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AGDA - A (M) (16 Mar 71) FOR OT UT 703255 22 March 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-WE 23 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 July 1970 RCS GSFCR-65 (R1)

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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers
the period 1 May through 31 July 1970. During the reporting period the
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment participated in Operations DONG TIEH II
AND TOAN THANG 43 in the Kingdom of Cambodia in May and June and in July
initiated operations in BINH DUONG, BINH HOA, and LONG KHANH Provinces.
Operation DONG TIEH II was conducted under TF Shoemaker and comprised
the 11th ACR, the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), and the 3d ARVN Abn Bde.
The TF crossed the border into Cambodia in the fishhook on 1 May, ac-
complished a link-up with the 3d ARVN Abn Bde on 2 May, and then thrust
on to SNOCU (XU5534). Operations continued during May and June to deny
the enemy his Cambodian sanctuaries. After 6 May the month passed with
light enemy activity, but numerous supply caches were found and destroyed
or evacuated. During the latter part of May and in June, the 11th ACR
provided security for the Rango operations of the 60th and 98th Land Clearing
Companies which cut through the dense forests northwest of SNOCU and into
the enemy base areas in the Fishhook. In the latter series of cuts enemy
activity increased in the form of RPG assaults, attacks by fire, and
mining incidents. On 19 June, the 11th ACR minus the 2d Squadron was
placed OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division, and by 28 June all elements
of the Regiment had withdrawn to R7V. On 5 July, after a short stand-
down, the 3d Squadron assumed a new AO which straddled the LONG KHANH
and BINH HOA province boundary. 1st Squadron had a well-deserved 21
day maintenance standdown at DI AN and on 23 July assumed 3d Squadron's
AO as 3d Squadron began its maintenance standdown.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

a. General: During the first two months of the reporting period,
the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated primarily in Cambodia, with
limited operations in War Zone C, Binh Long and Phuoc Provinces. During
the last month of the reporting period the Regiment began conducting
operations in two AOs encompassing portions of Binh Duong, Binh Hoa,
and Long Khanh Provinces.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CSFR-65 (r.1)

b. Order of Battle: The reporting period began with the initiation of Allied cross-border operations in Cambodia. Initially upon crossing the border, heavy resistance by the NVA Division was expected but failed to materialize. The 7th NVA Division was deployed with its 209th Regiment in the Katum-Bo Tuo area, while its 165th NVA Regiment operated in the Fishhook, and its mission, disposition, and strength were unknown. On 1 May 1970, the 141st Regiment was believed to be acting as the Division's reserve and was located in the COSWN base area in the Fishhook. Intelligence indicated that the two deployed Regiments, the 165th and 209th, would probably attempt to stop or at least delay penetrations. The two Regiments had been seeking aggressive contact with the 11th ARV in War Zone C just prior to 1 May 70, and it was expected that they would be tasked to halt and/or delay US advances.

On 3 May, the Regiment was ordered to proceed North and secure the Cambodian town of Snuol. Intelligence based mainly on refugee reports indicated the presence of a Regimental size force in the Snuol area. During the fighting for the town of Snuol, 138 NVA were killed. PWS and documents identified the C-18.

By the 10th of May the story of Snuol could be pieced together. On or about 22 April 70, two battalions of the 141st Regiment with mortar, M1, and sapper units seized Snuol. The three bridges south of Snuol on Highway 7 were blown and could only be crossed by foot. After securing Snuol, the 2d Battalion of the 141st Regiment moved to the Phnom area and assisted the 3d Battalion in attacking and securing Phnom.

Numerous unknown units were encountered during the early stages of the 11th ARV's T&OR were the 92d Recovery and Replacement Regiment, Inter Group 89, the 90th Recovery and Replacement Regiment, and the 94th R&R Regiment. Additional Inter-group units were identified throughout Cambodia by allied forces.

The Recovery and Replacement Regiments constituted a division size medical and training effort by the enemy in III Corps. The missions of these units were: (1) Receive and care for all wounded evacuated by Fair Service Groups and maneuver units, and give them extensive political indoctrination and limited military training.

(2) Receive, process, train, and reassign all recent infiltrators from NW.

(3) Operate facilities to rehabilitate criminals, NMLs, deserters, and others in need of political indoctrination. The strength of the unit fluctuated from 3,500 to 2,000 men. Cadre strength is documented at 1,200 to 1,800 men and women. The 92d R&R Regiment was subordinate to the Military Staff Department, F-9, SWL, COSVN. The Regiment operated in the Fishhook area and supported units in III Corps.

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The other new type of unit identified was the Inter-Unit combined groups or the Inter-Groups. In Smuol, the 11th ACR identified Inter-Group 87. The Inter-Group units were organized to facilitate NVA/VC control over the local populace in specific geographic areas. After Sihanouk Fall, they became the means of achieving both political and military control over the area. In Smuol, Inter-Group 89 recruited Vietnamese and Cambodians for a local militia, conducted propaganda missions, and established a governmental structure to rule Smuol. The Group remained covert while US units persisted in the area, but recent reports from agents indicated that the government is now overtly active and that the NVA/VC once again have a firm hold on the area.

Other NVA units in the 11th ACR Cambodian TACR were the 50th RSG and elements of the 206th Arty Regiment. The 50th RSG is subordinate to the Military Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA, COSVN. Like the other 10 NVA Rear Service Groups it had a geographic AO. The 50th RSG operated caches, hospitals, camps, and supply depots from Smuol to the border area of the Fishhook. In SW it maintained two major supply corridors through eastern War Zone C and was responsible for moving supplies, equipment, and infiltrators to SR-1, SR-5, and Binh Long Province. The Group operated the "City" in the Fishhook area; its efforts were severely hampered by the "Allied" operations in Cambodia. In May the unit had a strength estimated between 800 and 1,000.

The enemy's 208th Artillery Regiment conducted operations in the Hniot area during the early stages of the cross-border operations. When the 11th ACR moved back into the Fishhook area in early June, this unit conducted numerous attacks by fire in support of the 7th NVA Division's cross-border operations.

Other cross-border identifications of the 5th VC Division gave the following picture of this Division. As the 1st Cav Div (AM) moved into Cambodia north of Phuoc Long Province, the 5th VC Division withdrew to the thick jungle about 20 KM's into Cambodia. Recent activity after US withdrawal indicated that the 174th Regiment is again targeted against the Bu Dop area.

Before the move into Cambodia, intelligence indicated the infiltration of a new regiment, the B-6 from Laos. Documents captured indicated that this unit had been issued weapons by the 86th RSG in early May. The B-6 Regiment was to receive its cadre from senior officers and NCO's of the 174th Regiment. They were then to conduct training and infiltrate MS-7 to assist the 33d Regiment in the Long Khanh - Binh Trai area. Allied cross-border operations disrupted the plan. The 33d Regiment was returned to the control of MS-7 and the new Regiment was assigned to the 275th Regiment for assimilation.

INCL

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Following the withdrawal of US and ARVN forces from Cambodia, the 11th ACR redeployed into the center of III Corps. The Regiment was assigned two squadron-sized AO's: one in Binh Duong Province and Western Binh Hoa Province; and the other in the new area are elements of the Dong Hai Regiment of SR-5, the 274th MVA Regiment of MR-7, and the 74th Arty Regiment of the 69th Arty Command, COSVN.

Enemy missions in the new area of operations appear to be primarily directed against the pacification program. Local guerrillas have been directed to concentrate on building the political structure, propaganda, terrorism, and military and civilian proselytizing. Priority targets are the governmental officials, the RF/PF's, and other pacification personnel. Main force units support political ends by conducting harassing attacks against provincial forces.

The following is a list of enemy units reportedly in the 11th ACR's AO:

**In SR-5**

<table>
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<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SUBORDINATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH (EST)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-301 Tan Uyun Corp</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-62 Chau Tinh Corp</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-63 Lai Thieu Corp</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-65 Phu Quang Corp</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of Dong Hai Regiment</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-516 Arty Corp</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>20-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-504 Sapper Corp</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-506 Eng</td>
<td>SR-5</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In U-1**

1 VC LF Sapper Bn | U-1 Prov | 180
2 VC LF Sapper Bn | U-1 Prov | 110
C-4, Huan Loc Comp | VC Bn Long Prov | 30
C-206 Huan Loc Comp | VC Bn Long Prov | 40

**In MR-7**

Elements of the 274th MVA Regt | MR-7
Elements of the 74th Arty Regt | MR-7

**Intelligence Sources:**

1. General: The number and type of intelligence sources utilized by the 11th ACR during the quarter were approximately the same as in the previous quarters. There was an increase in POWs and this significantly improved intelligence efforts.
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23 August 1970


RGS GSPG-65 (R-1)

(2) Visual Reconnaissance: Missions were flown on a daily basis by the Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR. These provided the bulk of the information used for planning B-52 strikes, planned air strikes, ground reconnaissance operations, and AIP/LARP insertions. The Air Cavalry Troop has been instrumental in locating enemy units and fortifications in the jungle, as well as providing evidence of enemy movement and trail networks. Visual reconnaissance missions are also used to validate information from SLAR, Sniffer, Rod Hase, and Agent Reports.

(3) Captured Enemy Documents: The primary value of captured documents was the identification of enemy units. They also gave an insight into the political aspects of NVA/VC activities. This was especially true of the large amount of administrative documents found in Cambodia. Documents usually provided information from which general trends could be deduced rather than immediately exploitable information.

(4) Prisoners of War and Hoi Chanh: These sources provided the 11th ACR with its best order of battle and exploitable intelligence. The period 1 May - 31 July 1970 produced 13 PWs and 6 Hoi Chanh.

(5) Agent Reports: During the Cambodian operations no agent reports were received because of a lack of developed nets in the AO. When the Regiment moved to the new AO's, liaison was established with the 525th MI Group, 219th MI, and province intelligence personnel to obtain their agent reports. Generally, agent reports are used as indicators of activity and in coordination with other sources provide the overall intelligence picture.

(6) Integrated Civic Action Projects (ICAPs): ICAPs ceased in the 11th ACR AO's on 1 April. A MACV directive stated that ARVN participation was required in ICAPs; in the AO's occupied at the time local officials could not provide the support. When the new AO's were occupied in early July, province officials were able to provide the required support, and ICAPs have begun again. Experience has shown that ICAPs provide valuable information on VC personnel entering villages for food and other supplies. They are also valuable for their Voluntary Informant Program.

(7) L.A.C. Daily missions flown by the Air Force Forward Air Controllers provided a valuable source of intelligence.

(8) Technical Detectors: SLAR, Sniffer, Rod Hase, radar, and ground sensors all were employed with varying degrees of success. SLAR, Sniffer, and Rod Hase proved valuable during the Cambodian operations. But the new AO's, which have much higher population densities and smaller enemy units, these detectors were relatively ineffective. This was particularly true of the Sniffer because of the high degree of air pollution caused by the aircraft and industry in the AO. Radar, which saw limited use in Cambodia because of the jungle vegetation, began to assure
a more important role in the flat, open areas of the new AO's. A concerted effort to increase the capability of the radar was begun in July and by the end of the reporting period had begun to show results. Ground sensors were employed in Cambodia however, employment and monitoring were conducted by the 1st ACD to when the 11th ACR was OPLAN during that period. In July, the 11th ACR became OPLAN to IFFV. Since previously the 11th ACR obtained all sensor support from the 1st ACD, it became necessary for the Regiment to develop its own program. During July this program was developed and will be available for the next quarter.

(9) Imagery Interpretation: During the reporting period the 54th MID published 13 Continuing Photo/Interpretation Reports (CPHR's) from total of 66 aerial reconnaissance missions. The two areas covered were the Fishhook region of the SW-Cambodian border and the area of Long Khanh, Binh Hoa, and Binh Duong Province. The latter provinces contain the new AO’s of the 11th ACR.

In addition to interpreting current photographs of the above areas, the II Section produced accessibility, vegetation analyses, and detailed lines of communications studies in forms of charts, map overlays, and written reports. Special emphasis was placed on the accessibility analysis of Long Khanh, Binh Hoa, and Binh Duong Province prior to move into the new AO’s.

The II Section has also drawn detailed studies of 23 hamlets and villages in the above-named provinces. As photography becomes available more village studies will be provided. Several hand-held photo missions were flown during the quarter to supplement existing photographs. In order to expand this potentially valuable reconnaissance method, the II Section is sending its staff to a four day instruction period at Dotochmont 4, 1st NI BN (ARS), Binh Hoa.

d. Enemy Personnel and Material Losses:

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<th>Type</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual weapons</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Survived</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cap/Dos Rico</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cap/Dos Leave</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cap/Dos Gern</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cap/Dos Salt</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm Rockets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm Rockets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar Rounds</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>468</td>
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Ending 31 July 1970

RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

MAX JUNE JULY

- 60mm Mortar Rounds 63 46 3
- 57mm Mortar Rounds 31 59 0
- R41 (RPG-7) Rounds 7 2 0
- R40 (RPG-2) Rounds 58 167 3
- B20 (107mm Modified) Rounds 10 7 0
- 75mm FR Rounds 24 0 0
- 12.7mm AA Rounds 80 0 0
- 14.5mm (.51 Cal.) Rounds 100 150 0
- Small Arms Rounds 12,920 10,261 95
- Grenades 221 175 14
- AP Mines 6 8 4
- AT Mines 0 0 0
- TNT (lb) 150 0 0
- M79 Rounds 0 0 2
- Bangalore Torpedoes 0 0 0
- Machetes 150 0 0
- 2½ ton trucks 23 4 0
- 1½ ton trucks 8 1 0
- Bicycles 711 102 3
- Boats 0 0 1
- Typewriters 2 3 0

3. (c) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation of Operations:

(1) Cambodian Operations: On 27 April the Regiment was ordered
  to prepare plans for an attack into the Kingdom of Cambodia. The concept
  of the operations called for a limited thrust into the Fishhook area in
  conjunction with an ARVN airborne operation. The mission of the Regi-
  ment was to move north across the border, conduct search and destroy
  operations, and prepare to link up with ARVN airborne forces. The target
  area had long been considered the heart of the enemy’s command and logis-
  tics network for operations in III Corps. On 1 May all three squadrons
  (minus G/11) were under Regimental control. The Regiment was ordered
  to leave one squadron in War Zone C. The attack plan called for the 2d
  and 3d Squadrons to move north, while the 1st Squadron would initially
  remain in War Zone C to protect land routes of resupply and continue
  operations there.

(a) TF Shoumakur (See Map I): The order for the attack
  into Cambodia was DUMP TIME II. Under this OPORD TF Shoumakur was formed
  comprising the 11th AR, the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), and the 3d ARVN
  Div Bde. On 1 May, following a massive air, artillery, and E-52 pre-
  paration, 2d and 3d Squadrons attacked north. Second Squadron led the

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(7)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Operational Report Ending 31 July 1970

Attack. Just prior to crossing the border they received small arms and RPG fire. Tactical air strikes and artillery were employed, and at 010026 May the Regiment crossed into Cambodia. About 100 meters north of the border 2d Squadron again received small arms and RPG fire from an estimated reinforced NVA company. Again air and artillery as well as the squadron's organic weapons were employed. This contact resulted in two US WIA's. The 3d Squadron was committed to the east of 2d Squadron to maintain the momentum of the attack. Late in the afternoon 2d Squadron engaged an estimated enemy battalion in a bunker complex vicinity of XT 499995. G Troop received RPG and small arms fire and H Company reinforced, along with artillery, AAA, and tactical air support. From the first day's operations the Regiment suffered a total of 2 KIA and 25 WIA, while there were 52 enemy KIA. On 2 May 2d Squadron linked up with elements of the 3d ARVN 6th Bde and began conducting search operations in the area. On 3 May, the Regiment received orders to attack north on 4 May, conduct a passage of lines through the ARVN forces, pass through elements of two battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division (AH), and secure SNUCL (XU5534) prior to 060000 May. The Regiment attacked as ordered and early in the afternoon on 5 May arrived on the outskirts of SNUCL, after bridging three unfordable streams. The city was ringed with .51 cal anti-aircraft machinegun positions and an estimated two battalions of NVA troops. The battle for SNUCL was triggered by 2d Squadron as it moved into the city. Third Squadron joined the battle with three contacts just west of SNUCL about one hour after 2d Squadron's initial engagement. The enemy fought with small arms, RPG's, and .51 cal machineguns; five helicopters received ground to air fire during the period. Six hours after the firing started, 132 NVA were dead, three detained, and three .51 cal machineguns were captured. Sixteen US troopers were wounded in the fight. Sporadic fighting continued near SNUCL for several days, but no additional significant contacts were made.

(b) Operation TOW THANG 43 (See Map II): Operation TOW THANG 43 (Total Victory) followed DONG TIER II and covered a larger area of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. This operation was designed to search out enemy bunker complexes and cache sites. TF Shoemaker was dissolved on 4 May, and operations continued under the 1st Cavalry Division (AH). On 9 May the air-riifle Platoon (ARP), 15 Cav Troop, found a regimental size base camp (XU996266) consisting of 100 hoochies 15 by 8 feet in size with numerous fighting positions and mess areas. Less than one kilometer to the south, L Troop found a 9,000 lb rice cache. In addition, K Troop spent a number of days opening a cross-country route and then escorting convoys of the 1st Cavalry Division (AH) as they evacuated a very large supply area, named "The City." On 13 May, G Troop made contact with an estimated two enemy companies while on ground reconnaissance south of Route 131. Contact was broken 20 minutes later, leaving 5 NVA killed and 4 US troopers wounded. In the same area of triple canopy jungle, on 14 May H Company made contact with RPG teams.

Due to the heavy vegetation the company could not maneuver on line and the enemy evaded contact after killing two and wounding seven US soldiers with 4 RPG hits on the two lead tanks. A short time later in the same area, F Troop spotted six NVA and killed three. On the same day, HHT 2/11, on ground reconnaissance 1000 meters south of FSB Wilma (XU690318) found a bunker complex which contained 30 tons of unpolished rice. On the next day they found 11 more tons of rice there. On 11 May the Regiment was ordered to open the LOC NIKI-BU DOP road for land convoy required by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). This road, running parallel to the Cambodian border, was kept open for convoy passage until 10 July. In addition to this road, Routes 13 and 17 required combat troops for security and mine sweeping so that land convoys could resupply the Regiment. Twelve maneuver elements were required for these operations. During the entire period, no convoy vehicles or personnel were lost to enemy fire.

(c) Return to HVN (See Map IV): On 19 June realignment for the return to HVN began. Except for the 2d Squadron which remained OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and would withdraw through LOC NIKI (XU738699), the 11th ACR was placed OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and would withdraw through KATDM (XT853498). On 24 June the 3/4 Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division, was placed OPCON to the Regiment. The 1st Squadron withdrew from Cambodia on 26 June, and was followed on 27 June by elements of 2d Squadron. On the 28th the 3d Squadron and the 1/4 Cavalry withdrew from Cambodia. In the final days of the Cambodian operations, enemy activity increased sharply, and 31 contacts were
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
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made in the period 20 – 26 June. In these engagements 28 NVA were
killed while 11 US soldiers were killed and 74 wounded.

(2) Operations in BINH DUONG, BIEN HOA, and LONG KHANH Provinces:

On 30 June the Regiment became OPCON to II FFORCEV and was assigned two
AO's located east and west of the Long Binh Special Zone (LBSZ). This
enabled the unit to move its forward CP from QUAN LOI to DI AN, and the
move was completed on 3 July. In addition, the two squadron sized AO's
permitted the 1st Squadron to accomplish its first maintenance standdown
since March 1969. The 3d Squadron assumed responsibility for the western
AO. On 23 July 1st Squadron relieved 3d Squadron in its AO and 3d Squad-
ron began its maintenance standdown. Activity in the new AO's was sig-
nificantly less than the Regiment had previously experienced. Although
main force enemy units were reportedly present in the AO's, they avoided
contact with the Regiment. Enemy forces were targeted primarily against
the Pacification Program, such as villages, hamlets, and RF/FF units.
Blackhorse missions in the new AO's have consisted of ground reconna-
issance (often conducted with RF units), the employment of authentic
ambushes and population and resources control operations. The popula-
tion centers in or near the Regimental AO's have made the Airborne
Personnel Detector (Sniffer) almost ineffective due to the air pollution
from fires and aircraft exhaust. On the other hand, the new AO's have
increased the opportunity for the Regiment to explore new methods of
finding the enemy. The close liaison established with the National Police,
District and Province officials has significantly increased the intelligence
leads which can be exploited. The primary enemy activity has been
laying mines, most of which have been homemade devices which could not
be detected by the AN/PPA-152 mine detector. A limited number of anti-
personnel booby traps, consisting of trip devices and US Fragmentation
or homemade grenades, were also encountered.

(a) DOM TOH (Go Forward Together) Program: In May and
June the Regiment conducted no combined operations with ARVN forces. In
July the 11th ACR worked closely with RF/FF units in BINH DUONG, BIEN
HOA, and LONG KHANH provinces. Those operations consisted of seal and
search, reconnaissance, road security, and ICAP operations. Represented
below are the combined operations from 1 May to 31 July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMBINED OPERATIONS</th>
<th>1/11 ACR</th>
<th>2/11 ACR</th>
<th>3/11 ACR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF/FF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following ICAP's were conducted in coordination with provincial
medical personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/11 ACR</th>
<th>2/11 ACR</th>
<th>3/11 ACR</th>
<th>ICAP 5-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Ending 31 July 1970  RCS GPX-65 (n-1)

(b) Training: The Replacement Training School at Blackhorse Barracks serves an important function in preparing replacements for their assignments with the 11th ACR. In addition it also conducted replacement training for the 2/1 Cavalry, 1/30 Mechanized Infantry, 3/17 Cavalry, and the 11th Aviation Brigade. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

May - 397
June - 419
July - 516

4. (C) COMB. SUPPORT:

a. Chemical:

   (1) General: The 33d Chemical Detachment (CERC) continued to provide direct chemical support and technical advise to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

   (2) Concealed Personnel Detector, Aircraft-Mounted (Sniffer) Missions: During the period there were 31 Sniffer missions flown. Due to the recent change in the 11th ACR's AO's, from a relatively unpolluted AO to an AO with extremely high percentage of pollution (caused by the surrounding metropolitan areas), coupled with adverse weather conditions, the number of Sniffer missions flown were greatly reduced.

   (3) Defoliation Projects: There were no defoliation projects approved during the period.

   (4) CS Results: Persistent CS drops were not employed in the 11th ACR's AO's during the period. However, there were 10 non-persistent CS missions flown, of which 6 were of the area contamination type and 4 were of the Fire Suppression/Counter Ambush type. El58 CS Clusters were effectively employed from 15-29 June 70 to minimize the possibility of enemy ambushes along Route 7, north of FSB Susan (3/11th LRR).

b. Signal: Throughout the operation in Cambodia, the Regiment CP remained at Quan Loi. Using both the 210 ft. AB216, Antenna Tower and the radio relay (FM) located at NUI Ba DEN, adequate radio communication was maintained even though transmission distances often exceeded 50km.

In late June the Regiment CP was moved to Di An. A 72 ft. AB216, Antenna Tower was erected near the TOC. Dial telephone and Communication Center services at the Di An Base were provided by the 595th Signal Company. The 53d Signal Battalion established a Multi-channel, VHF
Terminal providing both common user and point-to-point circuits to II FFORCERV. The radio relay was removed from Nui Ba Den and relocated at Nui Chan Chan to provide better coverage. A station was also established in the II FFORCERV Operations/Intelligence Net (OTT).

With the now AO providing more suitable terrain for employment of Ground Surveillance Radars, emphasis was placed on equipment maintenance and operator training. Training classes were given by the Regiment and Squadrons. The services of a technical representative of Airborne Instrument Laboratories was obtained to provide operator training at the fire bases. The Regiment received six new JL/FPS-5 Radars in late July.

b. Artillery:

In addition to its three organic howitzer batteries, the Regiment received artillery support from II Field Force Vietnam Artillery in the form of 155mm and 8 inch howitzers and 175mm guns. Aerial rocket artillery from the 1st Air Cavalry Division's 2/20 Artillery was also available and was used extensively during the first two months of the period.

The howitzer batteries retained their missions of direct support throughout the period. The 1st Howitzer Battery assumed an additional mission of reinforcing 2d and 3d Howitzer Batteries' fires as part of Task Force Shoemaker (1-6 May).

On 1 May 1970, all three organic howitzer batteries plus Btry A 2/35 Arty (155) were located at FSB South I and II (X451905; X451901). Battery C 2/12 Arty (155) and two 8" Platoons from Btry A 6/27 Arty and B 2/32 Arty were at FSB Burkett (X41845). A 175mm gun platoon of A 6/27 at FSB Jan (X42422).

All fires were controlled by the Blockhorse FSCC and the 1/21st Arty. C 2/12 and A 2/35 had reinforcing missions, while the heavy artillery platoons had general support missions with a priority of fires to the 11th ARV.

On 4 May, the 2d and 3d How Batteries moved into Cambodia as the squadrons moved north. A 2/35, continuing its mission of reinforcing the fires of the 2d and 3d How Batteries which moved north with the 3d Squadron. On the same day, 1st How moved south to FSB Burkett resuming its direct support mission to 1st Squadron. The heavy artillery platoons and C 2/12 moved from Regimental control.
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The 3d How and 2/35 occupied two different and hastily occupied nights of 4 and 5 May and a third on the 6th and 7th. The two batteries established FSB Ft Scott (XU683256) on 8 May. On 11 May 2/35 moved out of regimental control and returned to 11 Field Force Artillery Control.

The 2d How reached XU 556335 on 5 May where it remained until 8 May when FSB Franks was established. On 9 May 1st Squadron became OPCON to the 1st Bde, 1st Air Cav Div, and 1st How moved to FSB Hilltop (XU559093).

On 11 May 2d How moved to FSB Wilm (XU590316), continuing their direct support mission. On 15 May the regiment gained the operational control of 1/77 arty at FSB Evans (XU871166), a 105mm unit of the 1st Cav Division in direct support of the 1/12 Cavalry, and an infantry battalion. This arrangement lasted until 26 May, when they returned to 1st Cav Div control. The 1st How moved into FSB Iowa (XU513237) when 1st Squadron returned to Blackhorse control on 21 May.

On 15 May 3d How moved into FSB Saber (XU574351). On 31 May the battery was split to provide coverage for 3rd Squadron elements west of Smokey.

Two How sections moved into FSB Hammorstono (XU534294). Three days later the remainder of the battery entered FSB Hammorstono.

The 2d How established FSB Sisson (XU656285) on 25 May. On the 26th, 2/35 returned to Blackhorse control with a general support reinforcing mission to the regiment firing out of FSB Enrico (XU682175). This battery moved to FSB Jorri (XU693222) on 9 June and left Blackhorse control on 11 June. 1st How established FSB Colorado (XU629227) on 3 June, and 10 days later moved to FSB Nodak (XU490232). On 9 June 3d How moved to FSB Carlson (XU503167) and two days later established FSB Susan (XU492143).

The 1st How began withdrawing from Cambodia on 25 June spending that night at XU420076 and the night of the 26th at FSB Carolyn (XU271762). The battery arrived at Da An Base Camp on 27 June for a maintenance standdown that lasted until 22 July.

The 3d How began its withdrawal on 26 June staying at FSB Korppey (XU570238) that night, and at Tay Kinh Base Camp the following night.

On 28 July 3d How set up at XU631312 to prepare for its next operation. That operation began on 5 July when the battery established FSB Petric (XU200325) in Binh Hoa Province. On 23 July FSB Petric was closed and 3d How moved into Da An Base Camp for a maintenance standdown.

On 26 June 2d How left Cambodia and established FSB Dias (XU815515). Second Squadron had become OPCON to the 1st Air Cav Division 8 days prior to this withdrawal. It returned to Regimental control on 10 July when it established FSB Victory (XU927116) in Binh Duong Province.

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On 22 July 1st Squadron moved into 3d Squadron's area assuming control on 23 July. First how was located at FSB Henderson (X16120). While there, it sent 2 how sections to X138243 to cover D Company's operation in an AO extension.

During the period the Regimental FSCC had been supervised by several higher artillery headquarters. These headquarters were TF Shoemaker (1-4 May), 1st Air Cavalry Division artillery (1 May - 17 June), 25th Infantry Division artillery (18 June - 30 June), and since 1 July the Regiment's FSCC has been directly controlled by II Field Force Artillery.

a. Artillery Fire Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
<th>Rounds High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>11,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquired</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>10,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Battery</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>2,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>7,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Support</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,774</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,752</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Engineers:

(1) General:

During the reporting period the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The primary area of operation in May and June was the area around Sauch, and the Fishhook and Flatiron areas in Cambodia. On June 30 the regiment moved into two new AOs in Binh Duong Province and Long Khanh Province.

(2) Operations:

During the quarter the separate platoons of the company were normally OPCON to the individual squadrons with headquarters platoon and one line platoon in general support. Engineers accomplished demolition work, ford and FSB site construction, route reconnoissances, FSB construction, destruction of enemy base camps, road clear operations, and combat as an armor element. In mine sweep operations 39 mines were found and destroyed.

(a) First Platoon/919th Engineer Company (Armored) from 1-6 May the platoon was in general support of the regiment with a work priority to sweep for mines and to improve Hwy 246 from FSB Jako (X1622611)
On 9 May 1970, the 1st platoon moved into Cambodia with 1st Squadron, initially removing obstacles to movement and then constructing FSB hilltop (XU347094). The platoon was placed OPCON C Troop on 14 May with the mission to sweep for mines and to improve LOC's in the area. During this period the platoon was involved in 2 contacts. On 21 May 1970, the 1st platoon was placed OPCON to HHT, 1/11th ACR and given the mission of constructing FSB Iowa (XU513237), and sweeping route 7 in the vicinity of the FSB.

On 30 May the platoon moved to a HDP vicinity XU437143 and linked up with the 3rd Platoon and elements from Headquarters platoon. They then began construction and improvement of the road from XU4180 to XU4302.

On 4 June first platoon, in conjunction with elements of headquarters platoon, began constructing FSB Colorado (XU423128), and upgrading Route 7 from XU400975 to XU401219. On 6 June the platoon returned to Quan Loi for a maintenance standdown, and remained there until 21 June. Mine sweeps and base camp improvements were accomplished during this period.

On 22 June the platoon moved to Di An Base Camp and until the end of the period, they have been utilized as a construction platoon.

(b) Second Platoon, 519th Engineer Company (Armored). At the beginning of the current reporting period, the second platoon was engaged in FSB construction and improvement for the 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR at FSB South II (XU512904). On 6 May 1970, the platoon moved into the Fishhook area of Cambodia with 3rd Squadron. Its mission was to remove obstacles to the squadron’s advance to Kimlao, where FSB Pt Scott (XU665293) was constructed. From 10-14 May the platoon conducted daily mine sweep operations from FSB Pt Scott to Loc Ninh, and escorted convoy back. On 12 and 13 May 2nd platoon worked with 3 Troop to destroy enemy bunkers near Pt Scott. On 15 May second platoon began construction of FSB Sabur (XU573233), and until 2 June was engaged in FSB improvements and security. The platoon moved to FSB Humorstone (XU500977) on 3 June, FSB Carlson (XU503186) on 7 June and FSB Susan (XU430114) on 8 June. On 9 June, augmented by headquarters platoon equipment, they began maintenance and improvement along FSB Susan. Enemy contacts during this period resulted in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, and the combat loss of 1 erdalator, 1 basket-loader and 1 VLB.

On 27 June, the second platoon departed Cambodia with the 31 Squadron, arriving at Di An on 29 June for a maintenance standdown. On 5 July they departed for Long Khanh Province to build FSB Petrie (XU201393) north of of Trang Bom. From 5-22 July the platoon improved the FSB, conducted nine sweep and route plow operations, and provided security for the FSB, and the erdalator. They returned to Di An on 23 July for maintenance standdown and remained there thru the end of the reporting period.
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(a) Third Platoon/918th Engineer Company (Armored):

From 1-8 May the 3rd Platoon, along with 1st Platoon and elements of the Equipment Platoon, were engaged in the improvement of Hwy 246 from FSB Jake to FSB Burkett. The road operation was completed on 8 May, and the platoon and Headquarters elements returned to Quan Loi Base Camp. During the period 8-30 May the platoon was involved in intermittent mine-sweep operations on Du Dap-Loc Minh road (d Lam) supported by the 11th Armored Cav troop, maintenance, base camp improvement, and some plow operations.

On 30 May the 3rd Platoon became OPCON to the 1st Squadron, with the mission of improving the road from XT4165 to XT4302. One ALT was combat lost due to mine damage on this mission. On 4 June the 3rd Platoon along with elements of the Equipment Platoon and 1st Platoon moved to FSB Colorado, where the platoon was involved in FSB construction and improvement until 22 June. On 13 June, the platoon moved to XT449035 where they continued FSB Nolak, staying here until 26 June. An enemy base camp vicinity XT480210 was destroyed on the 18th.

The 3rd Platoon departed Cambodia on 26 June, arriving at Di An Base Camp for a maintenance standdown the following day. On 19 July the 3rd Platoon augmented by elements from the Equipment Platoon, became OPCON to the 1st Squadron and moved to FSB Henderson (XT182122). Between the construction the FSB and the close of the reporting period, the platoon was involved in FSB improvements, mine sweeps, road plow operations, and mine plow operations.

(b) Fourth Platoon/918th Engineer Company (Armored):

At the beginning of the current reporting period, the 4th Platoon was OPCON to the 2nd Squadron at FSB South I (XT514002), and engaged in FSB construction and improvement at that location.

On 6 May 2nd Squadron attacked into Cambodia to the vicinity of Snuol, where FSB Franken (XT612307) was established. Fourth Platoon had the mission of reducing obstacles to movement and of constructing the FSB. On 12 May the platoon built FSB Wilma (XT602116), where they were again responsible for FSB improvements and security. They remained here until 26 May, when FSB Sisson (XT699248) was established. From 26 May until 28 June, the platoon swept daily from Sisson to Loc Minh, provided FSB security, conducted some plow operations, and continued FSB improvements.

The 4th Platoon departed Cambodia on 26 June, moving with 2nd Squadron to FSB Dias (XT864145). On 10 July the platoon moved to the vicinity of Tan Uyen and began construction of FSB Victory (XT896317). From 10 July until the close of the reporting period, the platoon has been engaged in

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FSB improvements, ordnance operation, and mine-sweep operations.

(a) **Headquarters/19th Engineer Company (Armored):**

The Headquarters Platoon was normally in general support at the Squadrons. One AVLB and a water suction ordnance were OPCON to each squadron.

(b) **New Equipment:**

The company received 3 each D-7 Tractors w/KG7kM Treadcarts (Rome Plows) on temporary load from USARV. This equipment has been extensively utilized to clear FSB fields of fire, destroy enemy base camps, cut access routes into previously untrackable areas, interdict enemy LOC's, and clear jungle along friendly LOC's. The equipment, although old and used previously by the 1st Infantry Division is durable and relatively trouble free if periodic maintenance standdowns are given.

(c) **Army Aviation:**

(1) **Employment:** The attack into Cambodia was initially augmented by Air Cavalry Scout Teams who found enemy troop locations, guided the attacking ground elements, and assisted in adjusting air strikes and artillery. As the operation progressed the Air Cavalry Troop provided visual reconnaissance for the squadrons and for themselves. During May, Air Cav Cobras flew 650 hours, LCHs flew over 600 hours, and the UH-1Ns flew over 500 hours. The Troop killed 19 NVA. The ARP's were inserted 25 times. They captured over 6000 lbs of enemy foodstuffs, 5 individual weapons, 100 anti-tank (40mm) mines, and 17 bicycles. Four Air Cav Troopers lost their lives.

In June, as the search continued in Cambodia for the NVA and his supply caches, the Air Cav Troop Cobras flew 430 hours, LCHs 415, and the UH-1Ns over 430 hours. The Scouts and ARP's uncovered 56 bicycles, 2 trucks, and miscellaneous construction material and foodstuffs. During the Cambodian operation, 2 aircraft were lost and 5 lightly damaged. The Troop expended 750 3.75" rockets, 2200 40mm rounds, and 21,000 rounds of 7.62 minigun ammo.

As the Regiment withdrew from Cambodia, the Air Cav screened its flanks then followed it into RVN.

During the period the Air Cav Troop was issued one XM35-20mm Vulcan gun for its Cobra Gunships. The system was employed with success in Cambodia by destroying an enemy 7-1 ton truck. Some early problems with installing delicate instruments and radios have been noted, but the weapon's excellent accuracy, standoff capability, and devastating results make it a fine addition to Air Cav capabilities. Three additional XM35 systems are programmed.

(2) **Construction:** The occupation of Di An Base Camp called for considerable engineer work to provide suitable landing, parking and maintenance area for the Regimental Aviation assets. Plans were submitted and work began on a Regimental heliport with revetted space for 8 Cobras, 16 UH-1Ns and 14 LCHs. Located adjacent to this area will be a maintenance area for the 398th Maintenance Detachment with 24 maintenance revetments and 1 UH-1N revetment.

The area will eventually house all aircraft of the Air Cav Trp as well as the three squadrons. Regimental Aviation Platoon occupied and expanded an existing heliport in close proximity to the HQ. The area has been resurfaced and remedial construction began on revetments.

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5. (c) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Logistics:

(1) General: The regimental logistical posture remained relatively constant throughout the reporting period. At times, degrees of need increased over the capabilities to satisfy them at others, a surplus existed. Logistic resupply was accomplished by truck convoy or fixed-wing aircraft from Long Binh to Quan Loi, and the support bases, but it remained primarily aerial from there to the forward areas. During the middle of May a land LOC was opened from Quan Loi to forward areas in the vicinity of Senol, Cambodia, over 700ms. away. Trucks were committed from the 48th Transportation Group and made daily hauls averaging 30 tons per squadron.

(2) Supply and Maintenance

a. Class I. The Class supply point remained the 15 S&S Company, Quan Loi. During the initial stages of the Cambodian Operation the squadrons subsisted on C Rations – as the operation stabilised it was possible to return to the normal two hot meals – supper and breakfast – and one C Ration meal per day. Fluctuations in troop strengths were minimal and no problems developed in resupplying Class I.

b. Class II and IV. Class II supply remained unchanged with no significant problem areas. Class IV supply remained under the control of the Regimental S-4, once items were drawn. This allowed equitable distribution of items which are command controlled and hence difficult to obtain.

c. Class III. Consumption rates remained constant at 3,500 gallons of diesel, 500 gallons of MOGAS, per squadron per day. Resupply forward initially by CH-47 in 500 gallon collapsible drums (Blivets), was accomplished entirely by truck transport after the land LOC was opened. Initially, 5,000 gallon tankers were used to transport bulk fuel to the squadron HDPs but this proved impractical, first the excessive time was consumed in decanting at the forward location and secondly, because there was a definite fire hazard on the return trip when the tankers had a partial load, and were extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. The solution was to truck filled Blivets to the HDPs and then fly them forward to the troop locations by CH-47.

d. Class V. Class V, like that of Class III, was carried out initially, by CH-47, but this procedure was also modified to use a land LOC to the HDP, and then use a CH-47 to the forward locations.
In the preparatory stage for the Cambodian Operation, during the establishment of forward support bases, it was estimated that heavy resistance would be met crossing the frontier. Accordingly, a five day prestock of 155mm ammunition, based on 2,000 rounds per battery per day, was established at FSB Jake. This proved excessive and became a logistical nightmare when it was necessary to re-stock FSBs. The last remnants of this prestock was still being retrograded in early July. Shortages developed in .50 caliber ammunition, and, at one point, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) overdrew their ASR of 81mm and 40mm ammunition by 150%, causing all other II Field Force units to lose their allocations. Through direct coordination with the Division O-4, the 11th ACR was able to divert sufficient stock to meet our needs from the divisional units.

e. Aerial Resupply. Fixed wing resupply was utilized during the establishment of two forward support bases (FSB Jake and Wade) to bring in 1,700 tons of prestock Class III and V. CH-47s were used to resupply all classes of supply forward until the middle of May when a general drawdown of available aircraft occurred throughout the III Corps area. Fortunately, this drawdown coincided with the opening of a land LOC from Quan Loi to Shoul. The tonnage carried by CH-47s decreased from a weekly average of 850 tons to 625 tons. This average was maintained until late June when enemy action and road conditions closed the land LOC for two of the three squadrons. By this time II Field Force aviation elements had regained their surge capability and were able to provide responsive support.

f. Redeployment to Di An. At the end of June the Regiment departed northern Binh Long Province and established AOs in the vicinity of Long Binh, Class I, II, and III resupply was shifted to the 23d SBS Co, 91st C & S BN, Di An. Resupply was transported to the squadron NDPs by unit organic vehicles with the exception of Class I (A rations) and selected Class II, which were flown out by CH-47. Resupply forward to the troop NDPs was by CH-47 from the squadron NDP. Because of the availability of an excellent road net and the maximum use of truck transport, the daily sortie request and blade time dropped off to new lows of 15 sorties and 23 hours blade time per squadron per day.

g. Extensive efforts were directed towards reconciling unit property accounts by turning in excesses and determining accountability.

h. Maintenance and Repair Parts Supply.

1. Deadline for Combat Vehicles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M551 Sheridan</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113A1 ACAV</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M48A3 Medium Tank</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M109 155SP Howitzer</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)
2. There were three primary reasons for the high deadline rate for this reporting period.

a. Combat Operations in Cambodia

The strain of combat operations requiring maximum capability of the combat vehicles was in effect for two of the three months covered by the CRP. There was an exceptionally high failure rate of major assembly items. Part of the problem lies in the high mileage placed on the vehicles during the Cambodian campaign. Extensive jungle busting in muddy conditions caused major assemblies to overheat and fail.

b. Decrease in Combat Losted Vehicles

During the last month combat losses have rapidly declined. Without combat losted vehicles to use as an alternate source of supply, the repair parts system has been unable to respond to the added demands placed upon it. This is particularly noticeable in July when the deadline rate for every combat vehicle rose. Wheel bearings, spindles, fan tower bearings, oil cooler lines, turret electrical parts, and numerous small engine parts caused the largest part of the deadline.

c. Standdown Operations

Since the beginning of July the 11th ACR has been undergoing stand down operations. During this period, 1st Squadron replaced a total of 41 major assemblies. 3d Squadron replaced 46 major assemblies, the majority of which were completed before the stand down. While some snags developed at the beginning of the stand down, there were no serious problems. Parts supply for major assemblies were generally satisfactory. An exception to this was the unavailability of H57B engines and auxiliary drives. One engine has been on a combat request for over three weeks with no results. Maintenance has been satisfactory, but there are areas for improvement in quality control. The most recurrent problem has been the loss of transmission connecting bolts. As a general rule, jobs remain in a wait shop category less than 72 hours.

b. Medical

1. In general, the health of the Regiment has remained satisfactory since the last reporting period. There was, however, an increase in the incidence of malaria, especially during late June and early July. While the incidence of vivax malaria remained within reasonable limits, malaria falciparum rose sharply. This increase is likely due to both the onset of the rainy season and the proximity of 11th ACR units to enemy troops and base camps in Cambodia. The Regimental Commander has emphasized the need for increased malaria prophylaxis.

2. Injuries: a. The incidence of non-battle injuries has decreased somewhat since the previous report. Total incidence of accidental injury was 812...
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cases, while 82 or an average of 27 per month required admission to a medical treatment facility.

b. While injuries sustained as a result of hostile action remained high during May and most of June, there was a sudden decrease during the later part of June and through July. Incidence of battle injury during the current period was 265 cases as compared to 450 during the past period.

c. A statistical summary of all injuries is shown in Table I.

3. Diseases: Aside from malaria, there were no significant changes in any reportable conditions from the previous reporting period. There was one case of encephalitis in May which resulted in death.

4. MEDCAP: MEDCAP and DENTCAP operations were performed by the 37th Medical Company working with an ARVN medical unit and a KMCV medical team. Operations were conducted in the Di An District. In several instances, patients were referred to US Army Hospitals in Long Binh and Saigon for admission or outpatient treatment.

5. Accomplishments: a. With the redeployment of the 37th Medical Company from Quan Loi to Di An late in June, the medical company assumed the responsibility of area medical support for Di An Base Camp, relieving the 136th Medical Dispensary of this obligation.

b. During this reporting period, two changes were made in Regimental policy concerning medical treatment. Dapone, used in the prevention of falciparum malaria, is no longer required for personnel assigned to rear base camp areas. However, troops operating in field locations are still required to take Dapone while in the field and for at least twenty-eight (28) days after their return to a rear area. The administration of gamma globulin for hepatitis prophylaxis is now left to the discretion of the individual physician evaluating the situation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCIDENCE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-battle Injuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Injuries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All rates expressed as incidence or admissions per 1,000 troops per year.
TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Current Quarter</th>
<th>Past Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Noneffectiveness*</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All rates expressed as admissions per 1000 troops per year.

*Includes man days lost for all admissions to 11th ACR treatment facilities. Expressed as sick days per 1000 troops per day.

c. Religious. During the reporting period, the Chaplains of the 11th ACR continued to minister to the moral and religious needs of the troops in the highest tradition of the corps. Specific activities included: 17 memorial services, 2 baptisms, 179 Catholic services, 179 Catholic Communions, 144 Protestant services, 34 Protestant Communions, and 17 visits to orphanages and schools to deliver surplus rice rations and designated offerings. When the Regiment's provisional squadron moved to Bi An, a full schedule of services was established for Sundays, and weekday services were added for both Catholics and Protestants. The response of the troops was good when the new schedule was announced. Chapel attendance by headquarters personnel increased by more than 700% over that in Quan Loi. Plans were also made to begin a schedule of Jewish services in cooperation with the IPPV Jewish Chaplain.

d. Postal.

1. The 7th Army Postal Unit continued its outstanding service for the troops of the 11th ACR. The assigned strength of the unit is: 2 officers and 34 enlisted men. For the quarter the money order sales totaled $3,297,592.33, and stamp sales totaled $36,020.00.

2. Mail volume handled for the period 1 May-31 July is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Mail</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Dispatched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pouches(letter mail)</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacks(parcel post)</td>
<td>3426</td>
<td>1144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle Mail</td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>1362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Mail</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured</td>
<td>3418</td>
<td>1241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL


3. The 7th APU continues to be the only APU in Vietnam that sends money order clerks directly to the tactical areas of operation. This unit had money order clerks in Cambodia for the payday periods at the beginning of May and June.

6. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a. Strengths: The following are strength figures by month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ASBD</th>
<th>TDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4610</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4361</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>4469</td>
<td>4361</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Hospital Returnees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>SER</th>
<th>NEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. MOS Shortages: In the table below the monthly figure represents the number of personnel assigned to the Regiment with the MOS indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11G</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31B</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31G</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67A</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05B</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Replacements: The overall caliber of replacements shows them to be technically qualified and competent personnel. The general analysis is that they are receiving sufficient training in their MOS's to successfully accomplish their assigned duties.

f. Awards and Decorations:

1. Statistical Summary of US Awards:
Subject: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1970

AWARD | APPROVED | PENDING
--- | --- | ---
Medal of Honor | 0 | 2
Distinguished Service Cross | 0 | 2
Legion of Merit | 5 | 2
Silver Star | 15 | 4
Distinguished Flying Cross | 22 | 5
Soldiers Medal | 3 | 0
Bronze Star, Service | 19 | 79
Air Medal | 61 | 57
Army Commendation Medal, Service | 149 | 215
Bronze Star Medal, Valor | 92 | 37
Air Medal, r | 8 | 16
Army Commendation Medal, Valor | 16 | 29

2. Statistical Summary of Foreign Awards:

AWARD | APPROVED | PENDING
--- | --- | ---
National Order of Vietnam, 5th Class | 1 | 0
Army Distinguished Service Order, 2d Cl | 1 | 0
Staff Service Medal, 1st Class | 2 | 1
Galantry Cross with Palm | 1 | 1
Galantry Cross with Gold Star | 3 | 3
Galantry Cross with Silver Star | 27 | 3
Galantry Cross with Bronze Star | 31 | 9
Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class | 12 | 4
Armed Forces Honor Medal, 2d Class | 8 | 6
Civic Actions Honor Medal, 1st Class | 2 | 1
Civic Actions Honor, 2d Class | 2 | 0
Army Badge | 8 | 2

7. (FCOO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The period 1 May-31 July has seen a continually effective PSYOPS program, which was divided into two phases due to the missions.

(1) The first phase was conducted in Cambodia where 5,132,000 leaflets were dropped and 25½ hours of aerial broadcast time were flown. This resulted in 12 PWS and 3 VC surrenders. PSYOPS missions were conducted as soon as possible after an enemy contact with leaflets and/or an aerial broadcast. The Chieu Hoi program received the greatest amount of aerial broadcast time.

(2) The second phase of PSYOPS for the period was conducted mainly in Xuan Loc and Long Thanh Districts, where over 450,000 leaflets were dropped. The VIP and Chieu Hoi themes were both used, but main emphasis was given to Chieu Hoi instructions.
b. Population Attitudes: During the Cambodian operation there was no contact with the population at first because the area was very sparsely populated. Those civilians who were eventually contacted proved to be quite friendly and cooperative. The Regiment secured roads to facilitate the movement of refugees to Vietnam.

8. (FUCO) CIVIC ACTION: No significant Civic Actions were projected for the Regiment during the reporting period. Commodities distributed during the month of July are listed as follows:

a. 500 lbs of rice given to the Refuge Center at Phuoc Vinh.

b. A policy for the 2/11th established by the S-5 and the Chief of Binh My Hamlet. The 2d Squadron will give all unused C rations to the hamlet. In return they will keep the children out of the trash dump.

c. POL barrels were given to the St. Theresa School in the Dong Hoi Hamlet for containment of rain water.

d. 40 pounds of soap distributed to the people of Binh My Hamlet.

e. 4 wheels and tires given to the Lai Thieu District Senior Advisor to build a garbage wagon.

f. 50 pistol belts and canteens given to the Boy Scouts of Lai Thieu.

g. 200 metal stakes sent to the PP compound at Binh Co to increase the size of their compound.

h. Two ½ ton trailers of food given to the School/Orphanage in the Di An District by Captain Khac, ARVN Liaison Officer and Major Cook, Regimental Chaplain.

10. BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENTS: During the period 1 May through 31 July seven new construction projects, costing over $500 each, were initiated and six of these have been completed. Seven repair projects costing over $500 each were initiated, and five have been completed. Those projects included:

a. Construction of an access runway
b. Removal of Stateside Service Club
c. Repairs of 94 buildings
d. Construction of maintenance building
e. Installation of air conditioners in dental clinic
f. Construction of latrines and showers.
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AVIC-ME


RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

Completion of 1 mile of all weather road on the east side of the Base Camp entailed the building of a bridge to provide ready access for supply. During June and July, material for 50 new bunkers was acquired for issue to units on the perimeter. The replacement of the older equipment with the new 96 channel AN/TRA 111 equipment and installation of a filtering system has improved the quality of communications. The MARS station has extended its call service to include USA, Korea, Germany, Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Okinawa, and Ethiopia.

11. ENTERTAINMENT:

a. USO Shows: The Special Services Officer arranged two USO Shows during the quarter. On 1 May, the Lillian Lehman Show, consisting of five talented females from Hollywood, performed for approximately 350 troops at US Army Base Di An. On 19 July, the Sydney Concert Party, a group consisting of five males and three females from Sydney, Australia, gave two variety-type shows for the troops of the 11th ACR. The first performance was held for 24 Squadron at FSB Victory. The afternoon performance was held at US Army Base Di An. Attendance for both performances totaled 600.

b. Command Military Touring Shows: On 27 July Special Services sponsored "Page Six", a group of six servicemen (one, incidentally, being from the 11th ACR) performing at the Di An Service Club annex. Approximately 350 troopers listened as this 'rock' group gave a 90 minute performance.

c. Motion Pictures: The Special Services Office is now furnishing 35 units with nightly motion pictures.

12. AMERICAN RED CROSS:

a. Total cases handled for the period
   773
b. Total emergency leaves
   172
c. Total loans
   12
   Total dollar amount loans
   $1,770.00
SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

   a. Personnel: None

   b. Operations:

      (1) OBSERVATION: At times during the Cambodian operations the land line of communications was approximately 100 km in length. Because the convoys required security, it was continually necessary to employ tracked vehicles along the routes, which significantly increased the maintenance problems and reduced the combat elements available for offensive operations.

      EVALUATION: The reconnaissance capabilities of the Armored Cavalry Regiment are severely hampered when a long land line of communications has to be secured by cavalry elements. Since tracked vehicles cannot cover long distances by convoy without serious maintenance problems, the land route was broken into sections with troop units assuming responsibilities for an AO along the route and for the security of the convoy through their area. This not only reduced the required daily mileage per troop but also provided continuous security along the routes.

      RECOMMENDATION: In areas where a long land line of communications must be maintained the armored cavalry regiment should be augmented with an armored car unit.

      (2) OBSERVATION: The initial attack into Cambodia by TF Shoemaker involved the classic armored attack and link up operation, it was then expanded to include the passage of friendly lines and continuation of the attack. This operation was successfully executed in accordance with present doctrine.

      EVALUATION: Present doctrine for the conduct of an armored attack followed by a link up, passage of lines, and further attack is sound.

      RECOMMENDATION: Doctrine for the conduct of an armored attack continue to be taught.

      (3) OBSERVATION: A tank company was engaged by RPG teams in triple canopy jungle. The two lead tanks took RPG hits and the enemy successfully evaded.

EVALUATION: Due to tactical requirements the tank company was required to move along a narrow jungle trail bordered by trees too large to be pushed down by the tanks. This area was suspected to contain enemy units so "rolling" artillery fires were placed in front of the lead tank. The initial engagement was from a well dug in force at close range resulting in the lead two vehicles being disabled. Since maneuver room was unavailable sufficient organic firepower could not be placed on the enemy force.

RECOMMENDATION: When armored units must operate in such dense jungle that maneuver is denied, infantry should clear the route for the armor unit.

(4) OBSERVATION: Rome plow cuts were directed into the ARVN Airborne Division's AO. Coordination for our AO was jointly agreed to be at the battalion level. The Regiment was unable to secure sufficient area of operation around the actual cut to provide space for security forces and supporting fires.

EVALUATION: A minimum of three kilometers on all sides of the proposed rime plow cuts must be controlled by the unit providing security. Unless this minimum area is available, a delay is experienced in obtaining clearance for aerial reconnaissance, artillery or air support, and security force maneuver room is unnecessarily restricted. Tactical cuts are also based on the principal that when an enemy base area is located, the rone plows cut to the areas. Delay in receiving permission to enter the area often gave the enemy additional time to remove caches.

RECOMMENDATION: A unit tasked to secure rime plow operations must have sufficient AO to properly protect itself and exploit intelligence without coordination limitations.

(5) OBSERVATION: While securing rime plow operations, an excessive number of vehicles often were congested into a small area.

EVALUATION: When the armored cavalry security elements and the rime plows are clustered in a small area confusion and a reduction in land clearing efficiency results, a solution is to divide the land clearing operation so that the rime plows operate in two separate areas. One armored cavalry platoon secures each smaller rime plow element and the remaining platoon can serve as a ready reaction force.

RECOMMENDATION: Land clearing operations should be planned so that the rime plows and the security force work in groups small enough to avoid confusion.
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(6) OBSERVATION: Offensive dismounted operations are required to find and eliminate booby traps.

EVALUATION: Offensive dismounted operations must be effectively conducted by armored cavalry units. The techniques of reconnaissance by fire and the use of grappling hooks are essential to these types of operations.

RECOMMENDATION: The importance of individual and tank training for dismounted operations must be reemphasized.

(7) OBSERVATION: The enemy was found to employ booby traps with trip wires suspended at chest level or higher.

EVALUATION: The normal soldier will expect to find the trip wires of booby traps at ground level. He must be cautioned about looking for trip wires suspended at chest level or higher.

RECOMMENDATION: RVN Replacement training should emphasize the fact that the enemy employs trip wires with ingenuity and it is necessary for a soldier not to limit his search to ground level trip wires.

(8) OBSERVATION: A significant number of enemy mines were emplaced deeper in the ground.

EVALUATION: Mines which have been emplaced more than 6 inches are difficult to detect. Inexperienced personnel can easily bypass this type of mine. In addition, mine detectors must be properly maintained. A knowledge of mine markings used by the enemy is essential when looking for these mines.

RECOMMENDATION: The importance of proper mine sweeping procedures and recognition of enemy mine marking techniques be reemphasized.

(9) OBSERVATION: Night ambush patrols must be capable of marking their positions for aircraft.

EVALUATION: Aircraft used in support of night ambush patrol must be able to accurately determine friendly positions. Strobe lights or flares can be employed by the ambush patrol for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATION: Night ambush patrols must preplan and carry with them a means of marking their positions for supporting aircraft.

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OBSERVATION: In July the 2d Squadron in the Regiment's western AO found and interdicted an enemy supply route by utilizing automatic ambushes.

EVALUATION: Automatic ambushes were emplaced between known enemy base areas east of LZ-16. Six enemy were killed before enemy travel along this route diminished. It was found that the enemy avoided these areas and began entering the village by circuitous routes which were then ambushed with success.

RECOMMENDATION: Automatic ambushes should be used to interdict enemy travel to and from villages where he may gather food and supplies.

- Training: None
- Intelligence: None
- Logistical: None
- Army aviation:

OBSERVATION: There is a need for a helicopter dispensed ground marker, able to withstand weathering 3-5 days.

EVALUATION: During air cavalry operations in RVN, the Aero Scouts discover and plot many lucrative targets susceptible to destruction in detail by air or artillery. Due to rapid moving situations the scout is seldom able to remain on station to direct air or artillery. Six digit coordinates on a sea of jungle foliage subject to interpretation by an aerial observer, FAC and fighter pilot induce a large probability of error, and related wasted time and money.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop and issue to air cavalry troops an expendable, non pyrotechnic, non toxic, 3-5 day weatherproof, high contrast, easily identified marker which could be safely and rapidly dispensed from a hovering helicopter. It must snugly lodge in tree tops, shrubbery or tall grass without being lofted by rotor wash. It must not create a significant bulk or weight problem when as many as twelve are carried in a LCH. It must not be similar to other trash in the battle area such as parachutes. This marker, when placed directly over a target by hovering helicopter could later be readily identified by a FAC or aerial observer using grid coordinates and would guarantee greater accuracy on preplanned destruction missions.
SIGNAL:

OBSERVATION: During the operation in Cambodia Radio Communication (FM) was difficult because of Allied interference.

EVALUATION: The shortage of discrete FM Frequencies assigned to the 11th ACR (10 discrete out of nearly 95 used) has long been a problem. As the density of units increased along the Cambodian border and transmission distances expanded to near maximum limits the problem of Allied interference became critical. The interference was both "shared" frequencies and "override".

RECOMMENDATION: Until more discrete frequencies can be obtained Radio Operators must be taught to shorten transmissions and cut "chatter".

h. Medical: None

i. Psyop/Civic Action: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incis
Incl 2 w/d HQ DA

DISTRIBUTION:
1-COMMI
2-CINC USARPAC
3-CO, USARV
1-CR, USARV
3-CO, LIVFY
5-CG, 1ST CAV DIV (AM)
1-USASLS
1-USAARMS
1-USARMC
1-Army War College
1-USAMSC
1-CO, 11th ACR
1-HQ, 11th ACR
1-CO, 1/11th ACR
1-CO, 2/11th ACR
1-CO, 3/11th ACR
8-28th MED, 11th ACR
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report — Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (U) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning AO coordination for land clearing operations, page 28, paragraph 1b(4); concur. AO coordination should be accomplished to provide sufficient area for effective support by artillery and to allow exploitation of local intelligence.

   b. Reference item concerning security of Rome Plow operations, page 28, paragraph 1b(5); nonconcur. Proper command and control of the land clearing company (LCC) and the security force will preclude congestion of vehicles. LCC's are most efficiently employed as a company and should not be fragmented. When fragmented, there is loss of centralized control, loss of mutually supporting security forces, and a requirement for an increased number of security forces to provide all around security for the operation. Under average conditions, the LCC should be kept intact. As an exception, in extremely dense jungle, it may be feasible to employ platoons separately. Caution must be used to provide enough distance between elements to insure unit safety from fires of the other platoons — 3000 meters separation is considered minimum to retain artillery support capability, with proper safety margins.

   c. Reference item concerning "Army Aviation", page 30, paragraph 2f; concur. It is further recommended that the unit submit a Small Material Requirement to the appropriate CDC agency for evaluation.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W. C. BARTER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVHDO-DO (23 Aug 70) 2nd Ind


Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
II PFORCE
11th ACR

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain
Assist. Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 FEB 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquartersconcurs in subject report with the following comment:

Reference the item concerning "Army Aviation," page 30, paragraph 1f. Concur with the requirement for a helicopter dispensed ground marker. Recommend development be pursued by USACDC.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. M. Ozaki
CPT, AG
Asst AG

Ct furn:
CG USARV
ANNEX INDEX

Annex A  Organizational Structure
Annex B  Roster of Commanders
Annex C  OPCON Status of Units
Annex D  Army Aviation Statistical Summary
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Annex A

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
Air Cavalry Troop
919th Engineer Company (Armored)
7th Army Postal Unit
17th Public Information Detachment
28th Military History Detachment
33rd Chemical Detachment
124th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment
309th Transportation Detachment
409th Radio Research Unit
541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Company
Hoditzer Battery

2nd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
E Troop
F Troop
G Troop
H Company
Hoditzer Battery

3rd Squadron

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
I Troop
K Troop
L Troop
M Company
Hoditzer Battery

* Attached Support Unit

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Annex C

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was OPCON to the following organizations during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF Shoemaker (1st Cav Div - AM)</td>
<td>1-4 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cav Div (AM)</td>
<td>4 May - 19 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Div</td>
<td>19-30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II FFORCEV</td>
<td>30 June - 31 July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. During the reporting period the following major units were OPCON to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/11 ACR</td>
<td>1-9 May, 21 May - 31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 May - 19 June, 10 - 31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11 ACR</td>
<td>1 May - 31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 Cav</td>
<td>24 - 27 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/5 Cav</td>
<td>16 - 20 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12 Cav</td>
<td>19 - 27 May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. During the reporting period the following units were GS to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/2/12 Arty</td>
<td>1 - 4 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/20 Arty</td>
<td>1 May - 19 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/6/27 Arty</td>
<td>1 - 4 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/32 Arty</td>
<td>1 - 4 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/35 Arty</td>
<td>1 - 11 May, 26 May - 11 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/77 Arty</td>
<td>19 - 28 May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. During the reporting period the following units were DS to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/31 Engr</td>
<td>14 May - 25 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th LCC</td>
<td>26 May - 23 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>984th LCC</td>
<td>13 - 26 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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3. HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

   a. The following organic units of 1/11 ACR were OPCON to other units during the periods indicated:

      | UNIT       | PERIOD  | OPCON TO                  |
      |------------|---------|---------------------------|
      | C/1/11 ACR | 1-4 May | 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) |
      | C/1/11 ACR | 7 May   | 2/11 ACR                  |
      | D/1/11 ACR | 22-27 May | 1st ARVN Abn Bde          |

   b. The 1/11 ACR was OPCON to the following units as indicated:

      | PERIOD     | OPCON TO                  |
      |------------|---------------------------|
      | 9-11 May   | 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) |
      | 11-15 May  | 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) |
      | 15-21 May  | 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div     |

4. HQ, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

   a. The following units were OPCON to 2/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

      | UNIT       | PERIOD  |
      |------------|---------|
      | C/1/11 ACR | 7 May   |
      | I/3/11 ACR | 1 June  |

   b. The following organic units of 2/11 ACR were OPCON to other units during the periods indicated:

      | UNIT       | PERIOD    | OPCON TO                  |
      |------------|-----------|---------------------------|
      | E/2/11 ACR | 12-31 July | 1st Cav Div (AM)          |
      | F/2/11 ACR | 10-12 July | 1st Cav Div (AM)          |
      | G/2/11 ACR | 1-19 June  | 1st Cav Div (AM)          |

   c. The 2/11 ACR was OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (AM) during the period 19 June - 10 July.

5. HQ, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment: The following organic units of 3/11 ACR were OPCON to other units during the periods indicated:

      | UNIT       | PERIOD    | OPCON TO                  |
      |------------|-----------|---------------------------|
      | I/3/11 ACR | 12 May - 1 June | 2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) |
      | I/3/11 ACR | 1 June    | 2/11 ACR                  |
Army Aviation Statistical Summary

1. Sorties Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>OH-6AA</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>3290</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3983</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift (Combat)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Lift (Logistical)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (Combat)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (Logistical)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>1369</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. Number Passengers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>5,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6AA</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>6,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Tons Cargo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Tons Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6AA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Hours Flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Hours Flown</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>6312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6AA</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>2086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>4304</td>
<td>9378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>1560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Results of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA KBA (BC)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans Damaged</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Ammunition Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>242,175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>6,245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>6,775</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50cal</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>86.9%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Aircraft Non-operational Ready (Supply):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Aircraft Non-operational Ready (Maintenance):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1G</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment