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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, CORPS I (15 Oct 70-1 Oct 71)

This document contains information relating to the National Defense of the United States. The information contained in this report is provided to ensure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to ensure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR STR within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Vernon L. Bowers
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVII GCP

11 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCS OSPORT (R1) A

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVII-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lesson Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 3 October 1970, RG5 CSFCOR-65 (R2) (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20320

1. (G) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (U) Command and Organization.

   (1) Command.

   (a) On 11 April 1970, Major General William E. Sheild III, Chief of Staff, departed for CONUS and Brigadier General Robert C. Hixon assumed duty as Chief of Staff.

   (b) On 9 October 1970, Colonel William W. Hixson, (USMC), Deputy Chief of Staff, departed RG5 for CONUS, and Colonel Robert E. Kersey, (USMC), assumed duty as Deputy Chief of Staff.

   (2) Organization.

   (a) The 2d Battalion, 8th Artillery was assigned to XXIV Corps and further attached to XXIV Corps Artillery, on 1 October 1970.

   (b) On 12 September 1970, the 1st Marine Amphibious Force was released from OPGCN and returned to III Marine Amphibious Force control for subsequent redeployment.

b. (G) Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

   (1) General Enemy Situation.

   [Footnote: Declassified at 10 years]

   [Footnote: Group 4 - Downgraded at 3 years and after 10 years]
AVII-OCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCS OSGOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Summary: The most significant development within the reporting period was the reorganization of Viet Cong local forces in southern Military Region I. In Quang Nam Province, several district units were reorganized as battalion size units. In Quang Tin Province, a few North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units were dismantled and the personnel sent to the local forces as replacements. The enemy withheld his main units (2d NVA Division, 141st NVA Infantry regiment) from battle, relying on the local forces instead. In Northern Military Region I, the enemy continued his consolidation of bases in the western areas and maintained his attempts to expand to the east. There was no significant increase in strength levels, which remained high.

(b) Quảng Tri Province.

During the reporting period, enemy activity in Quảng Tri Province was characterized by harassment of Allied installations. Enemy activity was not as high or as intense as it was during the previous reporting period.

In the Demilitarized Zone area, enemy mining appeared to be on the upswing in the Cua Viet River area. On 27 September 1970, seven mines were found in the Cua Viet River. One exploded in a fisherman’s net, two detonated from undetermined causes, two exploded during a sweep, one was reported by a fisherman and one was recovered. A recovery team working on a previously mined junk near the mouth of the Cua Viet River discovered an 850 pound Russian manufactured water mine. Few of these devices have been detected in South Vietnam to date. During the period 27 October through 12 November 1970, vital coastal area intelligence sources indicated the probable movement of 1700 tons of explosives and detonation devices from the Demilitarized Zone to forward areas in preparation for mining operations in the Cua Viet River. Local Viet Cong supply cells were to provide assistance in the infiltration and placement of the mines under the probable direction of units of the 12th Naval Sapper Regiment.

Along the southern trace of the Demilitarized Zone, fire support bases were frequently targeted during August and September 1970. These attacks slackened during October 1970 with the exception of the Fire Support Base Fuller area where the 5th Battery, 127th Field Artillery Regiment and elements of the 27th Regiment are currently operating. Daily rocket and mortar attacks on Fuller from 12 through 16 October 1970 caused negligible casualties and damage despite the 166 rounds that were received.

In Western Quảng Tri Province, aerial observation indicated increased foot traffic on 2 October 1970. Cavalry elements of C Troop,
3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged an unknown size enemy force three km west of Lang Vei, killing 29 KIA and capturing documents which indicated that the enemy unit was composed of inexperienced troops probably engaged in road building west of the Laosian Salient. Sensor activations on Route 9 south of Hau Saih indicated increased activity.

The major incident in Quang Tri Province was the entry of the 808th Battalion, 7th Front and the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment into Hai Lang District on 12 August 1970. Although the attacks were not combined, they were apparently coordinated. This force cost the enemy 315 KIA and 30 detainees while Allied losses numbered 22 KIA and 44 WIA. On 17 October 1970, elements of the 808th Battalion made their first tactical appearance since Hai Lang with an attempted ambush of 2d Battalion, 7th ARVN Cavalry Regiment units north of Fire Support Base Brienner. The enemy suffered 10 KIA in the engagement.

Again during this reporting period, enemy activity was highest around fire support bases in the western portion of the province. The enemy conducted sporadic attacks in the lowlands against population centers and installations.

Fire Support Base O'Healy was the most prominent enemy target until the base was closed on 7 October 1970. The enemy pressed hard after the closing of Fire Support Base Hoppmeier, but never succeeded in pinning Allied Forces in the confines of the fire base. The introduction of 120mm mortars against Fire Support base O'Healy on 15 September 1970 was believed to initiate the second phase of a three-phase operation to force evacuation of the base or overrun it. Toward the end of September and in early October 1970, enemy attacks on and around Fire Support Base O'Healy decreased. Sporadic ground contact continued south of the base, however, with 13 NVA KIA in two skirmishes on 13 and 15 October 1970.

In the lowlands, enemy forces conducted attacks by fire on Phu Bai on 2 August and 28 August 1970, accounting for seven US WIA. On 30 August 1970, enemy forces conducted attacks by fire on Camp Evans. Two more attacks by fire were reported in the camp on 1 September 1970. Hue City was targeted twice during the reporting period. The first attack by four 122mm rockets on 6 August 1970 resulted in 14 ARVN KIA and 63 WIA. The second attack on 28 September 1970 caused no casualties or damage. Camp Eagle received 12 122mm rockets on 28 August 1970.
1970, resulting in one US WIA. Other significant incidents in the lowlands were mining on the Hue-Danang Railroad and sniper fire at convoys on QL 1. Regional Force troops successfully ambushed an unidentified enemy unit on 11 October 1970 near Fire Support Base Viper, killing seven NVA.

(d) Quang Nam Province.

1 Enemy activity in Quang Nam Province was low during the reporting period with several notable exceptions. On the night of 8–9 August 1970, there was an increase in attacks by fire on friendly units and installations. During the period 30 August through 2 September 1970 and from 3 to 5 October 1970, the enemy again attempted to achieve results through attacks by fire and limited ground contacts.

2 A major incident was the attack on Duc Duc District Headquarters on 30 August 1970 which began with a 60 round mortar barrage followed by a sapper attack against a hospital and Buddhist orphanage. Ten civilians were killed and 44 wounded, most of them children.

3 On 1 September and 12 October 1970, enemy gunners fired eight 122mm and seven 140mm rockets respectively into the Danang Airfield area. The latter attack killed four civilians, wounded one and slightly damaged one aircraft and a building.

4 Increased enemy emphasis on the Thuong Duc District Headquarters and Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp began on 29 September 1970 with 12 rounds of 122mm rockets which caused no casualties or damage. On 2 October 1970, both the district town and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp received attacks by fire. Daily rocket and mortar attacks continued from 6 through 10 October 1970 inflicting light casualties and damage. On 13 and 14 October 1970 the enemy again struck the Thuong Duc area with 12 rounds of 122mm rockets. On 15 October 1970, a ground contact southeast of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp resulted in the capture of a FN who stated he was from the 2d Company, 41st Battalion, 25th Regiment. Attacks by fire continued on the 16th and 17th of October 1970 with district headquarters and friendly night defensive positions targeted. Forty five rounds of mixed recoilless rifle and mortar fire wounded 10 Civilian Irregular Defense Group troops while five 122mm rockets killed eight Vietnamese civilians and wounded 14 others. In the early morning of 20 October 1970, eight 122mm rockets struck the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp causing slight damage and no casualties.
In spite of the relatively low level of overt military activity in Quang Nam Province, recruiting, proselyting, and propagandizing continued.

(e) Quang Tin Province.

Quang Tin was relatively quiet during the reporting period with the exception of 3-4 October 1970 when there was an increase in activity.

Among the more significant actions were the attacks by fire on Chu Lai Airbase. The first occurred on 9 September 1970 and consisted of nine 122mm rockets resulting in no casualties or damage. The second attack on 15 September 1970 consisted of only two 122mm rockets but confirmed the interest in Chu Lai as a target. On 4 October 1970, the Nui Me outpost was the target for a mortar and ground attack from an estimated enemy company, believed to be the V-16 Sapper Company. Results of the attack were 11 friendly KIA and nine WIA while the enemy suffered 11 KIA.

Throughout the period Quang Tin Provincial Unit forces seemed preoccupied with resupply, training, and refitting. A number of short attacks by fire and harassment of outposts were reported. On 13 October 1970, 3-5 ARVN Regiment contacted an unknown size enemy force 12 km SE of Hoi An, killing 25 enemy while losing one killed and one wounded.

(f) Quang Ngai Province.

Quang Ngai forces, except during the period 2-3 September 1970 when numerous small attacks were reported, concentrated on resupply. Recent large cache discoveries by Allied Forces will apparently keep enemy forces occupied in the logistics and transportation field.

Among the more notable enemy-initiated activities were the attacks against Tra Bong and Landing Zone Stinson on 8 September 1970: Tra Bong Ranger Border Defense Camp and District Headquarters were struck with 100 rounds of mortar and rockets followed by a sapper attack. Friendly losses were 43 KIA and 56 WIA while the enemy suffered 52 KIA and seven POW. The attack was primarily if not wholly the work of the 406th Sapper Battalion. Also, on 8 September 1970, enemy units hit Landing Zone Stinson with 82 rounds of mortar followed by a ground attack. Friendly losses were 14 WIA with enemy casualties undetermined. Other contacts both friendly and enemy-initiated occurred on 8 September 1970, making it the most intense period of activity during the quarter.
CONNOERMI

AVII-QCT  12 November 1970
SUBJECT:  Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
          Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPGR-65 (R2) (U)

2  Attacks by fire on Regional Force units on 2, 3 and 11 October
    1970 caused light casualties while three mortar attacks on 8 October
    1970, totalling 90 rounds of assorted mortar rounds, left two friendly
    WIA.

4  On 11 October 1970, the 315th Regional Force Company successfully
    ambushed an unknown size enemy force killing nine enemy while losing one
    friendly KIA.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) General:  The Collection Division (Interrogation of Prisoners
            of War, Ground Reconnaissance, Ground Surveillance and Technical Intel-
            ligence) continued to provide timely collateral intelligence information
            to the AGofS, G2.  The division evaluated and distributed seven COMUSMACV
            Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) and published three
            XXIV Corps SICR's during the quarter.  The XXIV Corps Collection Plan and
            EBI were updated and disseminated.

(b) Interrogation of Prisoners of War.  A total of 219 detainees
    were interrogated in Military Region 1.  The breakdown by classification
    of these detainees is as follows:

    | CLASSIFICATION | NUMBER | %   | CLASSIFICATION | NUMBER | %   |
    |----------------|--------|-----|----------------|--------|-----|
    | NVA/HC         | 16     | 7.1 | NVA/IW         | 85     | 39.7|
    | VC/HC          | 37     |16.9 | VC/IW          | 79     |36.1 |
    | TOTAL          | 53     |24.2 | TOTAL          | 166    |75.8 |

XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch interrogated 77 of
these detainees.  Documents captured by the RUK Marines and Regional
Force and Popular Force Forces in Military Region 1 were obtained for
the first time.  These documents were borrowed from the capturing unit
and were copied by the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch.  The
copies were then forwarded to the Combined Document Exploitation Center
for exploitation and readouts.

(c) Ground Reconnaissance.

1  Ground Reconnaissance activity in Military Region 1 continues to
    produce positive results.  During this quarter, some 600 ground Recon-
    naissance teams were inserted in Military Region 1 on intelligence

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

information collection missions. Teams produced 334 sightings totalling over 1716 enemy personnel observed and 92 contacts. Contacts, combined with air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 169 enemy KIA in addition to providing information on enemy personnel movements, base camps, and troops concentrations.

2 ARVN long range reconnaissance teams in Military Region 1 contributed substantially to the above results. ARVN units deployed 146 patrols resulting in 15 enemy troop sightings totalling over 29 enemy personnel and 11 contacts. Contacts, combined with air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 21 KIA.

On 18 August 1970, Quang Da Special Zone long range reconnaissance program became operational. Quang Da Special Zone has established four long range reconnaissance teams and strives to maintain two teams deployed daily. Teams are inserted and extracted by Vietnamese Air Force or US Army helicopters.

(d) Ground Surveillance. Phase III of the sensor program was initiated in Military Region 1. The first of Phase III channels were allocated in August 1970. Air and land implant sensors plus Fortelettes were received by 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) during the month of September 1970. In October 1970, the Deployable Air Relay Terminal (DART) was converted to Phase III operation while retaining its Phase I capability. US Air Force seeded Phase III sensors in northeast Military Region 1, and the 5th Brigade, 5th Infantry Division converted these III implant in its Area of Operations. Plans were finalized to use Marine Aircraft Wing OV-10 aircraft for Phase III sensor implant in areas inaccessible for ground implant and the helicopters for helicopter implant. The following actions are being accomplished in the Vietnamization of the sensor program:

1 Inclusion of ARVN in the Phase III program.

2 Integration of ARVN personnel in sensor management, XXIV Corps.

3 Staffing of proposed 5th Brigade, 5th Infantry Division to integrate ARVN and US into a combined sensor operations center.

4 Initiation of sensor training program for Vietnamese Navy personnel.

(e) Technical Intelligence. A total of 163 war trophy items were
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

registered by the Technical Intelligence Branch during the quarter. The total includes 87 rifles, 49 pistols and 27 miscellaneous items such as knives and crossbows.

(3) Weather.

(a) The weather pattern over Military Region 1 during the period of August-October 1970 was characterized by unseasonably good weather. Military operations were relatively unhampered by weather with the exception of two instances during the second half of the period.

(b) The first frontal surge of the season brought exceedingly poor weather conditions to Military Region 1 during the last few days of September and early October 1970. Extremely low cloudiness and poor visibility reduced air operations to a minimum while heavy rains, associated flooding, brought ground operations to a virtual standstill. Timely notification of the expected frontal surge resulted in at least eight hours warning time on the low cloudiness and at least twelve hours warning time on the onset of heavy rains.

(c) During the period of 15-16 October 1970, Typhoon Joan posed a brief threat to operations in Military Region 1. Several operations were cut short and participating personnel and equipment returned to their base of operations to prepare for the oncoming typhoon. Winds gusting as high as 50 knots were recorded in Southern Military Region 1 and upper level winds were recorded in excess of 140 knots. The advanced warning given to commanders gave them ample time to make all necessary preparations.

(d) During the period, climatological planning data was provided to commanders involved in such Allied operations as Jefferson Glen, Wolfe Mountain, Texas Star, Elk Canyon, Frederick Hill, Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain, Geneva Park, Pennsylvania Square and Arc Light operations.

(e) Climatological weather information was provided by this unit for use in planning and coordinating joint Army-Air Force reconnaissance missions.

(f) Climatological planning data emphasized the inadvisability of leaving several fire support bases in operation during the northeast monsoon. Resupply could have been hampered by adverse weather for extended periods of time.

c. (C) Plans and Operations.
Period Ending 31 October 1970

(1) Boundary Changes.

(a) The permanent boundary in western Quang Tri Province was changed on 5 August 1970 since the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) received additional air cavalry assets for assistance in patrolling the Demilitarized Zone area. The responsibility for the zone was assigned to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (MECH). The responsibility for this area was then further assigned to C Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

(b) On 21 September 1970, the permanent boundary between the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and 1st Marine Division was changed to generally follow the Thu Thien/Quang Nam Provincial boundary. This change took advantage of the air cavalry assets of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) in patrolling a major enemy infiltration area. The 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) gained the base of the Khe Sanh Valley and a portion of the Elephant Valley area.

(c) On 22 September 1970, the permanent boundary of the 2d ROKMC Brigade was moved north into the 1st Marine Division area to encompass all of Dien Bien District. The change made the 2d ROKMC Brigade boundary coincide with in the Dien Bien District boundary, thus assisting in control of the Vietnamese forces within a single district.

(d) On 10 October 1970, the southern portion of the southern permanent boundary of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (MECH) was moved south into the area of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). This change gave the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (MECH) sole responsibility for a major base and infiltration area, ranging southeast-southwest, consisting of approximately 400 square kilometers.

(2) The following operations terminated during the reporting period.

(a) CHISAGO FEAK (Initially Named CHICAGO FEAK). This operation commenced on 25 July 1970 and employed elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and 1st ARVN Infantry Division. The basic mission was to increase the security of the population towards and support operations in the enemy's rear service support area in the mountains northeast of the A Shau Valley. This operation was part of Operation Texas Star. The operation terminated on 31 August 1970 with the following results:

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<tr>
<td>KIA 3 ARVN</td>
<td>KIA 97</td>
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<td>41A US</td>
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(b) PICKENS FOREST. This operation was conducted by the 1st Marine Division in the Song Thu Bo Valley. The mission was to destroy the enemy and his facilities and interdict his logistical support. The operation supported the I ARVN Corps/FWAP, Military Region 1, Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan. It commenced on 15 July 1970 and terminated on 24 August 1970 with the following results.

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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>DET</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>310</td>
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(c) LYON VALLEY. This 1st Marine Division operation was conducted in Base Area 112 with the mission of finding and destroying a suspected enemy regimental headquarters. It commenced on 16 August 1970 and terminated on 24 August 1970 with the following results.

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<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
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(d) RIPLEY CENTER. This was a 1st Marine Division operation conducted with the mission of locating and destroying an enemy headquarters. It commenced on 13 August 1970 and terminated on 31 August 1970 with the following results.

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<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
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<td>27</td>
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(e) TEXAS STAR. This 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) operation was designed to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches, and base camps, and interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Extensive airborne combined operations were conducted in the area east of the A Shau Valley and west of the populated lowlands of Thu Thien Province. Reinforcements were provided for the Hau Loc Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp. One airborne infantry battalion was also provided as Corps reserve. Assistance was provided to Government of Vietnam forces in assuming full responsibility for combat, pacification and psychological operations in Thu Thien Province. Operations were conducted in close coordination with Territorial Forces, to include Regional Forces, Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Forces, National Police Field Forces and Provincial Reconnaissance Units. The operation commenced on 1 April 1970 and terminated on 5 September 1970 with the following results.
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AVII-OGT 12 November 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

FRIENDLY ENEMY
KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA DET INC CSWG
349 US 1,774 US 8 US 2,053 25 59 420 101
6 ARVN 99 ARVN

(f) NEBRASKA HAMIDS (Initially Named ROCK CRUSHER). This operation commenced on 5 September 1970 and was designed to locate and destroy enemy forces, locate and extract caches, and disrupt enemy lines of communication. Elements of the Americal Division and 1st Marine Division conducted coordinated search and clear operations along the contiguous boundary of the 1st Marine Division/Americal Division. Additionally, United States Marine Corps and Americal Division Engineers assisted 2d ARVN Infantry Division in opening Highway 533/534 from QL 1 to Hiep Duc in preparation for a Government of Vietnam convoy. The operation terminated on 8 September 1970 with the following results.

FRIENDLY
KIA WIA
1 1.2

ENEMY
KIA DET INC
4 15 1

(g) DUPOIS SQUARE (Initially Named WILLIAM VALLEY). This 1st Marine Division reconnaissance in force operation was conducted with the mission of rocket belt security and patrolling of the area in the vicinity of Danang. Additional missions were to interdict enemy activity in the area of operation and interdict enemy waterway infiltration. It commenced on 10 September 1970 and terminated on 19 September 1970 with the following results.

FRIENDLY
KIA
5

ENEMY
KIA DET INC CSWG
59 1 13 12

(h) ELK CANYON. This Americal Division operation was conducted to secure Kham Duc Airfield and destroy or neutralize enemy forces, logistic bases, and command and control installations in the vicinity of Kham Duc. It supported the ARVN Corps/FWAF. Military Region 1 Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan. The operation was conducted in two phases. ELK CANYON I commenced on 12 July 1970 and terminated on 27 August 1970 with the following results.

FRIENDLY
KIA
5

ENEMY
KIA DET INC CSWG
59 1 13 12

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EKG CANYON II commenced on 27 August 1970 and terminated on 19 September 1970 with the following results.

**FRIENDLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

**ENEMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
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<th>DET</th>
<th>IWC</th>
<th>GSWC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Final results have been incorporated into operation FREDERICK HILL.*

(1) TOLAKS FALLS. This operation was under control of the Quang Nam Province Chief and majority of the forces were Vietnamese units. It commenced on 2 October 1970 and was conducted in Dien Bien District. The operation was a combined anti-litter offensive operation consisting mainly of saturation operations with small units. It was conducted because substantial intelligence indicated that the enemy would conduct numerous attacks in Dien Bien District in an attempt to destroy the GVN pacification effect. The basic mission of this operation was to preempt these attacks and destroy the concentration of enemy forces. US forces that participated in this operation were placed under CHUON of the 5th Marine Regiment 1st Marine Division. The operation terminated on 10 October 1970 with the following results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>DET</th>
<th>IWC</th>
<th>GSWC</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph (1) above.

(a) FREDERICK HILL. This operation is being conducted in Quang Tin Province. The operation employs a force of the 166th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division with the mission of conducting search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Americal Division is the controlling headquarters. The operation commenced on 18 March 1969.

(b) GENEVA PARK. This operation is being conducted in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province. The operation employs elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, with the mission of conducting search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Americal Division is the controlling headquarters. The operation commenced on 19 March 1969.
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(c) IRON MOUNTAIN. This operation is being conducted in Quang Ngai Province. The operation employs elements of the 11th Infantry Brigade, American Division with the mission of conducting search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The American Division is the controlling headquarters. The operation commenced on 19 March 1970.

(d) PENNSYLVANIA SOILS. This operation is being conducted by the American Division with the mission of performing search and clear and reconnaissance in force operations in the central plain of northeastern Quang Tin Province. It commenced on 29 June 1970 and employs elements of the 1st Squadron, lst Cavalry. The operation supports the 1 ARVN Corps/PMAP, Military Region 1, Phong Du-Dong Military Campaign Plan.

(e) NANTUCKET BEACH. This search and clear operation is conducted jointly by the 1st Infantry Division, American Division and the 8th Infantry regiment, 24th Infantry Division in the area between the Batangan Peninsula and Quang Ngai city. The mission is to destroy Main Force/Local Force Vietnamese Communist units, and eliminate the Vietnamese Communist infrastructure and political apparatus in order to restore Government of Vietnam rule to the area. The operation commenced on 20 July 1970.

(f) WOLFE MOUNTAIN. The operation is under control of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and consists of search and clear/reconnaissance operations along the Demilitarized Zone and central border of the Brigade area of operation in northern Military Region 1. Combined operations are conducted with Government of Vietnam forces to prevent enemy infiltration into the populated regions of Quang Tri province. Additionally, a reaction force is providing security of the 1st Infantry Division Irregular Defense Group Camps there at Tan Thanh. A secure communications channel has been established in the ARVN Division Headquarters in the Brigade area of operations. The operation commenced on 10 July 1970.

(g) IMINIAL LAKE. This operation employs elements of the 1st Marine Division. It is a search and clear operation with the mission of locating and destroying enemy front headquarters and capturing key enemy personnel. It commenced on 18 August 1970.

(h) JEFFERSON GLENN/Monsoon Plan 70. This operation is conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in coordination with the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and Government of Vietnam officials in Thua Thien Province with the missions of locating and destroying enemy forces.
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...staging areas, and forward cache sites; protecting vital lines of communication; and assisting Government of Vietnam officials in meeting their pacification goals for 1970. The operation commenced on 5 September 1970.

(i) NOBLE CANYON. This operation is conducted by the 1st Marine Division. It supports the Vietnamese MACV DICE Saturation operation in eastern Quang Nam Province. It employs elements of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. The operation commenced on 22 October 1970.

(j) TOLARE FALLS II. This operation is the name of the US part of the Vietnamese MACV DICE Saturation operation. It is composed of Task Force Burnett, Americal Division elements, and Marine elements, which are under control of the 5th Marine Regiment. The 1st Marine Division controls all US elements which are employed in this operation.

(k) Statistical list of current operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF OPERATION</th>
<th>STARTING DATE</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<td>FREDERICK HILL</td>
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<td>6995</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>GENEVA PARK</td>
<td>18 March 1969</td>
<td>7003</td>
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<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18 March 1969</td>
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<td>PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE</td>
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<tr>
<td>NANTUCKET BEACH</td>
<td>20 July 1970</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>474</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOLFS MOUNTAIN</td>
<td>22 July 1970</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERIAL LAKE</td>
<td>1 August 1970</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON GLENN</td>
<td>5 September 1970</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>NOBLE CANYON</td>
<td>22 October 1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOLARE FALLS II</td>
<td>27 October 1970</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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(4) Redeployment of Forces.

(a) Increment IV Redeployment. Increment IV Redeployment terminated on 15 October 1970. A total of 35,185 personnel spaces were redeployed from units under operational control of XXIV Corps during the reporting period. All spaces were United States Marine Corps elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Air Wing, Force Logistic Command, and Combat Action Force. Total Increment IV Redeployment including those redeployed before 1 August 1970, consisted of 17,021 United States Marine Corps personnel spaces and 3,377 United States Army personnel spaces.

(b) Increment V Redeployment. Increment V Redeployment commenced on 16 October 1970. No personnel spaces were redeployed from units under the operational control of XXIV Corps during the reporting period.

d. (U) Personnel Administration, Personnel and Discipline.

(1) Civilian Personnel. Management. The command is currently authorized 85 local national direct hire spaces a loss of 46 spaces since last report.

(2) Maintenance of Unit Strength. The number of units assigned to XXIV Corps increased over the reporting period. Authorized strength is now 4,335 with 4,412 assigned.

(3) Medical.

(a) During the early part of August 1970, it became apparent that the malaria rate was rising. Subsequent investigation revealed that unit personnel were taking the Chloroquine-Primquine pill weekly and the Dapsone pill daily. According to existing medical knowledge these medications should have maintained the rate at a much lower level. After checking further into the medications being used, it was discovered that the Dapsone being used was manufactured in 1947 or earlier. Additional tests proved that Dapsone produced in 1977 or earlier was non-effective. As of this date no Dapsone produced in 1947 or earlier is being used.

(b) In September 1970, it was brought to the attention of the Staff Surgeon's Office that ARVN soldiers were being lost in the US hospital system. Investigation indicated that this was in fact true and that approximately 175 soldiers had been lost. There are several reasons behind this situation. The primary reason is that many ARVN patients...
arrive at the hospitals untagged, and some are in such physical condition as to be unable to supply identification. Instructions were put out to all evacuating agencies that patients must be tagged with a field medical tag. In addition, the Dustoff number and helicopter call sign of helicopters bringing patients into hospitals will be recorded in the medical records of the patient. This will allow a determination to be made of coordinates where the patients were picked up, to help in identifying patients.

(4) Provost Marshal.

(a) There was a growing number of incidents wherein Vietnamese nationals surrounded and detained US Military personnel and their vehicles after traffic accidents in which Vietnamese sustained either injury or property damage. They pressed for on-the-spot settlement of their claim for damages. This tactic appears to have been utilized by Vietnamese in order to insure prompt and expeditious settlement of their claims for damages. In an effort to reduce the number of traffic accidents, accelerate the processing of claims and restore the previously held good will of the Vietnamese people, a three-pronged program was implemented.

1. Commanders were instructed to carefully review the driving records and personal habits of vehicle operators under their command, insure that newly assigned drivers were carefully screened and oriented prior to issuance of operator's permits. Conduct refresher and remedial training as required and otherwise take prompt and aggressive action to lower the accident rate.

2. Commanders were also instructed to expeditiously prepare and forward to Foreign Claims Commission reports of investigation regarding incidents involving damage to a foreign national's property.

3. As an aid to US Military Drivers and to inform Vietnamese victims of our Government's good intentions, a letter of instruction covering procedures to be followed by operators of US Government vehicles involved in accidents was prepared and given wide dissemination. This letter also prescribed a bilingual accident form to be locally reproduced and provided to all vehicle operators. The purpose of this form was to advise the Vietnamese of the fact that the accident would be reported to and investigated by Military Police and that they may submit a claim for injuries and damages at the address indicated on the form.

4. In addition, numerous meetings have been held with Civil...
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Operations for Rural Development Support Public Safety Division personnel, MACV Advisors, and Vietnamese civil and military officials in an attempt to obtain the cooperation of Vietnamese National Police, who have authority over the Vietnamese civilians involved in these incidents. Such attempts have met with limited success due to the political pressures existing in Military Region I.

(b) With the stand-down of US Marine Corps Military Police units, the need for US Army Military Police as replacements arose. The 504th Military Police Battalion resources in Military Region I at the time were inadequate to handle these requirements, and a request for assignment of an additional Military Police Company was submitted to USAV. The 188th Military Police Company was relocated from Military Region 4 to Danang and assumed the mission of supporting the Danang Sector Combined Police Operation in August. In addition, the 504th Military Police Battalion assumed Provost Marshal operational responsibilities for Danang Sector from XXIV Corps at the same time.

(c) The 12th Military Police Brigade assumed operation of the former III Marine Amphibious Force Provost Marshals, on 10 April 1970 and redesignated it USAV Installation Security, Danang. This confinement facility houses prisoners in partial confinement from Military Regions 1 and 2.

(d) In view of the rapid build-up of US Army Military resources in Military Region I, particularly in Danang, the 10th Military Police Group deployed from Nha Trang to Danang in September 1970.

(e) Several fact-finding teams interested in the status of drug abuse in the Republic of Vietnam visited Military Region I and were escorted by members of XXIV Corps Provost Marshal’s Office. Of particular interest was the recently instituted Amnesty Program for drug users. However, due to the “newness” of the program, any attempt to rate the degree of success or failure of this program was considered premature.

(f) A Military Payment Certificate Conversion was made during this reporting period. Instructions to law enforcement agencies regarding their C-Day responsibilities had been recently published and conversion was effected with no major police problems.

(g) Military Justice. The 7th Psychological Operations and 118th Interior Company (Airmobile, Fixed Wing) (Radio Research) were attached to XXIV Corps for administration of Military Justice, effective 1 October 1970.

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e. (C) Logistics.

(1) (U) General. During the reporting period the logistical posture throughout the Corps AO remained in a high state of readiness and was responsive to all demands.

(2) (C) Operations.

(a) Common Service Support. With the phasing out of the Naval Support Activity, Danang, the Army assumed the responsibility for all Common Service Support in Military Region I.

(b) Real Estate. During the reporting period the following bases were transferred to the ARVN. The total number of structures involved was 801 for a credit return to the US of over $1,218,620, in acquisition values:

1. Landing Zone Bayonet II.
2. Namo Bridge.
4. Sparrow Nob.
5. Camp Hovey.
6. An Hoa Combat Base.
7. Ninth Engineer Compound, Danang.
9. Landing Zone Artillery Hill.
10. Hue LCU Ramp.

f. (U) Inspector General. None.
g. (U) Information. None.
h. (U) Command History. None.
i. (U) Aviation. None.
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J. (C) Signal.

1. (C) Communications Support for Quang Da Special Zone. During the reporting period one additional C/C/TY circuit was activated from the Danang East Primary Relay Station to support Quang Da Special Zone.

2. (C) 108th Artillery Group Headquarters relocation. During the first part of October the 108th Artillery Group relocated to Phu Bai Combat Base. This re-location required the re-route and re-termination of 108th Artillery Group voice and data-type circuits. Additional voice circuits were activated between the 108th Artillery Group and 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery.

3. (U) Phase down and relocation 8th Communication Battalion. The 5th Communication Battalion (USMC) was phased down to a communications support company and relocated to Danang North. The 17th Signal Battalion assumed responsibility for maintaining cable installations at Danang previously assigned to the 5th Communications Battalion.

4. (U) Relocation of Headquarters, USA Support Command, USA Support Command relocated to the old Naval Support Activity Hospital area. This relocation required re-route and re-termination of required circuits.

5. (C) AUTOSEVCOM. An AUTOSEVCOM circuit request was submitted to support Company C, 5th Special Forces Group, off of SECORD at Monkey Mountain. On 17 September 1970 it was found that circuit could not be activated due to lack of line conditioning equipment. Therefore on 18 September 1970 another circuit request was submitted to re-route the circuit to SECORD N137 Danang. On 28 September 1970 Company C, 5th Special Forces Group advised that the circuit was not required because the unit was departing. Cancellation for circuit was submitted on 29 September 1970.

6. (U) Zone Coordinator. XXIV Corps was made Coordinator for the installation of circuits over US Component service cable installations within the Danang area by USARV message 230500Z September 1970 (C).

7. (U) Cable Outages.

(a) The 518 cable which runs between the Danang Air Force Dial Central Office to Danang East Dial Telephone Exchange is out of order because of small arms fire and poor splicing which was done in the past.
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During the recent heavy rains the cable pairs have become wet and shorted out. Work is underway to dry the cable out and repair the splice properly.

(b) During the period 29 September 1970 through 9 October 1970 the 439L undersea cable that connects Danang with Qui Nhon was out. This created a large amount of circuit outages to include landline telephone circuits. MINIMIZE was put into effect. The problem was alleviated by alternate circuits over existing Tropospheric Radio System until the cable was restored. The Defense Communications Agency is improving its OPPLAN for restoration of circuits if the cable should ever be cut again.

(9) (U) AFVN Retranscast at Phu Bai Camp Eagle areas. Action was taken to install AFVN retranscast stations at Phu Bai and Camp Eagle. This action was taken as an interim measure until studies could be conducted regarding the possible resuscitation of the Quang Tri AFVN Station to Hue.

(9) (U) Systems Deactivations. During the reporting period three Corps area communication systems were deactivated. One Defense Communications microwave system between Danang In-Country System and Danang East Navy site was deactivated on 5 October 1970. Deactivations included:

(a) 12 Channel System Phu Bai to Hue MCY.
(b) 12 Channel System Phu Bai to Gia Lo.
(c) 21 Channel System Phu Bai to Danang.
(d) 12 Channel System Danang MCY to Danang East Navy Site.

(10) (U) Circuit Activations/Deactivations/Reactivations. A total of 10 circuits were activated, 12 circuits deactivated, and 13 circuits reactivated or reactivated. All Defense Communication System and Corps Area Communications Solo User Voice TAC circuits were reported to USARV in chart form. All solo user circuits that serve Headquarters XXIV Corps were reviewed and reported to MACV.

(11) (C) FM Frequency Assignments. A complete new frequency assignment plan went into effect on 15 October 1970. The assignment program, after a loss of 117 FM Frequencies to MACV for ARVN, had to be adjusted and assignments made under a most austere condition. As a result the program has to be rigid and well managed especially in the area north of 2C

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the Hai Van Pass and South of Nui Dat.

(12) (C) NESTOR. Recent arrival of modification kits for UH-1D aircraft has enabled the program to progress. An area of special interest is the equipping of all Dustoff aircraft with secure equipment. Presently, the 67th Medical Group Dustoff aircraft are being scheduled for modification and concrete actions to draw the secure equipment are being established.

(13) (U) Air Force. Since the 12th Signal Group moved from Phu Bai to Danang, a revised source plan was placed into effect utilizing aircraft from the 12th Signal Group and 626 Aviation Company, providing for better service and utilization of aircraft assets.

(1) (U) Engineering

(a) During this quarter the 8th and 7th (Logistic Company) Force Engineer Battalions (FEB) occupied the 407th Mobile Construction Battalion and the 301st Mobile Construction Battalion Utilities (MSCB) were also redeployed.

(b) The initial portion (±3 reinforced) of the 5th Engineer Construction Battalion arrived in August, and is preparing facilities for the remainder of the battalion to occupy. The 5th Construction Battalion should be operational about 1 December 1970.

(c) The ARVN 18th Land Clearing Company is being equipped out of assets from the 18th Engineer Battalion and will be operational in the near future. The USMC Land Clearing Battalion was among the units retrograded during the quarter.

(2) Combat Support Operations

(a) Mine Clearing. There were 1037 mine and booby trap incidents in Military Region 1 during this quarter. 547 of these were detected and caused no damage. There were 490 that were accidentally detonated, causing 124 allied personnel to be killed and 63 wounded, 12 major pieces of equipment destroyed and 67 pieces damaged. These figures represent a 97.3 percent find ratio.

(b) Non-divisional. US engineer units were sweeping a daily average of 135 km of road for mines at the end of this quarter.

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(3) Significant Construction Projects.

(a) Advisor Well Program: During the 1st quarter Fiscal Year 1971, action has been taken at XXIV Corps to assemble a packaged program to assure a satisfactory water source for each outlying MACV advisor site in Military Region 1. A qualified geologic engineering team inspected 25 proposed sites late in the quarter and will submit a report which will provide the basis for a total water well program, complete with drilling machinery and installed equipment. When completed, the program will be submitted to MACV for submission for funding and scheduling.

(b) Piedmont Airfields: Considerable progress has been realized on a combined program, initiated in Fiscal Year 1970, to upgrade a series of piedmont airfields in Quang Ngai Province. XXIV Corps has coordinated the upgrading of airfields at Tam Ky, Ba Thanh, and in '70. The on-site work is being done by "3 Navy". See note: using steel matting provided by ARVN, with logistical support provided by the American Division and the US Air Force. The remaining sites were completed during the current quarter and are to be complete early in the next quarter.

(4) Facilities Engineering: The great reduction in facilities engineering operations funds for Fiscal Year 1971, as compared with Fiscal Year 1970 has had an effect on the availability of engineer troops to perform operational support missions. Some projects that would likely have been funded by contractor might not be done by troop units, i.e., dog kennels, a small store, family group improvement, of a hospital area, cutbacks in contractor provided services, have to be taken up "self help." These "self help" projects, if kept simple, housekeeping maintenance, require engineer skills and equipment, and cause the diversion of engineering troop effort an example being the maintenance of roads on bases at a time when the men are more likely to be needed to maintain tactical roads extremely difficult. This diversion of troop effort can be expected to increase in the next quarter.

(5) Road Construction and Maintenance

(a) The remaining 0.6 km of QL 2 in Military Region 1 was paved. This completion of QL 2 in Military Region 1 with the exception of approximately 7 km through Quang Ngai City, which has been contracted to the Kent, Morrison and Knudsen Construction agency. Also completed during this quarter were the roads to Fire Support Base Barbers, Hacksaw, Arsenal and the first phase of Provincial Highway 524/523. New projects started during this quarter were the upgrading and paving of...
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ML 13C/125, upgrading of HL 524/523 (second phase) and the start and completion of HL 525 and Hai Lang Rd. Work continued throughout the quarter on LTL 4 (which is now being paved), HL 521, HL 522, HL 533, Fire Support Base T-Bone Access Road and upgrading and maintenance of HL 547. The Quang Tri Bridge was completed and the Song Ne Bridge opened for traffic with pier protection remaining to be completed.

(b) During this quarter AH-1H engineer forces continued work on HL 529, HL 535, the Gia Lang Road, and they started work on HL 601 (the Hai Lang Road) and HL 597 (the Street Without Joy).

(c) Sixty-nine kilometers of tactical roads were completed and the upgrading of 91 kilometers of tactical road was started, while construction continues on 65 kilometers.

(d) During the latter third of this quarter, as was anticipated, with the beginning of the monsoon season in Military Region 1, it has become necessary to devote an ever increasing amount of engineering effort to road maintenance. Additional effort is required to keep the primary lines of communication and tactical roads open as a result of the destructive effects of the monsoon. The increased maintenance responsibilities brought about by the monsoon and the redeployment of engineer troops and their essential equipment and facilities has revealed the following:

1. Lack of properly trained, qualified, engineer units with only TOE equipment and the lack of funds to support engineer projects with funds to purchase sufficient Army, Department of Heavy equipment and facilities is engineer support due to cut back in funds.

2. Lack of properly qualified, trained engineer support due to cut back on funds.

(e) Land Clearing. Land clearing was conducted in five different areas of Military Region 1. Two platoon-level Clearing Platoons and one Land Clearing Company cleared a total of 33.941 acres of land. There were 1053 pieces of ordnance ranging from land mines to 500 pound bombs found and destroyed. One hundred fifteen booby traps were reported found and destroyed. Many other booby traps were hit by the equipment causing some damage. Firing and destruction in the 33.941 acres that were cleared were 1013 hand grenades, 916 12.5 firing roles, 6400 meters of trenches, 4064 meters of tunnels, 19 huts and 63 acres of gardens. Over 4000 pounds of food and other miscellaneous items including tools,
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Clothing, medical supplies, 49 pigs, 2 cows, and 25 chickens were captured. These losses were inflicted on the enemy at a price of 23 US MIA, 2 dozers destroyed, 3 dozers heavily damaged and 9 dozers lightly damaged.

(7) Flooding.

(a) From 27 October 1970 through 31 October 1970, intense monsoon rains caused severe flooding throughout Military Region 1. Rainfall in the mountain regions is estimated to have been two to three times that of the coastal lowlands. Data gathered from gaging stations in the coastal plains for rainfall in Military Region 1 from 27 October 1970 through 31 October 1970 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>7 STATION AVERAGE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MAX STATION RECORD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 October 1970</td>
<td>2.15 in</td>
<td>Camp Evans</td>
<td>4.55 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 October 1970</td>
<td>1.38 in</td>
<td>Camp: Eagle</td>
<td>2.14 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 October 1970</td>
<td>4.2&quot; in</td>
<td>Camp Evans</td>
<td>5.32 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October 1970</td>
<td>7.04 in</td>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>11.32 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1970</td>
<td>3.21 in</td>
<td>Camp Evans</td>
<td>7.54 in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The roads in Military Region 1 remained open through 29 October 1970. By 0700, 30 October 1970, all roads were under water in many places. The Hai Van Pass on QL-1 was closed by rock and mud slides. All tactical and secondary roads were closed due to high water and washouts. Parts of Quang Ngai City were under 18 feet of water. The rain continued and the water rose until QL-1 was under more than six feet of water in places, and completely under water for sections of up to 15 km of roadway. A large volume of water continued to flow over QL-1 until 5 November 1970, and portions of tactical roads remained under water until 5 November 1970.

(c) Two bridges on QL-1 were completely washed out. The most frequent damages were determined and washed out bridge abutments and approaches. Twelve bridges had one or both abutments of approaches washed out, and several bridges suffered from cracked, broken or washed out piles. Numerous culverts were washed out and large sections of the road surface were eroded. The problem requiring the most extensive repair effort is that caused by shoulder erosion along QL-1 which in some places extended to a depth of six feet below the normal ground level and up to half way across the road. Numerous other bridges and culverts were washed out on the tactical and secondary roads.
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(d) QL-1 was opened to traffic on 3 November 1970 as the waters receded. With a few minor exceptions all the tactical and lesser roads were open by 6 November 1970.

(e) The quick reopening of QL-1 and the tactical roads were a result of the quick response and coordination which took place between all engineer units in Military Region 1. US and ARVN units employed tactical bridging, refilled gaps, and repaired damage almost as it occurred. These emergency measures minimized the disruption to essential military traffic; however, a major reconstruction effort will be required to return the major lines of normal traffic to their previous condition.

1. (U) Civic Action/ Psychological Operations

(1) Civic Action

(a) Military Civic Action. The summary of military Civic Action accomplishments by US military forces in Military Region 1 for the reporting period is as follows: A total of 34,663 man-days, based on a 10-hour day, were expended in support of military Civic Action. Total monetary expenditures were $1,660,238 ($411,006, 80% from military resources, VNS1,057,422). Civil Affairs (psychological Operations Assistance in Kind) 1,897,888 (55% from military contributions). The average percentage of each project was completed using self-help labor was 78%, and 12 percent of the material furnished were from Vietnamese resources. A breakdown of civic action effort follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Van Days</th>
<th>VNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,140,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>416,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>524,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>1,834,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Support</td>
<td>0,992</td>
<td>677,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5,047</td>
<td>1,174,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14,659</td>
<td>13,776,724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutions assisted during the reporting period included 11175 schools, 156 orphanages, 13 hospitals, 217 communes, 240 villages.

(b) Medical Civic Action. A total of 635 CIH persons were treated by Medical Civic Action program personnel: 375 of these resulted from hostile action. Additionally 479 persons received dental treatment. A total of 276 immunizations were administered; 497 persons,
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, AOS CSP00-06 (R2) (U)

477 cholera, 39% smallpox and 71% miscellaneous injections. Five hundred sixty-four Vietnamese health workers were trained in first aid and nursing techniques in conjunction with the Medical Civic Action Program. Three hundred seventy-three personal hygiene, sanitation, classes were taught with 3156 persons attending.

(c) At 1300H 12 October 1970, the G5 established and supervised the XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center (DRCC) in accordance with XXIV Corps GFAN 197-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan), in order to prepare for Typhoon Kate. Actions and tasks were established for G2, G3 and G4 representatives of the DRCC. Warning conditions were passed as appropriate. Complete times for condition tasks accomplished by subordinate units were logged. Weather bulletins received from the Corps weather officer were provided to all agencies requesting storm status. All military and civilian personnel were kept informed through the DRCC's coordination with AVO, Public Relations, and Vietnam Information Service and through Civil Operations for Human Development Support. Condition II (highest warning released) was lifted at 2200H 10 October 1970. The DRCC remained operational for an additional 24 hours. Subordinate units were instructed in the proper disaster relief procedures occurring after this time. In the attention of the XXIV Corps G5. No further problems were reported.

(d) The XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center was again activated at 2030H 29 October 1970 in preparation for Typhoon Kate. The DRCC passed storm warning and was prepared to coordinate assistance for military and civilian personnel in Military Region I. A major contributing factor to the small contribution was experience gained from Typhoon Veronica on 10 October 1970. Early warning and timely preparation by subordinate units minimized damage. There were no serious injuries nor major equipment losses reported.

(e) The XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center was activated at 1530H 29 October 1970 for flooding conditions in Military Region I. For the third time during the period, the DRCC passed storm condition warnings and coordinated assistance for military and civilian personnel in Military Region I. Actions and tasks were established for G2, G3, G4, and Naval Support representatives of the DRCC.

(2) Psychological Operations.

(a) XXIV Corps published a letter (AVII-GE) subject: Chieu Hoi Ministry Monetary Rewards, dated 4 August 1970, explaining the Republic of Vietnam Chieu Hoi Ministry Publication #21 13 July 1970. The
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AVII-OCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970. AOS CSPAOC-00 (atl. 2)

publication deals with retraining for weapons, ammunition, military supplies, and war equipment. This letter is intended to improve US military psychological operations in support of the Government of Vietnam Offensive Program.

(a) The Military Region I Central Psychological Operations Center presently publishes a monthly bulletin entitled the 22nd and 24th of each month. The purpose of the bulletin is to improve communications between Headquarters and the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Problems areas such as the distribution of quality PSYOP materials, as well as new psychological operations techniques, are discussed. The Military Region I Central Psychological Operations Center uses outdated and counterproductive techniques and methods to combat questions and sentiments of the RFA and HCMV Army, and to achieve wide-spread application are also covered.

(b) The most significant event that occurred during the period was the August attack on Hoi An by the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam. The attack by the enemy forces was directed at the fortified area around the city of the pagoda, and destroyed many pagoda structures and statues. The pagoda was also destroyed by the North Vietnamese. The pagoda was finally exploited by the South Vietnamese; the North Vietnamese occupied it in the province of the North Vietnamese and used its temples and pagoda for propaganda against the United States and against the enemy. The pagoda is a national sacred site and the pagoda and the pagoda are used by the enemy to internationalize the conflict and gain support from foreign countries. The pagoda was also given to the North Vietnamese by the United States.

(c) During the period, 22/August-1/October 1970, Colonel Operations staff members of Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Political Warfare, staff members of Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Political Warfare, staff members of Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Political Warfare, and the Military Region I Central Psychological Operations Center, worked together to familiarize members of the XXIV Corps Political Warfare and the Military Region I Central Psychological Operations Center with US Army military operations in Vietnam. The goal was to improve the quality and effectiveness of the operations being conducted. The operations were designed to prepare the military for future operations in Vietnam. The operations were also given to the military for future reference.

(d) The Military Region I Central Psychological Operations Center (CPOC) was established in the spring of 1970. This
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consolidation placed all GFOC sections, with the exception of Air Section
at Danang Air Base, in the same compound with the 7th Psychological Op-

erations Battalion and the 10th ARVN Political Warfare Battalion. This
consolidation has improved efficiency and increased the coordination in
Psychological Operations.

(f) A summary of the Psychological Operations production and dis-
semination for Military Region 1 assets is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New leaflets requested</td>
<td>223*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New leaflets produced</td>
<td>209*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnetic broadcast tapes requested</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnetic broadcast tapes produced</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprints of printed material requested</td>
<td>215*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprints of printed material produced</td>
<td>185*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of new printed (leaflet equivalents)</td>
<td>45,671,500*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount of reprints (leaflet equivalents)</td>
<td>26,519,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflet targets scheduled</td>
<td>10,532*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflet targets flown</td>
<td>7296**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial broadcast targets scheduled</td>
<td>9680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial broadcast targets flown</td>
<td>1466*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The difference between the printed were requested and that actually
  printed resulted from the use of items already in stock or the substitu-
  tion of a very similar item already on hand.

** The difference between the targets scheduled and the targets flown
  resulted in targets not being flown due to adverse weather conditions.

(g) Corps Artillery

(1) Organization.

(a) During the month of August 1970, two units of the 11th Marines
    stood down. These were the 1st Platoon Battery which completed
    stand down on 16 August 1970 (6 x 105 howitzers), and the 3rd 175 Gun
    Battery which stood down on 27 August 1970.

(b) On 27 August 1970, 10 x 105mm howitzers that had been at-
    tached to the 7th Airborne Brigade were transferred to the 2d Bn, 320th
    Artillery of the 1st Marine Division.

(c) On 27 September 1970, 10 x 105mm towed howitzers in direct sup-
    port of the 13th Vietnamese Marine Corps Brigade moved with the Brigade
to Quang Tri Province from Quang Ngai Province.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 30 October 1970 RGS CSPOR-65 (RC) (D) (U)

(d) The 2d MOK Marine Corps Brigade returned 6 x LVTH-6's (Landing Vehicle Tracked Howitzes) on 2 September, 1970 and received 6 x 105mm towed howitzers on loan from III MAF on 2 September 1970.

(e) On 2 September 1970, the 2d Bn, 8th Artillery began its move to Quang Nam Province with the relocation of Battery C, Battery A followed on 25 September and Battery B, September 1970. The mission of the 2d Bn, 8th Artillery with the 8 x 105mm guns and 6 x 82mm howitzers is now General Support Artillery to Quang Nam Special Zone Artillery. In addition to its support capability for the 2d MOK Corps Artillery Headquarters, the Battalion will support troops from the 15th Marine Regiment.

(f) Also during September, the 9th Marine Division received three additional units. The first, a 2d Battery, 111th Marine Regiment (18 x 105mm towed) within six days, was on duty. On 10, September 1970 Battery M, 34th Artillery, 9th Marine Regiment (18 x 175mm) was received from the 1st Bn, 71st Artillery. The impact of these critical shortages was severe, particularly on subordinate units. With the 2d Battery, 111th Marine Regiment, the battalion was able to deploy a larger number of 105mm towed howitzers, and the 2d Battery, 111th Marine Regiment, was able to deploy a larger number of 82mm howitzers.

(g) During the month of September, headquarters troops and Headquarters Battery, 34th Artillery were relocated from Danang, Central Base to Phu Bai, Vietnam.

(h) Personnel Changes:


2. On 4 September 1970, Lieutenant General Bland assumed duties as Deputy Commander, XXIV Corps Artillery.

3. On 12 September 1970, Colonel Joseph T. Dana assumed duties as Executive Officer, XXIV Corps Artillery.

(i) Substantial losses of company grade officers, with no replacements, seriously threatened the combat effectiveness of XXIV Corps Artillery. As late as 30 September 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery and its subordinate units were short 1 of 62 authorized Field Artillery Captains, and 34 of 116 authorized Field Artillery lieutenants. This impact of these critical shortages was that all enlisted assignments of eight Air Defense Artillery Captains and 21 Air Defense Artillery lieutenants against Field Artillery vacancies. An aggressive program to insure that USAV Assignments Branch be aware of our critical needs.

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12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS C5POR-65 (R) (U)

refused these shortages to 15 Captains and 15 Lieutenants on 31 October 1970. Eight Captains and 11 Lieutenants, Air Defense Officers continued to fill Field Artillery vacancies on 31 October 1970.

(2) Significant Activities

(a) Support for Operations TEXAS STAR and JEFFERSON (C). Corps Artillery supported operations of the 82d Airborne Division (AMEL) and the 1st AIN Infantry Division from 13 October (YD 226582), U.S. Army Artillery (YD 550091), and 42 (YD 136606), Vandegrift (YD 446733), Nancy (YD 435576) and Landing Zone Sally (YD 322574).

(b) Support for Operations TEXAS STAR. Corps Artillery units supported operations of the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry Division (MEORP) and the 1st AIN Infantry Division from Fire Support Base A/A (YD 118591), C-2 (YD 218672), C-3 (YD 136606), Vandegrift (YD 446733), Nancy (YD 435576), and Landing Zone Sally (YD 322574).

(c) Support for Operations TEXAS STAR. Corps Artillery units supported operations of the 1st Infanry Division (AMEL) and the 1st AIN Infantry Division from Fire Support Base A/A (YD 118591), C-2 (YD 218672), C-3 (YD 136606), Vandegrift (YD 446733), Nancy (YD 435576), and Landing Zone Sally (YD 322574).

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(3) Significant Activities

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS GSPR-65 (R2) (U)

(f) On 19 September 1970, at the request of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery, a searchlight and quad 50 cal machine gun were emplaced on a barge in the LOS BAGS lane to cover nighttime activity along a portion of the railroad. This reflects the first attempt at maintaining a coordinated firing system (a Fortable for sensor readouts, searchlight, and machine guns) on a floating platform.

(g) On 9 October 1970, two Dusters from the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AA) (SP), moved from Combat Base Baldy to support a Combined Unit Pacification program team operation in the southern Que Son mountains. The action was well coordinated and reflects the first use of M22A1 Dusters to support by joint Duster and infantry operations.

(h) During the reporting period the change in policy on ammunition expenditures resulted in significant expenditure reduction by all calibers of artillery. Expenditures continued to decrease as artillery commanders continued to monitor the election and engagement of targets. By October 1970, expenditures had reached a low point and it was realized that many targets appropriate for artillery engagement were engaged by other means or not attacked at all. Recent efforts to gather, study, and coordinate all targeting activities have resulted in increased heavy artillery expenditures. The trend is expected to level off as sound targeting by fire support commanders at all levels continues to improve intelligence gathering and subsequent selection of attack criteria.

(i) Battle Damage Assessment - Battle Damage Assessment for Military Region 1 US Artillery units during the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Damaged</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Positions Destroyed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by Artillery (Confirmed)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by Artillery (Unconfirmed)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Fires</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenches Trench Destroyed</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Positions Destroyed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Damaged</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges Destroyed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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During this period nine US Navy ships, two Royal Australian Navy ships, and two Coast Guard cutters provided Naval Gunfire support to ground units in Military Region 1. About 75 percent of this support was provided by a destroyer firing 2.5"/54 caliber, rapid-fire guns in the southeastern portion of the Demilitarized Zone in support of 1st ARVN Division (FWD) and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH). The USS Saint Paul brought her 9-8" guns to bear on the enemy during a three-week period for the last time before returning to CONUS for decommissioning. The two cutters were extra assets borrowed from the coastal surveillance force for short periods of time. Other units utilizing Naval Gunfire support were Americal Division and ROKMC Brigade, and 1st Marine Division.

Due to the pacification successes, a decrease in Naval Gunfire support ship assets, deteriorating weather conditions, and unavailability of some ammo types the total number of missions and rounds expended has been cut 35 percent from that of the previous reporting period. The team at 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) Fire Support Coordination Center was consolidated with the team at 1st ARVN Division (FWD), but regular liaison is still being maintained from Cong Ha. All support in northern Military Region 1 is in the southeastern portion of the Demilitarized Zone in support of the 1st ARVN Division, and with the institution of a Fire Support Coordination Center at 1st ARVN Division (FWD) Naval Gunfire support of the 1st ARVN Division is expected to predominate in the future. The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company maintained liaison/spot teams at XXIV Corps Headquarters in Dien Bien Phu, at Americal Division Headquarters, and at 1st ARVN Division (FWD) Headquarters.

During the reporting period there were 2,690 missions fired in Military Region 1 and 1,719 rounds expended resulting in the following damage assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (Confirmed)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (Probable)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Damaged</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(k) Friendly Fire Incidents. The following fire incidents were
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SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period ending 31 October 1970. NCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

reported in Military Region I during the period 1 August - 31 October 1970:

1. Number of incidents and accidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Mortar</th>
<th>Aerial, Field Artillery</th>
<th>Naval Gunfire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Firing Battery Inspection Team. During the reporting period, the Corps Artillery Firing Battery Inspection Team was discontinued due to a lack of personnel. According to reports, they have enabled the team to be reformulated and to establish itself shortly within the Corps Artillery. As of this writing, procedures, firing battery inspection, and the training of personnel will be made in each battery. Upon the completion of the training within the Corps Artillery, attention will be turned to Artillery, Division and Corps, Division with emphasis being placed on technical assistance rather than inspection.

2. Merit Action Reporting System. The following is a listing, by month, of the number of candidates checked during the quarter and the results obtained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CHECKED</th>
<th>INSATISFACTORY</th>
<th>INSATISFACTORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. ExcessNAL/UNNEEDED Equipment. The emphasis was placed on the identification, classification, and elimination of excess and/or unnecessary equipment throughout the XXIV Corps Artillery units. During the period reported totaling &11,000 were determined to be excess and/or unnecessary and were turned in through appropriate supply channels.

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During the period 1 August to 31 October 1970, the XXIV Corps Artillery Command Fire Support Net was expanded with the addition of 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery (AW)(SP), and 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery into the net. This net offered a secure means of communication with those units that did not have access to the AUTOSEVOCOM telephone system, and served as a back up for those units that did have this capability.

The establishment of an FM retransmission station at Hai Van Pass enabled XXIV Corps Artillery Headquarters to have extended communications to the XXIV Corps Artillery Reserve and units in the rear area. This enabled the retransmission stations to be extended north and south to subordinate units in the Littoral Area.

Late in July 1970 there was a conference held with XXIV Corps, XXXVIII Corps Artillery, 1st Marine Division, 25th Signal Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Artillery (AW)(SP), and 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery personnel concerning ARVN control of Hai Van Pass after the Marine unit was to withdraw. It was determined that for security purposes it would be necessary to move the retransmission stations operated by 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery (AW)(SP) and XXIV Corps Artillery personnel. After making communications tests this move was successfully effectuated.

Several incidents of unintentional jamming were noted throughout the period concerned. Due to the reduction in the number of frequencies allocated in Military Region 1, units were using frequencies that they were not authorized, causing temporary communications disruptions and interference. Emphasis has been placed by all units to use only authorized frequencies and call signs as the results have shown a positive decline in interference reports.

Emphasis was placed on using XXIV Corps Artillery Secure Radioteletype Net for passing administrative traffic, artilleryctrine, Inteplans, sightings by Integrated Observation Devices, and intelligence targets. This communications system provided a fast secure means of passing traffic, and was a sound means of backup communications.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:
   
a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence/Counterintelligence.
CONFDENTIAL

AVII-CCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, AVII Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970. HCG DSSR-46 (R2) (V)

(1) Specialized Interrogation:

(a) Observation: AVII Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch assigned the investigator the function of conducting interrogations of all detainees from transportation units to Military units. To prepare himself for this specialized function, the interrogator conducted several studies in the operation... once, mission and methods used by various transportation units.

(b) Evaluation: This study provided the interrogator with a thorough knowledge in the area of enemy activity, enabling him to interrogate more efficiently the enemy in this field.

(c) Recommendation: This study has taken a unique way specialized interrogation in questions concerning the function used for collection. Emphasis was given to background, enemy units, weapons, artillery, reconnaissance, etc.

(2) Daily Intelligence Reports:

(a) Observation: AVII Corps conducted basic update training for the AIO's, Co-in which a part of the training was the AVII Corps Intelligence Briefing. The most recent and significant items of information were presented in a summary of pertinent events for the day in the past two weeks, special reports and follow-up required.

(b) Evaluation: The AVII Corps Intelligence Briefings are a compilation of pertinent information from... to the Co-in and other related agencies. Because... Intelligence Group is represented there is an... operation of Intelligence and reports. Further, the AVII Corps Intelligence Briefings to... be presented to the General Staff.

(c) Recommendation: That Co-in are holding a large number of Intelligence agencies which... briefing in coordination consider using a similar briefing at conferences.

(3) Remote Firing Device Report:

(a) Observation: Commander Task Unit 221.14 at Hoi An has had success utilizing remote firing devices in conjunction with sensor...
strings for mechanical ambushes. Claymore mines were placed to make a kill zone. The Claymores would be detonated when sensors indicated movement in the kill zone.

(b) Evaluation: Two successful ambushes resulted in positive kill assessment with refined target in friendly unit. Three failures can be attributed to erroneous technical information concerning the types of batteries to be used in relate firing device equipment. The battery type was corrected by COMUSNAV message dated October 1970 (C).

(c) Recommendation: New relate firing device equipment is to be issued in the near future. Document this equipment and earlier model equipment be considered for further use in exploiting this ambush technique.

1. (C) Remarks

2. (C) Attachment

3. (C) Observation

4. (C) Procedure

(a) Observation. Between October 1970, Typhoon Juan and others were reported to have caused that appropriate contingency plans were established to each situation and that responsible personnel were informed of the requirements of the plan.

(b) Evaluation. Typhoon Juan storms occur generally in December - March timeframe. At the beginning of the northeast monsoon season an additional typhoon storm creates a stress or expectation in the population. An above normal season is considered, it is essential that all personel be made familiar with the appropriate plan prior to the storm. The above normal are reviewed and the storm season planned so that they are correct and all procedures are up to date.

(c) Observation. All services and staff officers institute programs, usually a yearly, that personnel are familiar with seasonal contingency plan, to help establish contingency plans, and that a continuous contingency plan review is in effect. This is especially important in the our current situation.

1. (C) Comments: None.

2. (C) Remarks

3. (C) Report

(1) Unit Employment Procedures for the Mechanical Ambush.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-OCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Aspects - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, ARVN Corps,
Period ending 30 October 1970. REDacted (C), (T)

(a) Observations: Recent local reports with reference to ambushes reveal that faulty planning and carelessness on the part of emplacement and recovery procedures has resulted in severe injury and death to friendly personnel.

(b) Evaluation: The lesson learned is that provision and utilization results in terms of enemy killed, wounded, captured, and early warning for friendly forces. Ambush is a dangerous weapon, not only to the attacked force, but also to the emplacement and recovery. These tasks are best handled in perfect procedure until proficient, although in an emergency these must be reported and personnel within a short time notified at the command Am-

(c) Network notes: The changing methods and SOL of the Battalion, 1st Platoon, and the system of cooperation that the emplacement and recovery procedures, and the use of the annihilation device of individuals, must be coordinated to achieve effective operation. The only those inflicted on the enemy. The reports of ambush procedures for the Mountain Ammunition Batteries, ARVN Division 71

(d) Army, Navy, Air Force

(a) Observations: For the Mountain Ammunition Batteries employed

(b) Evaluation: This mined employed a technique in mines and the fuel oil was employed in

Confidential
1. November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period ending in October 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

success, it was expected that this technique would be used on QH-1 and other hard surface roads in Military Region I.

(c) Recommendations: That this technique of mine employment be disseminated throughout all units. That mine sweep teams be trained in the proper method of detecting a mine above a metal culvert by adjusting the sensitivity of the detector until the culvert is no longer picked up and then sweeping over the culvert. By using this method, metallic mines over the culvert will be detected. The mine sweep teams should be trained to make a mine visual at the site of the mine and to detect disturbances of the mine using materials. Of the subject aid to detect the location of mined areas. A special purpose letter written in the subject was distributed by XXIV Corps in November 1970.

1. CONDA
2. CONAIR
3. CONTAC
4. ARVN, Logistic
5. ARVN, Engineer

(d) Evaluation: ARVN has been given sole responsibility for providing their own tactical roads. In the planning, providing materials, and constructing the roads as well as maintaining the roads after construction.

(e) Recommendations: That the headquarters continue to encourage ARVN to assume more responsibility in this respect and that NACV be aware of this problem, particularly since ARVN must now ability to plan for and obtain
1. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970. RG 050-65 (R2) (O)

funds for road construction. Continued emphasis is being applied by Corps for further Vietnamization of engineer material supply system.

(2) Adequacy of Primary Lines of Communication.

(a) Observation: During the current monsoon season, heavy rains and high water have caused several culverts on road to be washed out and long stretches of the highway to be underwater.

(b) Evaluation: The culverts through this area were undersized and insufficient surge flow is employed to raise the road to its required level.

(c) Recommendation: Although the roads in Southern Military Region 1 should have a higher design capacity and the block bed should be as high as the surrounding earth embankments. Corps continue to place increased emphasis on road maintenance for this section during wet weather.

(4) Traffic Facilities

(a) Observation: On 15 July 1970, a motorcycle rider was struck and killed by a US Military vehicle. The victim was evacuated to MUI Hospital and pronounced medially killed. The body was immediately released to the family. The body was released to the family. The body was returned home on the vehicle. The family purchased the US vehicle and its belongings for VNS 800,000. The body was placed in front of the US vehicle, candle lit and a song was sung. The body was returned home to the family.

(b) Evaluation: Had the body been returned to the accident scene it would have been easier to control the emotions of the crowd, and allowed for more rapid resolution of the Vietnamese demands. In addition it would serve to indicate the respect to the family. The family was informed by weapon brandishing Vietnamese civilians.
AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 357-685 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: That every effort be made by US and Vietnamese medical personnel to prevent the immediate release of an accident victim where his presence can be used to further enrage the local authority.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

L. B. PROCTOR
LTC, AGC
Acting Adjutant General
AVDDE-DC (12 Nov 70), 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 1 October '70, HCS OSCP-14 (R257)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96371

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: JPAP-DT, APO 96371

Assistance Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the operational report - lessons learned for the quarter period ending 1 October '70 from headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. Reference Item concerning "AH-1A Engineer Unit," page 30, paragraph 3. This headquarters is currently working with headquarters MACV and units in a plan which will all aff AH-1A to operate itself from the MACV logistical system. The end product of this joint effort will be a self-sustaining AH-1A logistical system which will provide construction material and equipment support for AH-1A engineer units. Work on this plan is being developed primarily to AH-1A engineer units within 2ID constructively, to ensure that in future operations the AH-1A logistical system will operate the AH-1A support units throughout Vietnam. We feel that AH-1A support can be extended to all AH-1A units supporting all units with AH-1A support can be extended to all AH-1A units supporting all units with AH-1A support.

3. Signed:

[Signature]

Assistant Adjutant General

4. Copy:

XXIV Corps
GPOP-DT (12 Nov 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps, for Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JAN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.E. O'Neal
CGT, AOG

42
CONFDENfML

A7II-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CPGOR-65 (R2) (U)

TROOP LIST AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

XXIV CORPS
HHC, XXIV Corps
24th PI Det
212th Avn Bn (OPCON)
Co C, 5th Special Forces Gp (A) (OPCON)
204th MI Det
29th Civil Affairs Co
48th Chemical Det
108th Trans Co (CAR)
2d Plt, Co B, 504th MP Bn (OPCON)
31st MI Hist Det
7th Payops Bn (GS)
437th Dental Det (Atchd)
37th Det, 5th Weather Sqdn (Atchd)

XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY
HBB, XXIV Corps Arty
1st Bn, 44th Arty (155)(SP)
Btry G, 29th Arty (155)
Btry G, 65th Arty (155)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (155)(SP)
108th Artillery Gp

HBB, 108th Artillery Gp
8th Bn, 4th Arty (155)(SP)
1st Bn, 39th Arty (155)(SP)
1st Bn, 23rd Arty (155)(SP)
Btry F, 26th Arty (155)
235th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-14A)
239th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-14A)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-14A)
245th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-14A)
250th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-14A)

III MAF
HQ
1st MP Bn
1st Radio Bn (-)
Comm Spt Co (Rein), 7th Comm Bn
2d Combined Action Gp
A Co (Rein), 7th Engr Bn
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (O)

1ST MAJDIV

HQ BN (-)
1st Mar Regt
HQ Co
1st BN
2d BN
3d BN
5th Mar Regt
HQ Co
1st BN
2d BN
3d BN
11th Mar Regt
HQ Btry
1st BN
2d BN
4th BN (-)
3d 4th How Btry
1st Recom BN (-)
1st, 1st Force Recon BN
1st Engr BN
1st Med BN (-)
1st MT BN (-)
Co C, 1st SP BN
11th MT BN

FLL

1ST MAC

MAGC-1
MAG 11
MAG 16
MWCO-19

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AMBL)
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
HQ, 1st Bde
3d BN (AMBL), 506th Inf
1st BN (AMBL), 137th Inf
1st BN (AMBL), 501st Inf
2d BN (AMBL), 502d Inf
4th Inf Flt (Scout Dog)
CONFDENTIAL

11 November 1970

SUBJECT:  Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AMEL)
HQ, 2d Bde
2d Bn (AMEL), 501st Inf
2d Bn (AMEL), 327th Inf
1st Bn (AMEL), 502d Inf
47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
34th Public Information Det (Pld Svc)

3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AMEL)
HQ, 3d Bde
3d Bn (AMEL), 187th Inf
1st Bn (AMEL), 506th Inf
2d Bn (AMEL), 508th Inf
9th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
25th Public Information Det (Pld Svc)

101st Airborne Division Artillery (AMEL)
HQ, 101st Airborne Division Artillery (AMEL)
2d Bn (AMEL), 119th Arty (105)(T)
2d Bn (AMEL), 320th Arty (155)(T)
1st Bn (AMEL), 120th Arty (105)(T)
2d Bn (AMEL), 105th Arty (155)(T)
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 347th Arty (AMEL)
264th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
31st Trans Det, Aft Maint
384th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
Btry A (ACAV), 177th Arty (AMEL) (APA)
650th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

101st Aviation Group (TAC), (AMEL)
HQ, 101st Aviation Group (AMEL)
101st Avn Bn (Avn Hel., AMEL)
494th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
510th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
516th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
527th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
158th Avn Bn (Avn Hel.) (AMEL)
159th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
168th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
273d Trans Det (Aft Maint)
169th Trans Det (Aft Maint)
AVII-GCT
12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 350-65 (R2) (U)

159th Avn bn (Aalt Spt Hel) (AMBL)
325th Avn Det
479th Avn Co (Hyv Hel)
625th Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
327th Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
649th Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
163d Avn Co (CS) (AMBL)
530th Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
399th Avn Det (Div)

101st Airborne Division Support Command
RHC and Sdnl
5th Trans Bn (Aalt Maint & Sup) (AMBL)
326th Med Bn (AMBL)
426th CSS Bn (AMBL)
901st Maint Bn (AMBL)
101st Admin Co (AMBL)

101st Airborne Division Troops
RHC, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)
2d Sqn (AMBL), 17th Cav
291st Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
319th Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
319th Trans Det (Aalt Maint)
Co L (Rgnc) (AMBL), 75th Inf
16th Engr Bn (AMBL)
901st Sig Bn (AMBL)
101st Mgt Co (AMBL)
597th Inf Plt (Obt Tracker)
265th Radio Research Co
10th Cal Plt (CS)
20th Cal Det (CPR Gen)
22d Mil Hist Det
101st MI Co (AMBL)
CP LOC 6, 8th Weather Det (USAF)
20th TASS (USAF)

Non-Divisional Units
Det J, 7th Psycps Bn (GS of Div)
7th CA Plt, 29th CA Co (GS of Div)

AMERICAN DIVISION

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AVI-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CPUM-65 (R2) (U)

11th Infantry Brigade

HQ, 11th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 20th Inf
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
90th Cal Det
31st Public Information Det (Fld Svc)
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 1

196th Infantry Brigade

HQ, 196th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 45th Inf
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
43th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
27th Cal Det
10th Public Information Det (Fld Svc)

198th Infantry Brigade

HQ, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
5th Bn, 40th Inf
Trp H, 17th Cal
57th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
87th Cal Det

American Division Artillery

HQ, Div Arty
1st Bn, 14th Art. (105)(T)
1st Bn, 92d Arty (85/39)(T/SP)
3d Bn, 16th Arty .55(T)
3d Bn, 19th Arty (3.75/125)(SP)
3d Bn, 82d Arty (105)(T)

Btry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty
6th Bn, 11th Arty (105)(T)

1st Bn, 16th Arty (105)(T)

Btry G, 55th Arty (MG)

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AVII-OCT 12 November 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XII Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOM-65 (R2) (U)

251st FA Det (Radar)
252d FA Det (Radar)
271st FA Det (Radar)

16th Combat Aviation Group

16th Combat Aviation Group

14th Combat Aviation Group

116th Avn Co (Asslt Hel)
122d Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)
166th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)
167th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)
176th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)
178th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel)
196th Avn Co (Asslt Spt Hel) (OPCOM)
534th Med Det
556th Med Det
123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)

17th Inf Div, 1st Cav
Co E, 723d Maint Bn
Trp F, 8th Cav

315th Trans Co
362d Avn Det

American Division Support Command

HHC and Band
23d Med Bn
23d SAT Bn
723d Maint Bn (-)
63d Inf Flt (Cbt Tracker)
Co C (Ranger), 75th Inf
American Combat Center (PROV)
Cha Lai Defense Command (PHOCV)

Headquarters American Division

HHC, American Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)
Trp E, 1st Cav
Trp F, 17th Cav
26th Engr Bn

CONFIDENTIAL
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AVII-GCT
12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGCS FORM 65 (R2) (O)

523d Sig Bn
COMSEC Contact Team #2
23d MP Co
146th MP Plt, 504th MP Bn
3d MI Hq Det
635th MI Co
324th R & R Co
50th Weather Det (USAF)

Non-Divisional Units

6th LA Plt 29th LA Co (OS of Div)
Det 37th Pay Bn (OS of Div)
224th CSS

1ST BRIGADE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)

HHC, 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division (Mech)
1st Bn., 4th Inf
1st Bn., 4th Inf (Mech)
1st Bn., 4th Armor
4th Bn., 4th Arty (Mech, 105mm)
55th Support Bn (OS)
Co P (Ranger) 3rd BN
Co O, 3rd Bn., 4th Armor (Mech)
3rd Plt, 4th Bn., 4th Inf (Mech)
3rd Plt, 4th Bn., 4th Cav (CPXOU)
5th Arty Bn
937th Sig Bn
4th Inf Plt., Sec Drt
77th EB Det (Mech)
46th Cal Det
46th Publ Info Det (Mech)
507th MI Det (Mech)
407th R & R Det

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, XXIV Corps

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 August to 31 October 1970

CC, XXIV Corps

12 November 1970

N/A

N/A

N/A
6 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans ATTN: DAMO-ODU within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

M. L. Bowes
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
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2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

   a. (U) Personnel. None.
   b. (C) Intelligence/Counterintelligence.

   (1) Specialized Interrogations.

   (a) Observation: XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch assigned one interrogator the function of conducting interrogations of all detainees from transportation units in Military Region 1. To prepare himself for this specialized function, the interrogator conducted several studies in the operational area, mission and methods used by various transportation units.

   (b) Evaluation: This technique provided the interrogator with a thorough knowledge in one specific area of enemy activity, enabling him to interrogate more critically and thoroughly in this field.

   (c) Recommendation: That units use this technique where specialized interrogation is desirable. This technique can be used for collection emphasis on specific units or specific types of units, e.g., sapper, artillery, reconnaissance, etc.

   (2) Daily G2 Update Briefings.

   (a) Observation: XXIV Corps G2 holds a daily update briefing for the ACoF's, G2 in which each division of the G2 Branch and the 525th Military Intelligence Group presents the most recent and significant items of information and intelligence. A summary of significant events for that day is also presented. Other agencies present briefings as required.

   (b) Evaluation: The G2 Update Briefing results in a consolidation of pertinent information from all the divisions of G2 and related agencies. Because all the divisions as well as the 525th Military Intelligence Group are represented, there is an increase in coordination of intelligence and cooperation. Further, the G2 Update Briefing has proven to be a good training testing period for briefers and briefs to be presented to the General Staff.

   (c) Recommendation: That headquarters having a large number of intelligence agencies which must work in coordination consider using a similar briefing or conference.

   (3) Remote Firing Device Ambush.

   (a) Observation: Commander Task Unit 221.1.4 at Hoi An has had success utilizing remote firing devices in conjunction with sensor
strings for mechanical ambushes. Claymore mines were placed to make a kill zone. The claymores would be detonated when sensors indicated movement in the kill zone.

(b) Evaluation: Two successful ambushes resulted in positive kill assessment with reduced hazard to friendly unit. These failures can be attributed to erroneous technical information concerning the types of batteries to be used in remote firing device equipment. The battery type was corrected by COMUSMACV message 241027Z October 1970 (C).

(c) Recommendation: New remote firing device equipment is to be issued in the near future. Recommend this equipment and earlier model equipment be considered for further use in exploiting this ambush technique.

c. (U) Operations.

(1) Review of Contingency Plans.

(a) Observation: During the month of October 1970, Typhoons Joan and Kate endangered Military Region 1. It was found that appropriate contingency plans were outdated and in need of revision and that responsible personnel were unfamiliar with all aspects of the plan.

(b) Evaluation: The typhoon/tropical storm season is generally in October - November and also coincides with the beginning of the northeast monsoon season in Military Region 1. Personnel turnover creates a loss of expertise in all duty positions. Since these storms are seasonal, it is essential that all personnel become familiar with the appropriate plan prior to the season. Plans should also be reviewed, prior to the storm season, to insure that they are correct and all procedures are up to date.

(c) Recommendations: That all commanders and staff officers institute programs to insure that newly assigned personnel are familiar with seasonal contingency plans, as well as all contingency plans, and that a continuous contingency plan review is in effect. This is especially important in short tour areas such as Vietnam.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (C) Training.

(1) Unit Employment Procedures for the Mechanical Ambush.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: Recent field experience with Mechanical Ambushes reveals that faulty procedures and carelessness on the part of emplacement and recovery personnel has resulted in accidents causing injury and death to friendly personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Mechanical Ambushes have produced significant results in terms of enemy killed, denial of rapid enemy movement and early warning for friendly positions. However, the Mechanical Ambush is a dangerous weapon. Responsible individuals are required for emplacement and recovery. These individuals must be trained in correct procedures until proficient. Accurate Mechanical Ambush locations must be reported and personnel within a unit position must be briefed on Mechanical Ambush locations.

(c) Recommendation: That units utilize command emphasis and SOPs to establish personnel selection criteria, training procedures, emplacement and recovery procedures, location reporting and briefing of individuals on Mechanical Ambushes in order to limit casualties to only those inflicted on the enemy. A letter explaining unit employment procedures for the Mechanical Ambush was distributed by XXIV Corps on 21 September 1970.

(2) Enemy Mine Techniques.

(a) Observation: The Viet Cong and NVA have successfully employed a technique of emplacing antivehicular mines above metal culverts in order to escape detection by mine detectors. In August 1970, this technique was responsible for the death of three US soldier, the wounding of 28 others and the destruction of one 2½ ton truck.

(b) Evaluation: This mine was emplaced directly above a culvert to prevent mechanical detection. Emplacement was accomplished by removing base rocks from the shoulder of the road directly above the culvert, then digging an inclined hole to the desired depth and location directly under the edge of the pavement. Once the mine was emplaced, the soil was replaced and the base rock carefully relaid to conceal any disturbance. Liquid asphalt was poured over the rocks, but was spread to conceal the fresh asphalt and finally, the area was rolled with a tire to give the entire shoulder a uniform appearance. The wire was concealed by the rocks and asphalt on the road shoulder and by dense vegetation for a distance of 20 meters off the road. The mine was command detonated from a point 100 meters from the road. Considerable effort was exerted by the enemy in emplacing the mine. Based on this
success, it can be expected that this technique will be used on QL-1 and other hard surface roads in Military Region 1.

(c) Recommendation: That this technique of mine employment be disseminated within all units. That mine sweep teams be trained in the proper method of detecting a mine above a metal culvert by adjusting the sensitivity of the detector until the culvert is no longer picked up and then sweeping over the culvert. By using this method, metallic mines over the culvert will be detected. That mine sweep teams be trained to make a close visual check of the road shoulders to detect disturbances of the base course material or the asphalt and to detect the location of wires. A combat lessons learned letter on this subject was distributed by XXIV Corps on 3 September 1970.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (U) Communications. None.
h. (U) Material. None.
i. (U) Other.

ARVN Engineer Units.

(a) Observation: ARVN Engineer Units have become increasingly competent in routine field engineering. They are hampered somewhat by lack of some authorized equipment and construction material. However, the most glaring deficiency is the lack of proper management of these engineering assets. An example is road construction in Military Region 1. Unfortunately, in the past, XXIV Corps has not applied the idea of Viet-namization to this program. US units have constructed nearly all tactical roads to fire bases, including ARVN bases. In the case of the two roads being constructed by ARVN, I Area Logistics Command could not furnish materials. Materials are being furnished by the US.

(b) Evaluation: ARVN Engineers should be given sole responsibility for providing their own tactical roads, to include planning, providing materials, and constructing the roads as well as maintaining the roads after construction.

(c) Recommendation: That this headquarters continue to encourage ARVN to assume more of this responsibility and that MACV be aware of this problem, particularly since ARVN claims no ability to plan for and obtain
AVII-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Continued emphasis is being applied by Corps for further Vietnamese effort material supply system.

(2) Adequacy of Primary Lines of Communication.

(a) Observation: During the current monsoon season, heavy rains and high water have caused several culverts on QL-1 to be washed out and long stretches of the highway to be underwater.

(b) Evaluation: The culverts through this area were underdesigned and insufficient subgrade fill was employed to raise the road to its required level.

(c) Recommendation: QL-1 through the lowlands in Southern Military Region 1 should have much larger culvert capacity and the road bed should be as high as the railroad bed in the same area. Corps continue to place increased emphasis on road maintenance for this section during wet weather.

(3) Traffic Fatalities.

(a) Observation: On 15 July 1970 a Vietnamese bicycle rider was struck and killed by a US Military vehicle. The victim was evacuated to a US Military Hospital where he was pronounced dead-on-arrival. The body was immediately released to the father of the victim and returned to the scene of the accident where an emotion charged crowd had gathered. The crowd prevented the US vehicle and its occupants from leaving, and demanded VN $500,000. The body was then placed in front of the US vehicle, candles lit and mourners surrounded it and began their religious chants. This further aroused the crowd and hardened the demands of the family for an on the spot claim settlement.

(b) Evaluation: Had the body not been returned to the accident scene it would have been easier to cool the emotions of the crowd, and allowed for more rational resolution of the Vietnamese demands. In addition it would serve to reduce the threat to the lives of the US Military personnel involved who frequently were threatened with bodily harm by weapon brandishing Vietnamese civilians.

(c) Recommendation: That every effort be made by US and Vietnamese medical personnel to prevent the immediate release of an accident victim where his presence can be used to further enrage the local authority.