnamese supply points, an area at Nha Trang was proposed for the storage and issue of HIT materials. USARV informed us that the proposed area would have to be at Cam Ranh. A survey of the Army area at Cam Ranh Bay was made, but the USARV requirements could not be met. A reply was sent to USARV on 23 September 1970 informing them that an ideal area on South Beach, currently occupied by the Marine Maintenance Activity, could be made available if that activity is relocated from Cam Ranh Bay. At the present time, no reply has been received from USARV.

f. USAAMAV - The United States Army Marine Maintenance Activity-Vietnam has initiated a program to prepare the Vietnamese Army to support its own watercraft. The ARVN 306th General Support/Combat Support Group is the Vietnamese unit whose mission is most closely aligned to that of the USAAMAV. Twenty ARVN personnel from the 306th Group are presently participating in a BUDDY training program at MMV. Upon completion of this training, the Vietnamese will return to their unit to instruct additional Vietnamese. We are presently formulating plans to transfer MMV equipment assets to the Vietnamese so that they may assume the entire marine maintenance mission when MMV is inactivated.

(b) Vietnamese Training Status:

1. Total trained prior to 1 September 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Repair &amp; calibration of test equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Technical inspection of laundry units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Aluminum welding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>POL handling and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Care for future POL classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Radar repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Carrier repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Radio repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Generator repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Refrigerator repair</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Marine maintenance and repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>LCH-P maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Winch operators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Current Training Program:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Marine Maintenance and Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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31 October 1970

2. Anticipated Future Training:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER TO BE TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Seamen for LCU's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oilers for M-Tanker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Duffel Bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Small Unit operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Fort Documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Plans Division:

(a) Keystone - During the period, the command continued to experience a reduction in personnel under Increment 12 of Keystone Plan. The major unit involved in this drawdown was the 2nd Squadron of the 1st Cavalry.

(b) VAPP and Temporary Loans - During the reporting period, command letters and letters of instruction were published implementing USARV Reg 750-20, Temporary Loans and the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedure.

1. Temporary loan of equipment requests were approved by USARV for temporary mission essential requirements. The items loaned were issued from depot stocks and renewals were guaranteed only by USAR after submission of FTOE, MO.

2. VAPP allowed the units of this command to report all excess items on hand in the unit without penalty. This allows the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam to accurately determine what assets are in-country and their location.

3. All the facets of this report have been utilized by the command and is of interest for staff visits.

(c) Reassignment of Military Repon II - Reassignment planning for Military Region II proved to be a major part of the workload during this period. Letters received from this planning will be covered in the next Quarterly Report.

(d) OPLAN 70-70 - Annex C to USASTAOR VII CPCS A87-70. Severe weather conditions, was published and provides guidance for the preparation for typhoon and other severe weather conditions.

3. Manpower Management Division:

(a) RTOE/TRA Action. The Manpower Management Division processed 26 RTOE Actions during the 1st Quarter 71 AY. Twelve of these were sent to the Support Command from USARV for implementation. The following units were processed:
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155th Transportation Company
97th Transportation Company
HHG 912th General Support Group
125th Signal Company
129th Maintenance Supply Company
51st Personal Service Company
7th Military Band - TDA
31st 24th Field Artillery
128th Signal Company
19th Field Artillery

(1) Initial Detailed NIDs were inserted to further input to the CLEARFAC at the DDD.

(b) Unit Actions:

1. The 155th Transportation Company's initial detailed NID was inserted to the 1st Security Group.

2. The 174th Ordnance Detachment (QW1-A) was inserted to the 4th Ordnance Detachment (QW1-A).

3. The 24th Field Artillery's initial detailed NID was inserted to the 15th Security Detachment (QW1-A).

4. The 31st 24th Field Artillery's initial detailed NID was inserted to the 4th Ordnance Detachment (QW1-A) effective 13 August 1971.

(b) Security and Intelligence:

(a) Personal Security Clearance Actions - During the reporting period, a total of 117 requests for personal security actions were received and 115 clearances were granted or validated. At the close of the period, there were 78 actions pending.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support
Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCL CSFOR-70

(b) Document Security - All classified documents in the 5th Division were
reviewed for the purpose of regrading or destruction. This resulted in the
formal destruction of 107 separate documents which were either obsolete or else

(c) Security Inspections - Thirteen separate units were investigated in
junction with the command's Annual General Inspection (AGI).

(d) War Trophy Registration - A total of 147 war trophies were reviewed
for intelligence value in accordance with USARV regulations during the reporting
period.

(e) Ground Defense -

1. A BFS (Balance Pressure System) sensor system was acquired and de
ployed along a ridge line running west of Ammunition Area Photos and Tank
#1 & #2. Although operational, the system has not provided any confirmed
activations.

2. An average of three reconnaissance patrols a week were conducted in the
small areas of the Cam Ranh Peninsula with some insight findings.

(f) Intelligence -

1. There were a total of twenty significant attacks
on the Cam Ranh Special Sector during the period. The majority were
rocket/mortar attack type. Five of these were reported as having been
perpetrated in ambush situations. The majority of these attacks occurred
between the 14th and 16th of the months during period. The types of
these attacks were "squad" rocket or mortar operations, and in a number of
to be little if any coordination of significance.

2. The following is a chronological list of significant
incidents in the Cam Ranh Special Sector:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>UNIT INVOLVED</th>
<th>NATURE OF ATTACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/20/70</td>
<td>BFO110</td>
<td>ARV FF</td>
<td>Small arms and RPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/17/70</td>
<td>BFO7010</td>
<td>BCF</td>
<td>Small arms and RPG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTG</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>UNIT INVOLVED</th>
<th>NATURE OF ACTION/RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>071800H Aug</td>
<td>CPO52575</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3 x 107mm rockets. None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>072345H Aug</td>
<td>CPO59319</td>
<td>224 Repl (PDO)</td>
<td>6 x satchel charges. Minor damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120625H Aug</td>
<td>CPO65237</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3 x rounds type unk. None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262200H Aug</td>
<td>BF910320</td>
<td>ARVN FF</td>
<td>Small arms/3-40. None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300226H Aug</td>
<td>CPO69235</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3 x satchel charges. Moderate damage to Air Force POL farm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300459H Aug</td>
<td>CPO69277</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2 x 107mm rockets. Minor damage to buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032350H Sep</td>
<td>CPO53155</td>
<td>43rd Sig Co</td>
<td>5 x 92mm mortars. 4 WIA (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110403H Sep</td>
<td>CPO59171</td>
<td>USASUPCON-CRB</td>
<td>6 x 107mm rockets. 1 WIA (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPO61171</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 WIA (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPO69179</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151730H Sep</td>
<td>CPO64300</td>
<td>579th QM</td>
<td>Sniper fire. 1 round unk. 1 WIA (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 WIA (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222200H Sep</td>
<td>CPO59196</td>
<td>USASUPCON-CRB</td>
<td>12.7mm. 3-H. Gone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231040H Sep</td>
<td>CPO59196</td>
<td>USASUPCON-CRB</td>
<td>External explosion Ammo Ship &quot;Amerigo&quot; Moderate hull damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250346H Sep</td>
<td>BP991219</td>
<td>ARV1 PF</td>
<td>6 x F-40 rockets. 3 WIA (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 WIA (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012130H Oct</td>
<td>BP931199</td>
<td>ARVN PF</td>
<td>Small arms. 1 WIA (PF). 2 1/wpn. 1 radio lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032100H Oct</td>
<td>BP931199</td>
<td>ARVN PF</td>
<td>Small arms. None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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DTG LOCATION UNIT INVOLVED NATURE OF ACTION/RESULTS
032355H Oct CPO59140 USASUPCOM-CRB 7 x 107mm rockets. Jetty heavily damaged.
CPO62139
CPO64143
CPO66139
CPO67136
CPO69136
CPO72136

040600H Oct CPO53138 USASUPCOM-CRB 2 x 107mm rockets. None.
CPO53139

300325H Oct CPO63296 Dong Ba Thin 10 x 82mm mortars. None.

311432H Oct CPO55169 CPO53168 CPO53172 USASUPCOM-CRB 3 x 107mm rockets. None.

2. Effect of Pyramiding Detainees in Breaking Viet Cong Infrastructure Organizations - At 232000H Oct 70, Harbor Defense at Cam Ranh Bay detained one Vietnamese male in a sampan southwest of the Cam Ranh Peninsula. His actions were very suspicious. Under interrogation, the individual admitted he was an AWOL ARVN soldier who had been working for the VC. He carried weapons, food and salt for the enemy as well as watched and made regular reports on shipping in Cam Ranh Harbor. By extensive exploitation of the detainee, local allied forces were able to develop a list of five additional VC or VC sympathizers. When a search of their homes was made, weapons and explosive charges were found. By application of the principle of pyramiding, a well organized VC sapper cell and VC1 operation is being detected and eliminated in the Cam Ranh area.

3. At 300600H Oct 70, the Suoi Hoa PF platoon located at CPCC3325 received one raider named Phan-Van Cuong. He is believed to be an NVA enlisted man from the K-98 or K-92 Sapper Battalion located in the Dong Bo Bare area. Much of his initial story is inconsistent. He is thought to be of low intelligence and is being exploited by the S-2, Cam Ranh Special Sector.

4. Duclap 43-70 - During the period 3-17 August 1970, the command provided logistical support to the 10th Aviation Battalion in support of Operation Duclap 43-70, which took place 60 km southwest of San He Thoet.
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Operational Report—Lessons Learned

Subject: Operational Report—Lessons Learned

Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

This operation involved the following tactical units in addition to elements of the 10th Ave Bn:

a. 2nd Bn 45 Regiment (ARVN)
b. 3rd Bn 45 Regiment (ARVN)
c. 3rd ARVN Recon Co
d. 9th ARVN Cav Sqtr (Armored)

2. The operation began with a combat assault by elements of the 45th Regiment into the AO. The 7th Cav moved overland into the AO.

3. Supply consumption for the first day included the following items supplied by this command:

a. 17,700 gal JPH
b. 21,000 110mm Ammunition
c. 26,000 155mm Ammunition
d. 19,000 90mm Ammunition

4. Total logistical support provided by the Support Command included the following:

a. 77 S.T. ammunition
b. 89,000 gal JPH

5. Results of the operation: 1 ARVN KIA, 1 ARVN WIA, 21 Enemy KIA

   (b) Dong Po 12:

   1. During the period 15–19 Sep 70, the command provided logistical support to the 17th Aviation Battalion in support of Dong Po 12. This operation was conducted west of Cam Ranh Bay to the Dong Po mountain range. It was a section and search operation performed by the 17th ROK Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 79th ROK Regiment.

   2. Total logistical support provided by the command consisted of the following:

a. 16 S.T. ammunition
b. 96,000 gal JPH

   2. The majority of the support provided was during the initial insertion on 19 and 19 September and the extraction on the 29th. Due to the
close proximity of the operation to the Cam Ranh area and the lack of POL storage facilities in the Aviation Battalion, the Support Command provided two 5,000 gal tankers for use by the Aviation Battalion as mobile storage refuel points. Additional tankers were utilized in a shuttle operation to ensure that the point was full at all times. SAF trailers (12T semi-trailers) were provided for use as mobile rearm points. This assisted the aviation personnel in quick setting up and breaking down of the rearm/refuel points and saved considerable manpower.

2. Operation Dong Bo 12 was quite successful as numerous bunkers, huts, storage areas and small arms were captured and/or destroyed.

(c) Tuy Hoa Convoy

1. On 17 and 17 October 1970, a convoy was run from Cam Ranh to Tuy Hoa. This was the first convoy to this area by this command in more than one year. The purpose of this convoy was to transport the Headquarters of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) which relocated to Tuy Hoa from Phu Trang. Another purpose was to test the feasibility of running resupply convoys to the Tuy Hoa area.

2. The convoy was extremely successful, and no problems were encountered. The success proved the feasibility of running such convoys when needed.

3. ACoS, Supp:

(1) On the 31st of July, a directive from USAF arrived at this headquarters implementing Project ART (Accelerated Reduction of Tonnage). This project established FY 19 Quarter tonnage goals for the reduction of Class II and IV, Class VII and Class IX supplies at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. The first quarter FY 19 goal required that Class II and IX be reduced to 52,000 short tons, the depot attained 39.6% of the goal. Class VII was to be reduced to 11,000 short tons; 32.6% of this goal was attained. The assumption of the Qui Nhon vehicle park caused this shortfall.

(2) The ACoS, Supply assumed staff responsibility for retrograde in September, 1970. Retrograde to the movement off shore of Depot excess, Ammo and Reparables. In the month of September the goals established by USAF were 1900 S/T in Reparables, 900 S/T in Ammo, and 15,000 Tons in Depot excess. Of these targets, only the 10,000 Tons were missed. This was due to the late arrival of the storage programs from USAF. (1st quarter only)
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(3) Class II, IV and VII - The Cam Ranh Bay, IV and VII DSU continued to exceed the Command goal of 75% demand satisfaction. The DSU received 13,142 ASL requests and filled 10,923 for a 82.9% demand satisfaction. Demand accommodation attained was 82.9% for this quarter.

(3) The USARY JCM-FEL Self-Service Supply Centers continued to exceed the Command goal of 75% demand satisfaction. The jcm store received 3,694 requests and filled 2,672, for a 72.0% demand satisfaction. Combined statistics for both stores gave a demand satisfaction of 80.2% for the 1st quarter. Demand was improved from 71.0% average for the month of September to a combined figure of 80.2% in the month of October.

(3) On 1st July 1970, a Memo was issued by the 15th Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, for improvement in the EHT (End Expenditure Table) as of 1st August 1970. This Memo asked to identify a specific, inventory, and fix high dollar value, high volume, high risk, and unique items that may be reviewed. To date, 699 lines have been reviewed and 192 items have been removed from the EHT with a dollar value of $1,979,416.

VIII. Conclusi0n

(3) The proposed budget allocation was as follows for fiscal

year 1971:

(1) $00,000.00
(2) $00,000.00
(3) $00,000.00
(b) $00,000.00
(d) $00,000.00
(c) $00,000.00

A USARY Comptroller, during his visit to the Cam Ranh Bay ACoS Comptroller, that reimbursement to Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) was not being made by Military Construction, Army (MCA) for OMA financed stocks, not being made by MCA. Although there is no policy or guidance from USARY.
for recoupment of these funds, engineer units are required to report cost data for each project in process to the US Army Engineer Command-Vietnam. This should have been the basis for the transfer of funds from MCA to OKA. Since there was a severe reduction of USARV OMA funds for FY 71, reimbursement from MCA became significant. Subsequently, a representative from this office visited the 39th Engineer Group to review construction directives issued by USAECV for MCA projects. As a result $776,000 has been identified for transfer from MCA to OKA. Information necessary for recoupment of the funds was forwarded to USAECV. This office has implemented procedures to recoup the reimbursements due OKA from MCA in the future.

(4) Figures on the shipment of ammunition from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon by the break bulk and SLAX methods were furnished by the ACoCS Transportation to Comptroller on 11 October 1970. Information for costs of unloading by both methods at Qui Nhon, including the backloading of empty trailers, were furnished by Transportation. These factors have been considered and merged with costs at Cam Ranh Bay to determine the actual costs for a short ton of ammunition handled to supply Qui Nhon ammunition needs. The cost analysis by the Comptroller has been completed and is now undergoing study.

3. ACoCS, Ammunition

During the reporting period, ammunition received and shipped amounted to 43,640 TONS.

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<tr>
<td>LONG Binh</td>
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</table>

4. ACoCS, Details

(1) Grater Registration: GH-1 lists at the Support Command processed 120 remains during the reporting period, a decrease of 60 from the previous reporting period.
Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Field Laundry: The field laundry processed 629,450 lbs during the quarter which is a decrease of 142,954 lbs from the previous quarter. This decrease was due to lost time which was a result of a burned out boiler, C-Day and yellow alerts. Contract laundry costs for the quarter was $263,972.50. The cumulative cost for the period July through October 1970 was $393,917.51. This is $29,000.69 under the Command established goal.

(3) Storm Damage: On 10 October 1970, the Cam Ranh area was hit by Tropical Storm Louise. The full extent of the damage is not yet known; however, the initial estimate by the Installation coordinator put the damage at $225,000. This occurred mainly in terms of damage to roadways, facilities and utilities. The majority of the destruction involved total or partial loss of roofs; however, six troop billets and twenty miscellaneous small structures were destroyed.

(4) On 1 October 1970, the T-6 FDL jetty was heavily damaged by enemy action. Repair was made by the 4997th Engr. Co. (PC). The jetty was back in operation on 7 October 1970.

5. AGENS, Maintenance

Keystone Asset Repair Program: The Keystone Asset Repair Program was originally contracted for a total of 7,800 vehicles. This total was subsequently reduced to 3,800 vehicles by USARV, based on in-country requirements. Of a schedule of 612 vehicles through 2 October 1970, 441 items have been completed. An additional 164 items are on hand for completion which represents a backlog of 7 weeks. Another 319 items are awaiting parts. We anticipate generating some repairable assets from Keystone Robin Bravos; however, initial indications are that these will be insufficient to continue production at the required rate.

6. AGENS, Transportation

1 Project S-2: Class V support to Qui Nhon was continued during the quarter utilizing the Sea-Land Ammunition Movement (SLAM) system. A total of 13 shipments were made moving 204,537 containers. Four of the shipments were made break-bulk due to time involved in returning trailers to this location. Total Class V support of Qui Nhon from Cam Ranh began on 1 September with the majority of this support to be provided by SLAM.

2 MILVAN Pilot Program: Since the initiation of the MILVAN Pilot Program with the arrival of the Seafar in "Puerto Rico" on 28 June 1970, Cam Ranh has received seven Seafar vessels and has discharged 395 MILVAN containers. A total of 770 fully stuffed MILVAN containers have been unloaded of which 66 were shipped to Okinawa on the "NL "Comet". The average lift time (time involved in lifting the vessel to the crane and locking it in place) is 4-8 minutes, with an average turn-around time (time from ship to marshalling yard and return) of 72 minutes.
(a) The most recent concept involving MILVAN is the plan for ammunition containerization. This concept involves ammunition throughput from COHS to the field Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). The first ammo containers are scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay in March 1971. The schedule projects two vessels every 15 days with 463 containers per vessel, which would represent approximately 18,900 S/T (approximately 75% of the monthly ammunition requirement at Cam Ranh Bay).

(b) The original MILVAN concept envisioned the conversion of four large underway container vessels to container service; however, prior to the implementation of the project, Seatrain vessels were substituted. Seatrain vessels are capable of holding 95 containers, the remaining space being utilized by general cargo. The cost of MILVAN is determined by subtracting the total weight of the general cargo from the cost of the voyage; therefore if there are four ports of call including two MILVAN ports, the additional time is included in the voyage cost. Seatrain vessels are on an extended time charter basis ranging from $8,750 to $10,400 per day depending upon the vessel. The total cost of MILVAN per voyage depends upon the length of the voyage from COHS to Pacific ports and return. Seatrain vessels have visited Vinh Tau and Saatshap in addition to Cam Ranh Bay, Newport and San Juan. Based on computations, the one way charter, COHS to NHA, is estimated to be a maximum of $1,050 per container and a minimum of $700 per container depending upon the terms of the vessel charter.

(c) ARMYization of the Nha Trang Outport. Operational responsibility for the Nha Trang Outport was transferred to the 5th ALC on 1 August 1970. The USAS/JCOC/CRB concept of operation was as follows:

(a) Shallow draft operations were transferred to the ARVN on 1 August under a local agreement between the Commanding Officer, 5th ALC and the Commanding Officer, 14th Transportation Command was agreed upon, and approval of the joint MACV/RVN/ARVN agreement was signed on 27 October 1970.

(b) All deep draft vessels with cargo consigned to the Nha Trang Outport were diverted to Cam Ranh Bay after 1 August. Cargo destined to the ARVN to be transshipped via lighterage to Nha Trang to be re-shipped by the ARVN.

(c) All US cargo consigned to Nha Trang will be transported via lightage after 1 August except for special request cargo which will be cleared through the 5th ALC Terminal Commander prior to shipment.

(d) The Aran, Cargo & Transport tug "Panther" was withdrawn on 1 August and all harbor tug service at Nha Trang became the responsibility of the 14th Transportation Command until 27 October 1970, after which time the transfer to the ARVN is transferred to the ARVN. Transfer cannot be accomplished
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until the tug is returned from out of country maintenance in Taiwan. Upon return, the vessel will be tested and turned over to the 5th ALC for use in Nha Trang. The 5th ALC currently has personnel assigned to the 114th Trans Command in harbor craft training.

(e) The RCXA passenger operations remained at Nha Trang until 1 October 1970 when the mission was transferred to Cam Ranh Bay. This operation is further discussed below.

(f) RCXA Passenger Operations: The 114th Transportation Command has been tasked with the responsibility for embarkation/disembarkation of RCXA personnel and the discharge/load of arms in USNS troop ships arriving at Cam Ranh Bay. The troop ship mission was transferred to this location from Nha Trang on 1 October. Two vessels arrived during October with no major problems developing at the port.

(g) AMVization of Landing Crafts Utility (LCU) and Liquid Cargo Vessel (LCI) to Y-Tanker

(h) Currently three Landing Crafts Utility (LCU) are in administrative storage due to a lack of crew. The AMVization program would allow these vessels to be released and would provide for reduced US strength and requirements for the remaining vessels.

(b) The Liquid Cargo Vessel, Design 2114 (Y Tanker) has also been included in this program with the intention of eventually turning the vessel over to the Vietnamese Navy. This would allow for a ROCAF ports capability.

(c) Vietnamese Navy personnel will be trained initially in MOS 1111 (MOS 1111) and alee (MOS 1120). As the program develops, it would be phased to include training for Master Mate (MOS 1234) and Chief Engineer (MOS 1140) for the more highly qualified personnel. Vietnamese Navy personnel will also be trained as seamen and oilers on the Y-Tanker. The program will be similar to that of the Army personnel. The following program has been approved and will be placed into effect when the students are available.

1. Phase I (All MOS)
   - Basic Orientation 7-10 days
   - Nautical terminology
   - Nomenclature
   - Safety

2. Phase II (MOS 1111, 1120, 1234, 1140)
   - On-the-job-training 16 weeks

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(1) Phase III (NOS 61390 & 61079)
   On the job training-Length dependent on individual ability

(2) Phase IV (NOS 61394 & 61030)
   On the job training-Length dependent on individual ability

(3) All training will be conducted on a 'Buddy System' basis. Phase III and IV could require up to 20 weeks.

(4) A request for personnel to implement the training program was forwarded to USARV on 26 July and retransmitted on 17 August 1970.

(5) Transfer of Equipment to the Vietnamese: The ST 1978 was officially transferred to the Vietnamese during the month of September 1970. Observations regarding this transfer are noted in the Lessons-Learned section.

(6) Lessons Learned: Commander's Evaluation, Observations and Recommendations:

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Operations

   (1) Long Term Storage of Keystone Assets.

   (a) Observation: A large portion of the Keystone generated assets received by the contractor and stored for an indefinite period of time, becomes inoperable. Also, assets received in an already inoperable condition receive further damage in many instances because of long-term storage.

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(b) Evaluations: Long periods of time in storage produce some deterioration of exposed equipment resulting in higher labor and replacement costs. Additionally, cannibalization is evident and both willful and careless damage often occurs while equipment is in storage and intransit. Another, and more direct result, is the deterioration of seals and brake systems. In some cases, entire brake systems require replacement.

(c) Recommendations: Keystone generated equipment should be processed as expeditiously as possible and work ordered from the closest available maintenance facility to minimize repair costs.

(?) Implementation of Keystone Drawdown.

(a) Observations: With the implementation of Keystone Robin USARV OPLAN 183-70, USASUPCOM-CRB was tasked to provide the facilities and administration needed for Keystone units to withdraw and turn in equipment in Cam Ranh Bay. The following are procedures found to be needed to insure rapid and orderly phasedown:

(b) Evaluation:

1. USASUPCOM-CRB OPORD R-70 was published implementing USARV OPLAN 183-70 for Support Command units.

2. Immediate notification by headquarters of all units to bring drawdown under Keystone Bravo is required for expeditious planning and fulfillment of USARV OPLAN 183-70 requirements.

3. A planning and coordination conference should be held between all affected headquarters and units upon notification to begin the scheduling of drawdown, stand down dates, call-in dates and the requirements of each headquarters. Continuous and detailed coordination during the balance of the drawdown phase is necessary.

4. Submission of equipment densities from affected units to the ACOFE Maintenance and to the 54th General Support Group (major subordinate command) should also be accomplished rapidly so that scheduling can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations.

5. Transportation requirements must be submitted early in the planning stage so that scheduling again can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations. Primary and alternate means of transportation must be considered.
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6. Host units for withdrawal must be assigned as soon as possible to allow for preparation of living and messing areas.

7. Units should be withdrawn in segments, i.e., company, battery, troop, with equipment to expedite processing.

8. SCRAM coding teams must be sent to each unit to pre-code all equipment. This smooths out processing when the unit brings in equipment.

(c) Recommendations: In implementing Keystone drawdown, a careful study of, and where the situation allows adherence to, the aforementioned procedures will prove very helpful.

(i) MILVAN Pilot Program.

(a) Observations: It has been observed that poor stowage planning aboard Seatrain vessels has somewhat limited the efficiency of MILVAN handling operations.

(b) Evaluations: In many instances, containers were stowed in such a manner that containers consigned to other ports had to be restowed in order to backload Cam Ranh Bay containers without overstock. The Seatrain "Maryland" was completely discharged at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon before it could accept Cam Ranh Bay retrograde cargo. To preclude stowage problems a message requesting prestow planning for MILVAN was transmitted to MOTBA, Oakland, California.

1. Landing Gear construction: Extreme caution must be exercised in locking the landing legs of the MILVAN chassis after they have been lowered. When the legs are not fully extended, it is possible to push the locking pins in place and miss the receiver holes causing the legs to collapse and the van to fall forward. The landing gear is also less durable and more mechanically complicated than conventional military trailers. A program of equipment improvement recommendations is currently in progress to attempt to improve MILVAN equipment deficiencies.

2. Incompatibility with the M-52 Tractor: Only when the MILVANs are at a complete 90 degree angle to the tractor duals can the coupling be made without interfering with the landing legs. The higher center of gravity of the MILVAN when coupled often causes road instability which is extremely dangerous when operating on wet roadways and on mountain highways. Extensive driver training has been undertaken with emphasis on correct coupling procedures and proper operation, particularly on adverse roadways.
2. The plan for Ammunition Containerization provides for the MILVAN containers to be in-country (RVN) for a maximum of 15 days. This is an insufficient amount of time in which to discharge, transship to the ASP, return to Cam Ranh Bay and to generate sufficient container-compatible retrograde cargo.

4. It has been observed that the projected schedule of arrivals for Seatrains has not been followed. During September 1970, the Seatrains "Puerto Rico" and "Carolina" were in port during the same period while none were scheduled to arrive in October. The Seatrain "Ohio" and the Seatrain "Maryland" are scheduled to be at Cam Ranh Bay on 13 November 1970. The inconsistent scheduling of Seatrain vessels prevents the maximum utilization of MILVAN containers for retrograde in that fully stuffed containers are not shipped. In addition, discharge time and congestion are increased when two Seatrains berth during the same period.

5. It has been found that Seatrain vessels are inefficient due to excessive in-port time of the vessels and double handling of containers caused by poor stow planning. All of the factors inflate cost and create an unbalanced picture in the efficiency of the MILVAN test program.

6. This command has recommended that MILVAN containers be tested for transport on the C5A aircraft. Approximately fourteen MILVAN containers can be loaded aboard an aircraft. The Air Force has indicated that Engineering tests must be performed to determine if MILVAN is compatible to air transport. If proven valid, flexibility of the MILVAN containerized concept would be greatly increased.

7. Since MILVAN chassis are more compatible to commercial tractors, this command is considering the possibility of using commercial tractors for the MILVAN operation. There are currently 25 excess commercial tractors at Cam Ranh Bay that could be utilized for MILVAN.

(c) Recommendations: The use of Seatrain vessels is an inefficient and time consuming method of ocean transport and defeats the essential purpose and feature of containerized shipments: speed in discharge and clearance of the port. The costs of ocean transport are inflated and are not valid. If the MILVAN project is to be expanded, it is recommended that future container shipments be made via self-sustaining, container-compatible vessels. Every effort should be made to expedite engineering test of the MILVAN container and its adaptability to the C5A aircraft. Timely and evenly spaced vessel arrivals are an important key to the efficiency of the MILVAN program. To preclude time consuming congestion, and to aid the

MILVAR retrograde program, it is recommended that consideration be given to improve the Seabrain schedule.

(4) Transfer of Equipment to the Vietnamese.

(a) Observations: The transfer of Small Tug 1973 to the Vietnamese was hampered by a lack of consolidated procedures for turn-over. This is evidenced by the fact that many of the items listed as required components for transfer are peculiar to the Vietnamese and are not in our supply system.

(b) Evaluations: These items are identified as requirements of TOE 10-930 which is an ARVN TOE. Additionally, turnover procedures are provided by the following references:


5. In addition to the previous, numerous messages have been transmitted containing further requirements.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend that a consolidated procedural guide be published outlining all requirements for equipment transfers to the Vietnamese.

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Organization: None

e. Other: None
(R?) (U)

(1) Interservice Support Agreement Inspections.

(a) Observations: Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) inspections were conducted 1 October 1970 by representatives of the ACOFS, Comptroller at the Class II, III and IV yards and DSU, 18th PCL Platoon, 262nd Quartermaster Bn, and the 54th General Support Group at Nha Trang. A similar inspection was conducted at the Class IX yard, Consolidated Tech Supply, 69th Maintenance Bn and 56th General Support Group on the 14th and 15th of October 1970. The inspections revealed that in some cases, customers were not being billed as a result of general lack of knowledge by personnel of ISSA oriented activities of the ISSA program. Main problems centered around general ISSA procedures such as processing reimbursable issue documents correctly. The two activities had been inspected in 1969 with similar results. Original personnel rotated, successors were not taught the procedures and guidance documents were misplaced. During the inspection, personnel continue to be briefed by the inspectors, and a complete file of applicable ISSAs are furnished the activity.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel at the supply activities are not knowledgeable of ISSA listings, forms and publications concerned. The training of new personnel is inadequate and standing operating procedures are not comprehensive so that there are no concrete directions governing the ISSA program.

(c) Recommendation: Periodic inspections of supply facilities should be conducted at least every 90 days. Each activity must develop a standing operating procedure for ISSAs with careful references to applicable forms, publications and ISSA listings. Finally, new personnel must be thoroughly oriented and instructed in the ISSA procedures if the US Army is to be reimbursed. Since USARY's operating budget has been significantly reduced for fiscal 1971, the ISSA program has assumed added importance.

INCL 1 & 3 thru 6 w/d HQ DA

H.A. KISSINGER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
AVHD-DO (31 Oct 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support
Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 12 JAN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, US
Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.

2. Reference item concerning "Keystone Asset Repair Program," Section 1,
page 15, paragraph f: concur. The number of wheeled vehicles scheduled
to be repaired at CRB was reduced to 2400 on 3 November 1970 to reflect
a further decrease in the anticipated in-country supply requirements.
KEYSTONE Robin Bravo receipts at CRB have been insufficient to sustain
production at the scheduled rate, and action has been taken to provide
additional repairable assets by:

a. Job ordering from depot excess those 3/4-Ton Trucks which meet
the ARVN mileage criteria.

b. Transferring a number of repairable KEYSTONE wheel vehicles from
USASUPCOM-QNH to USASUPCOM-CRB.

No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy Furr:
USASUPCOM-CRB

Chuck W Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (31 Oct 70) 2d Ind (U)
Cam Ranh Bay, for Period Ending 31 October 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2FEB 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGC
Asst AG
## 54th General Support Group

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## 124th Transportation Command

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<td>Hostile, lightly wounded</td>
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## USSMMAV

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<tr>
<td>October 1970</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
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4. USAD-CRB

a. August 1970
None

b. September 1970
(1) ETHER (Killed in action) 1
(2) PRIAR Elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 1
(3) PRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 3

c. October 1970
None

5. UCASUPCOM-CRB

No casualty reports of any kind

6. HQ Special Troops

a. August 1970
None

b. September 1970
None

c. October 1970
(1) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 1
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay


HQ, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

1 REPORT DATE
31 October 1970

2 REPORT TITLE
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay


CG, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

1 REPORT DATE
31 October 1970

3 TOTAL NO OF PAGES
30

6 DESCRIPTION
N/A

7 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
N/A

11 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

12 SPECIAL MILITARY ACTIVITY
DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 1473
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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. WITHDRAWN
2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Evaluation, Observation and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations

(1) Long Term Storage of Keystone Assets.

(a) Observation: A large portion of the Keystone generated assets received by the contractor and stored for an indefinite period of time, becomes inoperable. Also, assets received in an already inoperable condition receive further damage in many instances because of long-term storage.

(b) Evaluation: Long periods of time in storage produce some deterioration of exposed equipment resulting in higher labor and replacement costs. Additionally, cannibalization is evident and both willful and careless damage often occurs while equipment is in storage and in transit. Another, and more direct result is the deterioration of seals and brake systems. In some cases, entire brake systems require replacement.

(c) Recommendations: Keystone generated equipment should be processed as expeditiously as possible and work ordered from the closest available maintenance facility to minimize repair costs.

(2) Implementation of Keystone Drawdown.

(a) Observation: With the implementation of Keystone Robin USARV OPLAN 183-70, USASUPCOM-CRB was tasked to provide the facilities and administration needed for Keystone units to withdraw and turn in equipment in Cam Ranh Bay. The following are procedures found to be needed to insure rapid and orderly phasedown.

(b) Evaluation:

1. USASUPCOM-CRB OPORD 8-70 was published implementing USARV OPLAN 183-70 for Support Command units.

2. Immediate notification by headquarters of all units to bring drawdown under Keystone Bravo is required for expeditious planning and fulfillment of USARV OPLAN 183-70 requirements.

3. A planning and coordination conference should be held between all affected headquarters and units upon notification to begin the scheduling of drawdown, standdown dates, call-in dates and the requirements of each headquarters. Continuous and detailed coordination during the balance of the
drawdown phase is necessary.

4. Submission of equipment densities from affected units to the ACofS Maintenance and to the 34th General Support Group (major subordinate command) should also be accomplished rapidly so that scheduling can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations.

5. Transportation requirements must be submitted early in the planning stage so that scheduling again can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations. Primary and alternate means of transportation must be considered.

6. Host units for withdrawal must be assigned as soon as possible to allow for preparation of living and messing areas.

7. Units should be withdrawn in segments, i.e., company, battery, troop, with equipment to expedite processing.

8. SCRAM coding teams must be sent to each unit to pre-code all equipment. This smooths out processing when the unit brings in equipment.

(c) Recommendations: In implementing Keystone drawdown, a careful study of, and where the situation allows adherence to, the aforementioned procedures will prove very helpful.

(3) MILVAN Pilot Program.

(a) Observations: It has been observed that poor stowage planning aboard Seatrain vessels has somewhat limited the efficiency of MILVAN handling operations.

(b) Evaluations: In many instances, containers were stowed in such a manner that containers consigned to other ports had to be restowed in order to backload Cam Ranh Bay containers without overstow. The Seatrain "Maryland" was completely discharged at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon before it could accept Cam Ranh Bay retrograde cargo. To preclude stowage problems a message requesting prestow planning for MILVAN was transmitted to MOTBA, Oakland, California.

1. Landing Gear construction: Extreme caution must be exercised in locking the landing legs of the MILVAN chassis after they have been lowered. When the legs are not fully extended, it is possible to push the locking pins in place and miss the receiver holes causing the legs to collapse and the van to fall forward. The landing gear is also less durable and more mechanically complicated that conventional military trailers. A program of equipment improvement recommendations is currently in progress to attempt to improve MILVAN equipment deficiencies.

2. Incompatibility with the M-52 Tractor: Only when the MILVANs are at a complete 90 degree angle to the tractor duals can the coupling be made without interfering with the landing legs. The higher center of gravity of the MILVAN when coupled often causes road instability which is extremely dangerous when operating on wet roadways and on mountain highways. Extensive driver training has been undertaken with emphasis on correct coupling procedures and proper operation, particularly on adverse roadways.
2. The plan for Ammunition Containerization provides for the MILVAN containers to be in-country (RVN) for a maximum of 15 days. This is an insufficient amount of time in which to discharge, transship to the ASP, return to Cam Ranh Bay and to generate sufficient container-compatible retrograde cargo.

4. It has been observed that the projected schedule of arrivals for Seatrain has not been followed. During September 1970, the Seatrains "Puerto Rico" and "Carolina" were in port during the same period while none were scheduled to arrive in October. The Seatrain "Ohio" and the Seatrain "Maryland" are scheduled to be at Cam Ranh Bay on 13 November 1970. The inconsistent scheduling of Seatrain vessels prevents the maximum utilization of MILVAN containers for retrograde in that fully stuffed containers are not shipped. In addition, discharge time and congestion are increased when two Seatrains berth during the same period.

5. It has been found that Seatrain vessels are inefficient due to excessive in-port time of the vessels and double handling of containers caused by poor stow planning. All of the factors inflate cost and create an unbalanced picture in the efficiency of the MILVAN test program.

6. This command has recommended that MILVAN containers be tested for transport on the C5A aircraft. Approximately fourteen MILVAN containers can be loaded aboard an aircraft. The Air Force has indicated that Engineering tests must be performed to determine if MILVAN is compatible to air transport. If proven valid, flexibility of the Milvan containerized concept would be greatly increased.

7. Since MILVAN chassis are more compatible to commercial tractors, this command is considering the possibility of using commercial tractors for the MILVAN operation. There are currently 25 excess commercial tractors at Cam Ranh Bay that could be utilized for MILVAN.

(c) Recommendations: The use of Seatrain vessels is an inefficient and time consuming method of ocean transport and defeats the essential purpose and feature of containerized shipments: speed in discharge and clearance of the port. The costs of ocean transport are inflated and are not valid. If the MILVAN project is to be expanded, it is recommended that future container shipments be made via self-sustaining, container-compatible vessels. Every effort should be made to expedite engineering test of the MILVAN container and its adaptability to the C5A aircraft. Timely and evenly spaced vessel arrivals are an important key to the efficiency of the MILVAN program. To preclude time consuming congestion, and to aid the
AVCA GO-H 31 October 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army
Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65

MILVAN retrograde program, it is recommended that consideration be given
to improve the Seatrain schedule.

(4) Transfer of Equipment to the Vietnamese.

(a) Observations: The transfer of Small Tug 1978 to the Vietnamese
was hampered by a lack of consolidated procedures for turn-over. This is
evidenced by the fact that many of the items listed as required components
for transfer are peculiar to the Vietnamese and are not in our supply system.

(b) Evaluations: These items are identified as requirements of TOE 10-930
which is an ARVN TOE. Additionally, turnover procedures are provided by
the following references:

   Turnover Procedures, Tug Boats (U).

2. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 14 Feb 1970, subject: Equipment Turn-
   over Procedures - KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (POO), with change 1 date 6 Mar 1970.

   Turnover Procedures Tug Boats (U).

4. Letter, HQ USARV, AVHCD-POO, 10 May 1970, subject: USARV
   Administrative and Logistical SOP for the Transfer of US Equipment Under
   the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

5. In addition to the previous, numerous messages have been transmitted
   containing further requirements.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend that a consolidated procedural guide
be published outlining all requirements for equipment transfer to the
Vietnamese.

c. Training: None.
d. Intelligence: None.
e. Logistics: None.
f. Organization: None.
g. Other:

(1) Interservice Support Agreement Inspections.

(a) Observation: Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) inspections were conducted 1 October 1970 by representatives of the ACFS, Comptroller at the Class II, III and IV yards and DSU, 18th POL Platoon, 262nd Quartermaster Bn, and the 54th General Support Group at Nha Trang. A similar inspection was conducted at the Class IX yard, Consolidated Tech Supply, 69th Maintenance Bn and 54th General Support Group on the 14th and 15th of October 1970. The inspections revealed that in some cases, customers were not being billed as a result of general lack of knowledge by personnel of ISSA oriented activities of the ISSA program. Main problems centered around general ISSA procedures such as processing reimbursable issue documents correctly. The two activities had been inspected in 1969 with similar results. Original personnel rotated, successors were not taught the procedures and guidance documents were misplaced. During the inspection, however, personnel continue to be briefed by the inspectors, and a complete file of applicable ISSAs are furnished the activity.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel at the supply activities are not knowledgeable of ISSA listings, forms and publications concerned. The training of new personnel is inadequate and standing operating procedures are not comprehensive so that there are not concrete directions governing the ISSA program.

(c) Recommendation: Periodic inspections of supply facilities should be conducted at least every 60 days. Each activity must develop a standing operating procedure for ISSAs with careful references to applicable forms, publications and ISSA listings. Finally, new personnel must be thoroughly oriented and instructed in the ISSA procedures if the US Army is to be reimbursed. Since USARV's operating budget has been significantly reduced for fiscal 1971, the ISSA program has assumed added importance.