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AGDA-A (M) (12 Mar 71) FOR OT UT 703016 C 22 March 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
Acting The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force
ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H
96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

   a. MISSION: During this reporting period the 1st Cav Div (AM) conducted a coordinated attack against the COSVN Base area in the "Fishhook" region of Cambodia. Subsequent raids and interdict operations were conducted throughout the Cambodian AO followed by a phased withdrawal and a redeployment of forces. Operations were continued throughout the AO to interdict enemy infiltration routes through Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Binh Dong, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces in order to deny enemy access to the population centers and to neutralize enemy forces operating in the area. Division elements continued to support the GVN Pacification Program and conducted Dong Tien operations with RVNAF forces operating within the Division AO.

   b. GENERAL:

      (1) The 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970 period saw the initiation and completion of the Cambodian operations followed by the redeployment of the 1st Brigade from War Zone "C" to War Zone "D".

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) Initially there was light enemy resistance to the Allied drive into Cambodia; however, by the end of the first week the enemy had begun to react and by 12 May initiated countersweep operations against the Allied Forces, highlighted by ground probes against FSB Brown and FSB Ready on 13 and 14 May. As the cross-border operations spread to Base Areas 350 (operation Hoc Ma) and 351 (operation Gioig To), enemy activity increased toward the middle of the month and then continued at a moderate level for the remainder of the reporting period. Enemy activity was most pronounced in the "Fishhook", where major elements of the 7th NVA Division were committed against the ARVN Abn Division.

(3) By the end of May the 1st ACD AO within SVN was virtually devoid of enemy forces other than artillery units. The "Fishhook" contained the 165th and 209th Regiments while the 141st was northwest of Highway 7 in Cambodia. The few 5th VC Division forces within RVN at the beginning of the cross-border operations were largely withdrawn as the Allied drive penetrated the 70th and 86th RSG depot areas. The remaining battalions of the 69th Arty Command within RVN attempted to lessen the pressure by fire attacks during the first week of May on the Cav's main base camps at Quan Loi, FSB Buttons and Camp Gorvad. By the end of the month the number and intensity of standoff attacks within RVN had delineated possibly indicating a shortage of both food and munitions. Local forces activity was markedly absent as the enemy began to suffer from the long term effect of the interdiction of his locations forcing his concentration on resupply rather than offensive action.

(4) In the month of June the 1st Cavalry Division continued to emphasize location, and evacuation or destruction of enemy caches as well as neutralization of enemy forces in the Cambodian AO. During June the frequency of contacts lessened although the Cav continued its relentless aerial and ground reconnaissance that resulted in the elimination of many enemy munitions and rice caches.

(5) Enemy activity remained moderate to heavy during the first part of the month with attacks by fire against Allied field positions and FSB's throughout the 1 ACD and ARVN Abn Division's AO; and decreased during the latter part of the month as Allied elements withdrew from Cambodia.

(6) Significant activities throughout the first half of July continued to be minimal. The boundaries of the 1st Cavalry Division's AO within the RVN were greatly changed as Allied forces relocated in the III CTZ. The 2nd Bde remained in eastern and central Phuoc Long Province. The 3rd Bde concentrated its forces in eastern Binh Long Province and western Phuoc Long Province. The major change in the Cav's AO involved the relocation of the 1st Bde from northeastern Phuoc Long Province into
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

an AO that included a large portion of northwestern Long Khanh Province including "War Zone D". Intensive ground and air operations continued against enemy forces. Significant results included discovery of several weapons caches in "War Zone D".

(7) The period centering around 20 July deserves special mention. Intelligence reports composed of Hoi Ghanh interrogations and captured documents made reference to this date as a time when intensified artillery attacks and sapper attacks would occur in III Corps. The 20 July date corresponds with the anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords, known to both North and South Vietnam as the "National Day of Shame". Indirect fire attacks on Ceub bases did increase and resulted in casualties and damage, especially at Camp Carval.

(8) Intelligence developed since March has indicated that the NVA in III Corps would stage a series of "Highpoint" periods lasting through the spring and summer months. These highpoint periods have been variously referred to as phases of the "X" Campaign. The purpose of this "X" Campaign: To disrupt the GVN pacification program and destroy the effectiveness of Vietnamization.

(9) In retrospect, the destruction of enemy sanctuaries and caches in Cambodia is the most significant aspect of Ceub operations during the reporting period, 1 May to 31 July 1970. The Division also contributed toward pacification in Binh Long, Phuoc Long and northern Binh Duong Province. In July major operations were initiated in Long Khanh Province, particularly War Zone "D".

c. 1st Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: From 1 May to 3 May, the 1st Brigade continued offensive operations in western War Zone "C" to interdict enemy lines of communication and supply, and to neutralize enemy elements operating within the area. From 4 May to 19 May, it conducted offensive operations in the "Fishhook" region of Cambodia, searching and extracting or destroying enemy cache sites, and neutralizing enemy elements in its TAOR. From 20 May to 30 June, the brigade continued its mission in the vicinity of ORANG, Cambodia. From 1 July to 9 July, the 1st Brigade conducted offensive operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes, search for caches and neutralize enemy elements within its TAOR in Northern PHUOC LONG Province. On 11 July to 31 July, the 1st Brigade conducted operations to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes, neutralize enemy elements operating within War Zone "D" and support Vietnamization and the Vietnamese Pacification program in the remainder of its TAOR.
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(2) Execution:

(a) From 4 May - 19 May, the 1st Brigade with the 2-5th Cav, 2-7th Cav, 1-5th Cav, 2-12th Cav, 2-47th Inf (Mech), 2-34th Armor and the 3d ARVN Abn Dde with the 3d, 5th, 9th, and 1st ARVN Abn Bns conducted operations in the vicinity of MOMOT, Cambodia searching and extracting or destroying enemy cache sites and neutralizing elements of COSVN headquarters, 7th NVA Division, and the 82nd RSG located in their TAOR. The operation resulted in the location of numerous caches and bunker complexes. Enemy activity increased during the latter part of this operation with most actions targeted against US and ARVN maneuver elements.

(b) The period 20 May - 30 June covers the 1st Brigade with the 1-5th Cav and 2-12th Cav, operating in the vicinity of O'RANG Cambodia. Operations were conducted to interdict the NIEHAN Road and parallel trail networks, exploit associated caches and disrupt transshipment operations in the vicinity of O'RANG. The operation resulted in the location and destruction/evacuation of 32,703 rounds of small arms ammo, 560,535 large cal machine gun ammo; 8,033 grenades, 482 tons of rice, and numerous other types of foodstuffs, weapons, and munitions. The enemy generally avoided contact except in and around cache sites where diversionary and harassing tactics were employed.

(c) During the month of July, the 1st Brigade operated in two areas of III Corps. The first area of operation with the 2-12th Cav and 1-5th Cav, was northern Phuoc Long Province with the mission of interdicting the Jolly Trail and Adams Road supply network and neutralizing enemy elements in its TAOR. This operation was characterized by light enemy activity in the TAOR. On 11 July, the 1st Brigade moved into War Zone "D" with 2-7th Cav. The 1-5th Cav followed on the 15th and the 1-12th Cav became OPOCN on 25 July. Mission was to interdict the Jolly, Sorges, Adams trail network and eliminate enemy elements in TAOR. Activity was moderate with several caches located in both eastern and western War Zone "D".

(3) Discussion and Analysis of Significant Events:

(1) 1 May: AB/FAC A/G firing at 0845 hours WT944893: AB/FAC observed 02 individuals on trail and 10 individuals on bicycles. Engaged with HE rockets, resulting in 06 NVA KBH and 01 secondary explosion.

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(2) 02 May: C/5-7 Cav, C/1-11 ACR at 2320 hours (FSB KRAMER) received 40 mixed RPG, 82mm, 60mm, 107, 75mm and 57mm rounds and small arms fire. At 2330, received ground probe from north northeast by estimated company size enemy force. Engaged with organics, flareships, Shadow, artillery, 03 sections of ARA and 02 air strikes. At 2350 hours incoming ceased and ground probe was repelled and enemy evaded into woodline to north northeast of FSB. Friendly casualties were 07 US WIA. At 2352, ARA on station received heavy .51 cal ground to air fire at 1500 feet, 140 knots from 03 positions north northwest with negative damage or casualties. Engaged with organics, resulting in 03 NVA KB/ARA and 01 .51 Cal destroyed, A check of damage inside; C/1-11, 3 ACAV's with moderate damage, 01 M551 Sheridan gun tube damaged and 02 81mm mortar tubes destroyed. A check around perimeter found 04 NVA KIA. First light recon around FSB found an additional 14 NVA KIA, 03 NVA POW's, 01 75mm recoiless round (live), 10 expended 75mm shells, 22 60mm rounds, 09 AK47's 15 Chicom grenades, 02 RPD LMGs, 02 B-40 rocket launchers, and assorted documents captured.

(3) 03 May: AF/FAC A/G firing at 1725 hours (WT911800) observed 20-30 water buffalo and 10 individuals. Engaged with artillery, resulting in 02 NVA KB/Arty, 06 water buffalo KB Arty. Further engaged with organics, resulting in 04 NVA KB/AF and 10 water buffalo KB/AF.

(4) 04 May: D/5-7 at 2245 hours (FSB WOOD) received approximately 25 60mm and possibly some 82mm mortar fire from 200 meters northwest of FSB. Also received small arms fire from woodline to west. Area was immediately engaged with organics, ARA and Arty. Ground attack from a company size enemy force was dispersed immediately. At 2305 hours most small arms fire ceased. At 2310 hours all small arms fire ceased. At 2310 hours flareship and Shadow received heavy .51 cal fire from 02 positions. Shadow engaged with organics and ground to air fire ceased immediately. Results of contact was 07 US WIA, 30 NVA KIA and 03 NVA POWs and numerous weapons captured.

(5) 05 May: A/2-47th at 0525 hours (XU350060) received approximately 12 x 82mm, 09 x 60mm, 05 RPG, small arms and automatic weapons fire from unknown size enemy force. Engaged with organics, ARA, Arty and air strikes. Results were 05 US WIA, 14 NVA KIA, 03 AK 47 and 02 RPG Rocket launchers.

(6) 05 May: 33 Co at 1645 hours, (XU515016) received small arms and B-40 fire from unknown size enemy force. Engaged with organics and ARA. Resulting in 09 NVA KIA, 06 weapons captured.

(7) 06 May: AF/FAC BDA of air strikes at 0715 hours (XU347080) revealed 03 NVA KBA, 06 water buffalo KBA, 04 pigs KBA and several structures destroyed. Also at 0805 hours XU341079: BDA of air strike destroyed bunkers and structures and 05 NVA KBA. At 1405 hours XT393940: BDA of air strike destroyed .51 cal HMG, 06 NVA KB/air strike.

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(8) 07 May: 31 Co at 1615 hours (XU536004) found large arms cache containing 04 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, 09 x 75mm recoilless rounds 18 x 82mm mortars, 04 x 57 recoilless rounds, 13 Browning automatic rifles, 08 light machine guns, 04 x 50 cal Chinese heavy machine guns, 01 US .50 cal heavy machine gun, 46 x 60mm mortars, 11 Chinese heavy machine guns, 02 B-41 rocket launchers, 04 B-40 rocket launchers, and 200 mixed small arms (AK, SKS), also 01 x 120mm mortar complete.

(9) 08 May: 2-34, 2-47 A and C Co at 1312 hours (XU284049) received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from unknown size enemy force. Engaged with organics, artillery, ARA and air strike. Contact broke at 1410 hours, resulting in negative friendly casualties, 05 NVA KIA, 05 NVA KB/Arty, 05 NVA KB/ARA, 01 AK47 captured.

(10) 08 May: 51 Co at 0915 hours (XU422003) received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire from an estimated company size enemy force to their north, northwest and southwest. Engaged with organics, artillery, ARA and air strike. Contact broke at 1200 hours, resulting in 03 ARVN KIA, 08 ARVN WIA, 12 NVA KIA and 04 AK47 captured.

(11) 09 May: 15 Co at 0915 hours (XT477966) found small arms cache which contained 01 x 7.62 heavy machine gun, 01 M60 machine gun, 02 Browning automatic rifles, 02 Dutch light machine guns, 02 B-40 rocket launchers, 01 B-41 rocket launcher, 02 AK50s and 02 AK47s.

(12) 09 May: 51 Co at 1215 hours (XT407997) received small arms fire from squad size enemy force. Engaged with organics and artillery. Contact broke at 1305 hours, resulting in negative friendly casualties, 05 NVA KIA, 03 NVA WIA, 01 POW WIA and 01 AK47 captured. Also detained 28 Cambodians.

(13) 10 May: A/2-7 Cav at 1030 hours (XT384977) received small arms fire from 3-4 individuals from north and northeast. Engaged with organics, artillery, ARA and AF/PAC. Contact broke at 1055 hours, resulting in 03 US KIA, 04 US WIA and unknown enemy losses. Also at 1745 hours (XT378978) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force in a bunker complex. Engaged with organics, artillery and ARA. Contact broke at 1805 hours, resulting in 03 US WIA. Check of contact area revealed 02 NVA KIA. At 1430 hours (XU405937) received small arms fire from estimated reinforced-platoon size enemy force. Engaged with organics, artillery and ARA. Contact broke at 1445 hours, resulting in 03 US WIA and unknown enemy losses.

(14) 11 May: 52 Co at 2250 hours FSB CENTER received unknown number of B-40, 82mm and small arms fire from east. Engaged with organics, ARA, Spooky, Vietnamese Spooky and Arty. Contact broke at 2350 hours, resulting in 11 ARVN WIA, 01 Jeep destroyed, 01 3/4 ton truck destroyed, 01 x 105 recoilless rifle and 01 x .50 cal heavy machine gun with moderate damage. At 0800 hours (XU458003) check of automatic ambush detonated, found 05 NVA KIA, 01 AK47, 10 B-40 and B-41 rounds, 100 x .51 cal rounds and 03 x 75

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recoilless rifle rounds. At 1340 hours (XT470002) received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire from an unknown size enemy force. Engaged with organics and artillery. Contact broke at 1434 hours, resulting in negative friendly casualties 03 NVA KIA, 01 AK47 and 01 K54 pistol captured.

(15) 11 May: 92 Co at 1030 hours (XU482048) received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire from an estimated company size enemy force to southwest. Engaged with organics, artillery and ARA. Contact broke at 1205 hours. At 1300 hours contact was re-established. Received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire from southwest. Engaged with organics and artillery. Contact broke at 1500 hours, resulting in 01 ARVN KIA, 16 ARVN WIA (02 serious), 10 NVA KIA and 02 unknown type weapons captured.

(16) 12 May: 15 Co at 0900 hours (XT491965) found arms cache containing 11 SKS rifles and 17 sub-machine guns and unknown quantity of small arms ammunition.

(17) 12 May: 92 Co at 0645 hours (XU490042) received small arms and 82mm fire from estimated platoon size enemy force from west. Engaged with organics, artillery and ARA. Contact broke at 1045 hours, resulting in 11 ARVN WIA and 14 NVA KIA, negative weapons.

(18) 16 May: A/1-5 Cav at 0902 hours (XU464266) engaged 15 meters southeast of location. Received small arms and B-40 fire in return. Contact broke at 0914 hours, resulting in 02 US KIA, 08 US WIA and 01 NVA KIA wearing black clothing. Contact initiated when the enemy element was between B/1-5(-) and 2d platoon. Believed enemy element was trailing 2d platoon (B Co).

(19) 17 May: C/1-12 Cav at 1100 hours (XU544100) found cache containing 10 x 60mm mortars, 06 x 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and 02 bundles of web gear. All was backlogged to FSB EVANS.

(20) 19 May: D/1-12th Cav at 1020 hours (XU467118) while moving southeast on northwest-southeast trail observed and engaged 02 individuals to southeast sitting on side of trail. Received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire from estimated company size enemy force from southeast, south and southwest (estimated 01 enemy platoon had flanked friendly position). Friendly engaged with organics, artillery, 02 sections of ARA and 03 air strikes. Contact broke at 1125 hours with 01 US KIA and 02 US WIA. At 1500 hours sweep of contact area revealed 04 NVA KIA and 01 AK47 captured.

(21) 21 May: A/1-5 Cav (YU201800 and YU283623) found a cache site containing 05 US M-1 rifles, 03 Belgium automatic rifles, 03 RPD light machine guns, 03 typewriters, 01 Willis ½ ton Jeep, 01 Dodge 6-passenger truck, 01 2½ ton truck (military type), 1200 rounds of US .30 cal ammo, 500 AK47 rounds, 20 French hand grenades, 01 M-1 rifle grenade adaptor, 08 US frag hand grenades, 15 SKS rifles and 01 M-16 rifles, 01 British Bren gun, 01 M-60 machine gun, 01 x 7.65 pistol, 01 AK47, 170 x .51 cal rounds, 13 saw blades, 300 x 82mm rounds with charges, 02 new jeeps (unknown type), 01 2½ ton truck (unknown type).
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(22) 22 May: A/1-5 Cav 3rd platoon at 1330 hours (YU289621) observed an automatic ambush activate. Check of area revealed 05 NVA KIA, 04 AK47s and 01 bicycle captured. Individuals were wearing green uniforms; 01 NVA was identified by KCS as a 1st Sgt. One NVA had 01 lb of documents in a box.

(23) 23 May: A/1-5 Cav at 0700 hours (YU278634) on first light recon of yesterdays contact area found: 15 NVA KIA, 02 SKSs, 07 AK47s, 440 x 7.62 rounds, 08 shovels, 07 individual medical kits, 01 bicycle, 120 x 82mm rounds in boxes, 01 x 82mm mortar site, 09 x 82mm mortar rounds, 08 pounds of rice, 02 pounds of coffee, 200 pounds of NVA clothing, 06 B-40 rounds with charges, 04 Chicom grenades, 12 NVA ponchos, 01 pair of bolt cutters, 175 rounds H-1 Carbine ammunition, 02 night lights for 82mm mortar, 17 empty AK magazines.

(24) 23 May: C/1-5 Cav at 1100 hours (YU371730) found cache containing AM CW receiver and transmitter with amp ant tuner, suspected to be a USCR-19 with 02 power packs, 401 CC power packs, 04 CAI power packs, 401 CAI type AII radios. Also found 01 French pack radio, 08 B-40 rounds, 01 x 75mm recoiless rifle, 07 M72 Lawss, 05 mortar base plates, 01 case of rifle grenades (32), 01 case of Chicom grenades (32), 09 cans of linked .30 cal ammo (1800), 01 case of tear gas (20 grenades), 211 x 60mm rounds, 65 x 81mm rounds, 01 Belgium 7.62 automatic weapon, 02 cases of incendiary grenades (32), 01 tripod of .50 cal machine gun, 01 case of 2.62 rockets (9), 01 case of smoke grenades (16), 29 cases of 40mm rifle grenades (2088 grenades), 04 cases of US .50 cal ammo (800), 04 cases of .30 cal ammo (3200), 13 M31 rifle grenades, 01 power supply (RT), 02 reels of commo wire (15,000 feet), 02 soldering irons, 16 microphones, 02 sound power telephones, 03 PRC-6 radios, 01 US switch board, 01 BC 2000 AM radio.

(25) 26 May: A/1-9 Blues at 1105 hours (YU378774) found 02 hondas, 70 flintlock and percussion type rifles, 494 x 81mm rounds, 1000 x 9mm rounds, 250 x 51 cal rounds, 120 SKS rounds, 720 x .30 cal rounds, 800 M60 rounds, 200 x 60mm rounds and 64 rifle grenades.

(26) 02 June: 1-5 Cav A Co at 1045 hours, while making a sweep of an activated automatic ambush area, discovered 01 hut 7 x 8 ft with false floor. Under floor found 01 bunker 7 x 8 ft containing 23 bangalore torpedoes, 28 Chicom grenades (new type), 10 Chicom CM, 01 case 7.62 ammo, 05 AT mines, 76 pick heads, 07 pick handles, 240 x 82mm mortar rounds with charges, 126 x 60mm mortar rounds without charges, 36 x 75mm recoiless rifle rounds, 02 cases TNT (100 lbs total), 12 B-40 rounds with charges, and 09 Chicom CM stands.

(27) 04 June: 2-12 Cav A Co (YU240547) south southwest of FSB SPEER at 1100 hours, while on a ground reconnaissance, discovered 01 hut (unknown size) with 300 x 220 lb bags of rice (total 66,000 lbs). Also found 02 huts 30 x 20 x 15 ft with 200 x 220 lb bags of rice in cache hut (total 88,000 lbs). Five tunnels were also found in the area.

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(28) 04 June: E Co 1-5 Cav (YU296562) southwest of FSB, at 1335 hours, while on a ground reconnaissance, discovered 01 hut 30 x 20 x 15 ft. In south hut found 360 x 300 lb bags polished rice (total 54 tons).

(29) 05 June: D Co 2-12 Cav at 1558 hours (YU249581) received small arms fire from unknown size enemy force. Engaged with organics, artillery and ARA. Contact broke at 1645 hours resulting in 02 US WIA, 04 NVA KIA and 01 Ho Chi Minh WIA.

(30) 06 June: Division sniper 1-5 Cav 2355 hours (YU349670) observed 06 individuals moving northeast to west. Engaged with claymores and M14, received small arms fire in return. Contact broke at 0015 hours resulting in 04 NVA KIA, 03 AK50, and 01 9mm pistol captured.

(31) 07 June: A Co 1-5 Cav at 1410 hours (YU293564) southwest of FSB, while on a ground reconnaissance discovered 03 huts 20 x 15 ft containing 135 tons of polished rice (1,350 x 100 kilo and 50 kilo bags). One hut showed signs of rice being evacuated recently. Also found an east-west trail with recent use by unknown number of individuals and ox-carts.

(32) 09 June: A Co 2-12 Cav at 1730 hours (YU240545) south of FSB SPEER, continuing exploitation of cache site, discovered an additional 125 cases .51 cal rounds (11,250 rounds) in hole #7 4 x 8 x 4 ft, hole #8 (5 x 6 ft) led to a cave 18 ft deep with a floor covered with plastic. In hole found 274 cases .51 cal rounds (46,580 rounds), 66 cases of 14.75mm (5,204 rounds), and 2 cases 37mm (40 rounds). In hole #9 (5 x 12 x 6 ft) found metal and plastic sheet lining; it contained 260 cases .51 cal (34,200 rounds).

(33) 10 June: A Co 2-12 at 1100 hours (YU240545), found 06 additional holes in cache site for a total of 15 holes. In hole #10 found 35, 540 rounds .51 cal ammo, 1,550 rounds 37mm (hole 4 x 5 x 18 ft with 20 ft tunnel). In hole #13 found 27,200 rounds of .51 cal ammo, 4,512 rounds 14.75mm (hole 4 x 5 x 18 ft with 15 ft tunnel).

(34) 11 June: A Co 1-5 Cav at 0555 hours (YU296568) had an automatic ambush detonate 45 meters east of location. After detonation received heavy movement to the north. Engaged with organics, claymores, 81mm mortars, and artillery. Received small arms, and Chicom grenades from 5-7 individuals in return. Further engaged with organics and artillery. Contact broke at 0630 hours, resulting in 01 US WIA. Search of area revealed 02 NVA KIA and 01 B-40 rocket launcher captured.

(35) 11 June: A Co, 1-5 Cav at 1300 hours (YU296567) discovered a cache under 20 x 8 x 20 ft hut, containing 250 B-40 rocket launchers, 68 AT mines, 153 x 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 120 x 60mm mortar rounds, 1,196 x 82mm mortar rounds, 750 Chicom hand grenades and 24 powder charges.

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(36) 12 June: A Co, 1-5 at 1330 hours (YU290566) while on ground reconnaissance discovered 01 hut 8x20x8 ft. Under hut found 510 B-40 rounds, 40 AT mines, 2 x 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 36 x 60mm mortar rounds, 336 x 82mm mortar rounds, 4,750 Chicom hand grenades, 27 pair of wire cutters, 33,600 non-electric blasting caps, 08 picks, 28 machetes, and 250 3ft x 2ft saw blades.

(37) 14 June: D Co, E Recon 1-5 Cav and HHC 1st Bde 0250 hours at FSB DAVID (YU345533) had a trip flare go off 50 meters from east side of FSB and observed individuals in wire. Engaged with organics and received small arms, B-40, 82mm mortars and Chicom grenades with ground probe from unknown size enemy force from the east and north. Friendly further engaged with organics and artillery receiving small arms and B-40 fire. Ground probe ceased at 0445 hours. FSB continued receiving small arms and B-40 fire from north and east and west. At 0700 hours the contact was broken resulting in 29 US WIA, (04 serious). Check of FSB area revealed 28 NVA KIA, 04 B-40 rocket launchers, 01 German luger, 08 AK47s and 01 AK Mark 2 captured.

(38) 17 June: B Co 1-5 Cav at 1350 hours (YU295556) while on ground reconnaissance found 02 huts 10x20 ft. Inside one hut found 50-220 lb bags unpolished rice (11,000 lbs). Under rice found 400 x 82mm mortar rounds, 300 x 60mm mortar rounds, 70 x 75mm recoilless rounds, 40 TM-46 AT mines (each weighed 19½ lbs), 200 B-40 rounds, 500 Chicom hand grenades, 20 satchel charges (2lbs each) and 16,800 AK47 rounds.

(39) 19 June: C Co 1-5 Cav at 1340 hours (YU289561) while on ground reconnaissance, discovered 01 hut 15x12x10 ft with 165 x 220 lb bags of unpolished rice (total: 33,000 lbs).

(40) 19 June: D/2-12 Cav at 1640 hours (YU296597) while moving through a saddle, approximately 50 meters from hilltop, observed a Chicom claymore. Pointman cautioned platoon and moved off trail as claymore detonated. This was followed by small arms and B40 fire. Platoon engaged with organics, artillery, ARA and air strike. At 1755 hours Co attempted to move up hill again and received small arms and B-40 fire. Engaged with organics and artillery. Contact broke at 1500 hours, resulting in 19 US WIA. (Negative enemy assessment).

(41) 20 June: B Co 1-5 Cav at 1600 hours (YU289561) while on ground reconnaissance, discovered 01 hut 10 x 20 ft containing 150 x 220 lb bags of rice (33,000 lb) (all destroyed). Also observed 03 individuals 50 meters east of location moving north and engaged with organics with unknown enemy losses.

(42) 02 July: D/2-12 Cav at 1000 hours (YU308487) found grave containing 03 NVA KIA. Bodies were hastily buried and blood was fresh. Believed to be results from D Co's contact on 19 June. Individuals were wearing green uniforms.
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(43) 04 July: E Recon/2-12 Cav at 0930 hours (YU273565) while moving from their NIP observed 01 individual moving east on east-west trail. Individual had negative weapon and was captured by E Recon and taken to CAFP GORVAD, RVN.

(44) 22 July: A/2-7 Cav at 0800 hours (YT273565) found 02 (30x20x10 ft) bunkers with 4 ft. over head cover. Inside bunker found 02 Bangalore torpedoes, 25 lbs of Chinese comp "E", 76 x 120mm mortar rounds, 124 x 60mm mortar rounds, 197 x 75mm mortar rounds, 162 rifle grenades (anti-tank type), 76 x 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 69 Chinese hand grenades, 2 x 82mm mortar rounds, 03 sets of 107mm rocket launchers welded together, other miscellaneous items.

(45) 23 July: D/2-7 Cav at 1835 hours (YT195976) recon patrol spotted 01 NVA latrine moved up to check out latrine/bunker when received 01 Chinese claymore approximately 25 meters to the south. Results were 03 US KIAs and 05 US WIsA with negative enemy assessment. Engaged area with artillery. Negative enemy assessment.

(46) 24 July: A/2-7 Cav at 0908 hours (YT272563) received automatic weapons fire and 01 Chinese claymore from an unknown size enemy force in bunkers 150 meters from north-northeast. Engaged with organics, artillery ARA and requested air strike. Contact broke at 1100 hours, resulting in 04 NVA KIAs, 01 US KIA, and 04 US WIs.

(47) 24 July: A/2-7 Cav at 1745 hours (YT272563) received small arms fire from unknown size enemy force in bunkers to north northeast. Engaged with organics, artillery, ARA and strike. 01 large secondary explosion observed. Contact broke at 1845 hours resulting in 02 US WIs. Rash on station observed 20 NVA KIAs.

(48) 28 July: C/1-9 Cav Blues and Ranger Team 72 (YT687684) found 3 x 12.7mm heavy machine guns in cradle, 03 spare barrels, 03 SKS T56, 127 x SKS T53, 09 Soviet 7.62 MOSIN-NAGANT, 12 cases .30 cal magazines, 03 tripods for 12.7mm machine gun, 24 AK47s, 08 sub-machine guns TJO, 15 Ross sub-machine guns PPS43, 04 x 60mm mortars complete, 04 x 107mm rocket launcher complete, and 02 duffel bags of web gear.

d. 2nd Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: During this period the 2d Brigade, 2d ARVN Airborne Brigade and 7th ARVN Infantry Regiment conducted ground operations, air reconnaissance and pacification operations aimed at fixing and destroying the enemy, interdicting enemy supply lines, locating enemy caches, and pacifying Phuoc Long Province. The 2d Brigade continued operations in Phuoc Long Province and concurrently assaulted into Cambodia first to locate and neutralize COSVN headquarters and then to neutralize Base Area 351. The 2d ARVN Abn Brigade continued ground operations targeted against the 275th NVA Regiment elements operating in the proximity of the Sorgus Trail until moving from Phuoc Long Province into a separate AO in Tay Ninh Province on 15 May. The 7th ARVN Inf Regt entered the 2d Bde AO on 12 July and took on the task of ground reconnaissance and security in the vicinity of the Song Be area and clearing and security of QL 14.

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(2) Execution: During the reporting period the "Raring To Go" Brigade conducted three major operations. In early May the Brigade drove into Cambodia with the mission of locating and neutralizing COSVN Headquarters. The second mission was to assault and neutralize Base Area 351. After the unprecedented cache exploitations made in Base Area 351, the 2d Bde conducted a successful withdrawal from Cambodia and realigned along the border. The 2d Bde then took on the mission of exploiting cache sites in RVN, interdicting the northern and central portions of the Adams and Jolley Trails and establishing contact with the enemy. Concurrently throughout this period, the 2d Bde continued its mission of pacifying Phuoc Long Province. The 7th ARVN Regt, upon their arrival, took up the mission of security of the Song 3e area and QL 14.

The only significant personnel change during the reporting period was the change of Brigade Commander on 1 July 1970. There was no significant impact on combat operations as a result of loss or shortage of key command personnel.

(3) Operations Conducted in May: During the month of May this headquarters continued its operations in Phuoc Long Province and concurrently conducted two major operations into Cambodia. On 2 May the 2d Bde was given the mission of conducting a two battalion thrust into the Fishhook region of Cambodia in order to locate and neutralize COSVN Headquarters. This move was coordinated with similar thrusts conducted by US Armored Cavalry units and ARVN elements. After the successful initiation of the first operation, the 2d Bde was given the mission on 5 May of assaulting into and neutralizing Base Area 351. To aid in the accomplishment of this mission, the 5-7 Cav and 5-12 Inf were placed under OPCON of the 2d Bde on 4 and 5 May respectively. The needed security mission for resupply convoys on Highway QL 14 and Route 311 was shifted from the 15th ARVN Cav Regt to two different US Cav units during the month. These units were the 3-4 Cav (-) and D Troop 3-17 Cav. The 2d ARVN Abn Bde moved from Phuoc Long Province on 15 May into a separate AO in Tay Ninh Province in an effort to complement allied operations in Cambodia. In support of these operations the 2d Bde constructed 7 fire support bases and reestablished an 8th one.

(a) The first operation was targeted against the Fishhook Region of Cambodia which contained COSVN Headquarters and large enemy weapons and munitions caches. Reacting on short notice, the 2d Bde moved a TAC CP and the 1-12 Cav to Loc Minh Special Forces Camp. On 3 May the 1-5 Cav was placed under OPCON to the 2d Bde and air assaulted into Cambodia and established FSB NORTH. On 4 May the 1-12 Cav was air assaulted into Cambodia and established FSB EVANS. This rapid deployment of forces caused the enemy to flee his major base areas and resulted in the capture of an extensive enemy complex dubbed "The City", and a large weapons and munitions cache. The 1-5 Cav oriented on "The City" and the 1-12 Cav seized the large weapons and ammunition cache.
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(b) The second major operation was initiated when the 2d Bde was given the mission to realign its forces and neutralize Base Area 351 located 60 kilometers east of the Fishhook in Cambodia. The Brigade TAC CP returned to FSB BUTTONS in Phuoc Long Province and released OPCON of the 1-5 Cav and 1-12 Cav to the 1st Bde on 5 May. In order to provide additional combat power the 5-7 Cav was placed under OPCON to the 2d Bde on 4 May. On 5 May the 5-12 Inf, 2nd Light Infantry Bde was also placed under OPCON of the 2d Bde. On 6 May the 2d Bde air assaulted the 5-7 Cav and the 2-12 Cav in Cambodia, establishing FSB BROWN and MYRON respectively. Again due to the rapid deployment of Air Cav forces, the enemy evacuated his sanctuaries leaving behind extensive ammunition, weapons and rice caches. On 7 May while moving into a suspected enemy cache site, D Co 2-12 Cav made contact with a reinforced NVA unit. In a series of sharp contacts throughout the day 33 NVA were KIA, three trucks and numerous documents were captured, and the cache site later named "Rock Island East", was discovered. This cache was so extensive that CIDG, RF and stevedores companies were utilized to retrograde the materials found. To provide a nearby logistical resupply and cache retrograde point FSB SNUFFY was reopened on 9 May by the 5-12 Inf. Concurrently the 1st ACD Engineer Battalion upgraded the Cu Gia May airstrip to accommodate C-130 aircraft. In order to block enemy routes of regress toward ORANG, Cambodia, and provide more extensive coverage of Base Area 351, the 1-8 Cav closed FSB MYNOOD THAI (YU352636) 10 May and established FSB NO (YU350450) on 11 May. Simultaneously, in order to jump ahead of the enemy and intercept his lines of communication further to the northeast, the 5-7 Cav closed FSB BROWN and established FSB NEIL (YU122523). As a reinforcing measure the 5-12 Inf (-) moved from FSB SNUFFY and reestablished FSB BROWN on 12 May. On 13 May at 0315 hours, FSB BROWN came under a heavy ground attack by an estimated force of two NVA companies. This attack was beaten off by B Co and C Co, 5-12 Inf who were defending FSB BROWN. This action resulted in 51 NVA KIA and 30 weapons captured. In a series of sharp contacts Co B 5-7 Cav, captured Hill 423, later named "Shakey's Hill". This cache site was so extensive in size that CIDG, RF and stevedores elements were again utilized to retrograde the munitions, weapons and rice. On 23 May the 2-12 Cav was clossen to the 1st Bde and established FSB NEIL (YU261519) in an attempt to intercept enemy routes of regress out of Base Area 351. In order to provide additional supporting fires, the 5-12 Inf moved its CP to FSB MYRON and closed out FSB BROWN on 24 May. This operation oriented on Base Area 351 continued through the month.

(c) Significant Contacts:

(1) On 1 May at 1750 hours, via YU352635, C 1-9 engaged 5 individuals resulting in 5 NVA KIA.

(2) On 2 May at 1555 hours, via YU350451, C 1-8 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 7 NVA KIA.
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(3) On 6 May at 1200 hours, vic YU127524, C 1-9 received ground to air fire and engaged the area with organics. The action resulted in 9 NVA KBH and 4 secondary explosions.

(4) On 6 May at 2300 hours, vic YU057369, C 5-7 had automatic ambush activate resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 6 Chicom grenades, 2 AK-50's, 2 B-40 rocket launchers and 2 B-40 rockets captured.

(5) On 7 May at 0800 hours, vic YU027430, C 1-9 engaged a convoy of 2½ ton trucks resulting in 20 NVA KBH and 6 2½ ton trucks destroyed.

(6) On 7 May at 1210 hours, vic YU023434, D2-12 made sporadic contacts with small enemy units throughout the day as they attempted to move into a large enemy cache site. The largest contact occurred at 1700 hours and was with an estimated company size enemy force. The results of the actions were 33 NVA KIA and 3 trucks, a series of caches, and documents captured.

(7) On 8 May at 0835 hours, vic YU125535, C 1-9 received ground to air fire and engaged the area with organics, ARA, air strikes and CS. The action continued throughout the day resulting in 29 NVA KBII, 14 NVA KB air strike, and 1 NVA KB ARA. Air strikes also destroyed 14 military structures, 5 bunkers, and caused 1 secondary explosion.

(8) On 9 May at 1835 hours, vic XU975445, C 1-9 engaged 7 individuals in a bunker complex resulting in 7 NVA KBH and several secondary explosions.

(9) On 10 May at 0650 hours, vic YU124523, A 5-7 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47's and 15 packs with medical equipment, miscellaneous equipment captured.

(10) On 11 May at 0915 hours, vic XU905173, 2-12 Co made contact with an estimated squad size enemy force, resulting in 5 NVA KIA.

(11) On 11 May at 1120 hours, vic YU365460, C 1-9 received ground-to-air fire from a complex of military structures and engaged the area with organics resulting in 10 NVA KBH.

(12) On 11 May at 1735 hours, vic YU188547, C 1-9 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 37 NVA KBH.

(13) On 12 May at 1550 hours, vic YU028490, C 1-9 received ground-to-air fire and engaged the area with organics resulting in 19 NVA KBH.

(14) On 12 May at 1730 hours, vic YU186442, B 5-7 made contact with an estimated platoon-size enemy force resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47's and documents captured.

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(15) On 13 May at 0315 hours, LZ BROWN received a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. The enemy was engaged with organics, AFA, Shadow, Night Hawk and air strikes with Blind Bat and flareships on station. The result of this action was 50 NVA KIA and several B-40 rocket launchers, 11 SKS's, 17 AK-47's, 1 60mm mortar, 3 RPD LMG's, 2 K-54 pistols and documents captured.

(16) On 13 May at 1400 hours, vic YU135496, C 1-9 engaged 7 individuals resulting in 7 NVA KBH.

(17) On 13 May at 1455 hours, vic YU120340, C 1-9 engaged 30 individuals resulting in 10 NVA KBH.

(18) On 14 May at 0910 hours, vic YU134443, C 1-9 received ground-to-air fire and engaged the area with organics resulting in 7 NVA KBH.

(19) On 14 May at 1540 hours, vic YU125433, C 1-9 engaged 5 individuals carrying a .51 cal machine gun. The results of this action were 5 NVA KBH.

(20) On 15 May 0715 hours, vic YU085399, C 1-9 received ground-to-air fire from 10 individuals and engaged them with organics, resulting in 5 NVA KBH.

(21) On 16 May at 1726 hours, vic YU264640, C 1-9 and ARA in support of Ranger Team 73 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 NVA KBH and 2 NVA KB AFA.

(22) On 17 May at 1100 hours, vic YU346832, C 1-9 received ground-to-air fire and engaged the area with organics and an air strike resulting in 5 NVA KBH and 7 NVA KB A/S.

(23) On 20 May at 1225 hours, vic YU225436, C 5-12 made contact with an unknown size enemy force and continued sporadic contact until 1930 hours. The results of the action were 8 NVA KIA.

(24) On 22 May at 1225 hours, vic YU225436, C 1-9 engaged 6 individuals resulting in 6 NVA KBH.

(25) On 25 May at 1040 hours, vic YU148463, A 5-7 had an automatic ambush activate, resulting in 5 NVA KIA and documents captured.

(26) On 25 May at 1645, vic YU134435, C 1-9 engaged a number of vehicles in a motor pool and called in an air strike. The results of the action were 13 jeeps destroyed, 2 25 ton trucks destroyed, 4 jeeps damaged, 5 bunkers destroyed, 15 x 55 gallon drums destroyed, 2 NVA KBH and 3 NVA KB A/S.

(27) On 31 May at 1055 hours, vic YU134650, the Bde Sniffer Bird received ground-to-air fire and engaged the area with organics. The results were 4 NVA KB Sniffer Bird (A227) and 10 NVA KB Cobra (D227).
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(4) Operations Conducted in June: During the month of June this Hq concluded its operations of neutralizing Base Area 351 in Cambodia and continued its operations in Phuoc Long Province. To aid in the accomplishment of these missions, the 5-60 Inf and 2-7 Cav (-) were placed under OPCON of the 2d Bde. The road security mission for resupply convoys on Highway QL14 and Route 311 remained with D Trp 3-17 Cav. In support of these operations the 2d Bde established two additional fire support bases.

(a) The major operation, oriented on Base Area 351 continued until 29 June and continually revealed new caches of enemy war materiel. In order to provide additional combat power the 5-60 Inf was placed under OPCON of the 2d Bde on 1 June and established FSB SHAKEY (YU210517). The 5-60 Inf then took responsibility from 5-7 Cav for evacuating the weapons and ammunition from "Shakey's Hill" which was completed 10 June and resulted in one of the largest caches of the war. On 5 June the 2-7 (-) was also placed under OPCON of the 2d Bde and co-located its CP at FSB NO with 1-8 Cav. Ground units encountered only light enemy resistance from small forces employing "harrassing" tactics. With lines of communications effectively cut, the enemy appeared to have withdrawn from Base Area 351 leaving his extensive caches of weapons, ammunition, rice and medical supplies to be discovered, evacuated and/or destroyed. A detailed and systematic search throughout the area was employed by ground units and aerial reconnaissance, resulting in the discovery of 18 significant cache sites.

(b) On 10 June the 2d Bde began its withdrawal from Base Area 351 to realign its forces along the border areas of Phuoc Long Province. The 5-7 Cav combat assaulted one company back into South Vietnam to establish FSB BARRY at (YU170331) and search out the area of the Dah Hayt River Corridor, then closing FSB VEAL on 20 June. Elements of 5-12 Inf conducted ground reconnaissance back to FSB MYRON and FSB SHAKEY, closing out these FSBs on 26 June respectively, at which time the 2d Bde released OPCON of these units. All other ground units conducted a thorough sweep back across the border concluding combat operations in Cambodia on 28 June, and began a search for caches which may have been evacuated by the enemy from Base Area 351 while the 2d Bde conducted its operations there. On 30 June the 2d Bde released OPCON of 2-7 Cav (-) to DIVARTY. In addition to this, the 2d Bde released OPCON of 5-7 Cav and assumed OPCON of 1-12 Cav, which took over FSB BARRY. Operations by 1-12 Cav were oriented against the Dah Hayt River Corridor and those by 1-8 Cav oriented against the head of the Adams and Jolley Trails.

(c) Significant Contacts:

(1) On 4 June at 1308 hours, a Pink Team from C 1-9 and APA from 2-20 Arty responded to Ranger Team 51's sightings, engaged groups of individuals throughout the Hill. The action resulted in 10 NVA KIA and 3 NVA X KIA APA.

(2) On 9 June at 1535 hours, via YU595179, C 1-9 engaged 4 individuals resulting in 4 NVA KIA.
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(3) On 10 June at 0830 hours, via YU086975, 334th Provincial Recon Unit made contact with an estimated 35-40 individuals firing small arms. The action resulted in 5 VC KIA and 3 AK-47s captured.

(4) On 11 June at 0910 hours, via YU134464, D 5-60 had an automatic ambush activate and made contact with an unknown size enemy force firing small arms. The results of the action were 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 captured, and numerous blood trails in the area. A tracker team was used to follow the blood trails and led the company to 1 NVA PW who was wounded.

(5) On 18 June at 1305 hours, via YU016394, C Trp, 2-11 ACR had two automatic ambushes activate resulting in 4 NVA KIA.

(6) On 18 June at 1600 hours, via YU141449, B 5-7 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 4 AK-47s, one magazine, 3 AK magazine belts and 6 Chicom grenades captured.

(7) On 19 June at 1202 hours, via YU095435, D 5-12 made contact with an unknown size enemy force firing small arms. The results were 5 NVA KIA.

(8) On 21 June at 1225 hours, via YU093363, C Trp, 2-11 ACR had 3 separate automatic ambushes activate resulting in 7 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 rifle captured.

(9) On 22 June at 1537 hours, via YU086431, D 5-12 made contact with an unknown size enemy force firing small arms, automatic weapons, and RG's. The results of the action were 6 NVA KIA.

(10) On 22 June at 1645 hours, via YU243515, A 2-7 made contact with an estimated platoon-size enemy force firing small arms and 3-40s. The enemy was engaged with machine guns, ARA, air strike and arty. The results of the action were 6 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47s, 9 rucksacks, 8 sets of web gear, 1.1 tons of rice and documents captured.

(11) On 29 June at 1605 hours, via YU222341, C 5-60 made contact with an unknown size enemy force firing small arms and RGs. The action resulted in 3 NVA KIA, 1 SES rifle, 1 RG, 2 rocket launchers, 2 RG rounds, 2 Chicom grenades and 10 x 220 lb bags of rice captured.

(5) Operations Conducted in July: During the month of July the 2d Bde, having concluded its Cambodian operations, realigned its Battalions along the enemy's routes of supply and infiltration. During this period of time 5 fire support bases were opened and four closed. Four of the five OPCON battalions rotated out to a three-day stand-down in Bien Hoa, two of which returned to Bde control. On 12 July, the 7th ARVN Regt (-) assumed a portion of the Bde AO with the mission of fixing and destroying enemy units in the Song Bo Area and securing Highway QL14. The 2d Bde in conjunction with the 7th ARVN Regt (-) continued the pacification of Phuoc Long Province and supported Vietnamization.
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(a) The month of July began with 1-8th Cav conducting operations from FSB MO, 1-12th Cav from FSB BARRY and 5-7th Cav from FSB SNUFFY. On 9 July, as a result of the relocation of the 1st Bde, OPCON of the 1-5th Cav at FSB EXODUS and 2-12th Cav at FSB 11-BRAVO passed to the 2d Bde. On 12 July, 1-5 Cav closed FSB EXODUS and rotated to Bien Hoa for a 3 day stand-down. On 15 July 1-5 Cav OPCON was passed to 1st Bde. On 16 July 2-12 Cav rotated to Bien Hoa, closing out FSB 11-BRAVO. On the same date, C 5-7 conducted an air assault into YU231234 to conduct ground reconnaissance in response to a LRRP team contact on 15 July. A 5-7 (-) was inserted along with Arty into FSB CANDY to provide support. On the 19th of July, 2-12 Cav returned from Bien Hoa to FSB MO to conduct operations targeted against the northern portion of the Jolley Trail complex. On the 20th of July the 1-8 Cav rotated out of FSB MO to Bien Hoa for stand-down. Having concluded operations vic FSB CANDY, A(-) and C 5-7 were extracted and air assaulted into YU245200 on 21 July. At that location, FSB BETTY was established. On the 22nd of July, 5-7 Cav assaulted B Co, D Co (-) and Recon Platoon into the Dong Nai River corridor in response to heavy ground-to-air fire and enemy sightings reported by 1-9 Cav. B Co along with Arty, opened FSB ANDREWS while D Co (-) and RCN conducted ground reconnaissance in the contact area. On the 23rd of July, 1-8 Cav returned from stand-down and assumed control of FSB BETTY, with the mission of interdicting enemy supplies and personnel moving south on the Adams Trail. A and B Cos 5-7 returned to FSB SNUFFY to continue the battalion's mission of locating and destroying main force units reported in the Bu Gia Map Area. The 1-12 Cav, on 24 July, rotated from FSB BARRY to Bien Hoa. OPCON of 1-12 was passed to 1st Bde on 26 July. B Co, D Co (-) and RCN 5-7 Cav concluded operations in the Dong Nai River Corridor on 26 July and returned to the Bu Gia Map Area, closing FSB ANDREWS. On 28 July, 2-12 Cav assumed the mission of interdicting supplies and destroying enemy personnel moving south in the central portion of the Jolley Trail complex. To support this mission, FSB JEANNE was established. The battalion's move from FSB MO to JEANNE was completed on 30 July at which time MO was closed.

During the month of July this HQ continued its mission of pacifying Phuoc Long Province and supporting Vietnamization. Security for Highways QL14 and 311 was maintained by D Trp 3-17 Cav in conjunction with 1-8th ARVN Inf until D Trp's departure from the Bde AO on 2 July. At that time the mission was assumed completely by 1-8 ARVN Inf. On 12 July the 7th ARVN Regt (-) began operations in the vicinity of Song Be. Operations included ground reconnaissance, local patrols, ambush operations and security of Highways QL14 and 311. The 60th Land Clearing Company passed OPCON to the 2d Bde on 13 July, with the mission of conducting Rome Plow operations along Highways 14, 1A and 301. Rome Plow security is provided by E Trp, 2-11th ACR.
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(b) Significant Contacts:

(1) On 5 July at 1555 hours, vic YT355765, C 1-9 engaged 3 individuals with organics and received small arms fire in return. The results of the action were 3 NVA KBH.

(2) On 11 July at 1328 hours, vic YU248443, B 1-8 made contact with 10-15 individuals in a skirmish line followed by a second line of 30-35 individuals firing small arms and automatic weapons. The enemy was engaged with organics, ARA, mortars, CS and air strikes. The results of the action were 5 NVA KB A/S, 1 NVA KB ARA, and 1 NVA KBH.

(3) On 12 July at 0855 hours, vic YU217370, D'1-8 made contact with an estimated company size enemy force firing S/A, A/W, and B-40's. D Co engaged the area with organics, artillery, ARA and air strike. The results of the action were 7 NVA KIA.

(4) On 12 July at 1640 hours, vic YU225368, B 1-12, while going into an LZ received ground-to-air fire. The area was engaged with ARA, air strikes and artillery. The action resulted in 3 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 Russian carbine, and 1 US carbine captured.

(5) On 15 July at 1650 hours, vic YU237225, A 1-9 on VR received a heavy volume of small arms fire. The area was engaged with organics and an air strike resulting in 4 NVA KB A/S and 1 8" x 10' military structure destroyed.

(6) On 16 July at 1615 hours, vic YU266434, A 1-9 on VR received ground-to-air fire and engaged the area with organics resulting in 3 NVA KBH.

(7) On 19 July the 2d Bde S-2 received an agent report which indicated that an air strike employed on 13 July, vic YU234231 accounted for a total of 12 NVA KB A/S.

(8) On 19 July at 1513 hours, vic YU565975, A 1-9 engaged an 8" x 10' military structure, resulting in 3 NVA KBH, 8 pigs KBH, and the structure destroyed.

(9) On 19 July at 1800 hours, vic YU542268, A 1-9 on VR received .51 cal ground-to-air fire while extracting Ranger Tm 71. The area was engaged with organics and ARA resulting in 3 NVA KBH, and 3 NVA KB ARA.

(10) On 22 July at 1130 hours, vic YT506977, A 1-9 spotted an estimated 20 individuals in the open and engaged with organics, ARA and air strike. The result was 7 NVA KB A/S, 4 NVA KBH, and 1 NVA KB ARA.

(11) On 23 July starting at 1400 hours, vic YU543389, A 1-9 on VR received ground-to-air fire on 4 different occasions from small arms and RPG. The area was engaged with organics, ARA, artillery and air strike resulting in 5 NVA KBH, 3 NVA KB ARA, 1 NVA KB Arty and 1 NVA KB A/S.

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e. 3rd Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: During the period 1-4 May 1970 the primary efforts of the 3rd Bde were directed toward interdiction of NVA/VC infiltration along the Mustang Trail and Saigon River Corridor within War Zone "C". The brigade was targeted specifically against the 95-C, 101st, and 165th NVA Regiments and the 50th and 82nd Rear Service Groups. During the period 5-15 May 1970 the brigade mission encompassed operations within the Flatiron area of Cambodia to neutralize NVA/VC Base Area facilities in the COSVN Base. During the period 14 May-29 June the brigade relocated to the northeast to neutralize elements of the 5th VC Division vicinity Base Area 351 to locate base areas and cache sites with emphasis on evacuation of supplies and equipment, and destruction of base area sites. During the period 29 June-31 July, as the brigade completed its withdrawal from Cambodia, efforts again were directed toward the interdiction of NVA/VC infiltration along the Serges Jungle Highway in western Phuoc Long and northeastern Binh Long Provinces. The brigade again assumed overwatch responsibility for RVNAF/GVN forces and installations in Binh Long Province and Bo Duc District of Phuoc Long Province.

(2) Execution: 3rd Brigade tactical operations during the period were characterized by 4 distinct phases. Phase 1 (1-4 May 1970) consisted of 3rd Brigade effecting initial penetrations of the COSVN Base Area and Base Area 353. During Phase 2 (5-15 May 1970) the brigade continued operations in the COSVN Base Area reorienting to the northeastern portion of Base Area 352. With the passage of tactical responsibility for Base Area 352 to the 1st Brigade, the 3rd Brigade realigned forces and commenced Phase 3 (13 May-29 June), reorientating forces again to the northeast into Base Area 350. Phase 4 (29 June-31 July) was initiated as 3rd Brigade elements withdrew from Cambodia after successfully neutralizing enemy sanctuaries and destroying numerous cache sites. Upon completion of withdrawal, 3rd Brigade initiated tactical operations along the Serges Jungle Highway.

(a) Significant Activities: May

(1) 1 - 4 May: During this period 3d Bde effected initial penetration of the COSVN Base under the operational control of TF Shoemaker. The 3d Bde organization for combat included 2-5 Cav, TF 2-7 Cav, TF 2-34 Armor and TF 2-47 Mech. On 30 April the 2-7 Cav established FSB WEST I (XT347934) to provide initial artillery coverage for 3d Bde forces. On 1 May TF 2-34 Armor and TF 2-47 Mech moved from assembly areas in RVN, effecting the initial penetration of the COSVN Base area, and secured initial objectives within Cambodia by 011730 May. The 2-7 Cav conducted a two-company AM assault into Base Area 353 and began search and sweep operations within Cambodia vicinity LZ X-RAY. The 2-5 Cav established the initial 3d Bde FSB within Cambodia, FSB X-RAY (XU359010) on 2 May. The 2-7 Cav, subsequent to the initial combat assault on 1 May, effected a link-up with the 1st ARVN Division forces on the eastern flank of the 3d Bde AO on 2 May. 3d Bde elements continued search and sweep operations during this period, directed at neutralization of NVA/VC base areas and cache sites with light enemy contact.
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(2) On 5 May Quan Loi Base Camp received an attack by fire consisting of 7 x 122mm rockets, resulting in 2 US KIA and 7 US WIA. Counter-battery fire was exercised with unknown enemy casualties. D/1-12 Cav found a large cache consisting of weapons, vehicles, ammunition and miscellaneous equipment at XU493172. C/1-5 Cav found a large weapons/ammunition cache at XU527215.

(3) On 6 May the 1-12 Cav at FSB EVANS received 2 x 107mm rockets resulting in negative friendly casualties. C/1-5 while still in cache site received 2 x 107mm rockets resulting in negative friendly casualties. C/1-12 found an additional truck and automotive parts cache and had an automatic ambush activate resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 5 AK-47s and 1 SKS CIA.

(4) On 7 May at 0025 hours E Rcn/1-12 Cav had an automatic ambush activate resulting in 10 NVA KIA. At 1920 A/1-5 Cav had an automatic ambush activate resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s CIA. B/1-9 made 6 significant sightings during the day resulting in 12 NVA KBH, 1 US WIA, and 1 US aircraft damaged.

(5) Scattered contact on 8 May accounted for 6 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA. Additionally, C/1-5, while in NDP, received 10 x 75mm RR rounds resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1700 A/1-12 engaged an estimated 25 NVA. Artillery and ARA supported the contact resulting in 5 NVA KIA.

(6) The period of 9 - 11 May was one of light scattered contact resulting in 23 NVA KIA and 1 US WIA. B/1-9 made 10 significant sightings resulting in 35 NVA KBH, 4 NVA KBARA, and 2 NVA KBA.

(7) On 12 May at 0205 C/1-5, while in NDP, received 4 x 75mm RR rounds. Again at 0455 C/1-5 received 1 additional 75mm RR round. There were negative friendly casualties. The ARP of B/1-9, while on a ground recon mission, engaged 7 NVA, resulting in 7 NVA KIA.

(8) On 13 May at 1600 a B/229 AVN aircraft in support of 3d Bde received heavy ground-to-air fire resulting in 2 US WIA and 1 damaged aircraft. At 1835 A/1-12 received small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 US WIA. 1-7 Cav was released OPCON from the 25th Inf Div and assumed OPCON by 3d Bde. The 1-7 displaced from FSB FRANCES and air-assaulted to secure FSB RANCH area (XU938638), began construction of the fire base and initiated ground recon operations to neutralize elements of the 5th VC Division vicinity Base Area 351.

(9) On 14 May C/1-11 ACR, while in NDP, received 5 B-40 rounds. The suspected enemy location was engaged with organics, resulting in 5 NVA KIA, and 1 NVA JW. There were negative friendly casualties. The 2-5 Cav at FSB READY received a ground probe on the fire base. ARA, Shadow and artillery supported and contact soon broke. A sweep of the area revealed 18 NVA KIA. Friendly casualties were 1 US WIA. B/1-9 had 4 significant sightings resulting in 11 NVA KBH.

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(10) On 15 May 1-5 Cav and 1-12 Cav were released OPCON by the 3d Bde and passed OPCON to the 1st Bde; and the 1-11 ACR was released OPCON by the 3d Bde and passed OPCON to the 25th Inf Div. Scattered contact during 15 May resulted in 2 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47s CIA, and 2 US WIA. Also the 3d Bde assumed OPCON of the 2-7 Cav which displaced from FSB BRUISER and established FSB KETTER (XU928427).

(11) On 16 May the 1-7 at FSB RANCH received a ground probe from an estimated 35-50 NVA. Artillery, ARA, Shadow, and fixed wing flare ship supported until contact was broken. Results of the contact were 13 NVA KIA, 4 small arms, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, and 75 hand grenades CIA. Friendly casualties were 5 KIA and 26 WIA. At 0650 the 2-5 Cav at FSB READY received 20 x 60mm mortar rounds with negative friendly casualties. Scattered contacts by 3d Bde elements throughout the day resulted in 6 NVA KIA and 4 small arms CIA. Friendly casualties were 1 KIA and 2 WIA. B/1-9 had 6 significant sightings resulting in 12 NVA KBH and 1 vehicle destroyed.

(12) At 0017 on 17 May 2-5 Cav at FSB READY received 3 x 107mm rockets resulting in negative friendly casualties. At 0905 C/1-7 received heavy sniper fire resulting in 4 KIA and 5 WIA with unknown enemy losses. B/1-9 had 7 significant sightings resulting in 16 NVA KBH, 4 NVA KBARY and 1 NVA KIA.

(13) On 18 May scattered contact throughout the Bde AO resulted in 3 NVA KIA, 4 NVA KBARY, and 2 NVA 13BMORTAR. There were negative friendly casualties. B/1-9 had 8 significant sightings resulting in 21 NVA KBH.

(14) During the period 19 - 21 May 3d Bde forces encountered light enemy contact in 19 NVA KIA, 1 NVA KBARY, 1 NVA FV, and 8 small arms CIA. Friendly casualties were 1 KIA and 2 WIA. B/1-9 had 6 significant sightings resulting in 18 NVA KBH. At 1730 on 19 May B/2-5 at XU822355, found a large rice cache. On 20 May 3d Bde assumed OPCON of the 2-8 Cav which displaced from Phuoc Vinh and established FSB GUNNER (XU807383). Also on 20 May the 2-7 Cav was released OPCON 3d Bde.

(15) During the period 22 - 23 May there was a marked decrease in enemy activity with 8 ground attacks reported, resulting in 9 NVA KIA and 6 small arms captured. Friendly casualties were 5 WIA.

(16) On 24 May at 1435 C/1-7 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force in a bunker complex. Results were 6 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1845 C/1-7, while on NDP, received heavy small arms fire, B-40 fire, and suspected 82mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force. Artillery, ARA, and air strikes supported during the contact which resulted in 5 friendly KIA and 8 WIA. Other elements of the 3d Bde forces encountered scattered contact resulting in 4 NVA KIA, 1 KBARY, and 35 small arms captured with negative friendly casualties. B/1-9 Cav had 2 significant sightings resulting in 5 NVA KBH.

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(17) During 25 May light enemy contact was encountered by 3d Bde forces. At 1445 B/2-5 had an OP engaged by 1 NVA resulting in 1 US KIA. At 1600 hours, A/2-8 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and a large motor pool cache uncovered (XU776566). At 1645 hours B/2-8 engaged 3 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and negative friendly casualties.

(18) During the period 26 - 27 May light enemy contact was encountered by 3d Bde forces resulting in 8 NVA KIA and 2 small arms-CIA. On 26 May A/1-7 found a cache at XU952434 containing rice; C/2-8 found an ammunition cache at XU802368; and C/2-5 found a arms cache at XU862338. On 27 May the 3d Bde assumed OPCON of the 1-12 Cav which then established FSB THOR (XU908286).

(19) During 28 May B/1-9 had 5 significant sightings resulting in 35 NVA KBH and 6 NVA KIARA. At 1905 the 2-5 Cav at FSB READY received 5 x 120mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA and 14 US WIA. Counter-battery fires were exercised, ARA and flare ship supported, with unknown enemy losses.

(20) The period 29 - 31 May was characterized by a marked decrease in enemy contacts as compared to previous periods. Extremely light contact was reported and automatic ambushes accounted for the majority of the 25 NVA KIA and 2 NVA PUs with 10 small arms and 1 light machine gun CIA. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 25 WIA. On 30 May the 1-7 Cav closed FSB RANCH and established FSB CORRAL (XU930538).

(b) Significant contacts in June:

(1) On 1 June at 0735 D/2-5 Cav was engaged by 5 individuals with small arms and .30 cal machine gun fire resulting in 1 friendly KIA and 2 WIA.

(2) 2 light contacts on 3 June by E Ren/1-12 Cav and 1/2-8 Cav resulted in 2 NVA KIA and 1 SKS captured.

(3) The period of 4 - 5 June was one of light activity. C/1-7 Cav had an automatic ambush activate at 1615 hours resulting in 3 NVA KIA. In a subsequent sweep of the area C/1 observed and engaged 2 individuals. The enemy returned fire, resulting in 2 US WIA. A/1-12 had an automatic ambush detonate at 0745 on 4 June resulting in 1 NVA KIA. B/1-9 had 6 significant sightings on 4 June resulting in 5 NVA KBH and 1 NVA KIARA. D/1-7 Cav at 0920 on 5 June observed and engaged 5 individuals attempting to disarm an automatic ambush, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. B/2-5 Cav observed and engaged 2 individuals at 0915 resulting in 1 NVA KIA and documents captured. An automatic ambush by C/2-8 Cav detonated at 1510 on 5 June resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. B/1-9 Cav had 1 significant sighting resulting in 30 NVN KBH and 6 bunkers destroyed. L/2-8, while on ground recon found a commo cache at XU83547.
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(4) On 6 June the 2-5 Cav displaced to and began construction of FSB CAMLOT. D/2-5 Cav remained at FSB READY to conduct retrograde operations. D/2-8 observed and engaged 3-4 individuals at 0830 resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 1 SKS and 5 Chicom grenades captured. B/1-9 Cav had 2 significant sightings resulting in 7 NVA KBH and 3 NVA KBK.

(5) On 7 June C/1-7 made contact with 4 individuals at 1505 hours resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. A/1-7 at 1550 hours was engaged by 3 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. A/2-5 Cav engaged an individual at 1020 hours resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 SKS CIA. D/2-5 Cav made contact at 1115 hours with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 NVA KIA, and 11 grenades, 1 AK-47, and 2 light submachine guns CIA. B/1-9 Cav had 2 significant sightings resulting in 1 NVA KBH.

(6) On 8 June the 1-7 Cav began retrograde movements at FSB CORRAL, displaced to, and began construction of FSB BRONCO. The 2-5 Cav moved from FSB CAMLOT to begin construction of FSB AHKA. D/1-7 observed and engaged 4 individuals at 1430 hours with negative return fire and the contact resulted in 1 NVA KIA. D/1-12 observed and engaged 10-15 individuals at 0830 hours resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 6 packs CIA. D/2-5 received sniper fire and then made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in the capture of 1 .30 cal machine gun and tripod. Friendly losses were 6 US WIA. B/1-9 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 NVA KBH.

(7) On 9 June A/1-7 Cav observed and engaged 3 individuals at 1700 hours resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 SKS captured. A/2-5 observed and engaged 2 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. B/2-5 Cav made contact at 1745 hours with 3-4 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA. They engaged 2 individuals at 1803 hours also resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. They later engaged 1 individual resulting in 1 NVA KBH.

(8) On 10 June the 1-7 Cav completed retrograde operations at FSB CORRAL and continued construction and security of FSB BRONCO. E Ren/1-7 received fire at 0745 hours from 5-10 individuals while making a light check of a contact. Friendly losses were 7 US WIA and there was negative enemy assessment. C/1-7 made contact with an unknown size enemy force which fired 30 B-40 rockets and utilized heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire. AAA, Rash, and air strike supported the unit in contact. Enemy loss was 1 NVA KIA. Friendly losses were 2 US KIA and 23 US WIA. An automatic ambush placed by A/1-7 Cav detonated at 1330 hours resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. B/1-12 Cav made contact with 20 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. They later made contact in the same area with 7 individuals at 1600 hours resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 3 grenades, 100 lbs of rice, 2 packs and 2 shovels CIA. Friendly loss was 1 US WIA. At 0920 hours A/2-5 Cav made contact with 3 individuals resulting in 2 NVA KIA and assorted equipment CIA. While extracting C/1-7 Cav, an aircraft of B/229 Avn received ground-to-air fire. The enemy was engaged with organics resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
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(9) The period of 11-12 June was one of light enemy contact in the 3d Bde AO. On 11 June 3/1-7 Cav completed the retrograde of FSB XZ-27 and closed that fire base. B/2-5 at 0715 hours received heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rocket fire in their NDP. The enemy was engaged with organics and .50 caliber machine gun rounds CIA. Friendly losses were 2 US KIA. A LOH of B/1-9 received ground-to-air fire at 1915 hours resulting in positive damage. Rash airstrikes supported the contact resulting in 4 NVA KIA. An automatic ambush employed by B/1-12 Cav detonated at 1030 hours resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 4 Chicom grenades CIA. E Rcn/2-5 Cav observed and engaged 4 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 7 US WIA. D/1-9 had 3 significant sightings resulting in 5 NVA KIA. At 1650 hours B/1-9 ARP was inserted and made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 NVA KIA. 3 Caches were found by the 2-9 Cav during this period containing ammunition and miscellaneous equipment.

(10) On 13 June D/1-7 Cav engaged 3 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. Friendly losses were 1 US WIA. An automatic ambush set by B/1-7 detonated at 1035 hours resulting in 2 NVA KIA. D/1-7 observed and engaged 1 individual who returned fire causing 1 US WIA. D/1-12 observed and engaged 12 individuals resulting in 2 NVA KIA. E Rcn/1-12 Cav observed and engaged an unknown size enemy force with organics and arty resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured. An automatic ambush set by C/1-12 detonated killing 1 NVA. D/2-5 Cav received light machine gun fire causing 1 US WIA. An automatic ambush set by D/2-8 Cav detonated resulting in 1 NVA KIA. D/2-5 Cav, while on sweep operations found 2 small caches containing ammunition.

(11) On 14 June D/1-7 was engaged by 6 individuals causing 1 US WIA. Return fire resulted in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. C/1-12 made contact at 1020 hours with an estimated platoon-size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 2 B-40 rocket launchers CIA. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.

(12) On 15 June an automatic ambush set by C/1-12 detonated resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47s captured. Another set by B/1-7 Cav detonated at 0710 hours resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 1 SKS CIA. At 1620 hours B/1-7 engaged 2 individuals and received small arms fire, 15 B-40 rockets and 25 x 82mm mortars from all directions. Artillery, ARVN and Rash supported the unit in contact. Enemy losses were 8 NVA KIA, and 2 packs, 4 grenades, and 2 B-40 rockets CIA. Friendly casualties were 6 US WIA.

(13) On 16 June B/1-7 Cav observed and engaged 1 individual resulting in 1 NVA KIA. D/2-5 Cav received fire from 40 individuals at 1305 hours. Return fire resulted in 2 NVA KIA with friendly losses 1 WIA.

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(14) On 17 June at 1100 hours C/1-12 engaged 2 individuals resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, and 1 B-40 CIA. B/2-8 had an automatic ambush detonate resulting in 2 NVA KIA, and 2 AK-47s and documents captured. A/2-8 engaged 3 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. B/2-8 was engaged at 1550 hours by 2 individuals in bunkers. Unit was supported by arty, ARA and Rash. Enemy losses were 1 NVA KIA with negative friendly losses.

(15) The period 18-19 June was one of light enemy contact. C/1-7 received heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire while on sweep operations on 18 June. The enemy was engaged with organics and arty. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA. At 1715 hours B/2-8 Cav received B-40 and small arms fire causing 2 US WIA and 1 US MIA. Enemy location was engaged with arty and organics. On 19 June the point element of D (-) 1-7 Cav observed and engaged 4 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. A/1-7, while on FSB BROCNCO, received 57 rounds of 120mm and 82mm mortar fire at 1905 hours, with friendly losses 2 US WIA. C/2-5 received small arms fire in their NDP causing 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA. ARA supported the unit in contact with negative enemy assessment. B/2-5 made contact with 10 individuals at 1015 hours resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Friendly losses were 1 US WIA. A/2-5 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force at 1015 hours. ARA and arty supported with negative enemy assessment. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. A/2-8 Cav found a small medical cache at UX 690515 at 1415 hours on 19 June.

(16) On 20 June C/2-5 Cav made contact at 1215 hours with 15-20 NVA. Unit received small arms, B-40 and light machine gun fire. ARA, Pink Team, and airstrikes supported the unit in contact resulting in 2 US WIA and negative enemy assessment. At 1545 hours C/1-12 found a miscellaneous equipment cache site and A/2-5 Cav found a cache site containing bicycles and parts at 1400 hours. C/2-8 found a machine shop area at 1625 hours and A/2-8 found a medical cache at UX782364.

(17) On 21 June C/1-7 Cav and E Rcn/1-7 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA. A/2-5 engaged 1 individual resulting in 1 NVA KIA with 1 AK-47 captured. B/1-9 had 2 significant sightings resulting in 1 NVA KH with 1200 hours. 3 caches were uncovered: a medical cache was found by A/2-8 at 1300 hours; a cache and 200-bed hospital and training area was found by B/2-5 Cav, and a miscellaneous cache was found by C/2-8 at 1200 hours.

(18) On 22 June at 0715 hours A/2-5 Cav engaged 2 individuals resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 B-40 rocket launcher and 6 RPG rounds CIA. At 0940 hours D/2-8 received small arms and B-40 fire while on patrol. arty, Rash, and ARA supported the unit in contact resulting in 6 US WIA. On a sweep operation, C/2-8 Cav received small arms fire and claymore activations from 10 individuals. Unit engaged with negative enemy assessment. Friendly losses were 7 US WIA. B/1-9 had 1 significant sighting resulting in 1 NVA KH.
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(19) On 23 June FSB BRONCO received 3 stand-off attacks. The suspected enemy firing positions were engaged by arty after each attack. Friendly losses were 12 US WIA. B/1-7 and C/1-7 made contact with an unknown size enemy force which engaged them with heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. D/2-5 Cav and E Ren/2-5 Cav engaged 3 individuals resulting in 3 NVA KIA. C/2-5 found an ammunition cache at XU743467. B/2-5 Cav and E (-)/2-5 Cav conducted the complete retrograde of FSB BRONCO.

(20) On 24 June the 1-7 Cav conducted a complete retrograde of FSB GONGER. Construction and security operations were begun at FSB RAW.DI. B/1-7 observed and engaged 7 individuals resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 IV. While in PZ posture, lift shifts received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in 1 UH-1H CBL. Artillery and ARV supported the unit in contact resulting in 1 NV. KIA. A/2-5 engaged 6 individuals resulting in 1 KIA-47 CIA. A/2-5 found an automobile parts cache and D/2-5 found an ammunition cache, and D Ren/1-12 found a truck park.

(21) The period 25-27 June was one of very light enemy contact. On 26 June A/1-12 observed and engaged 1 individual resulting in 1 NVA KIA. B/1-9 had 2 significant sightings on 26 June resulting in 1 NVA KIA. On 27 June B/1-9 had 2 significant sightings resulting in 3 NVA KIA. On 26 June the 2-5 Cav concluded operations in the 3d Bde AO and displaced to Bien Hoa VIP Center for stand down. On 26 June B(-)/2-8 Cav discovered a large bicycle cache, C/2-8 displaced to and began construction of FSB EUNICE on 26 June. FSB GONGER was retrograded and closed by the 2-6 Cav on 27 June.

(22) The period 28 - 30 June was also one of very light activity. On 28 June the 2-11 ACR was passed OPCON to the 2-8 Cav. While checking an automatic ambush at 1355 hours, G/2-11 received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and ARV engaged the suspected enemy locations. Friendly casualties were 1 US WIA. B/1-9 had 2 significant sightings on 28 June resulting in 3 NVA KIA. On 29 June a convoy from G/2-11 traveled from Quan Loi Base Camp to FSB J.KE hit a 23-lb mine. Friendly casualties were 1 US WIA and 1 H551 heavily damaged. B/1-9 Cav made 3 significant sightings on 29 June resulting in 4 NVA KIA. On 30 June the 1-12 Cav conducted retrograde operations and closed FSB TINH. 3/1-9 Cav made 3 significant sightings on 30 June resulting in 2 NV. KIA.

(c) Significant Contacts in July:

(1) The period 1 - 2 July was one of negligible enemy activity, 1 automatic ambush detonation and 1 unsuccessful ground-to-air firing incident summarized the enemy activity.
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(2) On 3 July the 2-5 Cav displaced from Quan Loi, air-assaulted to secure FSB FT GWITITE, and begun construction of the fire base continuing operations targeted against local force units and the 33rd Arty Bn. While on road sweep operations, G/2-11 ACR at 1215 hours found 1 NVA KIA by automatic ambush on 1 July.

(3) On 4 July the 2-8 Cav displaced from FSB EUNICE to begin stand down at Bien Hoa VIP Center. FSB EUNICE was closed.

(4) The period of 5 - 6 July was one of negligible enemy activity. 1 ground contact by LRRP Team 72 with 3 individuals and the detonation of a mine by a vehicle from H/2-11 ACR summarizes enemy activity. Losses included 1 US WIA and 1 M578 CBL.

(5) On 7 July the 2-8 Cav concluded stand down operations at Bien Hoa and displaced to, opened, and begun construction of FSB UNION. The 2-8 began operations to interdict NVA/VC main force infiltration routes. A/1-7 and C/1-7 Cav were passed OPCON from the 3d Bde to DIVARTY. 2 instances of ground-to-air fire occurred resulting in 1 hit to aircraft. There were negative friendly casualties.

(6) On 8 July the 1-7 Cav concluded operations in the 3d Bde AO, closed FSB RidDL, and passed OPCON to DIVARTY.

(7) There was negligible enemy activity on 9 July. On 10 July, 2-11 ACR passed OPCON to the 11th ACR with the exception of F/2-11 ACR, which passes OPCON to 2-8 Cav. B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged 1 individual resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(8) During the period 11 - 13 July there was negligible enemy activity. 3 ground contacts with negative results summarizes the action. On 12 July F/2-11 ACR passed OPCON from the 2-8 Cav to the 3d Bde and on 13 July passed OPCON to the 2-11 ACR.

(9) On 14 July D/2-8 Cav made 4 separate enemy contacts. At 1423 hours the unit engaged 1 individual with organics resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1715 hours they engaged 1 individual with organics resulting in negative enemy assessment. At 1913 hours they engaged an unknown size enemy force with organics resulting in negative enemy assessment and 6 US WIA.

(10) Only light enemy activity was reported on 15 July. The 297 RF Co received 7 x 75mm rounds and the District IR at Do Dac received 6 x 75mm rounds, all of which landed outside of the perimeter. There were negative friendly casualties. OPCON of D(-)/1-9 Cw was assumed by 3d Bde.

(11) On 16 July A(-)/2-8 Cav had sporadic contact with 5 individuals killing 1 NVA and capturing 1 AC-47. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.

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(12) On 17 July an 876 RP Co 2 ½ ton truck detonated a 23-lb mine resulting in 16 RF WIA.

(13) Enemy activity increased on 18 July. Rash 34 observed and engaged 1 individual carrying a pack, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. The C/31st Engr convoy on route to bridge site at YU04207, was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force at XU934205. The enemy engaged with 3-40, B-41, and heavy small arms, machine gun, and M-79 fire along the entire convoy. Contact broke after 45 minutes and movement was resumed at 1040 hours. Contact was later reestablished with heavy small arms fire. Enemy was engaged with cannons, 2 airstrikes, 8 sections of 81mm, Shadow, and Pink Team. QRF was inserted into LZ north of the contact area at 2025 hours. B/1-9 Cav ARP was inserted at 2320 hours. Enemy losses were 14 KIA. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA, 6 US WIA, 2 RF WIA, with 2 x 5-ton trucks, 1 V100, and 1 x 10-ton truck damaged, and 1 3/4-ton truck CB.

(14) On 19 July Quan Loi Base Camp received 2 x 107mm rockets resulting in 2 US WIA and 2 OH-47's slightly damaged. B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged enemy forces 7 separate times from 0755 to 1340 hours resulting in 3 NVA KIA. There were no friendly casualties. A/2-8 Cav received small arms fire resulting in 2 US WIA. The enemy was engaged with cannons, with negative enemy assessment. The 2-5 Cav conducted air assaults on 19 July to open and begin construction of FSB LUFFLER. Security was maintained by the 2-5 Cav at FSB FT GRANITE.

(15) On 20 July an automatic ambush employed by 3C/2-8 Cav detonated resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 4 .50-47s captured. 2 cases of ground-to-air fire were reported with negative hits.

(16) The period 21 - 25 July was characterized by very light enemy activity. There were 5 ground contacts with 3 individuals. 2 unsuccessful ground-to-air firing incidents were reported. There was negative enemy assessment and negative friendly losses. D(-)/1-9 Cav was released OPCON from the 3d Bde on 21 July and was reassumed OPCON on 24 July.

(17) The period of 26 July had light enemy activity. C/2-5 Cav observed and engaged 1 individual, resulting in 1 NVA FM. The 2-5 Cav concluded operations in the vicinity of FSB LUFFLER and retrograded the fire base.

(18) The period of 27 - 31 July was one of negligible enemy activity. 2 ground contacts (one on 28 July, one on 29 July) were the extent of the activity. Enemy losses were 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 GIA. D(-)/1-9 Cav was released OPCON from the 3d Bde on 27 July. D/2-5 Cav was passed OPCON to DIV. ARTY on 27 July and was reassumed OPCON to 2-5 Cav on 30 July.

(19) The remainder of the operations and contacts during the reporting period were characterized by platoon-size contacts with small enemy forces. Most of these contacts were light, involving usually 2-5 individuals. Sporadic ground-to-air firing incidents were also reported during this period.

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f. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry remained in general support of the Division and continues to provide reconnaissance throughout the Division AO. A Troop and B Troop supported the 1st ARVN Airborne Division during Task Force Shoemaker, then reverted general support of the Division when the 2nd Brigade was committed into Cambodia.

(2) During the first portion of this reporting period the squadron operated in Cambodia with Task Force Shoemaker and discovered numerous cache sites and enemy positions. A and B Troop initiated the operation into Cambodia on 1 May 1970. C Troop entered the Cambodian action on 5 May 1970 and continued reconnaissance there until the withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

(3) On 1 July 1970 the three (03) Air Cavalry Troops reverted to general support of the Brigades with A Troop supporting the 1st Brigade in the northern part of Phuoc Long Province. B Troop supported the 3rd Brigade in the northeastern section of Phuoc Long and in the eastern portion of Binh Long Province. C Troop supported the 2nd Brigade in the largest section of Phuoc Long Province. D Troop came under the operational control of Divarty and worked primarily with road convoys and ambush patrols in AO Chief around Camp Gorvad. On 11 July A and C Troops exchanged missions when the Division AO was shifted to give a more equivalent portion to each Brigade.

The quarter ended with the squadron supporting the Division in its area of operation in the following manner: A Troop in general support of the 2nd Brigade in the northeastern portion of the AO; B Troop in general support of the 3rd Brigade in the northeastern portion of the AO; and D Troop supporting Divarty in AO Chief, located in the southwestern portion of the Division AO.

With the squadron in this configuration priority of effort was placed on supporting the ground elements with visual reconnaissance. Locating and plotting enemy cache sites and trails continues to be an important function of the squadron. A Troop contacts during the reporting period were primarily with the 5th VC Div., 7th NVA Div., and 86th RSG. B Troop contacts were with the 5th VC Div., 7th NVA Div., 86th RSG and the 50th RSG. C Troop contacts were with the 5th VC Div., 7th NVA Div., 86th RSG and the 50th RSG. Specific results of the contacts were:

a. Enemy: KBH-1025 KIA-26 POW-2
b. U.S. KIA-15 WIA-42

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(5) Significant Contacts:

(a) 1 May 1970-Operation Task Force Shoemaker. Troop B crossed the Cambodian border at 0730 hours and was immediately in contact from ground-to-air fire at XU371017 resulting in one (1) truck, four (4) tents (destroyed), and twelve (12) NVA KBH.

(b) 2 May 1970- Troop A at XT412992 approx. 0835 hours spotted seven (7) to ten (10) individuals. They engaged with organics resulting in two (2) NVA KBH. Approx. 0850 hours at XT409986 an OH-6A received heavy AK-47 fire and crashed, resulting in three US KIA. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted on the downed bird and was in contact immediately, resulting in ten (10) NVA KIA, the capture of one (1) Russian flag and eight (8) inches of documents. During the remainder of the day Troop A and B were in contact many times resulting in the following: two (2) aircraft shot down, three (3) US KIA, 47 NVA KBH, ten (10) NVA KIA, twelve (12) enemy trucks destroyed and one (1) motorcycle destroyed.

(c) 3 May 1970- At 0750 hours Troop B at XU462219 spotted twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) individuals. An OH-6A received ground-to-air fire and engaged with organics. Results were twelve (12) NVA KBH. At 0950 hours Troop B at XU412271 spotted ten (10) to fifteen (15) individuals on bicycles, engaged with organics, resulting in fourteen (14) NVA KBH and one (1) bicycle destroyed. At 1030 hours Troop C at YU362267 spotted twenty (20) individuals on bicycles, engaged with organics, resulting in nine (9) NVA KBH and two (2) bicycles destroyed. During the remainder of the day Troops A, B, and C were in frequent contacts with the following results: seventy-two (72) NVA KBH, twenty-eight (28) trucks destroyed, thirteen (13) bicycles destroyed and fifteen (15) tons of rice destroyed.

(d) 4 May 1970- Troop B at XU496166 spotted and engaged four (4) 25-ton trucks loaded with military equipment. Two (2) trucks were destroyed by organics. During the remainder of the day Troops A and B were in light contact, resulting in the following: ten (10) NVA KBH, eight (8) trucks destroyed, one (1) motorcycle destroyed and one (1) ton of ammo destroyed. B Troop Aero-Rifle Platoon captured 257 SKS rifles, three (3) .51 Cal. machine guns, and one (1) 75mm HR and some small arms ammunition.

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(a) 6 May 1970- At 0910 hours an OH-6A and UH-1H from Troop C at XU956427 received heavy ground-to-air fire from a village. Results were two (2) US KIA, four (4) US WIA and two (2) aircraft destroyed. At 1150 hours Troop B at XU770364 had contact when an OH-6A received 200 rounds of AK-47 fire. The aircraft took one (1) hit in the bubble, engaged the fire with organics, and received a secondary explosion, similar to that of a 500 lb. bomb. Results: seven (7) NVA KIA. At 1350 hours Troop C at YU127524 an OH-1C and OH-6A received ground-to-air fire, engaged with organics resulting in eleven (11) NVA KBH. At 1630 hours Troop A at XU210589 spotted 225 tons of rice and one (1) truck. Area was engaged with organics and four (4) air strikes, resulting in 150 tons of rice and one (1) truck destroyed. At 1830 hours Troop A at XU223168 spotted fifty (50) tons of rice; they engaged with organics with negative results. Airstrike requested for 7 May 1970. Day's results: two (2) US KIA, five (5) US WIA, thirty-one (31) NVA KBH, 150 tons of rice destroyed, four (4) trucks destroyed and fifty (50) tons of rice located.

(b) 7 May 1970- At 0800 hours at YU127430 Troop C spotted six (6) 2½-ton trucks and thirty (30) individuals with AK-47 rifles. They engaged with organics, resulting in fifteen (15) NVA KBH and six (6) trucks destroyed. At 0810 hours at YU34423 Troop C spotted two (2) 2½-ton trucks and five (5) individuals. They engaged with organics, resulting in five (5) NVA KBH, five (5) SKS's destroyed, two (2) huts destroyed and two (2) AK-47's destroyed. Requested air strike resulting in one (1) .30 Cal. machine gun destroyed, one (1) .51 Cal. machine gun destroyed, and four (4) NVA KBH. During the remainder of the day Troops B, C had numerous contacts resulting in the following results: forty-five (45) NVA KBH, nine (9) trucks and five (5) water buffalo destroyed.

(c) 8 May 1970- At 0805 hours at YU004428 Troop C spotted and engaged six (6) 2½-ton trucks, resulting in four (4) trucks destroyed. At 0835 hours at YU125525 Troop C OH-6A received ground-to-air fire, engaged with organics, resulting in fifteen (15) NVA KBH. At 1337 hours at YU125526 Troop C spotted and engaged ten (10) individuals, resulting in ten (10) NVA KBH. At 1650 hours at XU255205 Troop A spotted and engaged fifteen (15) individuals, resulting in ten (10) NVA KBH. During the remainder of the day Troops A, B, C had numerous contacts resulting in the following: Fifty-one (51) NVA KBH, eight (8) trucks and one (1) tractor destroyed. One (1) aircraft, which spotted fifty (50) tons of rice, was shot down.
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(h) 9 May 1970 - At 1555 hours at XU710450 B Troop spotted twenty (20) individuals, twelve (12) 2½-ton trucks. An OH-6A then received ground to air fire and engaged with organics, resulting in four (4) NVA KIA, two (2) trucks destroyed. Requested air strike. EDA of air strike: four (4) trucks, one (1) ton of ammo, and one (1) ton of PAVN destroyed; two (2) NVA KIA. At 1830 hours at XU975445 B Troop spotted and engaged seven (7) NVA resulting in seven (7) NVA KIA and one (1) AK-47 destroyed. At 1830 hours at XU710450 B Troop spotted and engaged two (2) 2½-ton trucks, resulting in eighteen (18) NVA KIA, eight (8) trucks destroyed and one (1) AK-47 rifle destroyed.

(i) 10 May 1970 - At 1135 hours at XU710402 B Troop spotted and engaged three (3) individuals on bicycles, resulting in three (3) NVA KIA. At 1605 hours at XU350425 B Troop OH-6A received small arms fire, engaged with organics and ARA, resulting in eight (8) NVA KIA and two (2) NVA KIA. At 1600 hours at YU305540 C Troop spotted and engaged two (2) 2½-ton trucks resulting in one (1) destroyed and one (1) damaged. At 1836 hours at XU513053 A Troop spotted a large bunker complex with twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) individuals in area. Enemy was engaged with organics, ARA and air strikes resulting in six (6) NVA KIA, six (6) NVA KIA, three (3) NVA KIA and numerous bunkers and structures destroyed. During the remainder of the day light contacts were made, resulting in twenty-one (21) NVA KIA, one (1) aircraft shot down, one (1) US WIA and one (1) truck destroyed.

(j) 11 May 1970 - At 1015 hours at XU683459 Troop B spotted and engaged fifteen (15) individuals, resulting in three (3) NVA KIA. At 1115 hours at YU360460 Troop C AH-1G received fifty (50) rounds of automatic fire. Enemy was engaged with organics resulting in ten (10) NVA KIA. At 1400 hours at XU508520 Troop B spotted and engaged two (2) 2½-ton trucks resulting in one (1) destroyed and one (1) damaged. At 1700 hours at XU547034 Troop C spotted and engaged ten (10) individuals, resulting in six (6) NVA KIA. At 1730 hours at YU168547 Troop C spotted and engaged an unknown size element in an open field, resulting in thirty-seven (37) NVA KIA. During the remainder of the day Troops B, C and E were in moderate to heavy contact resulting in the following: seventy-three (73) NVA KIA; one (1) truck and one (1) radio destroyed; two (2) AK-47s and one .30 cal. machinegun captured.

(k) 12 May 1970 - At 1400 hours at YU574125 Troop B Infantry Platoon was inserted to check out a bunker complex. At 1425 hours the "Blues" were in contact resulting in seven (7) NVA KIA; one (1) SKE and several documents captured. At 1630 hours at YU028410 C Troop spotted and engaged twenty (20) individuals, resulting in nineteen (19) NVA KIA and two (2) individual weapons destroyed. During the
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remainder of the day contact of all troops was light resulting in the following: twenty-two (22) NVA KBH, seven (7) NVA KIA, and two (2) individual weapons destroyed.

(1) 13 May 1970- At 1245 hours at YU136497 Troop C OH-6A received ground-to-air fire. Aircraft went down with two (2) US WIA. Pink Team engaged the area resulting in eleven (11) NVA KBH. At 1500 hours at YU130442 Troop C spotted and engaged classroom demonstration area resulting in fifteen (15) NVA KBH. At 1710 hours at XU267306 Troop B Infantry Platoon established contact with four (4) individuals resulting in the following: one (1) NVA KIA and one (1) POW. During the remainder of the day there was light to moderate contact resulting in the following totals: thirty-six (36) NVA KBH, one (1) NVA KIA, one (1) NVA POW, two (2) US aircraft shot down, and two (2) US WIA.

(m) 14 May 1970- At 0815 hours at XU638536 Troop B spotted three (3) 22-ton trucks and five (5) oxcarts, each oxcart containing 2,200 pounds of rice. Same was engaged with organics resulting in six (6) NVA KBH, three (3) trucks and 6,600 pounds of rice destroyed. At 0905 hours at YU134443 Troop C OH-6A received ground-to-air fire, engaged area with organics resulting in seven (7) NVA KBH. At 1100 hours at XU243013 Troop A Infantry Platoon was inserted to look for earlier downed aircraft. At 1155 hours at XU246016 Troop A OH-6A received heavy AK-47 fire, crashed and burned. "Blues" attempting to move to the downed aircraft made contact at XU245015 resulting in three (3) NVA KIA, one (1) US WIA, three (3) US (air crew) KIA, and one (1) aircraft destroyed. At 1350 hours at YU125433 Troop C spotted and engaged five (5) individuals equipped with AK-47s resulting in five (5) NVA KBH and five (5) AK-47s destroyed. During the remainder of the day light to moderate contact was made, resulting in thirty-one (31) NVA KBH, four (4) NVA KIA, three (3) US KIA, one (1) US WIA, one (1) US aircraft destroyed, 12,000 pounds of rice destroyed, five (5) AK-47 rifles destroyed, and twenty (20) tons of rice discovered.

(n) 17 May 1970- At 0745 hours at XU771438 Troop B OH-6A received automatic fire from an estimated twenty (20) individuals. Enemy was engaged with organics resulting in five (5) NVA KBH. At 1030 hours at YU774427 Troop B spotted and engaged five (5) individuals entering a hut. Results were five (5) NVA KBH and the hut destroyed. At 1500 hours at XU73440 Troop B spotted and engaged eight (8) bicycles and destroyed 1600 pounds of rice. During the remainder of the day there was light to moderate contact resulting in the following totals: twenty-six (26) NVA KBH; one (1) bicycle captured; eight (8) bicycles and 1600 pounds of rice destroyed.

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(a) 18 May 1970- At 0900 hours at XU835474 Troop B spotted and engaged nine (9) individuals resulting in nine (9) NVA KDH. At 0905 at XU690534 Troop A spotted eight (8) individuals and an estimated 2,200 pounds of rice. Area was engaged with organics resulting in two (2) NVA KDH and 2,200 pounds of rice destroyed. During the remainder of the day all troops had light contact resulting in the following: twenty-seven (27) NVA KDH, four (4) tons of rice destroyed and twenty-two tons of rice discovered.

(p) 26 May 1970- At 1112 hours at XU700454 Troop B spotted three (3) individuals and 77,000 pounds of rice. Area was engaged with organics resulting in three (3) NVA KDH. Air strikes further destroyed 40,000 pounds of rice.

(q) 4 June 1970- Troop C at XU119358 spotted and engaged five (5) individuals resulting in five (5) NVA KDH. At XU12405 Troop C spotted and engaged four (4) jeeps and one (1) 2 1/2 ton truck resulting in one (1) 2 1/2 ton truck destroyed. During the remainder of the day contact was light resulting in fifteen (15) NVA KDH. 66,000 pounds of rice destroyed in the previous three days.

(r) 5 June 1970- Troop B at XU745555 spotted and engaged thirty (30) to forty (40) individuals resulting in thirteen (13) NVA KDH. During the remainder of the day contact was light resulting in fifteen (15) NVA KDH.

(s) 23 June 1970- Troop B at XU997425 an OH-6A received ground-to-air fire from a bunker complex. Area was engaged with organics resulting in ten (10) NVA KDH and one (1) 20' X 40' hootch destroyed by a secondary explosion. Air strike then requested.

(t) 18 July 1970- Troop D at XU957214, while performing security for a convoy made contact with an estimated company-size NVA unit armed with AK-47's, SKS's, RPG and B-40 rockets. Results: five (5) US WIA.

(u) 19 July 1970- At 0755 hours at XU904226 Troop B OH-6A received ground-to-air fire, and engaged with organics. Result: one (1) NVA KDH. This was the start of frequent ground-to-air firings for the remainder of the day. Total results: twelve (12) NVA KDH, three (3) VC KDH, and the destruction of numerous bunkers and hootches.

(v) 23 July 1970- At 1000 hours at YP589A Troop A spotted and engaged two (2) individuals. Result: one (1) VC KDH. This was the beginning of frequent contacts throughout the day. Total results: six (6) NVA KDH, three (3) VC KDH, two (2) US WIA, one (1) AH-1G shot down, one (1) AK-47 rifle and numerous bunkers and hootches were also destroyed.

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g. 11th Combat Aviation Group

(1) MISSION: During the period 1 May 70 through 31 July 1970 the 11th Combat Aviation Group has provided extensive general and direct support throughout the Central and Northern portion of III Corps Tactical Zone and Cambodia. Helicopters were provided in support of the First, Second and Third Brigades. Support was also provided to the elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 9th ARVN Regiment, 3rd ARVN Battalion and CIDG Forces. Other support missions flown included aerial surveillance, target acquisition, courier service, and VIP flights.

(2) EXECUTION: Support of the various units listed above, involved participation in the following operations:

(a) Operation Kentucky Cougar which was initiated the latter part of July 1969 and is still in progress.

(b) Toan Thang III which commenced in February 1969 and is also still in progress.

(c) Cambodian Operation which commenced on 1 May 1970 and terminated on 30 June 1970. The 11th CAG flew a record total of 50,533 hours of both Divisional and Non-Divisional support for this operation.

1. Planning: At 1400 hours on 29 April 1970 all battalions received the basic concept of the operation. The 227th Assault Helicopter Bn was assigned the task of combat assaulting 3 ARVN battalions into Cambodia. This was to be accomplished by 42 UH-1H and 8 AH-1G aircraft. The 229th Assault Helicopter Bn would establish FSB X-RAY utilizing US troops. The 228th Assault Support Helicopter Bn would provide general, tactical and logistical support to division and non-division units throughout the entire operation. 11th GS Co would provide Command and Control aircraft.

2. Initial Insertion: The initial insertion of US troops into Cambodia was led by B/229 in establishing FSB X-RAY. 2nd BN 7th Cavalry was the first US element airlifted into Cambodia. The first lift received no enemy opposition; however, the second insertion received heavy ground-to-air fire. Six of the UH-1H helicopters sustained battle damage and a seventh was shot down. Meanwhile, 227th AHB established 3 ARVN FSB's; East (3d ARVN BN), Center (5th ARVN BN), and West I (9th ARVN BN). The 228th ASIB, air lifting combat supplies and equipment, were just a few minutes behind the Combat Assaults. On 1 May Chinooks flew a record of 270.3 CH-47 hours, 1194.7 tons of supplies and 1405 packs carried in support of the initial insertion into Cambodia.

3. Sustained Operations in Cambodia: The succeeding days of the Cambodian Operation saw the establishment of FSB's North I, Drums, Myron, Brown, North, Alpha, Scout, Mo, Neal, Ranch, Ready, Remagen,
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Burkett, O-Rang, Gordon, Speer, Thor, Gold, Corral, Bronco, Anna, Shakey, and David. The enormous task of exploiting the area, resupplying and extraction of cache sites in support of both division and non-division units created an unprecedented need for aviation support. As the operation continued a tremendous increase in ground-to-air fire (GAF) occurred. A total of 213 separate GAF incidents were recorded during the 2-month operation. The majority of GAF occurred around the Fire Support Bases. Security provided by the ARVN's was poor. After Command Emphasis had been placed on better security, a noticeable decrease occurred in GAF at these locations.

4. Fire Support Base Extractions: The withdrawal, the most critical of all phases of the operation, was executed in a truly classic manner. The withdrawal sequence was time-phased to allow for the redeployment of one FSB each day. On the second day of extractions, FS3 David was to be relocated. Weather became a factor. The ceiling was less than 100 ft with ground fog and rain. The Chinooks from 228th ASHB showed the ultimate in professionalism by flying low level, through valleys and under Actual Instrument (AI) conditions to accomplish the extraction. No additional weather days were encountered during the remainder of the operation. 2 significant complications did present themselves. First, there was a lack of coordination between ground commanders and flight leaders as to the disposition of troops for expeditious loading of aircraft. Secondly, there was a noticeable shortage of slings, nets and chains for ground units to rig CH-47 external loads. Wasted blade time occurred while waiting for loads to be prepared for air movement.

h. 8th Engineer Battalion:

(1) During the reporting period the majority of the 8th Engr Bn's effort was directed toward support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AC) in Operation Toan Thang 43. The 8th Engr Bn constructed or assisted in the construction of 52 fire support bases for the division and assisted in the closing of 49 fire support bases which were no longer needed for tactical operations. Non-divisional engineer effort in the division area of operations was mainly directed towards the upgrade and maintenance of roads and airfields, and in the construction of MBR facilities for units moving to new base camps. This effort by non-divisional engineer units was coordinated by the 8th Engr Bn and was significant in enabling the 8th Engr Bn to devote the majority of its efforts to the direct combat support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AC).

(2) Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period. The equipment platoons were involved in several construction and maintenance projects in the division area of operations. During the months of May, June, and July, HHC was involved extensively in the upgrade and maintenance of forward airfields at Bu Gia Map and Rang Rang. At Bu Gia Map, the airfield was maintained as a Type I, C-130 airfield, and Rang Rang was upgraded and maintained as a Type I
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C-123 airfield. Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided the line companies with equipment for the construction and upgrade of FSB's in the FIRST TEAM's area of operation. A total of 1070 CH-54 and CH-47 sorties and 39 fixed wing sorties were required to move airborne engineer equipment throughout the division area of operations in support of widespread construction efforts. At Camp Gorvad, engineer equipment personnel maintained existing road and drainage systems. The divisional water points, operated by NHQ personnel, produced 943,825 gallons of potable water.

(3) Company A remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade with its base camp located at Tay Ninh during the first part of the quarter. During the last part of June, Company A relocated its base camp with the 1st Brigade to Bien Hoa. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to support the Brigade. During this period Company A was involved in the opening and/or maintenance of FSB's West II, X-Ray, Evans, Snuffy, Bruiser, David, Speer, Exodus, 11-Bravo, Garry Owen, Eisenhower, Nancy, Dan, Patton, Odin, Timber, and Bradley. At the end of May, Company A opened a Type I, C-7A airstrip at FSB David and maintained the airfield until the end of Toan Thang 43. Company A also provided engineer support in the relocation of the Brigade base camp to Bien Hoa.

(4) Company B remained in direct support of the 2nd Brigade with its base camp at FSB Buttons at Song Be. During the period, Company B was involved in the construction and improvement of FSB's Brown, No, Myron, Neal, Shakey's Hill, Rob, Brewer, Barry, Candy, Snuffy, Joanne, and Betty. In addition to these operations Company B was involved in the upgrade and maintenance of FSB Buttons. These projects included the installation of culverts and erection of Multiple Pipe Arch Shelters for the 1-9th Cav, and the pneumating and leveling of the old POL area at Buttons.

(5) Company C remained in direct support of the 3rd Brigade with its base camp at Quan Loi. Minesweep and demolition support was provided to the infantry on an "as required" basis. The construction, rehabilitation, and closing of fire support bases in the 3rd Brigade area of operation were Company C's main missions during the period. During May, June and July, Company C built and/or maintained FSB's West II, North II, Evans, Ranch, Ready, Ketter, Thor, Gonder, Corral, 11-Bravo, Anna, Ramada, Eunice, Ft. Granite, and Union. At Quan Loi, Company C built a TOC for one of the guard sectors, installed defensive wire, and worked on area drainage. Company C also provided support to the 1st Brigade in their relocation from Tay Ninh to Bien Hoa.

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i. 13th Signal Battalion:

(1) On 25 April, after being alerted by the G-3, the 13th Signal Battalion began planning for the 1st Cavalry Division's Cambodian Operations. The secrecy of the operation limited the size of the initial planning group to the BN Commander and the Assistant Division Signal Officer (AISO). On 27 April, a Task Force was organized with the code name "Shoemaker" and the AISO was selected as the Task Force signal officer. On the same date, the signal annex to the Task Force operations order was submitted to G-3 for approval. The task force signal officer and the 13th Signal BN's signal detachment deployed to Quan Loi on 29 April to establish communications for the Task Force Headquarters which was co-locating with the 3rd Brigade Headquarters.

(2) On May 1, when the 1st Cavalry Division combat elements crossed into Cambodia, the 13th Signal BN had established the following communications in support of the Task Force: a four channel VHF system between Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi tying in the Task Force headquarters with the division headquarters; a four channel system between Katum and Quan Loi connecting the 3rd Brigade TAC CP with the Task Force; net control stations for Task Force FM radio nets TF #1 (S), TF #2 (S), and TF #3 (NS); remote stations in the division FM nets D-1 (S) and D-2 (S) utilizing the 3rd Brigade's radios; and a SB-22 switchboard to provide a switching capability within the Task Force headquarters. In addition, a special courier system was instituted between the division headquarters and the Task Force headquarters and a C-7A (Caribou) with an AN/ARC-121 relay was placed on standby at Quan Loi. This airborne relay was activated on 2 May in order to maintain FM communications between the Task Force headquarters and its forward elements.

(3) As operations in Cambodia expanded, the warning order was issued on 2 May for the 2nd Brigade to establish a TAC CP at Loc Ninh. This TAC CP would be under the Task Force Shoemaker headquarters and control combat units assaulting into new areas of Cambodia. To support this new thrust, the battalion airlifted four channel VHF equipment and personnel to Quan Loi and Loc Ninh and activated a VHF system between the two points on 3 May. Additionally, an AN/VSC-2 radio teletype terminal was hooked into Loc Ninh to give the 2nd Brigade TAC CP entrance into the division's D-3 RTT net.

(4) On 3 May the battalion began planning for the termination of Task Force Shoemaker. With its end, control of 1st Cavalry Division units in Cambodia would revert back to the division headquarters at Phuoc Vinh. The 3rd BN TAC CP began moving from Katum back into Quan Loi on 5 May and at the same time, the 1st BN began displacing a forward CP to FSB Bruiser near Katum. To support the 1st BN's move, the VHF equipment at Katum was re-located to FSB Bruiser and a four channel system was re-established to Quan Loi. In addition, battalion FM radio assets and personnel were airlifted forward to the new FSB to assist the 1st BN. By 1400 hours, the
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1st Bde forward CP had communications established to the division headquarters at Phuoc Vinh. Task Force Shoemaker was officially terminated. On 8 May, an additional VHF system was activated between FSB Bruiser and Tay Ninh. This system enabled the 1st Bde forward elements to have voice communications with its rear area.

(5) As the tactical situation developed, the 1st Bde began moving its forward CP from FSB Bruiser back to Tay Ninh on 12 May. The VHF equipment and personnel supporting the CP were airlifted to Tay Ninh on 15 May to stand-by in anticipation of future operational requirements. On 14 May, one of these VHF channel systems was airlifted to Bo Duc and established a system for the 3rd Bde which was moving a TAC CP into that area. This VHF system between Bo Duc and Quan Loi connected the TAC CP with Brigade headquarters remaining at Quan Loi. On the same date, the 1st Bde began displacing to Quan Loi. To support this move, the battalion had to again furnish organic FM equipment and personnel. In addition, the provisional FSB located at Katum moved to Du Dop. The AN/VSC-2 in support at Katum was lifted into Du Dop to support a new provisional FSB being built up at that location.

(6) On 17 May, initial planning was begun on the 1st Bde moving a TAC CP from Quan Loi into the northeastern portion of the division's AO. On 19 May, VHF, FM, and .50 equipment and personnel were airlifted to FSB Snuffy in preparation for the impending move. On the following day, the 1st Bde secured and established a TAC CP at FSB David near O'Range, Cambodia. The 13th Signal Bn shifted the staged equipment and personnel from Snuffy to David in a matter of hours. In addition, a C-7A with an AN/ARC-121 airborne relay orbited the new CP and relayed FM voice communications for units moving and setting up their new areas. By nightfall on the 19th, the 1st Bde TAC CP had telephone, FM secure and AM communications with division headquarters; a distance of 110 kilometers.

(7) The VHF system between Quan Loi and Loc Ninh was terminated on 21 May and the equipment and personnel were airlifted back to Phuoc Vinh following the relocation of the 2nd Bde's TAC CP back to Buttons. At the same time, the AN/VSC-2 was also brought back to Phuoc Vinh.

(8) FSB David received a heavy enemy indirect fire attack and ground probe on the morning of 14 June. Personnel from the 13th Signal Bn immediately assumed their secondary role as infantrymen and helped repel the attack. Seven men from the Bn received awards for valor, including one Silver Star as a result of their bravery. In addition, no communications were lost throughout the battle and the 1st Bde TAC CP was able to communicate with all its supporting elements.

(9) On 19 June, the initial pull-out of 1st Cavalry Division forces in Cambodia was begun. On the same date, the AN/VSC-2 and FM equipment and personnel in support of the 1st Bde TAC CP at FSB David were airlifted back to Phuoc Vinh. The following day, the VHF system between FSB David and Buttons was terminated and lifted back to Phuoc Vinh. At the same time, the 1st Bde's TAC CP displaced to FSB Buttons.

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(10) On 28 June, the 3d Bde's TAC CP located at Do Duc moved back into Quan Loi. The VHF system supporting the CP was deactivated and airlifted back to Phuoc Vinh. By 30 June, 1st Cavalry Division forces were out of Cambodia and the Cambodian Operations were history.

(11) On 1 July 1970, the Secretary of the Army visited the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The 13th Signal Battalion provided equipment and personnel to provide him access to the D-1 and D-2 nets from FSB Mo and FSB Exodus. VHF systems were also installed from the two fire support bases to FSB Buttons to provide TOC to TOC telephone communications. After the Secretary of the Army departed the personnel and the equipment were redeployed to Camp Gorad except for VHF, which was left at FSB Mo to provide access to the 2nd Bde MNU station for personnel at No.

(12) The 13th Signal Bn sent a 3-man team to Bien Hoa on 5 July 1970 to assist the 1st Bde in erecting an AD-216 Antenna Tower. The 1st Bde was in the process of moving from its forward CP at FSB Buttons and rear CP at Tay Ninh to its new CP at Bien Hoa.

(13) On 6 July 1970, coordination was made with the 53rd Sig Bn for the 13th Sig Bn to emplace a relay site on Nui Chua Chan mountain. On 7 July 1970, a radio team with equipment deployed to the mountain and by 1700 hours relays for the D-1 and D-2 nets were functioning as well as the battalion engineering net. Nui Chua Chan provides relay capability for the 1st Bde to its higher headquarters and to its subordinate units. Late the same evening, the battalion was alerted to provide communications to Boa Luc. Major General Casey's helicopter had crashed and search parties were deploying to the vicinity of the wreckage. By 0503 hours on 8 July 1970, a shared hotline had been installed from G-3/11th AVN TOC to the MCV compound at Dao Luc over the area system. At first light on the 9th a VSC-2 as well as an AM team were airlifted to Dao Luc to provide AM communications as well as access to the D-2 and D-11 nets. The new relay at Nui Chua Chan was instrumental in relaying traffic from Dao Luc to Camp Gorad. Communications provided at Dao Luc were removed on 10 July 1970. The wreckage and bodies had been recovered.

(14) 15 July 1970 a battalion awards ceremony was conducted. Sgt Goldsworthy (VHF platoon 5) was awarded the Silver Star for his actions at Rang Rang, Cambodia during a ground attack.

(15) 16 July 1970, MG Latta, CG, USASTRAZCOM, visited the 13th Signal Bn. He was escorted by LTC Archibald, the BN commander. The provisional FSE at Du Dop closed and AM radio equipment was airlifted to Phuoc Vinh.

(16) 18 July 1970, the VSC-2 and radio personnel which provided access to the D-7 net were moved from Tay Ninh to Bien Hoa (Spt and Opns Plt). The lst Bde had ceased operation as a result of the move of the 1st Bde.

(17) 23 July, LTC Robert G. Lynn assumed command of the 13th Signal Battalion from LTC Norman E. Archibald, departing CO.
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2.(c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Senior NCO Assignment Policies

(a) OBSERVATION: In the battalion, a lack of experienced E7's to fill the position of Platoon Sergeant persists.

(b) EVALUATION: At present, NCOO graduates with the rank of E6 have been performing admirably, and are making ends meet in the rifle companies. However, much can be gained by having experienced E7's to help our men in battle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Senior NCO assignment policies should channel more E7's with an 11B MOS to rifle companies in Vietnam.

(2) Introduction of New Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: Unit personnel require special training to operate and maintain new items of equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: The introduction of new items of equipment causes special training problems. In most instances, new items of equipment were received by units and placed into operation by untrained personnel. This practice has resulted in injuries and excessive equipment damage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Mandatory training be established for select personnel in units scheduled to receive new equipment.

b. Intelligence

(1) Target Location Procedures Used in the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: Units with visual reconnaissance missions, such as 1-9 Cav and Brigade Scout elements, have difficulty in determining accurate grids for enemy locations they observe.

(b) EVALUATION: Inaccurate grids submitted by aerial reconnaissance elements often result in the loss of previously identified cache sites and base camps. Needless time is wasted relocating these areas. Although initially hesitant to shoot artillery into their working area, the reconnaissance elements soon found that artillery marking rounds were an excellent way to accurately determine grids of the enemy position they had located. The method developed was rapid and cut down considerably the time required to relocate targets which had previously been identified. In addition, the artillery had accurate grids to be included when desired in artillery plan firer.

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(o) RECOMMENDATION: The recommended method is to give the firing unit an "at my command" mission on a grid within the recon box prior to the arrival of the helicopters. When they arrive on station, they fire in one grid (this should not take more than three minutes). The battery is also laid and ready to fire any subsequent missions. If the teams identify any enemy structures or locations, they can either shift from the previous marking mission or conduct an adjustment. The replot grid is given to the recon unit along with the target number and posted at the firing battery for later reference should the recon unit want to locate the same area at a later date.

(2) Increase in Ground to Air Fire

(a) OBSERVATION: During the last month of the reporting period, an increase in ground to air fire near villages and other populated areas has been noted.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past, ground to air fire has normally been received while flying over unpopulated areas. Air crew members are usually more relaxed and less cautious in and around populated areas. With the increase in ground to air fire around these areas, we can expect more aircraft hits unless air crew personnel are provided with this information and take appropriate action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All air crew personnel should be notified of the fact that an increase of ground to air fire in the vicinity of populated areas has been noted and that they be strongly advised to continue their vigilance and caution until they are safely on the ground in a secure area.

(3) Grid Lines on Intelligence Overlays

(a) OBSERVATION: Unit commanders, supplied with intelligence overlays for use in the field with their operations, experienced difficulty in rapid assimilation of intelligence on the overlays when they only had "tick marks" as reference points.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to enhance the ease with which overlays could be used, the same grids which were on the map were drawn on the overlays. Unit commanders reported that these overlay grid lines greatly facilitated their use of the overlays.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Map grid lines should be placed on intelligence overlays intended for field use by unit commanders in order to provide greater and easier understanding of their contents.

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(4) Advance Warning of Impending Attacks

(a) OBSERVATION: Intelligence sources have been effective in providing advance warning of impending attacks on fixed installations.

(b) EVALUATION: On several occasions during this quarter, after receiving intelligence information on enemy activities, aircraft within the 11th Combat Aviation Group were dispersed to other airfields. Attacks did occur in a few instances and it is felt that losses and damages were minimized by the aircraft dispersal action taken.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed upon evaluating and acting upon intelligence information by commanders at all levels.

(5) Exploitation of Ground Sensor Activations

(a) OBSERVATION: Judicious employment of ground sensors around US logistics, communications and fire support bases, together with a rapidly responsive fire-plan to support sensor activations can effectively thwart planned enemy ground attacks and attacks by fire.

(b) EVALUATION: Ground sensors were recently emplaced in the vicinity of known and suspected enemy firing positions and routes of movement around Quan Loi Base Camp. Assessment of immediate, preplanned artillery response to sensor activations on three separate occasions revealed indications of abortive attempts to attack Quan Loi by fire. First light visual reconnaissance and ground sweeps revealed scattered clothing, artillery casings, partially fused mortar ammunition and other equipment left by the enemy in his apparent haste to escape the incoming artillery.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ground sensor systems be more extensively employed around logistical installations and fire support bases and that current sensor stocks be enlarged to permit employment in quantity.

c. Operations

1) Evacuation of Enemy Caches

(a) OBSERVATION: The expeditious, efficient extraction of large enemy caches, such as those discovered in Cambodia, is an operation infrequently practiced and requires detailed planning and coordinated execution.

(b) EVALUATION: Based on the cache evacuation experience in Cambodia, the following factors must be considered in planning:

1. Type of cache material; net weight, gross cube.
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2 Location and ease of extraction.

3 Security requirements; size of cache, nature of enemy forces, type and density of vegetation, stay time for security element.

4 Labor requirements; use of local labor, use of combat forces, request CIDG or RF/PF assistance and share captured material.

5 Employment of Engineers; type, number, duration, special equipment or skills (repelling proficiency).

6 Type of extraction and LZ construction.
   a. Road
   b. Helicopter, UH-1H
   c. Helicopter, UH-1H with cargo hook
   d. Helicopter, CH-47

7 Use of vehicles (usually miles).

8 Ground accessibility for vehicles (road construction required).

9 Disposition of materials
   a. Current guidance on material to be extracted
   b. Destruction and accountability
      (1) Description of materials to be destroyed
      (2) Photographs
      (3) Demolition, rigging, extraction of forces or movement to a minimum safe distance, incorporation of automatic ambushes to preclude tampering or deactivation of charges, air warning.

10 Evacuation requirements
   a. Slingers, nets, doughnuts
   b. Riggers
   c. Blackhats and control frequencies for LZ.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That these planning factors be incorporated into an SOP to assist units in planning exploitation, extraction and destruction of cache sites.

(2) 1st AVN Airborne Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the period of the Cambodian operation, this headquarters received nothing but good comments from Assault Support Helicopter Battalions concerning their support of the 1st AVN Airborne Division. The 1st AVN Airborne consistently had their external loads well-rigged and ready at prescribed pick-up times. Their log pads were noticed to be well policed, thus preventing the likelihood of blowing debris which invariably causes personnel injury and equipment damage.

(b) EVALUATION: It is believed that the liaison with the 1st AVN Airborne, when the 11th Combat Aviation Group initially started supporting them, contributed immeasurably to the AVN outstanding performance. The training received in rigging external loads, meeting prescribed pick-up times and policing landing zones contributed much to their combat efficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that in all future operations with AVN units, the same type of initial liaison support be given. A liaison team insures the supported unit is made aware of how this group operates and has already proven to pay big dividends. It also facilitates a smooth operation and is a big step forward in the Vietnamization effort.

(3) Pathfinder support.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Cambodian operation, the Pathfinders in some instances were not allowed to accompany the initial combat assault into new fire support bases.

(b) EVALUATION: After security has been established in the landing zone, it is common practice to immediately bring in heavy equipment using CH-47 and C-54 aircraft. Before medium helicopters descend into a new fire support base, the aviators must be assured security and necessary air traffic control has been established. This information is normally acquired by radio communication with the Pathfinder controller in the landing zone. The absence of Pathfinders in the landing zone has caused countless delays and has been a primary factor in wasting valuable time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended all supported ground elements throughout the 1st Cavalry Division be made aware of this problem. Additionally, it is suggested each maneuver battalion include in its SOP a section concerning Pathfinder support and an implementation of the above mentioned technique. Pathfinders, when included in the initial lift of a combat assault, have proven effective, successful and efficient.
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(4) Technique in Avoiding Ground to Air Fire.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Cambodian Operation, there was a significant increase in ground to air fire. The primary factor causing this increase was the prevalent low ceiling which forced aircraft to fly within the effective range of enemy anti-aircraft weapons.

(b) EVALUATION: This organization has found that exposure to ground fire is greatly reduced by conducting combat assaults at low level on the tree tops, utilizing the Cobra gunships at a higher altitude to vector the lift ships. This method proved effective and successful.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all assault helicopter units be made aware of this technique.

(5) Employment of the E158 CS Canister.

(a) OBSERVATION: The E158 CS Canister may be utilized to deliver both CS and PSYOPS leaflets.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the E158 CS Canister has been effective in the delivery of CS in many tactical situations. The psychological impact can be greatly enhanced by combining the CS drops with a PSYOPS leaflet drop. The leaflets can be taped to the E158. The tape holds the leaflets in place until ignition of the canister.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That PSYOPS leaflets be taped to E158 Canisters in situations where it would be advantageous to increase the psychological effect of the CS.

(6) Ground Troops Firing their Weapons While in Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that ground troops utilize their organic weapons to place suppressive fire on the LZ during a hot insertion.

(b) EVALUATION: While the extra suppressive fire placed on the LZ by ground troops on board the aircraft can decrease the amount of fire received during insertions, it has been noted that some of the troops have exited the insertion aircraft with empty or near empty magazines in their weapons. The aircraft commander does not have immediate, positive control over their fire like he does the aircraft door gunners (by means of the aircraft intercom system) and the possibility of the ground troops accidentally shooting friendly aircraft and/or ground elements because of aircraft movements overrides the usefulness of their suppressive fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That troops on board aircraft be instructed to hold their fire until after they exit the aircraft. This will insure the immediate use of their weapons on the ground, where they can be employed most effectively.

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(7) Utilizing AIR During Rapelling Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During rapelling operations the aircraft is in a stationary position and exposed to enemy fire for an extremely long period of time.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the extended time the aircraft used for rapelling is in a stationary position, it is exposed to an extremely heavy amount of enemy fire. Continued suppressive fire is needed to lessen the danger of the aircraft being shot down. Normally, the suppressive fire is placed in very close proximity to the aircraft. This, of necessity, limits the types of weapons which can be employed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That two sections of 4.2 be included in any plan for rapelling operations. These two sections should utilize, to the fullest extent possible, 2.75 inch rockets with 10 pound warheads and 7.62mm mini-guns. Suppressive fire as close as possible to the aircraft used for rapelling is where suppressive fire is needed most.

(8) The "Air Bridge" Concept.

(a) OBSERVATION: In AO Chief the concept of the "Air Bridge" was used to enhance the mobility of ground maneuver forces in crossing impossible barriers.

(b) EVALUATION: A plan of maneuver required a river crossing by two platoons of D Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Bridging was not immediately available. As the platoon approached the crossing site, a PZ was established where those personnel not involved in driving the vehicles or running the vehicular mounted weapons were organized for a combat assault to establish a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the crossing site. A brief artillery preparation was planned but not employed due to friendly troops in the vicinity of the bridgehead. An artillery smoke screen was used to obscure the area from which ground to air fire had been received the previous day. The bridgehead was secured by an aerial combat assault. Within minutes of the signal that the bridgehead was secure, CH-47's arrived at the PZ to lift the vehicles into the bridgehead. Due to the short turn around time for the helicopters, the crossing was rapidly completed. Extraction fires were planned along the air corridor during the crossing. The entire operation took less than 45 minutes. The crossing complete, the force continued on its mission. Blade time was minimal due to the short distance from the PZ to the bridgehead.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver forces should give the "air bridge" concept consideration on operations requiring the passage of barriers.
Extraction Fire Support Plans Used in Cambodia.

(9) **OBSERVATION:** Enemy fire encountered during early extractions in Cambodia brought about the need for extensive fire support planning in extraction operations. The extraction fire plan developed by Division Artillery proved to be very effective in the suppression of enemy fires during the vulnerable stages of extraction operations.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Used extensively by units of the Division Artillery and by the ARVN Airborne, the extraction fire plan prescribes defensive fires by Artillery and ME around the closing FSB and for an anti-aircraft suppressive fire along the assigned flight corridor. Evacuation lift ships participating in the extraction were well briefed as to the corridor restriction and the area in the area. AVSMCC warned other aircraft in the area. In this way, extraction fires were able to continue without check fire. The plan was so successful that significant enemy fire was not encountered by personnel or aircraft involved in extraction operations protected by this fire plan.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Fire support planners should consider the use of this plan during extraction operations.

Use of Artillery "Cache Denial" Fires in the Cambodian Operation.

(10) **OBSERVATION:** During operations in Cambodia, numerous cache sites were located by air and could not be immediately exploited by ground forces.

(b) **EVALUATION:** A method had to be developed to restrict enemy movement around the cache site until friendly troops arrived to exploit the cache. The artillery developed a plan for "cache denial" fires which was particularly effective. Artillery was placed in cache sites and along avenues of approach and withdrawal from the site. This fire was placed at irregular times on an around the clock basis prior to the arrival of friendly troops.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** The cache denial fire plan should be considered when interdiction of enemy forces from a known cache is desired.

Marking Positions for ME.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Aerial identification of friendly positions during monsoon flying weather continues to be difficult. Smoke is frequently masked by the low hanging clouds and strobe lights are confused with muzzle flashes.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Railroad flares continue to provide a brilliant, easily observed light even during reduced visibility. Friendly locations are easily spotted by ME aircraft when marked by railroad flares.
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(c) RECOMMENDATION: FO parties should carry additional railroad flares during the monsoon season.

(12) Cover and Deception for Combat Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Operations conducted in work areas of local civilian wood cutters, farmers, etc., pose a problem in cover and deception. Too often the answer has been either to warn the civilians to stay out of the area and possibly lose the advantage of surprise or to conduct the operation unannounced without the support of artillery GAP's and blocking fires.

(b) EVALUATION: In AO Chief, this problem has been successfully solved by clearing an operating AO through GVN channels much larger than required. Personnel not directly involved in the operation are briefed on an operation completely away from the actual target site. GVN officials and military leaders are asked to keep all civilians out of the entire area and for artillery clearances. Extensive air reconnaissance and artillery fires are used in the false area of operation. If a fire base is established, the guns are laid and registered in the direction of the false operation. The advantages of using deception plans of this type are as follows:

1. Simple and easy to employ.
2. Civilians are warned to stay out of the area, thus allowing artillery GAP's and blocking fires to support the operation from the beginning.
3. Political clearance for all artillery throughout the operation becomes a simple matter.
4. Possibility of early warning to the enemy is lessened.
5. Fire bases and artillery can be employed prior to the day of the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That cover and deception plans of this type be used when operations are in an area where large numbers of civilians are found.

(13) Use of Flak Jackets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Four flak jackets were issued to each company in the 2-12 Cav and worn by point men. This procedure has proven very effective and prevented numerous serious injuries.
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(b) EVALUATION: Because of the excessive weight of the flak jackets, four less packs were taken to the field and the log and personal items of the point men were divided and carried by other platoon members. The reduced weight enables the point men to move and react faster to the combat situation, in addition to affording the maximum protection possible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That resupply and personal items of the point men be distributed among members of the platoon to permit more effective utilization of the flak jacket on point.

(14) Defensive Wire.

(a) OBSERVATION: When installing wire in the barrier plan for a fire support base, the installation should be such that it can stop a scupper attack as well as a ground attack.

(b) EVALUATION: The concertina wire should be laid in three rows consisting of at least three belts for each row with all three belts on the forward slope, not on the top of the berm or at ground level. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to tie the concertina to engineer stakes with barbed wire. The second and third rows of defensive wire also consist of three belts of concertina and a two-strand barbed wire fence on the friendly side of the wire. The barbed wire serves as an "anti-ladder" fence, prohibiting the enemy from placing a ladder or pole across the wire and moving directly across. Stretching concertina wire to its maximum length and securing it to the ground is an extremely effective means of establishing hasty tangle foot. Three rows of hasty tangle foot can be installed rapidly and easily between each row of concertina with a 1/2 foot separation between each row.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders consider employing defensive wire as outlined above.

(15) Use of .50-caliber M6 Machinegun and 81mm Mortar.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of the .50-caliber machinegun and 81mm mortar at a unit's log site and/or PZ contributes to the overall security of the area.

(b) EVALUATION: The .50-caliber machinegun and 81mm mortar inserted into resupply sites and pick-up zones can be utilized in the H&I suppressive fire role. The mortar can fire periodic fires 360 degrees around the area, while the .50-caliber machinegun can be fired periodically in the "red splash" manner or as suppressive fires. These weapons can be delivered prior to final extraction or on the first log bird and removed either prior to the final extraction or during extraction. In the case of normal resupply, the weapons can be extracted anytime. The use of these weapons, however, requires considerable coordination between aviation support elements and the commander on the ground.
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(a) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders consider employment of these weapons during unit resupply and on extractions from pick-up zones.

(16) Assistance in Locating Cache Sites

(a) OBSERVATION: Assistance in locating cache sites may be obtained by careful evaluation and analysis of their physical layout.

(b) EVALUATION: Units were assisted in their search for cache sites by dissemination of information as to the location, manner of storage and camouflage, contents, etc. in their area of operation. This information assisted in the employment of mine detectors, aerial reconnaissance and general search patterns.

(o) RECOMMENDATION: That units be required to submit sketches of all bunker and cache systems to include sketches of an actual storage site.

(17) Use of Off-Leash Dogs.

(a) OBSERVATION: Observation of Scout Dog Teams on missions indicates that off-leash dogs are more effective than when on leash.

(b) EVALUATION: When using Scout Dog Teams with infantry units, increased effectiveness is gained by using off-leash trained dogs. The off-leash dog may be worked to the front of the point man or to the unit's flanks while the handler remains in position in the unit. This freedom of movement permits a large area to be checked by the dog in advance of the unit.

(o) RECOMMENDATION: That off-leash dog teams be utilized and additional teams acquired above the three currently available.

(18) Use of Automatic Ambushes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience during the Cambodian Campaign indicates the enemy has increased movement along trails during daylight hours.
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(b) EVALUATION: Automatic ambushes have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of maneuver elements in the field. They have denied the enemy freedom of movement at night. Consequently, he has been forced to increase movement during the day. On 14 June 1970, at approximately 0630 hours, Co C and Co D, 1-12 Cav had meeting engagements with enemy troops at separate locations while moving to disarm automatic ambushes. Had the two companies waited for 30 minutes, the battalion would have had approximately six additional kills for the campaign.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver elements should consider leaving automatic ambushes in place until approximately 0900 hours and increase use of daylight ambushes to take maximum advantage of the enemy's recent propensity for daylight movement.

(21) Detonation of Fougasse and Husch Flares upon Closure of a FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: On move day, bulldozers normally begin leveling the berm as early as possible. During the last two moves made by one battalion, the dozers severed and/or buried the wire and Claymore detonators connected to the Fougasse and Husch flares.

(b) EVALUATION: The flame/heat emitted by these chemical munitions serve as an effective means of destroying/burning anything left on the FSB after it has been cleared of all personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Shortly after first light on move day, the Chemical NCO should personally insure all Claymore wires and detonators are rolled and secured with their respective Fougasse and Husch flares. This will permit all Fougasse munitions to be realigned to face the interior of the FSB. The Husch flares should be ignited first, since they are closer to the interior, followed by the Fougasse detonations. This will saturate the FSB with fire as the final extraction takes place.

(22) Use of "Daisy-Cutters"

(a) OBSERVATION: The nature of the terrain in Brigade and Battalion AO's during the past 90 days has been generally rugged and devoid of natural LZ's. As a result, location of sit-down log and assault LZ's has been difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Daisy-Cutters are excellent for LZ construct missions in bamboo; however, they are ineffective in heavily forested areas with double canopy. A Daisy-Cutter does not have the force necessary to uproot and push away hardwood trees. It has been noted that 2,000 pound hard bombs and Commando Vaults are effective LZ construct weapons in forested areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maximum emphasis should be given to use of Daisy-Cutters in bamboo-infested areas and hard 2,000 pound bombs or Commando Vaults in forested areas.

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(23) Radar Tower Construction

(a) OBSERVATION: Construction of radar towers in the field is partially effective.

(b) EVALUATION: The construction of radar towers in the field using natural timber is time-consuming and utilizes manpower necessary for other firebase construction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Tower should be constructed prior to moving into the new firebase. The tower can be easily transported by an UH-1 helicopter and therefore could be moved from one firebase to another if necessary.

(24) Clearing of Hasty LZ's

(a) OBSERVATION: Location of cache sites in dense jungle requires the clearing of a hasty LZ.

(b) EVALUATION: To effectively clear the LZ, an efficient and highly organized engineer team with a rappelling capability is required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A typical rappel team consists of 1 NCO and 4 EM. This team is large enough to clear a UH-1B pad in 2-4 hours and small enough to be inserted in two lifts; one for the men and one for the equipment. The equipment carried consists of 3 chainsaws, 300 lbs of C-4, 1000 ft of detonating cord and demolition accessories. The mission starts as early in the morning as possible as it will give a longer work day and also allows the hovering helicopter a lower density altitude in which to work. If a larger IZ is required, additional men and equipment can be delivered once the UH-1B LZ is established.

(25) Use of M-757 Kit

(a) OBSERVATION: Demolition operations have shown that the use of the standard 30 block case of C-4 is bulky to handle and time consuming to use.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the 30 block case requires valuable time to disassemble and the case is difficult to handle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Experience during recent operations has shown the M-757 kit to be superior to the standard 30 block case of C-4. The M-757 kit consists of 8 canvas bags, each containing 16 blocks of C-4 and 8 lengths of detonation cord with boosters. Individual loads can be broken down and carried with greater ease and charges can be assembled at the work site quickly with less chance of malfunction.
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(26) Rappelling with a Chainsaw

(a) OBSERVATION: Members of an engineer team rappelling into the jungle should not rappel with chainsaws attached to their body.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience in rappelling operations has shown that a man rappelling with a chainsaw attached to his belt may cause injury to himself and damage to the chainsaw.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The best method of getting the chainsaw down to the ground is to tie it to the end of the rappel rope and lower it to the ground first. The advantage of this method is that it prevents injury to the operator and damage to the chainsaw, and also permits the chainsaw to serve as an anchor for the end of the rappel rope and aids in keeping the rope from becoming tangled in the trees and brush.

(27) POL Requirements in Initial Construction of a Firebase

(a) OBSERVATION: In firebase construction, the engineer equipment arrives shortly after the initial combat assault.

(b) EVALUATION: Maximum efficiency from the equipment is not attained on the first day because of the lack of POL products.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An engineer kit containing a minimum one day POL requirement should be shipped to the LZ after the combat assault or with the initial lifts of engineer equipment. The kit should consist of one barrel each of OE-10, OE-30, OE-50, two barrels of diesel, and one barrel of gasoline. If required for clearing fields of fire, a pallet of C-4 should be included.

(28) Cutting of Aircraft Tires by M8A1 Matting on Forward Airfields

(a) OBSERVATION: The M8A1 matting used on forward airstrips can cut the airplane tires.

(b) EVALUATION: If the matting is laid with the male end in the opposite direction of the landing aircraft, the cutting edge of the male end is exposed and could cut the tires. This is especially true during the wet season. When the matting is wet, the airplane will skid across the cutting edges.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: According to TM 5-337, M8A1 matting is laid with the female end in the direction of laying. Therefore in laying matting on airfields, placement should start in the middle of the airstrip. This procedure is recommended in matting the entire strip, or just the ends and overrun. The application of non-skid paint to the matting is important to prevent skidding during the wet season.

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Rice Destruction Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: The destruction of rice is a problem for units in the field due to a lack of resources and time in the area.

(b) EVALUATION: The dumping of rice in running water is the most desirable of all disposal methods. This, of course, is contingent on the proximity to streams. The next most practical method is to slit the sacks and scatter the loose rice over the ground. This method is dependent on the monsoon rains for wetting of the scattered rice. Once the rice has been wet, it begins to spoil in 12 hours. By 24 hours, mold growth on the surface of the rice was obvious and the odor had become very strong. By 72 hours, the rice had deteriorated to such a point that it would be difficult to eat, and even if it were it would have little food value. If the situation allows, the use of BURS to contaminate the surface of the rice is an effective adjunct to this method of disposal. CS use in this manner would be effective for about two to three days.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: These methods of rice destruction should be utilized whenever the situation permits.

Hazards of Thickened Fuel Drops and Thickened Fuel Log Missions

(a) OBSERVATION: Whenever thickened fuel is slung loaded, for log missions or thickened fuel drops, there is a possibility of small arms tracers igniting the fuel.

(b) EVALUATION: Drums of thickened fuel were taken to the range and fired at with an M16 rifle utilizing tracer ammunition. Approximately sixty (60) rounds of ammunition were fired from 300 meters into each drum test and none of the drums ignited. Tracers were also fired into the thickened fuel on the ground in an attempt to light the fuel, but this also failed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That thickened fuel continue to be carried as now prescribed, following all established safety procedures.

d. Organization.

(1) Colocation of US and ARVN Fire Support Coordination Centers During the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: Colocation of US and ARVN Fire Support Coordination Centers was instrumental to the success achieved by the fire support coordinators during the joint ARVN-US operation into the Fishhook area of Cambodia.
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(b) EVALUATION: Variations of fire support techniques and the risk of imprecise understanding between US and ARVN Fire Support Coordinator Centers caused US and ARVN Artillerymen to colocate their FSCC's and conduct joint fire support planning and operations. The joint fire coordinating infrastructure was further enhanced by attaching US forward observer parties to maneuver battalions to allow for maximum ARVN utilization of US artillery assets. The result was a thoroughly integrated fire support effort. The coordinating effect of face to face, side operation of US and ARVN artillerymen during the planning phase and day by day fire control cannot be too highly stated.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: Colocation of ARVN and US fire support agencies should be a strong consideration in the planning of future joint US-ARVN operations.

e. Training.

(1) Training of Ground and Aircrew Personnel on the Capabilities and Restrictions of the 2.75 inch Rocket

(a) OBSERVATION: During this reporting period, one (1) incident of friendly troops being wounded by aerial rocket fire occurred when rockets were fired too close to the friendly element.

(b) EVALUATION: This incident was caused by the lack of the ground commander to fully realize the capabilities and restrictions of the 2.75 inch rocket. An additional factor was the AH-1G aircraft commander placing several pairs of rockets on a target extremely close to the friendly element without first firing one pair for target identification and confirmation. Although the aircraft commander had informed the ground commander of the dangers involved in firing that close to friendly elements, the ground commander insisted upon the rockets being placed there. After the target was marked with a white phosphorous grenade by the scout ship, the gunship placed several pairs of rockets on the target. He did not shoot one pair for target identification confirmation and to ensure the safety of the friendly ground element.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: During in-country training, both ground personnel and weapons aircraft pilots should be fully informed of the capabilities and restrictions of the 2.75 inch rocket in different types of terrain. In the incident noted, there would have been little danger to the friendly personnel if they had been in open terrain, since the wounds were caused by the rockets hitting the trees and sending shrapnel down and outwards instead of up and outwards when hitting the ground.

(2) Requirement for Instrument Examiners

(a) OBSERVATION: Monsoon weather and late evening operations continue to demand that assigned pilots exercise a high level of instrument proficiency.
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(b) EVALUATION: In an area where instrument conditions prevail during a lengthy monsoon season, it is imperative each organization has a sufficient number of instrument examiners to maintain a high level of instrument proficiency. This organization has a present assigned strength of 577 aviators and consists of three separate aviation battalions and one aviation company. To support this organization's instrument program, there are only two qualified instrument examiners assigned. Qualified instrument pilots must maintain proficiency through training, and that training must be monitored and evaluated by rated instrument examiners.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a minimum of one instrument examiner be assigned to each company size-unit.

f. Logistics

Logistical Procedures for Support of Operations in Cambodia

(a) OBSERVATION: The logistical system established to support tactical operations in Vietnam can be extended to support operations in Cambodia without alterations.

(b) EVALUATION: Routine logistical matters are normally passed through Division directly to USAVE. During the period 1 May to 30 June 1970, while the Division was engaged in operations in Cambodia, routine logistical matters were required to be routed through II Field Forces, Vietnam. This exception caused a degradation in the responsiveness of the logistical system. Major logistical problems that have a bearing on the tactical situation should be brought to the attention of the tactical commander. However, a tactical headquarters should not be burdened with routine logistical matters. The established supply system was not changed to support operations in Cambodia. Therefore, a change in the routing of routine matters was not necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Routine logistical matters continue to be handled through established channels. Only significant logistical problems that have an adverse effect on the tactical situation be brought to the attention of the Field Force Commander.

(2) Ammunition Resupply in Cambodia

(a) OBSERVATION: The aerial resupply of artillery ammunition became, at times, critical during operations in Cambodia.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the large number of targets and enemy contacts during the Cambodian operations, the rate of artillery fire was quite heavy. The resupply requirements were "quite high. Ammunition supply points were established at the airfields at Bu Dop, Bu Gia Map, and later to a limited extent at O'Ring.
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Ammunition was brought in by fixed wing to those airfields and then by helicopter from there to the fire support bases in Cambodia and along the border. Bad weather and strip conditions often closed the airfield at Bu Gia Map. In addition, expected ammunition often failed to arrive. Only by hourly ammunition status reporting and an extremely flexible logistics response were the artillery battalions able to continually maintain sufficient ammunition stocks in their batteries. Priority of air assets given by the Division G-3 proved to be vital in the effort. The key to the operation, however, was the early identification of pending shortages and then decisive logistics action to get the ammunition to the FSB's before the onset of darkness or bad weather.

(e) RECOMMENDATION: During the monsoon season, commanders must develop systems which will give early warning of impending supply failure of critical items. In addition, logistics contingency plans to counteract these failures must be formulated.

5. Communications

(1) Ground Element Commander Utilizing a Headset for Communication During LZ Insertion

(a) OBSERVATION: A headset connected to the aircraft communications system and worn by the ground element commander during combat assaults has proven to be very successful for coordination with low and high birds.

(b) EVALUATION: Utilizing the aircraft communications system enables the ground element commander to have excellent communications with the aviation element and keeps him informed of all friendly and known enemy activity concerned with the assault. He can locate the enemy weapons emplacements and determine the type and intensity of fire. Therefore, the ground commander is kept better informed as to the enemy resistance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the ground element commander utilize a headset connected to the aircraft communications system during combat assaults to keep better informed of the friendly and enemy activity on insertions into LZ's.

(2) RO-292 Antenna Failures Because of Water

(a) OBSERVATION: The RO-292 antenna may become ineffective after exposure to the weather, especially during the monsoon season.

(b) EVALUATION: Water will enter the coaxial adaptor on the antenna base after prolonged (about one month) exposure to inclement weather. Eventually the water will seep into the coaxial cable itself, causing a short circuit.
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Water will also enter the ceramic insulators where the antenna is attached and at the interfaces of the insulators and the base. Splices or coaxial connectors along the coaxial lead-in cable are also susceptible to moisture penetration.

(o) RECOMMENDATION: The coaxial cable connectors on the antenna base should be well-taped in order to make the connection waterproof. Splices in the coaxial lead-in cable should be avoided and coaxial cable connectors should be utilized instead. These connections must also be taped to keep water from entering the cable. The rubber gaskets between the base plate and upper and lower insulators should be inspected and if found faulty or missing, an oven-layer of grease should be applied to the insulators to form a seal where the gaskets would normally be positioned. It is further recommended that a light coat of grease be applied to the threads on the ground plane extensions to eliminate rusting.

(3) Non-Utilization of AM Communication Capabilities

(a) OBSERVATION: AM communication capabilities are not being utilized.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/VSC-2, organic to maneuver battalions, is seldom used. As a result, operators are not proficient in the use of this equipment. The AN/VSC-2 is mounted in a 2 ton vehicle and has an AM single sideband transmitter which may be used for voice communication (non-secure) as well as a radio teletype capability. The teletype is secure when used separately and non-secure when used simultaneously with voice. The transmitter has a range in excess of 100 miles when the doublet antenna is used. The whip antenna provides a range of approximately 50 miles. In several instances, the receiver-transmitter has been dismounted from the vehicle. It may be used separately but requires a power source of 28 VDC.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The 13th Signal Battalion should send an AM training team to the brigades and conduct classes on the operation and maintenance of the AN/VSC-2 for brigade and battalion operators.

(4) Transmitter Output Measurement

(a) OBSERVATION: No determination is being made whether radio transmitters are operating properly.

(b) EVALUATION: Radio transmitters, especially the RT-524, are being utilized without determining if they are operating at peak efficiency. Transmitters operating at only a fraction of their rated power output are being utilized without operators being aware of this deficiency.
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(a) RECOMMENDATION: Wattmeter TS-2609, presently on order by all maneuver battalions, should be utilized to test the forward and reflected power of all their transmitters. This test should be made as frequently as possible, and the result should be compared to standards set forth in appropriate technical manuals. Transmitters not meeting these standards should be forwarded to the proper maintenance facility for necessary repairs.

(5) Use of Tactical Antennas on the FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: Units are constantly endeavoring to achieve maximum height on their tactical radio antennas, particularly on the FSB. This increases the range of organic radios, permitting greater flexibility in deployment of maneuver units.

(b) EVALUATION: The AB-577 launchers are generally used with two or three antennas to achieve greater height. 1-12 Cav has constructed a mast-head composed of cross arms 15 feet long and a 7½ foot vertical mast which is capable of mounting five antennas. The antennas are placed in a star shape 10 feet apart. The upper mast consists of RC-292 mast sections. This technique has proven successful through two complete SGT changes with frequencies as close as two megahertz apart. There has been no overlap or interference thus far.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver units having communications problems should consider this system.

(6) Use of a Jump Rig When Moving a FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: It is imperative that fast and reliable radio communications be established at the new FSB.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1-12 Cav has developed a mule-mounted command rig consisting of a wooden frame, four RT-524's, two AN/PRC-77's, one KY-36, and two long whip antennas. This rig is coupled with four RC-292 antennas and one 3 kw generator at the new FSB and is operated by three RTO's. The rig can be moved by UH-1H or CH-47 and can be operational on the battalion command and B2 nets within 10 minutes of set down. Within 45 minutes, five high-quality FM systems can be operational.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A command rig should be adopted during FSB moves to provide command and control as quickly as possible at the new location. These rigs may be mounted on a jeep or mule.

(7) Use of Short Whip Antennas

(a) OBSERVATION: Short whip antennas for AN/PRC-25/-77 radios are constantly breaking down as a result of the rugged terrain which maneuver elements negotiate daily.
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(b) EVALUATION: Without exception, all breaks occur at one of the three flex-rivet points. By taping the handle of a plastic C-ration spoon securely at each of these points, the antenna will last much longer and retain its flexibility and effectiveness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This field expedient method of care and maintenance of communications equipment has proven very effective and is submitted for consideration by other units.

(a) Radio Frequency Interference During the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: Concentration of radio antennas in a small area can cause an unacceptable amount of override with the result that some nets may not satisfy the purposes for which they were established.

(b) EVALUATION: At the Task Force Shoemaker Headquarters at Quan Loi, radio frequency interference and override caused many radio transmissions to be ineffective. Normally, clear frequencies assigned to major commands became unsatisfactory. The interference was caused basically from too many antennas located on one 200 foot antenna tower. All Task Force Headquarters units utilized the same tower and with the volume of traffic on all of the nets, it became quite difficult to communicate via FM radio. Once the source of the problem was recognized, some units removed their antennas from the 200 foot antenna tower and noticed an appreciable improvement in the quality of their FM radio communications. It was also clear that a total FM radio communications outage could result if the enemy attacked the tower and caused it to collapse. There were too many critical nets operating from a single supporting tower, thus leaving the Task Force Headquarters in a precarious disposition.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. Antennas should be sufficiently dispersed to avoid serious interference problems.

2. If large numbers of radio antennas are required to support a task force operation, consideration should be given to locating the antennas and radios at diverse locations and rotating into the headquarters. This will eliminate serious radio interference problems.

3. Enemy strength and capability should be considered when positioning communications assets to preclude serious communications outages due to enemy attacks.
(9) **UHF Radio Set**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Rotary and small fixed-wing aircraft usually have anHF radio channel for communication with ground elements. All of these aircraft flying in support of infantry maneuver elements have a UHF radio which is normally used for air communications. Each infantry battalion TOE includes the authorization for one (1) UHF Radio Set (AN/VRC-24). Operation of this radio set in the infantry battalion TOE provides the infantry commander with an additional radio channel for aircraft.

(b) **EVALUATION:** A UHF Radio Set, AN/VRC-24 has been operating in the battalion TOE with gratifying results.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** The UHF set should be a standard component of the TOE radio system.

(10) **Communications at Extended Ranges**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The AN/PRC-25 with RC-292 is not adequate for communications at ranges beyond 6 kilometers and in dense jungle.

(b) **EVALUATION:** It was observed that the RC-292 antenna cable is too short to permit sufficient antenna height for communications at extended ranges in triple canopy jungle. Therefore, the range at which a company could operate from the fire base with reliable communications was limited. Communications were improved by connecting two antenna cables together and utilizing pole climbers to permit the placement of the antenna heads approximately 100 feet above the ground. The additional weight of these items was, however, excessive.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That a light weight set of pole climbers and a lighter, longer antenna cable be developed for directing the RC-292 antenna head when operating in dense jungle terrain.

(11) **Airborne Communications Relay**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The air mobile concept often requires units to operate at extended ranges from their parent headquarters and beyond the capabilities of their communications equipment.

(b) **EVALUATION:** On several occasions during the Cambodian operation, companies over-extended their communications capabilities because of the dense jungle terrain. In most cases, the AN/PRC-25 with RC-292 was only reliable to a range of 6 kilometers from the fire support base. Communications between battalion and company stations was often unreliable to non-existent; during daylight it was necessary to utilize Air Force FAC's, Brigade Scout, Command and Control aircraft, and Pink Teams to reestablish communications between companies and their parent battalion. At night there was little assistance to be rendered if night-flyable aircraft (Flarcrafts and Nighthawk) were not available, or if weather conditions prohibited rotary wing operations.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That the Division maintain an organic, on-call, fixed wing, all-weather communications relay capability for use by brigades and their subordinate battalions; thus eliminating reliance on Air Force assets.

h. Material

(1) Securing Small Arms Ammunition During the Monsoon Season

(a) OBSERVATION: During numerous contacts at the outset of the monsoon season, an unusually high number of machine guns malfunctioned. The basic reason was later established as dirty ammunition. When a firefight is initiated, everyone hits the ground. The machine gun crew traditionally wrap the ammunition around themselves (poncho-villa fashion). This results in ammunition which becomes covered with mud and dirt.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to keep all small arms ammunition clean during the monsoon season, it must be maintained inside containers. Under no circumstances should it be exposed to the elements for the reasons cited above. Units have carried M-60 ammunition successfully in M-60 boxes. The rounds stay dry and clean.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Small arms ammunition should be carried in waterproof, mud-proof, containers to preclude weapons malfunctions from dirty ammunition.

(2) ARA Close Fire Support With New Delay Fuze

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the extensive canopy coverage in many areas of Vietnam, ARA close fire support is severely restricted as a result of the increased size of the fragmentation pattern caused by tree bursts.

(b) EVALUATION: At the present time, the 2.75" rocket does not have the firing capability for canopy penetration. There have been occasions where friendly troops have received shrapnel up to 200 meters from the point of rocket detonation. The ARA Battalion has just completed a test of the XM-433 fuze. The test was highly successful and the fuze would give the aviator the capability of selecting a delay action to prevent tree top detonation. With this capability, ARA support could be provided in closer proximity to friendly troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The XM-433 fuze be approved for production and every effort be made to obtain quantities of subject fuze at the earliest date for use in Vietnam.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

(3) Loading Tray Modification

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the tremendous amount of wear and tear incurred through the heavy firing of the medium artillery battalion, the existing ammunition loading trays (FSN 1025-557-3641) are splitting at two particular points of stress: immediately behind the front legs and just forward of the rear legs. Continued welding may repair the break, but this gives no strength to the body of the tray and the tray quickly breaks again.

(b) EVALUATION: The existing loading tray (FSN 1025-557-3641) is neither sturdy enough nor strong enough to withstand the heavy amount of wear and tear that is imposed on it.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a new type of loading tray be designed which has a base at least ⅞ inch thick with reinforcement bars of steel running lengthwise beneath the center part of the tray.

(i) Other

(1) Combat Test of Ammunition Bunker Blast Wall Protection During the Cambodian Operation

(a) OBSERVATION: On two occasions during the Cambodian operation, 120mm rounds impacted inside 155mm howitzer parapets without causing significant damage to mortar or ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION: The PSP lined ammunition bunker blast wall, which has been used by medium artillery batteries, has successfully passed its test by fire. The blast wall consists of an earth-filled revetment one foot thick placed in front of all ammunition bunkers. In one instance, a 120mm mortar round burst no more than six inches from the blast wall protecting a powder bunker. The fragments from the round failed to penetrate into the powder storage area, thus precluding a possible fire problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units required to store ready ammunition consider the use of blast walls to further reinforce their ammunition revetments.

(2) Fire Support Base Construction

(a) OBSERVATION: With the advent of the rainy season, it has been found that depressions left by bulldozing artillery parapets generate great drainage problems.

(b) EVALUATION: In construction of wet weather fire support bases, success has been obtained by utilizing engineer support to haul dirt in for the parapets from fill areas outside the base. The increased engineer effort required pays later dividends by increasing the health and operational standards.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the additional engineer support be made available to healing parapet fill when severe drainage problems would result from bulldozer constructed parapets.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. C. BUTLER

20 Incl
TAB A: Task Organization
TAB B: Friendly Order of Battle
TAB C: Enemy Order of Battle
TAB D: Weather and Terrain
TAB E: Surveillance Information
TAB F: Intelligence Activities
TAB G: Training/Combat Developments
TAB H: Key Personnel Roster
TAB I: G-1 Activities
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TAB K: Information Activities
TAB L: Provost Marshal Activities
TAB M: Surgeon Activities
TAB N: Logistic Activities
TAB O: Fire Bases Opened/Closed
TAB P: Civil Affairs
TAB Q: Psychological Operations
TAB R: Kit Carson Scouts
TAB S: Chemical Activities
TAB T: FIRST TEAM Inc of Operations
Incls I, J, K w/d HQ DA

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AVFBC-RE (14 Aug 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970,
RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970
from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Grid Lines on Intelligence Overlays",
page 43, paragraph 2b(3). Variations to standard techniques of overlay
production are, within reasonable limits, a matter of individual
preference. The use of "tick marks" versus grid lines is more properly
left to the discretion of the headquarters issuing the overlay.

b. Reference item concerning "Exploitation of Ground Sensor Activations",
page 44, paragraph 2b(5). Concur with the recommendation that unattended
ground sensor systems be more extensively employed around fixed support
bases. No action is necessary to enlarge the current stocks of sensor
devices. Present stockage level is adequate until Phase III equipment is
available and units are not limited in amount authorized for issue.

c. Reference item concerning "Employment of the E158 CS Canister",
page 47, paragraph 2c(5). Contamination of the area and the leaflets
would presumably prevent an immediate scrutiny of the message. There
are more orthodox and practical ways to disseminate leaflets than by
Canister Cluster E158. The physical characteristics of the canister
cluster necessitate that it be dropped from a minimum height of 700 feet.
During its descent three separate explosions occur, dispersing eight
separate modules, each module containing 32 canisters of CS. The
explosions will destroy a portion of the attached leaflets. The dispersion
of the leaflets would vary from 50 - 200 meters depending on the altitude
at which the canister was dropped. Thus, area coverage is no redeeming
feature.

d. Reference item concerning "Assistance in Locating Cache Sites",
page 52, paragraph 2c(16). Sketches of bunker and cache systems can be
extremely useful when operating in new areas or when unusual areas or
complexes are encountered. Recognition of layouts and clues to new
locations is essential to further success. However, a specific require-
ment in every case would serve only to impede units in a fast moving
tactical situation.

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AVPBC-RE (14 Aug 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

for early warning of impending supply shortages. These plans also include provisions for alternate means of re-supply should the primary helilift capabilities be unobtainable.

j. Reference item concerning "ARA Close Fire Support with New Delay Fuze", page 64, paragraph 2h(2). Information received from Doctrine, System and Training, G3 USARV, indicates that the test report is being finalised on the XM-433 fuze. There are several minor modifications to be made on the fuze and there was no estimate on when it would go into production.

k. Reference item concerning "Loading Tray Modification", page 65, paragraph 2h(3). Medusa artillery battalions within II PFGCEW Artillery have had no instances of loading trays splitting.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CPT. AGC

ASS'T AG

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AVHD-DO (14 Aug 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 27 NOV 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 1st
Cavalry Division (AM) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Senior NCO Assignment Policies," page 42, paragraph 2a(1): nonconcur. All senior NCO's are assigned
directly to the major subordinate commands and the responsibility for
channeling personnel to smaller units rests with these commanders. In
the case of lb40, grade E-7, the command is currently at 77% of authorized
strength. Of this assigned strength approximately 10% are profiled
personnel who cannot be fully utilized in their PMOS. No action by
USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

   b. Reference item concerning "Cutting of Aircraft Tires by M8AI
Matting on Forward Airfields," page 55, paragraph 2c(2) and 1st Indorse-
ment, paragraph 2h: nonconcur. The problem appears to occur when
matting laid with the bayonet hooks toward the prevalent landing direction
buckles sufficiently to expose the hooks. Proper laying techniques and
maintenance complying with TM 5-337 (w/Change 1) should eliminate this
problem. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so
advised.

   c. Reference item concerning "Requirement for Instrument Examiners," page 57, paragraph 2e(2). USARV currently has 57 instrument examiners
validated to support more than 180 company size aviation units. USARV
Aviation has coordinated with AG Aviator Assignments to provide additional
examiners to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. First Air Cavalry Division
presently has six examiners assigned with additional examiners to be
assigned as soon as possible. Unit has been so advised.

   d. Reference item concerning "ARA Close Fire Support With New
Delay Fuze," page 64, paragraph 2h(2). Evaluation of XM-433 delay fuse
on 2.75" rocket has been successfully completed. Tentative plans for
production are at a rate of 35,000 per month. Unit has been so advised.

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e. Reference item concerning "Loading Tray Modification," page 65, paragraph 2h(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2k. A new type loading tray should be designed if the problem experienced is recurring in nature. The 1st Indorsement indicates that splitting of ammunition trays may be an isolated case. Additionally, no other medium artillery unit has reported similar problems with loading trays. The 1st Cavalry Division has been notified to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR). Upon receipt, WECOM will conduct a technical evaluation of the problem. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy from:

II FFORCEV

1st Cav Div (AM)
GPOP-DT (14 Aug 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 Jan 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

TAB A: Task Organization

Task Organization: 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

a. Division Troops

HHC, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-9 Cav
   Co H (Rangers), 75th Inf (Airborne)
   62nd Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
   98th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
   151st Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
   54th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
   Ground Sensor Plt (Prov)
   8th Engr Bn
   11th Avn Gp
      273 ASCH (Hvy Hel)
   13th Sig Bn
   545 MP Co
   184th QM Plt
   191st MI Co
      583rd MI Det
   26th Chem Det
   371st RR Co
   14th MI Hist Det
   41st PI Team
   42nd PI Team
   Radio Relay Co (Prov)
   HHC, 1st Cav Div Rear (Prov)
   FIRST TEAM Academy (Prov)
   Personnel Services Co (Prov)
   15th Admin Co
   25th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   37th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   Operational Location #2, 5th Weather Squadron (USAF)
   322nd Avn Spt Det
   366th Avn Spt Det

b. 1st Bde

1-5 Cav
2-7 Cav
1-12 Cav
2-19 Arty (105) (DS)
A/8 Engr (DS)
C/229 Avn (DS)
Det/A/13th Sig Bn (DS)
Det/B/191st MI (DS)

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TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

c. 2nd Bde

HHC, 2nd Bde
5-7 Cav
1-8 Cav
2-12 Cav
Trp E, 2-11 ACR
1-77 Arty (105) (DS)
B/8 Engr (DS)
C/227 Avn (DS)
Det/A/13th Sig Bn (DS)
Det/C/191st MI (DS)

d. 3rd Bde

HHC, 3rd Bde
2-5 Cav
2-8 Cav
1-21st Arty (-) (105) (DS)
C/8 Engr (DS)
B/229 Avn (DS)
Det/A/13th Sig Bn (DS)
Det/D/191st MI (DS)

e. Division Artillery

HHB, DIVARTY
1-7 Cav
D/1-9 Cav (-)
2-20 Arty (ARA) (GS)
1-30 Arty (155) (GS)
1-171st Trans Det (ARA) (DS)
A/5-2 (AW) (GS)
5/82 Arty (AVN) (GS)
2-20 Arty

80th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
171st Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
329th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
1-21 Arty
1-77 Arty

Btry E (Avn), 82nd Arty

564th Trans Det (Acft Maint) (DS)
273rd FA Det (Radar)
TF North 5-2 Arty (AW)

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TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

f. 11th Avn Gp (Qnbt)

HHC, 11th Avn Gp
Air Traffic Control Plat (Prov)
11th Avn Co (GS)
   150th Trans Det (Aフト Maint) (DS)
227th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)
   166th Trans Det (Aフト Maint) (DS)
   390th Trans Det (Aフト Maint) (DS)
   394th Trans Det (Aフト Maint) (DS)
   400th Trans Det (Aフト Maint) (DS)

228th Avn Bn (Aslt Spt Hel)
   51st Trans Det (Aフト Med Cgo Hel Maint) (DS)
   165th Trans Det (Aフト Med Cgo Hel Maint) (DS)
   255th Trans Det (Aсход Med Cgo Hel Maint) (DS)

229th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)
   391st Trans Det (Aフト Maint) (DS)
   392nd Trans Det (Aсход Maint) (DS)
   393rd Trans Det (Aсход Maint) (DS)
   571st Trans Det (Aсход Maint) (DS)

g. Division Spt Qnd

HHC & Band
15th Med Bn
15th S&S Bn
15th Trans Bn
27th Maint Bn

h. Supporting Artillery

2-12 Arty (155)
B/1-27 Arty (155)
6-27 Arty (8"/175)
A/2-32 Arty (8"/175)
B/2-32 Arty (8")
## SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

### TAB B: Friendly Order of Battle

**1st Cav Div (AM) Friendly Order of Battle as of 31 July 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>STATION</th>
<th>COORD</th>
<th>CONTROL HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT967490</td>
<td>II FFV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 1st ACD</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT990130</td>
<td>1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 Cav</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>XT565384</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7 Cav</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>Gerry Owen</td>
<td>YT205546</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 Cav</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>Qlin</td>
<td>YT369515</td>
<td>1st Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Buttons</td>
<td>YU140070</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 Cav</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Snuffy</td>
<td>YU335331</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Cav</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Betty</td>
<td>YU245289</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12 Cav</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Jeanne</td>
<td>YU588178</td>
<td>2nd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Cuan Loci</td>
<td>XT890910</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-5 Cav</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Ft. Granite</td>
<td>YU928082</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8 Cav</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Bo Duc</td>
<td>XT967250</td>
<td>3rd Bde, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT962688</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7 Cav</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT967490</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-19 Arty</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>XT990130</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-20 Arty (ARA)</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT968490</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-21 Arty (105)</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT815905</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-30 Arty</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT972492</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-77 Arty (105)</td>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>Buttons</td>
<td>YU140070</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-82 Arty (AVN)</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT968490</td>
<td>Div Arty, 1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9 Cav</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT962500</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Engr</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT954488</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT962500</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th GS Co</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT962500</td>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227th Avn BN</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT962500</td>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228th Avn BN</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT962500</td>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229th Avn BN</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>XT158513</td>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Sg</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT965486</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co H (Rngr) 75th Inf Binh Duong</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>XT966492</td>
<td>1st ACD</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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TAB C: Enemy Order of Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PROBABLE LOCATION AS OF 31 JULY 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dong Khe Regiment Headquarters</td>
<td>XT 8644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. K1 Battalion</td>
<td>XT 9031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. K2 Battalion</td>
<td>XT 8547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. K4 Battalion</td>
<td>XT 8343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Subregion 5 Headquarters</td>
<td>XT 1540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Thang Loi Bn</td>
<td>XT 8913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. D168</td>
<td>YU 0700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. D368</td>
<td>XT 7589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 81st Rear Service Group</td>
<td>YT 2756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 84th Rear Service Group</td>
<td>YT 5359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 86th Rear Service Group</td>
<td>YU 1647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 90th Recovery and Replacement Regiment</td>
<td>YU 3450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. K33 Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>XU 8722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 5th Division Headquarters</td>
<td>XU 8751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 174th Regiment</td>
<td>XU 9220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 275th Regiment (possible)</td>
<td>XU 5553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Z22 Arty Bn</td>
<td>XU 9729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Z24 AA Bn</td>
<td>XU 9725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Z27 Recon Bn</td>
<td>In Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 70th Rear Service Group</td>
<td>XU 8833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Song Be Battalion</td>
<td>YU 0936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Z22, 208th Regt</td>
<td>XT 4095</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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TAB D: Weather and Terrain

1. Terrain:

   a. The Cambodian AO extended from the generally flat plains adjacent to Mienot, northeast through roughly rolling plains, and east to the roughly dissected hills and low mountains near O Rang. The low mountains in the east rise to heights of 650 to 700 meters. Hills between and at the southwestern edges of these mountains have an average elevation of approximately 350 meters, with slopes of 15 to 60 percent. The central area of the AO is generally an undulating plain with an average elevation of 100 meters. The relatively flat western plain has an average elevation of 70 meters and slopes of 0 to 5 percent. The southwestern portion of this area is rougher and more heavily dissected with numerous small hills. These hills have an average elevation of approximately 120 meters and slopes ranging from 10 to 30 percent.

   b. The AO in South Vietnam, occupied in July, extended from the rugged hills north of Bu Gia Map; south to the low mountains of central Long Khanh Province; west to the low foothills of eastern Binh Long Province, and east to the heavily mountainous region of western Quang Duc and Lam Dong Provinces. The entire area can be characterized as a transitional area between the delta and the highlands of MR II. In this AO the most prominent mountain is full Ba Ba.

2. Weather:

   a. May's outstanding feature was the failure of the southwest monsoon to become established until about the last three days of the month, much later than usual. Despite the absence of prevailing southwest winds, rainfall totals for the month were almost exactly equal to the monthly average, although ceiling and visibility conditions for flying were generally better than average. Overall rainfall, although heavy in spots, never blanketed the entire AO at any time. The official onset date of the southwest monsoon was decided as 28 May. The usual monsoon indicators were not clear cut this year and a typical monsoon wind pattern was not firmly established until the first two days of June.

   b. June was the first full month of the southwest monsoon and the increase in rainfall and cloud cover was very noticeable. Moreover, both the amount of rainfall and the number of days with rain were higher than for this month in previous years. As was expected, the section of the Division's AO most frequently having unfavorable weather for military operations was the area of high terrain in northern Phuoc Long Province extending northward into Cambodia. Moist westerly winds formed low ceilings, lasting often into the afternoon, which interfered with TAC air strikes. However, the last one-third of the month was not as bad as the first two-thirds, both in terms of rainfall and prolonged low ceilings. This better weather can be attributed in part to a reduction in the speed of westerly monsoonal winds.
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TAB D: Weather and Terrain (cont)

c. July's distinguishing feature was a period of unusually good weather from 17 through 29 July. Because of this dry period, rainfall during the month was less than average, particularly in the southern half of the AO. This weather was the result of a shift in winds above 5000 feet from the normal southwesterly direction to an easterly direction. Although rainfall was less than normal, the number of days with rain was very close to the average. Temperatures averaged slightly higher than normal.

d. Maximum Temperatures: May - 103
   June - 99
   July - 99

e. Minimum Temperatures: May - 73
   June - 73
   July - 73

f. Relative Humidity: May 94% morning
   55% afternoon
   June 95% morning
   65% afternoon
   July 92% morning
   55% afternoon

g. Rainfall: May 8.5 inches
   June 16.56 inches
   July 7.5 inches

h. Maximum Density Altitude: May 3641 feet
   June 3410 feet
   July 3280 feet

i. Minimum Density Altitude: May 1232 feet
   June 1582 feet
   July 1530 feet
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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

**TAB E:** Surveillance Information

1. Aerial Surveillance:

a. Mission statistics for the period 1 May to 31 July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION TYPE</th>
<th>SCHED/COMP</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>199/163</td>
<td>548 Emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>211/178</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (Mohawk)</td>
<td>172/172</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (Air Force)</td>
<td>117/117</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weather during the three-month reporting period was average for the southeastern monsoon season. Amount of rainfall generally conformed to the climatological averages. Weather adversely affected aerial surveillance missions, especially during the latter half of the reporting period.

(1) IR: During the quarter 81.9% of the missions were completed. 36 missions were cancelled; 31 because of weather and 5 because of sensor malfunctions.

(2) SLAR: During the quarter 84.3% of the missions were completed, 33 were cancelled; 29 because of weather, 4 because of sensor malfunctions.

(3) PHOTO (Mohawk): During the quarter, 100% of the Mohawk Photo missions were completed.

(4) PHOTO (Air Force): During the quarter, 100% of the US Air Force Photo missions were completed.

2. Ground Sensor Surveillance: Mission statistics for the period of 1 May to 31 July 1970:

a. Mission Sched/Comp: 26/24 (8 air/16 grnd)

b. New Sensors Emplaced: 372

c. Average Number Emplaced per Mission: 15

d. Air Employed: 241 (64.5%)

e. Hand Employed: 131 (35.5%)

f. Maximum Sensor Density: 504

g. Number of Targets Detected: 356

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# Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1970

## TAB F: Intelligence Activities

### 191st Military Intelligence Company Operations

1. **Background Investigations:**
   - a. Cases on hand at beginning of reporting period: 11
   - b. Cases received during reporting period: 377
   - c. Cases closed during reporting period: 112
   - d. Cases on hand at end of reporting period: 276
   - e. Cases processed past suspense date: 48
   - f. Leads completed: 357

2. **Security Services:**
   - a. Announced security inspection: 8
   - b. Courtesy inspections and checks: 41
   - c. Unannounced inspections and checks: 6
   - d. Unannounced sanitary fill checks: 103
   - e. Fingerprints: 219
   - f. Tech services (Locks, combination changes, etc): 140

3. **Liaison Contacts**
   - a. Local GVN Officials: 352
   - b. Military Officials: 913
   - c. Other Intelligence Units: 842

4. **Intelligence files checked:** 173

5. **Interrogations:**
   - a. NVA: 8
   - b. VC: 17
   - c. VCI: 0
   - d. Detainees: 247

6. **Brightlight Reports:** 32

7. **Collections:**
   - a. Overt: 30
     - (1) Spot Reports: 12
     - (2) Translations: 9
   - b. Covert: 89
   - c. ICAPS

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TAB P: Intelligence Activities (Cont.)

8. Personnel Security Actions:
   a. Number of Validations:
      (1) Top Secret 137
      (2) Secret 1264
   b. Interim Clearances Granted:
      (1) Interim Top Secret 140
      (2) Interim Secret 8
   c. Cryptographic Access Granted: 0
   d. Requests for USAIRR Checks Submitted: 293
   e. Local Files Checks Completed: 5160
   f. Requests for EI Submitted: 5
   g. Requests for NAC Submitted: 59

9. Detainees:
   a. PW:
      (1) NVA: 35
      (2) VC: 1
   b. Returnees:
      (1) NVA: 4
      (2) VC: 0

10. Documents: 431 (3995 inches)
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TAB G: Training/Combat Developments

1. DIVISION TRAINING:

   a. The FIRST TEAM Academy at Bien Hoa conducted individual replacement training for all incoming replacement personnel during the reporting period. A total of 564 officers and 6837 enlisted men received the four day course of instruction.

   b. The Combat Leaders Course (CLC) graduated 226 personnel during the quarter. The 10-day course of instruction provides training for selected personnel (E3 thru E5) who have demonstrated leadership potential in the field and are programmed to become team leaders and squad leaders. The subjects stressed are small unit tactics, air assault techniques, map reading, communications procedures, first aid, and leadership.

   c. The Kit Carson Scout training program graduated 25 personnel during the reporting period. The objective of the program is to provide maneuver units within the Division with well-trained former VC/NVA soldiers who perform as assets with American units during operations. Training includes basic airmobile tactics and techniques, care and operation of U.S. equipment, the English language, and the mission of the Kit Carson Scout.

   d. The Division Sniper School graduated 20 personnel during the quarter. The program is designed to train selected personnel in advanced marksmanship and sniper techniques. The course of instruction also includes communications procedures, map reading, adjustment of indirect fire and night firing techniques. Upon graduation the trained snipers are returned to their units to be employed as a battalion asset. Sniper training is conducted at Bien Hoa by a nine man Sniper Committee. This Sniper Committee is a specially-trained unit from the Army Marksmanship Training Unit, Fort Benning, Georgia.

2. NON-DIVISIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS:

   The Division made extensive use of the USARV school system during the reporting period. The following figures indicate the utilization rate for the quarter:

   a. Army Aviation Refresher Training School
   b. AH-1G Transition
   c. UH-1H IP/SIP
   d. CH-6A Transition
   e. CH-6A IP/SIP
   f. US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Bde.
   g. MACV R converse School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Aviation Refresher Training School</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G Transition</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1H IP/SIP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A Transition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-6A IP/SIP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Bde.</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV R Converse School</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. **US/RVN Training:**

   a. In keeping with the spirit of Vietnamization, the FIRST TEAM has participated in an on-the-job training program with the graduates of the 5th ARVN Division’s Platoon Leader Refresher Course, Company Commander Refresher Course, and NCO Academy. The graduates ARVN officers and NCOs are attached to 1st Cav Div (AM) units in OJT positions commensurate with their rank and MOS for a period of one week. During the last quarter 1/4 ARVN officers and 177 ARVN NCOs participated in the program. The program provided an exchange of ideas between US and ARVN personnel on concepts and techniques. This resulted in a greater respect for and appreciation of one another.

   b. A four-hour class was given to 108 students of the RVN advanced course C&SC on 8 July 1970. Given at Da lat, RVN in the RVNAF C&SC the class provided instruction on air mobile operations and techniques through a class study of the 1st Cavalry Division’s “Operation Pegasus”.

   c. RF/PF/PSDF received OJT instruction from division units in numerous areas. A summary of training follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>Man-Hours of Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airmobile Ops</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>664</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>7853</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4. **Combat Developments:**

   a. The 90-day evaluation of the Del Mar Non-Directional Ground Fire Detector was concluded on 23 May 1970. Seven systems installed on AH-1G aircraft of C/1-9 Air Cav Troop were evaluated. A total of 21 GAP incidents involving equipped aircraft occurred during the evaluation period. The system detected enemy fire on 19 of these occasions; however, many false alarms were also registered. The system has great potential and is particularly well-adapted for the Air mobile division. Continued R&D effort is requested to improve the system’s signal selectivity and to develop a directional capability.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB C: Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

b. Evaluation of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) for UH-1 series helicopters was completed on 1 June 1970. The unit performs the function for which it was designed (i.e., operation of radios on C&C aircraft when the engine is shut down) satisfactorily. However, this usage is minimal as commander's normally use ground station radios from unit TOG's when C&C aircraft are on the ground. Further, the range of C&C radios on the ground is limited. The APU's were used extensively, however, for providing auxiliary power during maintenance operations.

c. Evaluation of the Laser Target Designation System (LTDS) (ENSURE 170) terminated on 25 May 1970. The 1st Cav Div (AV) will retain the existing devices mounted on the aircraft of the 229th Aviation Battalion. There are eight laser devices in the 229th: three seekers in AH-1G helicopters, three designators in UH-1H helicopters, and two hand-held seekers.

d. Evaluation of the Tunnel Detector (Portable Differential Magnetometer) was completed on 30 May 1970. The device is capable of detecting tunnels as designed. The device is fragile, too heavy, and too bulky for employment with foot troops. The eight foot staff is cumbersome and not easily maneuvered in thickly vegetated areas. One detector is being retained by the 8th Engineer Battalion. It will be used for tracing operations when tunnels are found or when operating in highly suspect areas.

e. Evaluation of the XM433 Rocket Fuze was completed on 24 May 1970 and all fuzes have been expended. The fuzes provide flexibility in mission assignment by allowing attack options with airborne aircraft. Present missions must be preplanned with conventional munitions. The fuze was successfully utilized against troops in multiple canopy jungle and bunkers. This is the only rotary aircraft system with the capability of defeating bunkers. The fuzes and support system are reliable and presented no maintenance problems.

f. Use of the Canopy Marking Round (ENSURE 3) has been favorable. The M-79 fired smoke device provides a quick, efficient method of position marking in heavy canopy vegetation. All rounds have been expended and the next shipment is expected in January 1971.

g. As of 31 July 1970, the following equipment was under evaluation:
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB G: Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

(1) The Naval Airborne Munitions Detector has been in operation since 3 June 1970. It has acquired 204 readings - 84 of which were investigated with significant caches found in five areas. Using search boxes established by G2 Air the system makes parallel search sweeps in these boxes escorted by Cobra/LOH Pink Teams. The Pink Team provides security as well as the capability for immediate visual reconnaissance of significant readings.

(2) 20 Sandbag Bunker Kits have been deployed with the 2-19th and 1-77th Artillery Battalions. Field reports are highly favorable. The kits provide adequate protection from fragments and waterproof housing for the artillery gun crews. The lightness of the kits represents a significant saving in air sortie requirements during the movement of firebases.

(3) On 24 July 1970 a 60-day evaluation of Water-Resistant Writing Pads commenced. There are three types of paper to be evaluated in 20-day increments. The evaluation unit is the 1st Bn., 12th Cav. They are currently utilizing 40 pads of paper, type A. The first period of evaluation will be completed on 6 August 1970.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1970

**TAB H: Key Personnel Roster (1 May - 31 July)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK AND NAME</th>
<th>DATE ASGD</th>
<th>DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>MG E. B. ROBERTS</td>
<td>5 May 69</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>MG GEORGE W. CASEY</td>
<td>12 May 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>MG GEORGE W. PUTNAM</td>
<td>21 Jul 70</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC-A</td>
<td>BG GEORGE W. CASEY</td>
<td>12 May 70</td>
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<td>ADC-A</td>
<td>BG EUGENE P. FURSTER</td>
<td>4 May 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC-B</td>
<td>BG ROBERT M. GIDEON</td>
<td>22 Nov 69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC-B</td>
<td>BG JONATHAN R. BURTON</td>
<td>15 Jun 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>COL(P) EDWARD C. MEYER</td>
<td>15 Apr 70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>LTC HAROLD E. IVESON</td>
<td>16 Apr 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>LTC MICHAEL J. CONRAD</td>
<td>27 Apr 70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>LTC JOHN KIZIRIAN</td>
<td>30 Jun 70</td>
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<td>C4</td>
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<td>20 Apr 70</td>
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<td>C5</td>
<td>MAJ DOUGLAS S. BEASLY</td>
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<td>CO 1st Bde</td>
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<td>8 May 70</td>
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<td>15 Apr 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 3rd Bde</td>
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<td>6 Jul 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 4th Bde</td>
<td>COL ROBERT C. KINSON</td>
<td>5 Dec 69</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 5th Bde</td>
<td>COL ROBERT C. KINSON</td>
<td>4 Jun 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 6th Bde</td>
<td>COL WILLIAM J. MCCLOSKEY</td>
<td>5 May 70</td>
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<td>CO 7th Bde</td>
<td>LTC JOHN R. GALVIN</td>
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<td>CO 8th Bde</td>
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<td>CO 9th Bde</td>
<td>LTC JAMES L. ANDERSON</td>
<td>3 Jul 70</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 10th Bde</td>
<td>LTC WILLIAM A. BURKHARDT</td>
<td>21 Mar 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 11th Bde</td>
<td>LTC ELDON R. CARR</td>
<td>10 Mar 70</td>
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<td>CO 12th Bde</td>
<td>LTC FRANCIS A. IANNI</td>
<td>25 Feb 70</td>
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<td>CO 13th Bde</td>
<td>LTC EVERETT M. YON, JR.</td>
<td>25 Jun 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 14th Bde</td>
<td>LTC ANTHONY LAMBOY</td>
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<td>CO 15th Bde</td>
<td>LTC MAURICE O. EDDY</td>
<td>17 Apr 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 16th Bde</td>
<td>LTC CLARK A. BURKE</td>
<td>13 Dec 69</td>
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<td>CO DIV ARMY</td>
<td>COL MORRIS J. HART</td>
<td>10 Oct 69</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 17th Bde</td>
<td>LTC THOMAS E. FITZGERALD</td>
<td>7 Feb 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 18th Bde</td>
<td>LTC ROBERT E. HUBER</td>
<td>9 Jan 70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 19th Bde</td>
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<td>20 Feb 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 20th Bde</td>
<td>LTC HOWARD R. GUTFRESS</td>
<td>15 Jan 70</td>
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<td>CO 21st Bde</td>
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<td>22 Jun 70</td>
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<td>CO 22nd Bde</td>
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<td>15 Jun 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 23rd Bde</td>
<td>LTC WALLACE G. HUNT</td>
<td>11 Jun 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 24th Bde</td>
<td>LTC WALTER D. MERT</td>
<td>21 Jul 70</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1970

TAB H: Key Personnel Roster (1 May - 31 July) (Cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>RANK AND NAME</th>
<th>DATE ASSD DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO 227th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC DAVID L. JOHNSON</td>
<td>8 May 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 227th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC JOHN A. ISLIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 228th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC FRANCIS J. TONER</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 228th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC EDWARD E. WALDRON II</td>
<td>11 Jun 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 229th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC ROBERT S. PATTON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 229th Avn Bn</td>
<td>LTC DAVID L. MOSHER</td>
<td>15 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO SPT CHD</td>
<td>COL(F) TOM H. NICHOLSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 15th TC</td>
<td>LTC BENTLEY J. HERBERT</td>
<td>22 Jun 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 15th TC</td>
<td>LTC FRANCIS J. TONER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 15th S&amp;S</td>
<td>LTC JAMES C. MORGAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 27th Maint</td>
<td>MAJ(F) NEIL S. WILLIAMSON</td>
<td>19 Mar 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 15th Med</td>
<td>LTC JOSEPH W. McNaney</td>
<td>25 Jun 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 15th Med</td>
<td>LTC QUINN H. BECKER</td>
<td>5 Jun 70</td>
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<td>CO 13th Sig</td>
<td>LTC NORMAN E. ARCHIBALD</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 13th Sig</td>
<td>LTC ROBERT G. LYNN</td>
<td>23 Jul 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO 8th Engr Bn</td>
<td>LTC SCOTT B. SMITH</td>
<td>7 Sep 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO 8th Engr Bn</td>
<td>LTC HOMER JOHNSTONE</td>
<td>5 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

TAB L: Provost Marshal Activities

1. During the period 1 May 70 - 31 July 1970, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of seven hundred thirty-nine (739) offenses.

   a. Offense Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against persons/property</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous offenses</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military offenses</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offenses</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>739</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Breakdown of offense statistics:

   (1) Crime against persons/property: 250, Murder - 2, Manslaughter - 2, Aggravated Assault - 13, Simple Assault - 20, Robbery - 3, Housebreaking/Burglary - 23, Larceny over $50.00 - 142, Larceny under $50.00 - 45.

   (2) Miscellaneous Offenses: 134, Disorderly conduct - 19, Drunkenness - 6, Narcotics, Dangerous Drugs and Marijuana - 97, Blackmarketing - 7, Trespassing - 5.


   c. Comments on Offender Statistics:

   (1) The overall offense rate increased 01% over the last reporting period.

   (a) Crimes against persons/property increased 19%
   (b) Miscellaneous offenses increased 25%
   (c) Military offenses increased 50%
   (d) Traffic offenses decreased 76%

   (2) Significant changes with regard to particular offenses reported during the previous period are as follows:

   (a) Twenty-five robberies and housebreaking/burglaries were reported during the period 1 May - 31 July; none were reported during the previous reporting period. This increase is due in part to a change in reporting policy, which incorporated a greater number of cases into the robbery/burglary category.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
Tab L: Provost Marshal Activities (Cont)

(b) During the past reporting period ninety-seven Narcotics, Dangerous Drugs and Marijuana cases were reported as opposed to seventy-eight the previous period. This increase can be credited to the added emphasis placed upon enforcement in this area over the last reporting period.

(c) Forty AWOL's were reported during the period 1 May - 31 July; Nine cases of AWOL were reported during the previous reporting period. This increase is due to a change in reporting procedures during the last reporting period.

(d) Thirty-four pass violations were reported this period as opposed to one case last period; eighty-eight off-limits cases were reported this period with forty-six cases the previous period; and eleven curfew violations were reported during the period as opposed to three cases the previous reporting period. It is felt that the increase in pass violations, off-limits violations and curfew violations is due to the "standdown" status of 1 ACD units on Bien Hoa Army Base and an increased enforcement emphasis in the Long Binh-Bien Hoa-Saigon Area.

2. During the period 1 May - 31 July, the office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of three hundred fifty-three detainees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETAINEE STATISTICS:</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 353

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

TAB M: Surgeon Activities

1. Disease and Injury Statistical Data:
   a. Non-battle injuries: 361
   b. Disease: 1530
      (1) Malaria: 384
         (a) Vivax: 109
         (b) Falciparum: 275
         (c) Unknown: 0
      (2) Mio: 783
      (3) Psychiatric Cases: 114
      (4) Others: 17
   c. Remaining in hospital: 127

2. Discussion of Disease:
   a. There were 384 cases of malaria in this division from 1 May 70 to 31 July 70. 109 of those cases were attributed to Plasmodium vivax, and were caused, in most cases, by failure to take the weekly Chloroquine-Prophylaxis.

(1) The malaria incidence is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>HHC 2nd Bde</td>
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<td>2/9th</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>384</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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(b) The increase in the number of malaria cases during the period resulted from increased exposure due to the number of troops in the field, increased exposure due to the operations in hyperendemic areas which were recently NVA sanctuaries, and seasonal increases associated with the monsoon.

(2) Other selected disease of importance are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immersion Foot</td>
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<td>Heat Exhaustion</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Poisoning</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Animal Bites</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dengue Fever</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Meningitis</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub Typhus</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. WIA: From 1 May through 31 July 70, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 1048 U.S. Army personnel who were WIA. Of these, 778 admitted and 270 were CRO.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations

1. Significant Activities:

a. During the reporting period 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, the Division Support Command (DISCOM) continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in all operations. Combat service support provided and/or coordinated by DISCOM included supplies, maintenance, medical services, transportation, evacuation of captured enemy material, bath, laundry, graves registration and explosive ordnance disposal for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) organic and attached elements. Support to the Division increased dramatically with the First Team's role in the Cambodian operation during the months of May and June.

(1) The First Forward Service Support Element (FSSE) provided logistical combat support to Division maneuver battalions assigned to the 1st Brigade. Classes I, II, III, IV, and IX as well as direct maintenance support, medical service and air transportation support were provided by DISCOM elements from the 1st Brigade's base camps at TAY NINH. During the month of August, all support to the 1st Brigade displaced with the 1st Brigade to BIEN HOA with no delay in support being provided during the move.

(a) Forward Supply Points (Mini-FSSE's) were established at KATUM and at LOC NINH to further facilitate the movement of supplies to the First Team in Cambodia. Tactical helicopter refuel points were established at both locations, an 8 point, 30,000 gallon capacity semi-permanent site was established at KATUM and a temporary site operating from collapsible fuel drums was established at LOC NINH.

(b) CH-47 sling out pads were established at both KATUM and LOC NINH and a direct fixed wing to rotary wing transfer and sling out operation was maintained and controlled by the 1st FSSE for the duration of the Cambodian operation.

(c) Upon completion of the withdrawal from Cambodia on 29 June, a realignment of the 1st Brigade Area of Operations necessitated coordinating and carrying out the displacement of the entire 1st Brigade from TAY NINH to BIEN HOA. The 1st FSSE closed out both KATUM and LOC NINH on 23 June and 25 June respectively and began planning for the movement of the 1st Brigade. An advance party was sent to BIEN HOA to arrange for interim support to the Brigade while the main body moved. A rear element remained in TAY NINH until the 1st Brigade had completely displaced. The move was completed on 18 July 1970 without incident.
(d) During the report period a total of 1,074 tons and 5,021 passengers were flown out of the helipad by CH-7 helicopters with an additional total of 207 tons and 522 passengers flown into the helipad. CH-54 helicopters carried 208 tons out and 56 tons into the helicopters pad. The Movement Team located at TAY NINH Airfield reported 137 tons and 2,807 passengers flown into and 317 tons and 3,378 passengers flown out of the airfield.

(2) The 2d FSSE supported the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) and attached units based at and operation out of Fire Support Base Buttons. Classes I, II, III, IV, and V as well as medico-service, maintenance support and air transportation support were provided by DISCOM elements during the reporting period.

(a) In support of the Cambodian operation the 2d FSSE established a Forward Supply Point at BU GIA MAP and in conjunction with the 3d FSSE also established a Forward Supply Point at BU DOP. Direct fixed wing to rotary wing sling out operations was established with limited Class V storage facilities also established at both locations.

(b) To support the rotary wing operations out of both BU GIA MAP and BU DOP, helicopter refuel points were set up. Initially each location was established with an 8 point, 30,000 gallon capacity JP-4 refuel point. BU DOP was later increased to 40,000 gallon capacity on 15 June 1970.

(a) During the reporting period a total of 24016 tons were flown out of the helipad with an additional 8612 tons flown into the helipad. CH-54 helicopter carried 6482 tons out and 1340 tons into the helipad. The movement team located at SONG BE Airfield reported 13267 tons and 8199 passengers flown in and 2952 tons and 11062 passengers flown out of the airfield.

(3) The 3rd FSSE supported the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) and attached units based in and operating from QUAN LOT. Classes I, II, III, IV, and V as well as medical service maintenance support and rotary wing transportation support were provided during the entire reporting period.

(a) In support of the Cambodian operations the 3d FSSE established Forward Supply Points at TONLE CHAM, and in conjunction with the 2d FSSE, at BU DOP. Direct fixed wing to rotary wing sling out during the Cambodian operation was accomplished.

(b) To support the rotary wing operation a temporary helicopter refuel point was established at TONLE CHAM utilizing collapsible fuel drums which permitted flexibility in maintaining selected amounts of fuel on location at all times.
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SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations (Cont)

(c) The 3rd FSSE assumed complete control and operation of the Forward Supply Point at BU DOP on 21 June 1970 and closed the point and retrograded all material by 13 July 1970.

(d) During the reporting period a total of 27338 tons were flown out of the helipad with an additional 9112 tons flown into the helipad. CH-54 helicopters carried 273 tons out of and 91 into the helipad. The movement team located at the QUAN LOI airfield reported 1268 tons and 7115 passengers flown in and 1577 tons and 7187 passengers flown out of the airfield.

b. During the period a total of 34,980.8 tons and 45,726 passengers were flown from BIEN HOA in support of The First Team. A total of 173 Combat Essential and 26 Tactical Essential air movements were flown from BIEN HOA. All movements were coordinated and controlled by DISCOM elements.

c. During this reporting period, the 27th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide its normal direct support maintenance and repair parts supply for all ground equipment (less medical and cryptographic) of the FIRST TEAM. This "Anywhere-Anytime" support was evident in the fact that the following percentage of equipment was operational at the end of the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>% OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>97.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>92.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>90.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1). During the quarter there were 126 technical assistance visits conducted by the Battalion.

(2). The Battalion's AIM TEAM visited a total of 33 units during the reported period.

(3). The disposition of element of the Battalion as of 25 July 1970 was as follows:

- Headquarter and Company A...Bien Hoa
- Main Support Detachment...Phuoc Vinh
- B Detachment..........Quan Loi
- C Detachment...........Song Be
- D Detachment..........Bien Hoa

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(4) The consolidated Battalion production for the period shows the following completed jobs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQ&amp;CoA</th>
<th>MSD</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>3052</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>7172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Artillery)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Small Arms)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Instruments)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>5679</td>
<td>2502</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>13373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Other categories of completed work order requests shown above include machine shop work, canvas repair, glass cutting, office machine repair, welding and fuel and electrical component repair.

(5) Summary of supply data for the quarter reveals the following:

1. Total ASL requests received 27,588
2. Total fringe requests received 6,710
3. Demand accommodation 81.6%
4. Demand satisfaction 91.2%
5. Average ASL lines stocked 6,791
6. Average zero balance lines 3,110
7. Average fringe lines on hand 0
8. Units supported by ASL 117
9. Lines inventoried during the period 7,341

(6) Receipt of repair parts at the supply base at Bien Hoa for the quarter was as follows:

1. Red Ball Receipts 96,321 lbs
2. Parcel Post 1,970 lbs
3. Normal Stockage 489,271 lbs

d. The 15th Supply and Service Battalion continued to provide combat support to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during this reporting period. The battalion operated from a base area in Bien Hoa and forward location in Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi and Song Be. Major operation achievements were:

1. Tactical helicopter refuel points were established at Bu Dop, Bu Gia Map, Katum, Dinh Quan and Bien Hoa.

2. A new 16 point permanent refuel system was completed at Phuoc Vinh. Also a 2 point CH-47 refuel point was completed at Quan Loi.
(3) The forward platoon at Tay Ninh was closed as the 1st Brigade moved out of the area. Personnel and equipment remaining were returned to Bien Hoa while a forklift driver stayed behind to assist brigade units in completing their move.

(4) At Bien Hoa, the Main Supply Platoon turned over Castle Pad to the 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion. Hook-out operations are now being conducted from Dallas Pad pending completion of the new hook-out area in "D" yard. The lumber yard is being moved to a new location in "D" yard to escape water damage caused by heavy rains.

(5) New refrigeration units have been installed at the Class I yard to improve cold storage capability.

(6) The sling-out tonnage for the period 1 May 1970 thru 30 June 1970 has been the highest for any single two month period in the history of this unit. During the month May, 24,933 tons of material were rigged and delivered by 6,436 external helilift sorties—the highest monthly total in this unit's history.

(7) Red Hats in the Bien Hoa area continued to present sling-out instruction to each group of personnel going through the First Team Academy.

(8) Class activity report (quarter totals thru 24 July 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class I Issues</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) &quot;A&quot; rations (tons)</td>
<td>2,394.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) &quot;B&quot; rations (tons)</td>
<td>1,622,319.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) &quot;C&quot; rations (meals)</td>
<td>166,225.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) LRRPS (meals)</td>
<td>414,070.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Sundry Packs (cases)</td>
<td>13,907.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Ice (tons)</td>
<td>6,612.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Milk (pts)</td>
<td>1,203,081.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Ice Cream (gal)</td>
<td>50,908.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class II &amp; IV Issues</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>400.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class III Issues (tons)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>53,781.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9WC5</td>
<td>5,863.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9GC5</td>
<td>5,876.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-2</td>
<td>11,747.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations (Cont)

Number of Petroleum Analyses Conducted
(a) Samples Received: 96
(b) Suitable for Use: 91
(c) Not Suitable for Use: 5

o. During the reported period, the 15th Transportation Battalion continued to provide backup direct support maintenance for all division aircraft and supply of all aircraft parts, avionics and armament.

(1) The following is a statistical summary of aircraft maintenance activities during the month of July 1970:

(a) Productive man-hours: Co. A 18945
Co. B 49120
Total for 15th Trans Bn --- 38065

(b) Number of aircraft released: 208

(c) Operational readiness overall: High 89% Low 84% Average 86.6%

(d) Operational readiness by A/C type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/C Type</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1B/C</td>
<td>Dropped as of 15 July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D/H</td>
<td>91% 84% 88%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>90% 80% 85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>89% 84% 87%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47A/B</td>
<td>85% 78% 82%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Stock Control: The Stock Control Section continued its supervision of the aircraft supply operation of the Battalion. The following transactions were carried out for the period 21 June - 20 July 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lines on ASL</td>
<td>8827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zero Balance</td>
<td>2357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Percentage at Zero Balance</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Total Requests Received</td>
<td>13656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Demand Accommodation</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Demand Satisfaction</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ASL Requests Received</td>
<td>18040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ASL Requests Filled</td>
<td>7945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tonnage of Parts Issued to Supported Units</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

f. During the reporting period 1 May 1970 through 31 July 1970, the 15th Medical Battalion continued to provide complete division level and unit level medical support to the First Team. The 15th Medical Battalion was employed as follows:

1. HQ & Sp
   Camp Corvair

2. A Co
   Tay Ninh Base Camp thru 29 June
   Bien Hoa Army Base 30 June thru 31 July

3. B Co
   FSB Buttons

4. C Co
   Quan Loi

(a) The Battalion Headquarters provided administrative and logistic support to elements of the 15th Medical Battalion, as well as medical evacuation, psychiatric, optometry and medical supply services for all units of the First Team.
(b) Headquarters and Support Company provided medical support to the division base camp at Phuoc Vinh, Division Rear at Bien Hoa and back up support to the letter companies of the 15th Medical Battalion. The Air Ambulance Platoon provided aeromedical evacuation for the 1st Cavalry Division as well as non-Cavalry units working within the Division's area of operations.

(1) During this reporting period Headquarters and Support Company dispatched two (2) Emergency Medical Teams to act as forward triage and treatment units in support of the Cambodian operation. Both teams had the capability of emergency surgery, whole blood infusion and stabilization of critically injured patients.

(a) Team #1, consisting of one (1) doctor, six (6) enlisted medics and one (1) radio operator, was collocated with the Special Forces Camp at Katum on 1 May 1970. This team provided sick call support for indigenous personnel associated with the Special Forces Camp in addition to their medical support mission. A Medevac helicopter was lagered at Katum during daylight hours and returned to Quan Loi at dark. Logistical support came from Headquarters and Support Company through Quan Loi. Radio operator augmentation was furnished by both A&C Companies.

(b) Team #2, consisting of one (1) doctor, six (6) enlisted medics and two (2) radio operators, was collocated with the Special Forces Camp at Bu Dop on 6 May 1970. One Medevac helicopter was lagered at Bu Dop during daylight hours and returned to FSB Buttons with the remainder of the logistical support provided by Headquarters and Support Company.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

TAB N:

(2) The Air Ambulance Platoon normally deploys one Medevac helicopter with each Medical Company in direct support of a Brigade with the remaining nine Medevac helicopters stationed at Phuoc Vinh. On 1 May 1970 this deployment was changed to best support tactical operations. Three (3) Helicopters were lagered at C Co 15th Med Bn and one (1) helicopter at 37th Med Co, 11th ACR, both located at Quan Loi. One (1) helicopter was stationed at A Co, 15th Med Bn, Tay Ninh until 4 May 1970 when the aircraft deployed to Katum were it remained until 24 May 1970. One (1) Ship remained at B Co 15th Med Bn, FSB Buttons and on 6 May 70 an additional helicopter was sent to Bu Dop.

(3) During the reporting period the Air Ambulance Platoon has flown 2549 missions, accruing 2713:05 hours flying time and evacuated 4,487 patients of which 471 were hoist patients. Eighteen ships have been damaged by hostile fire, five of which total combat loss. One crew member was killed and eight wounded.

(4) A Command Medical Operations Center (CMOC), consisting of the Battalion Commander, the S-3, assistant air operations officer of the Air Ambulance Platoon, and two radio operators, was established at Quan Loi on 1 May 1970. The CMOC provides coordination with higher support and tactical forward CP's.

c. Company A provided medical support to the 1st Brigade during the period 1 May 1970 thru 4 May 1970. On 4 May 1970 the 1st Brigade deployed a jump CP and Company A provided a medical support to units remaining at 1st Brigade Rear, Tay Ninh. On 29 June 1970 Company A moved to Bien Hoa Army Base with the 1st Brigade and resumed their mission of providing medical support to the 1st Brigade.

d. Company B continued to provide medical support to the 2nd Brigade and all OPCON units. During the latter part of May 1970 Company B also provided medical support to 1st Brigade (FWD) and its maneuver Battalions.

e. Company C continued to provide medical support to the 3rd Brigade and all OPCON UNITS, less this 11th ACR, which has its own medical support. Company C had the responsibility of providing medical support to Task Force Shoemaker on 1 May. When the 1st Brigade became OPCON on 4 May and established a Jump CP at Quan Loi, Company also assumed responsibility of 1st Brigade medical support.

f. The MEDCAPS and DETCAP programs have been an area of emphasis throughout the quarter. The four companies of the 15th Medical Battalion have participated in 61 MEDCAPS treating a total of 3092 patients and 3 DETCAPs with a total of 31 patients.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations (Cont)

   g. During the reporting the First Team Band continued to perform throughout the Area of Operation raising the sprit and morale of many First Team Troopers.
# Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

**TAB 0:** Fire Bases constructed and closed 1 May – 31 July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>BRIGADE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEVERLY</td>
<td>XT 330900</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CLOSED 1 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRUISER</td>
<td>XT 332896</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 1/15 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST/YEN THE</td>
<td>XT 558008</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 1 MAY/4 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTER/CO LQA</td>
<td>XT 473010</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 1 MAY/24 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-RAY</td>
<td>XT 358010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 2/14 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>XT 525261</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 3/19 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI MAC</td>
<td>XT 700115</td>
<td>1-5 CAV</td>
<td>CLOSED 3 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOOD</td>
<td>XT 049801</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CLOSED 4 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVANS</td>
<td>XT 487166</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 4/27 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARISA</td>
<td>YU 454222</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CLOSED 6 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN</td>
<td>YU 062075</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 6/11 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 13/24 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYRGN</td>
<td>YU 039436</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 6/23 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 24 MAY/24 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH II/OKLAHOMA/PHU XULN</td>
<td>XT 428093</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 8 MAY/21 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST I</td>
<td>XT 375950</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>CLOSED 8 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHUFFY</td>
<td>YU 335361</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 9/13 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 19/20 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OPENED 30 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOUT/KY CON</td>
<td>XT 507937</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 10 MAY/23 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YU 274414</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 11 MAY/29 JULY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAL</td>
<td>YU 24523</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 11 MAY/20 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGUYEN TRAI</td>
<td>YU 369261</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CLOSED 12 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANCH</td>
<td>XT 938368</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 13/31 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READY</td>
<td>XT 854426</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 14 MAY/8 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGNG RA</td>
<td>YU 053150</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>CLOSED 14 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>BRIGADE</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI LANG</td>
<td>XU 928082</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>CLOSED 14 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA LONG</td>
<td>XT 928985</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>CLOSED 15 MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO QUYNH</td>
<td>XT 550864</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 15 MAY/16 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KETTER</td>
<td>XU 925429</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 16 MAY/15 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VO TANH</td>
<td>XT 475865</td>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 16 MAY/15 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONIER</td>
<td>XU 807383</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>OPENED/CLOSED 20 MAY/27 JUNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVID</td>
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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970

**TAB 0: Fire Bases (Cont)**

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB P: Civil Affairs

1. (U) Population and Resources Control

   a. Refugees

      (1) The Cambodian Operation produced an influx in refugee population that required coordination with various GVN agencies. The FIRST TEAM processed 2,650 refugees from 1st ACD AO and an additional 1,137 refugees that were generated outside 1st ACD AO during the operation.

      (2) 801.8 tons of rice was captured during the Cambodian Operation and was the primary source of food supply for refugees in the FIRST TEAM AO. Coordination was made with GVN agencies prior to distribution of food in the FIRST TEAM AO.

   b. Security Control: During the reporting period the Division provided supplies for the upgrading of FSDF defenses throughout the AO.

2. (U) Civic Action

   a. Arrangements were made to distribute various captured equipment to GVN agencies in the FIRST TEAM AO.

   b. 801.8 tons of rice was extracted during the reporting period and the majority of this was distributed to refugee centers in the 1st ACD AO.

   c. Project Understanding Phase II was conducted on 25 July 1970. The purpose of this operation was for the children of rural areas to visit Saigon and the main seat of government.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB 0: Psychological Operations

1. (C) General

   a. The quarter began with the 1st Cav operations in Cambodia. While the first ARVN and Allied units were moving across the border leaflets and tapes were made, targeting units identified by G2. The initial leaflets and tapes carried messages telling the enemy that GVN and Allied forces were interdicting their supply lines and formally safe base areas in Cambodia. As cache sites were discovered leaflets picturing the contents were developed with messages addressing the units as identified by documents and PW's. Daily broadcast in the areas reminded the enemy his sanctuaries were no longer safe havens and described the effects that the losses of food, weapons, ammunition and medicine would have on him in the months to come.

   b. During the Cambodian operation 9,000,000 special leaflets were dropped targeting the 7th NVA Division, 5th VC Division, 95C Regiment, 275th Regiment, 165th Regiment, 174th Regiment, 141st Regiment, 56th Rear Service Group, 50th Rear Service Group and 90th R&R. One hundred and fifty-four hours of broadcast were made against these same units. In addition 33,000,000 general leaflets were dropped. These leaflets were divisive in nature: telling NVA soldiers of the success of the GVN and Allied operations, the desertion of their COSVN Headquarters, and the benefits that they would receive by giving up their hopeless struggle. 178 hours of broadcast time was devoted to these same topics. Tapes and leaflets in Cambodian were developed to explain the operations to civilians. 126 Hoi Chanhs came in to the GVN/Allied forces.

2. (C) Support

   a. II FFCRCEV provided two 0298s and a C-123 on a daily basis with a C-47 every other night for night broadcast missions to augment Brigade organic aircraft.

   b. As the last troops returned to South Viet Nam the Brigades turned their attention to local force units in their respective AO's. Tapes and leaflets exploiting the Cambodian successes were developed and targeted against the K-16, K-17, K-28, and K-29 local force units operating in Phuoc Long, Phuoc Hoa Guerrillas, Phuoc Sang, and D-368 respectively.

   c. The Second Brigade initiated a campaign to coax Montagnards in Phuoc Long Province away from VC control during the month of July. 49 Montagnards rallied to GVN: 6 of these were declared Hoi Chanhs.

   d. DIVARTY began a program for publicizing the VIP program within AO Chief.

   e. Throughout the Division greater emphasis was placed on coordination by the S5's with province and ARVN officials stressing Vietnamization at all levels.
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TAB R: Kit Carson Scouts

The deployment of the 1st Cavlary Division (AM) into Cambodia created a need for additional Cambodian-speaking Kit Carson Scouts. 158 Cambodian Scouts, formerly with the 1st Infantry Division, were recruited, briefed, equipped and deployed to units operating in Cambodia as part of Task Force Shoemaker. Most had worked in the Vietnamese-Cambodian border area as members of the Cambodian KKK. The Cambodian scouts were instrumental in handling refugees, preparing leaflets and tapes for PSYOP, interrogating PW's and Ho Chi Minh and assisting with MEDCAIF. All reports have been complimentary regarding the performance of Cambodian Scouts.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB S: Chemical Activities

1. Operations: During the reporting period 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1970, Division Chemical, the 184th Chemical Platoon and the 26th Chemical Detachment conducted chemical support activities for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). First Team chemical personnel continued to support the Division in the following areas: Airborne Personnel Detection, CS employment, Defoliation, Flame utilization and Training and Inspections.

   a. A much greater demand for the "Mini-BURB" (i.e. Bunker Use Restriction Bomb) was received during the reporting period. This CS-filled munition has proved very successful in contaminating bunkers.

   b. Four (04) NVA reported killed resulting from the use of E158R2's.

   c. Airborne Personnel Detector ("Sniffer") missions resulted in fourteen (14) NVA KIA's, the discovery of several vehicles, and findings such as a POL dump, numerous bunkers, huts and rafts.

   d. Three members of the 1st ARVN Airborne Division were trained to operate and maintain "Sniffer" as well as conduct Sniffer missions.

2. Operational Totals: Totals for the reporting period include most, but not all of the wide variety of Chemical Support given the First Team:

   **SNIFER MISSIONS**
   474

   **CS DRUM DROPS**
   35 missions (84,000 pounds of CS)

   **E-158 DROPS**
   58 munitions dropped

   **MINI-BURBS PRODUCED**
   1497

   **FOUG'ESSE INSTALLED**
   334

   **HUSCH FLARES INSTALLED**
   52

   **HAPAIM DROPPED**
   213 drums (11,715 gallons)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970
TAB T: First Team Area of Operations

CAMBODIA

FIRST TEAM AO AS OF 31 JULY 1970

3rd Bde

2nd Bde

FSB Buttons

7 ARVN Regt

DIVARTY

1st Bde

Quang Loi

Camp Gorvad

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.