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**FROM:**
Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

**Authority**
AGO D/A ltr, 5 Sep 1975; AGO D/A ltr, 5 Sep 1975

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SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, dated 4 November 1966, Subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U)

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG John J. Hennessey, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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b. Security of the population and Vietnamization were the two basic considerations which influenced the operations and allocation of resources of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) during the past eight months. During that period, we maintained the closest possible liaison with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province to be certain that our operations and activities were not only conducted in coordination and cooperation with ARVN and territorial forces, but that they also contributed directly to the security of the province and its economic, rural and/or civic development. The Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and I met frequently. We conducted joint tours of the division area of operations weekly to insure that our plans and resources were mutually supporting. My brigade and battalion commanders worked very closely with the ARVN regimental and battalion commanders, the province and district chiefs, and the territorial forces commanders to improve and augment the efforts of the GVN. We maintained liaison teams at the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province as well as at each regimental and district headquarters. All these measures provided a rapid exchange of intelligence, close coordination of operations and prompt US and ARVN reactions to enemy activity.

c. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) is a professional and competent fighting force. Although there was improvement in the performance of the Regional and Popular Forces, more is needed. Twenty-two mobile training teams were deployed by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to assist district staffs in improving training and operational effectiveness of these forces during the summer months. Beginning in late August, these teams were replaced by MACV Mobile Advisory Teams. Since these MACV teams are to be phased out eventually, I am concerned about further upgrading of territorial forces. The Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) requires a great amount of upgrading. Although duty with the PSDF represents a positive commitment by the people to their government, the contribution of these units to the security of the hamlets and villages is minimal in many areas. As another step toward total Vietnamization, I recommend strongly that ARVN mobile training teams be developed to work with the Regional and Popular Forces as well as with the PSDF. I believe a desirable innovation toward this end could be the addition of an "Assistant Division Commander for Territorial Forces" to each ARVN division to monitor and work with province officials on all
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHD-DO

24 FEB 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG John J. Hennessey

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG John J. Hennessey. The report covers the period May 1970 through January 1971, during which time MG Hennessey served as Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

2. MG Hennessey is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incl
as (trip)
2 cy wd HQ DA

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
AVDG-GG

15 January 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375


2. (C) GENERAL:

a. The nature of the war changed significantly during the eight months I commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Accordingly, priorities of effort, allocations of resources, and areas of command emphasis had to be varied. Since the intensive combat in the Ripcord/O'Reilly areas in July and August, enemy activity has been characterized by occasional meeting engagements and infrequent, small scale stand-off attacks. As the intensity of combat has decreased, I have directed more time and energy to problems of morale and discipline, administration, maintenance and supply. The division has performed its combat missions in an outstanding manner; it has performed its administrative and logistical functions well. Support provided to the division by non-divisional artillery, engineer, signal and logistical elements was outstanding. The accomplishments of the division and the problems encountered during my tenure as Commanding General are summarized in the paragraphs which follow.
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matters pertaining to territorial forces. This may help to develop a one-Army concept in South Vietnam.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) primarily fought NVA regular units which operated in the canopied western regions of Northern Military Region 1. Since the end of his summer campaign, the enemy has sought to establish base areas as close as possible to the coastal lowlands in order to infiltrate NVA troops to augment the dwindling VC local force units operating against the population. During this period, enemy offensive operations have ranged from small size units conducting limited ground and sapper attacks to major offensive efforts by multi-regimental size forces.

b. To provide timely information concerning the enemy's capabilities, activities, and plans, every source of intelligence available to the division was employed. Special emphasis was placed on the use of sensors to enhance security of critical installations, to acquire targets, and to obtain indicators of enemy activity throughout the division area of operations. A detailed evaluation was conducted of our sensor program to insure that maximum benefit was being derived from sensor operations. Sensor employment techniques were evolved from experience gained within the division, from lessons learned throughout Vietnam, and from techniques developed in Project MASSTER. Sensor activations have been used to pin-point areas for visual reconnaissance and often assisted us in targeting airstrikes, and deploying ranger teams and other ground units. In the brigade areas of operation, monitoring was provided by teams on permanent fire bases and by teams operating with maneuver companies on key terrain. Extensive efforts with sensors by the 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry, the division's organic air cavalry squadron, in coordination with the ACofS, G2, provided a major source of intelligence in the division reconnaissance zone. Activations in this area were relayed by an Air Force aircraft orbiting over the western portion of Quang Tri Province during 20 hours of each day. The lack of coverage, during the period 1200-1600 hours, a normal time for increased enemy activity, left us with a void in our sensor effort. Coverage in the reconnaissance zone should be continuous if the division is to monitor and react to enemy movement in a timely manner. Sensor intelligence, integrated with other intelligence means and reacted

INCL 3
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AVDG-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

15 January 1971

... to with aggressiveness, provides a significant contribution to mission accomplishment.

c. Special Intelligence (SI) has proved to be such an essential source of information, that I feel that infantry battalion commanders and the air cavalry squadron commander should be cleared for ***. These commanders should be afforded access to all available information regarding the enemy situation. I do not believe the risk is such that battalion commanders should be denied access to Special Intelligence.

d. Although Special Intelligence was probably the most timely and dependable source of intelligence available, I was disappointed with some facets of the effort. I have prepared a supplement to this report covering these considerations which will be submitted through SI channels.

e. During my tenure, we provided continuous aviation support, at considerable risk, to CCN operations, but I was disappointed with the amount of hard intelligence which we received in return. I feel certain, however, that their efforts did contribute significantly to gaining an overall appreciation of their assigned areas of operation.

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS:

a. During the spring and summer months, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) increased the tempo of operations against enemy forces and base areas which had been established during the 1969-1970 northeast monsoon. The air cavalry squadron, with its attached ranger company, was employed to maintain continuing air and ground reconnaissance in the areas adjacent to the Laotian border and along known or suspected routes of infiltration. By placing the squadron in a general support role, we retained the flexibility to mass all its air and ground assets for employment as an effective quick reaction force anywhere in the division area of operation. Hard intelligence was reacted to with limited objective, combined, airmobile operations and/or massive artillery fires, tactical air strikes, and chemical munitions drops (flame operations and persistent riot control agents). These were followed by air or ground visual assessments whenever possible. Concurrently, US and GVN forces conducted extensive combined patrols and ambushes along...
SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

the periphery of the lowlands to provide a protective shield for the continued success of the pacification and development effort.

b. In preparing for the northeast monsoon, my chief concern was the selection of forward fire bases which could be resupplied and reinforced by road. Fire bases not meeting these criteria were closed during the months of September and October, with one exception - we kept Fire Base Brick open because we could resupply it by air 95% of the time. Units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) now occupy fire bases located in the western piedmont and eastern portion of the canopied mountain areas.

c. Organic aviation assets continued to contribute significantly to the conduct of operations. During the past eight months, 25 percent of the flight hours of the 101st Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile) were used to support non-divisional units, with the majority of this being tactical support. When the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) is eventually redeployed, aviation assets will have to be provided to the ARVN and GVN forces operating in Northern Military Region 1. Since CH-54 (Crane) assets may not be available, a tailored aviation force including an assault support helicopter battalion (equipped with the CH-47C model) is required.

d. Considering the many items of equipment developed for and evaluated by the Army in Vietnam, I believe the UH-1M Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) System (ENSURE 78) to be extremely valuable. Operationally, we have employed the FLIR to conduct first and last light checks of fire bases and fixed installations, day and night armed reconnaissance missions, and day and night missions to interdict roads and infiltration routes, all with considerable success. However, we have experienced serious problems in keeping the systems operationally ready. The system has great potential which is not being exploited fully because of inadequate maintenance and lack of repair parts.

5. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Morale and Welfare. Maintaining high morale and providing for the welfare of our troopers has been a particular challenge to me. Drug abuse, race relations, and discipline are three related areas which have
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

15 January 1971

received my close personal attention. Emphasis on strong, thoughtful leadership throughout the division and the introduction of several programs to speed communications between the highest and lowest echelons have kept serious incidents at a low level and have enabled me to anticipate problems. The major efforts in these fields are discussed below:

(1) The ready availability of drugs in this area has made drug abuse a serious problem in the division. We have made some progress in this area but there is much still to be done. I have approached the control of the problem from three directions--through confiscation, drug education, and an amnesty program.

(a) Confiscation. Frequent inspections in all units and searches of vehicles, troops and Vietnamese workers entering the base camps have limited the drug supply on fixed installations. Additionally, the Division Provost Marshal has worked closely with Vietnamese officials in a combined effort to eliminate sources of drugs. Confiscation efforts have been continuous and energetic.

(b) Drug Education. My approach has been very simple. We tell the trooper that drug use and possession is illegal; we give him all the facts available on drugs and drug abuse, and we tell him objectively, of the dangers involved in using drugs. Every trooper coming into the division (ES's and below) receives a one-hour class on drug abuse at the replacement training school. The drug education team that presents this class was hand-picked, and received extensive training by the Division Psychiatrist. The team also presents classes to units during their periodic refresher training and frequently to other units upon request. A mobile training team composed of representatives of the Provost Marshal, the Adjutant General and the Staff Judge Advocate conducts classes for leaders in all units (ES's and above). This instruction includes search and confiscation procedures, physical characteristics of drugs, the effects of drugs on the individual and the judicial and administrative implications of drug abuse. This team is available to all units upon request. We take the dual approach to ES's because of their unique position both as members of the peer group and junior leaders. Several excellent movies on drug abuse have been obtained, and these are sent through the division's entire film circuit, normally as a short subject prior to the main movie. Posters on drug abuse
have also been ordered and distributed throughout the division. A drug "hot line" has been set up in the Office of the Division Psychiatrist and is manned around the clock. Any trooper who has access to a telephone can receive answers to his questions about drugs, drug abuse and the drug amnesty program. The division Leadership Council has been re-designated the Human Relations/Drug Control Council and the subjects of drug abuse and drug control receive roughly half of the council's attention. Through their representatives on the council, major subordinate commanders stay abreast of the drug situation and are alerted to all possible means of reducing drug abuse. Similar councils have been established at each echelon, to battalion and separate company level.

(c) Drug Amnesty Program. I have great hopes for this program, but it is too early now to evaluate its effectiveness. Under the amnesty program, the drug user, providing he is not under investigation, under the influence of drugs, and does not have disciplinary action pending for drug use or possession, can turn himself in, to a chaplain, a surgeon, a leader in his unit, or a member of a battalion drug team, without fear of disciplinary action. He is then sent to the Division Psychiatrist, who provides medical treatment, including hospitalization, if necessary. He is counseled by the psychiatrist and then turned over to his battalion drug team for their counseling program. The battalion teams consist of two young soldiers who have been chosen for their maturity, intelligence and ability to deal with people. The teams are trained by the psychiatrist in drug abuse and counseling techniques. When a man is received into their counseling program, they monitor his rehabilitation, meeting with him often, and in general, providing much-needed moral support and encouragement. I recognize that there is little that can be done for the hard drug addict or the long-time drug user, considering the very limited facilities we have, for the ex-perimenter or the soldier who began using drugs in Vietnam, the amnesty program may help.

(2) Racial Relations. There have been no serious racial incidents in the division during my tour as Commanding General. I attribute this primarily to the sensitivity shown by my commanders at every level in the possible consequence of any but the fairest of treatment for all soldiers in their units. These commanders have been quick to discover and eliminate situations which could have led to disorder and violence.
AVDG-CG 15
January 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer’s Debriefing Report

Troublemakers have been identified and separated, and appropriate disciplinary action has been taken swiftly, when needed. The keys to harmonious relations between the races are just and impartial treatment for all, a constant vigil, and open communications. Human Relations/Drug Abuse Council members are encouraged to communicate their observations, feelings and suggestions on racial relations within their units. These discussions are of great value in assisting commanders to identify their problems.

3. Discipline. I have insisted upon the highest state of discipline in this division. By constant command attention to personal appearance, military courtesy, ethical conduct and, above all, professionalism, the men of the 101st are accustomed to a high state of discipline and they would not have it any other way. Again, I have emphasized the need for reasonable just treatment for our troopers and have not tolerated those leaders who could not provide it. Punishment, when required, has been swift and appropriate, and individuals and units meriting rewards have received them. As a result, crimes against persons and property in the division have remained well below the average rate; our incident rate is the lowest in country. I see no acceptable substitute for a consistent demand for high standards, based upon a carefully supervised system of rewards and punishments.

b. Personnel Management. The effect of the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, the curtailment of foreign service tours for the lower enlisted grades, and significant MOS shortages have made necessary the most stringent personnel controls. Despite the close attention given to management of personnel resources, some problems have arisen which deserve comment.

1. Noncommissioned Officers. Continuing shortages of experienced NCOs and senior technical specialists throughout the division, particularly in the enlisted grades E6, E7, and E8, left a serious leadership gap in the middle management and technical supervisory level. Further compounding these shortages was the large number of enlisted men in these grades with physical limitations. In the combat and combat support series MOSCs, the division normally operated between 60 and 75 percent of authorized strength. This resulted in the assignment of inexperienced junior grade enlisted men to leadership positions authorized personnel one or two grades higher. This lack of experienced leadership in a combat
environment hampered the capability of many squads and Platoons to operate effectively. The loss of expertise and technical experience in the combat service support series MOSCs could not be compensated for by substitution of the lower grade enlisted man. The division consistently operated at 65-75 percent of authorized strength in the middle enlisted supervisory positions. The impact of this shortage was felt in every field from food service to maintenance. The shortage of aircraft maintenance supervisors and technical inspection personnel was especially critical. There was little flexibility within the division to compensate for the loss of middle level enlisted specialists in the aviation field.

(2) Physical Profiles. The assignment and utilization of personnel with physical profile limitations, in particular senior NCOs with combat MOSCs, has posed problems. These personnel are often assigned to the division for duty in combat MOSCs when it is obvious that they are incapable of performing combat type duties. Many of these personnel have no secondary MOSC. Their inability to perform satisfactorily in their primary MOSC has a demoralizing effect on the individual and his associates, and hampers our efforts to maintain an effective enlisted force in the field. The assignment of these personnel to the division contributed significantly to our senior NCO shortages in the combat MOSCs. While there are a limited number of duty positions associated with the housekeeping functions within the division, there are more than enough profile personnel generated within the division to keep these positions filled. Early identification and reclassification of replacement personnel with physical profile limitations, either in CONUS or at the two replacement battalions in country, should lead to their assignment to a combat service support unit. A combat unit should not be burdened with administrative processing, retraining and attempting to utilize these personnel.

(3) In-country Transfers. Beginning in early September 1970 and continuing through the middle of December 1970, the division received approximately 3400 enlisted personnel from other combat units in country. The average retainability for these replacement personnel was slightly over five months; however, many had only 60 to 90 days remaining on their tour. While the bulk of the personnel proved to be
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CG
15 January 1971
SUBJECT: Senior Officer’s Debriefing Report

valuable assets to the division, some with two to five months remaining, particularly in the lower grades, were not motivated for continued service in Vietnam. They felt they had done their job and often avoided giving their full support to this unit’s mission. Reassignment to another unit which was operating in a different area was a traumatic experience for most, resulting primarily from the loss of friends, leaders in whom confidence had been gained, and the normal anxieties associated with joining a new unit with different policies and operating procedures. Indoclination into the 101st was made on a carefully planned, gradual basis. The process was begun upon arrival of the individuals at the division Replacement Detachment and continued into his new unit. The approach that proved most successful was first to recognize the fine record and accomplishments of the soldier’s former unit of assignment. This was followed by a presentation of the history of the division, exposure to Screaming Eagle unit esprit, expressing a sincere interest in the individual’s personal needs, and demonstrating through professional, positive leadership that he had joined a unit as good or better than the unit he departed. In contrast, replacements received directly from CONUS are more easily motivated, identify with the new unit quickly, have developed fewer undesirable habits, approach their duties with a fresh spirit, and provide far greater stability and continuity. The withdrawal of American soldiers from Vietnam is a reality and each soldier senses that he may be the last American casualty on the battlefield. Every commander must recognize that there is an increasing demand for a continuous and highly motivating indoctrination, followed with a closely supervised command information program.

c. Reenlistment. After enjoying a highly successful reenlistment program during the first six months of CY 70, our efforts began to falter as a result of the revised reenlistment program. Two major revisions were made:

(1) Objectives were calculated on one percent of the unit’s operating strength rather than one-half percent.

(2) Personnel in Army Career Groups 11, 12, and 13 were prohibited from reenlisting for other army career groups. The increase in the monthly reenlistment objective and the withdrawal of the more attractive options for the infantryman caused interest in the program to lag. In October we reassessed the entire reenlistment program. Renewed
AVDG-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

emphasis was placed on the active participation of all officers and non-
commissioned officers in the division reenlistment program. In November,
a total of 132 troopers were reenlisted, achieving 69 percent of
the objective. In December, 150 men were reenlisted, for 77 percent
of the objective. Solid command emphasis at all levels became the single
most important aspect of our program. The division has accepted the
challenge of a volunteer force in the coming years.

d. Finance. Communications with the US Army Finance Center con-
cerning non-receipt of dependent support allotment checks require im-
provement. Since replies to message inquiries concerning non-receipt
of allotment checks are normally not very timely, the division has made
maximum utilization of the telephonic inquiry system established by the
USARV Comptroller with the Finance Center. Current policy limits
telephonic inquiries to allotment checks that are at least 45 days over-
due. Although I recognize the magnitude of the workload of the Finance
Center, I feel a policy which permits dependent financial support to be
45 days or more late, before a direct telephonic inquiry may be sub-
mitted, fails to provide the service member and his dependents with the
responsive and vital finance service to which they are entitled. To off-
set this problem, the division has utilized, whenever possible, the
Class "L" allotment issued by the Division Finance Office. Utilization
of the Class "L" allotment has provided prompt, flexible, and reliable
response to trooper pay change requests or inquiries. Such effective
response is not possible under the Class "E" allotment system.

e. Safety. I have been pleased, particularly during the last four
months, with the success we have experienced in the prevention of acci-
dents. Our aviation and ground safety programs have resulted in a
gratifying reduction of non-battle casualties. This reduction was accom-
plished primarily as a direct result of the heavy emphasis placed on
safety at all echelons of command, particularly at fire bases and base
camps. Specifically, the success of the safety program is attributed
to recurring detailed fire base/perimeter defense inspections, estab-
ishment of a safety mobile training team at our replacement training
center, a special accident analysis safety briefing for brigade and bat-
talion commanders, appointment of brigade and battalion executive of-
fers as safety officers, vitality of the division safety council, and
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

the monitoring of individual unit safety training classes. These activities
have resulted in an effective and comprehensive accident prevention pro-
gram.

6. (U) LOGISTICS: Continuous logistic support has been provided not
only to division units but also to non-divisional and other free world
forces. The back-up support provided by the 26th General Support Group,
the USA Support Command, Da Nang, and by USARV has been outstanding.
This back-up support system assisted greatly in improving the logistics
readiness posture of the division, particularly for the monsoon campaign.
Despite the progressive curtailment of resources available to the divi-
sion, at no time was there an overall degradation of the support provided
to the trooper in the field. No tactical operation was curtailed, cancell-
or postponed through a lack of logistic support. The division maintained
very low equipment deadline rates. The Screaming Eagle Logistic Of-
fensive (SELO) was initiated with the objectives of intensifying our con-
servation of resources program and implementing procedures to stream-
line the division through the elimination of excess and unneeded supplies
and equipment. In the conservation of resources program, we revitalized
our efforts to reduce flying hours, to enforce strict control of construction
materials and projects, and to develop an effective POL management sys-
tem. Among the programs initiated to eliminate excess and unneeded
supplies and equipment were: periodic review to insure that items on the
ASL were demand supported; quarterly MTO&E reviews to eliminate or
reduce non-mission essential equipment; and liberalization and simplifi-
cation of turn-in procedures. For example, free turn-ins were conducted
at least quarterly. The division's continuous effort to streamline itself
for future redeployment has led to an average monthly retrograde of
$7,000,000 worth of material, both serviceable and unserviceable, since
September 1970.

7. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS: The division has oriented its principal civil
affairs and civic action activities to support the pacification and develop-
ment programs of the Government of Vietnam. Every effort has been
made to improve the image of the GVN by funneling our contributions
through local channels and emphasizing the role of local officials at
every opportunity. At the same time, continuing emphasis has been
placed upon getting local military forces, and especially the 1st Infantry
Division (ARVN), to play a larger role in civil affairs and civic action
programs. The ultimate objective is the eventual assumption of com-
plete responsibility by GVN forces for these critical programs. In
AVDG-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

15 January 1971

In order to achieve this goal, my staff has worked very closely with the staffs of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and of Thua Thien Province, offering them advice and assistance and some supplies, but only when absolutely necessary.

8. (U) OTHER PROBLEM AREAS:

a. Visitors. The constant stream of visitors from outside the chain-of-command has, on a number of occasions, resulted in significant disruption of my own schedule and in requirements for my staff to defer more critical actions. Often, these visits were not scheduled in coordination with other division activities, but were arranged at the convenience of the visitors. Additionally, the sizes of the visiting parties, together with their various escorts, are often such that an excessive administrative burden is imposed on the division, particularly in the areas of transportation and billeting.

b. Press Relations. There has been no consistent press coverage of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) during the past year. Rather, correspondents have elected to write about the division only during times of intensive combat or when they sensed controversial or sensational situations in the division area of operation. There was no apparent desire to tell the story of the Screaming Eagles, either from a military or humane point of view. Certainly the Vietnamization of the war in Thua Thien Province has yet to be told. Problems faced by the division have been aggravated by slanted reporting and inaccurate research. There is a morbid obsession with body count and with those divisive and debilitating problems such as racial relations, drug abuse, fraggings and alleged miscarriage of military justice matters. Providing support to the press has been a problem, in that transportation, billets, and other facilities are limited. This has been particularly taxing in the case of female correspondents. Certain individuals have been derelict in leaking stories before all the facts are known and giving leads to sensational stories that otherwise may have passed unnoticed. In this connection all Serious Incident Reports and Friendly Fire Incidents should, in my opinion, be classified For Official Use Only until the investigation is completed.
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AVDG-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

15 January 1971

(1) The Camp Eagle/Phu Bai area cannot receive AFVN from either Da Nang or Quang Tri. An improvised system was installed to provide some AFVN coverage in the Camp Eagle/Phu Bai area. This system consists of transmitting the AFVN signal over microwave from Da Nang to Phu Bai and Camp Eagle. Tactical radios are then used to re-transmit the signal to the Camp Eagle/Phu Bai area. Although this system provides reception to some units in the Camp Eagle/Phu Bai area, the AFVN coverage remains unsatisfactory. Part of the problem appears to stem from within the long line system between Da Nang and Nha Trang.

(2) During the period March through December 1970, a concentrated effort was made to improve the situation, culminating in the construction of an AM radio and TV rebroadcast station at Camp Evans. The Division, USARV, XXIV Corps and 1st Signal Brigade cooperated with MACV-AFVN in this extensive self-help project. Despite the installation of this IKW transmitter at Camp Evans, the signal cannot be received south of Hue which is only 15 miles distant. Satisfactory TV coverage is not yet available in the division area. This lack of radio/TV coverage has an adverse impact on troop morale. Men on fire bases are especially affected.

9. (U) The inclosures to this report reflect in some detail the significant activities, problems, and achievements of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) during my tenure as its Commander.

10. (U) The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) has met every challenge and accomplished each mission assigned. I appreciate the rare privilege I have had to command the Screaming Eagles in combat.

JOHN J. HENNESSEY
Major General, USA
Commanding

5 Inc1
1. Intelligence (C)
2. Operations (C)
3. Logistics (U)
4. Civil Affairs (U)
5. Psychological Operations (U) 14
1. (C) **Enemy Situation:**

   a. General. In May 1970, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) faced an enemy force consisting of 15 NVA infantry battalions, four sapper battalions, two NVA artillery battalions and seven VC local force companies. During the summer months of 1970, the enemy favored attacks by multi-battalion forces in an attempt to establish forward base areas near the populated lowlands. The high point of the Summer Campaign was the intensive shelling of FB Ripcord and FB O'Reilly. As fall and winter approached, the enemy directed his activities toward gathering rice and food stuffs, improving his lines of communication and caches and avoiding detection by allied forces. Enemy operations during the fall and winter were characterized by small unit probing actions and indirect fire attacks against allied bases in the lowlands. During the spring, the enemy will probably attempt to improve his position in the mountainous canopy and to strengthen the guerrillas units operating in the lowlands.

b. **Disposition.**

   (1) Military Region Tri-Thien Hue (MRTH) maintained a headquarters in Base Area 611, located in eastern Laos.

   (2) The 4th NVA Regiment, with two infantry battalions, was deployed in the mountainous area of southeastern Thua Thien Province.

   (3) The 5th NVA Regiment, with three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions, and one rocket artillery battalion, was located in central Thua Thien Province, southwest of Hue.

   (4) The 6th NVA Regiment, with three infantry battalions, one sapper battalion and one rocket artillery battalion, was located in northern Thua Thien Province.

   (5) The 29th Regiment, with three infantry battalions, was located north of the A Shau Valley.

   (6) The 303rd Regiment, with three infantry battalions, was located in mountain base areas north of the A Shau Valley.

   (7) Although the 512th Regiment operated north of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) area of operations, the 5th Battalion, 12th Regiment, supported by the K19 Sapper Battalion, 304th NVA Division, was
CONFIDENTIAL

Identified in the attacks against FB O'Reilly on 28 May 1970.

(5) The 66th Regiment, 304th Division, was located in the vicinity of the Da Krong Valley (western Quang Tri).

c. Enemy Activity by Month.

(1) In May, the enemy continued to expand and improve existing logistical facilities in the Tri-Thien Mountain region and to reinforce committed units in order to provide a stronger base for operations in the lowlands. The K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion, 5th Regiment, conducted 122mm rocket attacks on Camp Eagle, Hie City and Camp Sally. The K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion, 6th Regiment, launched a 122mm rocket attack against Camp Evans. FB O'Reilly sustained four attacks by fire and on 28 May repelled a ground assault by the 6th Battalion, 512th Regiment and the K19 Sapper Battalion, 504th Division, resulting in 77 NVA KIA and two FVs captured. The enemy also continued efforts to rebuild the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and strengthen local force units. Operations against the 66th Regiment, 304th Division, continued during May. This regiment had been confirmed as operating in the upper Da Krong Valley during April. On 6 May 1970, the 6th Battalion, 66th Regiment conducted a ground attack against FB Henderson. Employment of 57mm recoilless rifles and flame throwers indicated the battalion's high degree of combat effectiveness.

(2) During June, the NVA launched a series of attacks by fire against allied installations in the lowlands. The enemy employed 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets during these attacks. On 19 June, the 1st District Headquarters, Hue, North Bridge, SF Bay, SF Los Banos and FB Tomahawk received mortar attacks. The mortar attack at FB Tomahawk was followed by a ground assault, resulting in 28 NVA KIA and three FVs. The attacking force was identified as the K45 Infantry Battalion, 4th Regiment. Camp Eagle received 82mm mortar rounds and 122mm rocket on 26 June. Allied operations continued against the 66th Regiment and at the end of the month total casualties were approximately 200 NVA KIA. Because of these heavy losses, the 66th Regiment was forced to withdraw into the Last Son Salient. Indications at the time were that the 9th Regiment, 304th Division would infiltrate into western Quang Tri province to assist the 66th Regiment. During June, the 803d and 29th Regiments continued to avoid detection and destruction by allied forces. The mission of the 803d and the 29th Regiments was to lure allied forces out of the lowlands, thus leaving the area unprotected for possible offensive operations by the 4th, 5th and 6th Independent Regiments.

(3) In July, the 9th Regiment, 304th Division infiltrated into western
Qiang Tri Province. The unit was first discovered on 8 July in the Khe Sanh area where the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry inflicted casualties totaling 199 NVA KIA and four NVA PWS. Subsequent allied operations and airstrikes in the area accounted for an additional 150 NVA KIA. The high point of enemy activity in July was the attack on FP Ripcord by the 6th, 29th and 803d Regiments. Early in 1970, the cadre of MACV concluded that if allied units did not conduct operations in the upper A Shau Valley before June, the NVA would be able to improve its logistical position to the extent that it would be able to force allied units from the canopy in western Thua Thien Province. Their objectives included:

(a) Extending their cache system closer to the lowlands of Thua Thien Province and the piedmont of Phong Dien District.

(b) Increasing control of the piedmont of Phong Dien District.

(c) Strengthening the VC/Government to the point that a VC Government could be established.

(d) Disrupting the Pacification Program.

Encouraged by the fact that allied forces conducted only limited operations in the A Shau Valley, MACV ordered the offensive against FP Ripcord. As operations progressed, it became evident that the enemy intended to place continuing pressure on the firebase and surrounding ground units. The enemy secured the high ground around FP Ripcord and shelled the firebase almost daily. Initially, the enemy deployed 60mm and 82mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles. 12.7mm machine guns were employed in a direct fire role. During the week 14-20 July, the intensity of the enemy offensive increased and for the first time in 18 months, 120mm mortars were employed in the division's area of operation. During that week, FP Ripcord received 125 120mm mortar rounds. On 18 July, a CH-47 helicopter received in excess of 50 hits of 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire, crashed and burned in the artillery ammunition dump of the firebase, resulting in eight US WIA, eight artillery pieces damaged or destroyed and 3,230 105mm rounds destroyed. On 23 July, FP Ripcord was closed, but not before inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy including 163 NVA KIA.

In early August, the 29th and 6th Regiments turned their attention to FB O'Reilly. The 803d Regiment withdrew to refit and resupply. The operation against FP O'Reilly consisted of three phases. In the first phase, the NVA surrounded the firebase and shelled it with 82mm mortars. Because of the terrain in the area, NVA forces were not able to establish favorable firing positions for their mortars, consequently, their shelling was not overly effective. During August, enemy activity also increased sharply in the FB Barnett area. Units in the area were identified as the
CONFIDENTIAL

1st and 2d Battalions, 9th Regiment, 304th Division. These contacts indicated that the 9th Regiment had moved eastward from its last known area of operation in the Saigon. The 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, 304th Division, had moved even farther east and in conjunction with the 89th Battalion, 7th Front attacked Tai Lang (3) on 12 August. This was the first time that elements of the 304th Division or any other elements of the 7th Front had operated this far into the lowlands since a brief appearance in the Hue area during TDF 1968. After suffering heavy casualties, largely inflicted by ARVN/FI units, the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment and 89th Battalion, 7th Front withdrew to the west. During August, the 64th Regiment, 304th Division operated in the FB Surge area.

(5) During September, the 29th and 6th Regiments continued pressure against ARVN units in the TN O'Reilly area. On 9 September, the NVA offensive shifted into its second phase with the employment of 120mm mortars. The enemy continued to shell TN O'Reilly throughout the month of September. Activity by the 304th Division dropped sharply. Due to operations by the 353rd Main Force Division in the Phu Loc-Sk Hanh area, the 6th Regiment was forced to withdraw south to retain control of the lines of communications. The 2d Battalion and other elements of the 9th Regiment may have deployed to the PP Farbara and PP O'Reilly area. The enemy appeared resolved to maintain a presence in the central canyon area. Because of the numerous agricultural plots discovered during September, it is believed that the enemy was attempting to raise food stuffs in his rear area.

(6) During the month of October, activity by most units of MRTH decreased. However, the 9th VI Independent Regiment, did appear to be establishing a more aggressive posture. Guerrilla effectiveness in Quang Dien (D) received a severe setback during the month when a guerrilla assisted allied forces in neutralizing several members of the Quang Dien Special Action Unit. Results from the exploitation of this hit were three additional Ho Chi Minh Trail bases, six FIA, and seven VC FIA. The 29th and 6th Regiments continued their attacks by fire on PP O'Reilly, however, the third phase of the attack plan was never executed. ARVN forces manning the firebase withdrew the first week of October because of the approaching Northeast Monsoon. Since the attacks on PP O'Reilly, the NVA have not employed 120mm mortars in the division area of operation. The lack of identifiable contact with both the 6th and 9th Regiments, 304th Division, during October, indicated their withdrawal from TDF.

(7) Activity by units of MRTH during November was at approximately the same level as the month of October. On 25 and 26 November, six attacks by fire were conducted and four bridges were damaged or destroyed in Phu Loc District. This was the first high point of activity in the 9th Independent Regiment's area of operation since June 1970. It is believed that elements of the KaP Battalion, 9th Independent Regiment, with possible assistance from elements of the Phu Loc Special Action Unit, were responsi-
CONFIDENTIAL

able for the highpoint on 25-26 November. There was extensive activity in the vicinity of FP Kathryn indicating the presence of a reinforced battalion in the area. This activity was attributed to the 903d Regiment which probably moved into the area to establish a forward base camp and provide support for the 5th Independent Regiment.

(2) The most significant event during December occurred on 8 December when the Commanding Officer of the 514 Engineer Company, 4th Independent Regiment rallied to the 224th RP Company. Subsequent to rallying, he led a RP Company in an ambush of his company, resulting in 12 NVA KIA. He disclosed through interrogation that the K&K Battalion, 4th Independent Regiment had disbanded. During December, Camp Evans, Camp Steel, and Phu received attacks by fire. Moderate activity in the vicinity of the brick indicated the presence of the Chi Thua I Sapper Battalion, 9th Independent Regiment, in the area. Information obtained from FMs and analysis of recent activity, indicated that the enemy uses the Hong River approach for infiltration into the lowlands.

d. Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

(1) Tactics. NVA and VC tactics are based on an economy of force role with the aim of inflicting maximum casualties on allied forces while suffering as few casualties and losses of equipment as possible. The NVA/VC operate with numerous small units rather than in large formations, but will mass troops when a distinct advantage can be assured.

(2) Armament. The standard weapon for NVA forces in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) area of operation is the AK-47. Officers are usually armed with K-54 pistols. The NVA have at their disposal a wide variety of indirect and direct fire weapons. These include 60mm, 82mm and 107mm mortars, 122mm rockets, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, RPG-2 and RPG-7. In addition to HE ammunition, the enemy has 25 rounds for the 60mm mortar. He also has 7.62mm RPD machine guns which are employed against both ground forces and aircraft. Other anti-aircraft weapons in use are the 12.7mm, 23mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns. On occasion, the enemy has employed 81mm hurl rounds from his RPG launchers.

(3) Logistics. The enemy is dependent on supplies infiltrated from North Vietnam. He has, however, attempted to obtain food stuffs from the local populace with some success. During 1970, there was considerable evidence that the enemy had resorted to growing food stuffs. Photography and aerial reconnaissance revealed a large number of cultivated fields in the western portions of the area of operations. Once supplies arrive in SVN, they are distributed to cache sites scattered throughout the enemy base areas.

(4) Transportation. The infiltration of personnel into SVN and movement within SVN is accomplished on foot. Supplies are transported by

CONFIDENTIAL
track as far forward as the network will allow. The final distribution of supplies within SVN is done primarily by foot or pack animal. The enemy has been known to employ water buffalo, elephants and bicycles to assist in the transportation of supplies.

(5) Communications. Communications between battalion level units and lower echelons are usually accomplished by messenger using established communication routes. Communications between battalion level units and higher echelons are accomplished by radio or messenger. Low wattage radio transmitters are normally employed to avoid detection. The USAF revert to wire communications after becoming established in a secure area.

0. VCI Activities. Overall VC/VCI activities decreased from May through December 1970 when compared to the same period in 1969. This reduction resulted from a decrease in rice/tax collection incidents. Terrorism, however, has increased. Attacks against SVN facilities (HQ, villages, hamlets), sabotage, kidnappings and assassinations all increased significantly. This trend developed as the enemy attempted to undermine the SVN and disrupt the Pacification Program now taking firm hold in the province. For the VC/VCI to recover and continue their fight against the SVN, the almost ineffective VC local force units had to be strengthened.

During late 1970 there was evidence this was being accomplished by placing USAF personnel into the VC local force units. This tactic was particularly evident in Phu Loc (D) where the majority of VC/VCI activity has occurred. In Phu Loc, the 56th Engineer Company and the 71st Seaport Company, formerly of the 4th NVA Regiment, have been placed under the operational control of the Phu Loc (D) Party Committee and are working in conjunction with the Phu Loc Special Action Unit (PLSAU). Emphasis has been placed on terrorism although propagandist activities remain significant. This trend will continue until the beginning of the Spring Campaign.

2. (C) Intelligence Operations. Certain aspects of intelligence operations bear comment. The division made significant progress in many intelligence related activities, but difficulties beyond the control of this headquarters precluded success in all areas. These activities, with their associated achievements and failures are discussed below:

1. Surveillance.

(a) Aerial Reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance support received from the U.S. Air Force and Marines was reduced from a level of approximately 25 sorties per month during the summer to approximately five sorties per month by January 1971. This reduction required a greater reliance on direct support and organic assets. Direct support by Army fixed wing aircraft came from the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company (OV-1 Mohawks) and the 222nd Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1 Birddogy). While the coverage capability of these aircraft was significantly smaller than that of ARVN assets, the Army aircraft provided an immediate reaction.
CONFIDENTIAL

Isst to take advantage of brief periods of good weather. Each target had to be analyzed separately to ensure that the requirement did not exceed the capabilities of division aircraft. The division also improved considerably the quality and quantity of intelligence gained from the use of hand-held photography. An active photography training program was presented to the pilots of the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, resulting in considerable success and a significant extension of the photo-reconnaissance capability of the division.

The division received three Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) aircraft for field testing on 3 September 1970. The FLIR completed testing on 30 November 1970 with favorable results and was added to the division's inventory. The FLIR performed as a day and night reconnaissance system through the division area of operations with primary emphasis in the division reconnaissance zone. Since 3 September 1970, it has accounted for 110 NVA KIA and eight trucks destroyed. Significant maintenance problems were encountered with the system as an adequate supply of repair parts was not available in country. The FLIR is one of the most effective surveillance and attack systems yet devised, but the supply of repair parts must be improved before its full potential can be realized.

(2) Ground Surveillance

(a) Sensor Employment. After the arrival of the first sensor trained personnel in the division in April 1969, a provisional organization evolved to provide management and execution of the sensor program. A proposed organization with MTE, for the sensor platoon, 101st Military Intelligence Company, was submitted in November 1970. The organization provided the ACofS, G2 with centralized control of sensor personnel through the G2 Ground Surveillance Section. The organization also provided flexibility in the form of augmentation teams to be employed with special equipment packages such as the Battlefield Area Surveillance System (PASS) and the Sensor Analog Relay System (SARS). To provide new impetus and direction to sensor employment and to take advantage of experience gained throughout Vietnam and in Project MASTER, a sensor program was formalized and distributed to the division 1 November 1970. In scope, the program covered responsibilities, policies and procedures for planning, management, employment, maintenance and training for employment of sensors. Specifically, each brigade manages the sensor program in its assigned area while the employment in the division reconnaissance zone is managed by the ACofS, G2 in coordination with 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry. The ACofS, G2 also insures the coordination of effort between brigades and with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). The 101st Abn Div (Ambl) assigned three basic roles to sensor strings. These roles were intelligence, security, and target acquisition. Each sensor string was assigned only one specific role, although the role was changeable, dependent on the tactical situation. Intelligence strings were used to gather information and activations were not normally fired upon. If
possible, they were visually reconnoitered. Security strings were used to provide early warning to firebases and base camp defenses. Activations of these strings were reacted to with the consideration that certain responses tended to compromise string locations and cause loss of intelligence without significantly harming the enemy. For this reason, responses to security strings normally included some means of visually or electronically evaluating the target to determine the appropriate method of attack.

Sniper teams, manned ambushes and night aircraft such as FIR and Night-hawk were employed. Target acquisition strings were normally used for immediate attacks by fire. For this reason, the division assigned the target acquisition role only to strings which were located where the enemy movement was canalized, well-defined and in areas the division wished denied to the enemy. In practice, most strings in the reconnaissance zone were used in the intelligence role, while strings in the brigade area of operation were used for security and target acquisition. During weather which permitted reaction by air, strings often reverted to a target acquisition role and were visually reconnoitered and attacked. String activations were used to target air-strikes, planner team insertions and ground troop employment. The major deficiency in the sensor program was the dependence upon an Air Force aerial relay to provide the sensor readout capability in the division reconnaissance zone. The aerial relay was provided for only 20 hours daily while 24 hour coverage is required to maintain accurate information concerning enemy movement. The readout capability was lost between the hours of 1200-1600, a known period of increased enemy movement. Adequate locations for sensor monitoring was a problem in the brigade areas of operation. To extend the coverage beyond the line of sight capabilities of occupied firebases, the division placed monitor teams with maneuver companies occupying key terrain. This procedure extended the areas which could be covered with sensors, but it had inherent disadvantages. Once sensors were planned and emplaced, any movement of the monitor site could cause loss of line of sight to certain devices. Future plans are to alleviate the need for field monitor sites by greater usage of relays and aerial readout in order to extend coverage into remote areas. With the active interest of all major commanders in the division, a significant increase occurred in numbers of sensors employed and in the varied ways sensor intelligence was used and exploited. Kills directly attributed to reactions to sensor activations were on the increase and aggressive employment of new devices and monitoring systems was being planned. In such an atmosphere, sensors can provide a vital addition to the commander's knowledge of the enemy.

(b) Surveillance Radar Employment. During 1970, AN/FFS-4 Ground Surveillance Radars, organic to the division, were replaced with newer AN/FFS-6 radars. The FFS-6 has a rated range of 5000m against moving personnel as compared with 1500m for the FFS-4. To overcome the problem of organic ground surveillance radars becoming non-operational and
remaining non-operational for extended periods due to their employment in outlying areas, a concentrated maintenance program was established. Initially, the coordination of radar status and transportation to and from maintenance facilities was placed under the G2 Surveillance Officer. In addition, command policy was disseminated emphasizing the priority of radars for transportation and employment. This program, aggressively pursued, resulted in a decrease of radar downtime from 16.7 percent in 1969 to 3.2 percent in 1970.

(4) 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Operation. The Air Cavalry Squadron proved to be an extremely valuable asset for intelligence collection and surveillance operations. The flexibility of the air and ground elements of the squadron permitted complete canvassing of specified areas for purposes of gathering intelligence and intelligence indicators. The squadron was tasked to provide complete surveillance, both air and ground, of the division reconnaissance zone. The squadron operated forward of the brigade areas of operation and provided the division with early warning and extensive information concerning infiltration and enemy movement. Utilizing organic aircraft structured in various configurations (pink Team— one AH-1G and one OH-6A; red Team— two AH-1Gs; cavalry Team— one UH-1H, two or more OH-6As, and two or more AH-1Gs) and tailored to meet the requirements of the mission, the squadron provided daily, low level visual reconnaissance in support of the Division Surveillance Plan. To provide ground surveillance, Company L, 75th Infantry (Rangers) was attached to the squadron and employed in five to ten man teams throughout the forward portion of the division area of operations. Primarily, the missions assigned were area reconnaissance, trail and cache site monitoring and verification of visual reconnaissance sightings. The 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry was an invaluable asset in the conduct of airmobile operations.

(5) CCN Operations. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) maintained close coordination with CCN ground reconnaissance operations during the period 1 May 1970 to 15 January 1971. This coordination consisted of target recommendations and operational support. Target recommendations were submitted on a regular monthly basis for missions within the scope of CCN operations, and division aviation assets were provided to support the operations.

The information derived from CCN operations proved to be of limited value. In areas where there was information to be gained and elements were inserted, enemy anti-reconnaissance units often forced CCN teams to abort missions before any useful information could be obtained. Missions conducted in response to specific requests seldom provided information concerning enemy equipment, base camps, movement or unit identification. Information from CCN operations consisted primarily of terrain reports and results of contacts. Information from the contacts contained only an estimate of the size of the enemy element, the type of uniform worn and the
type of individual weapon being used. Documents, PMs or unit identification indicators were rare.

The concept of OCN holds great potential for providing information of significant value; however, until OCN missions can obtain positive information, the risk involved to OCN teams and aviation and support elements far outweighs the limited information resulting from their operations.
CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT OPERATIONS

1. (C) Operation TEXAS STAR (1 April - 5 September 1970).

   a. In Operation TEXAS STAR, the 2d Brigade was employed in the populated lowlands, piedmont and eastern edge of the canopy in coordination with the 3d and 54th Regiments, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), to assist in the coordination and support of pacification and development for the ten rural districts of Thu" T" Tien Province. The enemy threat was most significant to Phu Loc and Phong Dien Districts as their boundaries extend into the piedmont and eastern canopy regions. Therefore, the 2d Brigade concentrated its efforts in these two districts to conduct combined operations and training with territorial force units in the area. The brigade controlled 22 mobile training teams whose mission was to increase the combat effectiveness of territorial forces in defense of their homes. In addition, the brigade also maintained liaison with the remaining eight district headquarters to improve the capability to react to incidents of enemy terrorism and food gathering among the people. The 1st and 3d Brigades, in conjunction with the 1st, 3d and 54th Regiments, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), deployed against NVA in the canopied mountain areas between the lowlands of Thu" T" Tien Province and the A Shau Valley. Combined airmobile operations were conducted to locate and destroy enemy forces, base camps and cache sites, and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands.

   (1) Special Forces Operation BARBER GLADE (15 May - 30 June 1970). The division assumed operational control of Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (A) (Project Delta) on 10 May. This element initiated Operation BARBER GLADE on 15 May from the Hai Loc area to conduct deep covert reconnaissance and tactical exploitation of intelligence and to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes in the Khe Sanh Plain and Da Krong River Valley area. The detachment conducted 3d ground operations, inserting elements to perform area and route reconnaissance and bomb damage assessment of air, artillery and ARA strikes. The detachment accounted for 15 enemy KIA, 10 trucks, two bulldozers, and a large amount of supplies destroyed along Route 616.

   (2) Brigad. Operation CLINCH VALLEY (9 July - 15 July 1970). On 8 July, aerial reconnaissance elements from the 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry observed 150-200 enemy troops in the open in the Khe Sanh area. Cavalry aircraft, supported by ARA, engaged enemy elements throughout the day, resulting in 139 enemy killed and three prisoners captured. The prisoners identified the unit as the 9th Regiment, 304th NVA Division which was infiltrating into South Vietnam to reinforce the 66th NVA Regiment. In response to this activity, Operation CLINCH VALLEY, employing elements of the 3d Brigade and the 3d Regiment (ARVN), was initiated on 9 July. One US battalion and two ARVN battalions conducted airmobile assaults into western Quang Tri Province to locate and destroy elements of the 9th NVA Regiment. Massive tactical air, heavy artillery and chemical munitions were employed during the operation. Results of the operation, which was terminated on 15 July, were 226 NVA KIA and 29 weapons captured.
CONFIDENTIAL

(3) RIPOORD. Fire Base RIPOORD was opened at the onset of Operation TEXAS STAR as a key forward fire base in the division's offensive campaign to locate and destroy the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 506th Infantry secured the fire base and conducted operations in the area without significant contact until 1 July. The period 1-23 July was marked by increased enemy attacks by fire on and around the fire base and numerous ground attacks against units operating in the vicinity of the fire base. Intelligence indicated that elements of the 6th NVA Regiment had joined the 29th and 803d NVA Regiments in an attempt to control the RIPOORD area. With the steady increase of enemy activity in the RIPOORD area, it became apparent by the third week of July the cost and effort required for the self-defense of the fire base placed the successful accomplishment of other operations in jeopardy. The closing of RIPOORD would make troops available for offensive operations against enemy supply caches and logistic installations to the rear of NVA forces massed around the fire base. Therefore the decision to withdraw from RIPOORD was made, and extraction was completed on 23 July.

(4) Brigade Operation CHICAGO PEAK/LEM SON 363 (25 July - 12 August 1970). This operation was designed to locate and destroy enemy cache sites, logistical facilities and interdict routes of resupply and communication in the mountainous area northeast of the A Shau Valley. This area was believed to contain areas of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. Elements of the 1st Brigade entered the area of operation on 25 July, followed on 30 July by two battalions of the 3d Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (Airmobile). The elements conducted detailed search and attack operations throughout the area, until termination, with moderate success on 12 August. The operation netted 97 enemy killed and 32 enemy weapons captured; however, no major cache sites or logistical facilities were discovered.

b. In early September, the division terminated Operation TEXAS STAR and began repositioning units in preparation for the northeast monsoon season. TEXAS STAR was costly to the enemy in Northern Military Region I. The division, in conjunction with the 1st Infantry Division (Airmobile), killed 413 enemy soldiers and captured 49 prisoners and 1298 weapons.

2. (C) Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MOONSON PLAN 70 (5 September - Continuing).

a. This operation is designed to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist GVN officials in meeting their pacification goals for 1970. To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions. Repositioning facilitated resupply operations by road and greatly decreased the possibility of small units being isolated deep in the canopy without the capability of being reinforced, as a result of extended periods of inclement weather.

(1) O'REILLY. Following the withdrawal from Fire Base RIPOORD in July the enemy began concentrating its activity in the Fire Base O'REILLY area. As in the RIPOORD situation, a threat was presented to the fire base. However, since the massing of enemy forces presented numerous targets which were vulnerable to allied fire support weapons systems, the decision was made to maintain the fire base and

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

exploit the massed enemy. Search and attack operations by elements of the 1st and 3rd Regiments, 1st Infantry Division (AIVN), supported by division assets, were successful in causing moderate to heavy NVA casualties. By October, enemy activity around O’REILLY had decreased significantly and the 1st Infantry Division (AIVN), closed the fire base. The decision to close O’REILLY was based on expected difficulty in resupplying or reinforcing elements in the area during the northeast monsoon season.

(2) Offensive operations during the monsoon season. The division conducted extensive patrol, ambush, search and attack and reconnaissance operations on the periphery of the populated lowlands as well as forward in the camouflaged mountain areas. Whenever weather conditions permitted, limited objective airmobile operations, artillery raids, flame raids and interdiction missions were conducted deep in the canopy based on hard intelligence. In late September, elements of the 1st Brigade and the 3d Regiment (AIVN) air assaulted to a area just northeast of the A Shau Valley, while elements of the 2d Brigade assaulted into the Ruong Ruong Valley area. Both of these operations lasted approximately ten days. In November, the 2d Squadron (Air-mobile), 17th Cavalry inserted elements of its ground troop in the floor of the A Shau Valley to conduct road interdiction and bridge destruction missions. During December, extensive artillery raids and tactical air strikes were targeted against suspected enemy buildups in the Bao La Valley area and in the Ruong Ruong Valley area.

b. Although contact with the enemy has decreased significantly since the initiation of Operation JEFFERSON PLAN 70, allied forces in Thua Thien Province have killed 1052 enemy soldiers and captured 21 prisoners and over 550 enemy weapons.

3. (C) Employment of the Air Cavalry Squadron.

a. Operating in general support of the division, the air cavalry squadron has been given complete responsibility for an area of operations encompassing several thousand square miles in which all fires and air strikes must be cleared by the squadron. When operating in this area, the squadron reacts immediately to enemy contact without the time consuming necessity of obtaining fire clearance. This area includes all the major NVA infiltration routes and numerous staging areas; operations are conducted in this area as often as possible.

b. The mobility and flexibility of the squadron allows it to perform a variety of missions with relative ease. The primary mission is collecting information about the enemy to complement the division’s intelligence effort. Additional missions are the destruction of enemy anti-aircraft weapons, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes, and economy of force operations. In this role, the squadron is unique in that often these operations are conducted with the Bao Bao Company of the 1st Infantry Division (AIVN), OPCON. During operations involving the Bao Bao Company and other AIVN units, the squadron supplies its own advisors to the unit to insure rapid dissemination of intelligence to and from the ground unit. The squadron has also conducted raids with D Troop’s 106mm recoilless rifles. The accuracy and destructive capabilities of this weapon provide deadly firepower for use against enemy fortifications. In addition to these missions, the squadron also provides all support for the Rangers, and provides assets to perform
immediate damage assessment of artillery and air strikes. Squadron assets are employed in search and rescue operations and for downed aircraft security. The flexibility derived from employing the air cavalry squadron in a general support role has given it the ability to perform a multitude of missions and react with all assets to develop a target or destroy it.

c. When the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was selected to conduct testing and evaluation of the UH-1M Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) system (ENSURE 78), the cavalry squadron was designated as the host unit. The objectives of the evaluation were to determine the capability of the FLIR system to detect and engage targets under night and daytime conditions and to analyze employment techniques. The squadron employed the system concurrent with its armed reconnaissance and intelligence role. In addition, the FLIR was employed to conduct first and last light checks of fire bases and fixed installations and to react to sensor readouts throughout the division area of operation. During the period 10 July through 31 October, the FLIR system located and killed 186 confirmed enemy, which was 7.8 percent of the total confirmed enemy kills for the entire division. Results obtained through the use of FLIR required a total of 332 flying hours in 229 sorties. In addition to enemy KIA, 8 trucks and 24 sampans were destroyed. There were no friendly casualties involved in the above actions. Mechanical difficulties with the FLIR system have been numerous, but repair parts and technical assistance have received a high priority at all levels. However, modifications to the UH-1M airframe and the electronic system have caused excessive problems. The division considers the FLIR system to be extremely valuable in a insurgent environment and has requested the FLIR system remain with the division for an indefinite period.

4. (C) Integrated Fire Support (ARVN/US).

a. Operations. Throughout the period there were many specific actions in which US maneuver units were supported by ARVN artillery, and, conversely, several actions where US artillery supported ARVN maneuver elements. The success of these operations was the result of the close liaison and cooperation which existed between the units. A "quick fire" communication channel was always maintained, forward observers were exchanged, and bilingual personnel staffed the fire direction centers. Fire bases were selected so as to be under the fan of protective support fires.

b. Training. Substantial progress has been made in training ARVN units to become operationally proficient on various types of US fire support equipment. In June 1970, training of ARVN artillery personnel began on the AN/MPS-4 counter-mortar radar. Later a radar set was made available to an ARVN fire base and was effectively maintained and operated by ARVN personnel. On another ARVN fire base, ARVN personnel trained by the US now operate their own visual meteorological station. Weather data is forwarded to ARVN/US fire bases in the area to enable a more efficient massing of fires. In addition, an electronic meteorological station is being established at this fire base with concurrent training of ARVN crews. The M-36 chronograph has been taken to all ARVN fire bases and the calibration of all ARVN howitzers has been completed. ARVN personnel are now trained in the use of the chronograph and are using the resulting analysis of velocity error to improve the effectiveness of their fires.
c. Artillery Raids. The Division has been able to exploit the buildup of target intelligence through the employment of artillery raids, utilizing both tube and aerial rocket artillery. This enables the division to extend heavy concentrations of firepower into areas where the enemy has previously felt relatively secure. Fire bases used for cannon artillery raids are beyond current areas of action and must be easily secured by a minimal number of ground troops. Firing data is precomputed for the selected base and a schedule of fires and programmed ammunition expenditures computed. Massive fires can be employed in a very short time using the technique of raids.

d. Ammunition Management. Particularly significant increases in artillery expenditures were evidenced during July and August 1970, correlative to high levels of enemy activity. For example, over 51,000 105mm howitzer rounds were fired in July and almost 84,000 in August. Expenditure rates of this magnitude could not be justified and a program to reduce them was undertaken. By command letter on 14 August 1970, certain ammunition items were allocated to brigade commanders with specific guidance for employment. This guidance established a daily available supply rate (ASS) as a management tool. The ASS could be exceeded on any given day so long as the brigade's sub-allocation for the period was not. Expenditures beyond sub-allocation required justification; however, this did not prohibit profitable and operationally necessary use of ammunition. Expenditures for the following two allocation periods were reduced. This management action fulfilled ammunition expenditure guidance imposed by USARV through XXIV Corps. There has been a 100 percent increase in the expenditure of heavy artillery ammunition by units of XXIV Corps artillery in support of the division. Those targets selected for Combat Skyrapts or TAC Air are also engaged by heavy artillery as a gap filler and as a surprise second strike after a few hours delay. The 175mm fires are used in conjunction with the road interdiction program and with the ground sensor program. Heavy artillery is integrated into all of the division's fire plans.

5. (C) Chemical Operations.

a. Airborne Personnel Detector M3 (APD) (Sniffer). The APD assisted in pinpointing enemy locations and determining enemy concentrations in both the division and ARVN areas of operation. "Hot spots" detected were exploited by visual reconnaissance, aerial rocket and cannon artillery, CS agent (persistent and nonpersistent), air strikes, and/or insertion of troops.

b. Herbicide Operations.

(1) Defoliation operations, utilizing herbicide agent Blue in approved and authorized areas, and diesel fuel in areas where agent Blue was not authorized, were conducted to clear fields of fire and provide good observation around fire bases. These operations denied the enemy concealment and reduced his capability to launch surprise attacks.

(2) Crop destruction operations, utilizing herbicide agent Blue in approved and authorized areas and persistent riot control agent CS2, proved to be effective in controlling enemy crops. The technique employed was the use of Lag-4-Jugs and persistent riot control agent CS2 for destruction of crops and restriction of enemy harvesting activities. Lag-4-Jugs are five gallon collapsible plastic water
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container filled with herbicide agent blues. Twenty Jug-A-Jugs were employed from a OH-6 helicopter or six jugs from an OH-58 helicopter. They were dropped individually from helicopters at altitudes of 100-1500 feet AGL and each jug covered a circular area of 50 meters. Jug-A-Jugs proved to be effective and practicable in destruction of scattered enemy garden crops. Persistent riot control agent CS2 was used in conjunction with Jug-A-Jugs or alone to contaminate enemy crops and restrict enemy harvesting activities. Persistent CS2 in 55-gallon drums was carried internally by C-47 aircraft. Once over the target area, flying at 85 knots and between 1500 and 4000 feet AGL, the drums were rolled out of the rear of the aircraft and burst upon impact causing contamination of the crops and surrounding area.

a. Employment of Reflective Slurry, Personnel Marking and Identification System (RUMS), RUMS slurry, an ultraviolet sensitive material used to mark and identify individuals trespassing in unauthorized areas, was employed using the OH-6 helicopter on known or suspected enemy routes of infiltration into the Lowlands. These routes are restricted to civilians and have low vegetation. Ultraviolet lanterns were used to monitor civilians to detect traces of the slurry. Monitoring of civilians was conducted at entrances to base camps and during cordons and search operations.

d. Aerial Flame Drops. The division made extensive use of aerial flame drops to assist in neutralizing and destroying enemy booby traps, base camps, and bunker complexes. Aerial flame drops consist of three types:

(1) The "Mini-Flame Drop" consists of two drums of four percent thickened fuel released from a OH-6 helicopter. The drums are secured with straps and are suspended below the aircraft by the cargo hook. The mini-flame drop is employed on small area targets and point targets such as booby trapped trails and dikes. The drums burst on impact and are ignited by white smoke grenades.

(2) The "Regular Flame Drop" consists of eight to ten drums of four percent thickened fuel released from a C-47 helicopter. The drums are suspended 10 feet below the aircraft in a 14 x 14 foot nylon net. Drums burst on impact when released and are ignited by white smoke grenades. Area coverage is circular with a 40-50 meter diameter.

(3) The "Super-Flame Drop" consists of 18-20 drums of four percent thickened fuel released from a C-47 helicopter. The drums are suspended below the aircraft in two 14 x 14 foot nylon nets. The super flame drop is primarily employed on bunker complexes and on booby trapped areas. The drums burst on impact and are ignited with white smoke grenades. Coverage is circular with an 80 to 100 meter diameter, depending on the terrain.

e. Flame Operations. Flame field expedients such as fougasses and Hush flares are extensively used as an integral part of fire base and base camp perimeter defense. Fougasses are emplaced tactically around perimeters with particular emphasis on likely avenues of approach. Fougasses have proven to be effective weapons in defensive operations. Hush flares provide supplemental illumination for as long as an 8-hour period.

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f. Employment of CS.

(1) Nonpersistent CS was effectively used in supporting combat assaults, fire bases and base camp defenses, and reconnaissance by fire. The M18 CS cluster, 88 CS launcher, and the 2.75-inch CS rocket munitions were used for these purposes.

(2) Persistent CS2 was used to restrict enemy infiltration, lines of communication, and the use of base areas and key terrain. This use has caused the enemy to relocate and establish new routes and base camps. This impedes enemy movement and makes him vulnerable to observation and fire. Persistent CS2 has been used successfully in seeding bunkers, caves, and tunnel complexes as they are found during combat operations.

g. Portable Flamethrowers Used to Fight Fires. During the summer months several large fires resulting from enemy activity destroyed equipment on fire bases located in areas inaccessible to the fire department. These fires revealed a need for effective portable fire fighting equipment. A search for portable equipment resulted in the test and employment of the flamethrower filled with "Lite Water" to fight fires. "Lite Water" is a soap concentrate which produces blanketing foam when mixed with water and sprayed under pressure. The mixture is sprayed on fires by the portable flamethrower at a range of 30 meters and provides excellent means of extinguishing most types of fires. Two portable flamethrowers and a pre-mixed 55-gallon drum of "Lite Water" are now a part of the minimum fire fighting equipment at each occupied fire base. Use of this expedient has been credited with saving a mess hall and an ammunition dump.

h. (1) Engineer Support.

a. Following the combined enemy and ground attack of FB HENDERSON on 3 May 1970, the division's concept of fire base construction became that of "hardened" fire bases—the bases which could withstand enemy stand off and/or ground attacks with minimal damage and casualties. Initially, only essential command and control facilities were protected. By November, every two fighting positions were provided with an 8 x 12 firing bunker, thus bringing all facilities underground. Underground mess and kitchen buildings ranging in size from 15 x 32 feet to 20 x 104 feet were also constructed. These buildings enhance the welfare of the troops in that they serve not only as a frequent-proof dining facility but also as a meeting place, a theater, and a living area. The creation of a concrete floor to the mess bunkers and kitchen bunkers saved greatly in relieving what had previously been a serious sanitation hazard.

b. With the improved facilities on the fire bases, the decision to keep them open throughout the season was made. This placed great importance on maintaining a land route of resupply. At the end of July, a single lane, fair-weather road was through to each of the fire bases. By the onset of the monsoons, these roads had been upgraded to single lane, all-weather roads.

c. In addition to full combat support, the 326th Engineer Battalion (Airmobile) effectively aided the local populace during the extensive flooding of early November 1970. The battalion's six Boston bombers and 14 pneumatic assault rafts were
used to resuply more than three thousand people with food and evacuate an additional 732 from isolated areas.

7. (U) Aviation Support.

a. Aviation Support to GVN Forces. Over 22,000 flight hours, representing 11 percent of the division total flight time for the period, were flown in support of tactical operations of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 25th Vietnamese Army. The majority of this support was tactical in nature and consisted of combat assaults, critical resupply of combat units in the field, and resupply of medium and high-threat fire bases. The expertise provided by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) liaison officers assigned to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 25th Vietnamese Army, facilitated response to immediate requirements and the conduct of coordination of airmobile operations.

b. Tactical Resupply of High-Threat Fire Bases. The intense ground-to-air enemy fire experienced by aircraft conducting resupply of high-threat fire bases such as RIPCORD, O'KELLY, PAINTER, and FULLER revealed the necessity for protection of CH-47 aircraft in excess of that normally provided by escort gunships. Planning for these missions followed the same sequence as prescribed for combat assaults. Artillery fires were planned along all approach routes on known and suspected enemy locations. A-10 and F-4D aircraft escorted the CH-47s at altitude to provide suppressive fires on enemy targets preventing a threat to the progress of the aircraft. Gunships escorted the CH-47s over pre-designated routes into and out of the fire bases. The approach and exit routes were chosen frequently and time intervals between routes were varied. By employing this procedure, the division aircraft successfully supplied fire bases in close proximity to enemy forces while sustaining minimum damage from ground fire. This procedure was so successful that the tactical resupply of Fire Base FULLER was routinely accomplished under radio silence.

c. Tactical Weather Reporting. To provide a continuous weather profile of the division area of operation, the division pathfinders were trained by the US Air Force weather personnel in the fundamentals of weather observation and reporting. A weather reporting net was established through the 22, 101st Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile), controlling headquarters for the pathfinder elements, to the G2 weather office. Pathfinders stationed on each fire base reported hourly the existing weather conditions at their respective locations throughout the division area of operations. On marginal weather days this net was augmented by weather check aircraft launched by the assault helicopter battalions and the air cavalry squadron to check their areas of operation. By providing current weather to aviators the number of aircraft operating in marginal weather was controlled, reducing the probability of mid-air collisions.

d. Combat Weather Minimums. To provide commanders and aviators with guidance for operations during marginal conditions, combat weather minimums applicable to all units assigned or attached to the division were published. A summary of these minimums is at tab A. Once accustomed to operating within these parameters, commanders and aviators planned and safely executed their missions with minimum confusion and extraneous effort.

e. Non-Divisional Aviation Support. Since the division is the only unit in
Northern Military Region I with an aviation general support capability, fully 24.8 percent of the 101st Aviation Group flight hours were devoted to support of non-divisional units.

f. Conversion of the CH-47 Super C Aircraft. On 16 September 1970, 27 CH-47 Super C aircraft with T55-L-11 engines were grounded pending modification. This represented 52 percent of the medium and heavy lift capability of the division. An extensive modification program was initiated on 15 October 1970 by USAV and conversion to CH-47C aircraft was completed on 16 November 1970. During this period, the division continued to perform its operational mission without interruption. The division was augmented by a platoon (4 flyable CH-47A aircraft) from XXIV Corps assets during the conversion period.

8. (U) Training.

a. Battalion Refresher Training. A 7-day program for battalion refresher training was initiated on 12 May 1970. This program provides 2 days for troop movement (the first and last) and 5 days for the conduct of training and recreation. Companies are rotated for 1 day stand-downs at Eagle Beach during the 5-day training period. Troops are training for 1 day of recreational stand-down and 4 days of training for each company. During the 4 days of training, 9 hours of division mandatory subjects are presented. Infantry battalions normally conduct refresher training every 30-60 days. This frequency of training enables more effective integration of replacements, correction of unit tactical weaknesses, and implementation of lessons learned.

b. Infusion Training. The division began receiving infusion personnel from other commands for replacement training at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SEERTS) on 2 September 1970. The objective of the training is to provide instruction in those areas that are required to attain a minimum degree of combat proficiency in airborne operations. A course of 12 hours provides for rapid indoctrination and early utilization of experienced personnel.

c. GIVI Territorial Forces Training.

(1) During Operation JZ/3 CAMAR, 22 mobile training teams and one dedicated battalion conducted an intensified training program for the territorial forces in Thua Thien Province. The concept of employment of LVTs was changed on 19 May 1970 to the technique of on-the-spot corrections during the conduct of operations as the primary instruction vehicle. Formal classes were presented only upon request for the specific instruction desired by GIVI officials. All LVTs operated in close coordination with the district chief and district senior advisor to identify weaknesses and take corrective action in an effort to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the territorial forces. The division gradually reduced its GIVI training program and discontinued employment of the dedicated battalion beginning on 24 August. By December 1970, all LVTs were deactivated and replaced by newly formed MACV Mobile Advisory Teams (MUS).

TABS
A - Combat Weather Minimums

33

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The following weather minimums were approved by the Commanding General 2 Oct 70 for all aircraft assigned or attached to the 101st Abn Div (Amph).

1. Routine missions:
   a. Flat terrain.
      - Single ship/gun team: Day 300/1, Night 300/1
      - Multi-ship: Day 500/1, Night 1000/1
   b. Mountainous terrain.
      - Single ship/gun team: Day 300/1, Night 1000/1
      - Multi-ship: Day 500/1, Night 1000/1

2. Combat essential missions:
   a. Flat terrain
      - Day 200/1, Night 300/1
   b. Mountainous terrain
      - Day 200/1, Night 500/1

3. Tactical emergency missions:
   No weather minimums

4. All CH-54 missions, CH-47 missions with internal passengers:
   - Day 1500/2, Night 1500/2

*Minimums apply along flight route and above highest obstacle to include sufficient lateral separation to permit 180° turn.

**Gun escort and general officer approval is required when these minimums cannot be met.

Tab A
LOGISTICS

1. LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS: a. All classes of supply were distributed as far forward as possible by ground transportation, which resulted in the most efficient use of aircraft. During the northeast monsoon, a minimum of five days of class I, III, and V supplies are maintained on all firebases accessible by road and a minimum of 10 days are maintained on firebases accessible only by air. Additionally, all units operating away from firebases maintain a minimum of two additional days of rations and small arms ammunition. Many commanders found it practical to establish cache sites from which the companies could resupply during periods of marginal flying weather.

b. During the past eight months, a marked improvement has been realised in maintenance within the division. The implementation of the following programs has resulted in a lower deadline rate and a more efficient maintenance management program throughout the division.

(1) All battalion/separate company commanders receive a technical assistance visit (TAV) within two months after assumption of command. The purposes of the visit are to identify early any maintenance problems or weaknesses, and to assist them in improving their maintenance program. The team remains with the unit as long as is required.

(2) In addition to the TAV, the division has established PLL/TAMS contact teams that travel daily to present classes, on the job instruction, and, if necessary, assist in the establishment of effective maintenance systems. The overall concept is to assist and train maintenance personnel, not to inspect or harass them. This program has reduced the impact of problems caused by personnel turbulence.

2. FORWARD SUPPORT OPERATIONS: Support of the brigades was accomplished by the three DISCOM Forward Service Support Elements (FSSS), operating in direct support from the three combat bases. Each FSSS consolidated logistical transportation requirements for the brigades and operated the logistical helicopters in each brigade area. This area support included logistical missions in support of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), Corps artillery units on ARVN firebases, and elements of the 1st Brigade (Mech), 5th Infantry Division.

3. EMERGENCY AERIAL RESUPPLY SYSTEM: An aerial resupply system has been tested and is now operational by which firebases and units in the field can be resupplied during inclement weather. Individual 1,000 pound bundles can be dropped with a reed parachute which opens just prior to impact, providing an accurate delivery means. This system is currently available for combat emergency resupply when logistical helicopter operations are restricted as a result of adverse weather conditions. This system was used initially in an emergency drop on 3 October 1970 and was highly successful.
4. LOGISTICAL MANAGEMENT: From May 1970 through December 1970, logistical improvements in the division were achieved through refinement of management procedures. The following paragraphs summarize salient features of DISCOM operations during this period.

a. 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Airmobile).

(1) Class I - The total tonnage of class I issued for the period was 26,987 S/T (Tab 1). The downward trend from 3,627 in September to 2,839 in December resulted primarily from the change in weather and a reduction in ice consumption.

(2) Class II.

(a) Average demand accommodation for the period was 76.9% (Tab 2). The current Authorized Stockage List of 935 items allows for intensive management of a reasonable number of items. The favorable trend, which began in August 1970, relates to a major revision of the ASL to include addition of high demand items to the authorized stockage list.

(b) The demand satisfaction average for the period was 65.8%. The decline from June through October occurred because of a reduction in supply response by supporting depots. This resulted from problems associated with the transfer of responsibilities from the Kawai Support Activity, Danang to the Danang Depot. Some problems are being solved and more timely support is now being received.

(c) Average authorized stockage list zero balance for the period was 42.2%. The increase from 37.2% in August to 48.0% in September was a direct result of the ASL revision previously discussed. The present downward trend is due to the increased receipt of supplies.

(3) Class III - The total tonnage issued for the period was 67,471 S/T (Tab 3). The August 1969 peak of 13,031 S/T was related to additional flying hours in support of increased tactical operations. The decline starting in September and continuing through December to a low point of 6,639 S/T was attributable to the tactical employment of the division and reduced flying hours resulting from monsoon weather. Fuel consumption remained directly proportional to the flying hour program, as JP4 is the major commodity in the class III area.

(4) Class IV - High levels in May and June were due to a concentrated effort to upgrade the quality of firebases. The high levels in August and September reflect a firebase improvement program which was undertaken in preparation for the monsoon (Tab 4).
(5) Class V - Total issues for the period were 40,361 S/T (Tab 5). The rather steady decline since May has been due to more stringent controls on the use of artillery ammunition. The only break being during the operations at Firebase Ripcord, and support of operations around Firebase O'Reilly.

b. 801st Maintenance Battalion (Airmobile).

(1) Automotive operational readiness (OR) - The OR during the entire period from 1 May 1970 to 27 December 1970 consistently exceeded the USARV goal of 95% (Tab 6). During one week in August 1970, an outstanding posture of 96.1% was achieved.

(2) Armament operational readiness (OR) - The OR trend remained above 99.8% throughout the period (Tab 7). Command emphasis reduced significantly the repair and return time intervals for night vision devices from Sacramento Army Depot. Prompt evacuation of unserviceable weapons and intensive management of float assets aided in maintaining outstanding OR within the division artillery.

(3) Electronics operational readiness (OR) - The OR trend remained constantly above 96% during the period because of an expanded USU repair capability using round-the-clock operation (Tab 8). Expedited repair of all/FIS 5 radars was accomplished through command emphasis, management by exception, and twenty-four hour a day maintenance operation.

(4) Supply performance - During this period, a major revision of the repair parts supply system was made. The authorized stockage list was reduced from 6,125 lines to 3,337 lines. Project Fill procedures were also used to identify critical ASL zero balances to the backup depot system. A one time fill or kill project on zero balance items and a complete inventory produced outstanding results.

(5) Supply transactions - Supply indicators such as demand satisfaction and zero balance percentage remained favorable although a large volume of technical supply transactions occurred during the period (Tab 9).

c. 326th Medical Battalion (Airmobile).

(1) The patient work load of the four organic medical companies consisted of the following major categories:

(a) Routine outpatients/sickcall patients on an area basis for units which lack organic medical support was conducted. There were a total of 24,997 patients treated for diseases and injuries.
(b) Of these, 2,640 were admitted to the wards for stabilization and returned to duty or evacuated further through medical channels. A total of 1,279 patients were evacuated during the reporting period.

(c) The greatest number of patients admitted and patients seen occurred during the months of July and August. During this period the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) conducted operations in the area of Granite, Henderson, Ripcord, and O'Reilly (Operation TEXAS STAR). A total of 4,320 patients for July and 4,281 patients for August were seen. Of these, 434 patients were admitted for July and 318 patients were admitted for August and a total of 299 patients were evacuated. (Tab 11)

(2) The 326th Medical Battalion (Airmobile) has an Air Ambulance Platoon organic to its TO&E. Twelve (12) UH-1H helicopters are assigned to the platoon and all Aeromedical Evacuation for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) is accomplished by Eagle Dustoff. During this reporting period, a total of 1,321 Aero-Medical Evacuation missions were conducted. A breakdown of the category of patients is as follows:

(a) Urgent: 696 or 53% of the total missions.*
(b) Tac Urgent: 190 or 14% of the total missions.
(c) Priority: 219 or 17% of the total missions.
(d) Routine: 216 or 16% of the total missions.

*51% of the Urgent and Tac Urgent were hoist missions.

(3) During the reporting period, the division medical supply averaged a 92% rate of fill on requests for medical supplies.

d. 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Airmobile) - The aircraft maintenance and supply posture of the division has steadily improved. Aircraft availability for the months of May 1970 through December 1970 has ranged from 81% in May 1970 to a high of 86.1% in November 1970, with an overall monthly average of 84.4% (Tab 10). A major factor in maintaining this high availability has been the application of intensive management procedures for maintenance and supply. Of particular significance is the handling of "not operational ready for supply" (NORS) requirements. When an aircraft is in a NORS status, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Airmobile) makes intensive efforts to locate and expedite the delivery of critical repair parts. Also, a significant factor in maintaining and improving the division's availability has been the steady improvement of CH-47 availability. Significant improvements in maintenance and supply management at the aviation unit level have been principle reasons for this rate of availability.
(1) During CT 70, three significant troop movements were conducted for special events at Camp Eagle. In April, approximately 8,000 troops were transported to Camp Eagle for Easter services. Again, in August, approximately 12,500 personnel were transported for the Miss America USO Show. Finally, in December, approximately 18,000 personnel were transported for the Bob Hope Christmas Show.

(2) Air Transportation.

(a) Passengers. The division processed an average of 3,273 incoming passengers and an average of 3,259 outgoing passengers per month. However, both incoming and outgoing passengers increased by about 22% during the last quarter. This was primarily due to the influx of replacements from units deployed from Vietnam, the early releases of DFRPS personnel, and the new 14 day leave program that was initiated.

(b) Air Cargo. The division received an average of 147 tons of aircraft parts monthly which arrived at Phu Bai Airfield on a daily Special Mission Airlift Requirement (SMAR). In addition, an average of 37 S/AT of other critical cargo was received monthly by air. There was no significant change during the year. Retrograde air cargo, which was 99% aircraft parts, reflected approximately 86 S/AT per month.

(3) Wheeled Vehicles. The Movement Control Center (MCC), DISCOM, monitored the utilization of 10,576 wheeled vehicles during the year for a monthly average of 876 per month. Vehicles monitored, moved an average of 5,970 S/AT of cargo and 16,463 passengers within the division area per month. However, the last six months showed an overall increase of 20% mainly due to the Miss America and Bob Hope shows.

(4) Helicopters (Logistical). The Movement Control Center (MCC), DISCOM, monitored the utilization of 1,463 logistical sorties per month to resupply division firebases during calendar year 1970, with an average of 5,120 S/AT per month being airlifted. The trend, however, indicated more favorable conditions during the first half of the year. A decrease of approximately 15% was noted during the last quarter due to an increase of marginal flying conditions and increased emphasis on the use of lines of communication (LOC).

(5) Sea Transportation. The division received approximately 16,800 S/AT of cargo through the Tan My Ramp facilities during the calendar year 1970. During October, November, and December, the average tonnage received almost doubled that received during the preceding months. This increase was largely due to the receipt of heavy building materials, wheeled vehicles, and equipment laterally transferred from the 4th Infantry Division. The Military Sealift Command has recently expanded their capability to provide increased service for Military Region I. This expanded capability should enhance the logistical posture of the division.
6. RETROGRADE: The division initiated an intensive retrograde program to eliminate excess, non-essential and unserviceable supplies and equipment. The following data, showing the dollar values of supplies and equipment retrograded during the period from 1 September 1970 to 4 January 1971, clearly illustrates the success of the program.

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<th>Automotive</th>
<th>General Supplies</th>
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### CLASS III

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<td>NOV</td>
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<td>6,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
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*Figures represent tons per month.*

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*Tab 3*
CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. The 101st Abn Div (Ambl) has the mission to support pacification activities of the GVN with civic action projects. The division sponsors an active community relations program and provides medical training, assistance and support to Thua Thien Province.

2. Policy: a. The operative principle behind 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) military civic action was the maximization of Vietnamese participation. If the effort to build a nation in Vietnam is to be successful, the people must determine their own needs for projects and bring them to fruition with their own sweat.

b. The division civic action program is founded on continuous coordination with province and district officials and Vietnamese military units. Civic action priority lists are proposed by hamlet/village chiefs and recommended for civic action by district and province chiefs. Each proposed project is screened for Village Self Development and GVN funding to avoid duplication of effort. Labor for each project is organized and supervised by district officials, and maximum use of Vietnamese transportation assets and materials is stressed.

c. To execute the program, each battalion is assigned a civic action area of responsibility and overall responsibility for supervising projects within this area. The battalion civil affairs officer (85) exercises staff supervision of these projects.

3. Achievements: a. Between 1 May 70 and 15 Jan 71, over 59,000 persons were treated at 1,074 BSU's. These BSU's were held at 47 carefully selected sites and were even more important as teaching vehicles for the Vietnamese medical workers than as healing vehicles for the patients. Presently the Vietnamese are constructing their own independent MEDCAP programs: five rural districts and in Hue City.

b. Under the cited period, 164 civic action projects were completed, including 52 schools, 11 dispensaries, four markets and 76 wells. On 1 May 1970, 196 projects were in progress; with the advent of monsoon weather 35 were instructed to defer project initiations in favor of increasing project completions. There are currently 67 projects in progress, including six schools, eight dispensaries, four markets and 29 wells.

c. The division activated a Disaster Relief Coordination Center (DRCC) on four occasions to assist in saving lives of people threatened by flood waters and typhoon conditions. On two of these occasions division aircraft flew 546 sorties employing 22 CH-47s and 49 UH-1Hs. Division aircraft and boats evacuated 6,053 of the 20,000 evacuees caused by the floods, and the division received a citation from the President of the Republic of Vietnam.
d. In order to preserve and enhance Vietnamese-American relations, a community relations program which stressed understanding and knowledge of local customs and history was encouraged. An integrated, multi-faceted program was implemented acquainting troopers with the history and customs of Vietnam. Fact sheets and pamphlets were distributed to the individual soldier informing him of the type of assistance the local citizens have provided, citing the numerous incidents where the people have reported booby traps, mines, bunkers and weapon caches. Division personnel voluntarily taught classes in English on a weekly basis during their off duty hours in conjunction with the Hue Culture Center. The division band provided music instruction and concerts at the Hue Conservatory. At the request of the province chief, the band played a benefit concert in Hue City, the proceeds of which were contributed to the local flood relief program. On the occasion of the Mid-Autumn Festival, the division provided approximately 12,000 dependent children of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province soldiers with gifts of candy and toys. Our efforts in community relations have cemented firm bonds of understanding. With division support approximately 10,000 former refugees have been returned to their ancestral homes. No refugees were generated during the period 1 May to the present as a result of combat operations. The people of Thua Thien Province live in one of the most secure and politically developed provinces of Vietnam. Socio-economic indicators reflect a strong, long-range favorable trend in this area, and participation by the people in elections and territorial forces is cause for confidence. The success of these programs indicates that the people are interested in supporting the government. The military shield of the division and its activities in the lowlands provide the opportunity for the people to demonstrate this support.
1. Policy/Objectives: The division's psychological operations were targeted at friendly, hostile, and neutral Vietnamese groups throughout the area of operations. The goal of these operations was to influence the attitudes, behavior, emotions, and opinions of these groups in order to gain support for both national and local objectives. Special emphasis was placed on Phoenix, pro-GVN rewards, rice denial, anti-VC/NVA, and Chieu Hoi programs.

2. Operations/Achievement: a. Development of the PSYOP program. Psychological operations have been integrated with combat operations against the NVA and VC found in the piedmont and mountainous areas of the province and have been employed, in conjunction with civil affairs, to exploit pacification and anti-VC campaigns in the lowland regions. All operations, regardless of terrain or target audience, required the support of major units within the division. Organic aerial loudspeaker systems permitted extensive psychological operations in the mountainous and canopied jungle regions of the province, which are inaccessible to ground teams. The system gave the division a quick reaction capability for the rapid exploitation of Hoi Chanh and other targets of opportunity.

b. Combined operations with other units and programs. All psychological operations conducted in the division area of operations were coordinated with province PSYOP agencies and the 65th 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). As a result of such close team work, many PSYOP campaigns were executed as combined operations, with these agencies providing their experience and intimate knowledge of the people, their customs and language, while the 101st Air Div (Airl) contributed air mobile and propaganda assets.

c. Effectiveness of PSYOP Activities.

(1) Impact on NVA. NVA ralliers confirmed that allied psychological operations had a deleterious effect on their morale and combat effectiveness.

(2) Impact on VC/VCI/VCS. Approximately 75 percent of the Hoi Chanh who rallied in the province possessed the PSYOP leaflet "Safe Conduct Pass". All the Hoi Chanh indicated their decision to rally was prompted by reading leaflets or hearing PSYOP broadcasts.

(3) Local populace.

(a) Psychological operations support of the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) and rewards campaigns has been very successful, as evidenced by the volume of reports from the Vietnamese people concerning VC weapons and food caches, personalities, and activities.
(b) In combined operations with Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), audio-visual and ground loudspeaker teams accomplished a dual mission. While informing the local populace of GVN and civic action projects that were being planned or had been completed, they have also instructed the VIS cadre in the operation and maintenance of ground loudspeaker and audio-visual equipment.

3. Problems Experienced: Sufficient maintenance facilities are not available to provide necessary maintenance support of the AN/UIT-6 serial loudspeaker systems. Of four systems assigned, one has been in a nonoperational status since 13 Sep 70, and another since 26 Dec 70 due to lack of repair parts for the amplifiers AM-4254. Repair parts are not readily available in-country, and must be shipped from CONUS because the loudspeaker systems are Ensure items.

4. Summary of psychological operations: By combining PSYOP assets and experiences of the 101st Abn Div (Amb), the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and the province agencies, effective exploitation has been achieved throughout the area of operations. Psychological operations detracted from the morale and combat effectiveness of the NVA and VC, and denied the enemy popular support of the people. Combined psychological operations served to increase the confidence of Vietnamese people in their national and local government.
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