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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Edward Bautz, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACV & CG, 25th Infantry Division, Period March 1969 to December 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Edward Bautz, Jr., subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVNDO-DO

20 JAN 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG Edward Bautz, Jr.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG Edward Bautz, Jr. covering the period March 1969 to December 1970. MG Bautz served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACV and Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

2. MG Bautz is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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as (trip)
2 cy wd HQ DA

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INTRODUCTION

Transmitted herewith is my debriefing report as directed by USARV Regulation 1-3, dated 1 June 1968.

Rather than follow the standard format in detail, I have elected to orient my report primarily on lessons learned. The insurgency witnessed in the Republic of Vietnam has been well documented by numerous sources over the past years. What has yet to emerge is clear-cut Army doctrine for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, this report emphasizes areas where improvement is needed and, with the benefit of hindsight, areas which might have been approached or decided differently. As such, this report is critical, but hopefully it will contribute to the data base needed for historical retrospection so that doctrine may coalesce.

No attempt has been made to provide a chronology of events nor specific examples of tactical operations. These may be found in routine historical reports.

The conclusions and opinions expressed are based on experience from March 1969 to December 1970 as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, Headquarters, US MACV, and Commanding General, 25th US Infantry Division. They are provided prospective in terms of a previous tour during 1965-66 as Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters, US MACV.

THE OVERALL COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT

The Strategy of "Graduated Escalation" is unworkable in situations where nations who support the insurgency are not threatened and whose
national objectives are not jeopardized. When insurgency reaches the
Phase III Level and the decision is made to intervene directly with US
civilian power, the decision must be supported in such a way that military
power is not restrained. Preceding the decision to intervene in an
insurgency with military power, the enemy’s use of sanctuaries and how to
deal with them must be fully understood and appreciated. If military
power is to be restrained a credible case must be established, sufficient
to ensure popular support over the long term.

Cambodian operations revealed that the size and complexity of the
enemy's command and control, logistics and administrative system were
grossly underestimated. The concept that the enemy can perform miracles
with nothing is not valid.

Once the main force threat has been reduced to acceptable levels, the
destruction of enemy local forces and guerrillas should become first
priority. Main force and other externally supported units cannot operate
effectively without support of local forces. As local force effectiveness
is reduced, it may be expected that main force resources will be used to
reinforce and sustain local forces.

The very best personnel must be assigned as advisors. They should be
proficient in language and knowledgeable of cultural, ethnic and social
systems. Professional recognition and rewards for service as an advisor
must be commensurate to that for duty with US Forces.

US personnel have the ability to quickly identify problems, then solve
the problem by doing the work. We must discipline ourselves in patience
in teaching indigenous personnel to do the work as part of the training
involved in nation building.

In developing programs to help the villager, it is most important to
prove that it is to his personal advantage to support the government. Once
the villager is assured of economic improvement with security, it is an
easy task to win his "heart and mind". Inter-village economic intercourse
is a necessity for area development. Accordingly, a high priority must be
established for the construction and maintenance of roads and waterways to
ensure inter-village travel.

Measuring progress in counterinsurgency is difficult. The requirement
for quantitative data as a measurement when the data must be estimated
often leads to exaggeration. Qualitative assessments by personnel know-
ledgeable of the objectives in an area, supported by the level and type
of enemy incidents and activity, serve as a better basis for establishing
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AVDCCG
1 December 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing (RCS-CSFOR-74)

priorities, allocating resources and changing missions.

The Country Plan should include the objective of assigning territorial responsibility eventually to civilian leadership. Initially it may be expected that the military will be the only element available to provide leadership. During this period, a single line of authority is required until the situation stabilizes sufficiently to adjust to civilian leadership.

Most underdeveloped countries have insufficient ports, airfields and transportation systems to support large-scale military operations. Any plan must provide for the early and rapid construction of required facilities.

THE ROLE OF US MILITARY FORCES

The role of US Military Forces encompasses three broad areas:
(1) Organizing and training indigenous forces; (2) supporting host government programs for "pacification"; and, (3) combat operations. Except when the enemy threat dictates otherwise, priority of effort should be in the order listed.

A single manager for all US Agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations is essential. Authority should be "directive" in nature, not based solely on cooperation and coordination. This single line of authority should extend through field organizations to include the division level. US civilian agencies cannot recruit sufficient qualified personnel when the going is tough. Only the military has sufficient resources and, most important, the necessary control over its people to get done what must be done.

There is a tendency to construct indigenous forces in the image of US Forces: an Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, with classical subdivisions within each. An underdeveloped nation cannot afford the luxury of duplication in various services due to limitations in leadership, manpower, money and time. Further, Service concepts of operational command and control channels should not simply duplicate US doctrine. Indigenous forces should be designed and employed to be most efficient and effective within a rural country’s capability. Within the Army itself, we must avoid situations where dual systems develop (i.e., Special Forces).

US units have an inherent capability to develop the effectiveness of indigenous forces while conducting military operations. This capability should be exploited fully in view of the severe limitations of the Advisory Team concept. Effectiveness of indigenous forces can be enhanced by combined operations, integration of personnel with US units, and by

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special training conducted by US units. Examples of special training are at Inclosure 1.

Once pacification has begun to progress, military forces should remain in an area of operations until indigenous military, para-military or civilian forces are capable of completing the mission. The populace needs to be assured constantly that they will not be abandoned if lasting progress is to be made. The error of leaving an area too soon was made frequently in Vietnam.

COMMAND AND CONTROL, OPERATIONS, AND TACTICS OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION

The basic structure of the Infantry Division is sound. The brigade, support command, separate battalion concept provides good flexibility in adjusting to changing situations. It was normal for the division to have under its operational control an additional separate brigade/regiment and, at times, both. No difficulties were encountered with this span of control, although it should be noted that division headquarters did not displace and brigade headquarters displaced only infrequently.

Both Assistant Division Commanders were used as ADC maneuver with the Chief of Staff and CO, DISCOM primarily responsible for administration and logistics. This facilitated coordination, communication, and supervision. Frequent personal contact with commanders and senior staff members of indigenous and allied forces is essential. Assistant Division Commanders can be of invaluable assistance in this role. They were never used as task force commanders. Assigned responsibilities were adjusted periodically to meet changing situations. An example of assigned responsibilities is at Inclosure 2.

There are limitations on the effectiveness of firepower and air mobility. At times they can be counterproductive. Care must be taken to ensure firepower does not endanger friendly civilians or restrict the progress of pacification by denying friendly civilian development of areas. Likewise, air mobility at times is not as efficient time-wise and cost-wise as surface transportation. Additionally, air movement fails to provide the psychological impression of security on the populace and the enemy that constant surface movement through areas does.

Even in relatively static situations, it is advisable to move battalions among brigades periodically. This increases flexibility and mobility and changes the pattern for the enemy. If a unit moves frequently, it will not accumulate excesses nor become bogged down in "improving" fire support bases. However, unit moves must be tempered by the value
of association with indigenous forces and knowledge of an area of operations. Units must maintain constantly the capability to adjust quickly to variations in the tempo of combat.

The Air Cavalry Troop should be employed as a unit, centrally controlled by division, and used normally under the operational control of a brigade or the armored cavalry squadron when the latter is directly under division control.

Artillery should be employed in less than battery size units only in exceptional circumstances. Employment by battery provides better fire control, increases responsiveness, permits greater massing of fires, releases infantry from security missions, facilitates administration and logistics, and reduces firing incidents.

Establishment of large base camps should be avoided. Not only are they expensive in terms of resources, but they restrict mobility as units become laden with impediments. A mental attitude contrary to mobility and flexibility quickly develops.

INTELLIGENCE

In counterinsurgency operations intelligence is at a premium. Though much has been accomplished in providing new equipment, significant effort is needed to formalize doctrine and design equipment which will integrate all aspects of intelligence.

Ranger companies should be used primarily for intelligence collection purposes and can be controlled and trained best at Division level. Teams should be allocated to Brigades on a mission basis. Ranger teams should be specifically trained for long-range reconnaissance patrols and not assigned normal combat patrol missions.

There has been an overemphasis on Order of Battle to the virtual exclusion of other important aspects of intelligence about the enemy. It is critically important to learn also of his motivation, how he operates, how he lives, how he is trained, supplied, fed, provided medical attention, etc. It is only through these kinds of data that we can devise appropriate responses and initiate actions to attack the enemy core.

PERSONNEL

Rapid turnover of personnel, which averaged about 12% a month, bears
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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing (RCS-CSFOR-74)

1 December 1970

directly on combat effectiveness and efficiency.

There is too much emphasis on career development, especially for commanders. Combat should not be a medium primarily to train officers but rather a situation where proven capability is used. One position for a one-year tour should be the goal.

The R&R Program is a morale builder of the highest order.

Control of individuals' funds must be emphasized. Loose controls will impact on the local economy in the form of inflated prices and black market activities. Poor control can result in a source of money for the enemy.

Troop conduct and discipline vis-a-vis the local population is of paramount importance. All of the sacrifice made to secure an area can be lost by the immature or foolish acts of a few soldiers.

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, NEW CONCEPTS AND EQUIPMENT

The maneuver battalion mix of the 25th Infantry Division (6 infantry, 3 mechanized, 1 tank, and 1 reconnaissance) was good for the terrain involved. It allowed integration of the ground mobility, shock action and sustaining power of mechanized units with the air mobile capability of infantry battalions. Cross attachment of companies to different type battalions was common. Properly employed, this mix of type battalions provides a synergistic effect. In this regard, an infantry division, if provided the aircraft support, can do most anything an airmobile division can do and at lower cost. Experience in RVN indicates that a hard look at the mix of battalions in divisions is in order to maximize the synergistic effect. Each division should have an Air Cavalry Squadron.

The individual training system of the US Army produces an outstanding product. Especially noteworthy are the junior leaders from the Non-commissioned Officer Candidate Courses; this course should be made a permanent part of the Army School System. However, under the system employed for RVN, most replacements received no unit training prior to being assigned to a unit actually engaged in combat. Further study should be given to unit rotation or for providing unit training in CONUS.

Lacking the above, training must receive a priority equal to that of routine combat operations. At Inclosure 3 are the training policies of the 25th Infantry Division which were designed to meet the foregoing objective and maintain combat effectiveness.

6

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Special attention must be given to the enemy's use of mines and booby traps, a typical weapon for insurgents. Frequently, the US soldier is his own worst enemy in this regard by leaving ammunition items and trash on the battlefield. The enemy can, and will, use any material to make mines and booby traps. A practical lightweight detector for squad use or other means to detect mines and booby traps should have the highest development priority.

The Nestor Program is a workable and essential program. Maneuver units, including foot mobile infantry companies and Ranger teams, can successfully use the equipment. Command emphasis, refresher training and maintenance follow-up are necessary for good results.

The Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) Program has made a tremendous impact on operational and intelligence matters. Continued work and expenditures in this area are justified, but doctrine is lagging behind materiel.

The battlefield test concept is valid; however, consideration must be given to the impact of diverting resources from their primary mission. In particular, too many items fell into the "gimmick" category. Test items should be screened carefully before introduction to the combat zone.

Counterinsurgency doctrinal development emphasis should be placed on other than large scale main force operations. The latter can be accommodated by essentially conventional doctrine as long as its place within the overall operation is recognized. When the enemy battalion and multi-battalion threat is minimal success is dependent on small unit operations, basically squad-sized patrols and ambushes. In this environment artillery batteries can and should secure themselves.

As mentioned earlier, counterinsurgency operations are not only combat operations. To provide guidance on integration of the total effort the letter at Inclosure 4 was published. It has proven to be sound over the past nine months.

EDWARD BAUTZ, JR.,
Major General, USA
Commanding
SUBJECT: Final Report on the 25th Infantry Division Territorial Forces Training and Assistance Program

Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam
ATTN: AVPBC-FDT
APO San Francisco 96266

I. Background.

The 25th Infantry Division has maintained an active program for training and combined operations with RVNAF and Territorial force units throughout the Division AO since 1967. Throughout 1969 and early 1970 combined operations were emphasized by all Divisional units. However, while combined operations were successful in improving the operational ability of Vietnamese forces in many areas, they fell short of the ultimate objective. Most frequently, combined operations were planned and supervised by US leaders and US forces provided the preponderance of combat power in the operations. Even when this was not the case, the US element and Vietnamese unit usually worked as separate though coordinated maneuver elements, with the net result that the Vietnamese leadership and staff rarely benefited. The Cambodian cross-border operations provided Regular ARVN forces the first real test of independent operations from planning through execution; resulting in high esprit and unit confidence that can only be obtained through success on actual operations.

II. RF/FF Leadership Training.

a. The Cambodian operations placed an increased burden on the Territorial Forces to provide security and prevent enemy infiltration, while US and ARVN units were committed elsewhere. Generally, RF and FF units met the test. However, the requirement for better trained junior officer and NCO leaders became apparent as units operated farther from their own villages and hamlets and broke down into smaller size maneuver and patrol elements.

b. In May 1970, the 25th Infantry Division, in close cooperation with Hau Nghia Province, initiated a four day, thirty-two hour leadership course designed to increase the professional knowledge of RF and FF junior leaders.
This course was developed from the Division's Lightning Combat Leaders course taught to US squad leaders, and concentrated on known weaknesses of Hau Nghia Province units. The POI is at Inclosure 1.

c. This course, which will continue through 5 Dec 70 at the Division's Tropic Lightning Academy, is unique. It is taught entirely in Vietnamese by Vietnamese instructors, trained and supervised by experienced US instructor personnel. Initially the RF/PF NCOs were from local districts and commuted daily to training sites at Cu Chi. With the enthusiastic reception by local Vietnamese officials and conclusion of training of NCOs from Cu Chi and Trang Bang Districts, this system was modified since travel time and transportation requirements became prohibitive. Beginning in July 1970 small classes of 25 students moved into the Tropic Lightning Academy and stayed for the duration of the course.

d. In spite of predictions of problems that would result, the co-location and sharing of all US facilities including the mess, billets, showers and recreation areas was accomplished without difficulty. Each RF/PF class was required to bring one interpreter and one US advisor to assist coordination and control. RF/PF soldiers were treated as equals and handled with respect as fellow soldiers, abiding by the same policies as US students. This was a principle factor in establishing and maintaining a positive attitude and professional motivation among students and instructors.

e. In the realization that the capacity of the Tropic Lightning Academy prohibited expansion of the program to train all the RF or PF NCOs requested, steps were taken to provide for continuation of the training in the home districts. All lesson plans were translated into Vietnamese and produced in sufficient quantity to permit issuance of a full packet to at least one officer or NCO from each unit represented. In addition to the initial Vietnamese NCOs used to start the course in May, as the program was expanded in August, additional NCOs were obtained from Tay Ninh Province and regular ARVN interpreters were added to the instructor cadre and trained. In this way each province which has participated in the program will have a small core of highly experienced, well trained instructors, to carry on the training in their area after the Division's departure.

f. Graduation was made a ceremonial occasion during which all students who achieved the established standard were awarded a certificate (Inclosure 2). This served as an added incentive to other students from the same district and/or unit and rapidly became an actively pursued status symbol of achievement. At the completion of this course in December 1970 over 1800 RF and PF NCOs from three provinces will have been trained by the Division.
CONCERNED

AVDCOF-D
SUBJECT: Final Report on the 25th Infantry Division Territorial Forces
        Training and Assistance Program

III. Mobile Training Teams.

Mobile Training Teams composed of one or two US instructors and one Vietnamese
interpreter/instructor were used extensively for instruction on the construction,
emplacement and employment of mechanical ambuses, night firing techniques,
care and use of starlight scopes, and demolitions. More than 2500 RF and PF
soldiers were trained by 25th Division mobile training teams at Cu Chi and in
their home districts during the period June through Aug 1970.

IV. RF/PF Dedicated Company Program.

a. Background. During July 1970 it became obvious that something more ambi-
tous was required to complete the mission of upgrading the Territorial Forces
of three provinces. This led to the development of the Dedicated Company Program.

b. Concept. The concept behind the dedicated company program was to pull
one US Infantry Company out of combat operations and "dedicate" it to a pure
training and assistance mission in a Vietnamese district; to train the terri-
torial force units on their home ground with minimum disruption of the districts,
security posture. The company selected was used as the nucleus of a battalion
training team and was reorganized specifically for the training mission.

c. Selection of Personnel. In recognition of the fact that not all US
companies and/or soldiers were suited for this special training mission, all
company personnel were carefully screened. Only those personnel who were will-
ing and able to work and live with the Vietnamese, to treat them with respect
and patience, and conduct themselves with dignity and restraint while setting
the example, were selected. Carefully selected platoon leaders and NCOs were
infused into the company from other battalion resources to provide it with the
experience and skills required to accomplish the mission.

d. Organization. The organization of the company into a small control
headquarters and separate platoon (to train RF companies) and squad training
teams (to train PF Platoons) was determined by the density of units in Tri Tam
District, Binh Duong Province. Platoon training teams consisted of a platoon
leader, three to five NCOs (to use as instructors) and up to twelve enlisted per-
sonnel to serve as assistant instructors. Squad training teams consisted of
a squad leader NCO with two or three other NCOs and three to five EM. Exper-
ience in Tri Tam District proved an NCO essential for PF training since PF pla-
toon leaders were generally reluctant to communicate with officers and their
active participation in the program was degraded. Members of the company not
selected to participate in the training program retained their identity as a
platoon and were used by the battalion for normal combat missions.
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SUBJECT: Final Report on the 25th Infantry Division Territorial Forces Training and Assistance Program

o. Preparation. Since the dedicated company was essentially a US infantry unit, pulled out of the field from combat operations with few experienced instructors, and had been reorganized for the mission, special preparation for the mission was essential. Upon completion of the selection and reorganization the company was sent to the Tropic Lightning Academy for a special five day orientation/refresher course (Inclosure 3). This course stressed methods of instruction, the use of an interpreter for instruction and the basic combat skills that the company would be teaching in the district. In addition, selected RF and PF NCOs from the district attended a parallel course at the academy taught in Vietnamese, working together for practice instruction on the afternoons of the 2d and 3d days. In this way, with the interpreters attending the course with the company, company personnel were exposed to language and interpreting utilization problems in advance. The final day of the course was concluded with a class on Vietnamese customs, organization of the district, and situation by the Deputy District Chief - in English. At the conclusion of the course the company was given ten days to prepare lesson plans, rehearse classes, fabricate training aids and complete final coordination with District Advisors and Officials.

f. Coordination. Coordination between the Province and District on one hand, and Division, Brigade, Battalion, and the Company on the other, was completed in advance. The Province Chief's approval and support for the program was requested and obtained. From that time forward, coordination with District Advisors and officials was direct and continuous, ranging from subjects required for training, to the schedule, specific location of training teams and sequence of units to be trained. The District Chief was given final decision authority in all matters concerning management of the program in his District. Coordination between the District and Company was continuous throughout the program and essential for success (LOI at Inclosure 4).

g. Execution. The Company Headquarters moved into the District Headquarters compound to facilitate control and coordination. The training teams moved directly into the RF and PF compounds of the units being trained and integrated into the daily routine and all activities of the unit. In essence, the platoon leader and/or squad leader became the counterpart of the RF or PF unit leader for the training period. Formal classes were kept to four hours per day, five days a week, in order to maintain the motivation to the RF/PF soldiers. The remaining time was used to assist the unit to improve the compound, conduct routine missions, and to train on special subjects (i.e. medics, communications, supply, maintenance and mortars). The subjects presented in formal classes (schedule at Inclosure 5) was coordinated with the District Chief and unit commander and concentrated on known or identified areas of weakness in the unit. Additional subjects were added when ever requested by the District Chief, unit commander and/or US Advisors. The specific length of time spent training any given unit was entirely dependent upon the requirements of the unit being trained and pro-
progress made. No local population was involved directly and the area was placed on the US Company. Joint patrols were conducted under US control of the Vietnamese leader. The first phase of training, which consisted of a two to four day integrated operation.

h. Operations. In conclusion, the operation was well-planned and controlled by the Vietnamese. Allied companies' commanders and the provisional leaders played purely an advisory role as they were integrated into the RF/PF unit. All patrols and ambushes were integrated with Vietnamese units; the US soldiers in any given location. This tactic proved highly effective in getting the RF/PF to break down into smaller elements and make their movements further away from compounds and/or villages. Essential to success was the fact that another element, either US or Vietnamese, was tasked to provide security for the village, hamlet, and/or dependent compound during the operation. This relieved the unit personnel from concern for the safety of dependents during the operation and permitted the whole unit to participate. The final decision was when a unit had completed training, was made jointly by the US commanders and District officials.

1. Graduation. In keeping with the graduated approach, a RF/PF soldier and create an appropriate conclusion to the training, graduation certificates (insignia of) were presented to each soldier and were displayed with pride.

j. Results. The results achieved have been encouraging. The increased aggressiveness and confidence displayed by these units on operations and in the performance of daily routines was particularly gratifying. The enthusiastic support and cooperation of the District officials and numerous requests for extra training were indications of the program's acceptance and provided training company personnel with a real sense of personal worth and personal accomplishment. The RF/PF soldiers, who, throughout, became the strongest advocates of the program as they became engrossed in the real task of helping the units and their families in a multitude of ways and were able to see concrete results. By now, almost everyone, through a poor structure, the results have been more than worth the commitment of a US Company, since TriTam District forces eliminated more VC in RF/PF than they had in the previous five months prior to the program.

k. Support. Administrative and logistic support of the company was accomplished through normal TOE channels. The training teams were regularly supplied with C-rations, water and mail and did not have to expend time or energy on logistical functions. This permitted them to concentrate their entire effort toward accomplishing the mission. To provide a break to the training teams and permit the men to relax, each Saturday they moved to the battalion base for the night, returning to the RF/PF unit compound on Sunday afternoon.
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SUBJECT: Final Report on the 25th Infantry Division Territorial Force Training and Assistance Program

1. Reports. The company was required to submit a detailed report each time an RF or FF unit completed training. Regular recurring reports were not required to minimize the administrative burden on the company. The reports submitted are included as Inclusion 7.

V. Recommendations for follow-on training.

a. Follow-on training will be required in the following areas:

(1) Staff Training - for the RF Control Group Headquarters. Presently the control group plays no active role in planning, coordinating and controlling operations.

(2) Supply Training - the supply specialists in the RF companies require training in routine procedures, accountability and supply records. They are the key link in the system, yet they have received little if any formal training on supply procedures.

b. Mobile Training Teams. The MACV MATT Teams, having no TOE or adequate TD support system, spend much of their time and effort providing for their own administrative and logistic requirements. In addition, numerous administrative report requirements have been placed upon them that further reduce the time spent on their primary mission of training and operations. By modifying their requirements and making them truly mobile instead of tied to a specific location much more benefit could be derived. In this way special training on equipment maintenance, use of new equipment, periodic refresher training on crew served weapons or other areas could be covered throughout a district with a minimal expenditure of time or man power.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. M. PUCHALSKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

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**LIGHTNING REINFORCEMENT TRAINING COURSE**
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

**AVDCOP-T**

**SUBJECT: Program of Instruction**

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<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
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<tr>
<td>0800-1150</td>
<td>Mines and Boobytraps</td>
<td>During this block of instruction, students learn how to recognize, mark, record and report enemy mines and boobytraps and the techniques of employment and detection of enemy mines and boobytraps. A brief orientation on enemy hiding places is given. During the last hour of the class, students are taken down a boobytrapped trail.</td>
<td>L,B, PE</td>
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<td>1300-1350</td>
<td>Geneva Convention</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, students are given an orientation on the Geneva Convention and how the Geneva Convention affects them.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1450</td>
<td>Code of Conduct and the UCMJ</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students are familiarized with the standards required in the event of capture and the military justice system. Specific emphasis is given on explanation of Article 15 procedures and the provisions of the UCMJ which insure equal justice for all military personnel.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1550</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students are introduced to the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and the people of Vietnam.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1650</td>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students receive an orientation on the organization and purpose of the S-5 program and Rural Development.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>SCOPE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800-0850</td>
<td>M-79 and M-203 Grenade Launchers and 40mm Ammo</td>
<td>Orientation on the characteristics, functioning, operation, care and cleaning of the M-79 and M-203 grenade launcher. Orientation on type and care of 40mm ammunition.</td>
<td>L,C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-0940</td>
<td>M-60 Machine Gun</td>
<td>Orientation on the characteristics, functioning, operation, care and cleaning of the M-60 Machine gun.</td>
<td>L,C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0940-1100</td>
<td>M-16A1 Rifle</td>
<td>Orientation on the characteristics, functioning, operation, care and cleaning, maintenance, stoppages and immediate action on the M16A1 rifle. Included will be maintenance of the magazine and care of the ammo used in the M16A1. In addition, zeroing procedures will be covered. The students will receive a briefing on the safety procedures and operation procedures to be used on the range while zeroing his individual weapon.</td>
<td>L,C, D,PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1650</td>
<td>M16A1 Zeroing and Special Purpose Weapons</td>
<td>Students will fire on the range to obtain a battle sight zero. The students will receive an orientation on the operation and functioning of the M-72 LAW, M118 Anti-Personnel Mine, grenades, pyrotechnics and a safety orientation on the cal. 45 pistol.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Class will be divided in two groups. One group will fire from 1300-1450. The other will attend Special Purpose Weapons orientation. Groups will rotate at 1300 hours.
THIRD DAY

TIME | SUBJECT | SCOPE | TIME
--- | --- | --- | ---
0800-0850 | Night Viewing Devices | The students receive an orientation on the operation and employment of the Starlight Scope and strobe light. | L,C
0900-0950 | Communication Security | Orientation on radio security and operation of the AN/PRC 25 radio. | L,C, D
1000-1050 | COSMINT Briefing, Safeguarding Defense Information, Defense against Subversion and Espionage and Interrogation of POW's | Orients the student to the requirement for constant security consciousness in the Army including control of local indigenous personnel, procedures for destruction of official waste, dissidence in the Army, causes for defection and SADDA. Also included is a short briefing on the enemy's communication intelligence capability (COMINT). Two methods and techniques used when interrogating POW's, also how to identify types of prisoners. | L,C
1100-1150 | Know Your Enemy | An orientation on enemy equipment and weapons. In addition, lessons learned on strengths, weaknesses, tactics, fortifications and how to find the enemy are presented. | L,C
1300-1450 | Land Navigation | Orientation on land navigation techniques, map and compass orientation with practical application using pictorial maps and lensatic compass. | L,C, F
1500-1550 | Medevac | Orientation on medevac operations to include techniques used to request a medevac. | L,C
1600-1650 | First Aid and Personal Hygiene | Orientation on life saving steps, heat casualties, venereal disease and personal hygiene. | L,C
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0925</td>
<td><strong>Air Mobile Operations</strong></td>
<td>During this period of instruction the students receive an orientation on eagle flights, combat assaults, marking and securing a Landing Zone and Pick-up Zone. Practical exercise in mounting and dismounting the aircraft are conducted during the last half hour of the class.</td>
<td>L,C, FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-1125</td>
<td><strong>Offensive and Defensive Tactics</strong></td>
<td>Familiarise the students with the combat formations, movement, security control methods and the fundamentals of defense.</td>
<td>C, FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230-1320</td>
<td><strong>Sapper Tactics</strong></td>
<td>During this block of instruction, the students receive an orientation on the organisation of enemy sapper teams and the defense against sappers.</td>
<td>C, FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1420</td>
<td><strong>Artillery Planning</strong></td>
<td>This class is designed to familiarise the students with the procedures for requesting and adjusting supporting fires.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430-1520</td>
<td><strong>Patrolling</strong></td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students will discuss the organisation of patrols and the duties of the patrol members.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1620</td>
<td><strong>CBR</strong></td>
<td>This class is designed to familiarise and orient the student on chemical equipment and munitions used in conjunction with military operations in Vietnam to include protective masks and chemical munitions.</td>
<td>L,C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1700</td>
<td><strong>Survival, Escape and Evasion</strong></td>
<td>The student learns the three basic types of evasion and the principles, techniques and procedures of evasion, best time to escape from POW camps and holding areas, survival to insure safe return to friendly lines.</td>
<td>L,C,D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIGHTNING REINFORCEMENT TRAINING SCHOOL

AVDCOP-T
SUBJECT: Program of Instruction (Con't)

**FIFTH DAY**
(Officers and NCO's)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0950</td>
<td>Patrol Planning and Patrol Order</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, students discuss the methods of organizing and conducting an effective ambush to include site selection, ambush formation, emplacement of elements, proper security and proper fire discipline and the employment of weapons at the ambush site.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1150</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>Orientation on recognising and clearing danger areas and the employment of preplanned fires.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1350</td>
<td>Employment of Snipers</td>
<td>Familiarize the students with the concept of sniper employment in Vietnam, how snipers operate in Vietnam and the ways snipers are employed.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1450</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td>Orientation on clearance of fires and rules of engagement in accordance with 25th Inf Div Reg 525-7.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1550</td>
<td>Commo Security</td>
<td>Orientation on the capabilities and purpose of the KY/38 with the AN/PRC 77.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All students receive the first four (4) hours of instruction. At 1300 hours, the officers and NCO's are separated from the enlisted men and receive special classes.
**FIFTH DAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0950</td>
<td>Patrol Planning and</td>
<td>The students are given an orientation on the five paragraph field order. During the last hour, the students are required to write a five paragraph field order and certain cases are read and the class discusses them.</td>
<td>C, PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1150</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, students discuss the methods of organizing and conducting an effective ambush to include site selection, ambush formation, emplacement of elements, proper security and proper fire discipline, and the employment of weapons at the ambush site.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1350</td>
<td>Actions at Danger Areas</td>
<td>Orientation on recognizing and clearing danger areas and the employment of pre-planned fires.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1550</td>
<td>Daylight Ambush</td>
<td>The students are broken down into groups and are required to set up an ambush. Once the ambushes are set up, the instructor critiques the formations.</td>
<td>C, PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1650</td>
<td>Counter Ambush</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students receive an orientation on the procedures for counter-acting an ambush.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHỦNG CHỈ TỐT NGHIỆP

CHỦ HUY TRƯỞNG TRUNG TÂM Huấn Luyện Sứ Đội 25 BỘ BỊNH HOA KỲ
CHỦNH NHÂN: ______________________
ĐÃ TỐT NGHIỆP KHOÁ Huấn Luyện VỀ THUẬT LÃNH DẠO VÀ KỸ THUẬT TÁC CHIẾN TÂN KỲ.
CHỦNG CHỈ NÀY ĐƯỢC CẤP PHÁT NGÀY: ______________________

COMMANDANT
CHỦ HUY TRƯỞNG
TROPIC LIGHTNING ACADEMY
TRUNG TÂM Huấn Luyện
SỨ ĐỘAN 25 BỘ BỊNH HOA KỲ
TROPIC LIGHTNING ACADEMY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCOP-T

SUBJECT: Program of Instruction (RF/PP Orientation Refresher Training)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0850</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>In this period the students will be oriented on the importance and concept of their training mission, and given some do's and don'ts to follow.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-0950</td>
<td>Introduction to POI</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, two students will become familiar with the training schedule and the POI.</td>
<td>L,T,C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1050</td>
<td>The Army Instructor</td>
<td>During this period, the students will be introduced to Methods of Instruction. The students will be taught what an Army instructor consists of, such as the different personality qualities he must possess to present an effective period of instruction. They will also be instructed on what their conduct should be as an instructor. In addition, they will learn certain methods which they may utilize to improve themselves.</td>
<td>L,T,D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1150</td>
<td>Techniques of Delivery</td>
<td>In this period, the students will learn methods of controlling nervousness. They will be introduced to some of the points to consider as an instructor. Then finally, they will also learn the different student attitudes and how to overcome such without closing the minds of the students being taught.</td>
<td>L,T,D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1350</td>
<td>Oral Instruction</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students will learn the instructional process involved in teaching. They will be taught specific items in the instruction of the class and the methods utilized to gain contact. Subsequently, they will learn oral instruction in the explanation phase and how to properly conduct a review.</td>
<td>L,T,D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1430</td>
<td>Training Aids</td>
<td>The purpose for this period is to familiarize the students with the training aids available for use in Vietnam. The students will be taught how to use these aids to the best advantage. They will also be instructed on the purpose of such during training and shown the different characteristics of aids.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1550</td>
<td>Conference Method</td>
<td>This period of instruction is conducted to further the knowledge of the students on the conference method of instruction. They will be taught the advantages of a conference, the proper conference question and what it consists of. They will learn the procedures in tasking a good conference question. Then they will be taught how to handle students in different situations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1650</td>
<td>Demonstration Method</td>
<td>This period of instruction is conducted to give the students an idea how to conduct a demonstration in any given period of instruction. The instructor will give the students several purposes for the demonstration and familiarize the students with different types of demonstrations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECOND DAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0850</td>
<td>Mechanical Ambush</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the student will learn to set and recover the rat trap, sliding wire and clothespin mechanical ambushes. Safety procedures are stressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1150</td>
<td>Mines and Boobytraps Destruction w/Bangalore Torpedo/VC/NVA Markings</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, the students learn how to recognize, mark, record and report enemy mines and boobytraps. The students will learn how to destroy mines and boobytraps by using the bangalore torpedo. Students are broken down into small groups and are taken down a boobytraped trail. During the last hour of instruction the students are given instruction on enemy fortifications and tunnels in Vietnam. Students recon the school tunnel complex and are shown the latest tunnel exploration and destruction equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1650</td>
<td>Practice Instruction</td>
<td>The U.S. personnel are given the opportunity to practice instructional procedures using the RF/PP cadre as students.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### September 1970

#### THIRD DAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0950</td>
<td>M16A1 Rifle</td>
<td>Orientation on the characteristics, function, operation, care and cleaning, maintenance, stoppages and immediate action on the M16A1 Rifle. Included will be maintenance of the magazine and care of the ammunition used in the M16A1. In addition, zeroing procedures will be covered. The students will receive a briefing on the safety procedures to be used on the range while zeroing his individual weapon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1050</td>
<td>M-79 and M-72 LAW</td>
<td>Orientation on the characteristics, function, operation, care and cleaning of the M-79. Orientation on types of and care of 40mm ammunition. Orientation on the operation and functioning of the M-72 LAW to include assembly and disassembly, sighting procedures, immediate action, safety procedures and dry firing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1150</td>
<td>M-60 Machine Gun</td>
<td>Orientation on the characteristics, operation, functioning, maintenance, and ammunition of the M-60 MG. Included will be the mechanical aspects of the M-60 MG.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1650</td>
<td>Practice Instruction</td>
<td>The U.S. personnel are given the opportunity to practice instructional procedures using the RF/PF cadre as students.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U.S. personnel are given the opportunity to practice instructional procedures using the RF/PF cadre as students.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0850</td>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>This period is designed as an introduction to patrolling. It includes purpose, importance, types of patrols, explanation of terms and patrolling responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-0950</td>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>During this period of instruction, students receive instruction in patrol planning and preparation to include the patrol planning steps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1050</td>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>Students receive detailed explanation of patrol order to include its use and format. Each main paragraph will be discussed thoroughly and an example of a complete patrol order will be handed out for study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1150</td>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>Students will receive instruction in night combat to include operation in night environments, movement, finding direction, security, action under flares, crossing danger areas, night firing techniques, night vision, night vision devices, starlight scope, starclusters, and the use of trip flares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1350</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>Students receive an introduction to ambush and ambush patrols to include purpose, descriptive terms, fundamentals of a successful ambush and point and area ambushes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1450</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>The students receive detailed instruction in weapons employment for the different ambush formation. An attempt is made not to standardize employment but rather to make the student aware of certain general rules of employment. Practical exercise is conducted where the students offer various solutions to employment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Fourth Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1500-1550</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>The students receive detailed instruction on execution and sweep of the kill zone. Various methods of execution and control will be discussed in the light of hypothetical tactical situations. Methods of sweep and reconnaissance of the kill zone instruction on the hasty ambush.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1650</td>
<td>Counter Ambush</td>
<td>The students receive instruction on counter-ambush techniques to include prevention of ambushes and reaction to enemy ambushes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fifth Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-0850</td>
<td>Comm Securty</td>
<td>Familiarize the students with radio telephone procedures, the phonetic alphabet, pro-words, operation and organizational maintenance. Also include is the procedures for making net calls. Orientation on the purpose and capabilities of the KY 38 with the AN/PRC 77 and PRC 25.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-0950</td>
<td>Medevac</td>
<td>The students are placed in a tactical situation and are instructed in proper methods of calling in dust-offs and how to load patients. A Cu Chi dust-off is used to add realism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1150</td>
<td>Maintenance of Vehicles and Commo Equipment</td>
<td>During this period of instruction the student becomes familiar with the 1st echelon maintenance of ½ ton, 3/4 ton, and 1½ ton vehicles to include the PRC 25 radio. Also the student will learn how to use MOGAS in the defensive position.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1450</td>
<td>Intelligence Training</td>
<td>This period of instruction is conducted to familiarize the students with different types of combat intelligence, collecting, reporting and employment of counterintelligence measures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1550</td>
<td>Artillary Adjustment</td>
<td>Students received instruction in artillery adjustment to include methods of target location, the call for fire and adjustment of artillery fire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1650</td>
<td>Vietnamese Customs</td>
<td>During this period an advisor from the District will cover Vietnamese customs and traditions of and orient the company on the organization of and conditions in the District, and problems to expect during the training program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (RF/PF Training Assistance)

Commanding Officer
3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

1. (C) PURPOSE. This letter assigns responsibility for the conduct of a pilot training program for RF/PF forces of Tri Tam District, Binh Duong Province. It is effective upon receipt.

2. (C) GENERAL. One of the primary missions of the 25th Infantry Division is to upgrade Vietnamese territorial forces in the tactical area of interest. The Commanding General has designated Tri Tam District, Binh Duong Province as the location for the pilot program the results of which will provide the basis for an expanded Division RF/PF training program.

3. (C) MISSION. The 3rd Brigade will upgrade all RF/PF units in Tri Tam District to enable them to perform their assigned security missions satisfactorily.

4. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. a. One US Company will be selected and dedicated to a pure training mission in the district. Key to success of the program is the motivation and quality of the personnel selected. They must be willing to live with the RF or PF unit, capable of training it in all aspects of small unit operations, and treat the Vietnamese with respect. In addition to the formal training discussed below the US training personnel must train by example and concerted effort taking an active part in security, welfare, improvement of facilities, sanitation and routine activities of the unit being trained. In effect the training team assumes an advisory role with the Platoon Leader becoming the RF Company Commander's counterpart for the duration of the program. Careful selection and continuity of training personnel is essential for success.

b. The training will be conducted on the RF/PF unit's home ground and will concentrate on known or identified areas of weakness and basic combat skills: marksmanship, maintenance, communications, detection and destruction of mines and booby traps, ambush and patrol techniques, and intelligence.

c. The training will be conducted in a formal manner with maximum emphasis on practical application, hands-on-equipment instruction.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDCOP-D

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (RF/FF Training Assistance)

d. Every effort will be made to assist the territorial forces in the performance of routine missions and duties throughout the training period including improvement of defenses, upgrading security, and operational procedures. All training, including the formal training, will be tailored to the needs of the RF Company/FF Platoon being trained. Training on any given day should not exceed the learning capacity of the unit.

e. The formal training will be followed by integrated operations away from the RF Compound during which time other forces will be tasked with securing the RF Compound and district.

f. The training program will continue until all territorial forces in the district have been upgraded to a satisfactory level of proficiency as jointly determined by the Brigade, Battalion, Company, Commanding Officers, District Chief and District Senior Adviser.

g. Direct close coordination between the Company cadre and District Officials and Advisors is essential.

5. (C) EXECUTION. The Company selected will:

a. Organize three 12-15 man Platoon Training Teams consisting of a Platoon Leader, 3 NCO instructors, and 8-12 EM assistant instructors to train RF Companies.

b. Organize two 3-5 man Squad Training Teams with a minimum of two qualified NCO instructors to train FF Platoons.

c. Co-locate the Platoon Training Teams with the RF Companies being trained for the duration of the training program.

d. Co-locate the Company Headquarters with the District Headquarters to facilitate close continuous direct coordination with District Advisors and Officials.

e. Undergo a five day orientation/refreshers course at the Tropic Lightning Academy, Cu Chi, tailored to the training mission, prior to assuming the training mission.

5. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES. The Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade will:

(1) Insure that qualified personnel, equipment and interpreters are provided to the Company selected.

(2) Supervise and coordinate the conduct of the training. Assist the Company as required.

(3) Report problems encountered and recommend changes to the program if required.

(4) Submit progress reports as each RF Company/FF Platoon completes training to this Headquarters, ATTN: G3 DOT.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDCOP-D

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (HF/VHF Training Assistance)

b. The Commandant, Troops Lightning Academy will:
(1) Formulate and conduct an orientation/refresh training course for the US Company, interpreters, and representatives of the District Territorial Forces, tailored to the training mission.

(2) Produce training packets of lesson plans for the Company to use during the formal training.

(3) Produce Vietnamese lesson plans to provide to the territorial forces upon completion of the training to carry on the training.

c. ACoFS, G3 will monitor the training program and provide assistance and coordinations as required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Col. [Name]
Chief of Staff

Copies Furnished:

10 - CO, 1st Bde, 25th Div
10 - CO, 2nd Bde, 25th Div
10 - CO, 3rd Bde, 25th Div
10 - ACoFS, G2
10 - ACoFS, G3
10 - ACoFS, G5
10 - Cmdt, TLA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY OF THE WEEK</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1               | M-16 Mech Training  
(Maintenance Care & Cleaning) | 0900-0950 |
|                 | Marksmanship Training  
(Sight Picture, 6 Steady Hold Position, & Firing Positions) | 1000-1050 |
|                 | M-60 Mech Training  
(Maintenance Care & Cleaning) | 1100-1150 |
| 2               | M-60 Familiarisation  
(Methods of Fire & Firing Positions) | 0900-0950 |
|                 | M-79 Mech Training  
(Maintenance, Care & Cleaning) | 1000-1050 |
|                 | M-79 Familiarisation  
(General Instructions & Firing Positions) | 1100-1150 |
| 3               | Range Firing M-16  
(Zero, Quick Kill & K.D.) | 1000 Until Completed |
| 4               | Range Firing M-60 & M-79  
(Firing Positions M-60, M-79)  
Rate of Fire M-60) | 1000 Until Completed |
| 5               | First Aid  
(Life Saving, Bandage, Splinting, Wound Bandage Procedures) | 0800-1150 |
| 6               | Demolitions  
(Discussion of type of explosive, Making Charges, Ring Main, and Destruction of Bunkers) | 0800-1150 |
RF TRAINING SCHEDULE  
(Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY OF TNG</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PRC-25</td>
<td>0800-0850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Care &amp; Cleaning; Procedures for use</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50 Cal Mg.</td>
<td>0900-1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance Care &amp; Cleaning, Head Space &amp; Timing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 8          | Airmobile Techniques  | 0800-0950 |
|            | (LZ & PZ Actions & Security, Inflight and landing Formations, Practice (fundamentals)) | |

| 9          | Patrolling  | 0800-1150 |
|            | (Ambush & Recon) | |

| 10         | Artillery Adjustment  | 0800-1000 |
|            | (Type of Rounds, Types of Adjustments, and Types of Fire) | |

|              | Night Firing Tech  | 1800-1830 |
|              | Practical Exercise at night location | |

11-13 Joint Combat Operations (Preparation and Conduct of Airmobile initiated operations).

Additional training will be presented when requested by the District Chief in the RFG Co. These classes may include such instructions as; M-72 LAW, Combat Intelligence, Medical Procedures, Mortar Training, 50 & 30 Cal MG, and any or other appropriate subjects.
**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 27TH INFANTRY**  
(THE VOLKHOUNDS)  
APO San Francisco 96225

**AVDCSM-0**  
**20 October 1970**

**FP TRAINING SCHEDULE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY OF THE</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1          | Patrolling  
(As bush and Recon) | 0800-1150 |
| 2          | Artillery Adjustment  
(Types of rounds,  
Types of Adjustments,  
and Types of Fire) | 0900-1050 |
|            | Airmobile (Basic Discussion) | 1000-1150 |
| 3          | Demolitions  
(Discussion of types of  
explosives, making charges,  
Ring Main, and destruction  
of bunkers) | 0800-1150 |
| 4          | First Aid  
(Life saving steps,  
Splinting, bandaging  
Wounds and medicare) | 0800-1150 |
| 5          | M-16 Mark Training  
(Maintenance, care & cleaning) | 0900-0950 |
|            | M-16 Marksmanship Training  
(Sight picture, & steady hold  
Factors & firing positions) | |
|            | M-60 Mark Training  
(Maintenance, care & cleaning) | 1000-1150 |
| 6          | M-60 Familiarisation  
(Methods of firing, positions) | 1000-1050 |
|            | M-79 Familiarisation  
(Types of rounds & firing  
positions) | 1100-1150 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY OF THE</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Range firing M-16</td>
<td>1000 Until Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Zero, quick kill &amp; K.D.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Range firing M-60, M-79</td>
<td>1000 Until Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Firing positions (M-60, M-79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate of Fire (M-60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BỘ TƯ LỆNH SƯ Đ'OÀN 25
BỘ BÌNH HOÀ KỲ
CHỨNG CHỈ TỐT NGHIỆP

BỘ TƯ LỆNH SƯ Đ'OÀN 25 BỘ BÌNH HOÀ KỲ
CHỨNG NHẬN: ________________________
TỐT NGHIỆP KHOA HUẤN LUYỆN VỀ KỸ THUẬT
TÁC CHIẾN TRUNG CẤP VÀO NGÀY: ____________
SỰ CÔ GÁNG VÀ THIẾN CHỈ CỦA ĐƯỜNG SƯ
ĐÀ GIÚP CHO ANH TA CÔ MỘT TRÌNH BỘ HIỆU
BIẾT ĐÂY ĐỨ CỦA NGƯỜI CHIẾN BÌNH.

________________________
SĨ QUAN ĐIỀU HÀNH
OPERATIONS OFFICER
AVBCSN-CO

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report

THRU: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO 96225

1. Training conducted by Bravo Company, 1st Bn, 27th Inf in Binh Dinh Province, Tri Tam District. Training was initiated on 14 September 1970.

2. Organisation for training and location.
   a. Co HQ's consisted of six personnel co-located at Tri Tam District, HQ's. CPT Paul J. Miller is the CO of Bravo Company.
   b. The first platoon consisting of eighteen personnel was located at the 170 RF Compound, VIC coordinates 492457. LT Dixon is the 1st platoon leader.
   c. The second platoon consisting of eighteen personnel was located at the 396 RF Compound VIC coordinates 501446. LT Freeman is the 2d platoon leader.
   d. The third platoon consisting of ten personnel was located at the 108 FF Compound VIC coordinates 536377 and 546367. SFC Schumate is the 3d platoon leader.

3. Designation of RF and FF Units which have completed training.
   a. 396 RF Company completed training on 2 Oct 70.
   b. 170 RF Company completed training on 3 Oct 70.

4. Synopsis of Training conducted.
   a. (Training Schedule) Incl 1 and 2.
   b. Subjects requested by GVN officials or unit CO.
AVDOM-CO
SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report

b. Subjects requested by GVN officials or unit CO, (396 RF Co).
   1. Hand to hand combat
   2. Bayonet
      (170 RF Co)
   1. Leadership
   2. Map reading

c. Subjects requested by advisers. (None)

d. Comments or observations concerning methods of training. (None)

5. Unit Response to Training

   a. Cooperation was outstanding in the 170 RF Company. Some difficulty
      was experienced with the 396 RF Company, but it was quickly ended by the
      District Chief. The training of the 108 PF Platoon was interrupted by the
      units relocation and training was ended at the District Chief's request.
      The remaining subjects will be covered upon completion of the training of
      all other PF platoons.

   b. The RF and PF forces were very receptive to the training given to
      them. They displayed an intense interest and desire to learn.

   c. Average daily attendance was fifty-five in both the RF Companies
      being trained.

   d. The soldiers being trained displayed good enthusiasm. During
      periods of practical exercise there were always personnel willing to demon-
      strate for the remainder of the class. The soldiers of the territorial
      forces remained attentive at all times.

6. In addition to training assistance, the 170 and 396 compounds were up-
   graded by combined Vietnamese and US effort. This included clearing fields
   of fire, replacement of sandbags, digging of sumps at the 396 compound,
   construction of a 25 m zero range.

7. Specialized training was given to medics and mortar crews. In addition
   eight members of the 170 RF company were given four extra hours in demolition
   training.
6. During training, two ambushes were conducted nightly from both compounds. Initially, the Regional Forces from both compounds were ambushing only two hundred meters from respective compounds and habitually utilizing two to three locations. This was improved so that ambushes were being conducted up to 1500 M from the compounds and varied locations were being used.

The field operations were conducted with little difficulty. The 170 RF compound has exemplary leadership from the company commander to squad level. They demonstrated an outstanding ability to function as a unit in combat operations. The 396 RF Company has outstanding leadership at squad level and platoon level. The company commander is presently in school and will not return to the unit until after completion of training. The acting commander is very weak in leadership and knowledge of combat operations.

The compounds were secured by elements of Bravo Company not directly involved in the training program while the units were on operations.

9. A minimum number of problems were encountered during the training cycle. Materials necessary to upgrade compounds were not readily available.

10. The principle support given by MACV was in the form of coordination with the Vietnamese and US personnel.

11. At the present time no suggestions can be made for improvement in the Dedicated Company programs.

12. The training program has improved the operational ability and self confidence of the units trained. The objective now should be for maximum utilization of the RF companies in field operations to maintain and improve efficiency.

13. Units which have completed training.
   170 RF
   396 RF

14. Units in training.
   167 RF
   324 RF
   73 PF
   49 PF

15. Units to be trained.
   108 PF (to complete at a later date)
   46 PF
   47 PF
   48 PF
   98 PF

FOR THE COMMANDER:
/s/Eugene C. McCaffery
/t/EUGENE C. McCAFFERY

A TRUE COPY:
R. M. PUCHALSKI, CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVDCSN-A

SUBJECT: PF Completion of Training Report

THRU: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO 96225

1. Training conducted by Bravo Company, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, in Binh Duong Province, Tri Tam District. Training was initiated on 14 September 1970.

2. The PF training teams consisted of eight personnel at two locations. One team was led by SFC Schumate, VIC coordinate 483469. The other element was led by SGT Carmon, VIC coordinate 521414 XT.

3. The Popular Force Units which have completed training are:
   a. 49th PF started training on the 5th of October and completed training on 15 October 1970.
   b. 73d PF started training on the 5th of October and completed training on 15 October 1970.

4. Synopsis of Training Conducted:
   a. Training Schedule (Incl 1)
   b. There were no subjects added at request of GVN Officials.
   c. The advisors requested no additional training.
   d. The training for the 49th PF platoon would have been more effective had the platoon leader been convinced to hold classes in a more isolated area. He insisted on holding classes next to the road.
AVDCSN-A
S U B J E C T: PF Completion of Training Report

20 October 1970

5. Unit Response to Training:

a. The 73d and 49th Platoons cooperated in every way during the
course of the training period.

b. The individuals of these units seemed very receptive to the train-
ing given them. They asked intelligent questions whenever they did not
understand the instructions and were at all times very attentive.

c. The average daily attendance was twenty in both units.

d. The units being trained demonstrated a great deal of enthusiasm,
during the training period. They also showed genuine interest in the
majority of the classes given.

6. The Vietnamese and US forces combined their efforts to improve fields
of fire, dig sumps and improve latrine conditions in the compound.

7. Specialized training was given to the squad leaders of both units in
adjustment of supporting fire and to the unit aid personnel in medical pro-
cedures.

8. The 73d PF platoon and the training section under SGT Carmon conducted
night ambushes. The mission of the 49th PF platoon was to secure the bridge
on the Saigon River with no additional missions that allowed for joint
operations.

9. The Vietnamese on several occasions stated they could not train the
following day because their units was going on an operation or, as in the
case of the 49th PF platoon, were moving. After coordination with the
District Headquarters these missions were cancelled and training went as
scheduled.

10. The advisors main effort was towards coordination with the Vietnamese
and US personnel.

11. At the present time no changes could be made that would improve the
"Dedicated Company" program.

12. The two Popular Force platoons which have completed their training
have gained useful information and their operational ability has improved
as a result of the training program.
A.VDCSN-A

SUBJECT: PF Completion of Training Report

13. Units which have completed training:
   a. 170 RF
   396 RF
   b. 49 PF
   73 PF

14. Units remaining in training:
   a. 167 RF began training 12 October 1970
      324 RF began training 12 October 1970
   b. 46 PF began training on 19 October 1970
      47 PF began training on 19 October 1970

15. Units which have not completed training:
   a. 108 PF
   48 PF
   98 PF

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Eugene C. McCaffery
/t/ EUGENE C. McCAFFERY
1LT, Infantry
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY:

R. M. PUCHALSKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
1. I have designated my Assistant Division Commanders as follows:

2. Duties and responsibilities are assigned to the Assistant Division Commanders primarily on a geographical area basis, but the duties of each include specific functional areas as well. In addition to performing in their specific areas of interest, I expect each Assistant Division Commander to maintain a "feel" for this Division as a whole; to be prepared to supervise such functions of special interest to me as I may direct; and, to be prepared to command the Division in an emergency on order.

3. Specific areas of responsibility for the Assistant Division Commanders:
   a. ADC-Alpha:
      (1) 1st Brigade; 3rd Brigade; Division Support Command; 65th Engineer Battalion; 125th Signal Battalion; Company F (Rangers), 75th Infantry; and non-organic US units supporting (or operating in the area of) the 1st or 3rd Brigade.
      (2) Direct and personal liaison with:
         (a) CG's, 25th and 5th ARVN Divisions and Capital Military District (as necessary).
         (b) Tay Minh, Binh Long, Binh Duong, Long An and Hau Nghia Province Chiefs and their Province Senior Advisors.
         (c) District Chiefs and their District Senior Advisors in the areas of the 1st Brigade and the 3rd Brigade.
AVDCG

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff

(3) Supervision of RVN pacification program support in the area of the 1st Brigade and 3rd Brigade. This will include all plans, programs and activities incident to:

(a) Developing effective DI OCC and PIOCC capabilities.

(b) Developing and sustaining increasingly effective Territorial Forces (RF, PF, PSDF); and National Police Field Force (NPFF) and Special Police Operations.

(4) Unit training UP of 25th Inf Div Reg 350-1 for those elements outlined in 3a (1) above.

(5) Supervision of road and waterway lines of communication in the areas of the 1st Brigade and 3rd Brigade (to include security of bridges, convoys, and waterborne military logistics traffic).

(6) Dau Tieng and Cu Chi base defense.

(7) Base (to include FSB and PB) closures and transfers in the areas of the 1st Brigade and 3rd Brigade.

b. ADC-Brr 2nd

(1) 2nd Brigade; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; Division Artillery; 25th Aviation Battalion; and, non-organic US units supporting (or operating in the area of) the 2nd Brigade or 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Direct and personal liaison with:

(a) CG, 18th ARVN Division and Headquarters, III Corps Staff.

(b) CG, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force and Cmdr, 1st Australian Task Force.

(c) CG, 1st Cav Div.

(d) Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Province Chiefs and their Province Senior Advisors.

(e) District Chiefs and their District Senior Advisors in the area of the 2nd Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(3) Supervision of RVN pacification program support in the area of the 2nd Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. This will include all plans, programs and activities incident to:
SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff

(a) Developing effective DIOCC and PIOCC capabilities.

(b) Developing and sustaining increasingly effective Territorial Forces (RF, PF, PSDF); and National Police Field Force (NPFF) and Special Police Operations.

(c) Training, to include unit training as outlined in 25th Div Reg 350-1 for those elements outlined in 3b (1) above; formal training of RVNAF elements; and operation of the Tropic Lightning Academy.

(d) Training of Territorial Forces by 25th Division units.

(e) Supervision of roads and waterway lines of communication in the areas of the 2nd Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (to include security of bridges, convoys, and waterborne military logistics traffic).

(f) Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) Program.

(g) Division-wide residual base development planning, coordination and execution.

(h) Base (to include FSB and PB) closures and transfers in the area of the 2nd Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

4. To insure that the lines of command emphasis and staff supervision are clearly drawn, the following overwatch responsibilities for units indicated are assigned:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ADC OVERWATCH</th>
<th>GS SUPERVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/75th Inf (Rangers)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th MI Co</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Admin Co</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Repl Det</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropic Ltng Academy</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th MP Co</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Sp Security Det</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Mil Hist Det</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Ord Det</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372nd RRU</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Chem Det</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Inf Plt (Cmbt Tracker)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>G3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders
and the Chief of Staff

5. The Chief of Staff directs and supervises operations of the 25th
Infantry Division's General and Special Staffs. Guidance and directions
normally come directly from the Commanding General to the Chief of Staff.
While the Assistant Division Commanders have an overwatch responsibility
in the fields of maintenance and operational readiness as it applies to
the specific units which they supervise for the Commanding General, the
Chief of Staff (assisted by the ACoS, G-4 and the CO, Division Support
Command) is primarily responsible to the Commanding General for the
logistic readiness of this Division.

EDWARD BAUTZ, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
A+
ADC-Alpha
ADC-Bravo
CofS
CG, 1st ACD
CO, 1st Bde
CO, 2nd Bde
CO, 3rd Bde
CO, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
CO, DIVARTY
CO, DISCOM
CO, 25th Avn Bn
CO, 65th Engr Bn
CO, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav
CO, 125th Sig Bn
CO, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor
CO, Replacement Detachment
CO, Co E (Rangers), 75th Inf
CO, Co F (Rangers), 75th Inf
CO, 11th Armored Cav Regt
CO, USA Special Security Detachment (Cu Chi)
CO, 25th MP Co
CO, 25th MI Co
CO, 25th Admin Co
CO, Tropic Lightning Academy
CO, 372nd RRU Co
Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff.
APPENDIX A

COMMANDING GENERAL'S TRAINING POLICIES

1. The primary objective of this training program is to achieve and maintain a high state of combat effectiveness. To achieve this objective, training will be oriented to fulfill the policies and special areas of interest in furthering US objectives in the Republic of Vietnam as contained in Inclosure 1 to this Appendix.

2. Training will receive a priority equal to that of routine combat operations. During periods of major operations training may be relegated to second priority temporarily, but will be continued on a reduced scale. As a general rule of thumb approximately 25% of the time should be dedicated to training.

3. The Tropic Lightning Academy and selected organizations will conduct training for individual replacements and specialized courses, and provide instructor teams for selected subjects.

4. The Battalion Commander has primary responsibility for the formulation and conduct of a training program designed to meet the needs of his unit.

5. Major subordinate commanders will exercise supervision of training programs, schedule facilities which may be used more than one unit, and initiate action to insure that adequate training facilities exist.

6. Training will be planned and programmed in a formal manner; practical work will be the primary method.

7. Training will be oriented to improve skills required for an individual to perform satisfactorily in his duty MOS. Training in secondary missions and secondary skills will be undertaken only if all primary skill requirements have been met.

8. Unit training will emphasize small unit actions, including the coordination of fires and support.

9. Throughout, emphasis will be on those areas which contribute to the unit's ability to move, shoot and communicate under all weather conditions, day and night. Specifically:
   a. Marksmanship training will stress aimed fire and be conducted weekly.
   b. Maintenance training will stress the proper care and functioning of weapons, vehicles, and radios.
   c. Communications training will stress use of secure means and authorized codes.
   d. Quick reaction situation training will stress the soldiers' ability to react and engage unexpected targets.
e. Night training will stress the ability to fight effectively at night including night firing, noise and light discipline and security.

f. Brigade, artillery battalion and maneuver battalion headquarters will operate from field locations a minimum period of three days and two nights each month.

10. Training will be continuous and repetitive to compensate for the rapid turnover of personnel. To avoid boredom, the more experienced soldier should be used as an instructor or assistant instructor.

11. The chain of command will be the primary means of conducting training; unit integrity will be maintained in operations, training and administrative details.

12. Operations will habitually be critiqued as a means of training and improving combat effectiveness. Training areas of special concern will be published as annexes to this regulation as required. Those presently singled out for special emphasis are contained in Appendices B and C.

13. Mandatory subjects in terms of specific hours required for all individuals will be limited to those required by Department of the Army and Headquarters, USARV.

14. Training reports and administrative requirements will be held to the minimum essential required to comply with Department of the Army and USARV Regulations.

15. Training will be reported through operational channels in the Daily Plans Summary and will include the subject areas scheduled for presentation.
AVDCCG

SUBJECT: General Policies and Areas of Interest

2 April 1970

6. Avoidance of non-combatant casualties and incidents is essential. Attempt to view both friendly and enemy actions as the villager sees them. If he suffers losses to his family and his property the impact on him, personally, is the same, whether due to our action or the enemy's. This is not limited to combat action but extends to every facet of our association with the population.

7. Economy of Force is an accepted principle of war. Use it not only in tactics but in all areas. Looked at another way, it is simply "Good Management" to avoid waste. In this regard, eliminate excess equipment; usually, it drains off resources and creates imbalances in our structure that decrease efficiency and effectiveness.

8. Elimination of the enemy is an essential step. POW and Ho Chi Chanhs are more valuable than dead enemy soldiers. KIA statistics are important but are not an end in themselves.

9. Take every opportunity to work with the RVNAF so as to increase their effectiveness. Teach them how to do things rather than doing it for them. In this geographical area, the point has been reached where we should gradually reduce our combined operations with the objective of eventually turning over complete and independent control to the RVNAF.

10. Watch HES ratings carefully. They highlight areas needing concentration of effort. When there is regression, react promptly.

11. Insure we are fighting under a "One War Concept". Integration and orientation of all resources, programs and operations to the achievement of a common objective is complex but essential. In pacification, particularly, insure that your programs support the District or Province Chief's plan.

12. US Forces are not "operations security" conscious, particularly in use of voice communication. Reduce the amount of chatter and use the secure means which have been provided.

13. Perfection in a tactic or technique is laudatory, but don't become so enamoured of it that you fail to change when change is needed. The enemy adjusts rapidly.

14. Learn the established system for getting things done and use it. By-passing and shortcuts may achieve quicker results initially but usually undermine the system, and the end result is less responsiveness to one's needs.

15. In briefings and reports, be precise and factual. Opinions may be helpful but label them opinions. Historical data provide a good basis for projections, but I am more interested in knowing what is being done at the moment and what is planned for the future. Content, simplicity and knowledge
AVDCG
SUBJECT: General Policies and Areas of Interest

of the subject are more helpful than elaborate training aids and wordy, formal presentations.

16. When you reach the point where you can feel complacent about the effectiveness of your unit, your own ability to do your job, or the enemy situation, ask for a transfer.

EDWARD BAULTZ, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
B
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Edward Bautz, Jr.

MG Edward Bautz, Jr.

1 December 1970

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310

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N/A