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<td>Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>AGO D/A ltr, 16 Jul 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 16 Jul 1976</td>
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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Major General, USA
Acting The Adjutant General
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3D WOE 9TH INF DIV OML

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**INCLUSIONS**
INCL i
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, ATTN: AVDC-MH, APO 96225
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6330 I, II, IV; 6229 I, IV; 6329 I, IV.

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Introduction:

(1) During the reporting period, 1 May - 31 July 1970, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued its mission of conducting operations in Long An Province and the political boundary areas of the four adjacent provinces of Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Tuong in support of the overall pacification program. In addition, the tactical area of interest of the Brigade was expanded to include the entire Long An Province and the southwestern portion of Duc Tu and Long Thanh Districts of Bien Hoa Province. During the months of May and June, Brigade elements participated in offensive operations in Cambodia. The Brigade Headquarters remained at Tan An.

(2) The Brigade was involved in multiple combat operations daily. There were no ceasefires during the period. The accomplishment of the Brigade's assigned mission of destroying enemy units in this area was readily apparent from the reduced size of enemy units and frequency of contacts with them.

(3) Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang continued to be implemented. The objective of Operation Toan Thang IV (Complete Victory) is to seek out the enemy with combined US/GVN operations to prevent his employment of men and equipment. July marked the implementation of the 1970 Wet Season Campaign Plan.
15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG3 CTPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(4) One base camp was turned over to OVN control and three fire support bases were closed in continuation of the gradual and orderly Vietnamization of all combat functions in the TAOI. (Incl 1)

(5) At various times during the reporting period all four maneuver battalions were OICOM to other headquarters. (Incl 2)

(6) There were minor changes in three HQ's.

(7) There were minor changes in supporting elements attached to the Brigade. (Incl 3)

(8) During the reporting period, subordinate elements made eight tactical moves and one administrative move. (Incl 4)

(9) The overall training program consisted of sending selected individuals to schools conducted by higher headquarters, centralized Vietnam Orientation training at brigade level conducted by "Go Devil" Academy, and decentralized training conducted at battalion and separate company level. In July, on return from Cambodian operations, maneuver battalions conducted intensive refresher training programs to reorient personnel to the Delta environment.

b. (C) Organization:

(1) Minor revisions of TOE's to assigned units are indicated below:

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<td>USARV-INC 60 156, 22 Apr 70</td>
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<td>E/75th Inf (Ranger)</td>
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</table>

(2) Task Organization - Inclosure 5.

(3) Brigade TAOI and Primary Unit Locations - Inclosure 6.

c. (U) Personnel and Administration:

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength. During the reporting period the Brigade's personnel replacement flow was greatly reduced by HQ, USARV. The impact is reflected in Inclosure 7. Brigade Strength at the end of this reporting period was 4.7% lower than at the close of

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AVB--NL

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15 August 1970

The previous reporting period. The Brigade had received 60.3% fewer replacements this reporting period than last reporting period. Although officer strength had dropped this quarter it was still 1.2% over authorized strength. Enlisted strength is presently 5.0% below authorized strength.

(2) Roster of Key Personnel — Inclosure 8.

(3) Personnel Manpower Management.

(a) Reenlistment.

1. A Reenlistment Conference was held on 27 June 1970 at the Brigade HQ. The purpose of the conference was to stress the importance of the Reenlistment Program, to improve the job knowledge of unit reenlistment personnel, and to inform them of recent reenlistment policy changes.

2. Two factors which have adversely affected the Reenlistment Program are: Reenlistment out of MOS 11, 12, and 13 series, which would result in moving 8% from assignments in these MOS's during the Vietnam tour, was suspended for an indefinite period of time, and rumors that the Brigade will deploy to CONUS in the near future. Many believe they will redeploy with the unit to which they are assigned regardless of time in-country.


(4) Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(a) Special Services Activities. The following USO shows were provided during the period:

The Sunshine Delegation USO Show
The NCAA All-Americans USO Handshake Tour

(b) Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Allocations Utilization. Approximately 95% of the R&R allocations were utilized as indicated in Inclosure 10.

(c) Special Services Motion Picture Program. Utilization and attendance of motion pictures are shown as Inclosure 11.

(d) Postal Service Activities. The statistics given in Inclosure 12 indicate the amount of business conducted by APO 96371 during the reporting period.

INCL 3

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, CSS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Awards and Decorations. Awards and Decorations for the reporting period are indicated as Inclosure 13.

(5) Chaplain Activities.

(a) General Operations.

1. Utilization of Brigade forces created a constant state of operational flux among the battalions, particularly during the Cambodian campaign. During this period all four maneuver battalions operated in areas many miles away from the parent organization’s area of operations. Contact between this Headquarters and distant battalions was difficult to maintain. The dispersion of units meant a greater portion of the Chaplain’s time had to be used for travel so that religious coverage could be provided for the troops.

2. A Chaplain’s orientation program was initiated for incoming troops at “Go Devil” Academy. Counseling and religious services available throughout the Brigade were announced to incoming troops. Special problems of the command in Chaplain related fields were discussed on a troop/chaplain dialogue basis. A “Chaplain Happening” was offered to new troops each Thursday evening, and Catholic and Protestant services were offered for each graduating class with an average of 98% of all graduates attending. Prompt exposure of chaplains, particularly on an informal basis, created a relaxed personal relationship between soldier and chaplain. When the chaplains took the initiative in offering their help to impressionistic new arrivals to a combat unit, ice was quickly broken and there was a new dimension of warmth in all subsequent meetings.

(b) Surgeon Activities.

(a) The gastro intestinal study to determine the cause of a non-specific diarrhea disease conducted by the Walter Reed Institute of Research (WRAIR) with 3d Bde personnel was conducted 25 June 1970. Information is presently being evaluated and no results have as yet been published.

(b) The WRAIR is continuing a study of dermatological disease of the feet with the 5-60th BN. The study will be completed in the near future. The study has given the aforementioned units the benefits of many preventive measures that have reduced the man-days lost to an almost insignificant degree.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) The 20th Preventive Medicine Unit has supported the 3d Bde in an extremely effective manner during the Cambodian campaign when several episodes of diarrheal disease occurred because of frequent lack of potable water. Aerial spraying of malathion, sanitation classes, malaria prophylaxis, water decontamination, and insect and rodent control have resulted in the control of diarrheal and malaria episodes. (Incl 14). In addition to Major Garcia, the Preventive Medicine Officer, there are two members of the 20th Preventive Medicine Team attached to this Brigade.

(d) The medical drug abuse program has continued as in the past, however, with command emphasis a treatment program has been initiated at Brigade level. Several heroin and other drug addicts have been treated, and hopefully a newly constructed ward for treatment of drug abuse will be completed very soon.

(7) Finance Activities. The 3d Brigade Finance Office was involved with the retroactive pay raise, payday support operation, and auditing of records in conjunction with pay complaints. The pay raise involved the payment of 6,000 part-pay vouchers and a complete audit of all records to insure each individual received the correct raise. A retroactive Tiger Scout pay raise was also paid during this period. Due to the Cambodian operations, the Finance Officer delivered payrolls to the infantry battalions at Bear Cat, Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, and FSB Jamie, thus providing service without interference with ground operations. In late June and July, all infantry units' records were audited at their rear areas to eliminate existing pay complaints. This policy proved 100% effective to both the finance officer and to the satisfaction of the individual soldier.

(8) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(a) Provost Marshal.

1. Personnel. The 483d Military Police Platoon and HHC MP Platoon are presently functioning at a strength of 88%. No change in this strength is projected for the next quarter.

2. Significant Activities. Joint MP-ARVN MP patrols and joint MP-National Police have been continued during this reporting period in an effort to decrease traffic accidents in the Brigade area of operation. In June the three Military Policemen at Tan Tur were withdrawn from the 2-60th Infantry Battalion. The MP's escorted convoys of the 2-47th Infantry Battalion and of the 6-31st Infantry Battalion to new bases of operations.
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AVBB-MH                      15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Staff Judge Advocate.

1. Operational Report. During the reporting period the following numbers and types of courts-martial were processed and tried:

Summary Courts-Martial - None
Special Courts-Martial - 27
General Courts-Martial - None
Special Courts-Martial authorized to impose Bad Conduct Discharge - 4

2. The SJA's office reviewed 279 non-judicial punishments under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ:

Officer Personnel - 0
Warrant Officer Personnel - 0
Enlisted Personnel, grade E-5 and above - 25
Enlisted Personnel, grade E-4 and below - 254

3. There have been no significant increases in crimes against persons and property, but larcenies continue to be a persistent problem. Blackmarket activities and military offenses have declined, but traffic violations have increased. (Incl 15).

4. Under the provisions of AR 27-20 the office of the SJA has processed 166 claims against the government during the reporting period.

5. The SJA's office also handled military legal assistance to matters such as wills, powers of attorney, citizenship, marriage to a foreign national, taxes, civil suits, counseling of personnel accused or suspected of criminal acts, and reviewed recommendations for administrative eliminations, line of duty investigations, report of surveys, and other miscellaneous investigations.

3. (C) Intelligence

(1) Discussion.
AVBB-MH

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) General. Enemy activity against US Forces in the 3d Bde's AO during the period 1 May through 31 July 1970 continued to remain at a low level. During this period the enemy was supposed to initiate Phases 2 & 3 of his summer campaign; however, due to the Allied cross-border operations, he was forced to abandon those plans in order to defend rear supply areas. Generally, enemy activity was scattered, with small ARVN and RF/PF outposts being the enemy's main targets for attack. The enemy continues to employ sapper tactics as a key weapon against isolated RF/PF compounds. Because of low strengths and failure of rear service to supply necessary equipment in adequate quantities, all units have been assigned the mission of avoiding contact and countering the GVN Pacification Program. Local Forces Companies have been used to guide main force units and replacements and to act as security elements for meetings of Village and District Cadre.

(b) May. During the early part of May there was a slight increase in enemy attacks by fire. This increase was believed to be an attempt to release the pressure of Allied operations in Cambodia.

1. On 31 May 1970 the 308th MF Bn was contacted in the vicinity of XT189138 by elements of the 46th ARVN Regt resulting in 31 VC/NVA KIA and 1 PW.

2. On 16 May 1970, a PW, Truong-Van-So (ARA Son) 1st Lt, Chief of Engineers for the 1st Ind NVA Regt, was captured. The subject stated that on 3 May 1970, the 1st Ind NVA Regt Hq was encircled and attacked with heavy casualties. He stated the following individuals were killed in that action: Nam Khoi, the Regt CO; Cham, the Regt XO; LTC Hai Lieu, Field Grade PO; Sr Cpt Ich, Chief of rear service; and other key personnel of the Regt.

(c) June. Activity during the month of June was limited to scattered contacts. The most significant of these occurred on 11 June 1970, vic XS7468, which resulted in 29 enemy KIA and 4 PW's from the 211 Sapper Bn.

1. On 15 June 1970, the CO of the C3 Co, K4 NVA Bn was captured vic XS685694. He revealed the strength of the K-4 Bn to be 70 men. He further stated that many of their individual weapons had been lost or captured. The subject stated that food supplies were diminishing and they could no longer depend on the local populace for food. Because of lack of food and military supplies the subject stated the morale was very low and the attitude of the cadre towards the war was that of indifference.
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SUBJECT: Operation: 1 Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS OSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. The most significant incident occurred on 6 July 70 vic XS168860, where Recon-2/47 inflicted 11 KIA on an unknown unit from Phnom Trach District.

2. On 15 July, southwest of Long Thanh, a command and control ship from the 240th Assault Helicopter Company engaged an estimated 12 enemy (150678) possibly from the Doan 10 Sapper Battalion, SR 4, resulting in 14 enemy KIA.

(a) Recapitulation. During the period 1 May /U through 31 July 70, the VC/NVA combat effectiveness continued to deteriorate. The primary problem the enemy faced was his inability to resupply his units with men and equipment needed to carry on their missions. Due to the failure of Rear Service elements to supply equipment in adequate amounts and the effects of the cross-border operations, the Main Force units have been assigned the mission of avoiding contact and countering the GVN Pacification Program. Local Force Companies have been used as guides for main force units and to help local guerrillas collect taxes.

1. The lst Long An MF Bn was contacted frequently through PW's. According to PW interrogations, the battalion's mission is to remain widely dispersed and to coordinate with the VC local authorities to motivate the populace to pay taxes to the VC. The 6th MF Bn, after avoiding contact for a few months, was contacted on 8 June in the vicinity XS740850. This was a slight move to the southeast for the battalion. Its present AO is believed to be Binh Chanh (D). The 211 Sapper Bn was contacted only once. On 11 June, vic XS7468, the 627, 282, 207, 556, and 197 RF Co's killed 19 VC/NVA and apprehended four PW's who were identified as members of the 211 Sapper Bn. The 308th MF Bn was contacted on 31 May in the vicinity XT189138 by elements of the 46th ARVN Regt resulting in 31 VC/NVA KIA and 1 PW from the
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LVBE-MI 15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division: Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

308th MF Bn. This contact took place west of the Angel’s Wing in Cambodia. This possibly means that the 308th MF Bn had been assigned a mission of protecting supply areas in Cambodia during the allied cross-border operations. The 520th MF Bn was identified in only one contact. On 9 June, Vicinity K3740655, 3/50 ARVN killed four enemy from the 520th MF Bn. The 267 MF Bn was involved in the protection of the base areas in Cambodia during the allied cross-border operations. On 18 June, Vicinity K2277154, an unknown ARVN unit engaged the 267 MF Bn resulting in 7 VC/NVA KIA and three PV’s. At the present time the 267 MF Bn is held to have one element in Cambodia and elements in Hau Nghia (P). The 269 MF Bn was also involved in the protection of the rear areas in Cambodia during the allied operations. Presently, the 269 MF Bn is held to have elements in Cambodia and elements in Hau Nghia (P). During the reporting period there has been no significant contacts identifying the 269 MF Bn.

2. The subordinate battalions of the 1st Ind NVA Regt have been greatly reduced in combat effectiveness and are generally avoiding contact. According to the interrogation of Truong Van So (AKA Son) the following personalities of the 1st Ind NVA Regt were killed in a clash with an ARVN unit which encircled the NVA with APC’s: Nam Khoi, Regt CO; Chuc, Regt XO; LTC Hie Lieu, Field Grade PO; Sr Capt Ich, Chief of Rear Service Staff; Ken, Chief of Signal Staff; Sr Capt Tuc, Chief of Political Staff; Cuc, Leader of Cadre Section; Kha, Leader Organization Section. The K4 NVA Bn and the K5 NVA Bn suffered the heaviest losses of the Regt in the several small contacts.

3. Information on the units operating in and around Kho Trach (D) is very limited due to the fact it is a newly acquired AO. There has been only one significant contact in the area thus far. On 6 July 70, Recon 2/47 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 11 enemy KIA (IC); however, there was no unit identification.

4. The Dong Phu Bn, 2d Long An Bn, 3d Arty Bn, D16 Bn, 2642 Bn, D12 Bn, and the 128 Arty Bn are presently understrength and awaiting replacements, with their only mission to remain dispersed and avoid contact.

5. The Local Force Companies in the 3d Bde AO remained out of significant contact. Because of their low strength, these companies have been used as guides for replacements and main force units and to assist local guerrillas in the collection of taxes.

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**MP/NVA Bn's Long An (P)**

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**MP/NVA Bn's Hau Niah (P)**

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<td>130 VG/NVA</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

AUBR-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 26 Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS GSFP-65 (M2) (U)

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Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Discussion of Enemy Techniques and Tactics.

(a) During the reporting period, enemy initiated activity remained at a low level of intensity.

(b) This low level of intensity continued to reflect the enemy's objectives of conducting only stand-off attacks by fire aimed primarily at isolated GVN Outposts and poorly defended Hamlets. His tendency to avoid contact was a function of his inability to resupply and recruit new members. US and GVN interdictory operations have placed tremendous pressure on the enemy's logistical and infiltration routes, forcing him to conserve his resources.

(c) In addition, the enemy was gradually losing his numerous hiding places and the security of his lines of communication as the pacification effort spreads throughout the area.

(d) He can consider but few places free to conceal himself from the ever increasing numbers of GVN forces as outposts are being built in areas once considered enemy controlled.

(4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

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<th></th>
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<th>JULY</th>
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AVBB-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

MAY JUNE JULY

Grain (tons) .95 0 .03
Sampans 2 1 10
Structures 113 7 13
Bunkers 249 160 181

(5) Intelligence Sources and Assets

(a) Significant activities and new techniques in the area of counter-intelligence.

1. The counter-intelligence section (CIS), in keeping with its basic mission, employed six coded sources, nine casual informants, and six Tiger Scouts. The period was marked by considerable movement by the battalions assigned to the 3d Brigade. Before, during, and after the Cambodian operation, battalions assigned to the 3d Brigade were assigned to various locations in III CTZ. During the period, 2/47 Infantry (Mech) was returned from OPCON, 25th Infantry Division to the 3d Brigade and sent to Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province. CIS provided full support to 2/47, stationing an agent team at Nhan Trach and initiating intelligence collection efforts in support of the battalion.

2. During the reporting period, CIS has established a close relationship with Phoenix Program in Long An Province. Phoenix Files and Blacklists are utilized by CIS in targeting areas and personalities and to verify and update blacklists, as well as providing general information on VC activities. CIS has continued to maintain close liaison and exchange of information with Long An PSCD, 3d Battalion 525th MI, and Long An MSS. CIS has continued to work closely with the 14th ARVN MI Detachment in a mutual exchange of highly useful information.

3. Intelligence Collection Techniques. During the establishment of a CIS field office in Nhon Trach District, several problems were encountered. Due to heavy VC infiltration in the villages, indigenous personnel were unwilling to furnish information under circumstances which could possibly compromise them. All prospective sources stated that they would not go to US Base Camps or MACV Compounds since their presence in those areas would be quickly noted by the VC. This refusal, although understandable, precluded the gathering of information in the manner normally used by CIS.
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SUBJ/mt: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 36 Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS OSPM-65 (R2) (U)

The problem was resolved when the CIS Agent in the area made a survey of places in the district which were normal areas for congregation of the people. The Agent found that the community center of one village was a gathering place where people went there to obtain routine government services and to peruse the bulletin boards containing notices of community interest. Discrete contact with US Advisors lead to the introduction of a CIS interpreter in civilian clothes with a private office in the center, on what the US Advisors explained to indigenous personnel was a census survey project. The interpreter was thereby able to routinely meet and debrief sources in a manner which cast no suspicion on the source. The use of flexibility and imagination in meeting and adapting to local conditions and problems has been a prime factor in enabling CIS to provide a uniform quality of intelligence service throughout the Brigade AO.

Interrogation of Prisoners of War. The Brigade Interrogation Section processed a total of 172 detainees during the reporting period. Of this total, 27 were classified Innocent Civilians, 19 were classified Civilian Enemies, 58 were classified PW, and 68 were classified Ho Chi Minh. In addition, the section processed 37 batches of documents, 14 of which were of tactical value. The section also processed approximately 100 pounds of captured material, primarily Viet Cong weapons, clothing, and equipment. The IPW section has continued to provide interrogation coverage of PW's and the Ho Chi Minh throughout the Brigade AO. The coverage has been broadened to include an interrogation team working with the A3I MACV Advisory Team giving coverage of Khe Sanh Province, and an interrogation team with 2d Bn, 47th Infantry giving coverage of the Xuan Truc District. One of the main obstacles which was observed during this period was the need for greater liaison with various ARVN Intelligence Agencies throughout the AO. This was especially prevalent in cases when the source of information was captured by an ARVN Unit. It was found that the most efficient way of dealing with this problem was to have daily coverage of these units using the mobile interrogation liaison team (MILT) technique.

5. New Techniques in the Area of Aerial Reconnaissance. The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during the reporting period: Twenty-five Aerial photographic missions were received and plotted. From these missions a total of 25 Photo Interpretation Reports were prepared and disseminated. A total of
one Red Hase sortie was received and read out, and the results disseminated. Also one Sensor Interpretation Report was prepared and disseminated. In response to specific requests, the II Section prepared 21 Photomosaics, 6 special targeting overlays, and one trail overlay. Fifteen photographic missions have been cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to 3d Brigade units.

6. New Techniques in Unattended Ground Sensors. The Duffle Bag Section (Sensor Section), in keeping with its basic mission, employed during the reporting period sixty (60) sensors comprising eight (8) strings. There were 59 activations of which 15 were fired on by artillery. Beginning on 01 May 1970 the Sensor Section assumed responsibility for the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division's former area of operation. A three man remote monitoring team replaced the monitoring team from the 25th Infantry Division at Fire Support Base Chamberlain. During the month of May the section was restricted to monitoring existing active strings since there were no assets available for additional emplant missions in the area of operations assigned to the Brigade. Coordination with United States Navy and 25th ARVN Division sensor units made possible receipt of their activations by the Brigade S-2 section with the goal of producing timely reaction by supporting artillery, air or ground troops. Sensors have continued to be utilized to establish infiltration patterns. As a result of large numbers of activations by Navy sensors during the period 01 - 16 July, ground operations supported by artillery on barges were conducted along the Vam Co Tay and the Industrial Canal in the Plain of Reeds. As a result of a recent change in policy concerning US Artillery engagement of sensor activations, they will be used more in the future as indicators of potential areas for tactical operations than as means of target acquisition. The sensors monitored by the Brigade have had a low level of activity throughout the period. An experiment was conducted by the sensor section with the Miniature Seismic Intrusion Detector and the Magnetic Intrusion Detector, to determine the best method of emplanting under the extremely wet conditions which exist in this area of operations. It was found that the Minisid-Magid sensors were the most effective when the Magid was three to five meters from the trail or paddy dike and completely concealed under mud and water. The Minisid had to be emplanted in higher ground to maximize its life and prevent the antenna from being shorted-out by rising water. Sensors emplanted in low areas during the dry season deactivated simultaneously with the beginning of the rainy season. Present emplant procedures are based on previous field experience and the results of the experiment.
A16-36
15 August 1970
Subject: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROS OGPFR-65 (R2) (U)


(a) The reporting period covered the transition from dry season to wet season; however, rain had not yet become a daily occurrence and the higher paddies in all the Brigade AD's were wet but not flooded.

(b) This increased water table resulted in restriction of wheeled vehicles to roads and in some areas becoming impassible to tracked vehicles. Travel by boat and AOV, especially in the Plain of Reeds, was improved.

(c) Friendly operations were little affected by this increase in water level; however, rain did interfere with some aerial missions and the lengths of time and elements operating continually in the field became more critical due to the increased danger of fungal foot problems.

(d) Enemy operations were also affected by weather; however, the increased water level in the Plain of Reeds may have improved enemy infiltration routes for use of sampans.

7. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Courses of Action.

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Remain dispersed in small squad/platoon sized elements to avoid detection and contact.

2. Conduct brief attacks by fire on US and GVN installations and Outposts.

3. Conduct limited sapper attacks on US and GVN installations and Outposts.

4. Overrun small squad or platoon sized outposts in an effort to obtain weapons and supplies.

5. Place and take advantage of booby trap areas to provide effective routes for evasion and concealment from allied operations.

6. Take advantage of set patterns by allied elements for the placement of mines and booby traps.

7. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and obtain logistical support from them.
ATGJ-371
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2. Attempt to disrupt the GVN Pacification Program wherever and whenever feasible.

3. Conduct terrorist activities against the local populace.

(b) Then enemy is vulnerable to:

1. The Pacification Program as it denies him support from the local populace.

2. Well placed AP's to disrupt his command liaison routes and disrupt his movement.

3. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

4. Decrease in combat effectiveness and a low morale due to the effect of the Cambodian operations.

5. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.

6. Increased dependance on existing caches and the loss of these caches due to allied operations.

7. A breakdown of his infrastructure by aggressive allied operations.

(c) From all appearances the enemy will continue to disperse in small squad/cell sized units in an effort to avoid contact. He will continue to attempt to rebuild his command liaison routes, reorganize, and re-infiltrate back into his old areas of operations. At the same time he may conduct isolated attacks against small outposts and attempt to disrupt and counter the GVN Pacification Program whenever and wherever feasible.


(a) Ground Surveillance Radar detected 1265 targets resulting in 138 artillery fire missions. The number of radar sets employed by the Brigade fluctuated as battalions were either placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division or returned to Brigade control. In May the Brigade operated six (6) organic PPS-5 sets and one (1) Navy PPS-5.
AVBB-MH  
15 August 1970  
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

on 23 June the two (2) PPS-5 Radar sets assigned to the 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry (H) were returned to Brigade control and employed in the new AO in Nhon Trach (D), Bien Hoa (P). On 27 June the two (2) PPS-5 Radar sets assigned to the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry were transferred to the control of the 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division. On 12 July one (1) PPS-5 Radar set from 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry returned to Brigade control and was employed on the barge operated by 2nd Battalion 4th Artillery. On 23 July a II FFORCEV TPS-25 was placed under Brigade operational control and employed at Phu Ho (V), Nhon Trach (D), Bien Hoa (P). At the end of the reporting period this left the Brigade with operational control of seven (7) organic PPS-5 Radar sets, one (1) Navy PPS-5 set, and one (1) II FFORCEV TPS-25 set.

(b) Radar coverage continues to be concentrated in areas which the enemy used for resupply and infiltration. For this reason, radar sets are located on the border between IIII MR and IV MR, along the eastern edge of the Plain of Reeds, and in the Pineapple Area.

(c) Two new techniques of radar employment and/or utilisation of sightings were used during the reporting period:

1. From 12 July through 31 July a radar set was employed as part of a floating fire support base on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers. Few targets were detected; however, since that time span was also one of reduced sensor activity possible indicating reduced movement, the set continues to be used from the barge.

2. From 10 June through 25 June a study was conducted to evaluate the tactic of vectoring friendly patrols to the location of radar sightings and to establish the exact nature of as many targets as possible. Teams from Echo Company, 75th Infantry and the PPS-5 Radar set located at Che Tay Yen (XS 465631) were the primary elements involved; however, Brigade Night-hawk aircraft, an element of Co D, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the Thu Thua (XS 537720) and Ben Luc (XS 618754) PPS-5 Radar sets also made contributions. The conclusions drawn from the experiment were:

   a. Radar vectoring of Night patrols onto radar sightings should be attempted whenever terrain permits.

   b. Multiple canals and water-filled rice paddies in most of the area preclude stealthy movement toward a radar target.

   c. Many sightings are other than personnel movement. Water Buffalo were the most common example.
SUBJ/NOTE: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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AVSB-MR 15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) On 4 May 1970, the Brigade's TA0I was expanded to include Hau Nghia Province south of QL1. On 22 June, Nhơn Trạch District, Bình Hoà Province was added to the Brigade TA0I with the return of 2/47 Inf (M) to Brigade control. By 25 July the AO of 2/47 Inf (M) had been expanded to incorporate a portion of Long Thành and Đô Tu Districts, Bình Hoà Province, west of QL15 and south of Long Binh Post.

(3) Except for actions fought in Cambodia, enemy activity in the Brigade's TA0I remained at a low level throughout the reporting period. Combat actions were characterized by brief, violent contacts between small units. Areas of most frequent contacts with the enemy were the Cho Thay Ten area (XS 4464) of Bình Thạnh Province near the borders of MR III and MR IV, the "Eagle's Beak" area (XS 5777) near Ben Luc, the eastern parts of Đô Trạch (XĐ6671) and Bình Phước (XS6857) Districts in Long An Province; eastern Đô Trạch District in Hau Nghia Province; and eastern Nhơn Trạch District (YS1885).

(4) The Brigade continued to maintain pressure on the enemy throughout its enlarged TA0I with fewer maneuver battalions by applying a combination of airborne, ambush, patrolling, and waterborne operations. The Brigade's operations were planned to complement and reinforce those of GVN forces. The enemy's capacity for movement through the TA0I, both by daylight and at night appears to have been severely hampered by this coordinated effort. The Cambodian sanctuary operations have curtailed enemy operations since the end of April, as reflected by the low level of enemy activity in recent months. Excluding operations in Cambodia, the Brigade had 52 contacts in May; 21 in June; and 27 in July.

(5) Combined operations continue to be the primary technique for upgrading the effectiveness of GVN Forces. The Brigade's objective in the conduct of such operations was to develop a self assured ally, capable of providing for its own defense on completion of the Brigade's tenure in Vietnam. A significant indicator of the success of such operations is that over the past three months, GVN forces have displayed increasing aggressiveness and efficiency in combat operations.

(6) Significant Combat Operations.

(a) On 7 May 1970 in Operation Rơm Thang 500, the Brigade established FSB Seminol at Ba Thu, Cambodia and conducted airborne operations with the 6-31 Infantry in conjunction with four CIDG Companies from Đô Trạch and Trảng Cu and two RF Companies from Bao Trai. There was one major contact on 7 May in the vicinity of XT 206003 involving Companies A, B, and D of the 6-31 Infantry supported by 6/2-4 Artillery, 145th Avn Rn, B/3-4 Cav and USAF. Enemy losses in the contact were 3 KIA, 16 KIA, and 14 POW.
(b) On 8 May, 6-31 Infantry conducted airmobile operations with A, B, and D Companies in the vicinity of Chantrea, Cambodia (Xl 1801). As lead elements of Company D entered the city, heavy enemy fire forced the unit back with a loss of 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Company B, entering the city from the south, was also repulsed with a loss of 4 US KIA and 8 US WIA due to a heavy automatic weapons, small arms and mortar fire. As Co A attempted to penetrate the city's northeastern edge, it suffered 2 US WIA and was likewise forced to withdraw. The city was pounded throughout the remainder of the day and the following night by ten USAF tactical air strikes and continuous helicopter gunship strikes. On the morning of 9 May four more attempts to enter the city by Companies A and D were repulsed and again the city was hammered day and night by continuous air and artillery strikes. On the morning of 10 May the city was assaulted by Companies A, B and D and taken with no resistance. A Hoi Chanhs, captured on the morning of 9 May by 4/6-31, revealed the size of the enemy force to be 200 men.

(c) On the afternoon of 10 May, D/6-31 Infantry, moving to the northeast of Chantrea, encountered a well-entrenched enemy force in the village of Phu Tract. As the company's lead elements entered the town, its 2d Platoon and CP group were pinned down by heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA. After a fierce 3-hour battle, the company withdrew from the town under cover of tactical air and helicopter gunship strikes. By the afternoon of the following day, resistance had ceased and the town was taken by Companies A and D.

(d) In a second battle on 10 May, 6-31's C Company and the Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon in the vicinity of X2 2110 to the west of Ba Thu, Cambodia, encountered an unknown sized enemy force and were engaged in a four-hour firefight assisted by gunships and tactical air sorties.

(e) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division attack on the Ba Thu area terminated on 12 May when all Brigade units were withdrawn to their home bases in Vietnam. Total enemy losses attributed to 6-31 Infantry and CDO Forces during the period were 159 KIA, 18 Hoi Chanh, 18 POW's, 126 individual weapons, 47 crew-served weapons, 28 tons of ammunition, and four tons of rice against US losses of 7 KIA and 29 WIA.

(f) At 241323 May, vicinity X2 436637, USAF observed two persons evading in the area of an earlier airstrike. Ranger Teams 14 and 24 supported by D/3-4 Cav were inserted into the area. Ranger Team 14 engaged two enemy, killing both. A sweep of the area revealed two enemy AKs, three RKB, three AK-47's, one B-40 launcher with two rounds, 20 AK-47 magazines with 500 rounds of ammunition. The enemy unit was identified as an element of the 514 MP Battalion.
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AVD-MI 15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG CSFOR-65 (12) (U)

(g) At 262020 June 70 in the vicinity of XS 488693, Ranger Team 21 engaged 15 enemy soldiers at a range of 20 meters. US Navy "Sealvkl" gunships and "Black Pony" aircraft supported the team during its sweep. Results of the contact were four enemy KIA.

(h) At 070300 July 1970, Recon/2-47 Infantry (Mech) engaged an unknown sized enemy force at a range of 100 meters. Artillery, helicopter gunships, the Brigade's "Markin" night hawk, an "Infant" aircraft, and USAF air strikes supported the unit in contact. Aircraft received return ground fire until 0330 hours. Results of the contact were 11 enemy KIA credited to supporting aircraft.

(i) At 082330 July 1970 at "Noose Island" vicinity XS 473715 Brigade "Markin" night hawk and "Infant" aircraft received ground fire while enroute to a night reconnaissance target. Aircraft returned fire and were engaged by an estimated 75-100 firing positions on the ground. Contact was supported by two Navy LFT's, two "Shadow" 25th Infantry Division IFF and flare ships, USAF air strikes, and US Artillery from Thu Thua. Results of the contact were four confirmed enemy KIA with an intelligence report of 18 enemy KIA.

(j) Combat Statistics = Inclosure 17.

(5) Combat Support Activities.

(a) Artillery Support.

1. Artillery support of the Brigade during the reporting period continued to be provided by the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery. Within the Brigade TA0I there were no RF/FF outposts which could not be covered by artillery. US Artillery covered approximately 60% while ARVN Artillery covered approximately 85% of the Brigade TA0I. Eighty-four ARVN/FF/RF operations were supported solely by US Artillery during the reporting period while 23 ARVN/RF/FF operations were supported by combined US and ARVN Artillery.

2. Significant operational activities of the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery included the following: Battery A supported the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry in Cambodia in its OCPG mission to the 1st Air Cavalry Division at FSB Shakey (YU 210518) from 1 June to 26 June 1970. Battery B supported the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mech) in Cambodia in its OCPG mission to the 1st Air Cavalry Division from 1 May to 10 May 1970 and during its OCPG mission to the 25th Infantry Division from 10 May to 30 May 1970.

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Battery C supported the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry with a half battery during operations in the Parrot's Beak region of Cambodia from 7 May to 12 May 1970. The battery element was located at FSB Seminole (KT 275028).

3. A statistical summary of artillery support for the reporting period is as follows:

a. Fire Support Bases.

(1). FSB Gettysburg. The operation of FSB Gettysburg continued until 26 May. On 25 May the three howitzers were removed and FSB Gettysburg was closed on 26 May 1970.

**FSB GETTYSBURG ARTILLERY SUPPORT 1 MAY 1970 - 25 MAY 1970**

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**DEF OGN MISCELLANEOUS**

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(2). FSB Seminole. On 7 May Battery C at FSB Chamberlain air-mobilized three howitzers to FSB Seminole (KT 275028) with an initial security force from the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. Battery C supported operations of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry in Cambodia until FSB Seminole was closed on 12 May 1970.

**FSB SEMINOLE ARTILLERY SUPPORT 7 MAY 1970 - 12 MAY 1970**

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</table>

1

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AVER-MH

SUBJ: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division Period Ending 31 July 1970

15 August 1970

RCS C5FOR-65 (R2) (U)

DUFFLEBAG INTEL DEF CON REGISTRATION SURV ILLUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT FIRE</td>
<td>MISC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE ILLUM ICM WP TOTAL ROUNDS</td>
<td>2333</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) FSB Shiloh. On 26 June Battery C airlifted three howitzers
from FSB Chamberlain to FSB Shiloh with initial security provided by
the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. Battery C supported operations of the 6th
Battalion, 31st Infantry and the Air Cushioned Vehicles until 29 June when
FSB Shiloh was closed.

FSB SHILOH ARTILLERY SUPPORT 26 JUNE 1970 - 29 JUNE 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>NIGHT HUNTER</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>RADAR</th>
<th>RED HAZE</th>
<th>SLAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DUFFLEBAG INTEL DEF CON REGISTRATION SURV ILLUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT FIRE</td>
<td>MISC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE ILLUM ICM WP TOTAL ROUNDS</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>761</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(4) FSB Chamberlain. On 8 July Battery C moved three howitzers from
FSB Chamberlain and placed them on river barges for riverine operations.

RIVERINE ARTILLERY SUPPORT 8 JULY 1970 - 31 JULY 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>NIGHT HUNTER</th>
<th>KNOWN ENEMY</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>RADAR</th>
<th>RED HAZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</table>
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15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (K2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SLAR</th>
<th>DUFFLEBUCK</th>
<th>INTEL</th>
<th>DRY CON</th>
<th>REGISTRATION</th>
<th>SURE</th>
<th>ILLUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT FIRE</th>
<th>MISCELLANEOUS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TOTAL MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ROUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HE</th>
<th>ILLUM</th>
<th>TNR</th>
<th>WR</th>
<th>TOTAL ROUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>922</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Ammunition Expenditures—1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>ILLUMINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>9167</td>
<td>4372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6344</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4331</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19,842</td>
<td>5,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Surveillance—1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS</th>
<th>BUNKERS</th>
<th>MILITARY STRUCTURES</th>
<th>ENEMY ETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support. The Brigade received air cavalry support from elements of 3-17 Cav Squadron and D/3-4 Cav. Helicopter gunships support was provided on a mission basis by units of the 25th Aviation Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, and the 12th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade. Missions included support of 3d Brigade units in contact; escort and cover for combat assault; escort and cover for Ranger raids, insertions, extractions and "parakeets", and aerial visual reconnaissance. Gunship support was also provided on a mission basis by US Navy UH-1C and OV-10 aircraft from Ben Luc and NhC De.

c) Tactical Air Support. Tactical air support sorties provided by USAF and USN aircraft and total ordnance expended is reflected in Enclosure 18.

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(d) Strategic Air Support. There were no B-52 strikes conducted in support of the Brigade during the reporting period.

(e) Organic Army Aviation consisting of four UH-1H and four OH-6A helicopters supported the Brigade with 212 sorties, airlifting 3,897 tons of cargo and 2,514 passengers. Missions included aerial resupply; visual reconnaissance; emergency medical evacuation; "Night Hawk", insertions, extractions, escort, and cover of Ranger "Parakeets" and raids; command and control, and administrative flights.

(f) Training. During May and June, each organic battalion participated in operations in Cambodia. Upon return from Cambodia in June, each battalion conducted an intensive refresher training program during July (Inclosure 19). Replacement training at the 3d Brigade "Go Devil" Academy (Inclosure 20) continued until mid-July, at which time replacements for the 3d Brigade were not in sufficient quantity to warrant maintaining a replacement training center. Training allocations to various higher headquarter schools continued to be utilized throughout the reporting period, (Inclosure 21).

(g) (C) Logistics:

(i) General.

(a) The logistical mission of providing, planning, guidance, and support for all organic and attached units of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was accomplished by the Brigade S-4 during the reporting period. The major tactical units supported were four land based battalions.

(b) During the reporting period there were several unit moves and tactical operations that directly affected the logistical support of the units involved and the Brigade as a whole.

1. On 2 May 1970, the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry moved all but a very small rear element from Dinh Phuc for combat operations under the OPCON of the 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Division provided them with Class I, II, III, V, and IX supplies. Maintenance support was provided by a contact team from Co D, 99th GS Support Battalion which was later put under the operational control of the 725th Maintenance Battalion.

2. On 1 May, the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry moved all but a small rear unit from Ben Loo to the Parrot's Beak in Cambodia for combat operations. All supplies had to be moved from Tan An by truck to MSC Chamberlain for resupply to Da Tho, Cambodia.
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SOPPERATION--Laetie-w

Learnd of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry

Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (R2) (R)

1. On 22 May 1970, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry moved all but a
small rear element to Cambodia from Tan Tru for combat operations under
CPCHQ of the 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Division provided them Class
I, II, III, V, and IX supplies. Maintenance was provided by support from a
contact team of Co B, 99th GS Support Battalion, also under the operational
control of the 725th Maintenance Battalion.

2. On 12 May, the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry returned from operations
in Cambodia and operated over both Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces making
internal battalion logistical support extremely difficult.

3. On 22 June, the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry returned to the oper-
ational control of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Logistical
support was resumed using supply activities located at Dearot. The main-
tenance contact team from the 99th GS Support Battalion remained in direct
support of the battalion.

4. On 26 June 1970, the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry returned to the
3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for operational control and logistical
support.

5. On 3 July 1970, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry started rotating
companies through their base camp at Tan Tru in order to pack their per-
sonal property, clean up their company areas, and turn in excess equipment
in preparation to move permanently to Dau Tien under the operational con-
trol of the 25th Infantry Division.

(2) Supply.

(a) The 3d Brigade units drew supplies from the 99th GS Support
Battalion located at Tan An airfield on a supply point distribution basis.

(b) With the return of the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry to Nhon Trach
District, Bien Hoa Province, the Brigade became responsible for Class I and
III support of the 318 ARVN Eng Co (Land Clearing) for Reo Plow Operations
in that district. The Brigade coordinated with the 29th General Support
Group Dearot 189 who actually provided the supplies. Unit distribution of
these supplies was effected utilizing transportation from the 99th GS Sup-
port Battalion. A mess hall was established in direct support of the ARVN
Company by the headquarters company.

(c) The large number of unit moves resulted in units turning in excess
and unneeded equipment rather than to be burdened by taking it with them.

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During this period, the Brigade provided support to the Tan Hiep training center in the form of barrier and construction materials. These materials were used to upgrade the training center and consisted of concrete, plywood, cement, and engineer stakes.

The Brigade is in the final stages of coordinating the turn-over of the four 100 KW generators at the Tan An and Den Lao bridges to GVN Forces.

Maintenance.

(a) Maintenance Support was provided by Co B, 99th CS Support Battalion at Ben Lao and Tan An Airfield on a maintenance point basis, except for the support of detach units and the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry.

(b) The loss of skilled personnel, those sent on the contact teams, prevented the Support Battalion from performing command inspections during the period.

(c) The Brigade set up a "Cost Cambodian" maintenance catch-up program. This program consisted of series of maintenance stand-down periods and inspections and assistance visits.

Transportation.

(a) Due to the widespread tactical commitments and numerous unit moves during the period, the Brigade had to rely quite heavily on non-organic transportation support.

(b) The use of Landing craft (LCM-8) from the 1099th Medium Boat Co. and security boats from the United States Navy was extremely vital in supporting and closing FSB Gettysburg, due to the complete lack of roads in the Plain of Reeds and the difficulty of obtaining helicopter support.

(c) FSB Gettysburg and Chamberlain were used as forward resupply points to support the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry during their operation in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia. All of the air assets for resupply came from the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi. Due to the distance involved, the supplies had to be shipped to FSB Gettysburg by boat or trucked to FSB Chamberlain and then flown into Cambodia.

(d) C-7A flights were used to move the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry personnel from Dau Tieng to Tan Tru and return. Several 5-ton tractor trailers from the 48th Transportation group were used to assist in moving 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry's equipment and supplies to Dau Tieng.
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(e) The 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry was given authorization for all of its personnel to ship their personal property prior to receipt of orders because of their move from a minor base camp, Tan Tru, to a fire support base where there were inadequate facilities to store personal property.

(f) To help trim down the brigade of excess and unneeded equipment, a program was set up to retrograde unserviceable Conex containers. A total of 31 have been turned in to date.

h. (U) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) The 3d Brigade PSYOP effort continued in support of the Long An Province Pacification and Development Program. The objectives of PSYOP during the period have been:

1. Quick reaction broadcasts and leaflet drops to exploit enemy personnel and equipment losses and perishable intelligence information.

2. To convince the civilian population that the pacification and development program is an expression of the response of the GVN to the needs of the people.

3. To create dissension between VC and NVA by exploiting personality differences.

4. Utilization of Family Tree Program to create dissension between higher and lower levels of command.

5. Increased numbers of Hoi Chanh through extensive Chieu Hoi appeals.

(b) The PSYOPS campaign against the 1st NVA Regiment and local and main force VC units has been very successful during the reporting period. Four special tapes and three special leaflets prepared by NVA ralliers and addressed to specific NVA units and individuals were used during this period. Widespread dissatisfaction is apparent in the NVA/VC units due to lack of medicine and equipment, isolation from population, the necessity to constantly hide and fear FMAF's firepower. All these fears have been exploited in operations against the NVA/VC units.

(a) The PSYOPS section has intensified the Hoi Chanh interview program to obtain new themes for exploitation. Reasons for rallying, methods
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OPERATIONAL REPORT—LESSONS LEARNED OF 64 BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY
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To persuade comrades to rally and exploit conditions are the primary
goals of this interrogation.

(d) Major themes during the reporting period were Chieu Ho, Family
Tree, Support of GVN, Surrender, Scare, Hardship, Health and Sanitation,
and Pacification.

(e) Summary of PSYOPS activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER</th>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Civil Affairs:

(a) Promotion of safety program in weapons and vehicles.

(b) Summary of MILCAP programs for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILCAPS</th>
<th>ICAPS</th>
<th>MEDCAPS</th>
<th>DENTCAPS</th>
<th>PATIENTS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23,699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) In the field of MILCAPS, the future will see all province MEDCAPS
coordinated by the Provincial Hospital with support and advice from their
MILCAP team. The Brigade is cooperating in this effort by submitting a
list of proposed MEDCAPS a week in advance. This makes it possible to have
Vietnamese medics on the spot to perform medical treatment. The ultimate
goal is to show the Vietnamese that they can plan and execute their own
program without our assistance.

(d) Civil actions also included construction projects to improve the
living conditions within Long An Province. These were targeted for short
duration—high impact results. The following is a list of projects com-
pleted:

1. Dwellings - 4
2. Roads - 2
3. Schools - 2
OPERATIONAL REPORT—LESSONS LEARNED OF 3D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION, PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1970

1. BRIDGES - 2
2. OTHERS - 2

(d) MATERIALS DISTRIBUTED FOR CONSTRUCTION:
1. LUMBER - 64 bd ft
2. ROCKS - 10 tons
3. SANDBAGS - 1600 bags
4. CEMENT - 50 bags

(a) During the conduct of MILCAPS the teams distributed various health items and commodities:
1. HEALTH ITEMS - 3,584 lbs
2. FOOD - 1,818 lbs
3. FLAGS - 1,300 flags

(b) KIT CARSON SCOUTS

(a) The KCS Program has a dual purpose. It gives employment to Chieu Hoi graduates who wish to help the Allied Forces by patrolling and localizing the enemy and his infrastructure. In addition, these scouts greatly reduced US casualties as they are particularly adept at locating enemy booby traps.

(b) SUMMARY OF KCS PROGRAM FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>HIRED</th>
<th>TERMINATED</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. (1) ENGINEER SUPPORT

(1) This reporting period marked major progress on the Long An Secondary Road Program. The overall joint ARVN-US program is 80% complete, with US elements 92%. The anticipated completion of the US portion is
24 August 1970. Once completed, the program will add 190 Kms of all weather roads to the existing road net since the beginning of September 1969. The program plays a key role in pacification by permitting overland resupply of ARVN/GVN outposts. With the additional roads, it is possible to move outposts further into the outlying regions, thus expanding GVN control.

(2) On 1 June, the 571st Engineer Company received six Kenner Ski Barges for operations in support of the maneuver elements. The boats are assigned to the engineer company and operate GPOON to maneuver battalions on a mission basis. There are two basic methods of employment. The first is the boat ambush, in which the boat with its on-board machine gun, is used as an integral part of the ambush. The second is the insertion, where boats make multiple insertions, then retire to a nearby area where they remain in reserve for extraction or possible fire support. Each boat carries a two man engineer crew (pilot and M-60 gunner) and up to eight infantry troops. Four infantrymen are the normal maximum where the boats are used for ambushing.

(3) Light construction projects continued. The multiplate anch structure was found to have a variety of usages for readily recoverable construction. They have been used as berm bunkers, live-in bunkers, and as bunkerized facilities that require a constant manning. In addition a 20 man hospital ward was constructed in four days.

(4) Combat support continues to be furnished on a mission basis. As the Brigade's delta AO is highly suited to helicopter landing, rapid reaction to support requests is possible. This feature permits a high percentage of resources to be employed on projects such as the Secondary Road Program. One platoon is designated as the combat support platoon, and one squad of this platoon is kept as a ready reaction element at Tan An Airfield. The maneuver elements have a limited organic demolition and mine sweep capability. If they encounter situations beyond their capability, the standby squad reacts with equipment and materials tailored to the particular mission. On occasion, large scale operations or distance restrictions dictate that engineer support elements must be collected with the maneuver elements.

J. (G) Signal Support:

(1) During the reporting period, the Brigade Signal Office continued its normal operations to include advising the Brigade Commander on all signal matters, coordination and tasking the commitment of the 56th Signal Company assets, coordinating the signal operations of the organic battalions.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 ROE GSPCR-65 (R2) (U)

and preparing and managing the 3d Brigade Signal Operating Instructions (SOI).

(2) Communications systems (VHF) have changed within the Brigade as organic battalions have relocated their base camps and deactivated fire support bases. The VHF system to Tan Tui has been deactivated while four channel VHF (AN/GRC-161) systems from Tan An to Khanh Trach; and from Khanh Trach to Bearcat were activated. A twelve channel VHF system was also activated from Tan An to FSB Chamberlain. FM radio systems have not significantly changed since the last reporting period; however, on various occasions the company has been tasked to provide FM radio transmission in support of operations for the maneuver battalions.

(3) Communication support from non-brigade units has been downgraded with the deactivation of the twelve (12) channel (UHF) system between My Tho and Long An since the last reporting period. The Brigade has lost a vital and heavily used communication link with IV Corps elements, advisors, as well as a valuable alternate means to link into the Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) system which connects all major units and headquarters throughout RVN.

(4) Communication Security (COMSEC) continued to receive command emphasis in the Brigade. The Brigade program of upgrading COMSEC includes greater use of NESTOP secure voice equipment, and authorized codes, as well as the discontinuance of unauthorized codes, on non-secure media. Utilization of Brigade NESTOP assets is currently 85%. The Brigade implemented the new Numerical/Authentication system (CIRCLE WHEEL) on 1 July 1970. This new system enhances the use of authorized codes within the command.

(5) During the reporting period, the Brigade conducted combat operations in the Parrot’s Beak area of Cambodia. The 56th Signal Company installed an FM retransmission station for the Brigade 3 & 1 Net at FSB Gettysburg in the Plain of Reeds, This system was marginally effective due to a high rate of equipment failure. During the Cambodian operations, the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry was heavily committed and extended, making internal communications difficult. In an effort to assist this battalion’s radios and generators were handreceived to the battalion to supplement their organic communications capability.

(6) A new Communications Tower, 4D-216, (height, seventy-eight (78) feet), was erected on 21 July 1970 at Linh Phuco to upgrade the quality and reliability of FM radio communications within the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry area of operations.
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k. Chemical Supports During May, June, and July the 39th Chemical Detachment continued Personnel Detection Operations and defoliation missions in support of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

(1) Twenty Personnel Detector (EM34PD Airborne Personnel Detector) missions were flown for a total flying time of 16 hours. All missions were flown utilizing either the uh-1H or LCH aircraft. The EM34PD was also employed on the Air Cushion Vehicles for 24 hours "sniff time".

(2) There were no defoliation missions flown, but ground spray operations were conducted around Tan An Airfield, with the expenditure of approximately 110 gallons of mixed white. Also there were four combined river operations with the SVN Navy.

1. (C) Radio Research Intelligence Support:

(1) During the reporting period 1 May to 31 July 1970, Detachment 1, HHC, 303d Radio Research Battalion provided intelligence support to the Brigade.

(2) This support was rendered in the form of early warning and Usually Reliable Intelligence Reports (URIR). The detachment also provided secure communications between the Brigade S-2 and SSO, 25th Infantry Division.

(3) In the month of May there were eight (8) URIR's passed to the S-2 of the Brigade. In June the detachment did not provide any URIR's and in July there were fifteen (15) URIR's.

n. (C) Air Force Weather Support:

(1) During the entire reporting period the Combat Weather Team #2, CL4, Detachment 32, 5th Weather Squadron Air Force Weather supported the Brigade. The detachment consists of two assigned personnel and standard weather forecasting equipment. Its mission is to support the Army Aviation and Air Force FAC's with pertinent weather data. It also relays weather data to the 25th Infantry Division for dissemination to all air traffic flying or planning to fly over Long An Province.

(2) Rain was experienced 52 days during this reporting period in Long An Province as recorded at Tan An Airfield Weather Station. The total rain accumulated was 16.65 inches with the heaviest rain fall accounted as 1.31 inches in one day. The temperatures ranged between 72 F and 99 F with an average high temperature of 91 F and an average low of 77 F. Relative humidity ranged from 100% to 35%. Winds were generally out of the east or
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southeast at eight to twelve knots with occasional gusts up to 25 knots.

(3) The effect of weather on operations during this period was negligible. Only when ceilings, sky conditions, dropped to 1500 feet or below and/or the visibility range dropped to less than three miles were operations affected. Under these conditions the Air Force FAC's could not direct air strikes.

(4) During the next reporting period the rain fall is expected to be the same as it has been for this reporting period. Visibility during the next reporting period will drop to 1-3 miles at times with rain and fog, but should hold mostly at seven miles.
Avn-IC

Submit: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Necessity for a flexible approach toward intelligence collection techniques,

Observation: During the establishment of a Counter-Intelligence Section field office in Mon Trach District, several problems were encountered. Due to heavy VC infiltration in the villages, indigenous personnel were unwilling to furnish information under circumstances which could possibly compromise them. All prospective sources stated that they would not go to US Base Camps or Viet Cong compounds since their presence in those areas would be quickly noted by the VC.

Evaluation: This refusal, although understandable, precluded the gathering of information in the manner normally used by CIS. The problem was resolved when the CIS Agent in the area made a survey of places in the district which were normal areas for congregation of the people. The Agent found that the community center of one village was a gathering place since the people went there to obtain routine government services and to peruse the bulletin boards containing notes of community interest. Discrete contact with US advisors led to the introduction of a CIS Interpreter in civilian clothes with a private office in the Center, on what the US Advisors explained to indigenous personnel was a census survey project. The Interpreter was thereby able to routinely meet and debrief sources in a manner which cast no suspicion on the sources.

Recommendation: Recommend that combat units operating in a similar environment use this intelligence gathering technique.

(2) Determining the best method of emplacing detectors in wet weather conditions,

Observation: Sensors emplaced in low areas during the dry season deactivated simultaneously with the beginning of the rainy season.

Evaluation: An experiment was conducted by the sensor section with the Miniature Seismic Intrusion Detector and the Magnetic Intrusion
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Detector to determine the best method of emplanting under the extremely wet conditions which exist in this area of operations. It was found the Minisid-Magid sensors were most effective when the Magid was 3 to 5 meters from the trail or paddy dike and completely concealed under mud and water. The Minisid had to be emplanted in higher ground to maximize its life and prevent the antenna from being shorted-out by rising water.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that units employing the Minisid-Magid sensors in similar terrain use this method to prevent this sensor from shorting out; and that appropriate publications incorporate the above.

(1) Operations:

OBSERVATION: In the marshy areas such as the Plain of Reeds, sites for artillery pieces are very limited.

EVALUATION: During this period the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery employed three artillery river barges to support Infantry operations in the Plain of Reeds and along major waterways in Long An and Binh Minh Provinces. The employment of barges proved to be an effective means of providing artillery support in the areas which were otherwise inaccessible to artillery. To insure that the barges stayed firmly emplaced, one end of a section of aluminum flooring from a pontoon bridge was secured by rope to the wooden bumper on the barge at the opening in each gun pit. The other end was pushed into the river bank. The barge was then winched toward the bank as far as possible. As the tide rose or fell the position of the brace was changed and the barge was again winched tight.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that other units, operating where there is a vast network of canals and inundated terrain, employ artillery pieces on barges to expand artillery coverage.

(2) Problem of moving the barges.

OBSERVATION: The employment of artillery from barges presented the problem of having a means of moving the barges.

EVALUATION: Vietnamese Navy Alpha Boats were used to pull the barges. This was a satisfactory arrangement for moving the barges.
CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS GSRM-05 (R2) (U)

but the strain on the Navy boats resulted in damage to the engines and transmissions.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that units employing artillery on barges use LCM-6's or tug boats to tow the barges and that such use be widely disseminated.

d. (U) Organization: None

e. (U) Training: None

f. (C) Logistics:

(1) Resupply to units where canals are main LOC.

OBSERVATION: Bulk resupply by air to units in inundated areas where canals are the main LOC is inefficient due to high operating costs of aircraft.

EVALUATION: The use of boats for bulk and normal resupply to units operating in areas inundated by road but accessible by boats is more economical than by aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that other units, operating in areas where the only LOC's are by air and water, be resupplied by boat when the tactical situation permits.

g. (C) Communications:

(1) Equipment failure during extended operations.

OBSERVATION: During the Cambodian Operations there was a high rate of communications outages due to overheating of AN/BCS-12 series radios, NESTOR equipment, DC power supplies, and AN/BCS-69's at five isolated fire support bases. There were not enough signal maintenance personnel available to cover all the bases continually. In addition, there was only one helicopter run available per day from Brigade Headquarters to the various bases to carry repaired and equipment to areas experiencing equipment failure.

EVALUATION: Communications equipment failure is higher when the equipment is continuously operated at location, where the equipment is not protected from the hot weather and signal maintenance personnel are not immediately available to provide the necessary support.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-4H  15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Gansons Tested of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, 435 CPOR-65 (RC) (U)

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that units at fixed fire support bases keep communications equipment in bunkers to provide shelter from hot weather. Also recommend that fans and extra high-use parts such as tubes be sent out with communication teams so that operators will be able to repair some of the simpler and more common causes of equipment failures.

L. (C) Material:

(1) Use of Cartridge, 105-MM; High Explosive M444 (EM).

OBSERVATION: The 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery has found that the Cartridge, 105-MM; High Explosive M444 (EM) can be used very effectively in the direct fire, close-in defensive role.

EVALUATION: Experimentation has shown that a quadrant setting of 200 rounds on the 150 howitzer and a fuse setting of 2.0 seconds on the Cartridge 105-MM; High Explosive M444 (EM) produces effective coverage of an area approximately 60 x 60 meters at a range of 300-400 meters. Due to the low height of burst, correction for wind direction and velocity is unnecessary.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that other units consider using the Cartridge 105-MM; High Explosive M444 (EM) for close-in defensive fires; and that such use be considered for incorporation in the appropriate DA publications as standard utilization.

(2) The multiplate arch structure.

OBSERVATION: The combat soldier in the delta needs a protected living area to operate for extended periods. Current construction funding limitations prevent permanent construction.

EVALUATION: The arch structure has proven to be a highly versatile and useful device. The arch structure's employment is described in TB5-15-1 (July 69), but many of the applications listed in this publication are not usable in the delta environment. This is principally due to the high water table, which inhibits placing the shelter base below ground level. However, the structures have been employed quite successfully in a number of roles. Some of these are:

(a) Berm bunkers - the multiplate is preassembled in a position adjacent to the portion of the berm where they are required. Once the structures are assembled, a slot is cut in the berm, and the berm

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AFBDR-48
Subj: Operation Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RC) (3)

In skidded into position and covered with earth fills. Lumber, 12 x 12" can be prepackaged and rapidly emplaced for protection of the open ends. Preassembly prior to emplacing the slot in the berm reduces the time that the berm is left open.

(b) Bunkered offices - some facilities such as classified document centers must be armed around the clock, even during an attack. The arch structures can be sandbagged for protection and used as recoverable or movable structures.

(c) Hospital wards - a 20 man ward was added to the Brigade's clearing station using multiplates. They provide protection when sandbagged, for hospitalized personnel. In this construction, 4 each 12-foot sections of arch were used. To provide a rapidly removable facility the individual sections were abutted rather than bolted as in normal construction. The pipe where the shelters abutted were covered with water proof material. This permits easy relocation of the facility. The project was completed in four days by two squads.

(d) Troop field hospital - it is necessary to have dry quarters for troops operating in the delta. Medical problems, particularly foot diseases, develop if the troops cannot return to a dry facility after combat operations on inundated terrain. The multiplates are set on two stringers to raise them slightly above the ground, and are sandbagged for protection. One company is currently billeted in multiplate arch structures. Should their FSB be moved, the structures can be recovered and reassembled at the new locations.

(e) While not yet attempted, it is believed to be possible to preassemble the structures in a remote, then lift them by CH47 to a staging area for rapid FSB construction. This tactic could be highly suited to facilities such as the 6th of Reeds in the Brigade's AO.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that TB5-10-1 (July 69) be revised to include these new uses of the multiplate arch structure.
AVER-04

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry
Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROS OCP-65 (R2) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Maj, Inf

30 Incl

1-21. as

22. 5th Bn, 69th Inf OORL

23. 2d Bn, 69th Inf OORL

24. 2d BN, 47th Inf OORL 30 Apr 70 (Extract only)

25. 22d Bn, 47th Inf OORL 31 July 70

26. 99th GS Support BN OORL

27. 2d BN, 4th FA OORL

28. 492d HP Maintenance BN

29. 571st Engineer Co OORL

30. 56th Signal Co OORL

Incl 6 thru 13, 15 & 16, 19 thru 30 w/d HQ DA
AVNCOM (26 Aug 70) 1st Inf
SUBJECT: 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Operational Report for the period ending 31 July 1970, CSFOR - 65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, APO 96225

THRU: Commanding General, II FFORCHEV, ATTN: AVFEC-RE-H, APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVMGC(DST), APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOD-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This Headquarters has reviewed and concurred with the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

T. J. HAMPTON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CS/CR-65 (R2) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and concurs with the comments of the indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concern: "Equipment Failure During Extended Operations", page 38, paragraph 2g(1). Air conditioning units designed for use with the AN/MRC-69-type shelter are available through supply channels and will eliminate overheating problems. Air conditioners may be requisitioned as required.

      Nomenclature: Air Conditioner, trailer mounted, 208V, 3 phase, 60 cycle, 18,000 BTU.

      FSN: 4120-930-5700

   b. Reference item concern: "Use of Cartridge, 105-MM High Explosive M44 (ICM)", page 39, paragraph 2h(1). Selected munitions for both 155mm and 8" howitzers have also proven to be highly effective when used in the direct fire, close-in defensive role.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTEL, JR.
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVHDO-DO (15 Aug 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 RCS CPOR-65 (RZ)(u)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 4 NOV 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Multiplate Arch Structure," page 39, paragraph 2h(2). Recommend that DA consider incorporating some of these methods into TB5-15.

b. Reference item concerning "Armored Personnel Carriers (M113A1) in Jungle Operations," Inclosure 24, page 9, paragraph 3: nonconcur. While this vehicle may be used for this application, the results are usually a significant increase in the engine and transmission failure rates. This is caused not only by the environment surrounding "jungle busting" but is also due to being overloaded carrying ammunition, water and food. This application should not be included in training manuals. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Chet W. Stevens Jr.
Captain, AG/C
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:

II FORCEN
3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 70) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 DEC 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

[Stamp: 25, OTAXI CQ, August 80]
### Turn Over of Base Camps

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<td>X3654623</td>
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### Closure of Fire Support Bases

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<td>Gettysburg</td>
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<td>6-31 Inf</td>
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<td>30 May 70</td>
<td>Jarrett</td>
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**SUBORDINATE UNIT MOVEMENT**

### Tactical Movements

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<td>FSB Seminole, XS277028</td>
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**Task Organization as of 31 July 70**

*Mis Control*

*E* / 75th Inf (B) x

45th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

65th Inf Det (Cbt Tkr)

39th Cav (ACV)

2-4 Arty (-)

571st Engr Co

56th Sig Co

99th CSSB

19th PI Det

19th MI Det

39th Chem Det

483d MP / Plt

493d MI Det
### NUMBER OF CASES OF SIGNIFICANT DISEASES

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<tr>
<td>Burns</td>
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**Chart Explanation:**

The daily non-effectiveness, which reflects the man-days-lost, has declined from 3.95 to 3.48 for June. The man-days-lost due to dermatological conditions is significantly lower when compared with the 9th Division monthly average of 406 last year (total 9th Infantry Division) to an average of 4 to 6 per month for the 3rd Brigade this season.

The increase in malaria cases and diarrheal cases has been the result of the 3rd Brigade's participation in Cambodia. In comparison with other units there are significantly fewer cases.
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<th>VC KIA</th>
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**Note:** These statistics reflect the friendly casualties sustained and enemy eliminated for those elements only while under operational control of 3d Bn., 9th Inf Div. Statistics are not included for periods during which subordinate elements were OPCON to other Headquarters.
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**NOTES**: These statistics reflect support given to 3/9 Div Operations. Support given to subordinate elements during periods that they were OPCON to other headquarters is not shown.
SECTION II - Lessons Learned, Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

1. (U) Personnel: None

2. (U) Intelligence: None

3. (C) Operations: Armored Personnel Carriers (M113's) in jungle operations:

   a. Observations: The use of the M113 in the jungle is a highly effective means to achieve superior fire power in support of ground troops. A disadvantage is that mobility is severely limited.

   b. Evaluation: The use of M113's in jungle operations must be carefully controlled. The density of the vegetation can create safety hazards to ground forces operating with the vehicles. Location of ground elements must always be known to personnel operating the M113 so that safe and effective fire may immediately be brought to bear against enemy forces. The M113's can effectively bust most jungle. The only real barrier is bamboo. In most cases all barriers of this type can be crossed by lateral maneuver. The foremost advantage M113's have in jungle operations is that it gives the ground troops an almost unlimited supply of water, ammunition, and greatly enhances the achievement of fire superiority. At night they can clear night locations and with the use of RPG screens and other night devices it makes a formidable defense position.

   c. Recommendation: That this technique be included in appropriate training manuals.

4. (U) Training: None
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.**

*Experiences of units engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.*

**CO, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division**

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