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
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JUNE 1970

**AD 51 4242**

**AN INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE  
OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE  
OFFICER CORPS (U)**

Allan E. Goodman



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prepared for  
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

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
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PREFACE

(C) This Memorandum reports work completed in a Rand research program, sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, to study the pacification effort in Vietnam in a system context, identifying and relating key elements. The author, a consultant to Rand's Social Science Department, focuses on the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF), as one of these key elements. From personnel data collected on RVNAF officers during a 1967 visit to Vietnam and processed by computer, the author analyzes the social origins, career patterns, and political structure of the officer corps. Since these data were collected, the RVNAF has expanded and the number of officers serving in junior ranks has greatly increased. However, since the data describe the background and experience of the senior officers and decisionmakers in the RVNAF (whose numbers have not increased comparably), the study should still be of interest to those concerned about the political behavior of the force. Related Rand publications include: D.W.P. Elliott and W. A. Stewart, *Pacification and the Viet Cong System in Dinh Tuong: 1966-1967*, RM-5788-ISA/ARPA, January 1969; F. J. West, Jr., *An Area-Security System for Vietnam Incorporating Combined Action* (U), RM-5895-ARPA, March 1969 (Secret); and L. P. Holliday, A. W. Jones, and R. Rhyne, *Final Report: Seminar on Area Security and Development (Pacification)* (U), RM-5923-ARPA, June 1969 (Secret).

(U) The author especially thanks his original partners in this enterprise, Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard, then a consultant to the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State; David J. Carpenter, then a political officer in the American Embassy; and two staff sergeants who prefer to remain anonymous. In addition, the author is grateful to Richard Teare of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for helping to sort out the data when it arrived from Saigon. A vote of thanks is due Fred C. Iklé and Guy Pauker, whose interest in the project made it possible to do the analysis at Rand. Thanks also go to those at The Rand Corporation who labored over the presentation of the supporting data, particularly William Allen of the Computer Sciences Department.

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(U) Though this analysis has been informed by many valuable discussions with staff members in the Social Science and Economics departments, and has directly benefited from reviews by C.A.H. Thomson, Sam Cochran, Brian Jenkins, and Guy Pauker, the author assumes full responsibility for the conclusions and any analytical shortcomings.

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## SUMMARY

(U) Central to the success of "Vietnamization" is the ability of the military officer corps of Vietnam to assume responsibility for the leadership and conduct of the war. Information on the social structure and origins of the Vietnamese officer corps is essential to any effort to appraise Vietnamization. This study attempts to shed light on some of the background characteristics and political features of the RVNAF officer corps.

(U) Being larger, better organized, and more widely distributed in the country than the civilian bureaucracy, the RVNAF is frequently the government's sole representative and agent in rural areas. Thus the RVNAF officer is a key figure in dealing with the needs and problems of the rural people. Yet, to the rural population the RVNAF all too often appears in the role of an alien army, in large part because of the social distance between the officers and people.

(U) The educational requirement for commissioning tends to fill the ranks of the military elite with men from large metropolitan centers and provincial capitals, where education is more readily available. Officers are consequently seldom accustomed to the hardships of rural life and unfamiliar with and hence unsympathetic to the peasants they are commissioned to protect. Thus the urban orientation and educational background of the RVNAF officer differentiate him from the bulk of the rural population and reinforce the gap between urban officer and peasant soldier.

(C) Although the composition of the officer corps reflects the regional and religious divisions in South Vietnam, the corps as a whole is ethnically homogeneous -- 98.6 percent of the officers are ethnically Vietnamese -- much more so than the society at large. This further serves to isolate the officer from much of the society he is charged with defending and from the men he commands. Another significant characteristic of the corps, contrary to widespread opinion, is its predominately southern composition -- 44.2 percent of all officers were born in provinces south of Saigon. The portrait

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of the RVNAF officer of a decade ago remains essentially unchanged and reflects the politicized nature of the recruitment and training policies in the South Vietnamese military establishment.

(U) The RVNAF officer corps has failed to develop professionalism. This owes partly to the low wages and few legitimate economic incentives involved in the military career, exacerbated by the increased opportunity for corruption that the intensified conflict has brought. It also owes much to the military's involvement in politics since 1963. The continuing involvement of the military in politics both feeds on and perpetuates factionalism in the officer corps. This "old school tie" syndrome is a universal characteristic of elite formation, but in South Vietnam it is especially potent, because of the paucity of educational institutions and the roles their star graduates have played in national politics. Indeed, political loyalty, not battlefield performance, has long dominated the promotion system in the officer corps, with the result that there is often an inverse relationship between rank and military skill. Morale is low among RVNAF officers in the countryside who have stagnated for years in junior ranks while more politically favored and often younger colleagues advance rapidly to posts in Saigon or provincial and Corps capitals. Even "political" officers exhibit divided loyalties. Some support Thieu; others support Ky; and those officers who bear the brunt of the fighting may be forming a third faction, opposed to both.

(C) By the time this study was written, in early 1969, President Thieu had succeeded in replacing many senior generals and influential officers loyal to Vice President Ky, but this consolidation of power represents the victory of one faction over another rather than an end either to the causes of factionalism or to the prevailing mode of resolving basic social and career tensions within the RVNAF. Political loyalty continues to be a major criterion for advancement in the military. Without major reform of the selection, assignment, and promotion systems, the author concludes, it is unlikely that the present RVNAF will ever constitute a long-term political or military counter to the Viet Cong and NVA. Reform demands immediate, vigorous

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action at the highest level to make the basis of promotion and assignment professional competence rather than political loyalty. Fundamentally, such a transformation will depend upon the ability of President Thieu to build a solid political base outside the RVNAF and thereby insulate the officer corps from the vagaries of South Vietnamese politics.

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## Part One: Social Origins and Career Patterns of the RVNAF Officer Corps

Know oneself; know one's enemy.  
A thousand battles, a thousand victories.

-- Sun T'zu

### I. INTRODUCTION

(U) While it is widely recognized that victory in warfare depends upon knowledge of the situation, the United States' involvement in South Vietnam suggests a corollary to Sun T'zu's classic thesis: "Know one's ally." This study analyzes the sociocultural backgrounds and career patterns of the officers in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) as indices of the professionalism of the officer corps. It is intended as a contribution to the assessment of the RVNAF's capability to defend South Vietnam and aid in its future development.

(U) Data and systematic analysis of the social origins and political orientations of RVNAF officers are meager, in contrast to those available for other Vietnamese elites, such as the civil service and members of the National Assembly. American policy planning regarding South Vietnam has been poorly informed about that nation's military elite, particularly the dominant career patterns of RVNAF officers and the mechanics of military recruitment and advancement. Such information is now clearly essential to appraise the success of Vietnamization. The rate at which the transfer of combat responsibilities can proceed will depend in large part upon the capability and flexibility of RVNAF elite to respond to the challenge. The data and analysis presented here are intended to provide a basis for evaluating the ability of the RVNAF to perform its future mission.

(U) In many of the non-Viet Cong areas of South Vietnam, government authority and administration are represented by the RVNAF officer rather than by his civilian counterpart.<sup>1</sup> An important consideration,

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<sup>1</sup>(U) That is, since 1958 the RVNAF has grown faster and larger in size than the civil service with which it once was equal in size. Also,

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then, for transfer and withdrawal strategies is the extent to which the military can widen or reduce the gap between the government and Vietnamese society at large. The social profiles of the officers are offered here to illustrate the distance between the officer corps and Vietnamese society at large. This in turn provides a measure of how far current reforms must go to fundamentally transform the RVNAF. However, while this study may fill in some of the obvious gaps in the information available on the RVNAF officer corps, it can never replace the detailed biographic reporting that should have been an integral function of the MACV mission. Some of the interpretative ambiguities in the data used here point to the need for greater efforts in the field to examine and update these findings and to supplement the kind of biographic analyses currently available.

(C) The methodology of the following analysis is straightforward. From statistical summaries of all service records current to August 1967 (N = 25,016 officers) inferences are drawn concerning the social origins and career patterns of the RVNAF officer corps.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the data are used to comment upon the following topics:

1. The social origins of the RVNAF officer corps, i.e., to what extent does the composition of the officer corps mirror the social (e.g., ethnic, religious, regional) complexity of South Vietnam.
2. The obstacles to reform, i.e., to what extent do the career and background profiles serve as indicators of the inability of the RVNAF to perform defense and nation-building missions effectively.

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the scope of civil service functions has remained constant compared with that of the RVNAF.

<sup>2</sup>(U) A more detailed statement on the nature and the scope of the data used appears on p. 32.

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## II. SOCIAL ORIGINS<sup>3</sup>

The sociopolitical complexity of Vietnam has made it difficult to defend and govern. Central to the objectives of the GVN in the countryside is winning the support and confidence of the rural population. Because the RVNAF is more widespread than the civilian ministries and because it has a monopoly on development resources, the RVNAF is frequently the government's sole representative and development agent in the rural areas. It is thus the RVNAF officer who becomes the key figure in dealing with the needs and problems of the rural population. As former Prime Minister Tran Van Huong observed:

. . . when the masses trust and respect the governmental cadres, they will then, as a consequence, have confidence in the regime and government, and will respect national authority.<sup>4</sup>

If the GVN is to compete effectively with the Viet Cong, the military officer will increasingly have to serve as a major link between the people and the government. Yet all too often the GVN appears in the countryside in the form of an alien army.

The political implications of the diversity of South Vietnamese society have been treated elsewhere,<sup>5</sup> but the impact of this social complexity on the effectiveness of the RVNAF is less well documented.

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<sup>3</sup>In the following discussion, RVNAF officers' ethnic, regional, religious, educational, and civilian occupational backgrounds are used to form the construct of social origins. The tables that appear throughout the text are summaries of the data contained in Section V.

<sup>4</sup>"Speech Delivered by Prime Minister Tran Van Huong at the Opening Session of the Second Administrative Training Course for Military Officers, 9 September 1968," Reported in Saigon's A-893, 23 September 1968.

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, Bernard Fall, "Political-Religious Sects in Vietnam," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28 (Summer 1955), pp. 235-253; Roy Jumper, "The Sects and Communism in South Vietnam," *Orbis*, Vol. 3 (Spring 1959), pp. 85-96; Gerald C. Hickey, *Accommodation in South Vietnam: The Key to Sociopolitical Solidarity*, The Rand Corporation, P-3707, October 1967; and Allan E. Goodman, *Government and the Countryside: Political Accommodation and South Vietnam's Communal Groups*, The Rand Corporation, P-3924, September 1968.

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Table 1 indicates in broad demographic terms the diversity of the South Vietnamese population. As can be seen from the population's mobilization potential, the Vietnamese military establishment can draw officers from a variety of cultural and ethnic sources. However, the RVNAF has consistently chosen to restrict commissions even though changes in recruitment and commissioning policy would have provided needed and experienced officers. In addition, the limitation on commissions has made the RVNAF's overall mission of providing rural security a difficult one.

(U) Table 1

## ETHNIC MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1967

Ethnic Group	Proportion of Total Population		Mobilization Potential
Vietnamese:		14,900,000 86.4%	5,587,500
Buddhists	10,000,000 58.0%		3,750,000
Catholics	1,800,000 10.4%		675,000
Hoa Hao	1,500,000 8.7%		562,500
Cao Dai	1,500,000 8.7%		562,500
Protestants	100,000 0.6%		37,500
Chinese		1,100,000 6.4%	412,500
Montagnards		750,000 4.3%	281,250
Khmer		500,000 2.9%	187,500
Total		<u>17,250,000</u>	<u>6,468,750</u>

NOTE: Mobilization potential is based upon the assumption that, of an average-sized family of eight, three persons are eligible for military service. Thus the mobilization potential of each group would be three-eighths of its total size. On the basis of this calculation and taking into account the propensity of religious and ethnic groups to enter or be drafted into the military services, an index of officer mobilization potential might also be constructed. To do that, the overall mobilization potential presented here would have to be "handicapped" by some determination of the projected ability of each group to meet the criteria for officer selection (e.g., the number of children in each group who complete secondary school).

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Rather than serve as a means for integrating social forces, the officer recruitment policy has accentuated the gap between the government and the countryside. In order to be commissioned in the RVNAF, a man must have the equivalent of a high school education. But before 1967 the opportunity to complete a secondary education was a luxury available in few areas in South Vietnam, so military officers tend to come from the large metropolitan centers and provincial capitals, where education is most readily available.<sup>6</sup> In most cases the result is an officer generally unaccustomed to the hardships of rural life (where the war is) and unfamiliar with and hence unsympathetic to the peasants he is commissioned to protect. His urban background and temperament have reduced the effectiveness of the RVNAF officer in bringing security to the countryside and have made winning the population's confidence more difficult, but the Joint General Staff of the RVNAF has consistently refused to alter the educational requirements for its officers.<sup>7</sup> The urban orientation of the Vietnamese officer differentiates him from the bulk of the rural population, and the educational requirement for commissioning tends to reinforce the gap between urban officer and peasant soldier. Thus, the following description of RVNAF officers in the late 1950s was still apt in 1967:

. . . the officers recruited . . . displayed in some cases more interest in the perquisites and privileges attaching to their rank than in the efficient discharge of their duties,

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<sup>6</sup> Presumably the much-heralded increase in educational opportunity from 1967 to the present has expanded the base from which the RVNAF can draw officers who meet this requirement for commissioning. The extent to which this has in fact taken place, however, cannot be determined from the data presented here.

<sup>7</sup> This is in rather sharp contrast to the relationship between educational level and rank and advancement among the Viet Cong. See, for example, W. P. Davison and J. J. Zasloff, *A Profile of Viet Cong Cadres* (U), The Rand Corporation, RM-4983-ISA/ARPA, June 1966 (Confidential); Konrad Kellen, *A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp* (U), The Rand Corporation, RM-5462-ISA/ARPA, October 1967 (Confidential); and Melvin Gurtov, *Viet Cong Cadres and the Cadre System: A Study of the Main and Local Forces* (U), The Rand Corporation, RM-5414-ISA/ARPA, December 1967 (Confidential).

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an attitude which was combined on occasion with a townsman's disdain for the peasant soldiers whom they were appointed to command. The supercilious attitude of these scions of the bourgeoisie towards officers of the ill-armed and underpaid militia bodies was also a recurrent cause of friction and resentment, for many of the officers in the auxiliary forces, in spite of proven military capacity, were themselves debarred by lack of the requisite scholastic qualification from access to the better-paid officer corps of the regular army.<sup>8</sup>

The elite nature (rather than the specific composition) of the RVNAF officer corps has changed remarkably little, given the demands of the war, since the above description was written.

In a country characterized by ethnic diversity the RVNAF officer corps is ethnically homogeneous (98.6 percent of all RVNAF officers are ethnic Vietnamese). Chinese, Montagnard, and Khmer peoples, who inhabit more than 60 percent of the nation's territory and account for an estimated 13.6 percent of the total population, constitute less than one percent of the officer corps, although they comprise 15 to 20 percent of the nation's soldiers. This reflects the extremely limited educational opportunities for these people in the South Vietnamese system and illustrates how most minority soldiers are prevented from qualifying for commissions in the RVNAF. Indeed, the RVNAF officer corps is even less ethnically diverse than prevailing statutes prescribe for other government institutions (see Table 2). The ethnic homogeneity of the Vietnamese officer corps, coupled with the urban orientation that the educational requirement fosters, tends to differentiate and isolate the RVNAF officer from much of the society he is charged with defending and from the men whom he commands. Internally, however, the composition of the RVNAF officer corps reflects the regional and religious divisions in South Vietnamese society.

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<sup>8</sup> Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indochina*, London, 1961, pp. 248-249.

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(U) Table 2

## ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF SELECTED SOUTH VIETNAMESE INSTITUTIONS (In percent)

Ethnic Group	Total Population	Constituent Assembly <sup>a</sup> 1966	Lower House <sup>a</sup> 1967	Upper House 1967	RVNAF Officer Corps (ca. 1967)
Vietnamese	86.4	86	84	97	98.6
Chinese	6.4	3	4	0	0.1
Montagnard	4.3	8	6.5	3	0.1
Khmer and Cham	2.9	3	5.5	0	0.2

<sup>a</sup>Minority representation fixed by statute.

(C) The RVNAF officer corps is frequently criticized for being overwhelmingly northern in composition. However, in terms of region of birth, the RVNAF officer corps is predominantly a southern elite (see Table 3). More than half of all general officers were born in the south, and 44.2 percent of the entire corps were born in provinces south of Saigon. Southerners tend to predominate in all ranks by sheer force of numbers, although the single largest proportion of all officers (11.4 percent) was born in the central Vietnamese province of Thua Thien.

(U) Table 3

## REGIONAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTED SOUTH VIETNAMESE INSTITUTIONS (In percent)

Region of Birth	Constituent Assembly	Lower House	Upper House	RVNAF Officer Corps
Northern	27	24	38	24.7
Central	30	32	29	28.7
Southern	42	43	33	44.4
Foreign	--	--	--	1.3

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Indeed, officers from Thua Thien constitute about 10 percent of each rank, reflecting no doubt the opportunities presented by both civilian and military educational facilities near Huế.<sup>9</sup> Finally, the proportion of officers born in the central and northern regions of Vietnam tends to be similar and remain constant across all ranks. The highest proportion of officers born in foreign countries (2.5 percent) was found in the rank of colonel, with the other ranks having proportions of 1 to 1.3 percent foreign-born.

(C) Like regionalism, religion has traditionally divided Vietnamese society, and most religions tend to be organized for politico-military as well as spiritual activities. Currently the primary religious conflict in the society is between Catholics and Buddhists. As veterans of one phase of this struggle, the RVNAF general officers have about 10 percent more declared Catholics within their ranks compared with the average proportion of Catholics across all ranks.

(C) More than two-thirds of all RVNAF officers are Buddhists (see Table 4), while the two religious sects of the Delta, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, are proportionately equal throughout all ranks except officer candidates, where the Cao Dai outnumber the Hoa Hao six to one. When the religious composition of the officer corps is compared with the composition of the population at large, Catholics have a larger representation than they would seem to merit by the sheer weight of numbers.<sup>10</sup> However, it seems to be the Delta sects and other religious minorities, rather than the Buddhists, that are affected by Catholic overrepresentation in the officer corps.

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<sup>9</sup>(C) While the limits of the data do not permit verification, many of these Thua Thien officers may be the youngest sons of the old mandarin families attached to the Huế court whose older brothers are now in the GVN civil service. Such family ties would, among other things, provide an efficient channel for corruption.

<sup>10</sup>(U) The apparent "overrepresentation" of Catholics in the officer corps may owe to the belief of a number of younger officers (including President Thieu himself) that membership in the Catholic church offered a means of advancement under the Diem regime.

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(U) Table 4

## RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF SELECTED SOUTH VIETNAMESE INSTITUTIONS (In percent)

Religion	Total Population	Constituent Assembly	Lower House	Upper House	RVNAF Officer Corps
Buddhist (Mahayana)	59.0	31.0	32.5	20.0	62.2
Catholic	10.4	29.0	26.0	43.0	19.4
Hoa Hao	9.0	9.5	9.0	3.0	0.2
Cao Dai	9.0	3.0	4.0	7.0	1.3
Protestant	0.6	1.0	1.5	--	1.0
Buddhist (Theravada)	2.9	3.0	5.5	--	--
Confucianist	6.4	7.5	2.5	--	12.0
Undeclared, unknown	2.7	16.0	19.0	16.0	3.0

(C) Next to the civil service, the RVNAF officer corps proportionately employs the largest number of educated South Vietnamese. By and large, RVNAF officers have completed the equivalent of a high school education, and more than 7 percent of all officers have advanced degrees. Indeed, Ph.D. holders constitute 5 percent of the generals, 13.4 percent of the colonels, 14.6 percent of field grade officers, 9.1 percent of the company grade officers, and 2.4 percent of officer candidates. The most popular field apparently is mathematics (6.1 percent of all Ph.Ds); 13.4 percent of the colonels and 7.8 percent of the company grade officers have an advanced degree in this field.<sup>11</sup>

(C) Regarding prior civilian occupation, more than half of all RVNAF officers (53.6 percent) entered the service directly from high school or college. But of those officers who had civilian jobs before entering the service, 12.9 percent were in the teaching field (including 21.5 percent of all officer candidates and 26.9 percent of all second lieutenants). Taken together, they represent a loss of more than 3000 teachers and professors to educational institutions throughout South Vietnam. However, many of these officers probably will not remain in

<sup>11</sup>(U) Mathematics is heavily stressed at the national military academy and is a popular field for advanced studies in Vietnamese universities in general.

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the army as a career (few hold field grade or higher ranks), and many will reenter the teaching profession while still holding reserve commissions and future service obligations.<sup>12</sup> The civil service appears to constitute a large occupational group (21.1 percent of all RVNAF officers), along with business (2.8 percent) and the professions (3.6 percent),<sup>13</sup> but very few RVNAF officers above the rank of captain

(U) Table 5

## OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED SOUTH VIETNAMESE INSTITUTIONS (In percent)

Occupation	Constituent Assembly (1966)	Village Councils	Hamlet Chiefs	Upper House (1967)	Lower House (1967)	RVNAF Officers (as Civilians, ca. 1967)
		(ca. 1965-67)				
Agriculture	6.0	57.0	45.0	3.0	4.0	1.8
Professions	35.0	5.0	4.0	54.0	31.0	3.6
Military	17.0	0.5	0.5	18.0	24.0	
Civil service	18.0	4.0	5.0	12.0	26.0	21.1
Business <sup>a</sup>	14.0	11.0	6.0	10.0	7.0	2.8
Notable <sup>b</sup>	7.5	2.0	0.5	3.0	--	
Village/Hamlet official	--	13.0	34.0	--	7.0	
Provincial council	--	0.5	--	--	--	
Private industry <sup>a</sup>	--	4.0	2.0	--	0.5	
Handicrafts	--	2.0	2.0	--	--	0.3
Domestic work	--	1.0	1.0	--	--	
Other	2.0	--	--	--	0.5	

<sup>a</sup>"Business" refers to individual entrepreneurs such as merchants, and "private industry" refers to workers in such enterprises as cement, brick, and textile factories, and rice mills.

<sup>b</sup>A traditional position in the Vietnamese village.

<sup>12</sup>(U) Not infrequently the threat of reactivation has hindered the pursuit of academic freedom and political research.

<sup>13</sup>(U) See Table 5.

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had civilian occupations before entering military service. When the occupational distribution of the RVNAF officer corps is compared with other groups of government officials, it appears that the military has only a limited range of contact with the economic and occupational problems of civilian life.

(U) What emerges from the foregoing description of the social origins of the RVNAF officer corps is that the RVNAF officer corps constitutes an elite in South Vietnam that is characterized by its social, educational, and occupational distance from the bulk of Vietnamese society (and other elite institutions). Officers' prior contact with and understanding of the rural way of life and problems of civilian life in general have been limited. Despite the growing importance of the RVNAF role in the development of the countryside, the urban outlook of most RVNAF officers has hindered their identification with and empathy toward the bulk of the rural population. The portrait of the RVNAF officer of a decade ago remains essentially unchanged and reflects the politicized nature of recruitment and training policies in the South Vietnamese military establishment. This is not to say, however, that the social composition of the RVNAF is not itself varied. While to most of society the RVNAF officer corps appears a distinct entity, internally it is by no means a monolithic organization.

(C) Indeed, important differences between officer grades suggest that the specific composition of the RVNAF has changed somewhat. The composite RVNAF general officer in 1967, for example, was a non-Catholic ethnic Vietnamese (70 percent of all general officers do not consider themselves Catholic), was born within the territory of present-day South Vietnam (75 percent of all general officers were born south of the 17th parallel), and had entered the service directly from secondary school or college (three generals had advanced degrees: one in law and two in mathematics). In comparison with general officers, officer candidates<sup>14</sup> display a greater range of educational and prior occupational

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<sup>14</sup>(C) For record-keeping purposes, this category includes not only the cadets at the Dalat Military Academy but also those who hold the rank of operational warrant officer.

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experience, and slightly more diverse regional origin (68.9 percent were born south of the 17th parallel). The greatest regional diversity within the RVNAF exists among the field grade officers; the more than 40 percent of them who were born north of the 17th parallel form the peak of the bell-shaped distribution of this variable. In contrast, across all ranks the proportion of non-Catholics grows larger with each jump down the grade scale. Thus, while the demographic composition of the RVNAF officer corps has changed over time, as typified by the data on regional origins, such change has done little to bridge the basic gap between the RVNAF officer and South Vietnamese society.

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## III. CAREER PATTERNS

In simultaneously playing the roles of administrator and combatant since the fall of Diem, the South Vietnamese military establishment has jeopardized the effective functioning of both. The proliferation of opportunities for corruption with the increase in foreign assistance and the diversion from combat commands that the opportunity for wealth tended to foster have inhibited the development of professionalism in the RVNAF officer corps. In this analysis, the term professionalism<sup>15</sup> denotes a sense of corporateness and a system of self-administration appropriate to the complexity of the military establishment's mission but autonomous from the vagaries of civilian politics. Officers advance on the basis of the standards of the profession rather than by political windfalls. Above all, the professional military officer considers himself an expert in the performance of a highly specialized task.

From an examination of officers' career patterns and a review of the history of the RVNAF over the past decade, it is apparent that the RVNAF officer corps lacks some of the requisites of professionalism. Admittedly, the data on which the analysis primarily relies -- officers' service records -- do not permit a definitive study. As one student of military elites has suggested,

. . . the professional officer requires analysis in terms of variables which would be applicable to any professional or elite group: social origins, career lines, social status and prestige, career motivations, self-conceptions, and ideology.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>See the discussion of this concept in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier; A Social and Political Portrait*, Glencoe, Ill., 1964; and Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-64*, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.

<sup>16</sup>Morris Janowitz, "Military Elites and the Study of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1 (March 1957), p. 7.

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In looking at RVNAF careers through the variables of source of commission, year of entry into the service, and age, training, and dependency ratios, the analysis is intended to identify career patterns that indicate bases of cohesion and factionalism among the ranks and suggest priorities for RVNAF reform.

The lack of professionalism owes partly to the military's involvement in South Vietnamese politics since 1963. Few analysts would dispute the hypothesis of a generally inverse relationship between the rank and military skill of an RVNAF officer. But even before 1963, command ineptitude plagued the efforts of the RVNAF to engage and defeat the Viet Cong. Diem's preoccupation with the political loyalty of the RVNAF resulted in a tradition of poorly trained officers (who qualified for commissions by education but not by temperament) more attuned to the dictates of politics than those of military strategy. Moreover, Diem's reported attitudes toward casualties on the battlefield tended to inhibit risk-taking by unit commanders. Even after Diem passed from the scene, RVNAF officers by and large remained timid and unwilling to engage the enemy. Since 1965, for example, only five RVNAF lieutenant colonels and fifteen majors have been killed in action against the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces.<sup>17</sup>

That associations within governing or administrative bodies are based on common educational experiences ("the old school tie") is a universal characteristic of elite formation.<sup>18</sup> In the case of South Vietnam, however, the paucity of these institutions and the participation of their stellar graduates in national politics have tended to make

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<sup>17</sup>R. D. Heinl, Jr., "How Effective Is the Army of South Vietnam?" *Boston Globe*, September 22, 1968, p. A-7.

<sup>18</sup>See, for example, J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, 1962; Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*; David A. Wilson, "The Military in Thai Politics," in Johnson, ed., pp. 253-276; Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity*, New Haven, 1962; William Gutteridge, *Armed Forces in New States*, London, 1962; Morroe Berger, *Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt Since Napoleon*, Princeton University, Center for International Studies, Research Monograph No. 6, 1960; and Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton, 1963, pp. 251-281.

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them the basis for mutually exclusive group affiliations that have persistently divided the military elite.<sup>19</sup>

(U) Following the French withdrawal, a joint U.S.-Vietnamese military school planning board was established to develop a training system consonant with the role and mission of the newly organized RVNAF. It was hoped that the service academies could supply officers to command a Vietnamese army that would be able to hold back a Korea-type invasion of North Vietnamese regulars across the 17th parallel. A training program had been initiated at Hué by the end of 1948, which by November 1950 had produced approximately 200 junior officers. The Dalat Military Academy was inaugurated on November 5, 1950 by the then Emperor Bao Dai and the French Commissioner General, and it was expected that 150 officers could be graduated per year to eventually fill the sparse ranks of the field commands.<sup>20</sup>

(U) Since 1954, the three principal sources of officers have been the service academy at Dalat (13.2 percent of all officers received commissions there), the Thu Duc reserve training system (65.6 percent), and the enlisted ranks (less than 10 percent of the officer corps, but 13.4 percent of full colonels).<sup>21</sup> While 30 percent of the general officers were commissioned at Dalat, only 17.5 percent of the company grade officers and less than one percent of all officer candidates received commissions there.<sup>22</sup> In contrast, the proportion of officers of all ranks commissioned at the Thu Duc schools has steadily increased: 5 percent of the general officers, 11 percent of the colonels, 30.3 percent of field grade officers, 55.7 percent of company

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<sup>19</sup>(U) Indeed, as Part Two demonstrates, the source of commission together with year of entry into the service are the two major criteria upon which political alliances within the RVNAF appear to be based and can be indexed.

<sup>20</sup>(U) In 1952, for example, there were only 80 field grade officers available to command an army of 150,000 men.

<sup>21</sup>(U) See Table 6.

<sup>22</sup>(U) Officer candidates receive actual commissions from academies, but do not receive rank until they have served six to twelve months with ARVN units.

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(C) Table 6

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE SERVICE ACADEMIES AND TRAINING FACILITIES (U)

Academy/Location	Student Body	Description
Dalat Military Academy	Approximately 200 field and company grade officers per year	Formerly the National Military Academy of Hue, this service school was established in the mid-1940s and was moved to Dalat in 1950 by the French. In 1957, the course was extended to 4 years and modeled after the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Cadets average 17-25 in age, and are required to have graduated from high school or, in the case of entrance from the ranks, pass a special examination. Between one- and two-thirds of each class graduate.
Thu Duc Military School Complex	400-600 per class	Formerly the Nam Dinh Reserve officers school in North Vietnam, the Thu Duc complex has seven branch schools (armor, signal, transportation, ordnance, administration, artillery, and engineering), with courses varying from 1 to 9 months. This is the primary source of reserve commissions, which after 6 months of service with an ARVN unit are converted to regular second lieutenantcies. By 1958, almost 3300 reserve officers had been graduated.
Medical Training Center, Saigon	Approximately 550 per class	This center trains medical officers and corpsmen. Course lasts up to 4 years depending upon the technical content.
Quang Trung Training Center	10,000 per class	Primarily designed for paramilitary training, this center has mainly NCOs and enlisted men. Course lasts 8 weeks, and training often is given to entire units.
Psychological Warfare and Intelligence School, Cholon	Maximum capacity: 250 per class	The G-2 course lasts 7-8 weeks.
Dependents School	950 students in 1956	A school system instituted by the French; dependents of Vietnamese military personnel are given instruction in military and academic subjects.
Commando & Physical Training School, Nao Trang	3200 per class	The school conducts commando training for individuals and company-sized units and ranger battalions. Individual commando training lasts 7 weeks; unit commando training, 10 weeks; individual ranger training lasts 8 weeks.
Signal Training Center, Vung Tau	1000 per class	The center is primarily for NCOs and a few junior officers. Courses last 1-5 months depending upon the demand and are administered by the commander of the Thu Duc complex.
Command and General Staff College, Saigon	Approximately 200 field and company grade officers per year	Established in 1956, this college offers a 10-month course for field grade officers and a 5-month course for company grade officers.

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grade officers, and over 90 percent of the recently commissioned officer candidates. The Hué-Dalat system, in contrast, has contributed a declining proportion of officers; less than 5 percent of all field grade and junior officers are products of that system. To be sure, the declining proportion of Dalat commissions is a function of the growth of the army and the development of other school systems with larger capacities and shorter training periods.<sup>23</sup>

(C) As the nature of the war in South Vietnam has changed, the organizational structure of the armed forces has also changed. What once was primarily an infantry-oriented army with few special components (e.g., to prevent coups and protect the chief of state) has gradually been transformed into a force more appropriate to counterinsurgency warfare. This change is reflected in the declining proportion of RVNAF officers receiving infantry commissions and the subsequent rise in the proportion holding commissions in other than infantry. Whereas 70 percent of RVNAF general officers were commissioned in the infantry, only approximately 50 percent of all field grade officers and 47.7 percent of company grade officers received such commissions. In all ranks, a little more than half the officers have infantry commissions today.

(C) This "de-infantryzation" reflects the proportionate increase of special forces, ranger, and airborne units in the total RVNAF force structure. Such special units, together with artillery, constitute 10.1 percent of all RVNAF commissions and 12.5 percent of field officer commissions. In addition to special warfare units, the proportion of officers serving with the technical services, such as engineering,

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<sup>23</sup>(C) The roles of Vietnamese service academies have changed, and the bases upon which factions within the officer corps have traditionally formed may have changed also. For example, unless the Dalat faction continues to dominate the field grade ranks, there is the possibility that the Thu Duc group may come to displace them, or conversely, the size of the Thu Duc classes may make group formation and cohesion so difficult as to promote, or at least not hinder, the continued existence of the Dalat elite. In any event, while fundamental changes in the power structure of the RVNAF are occurring, the service academies are likely to continue to be suppliers of political futures as well as limited military skills.

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communications, and medicine, has increased by an average of two percentage points from the field grades to the company grades and officer candidates.<sup>24</sup> Temporary commissions are far less prevalent than would have been expected judging from conversations with American military advisors of Vietnamese units.<sup>25</sup> The relative paucity of such commissions in most ranks suggests that promotions are distributed on the basis of agreement between the generals on promotion boards rather than on the recommendation of individual officers. The implications of such negotiations for the promotion process were aptly summarized in the following quip attributed to Nguyen Cao Ky: "Before I can fire even a driver, I have to check with eight generals and their families."<sup>26</sup> (This will be considered more fully in Section IV.)

(C) The growth in size of the RVNAF officer corps clearly reflects the expansion of the war and U.S. military assistance to the Republic. Since 1960, 60.1 percent of all RVNAF officers have entered the service, of which 32.3 percent entered between 1964 and 1966. In contrast, half of the general officers entered the service from 1946 to 1951; 40.5 percent of the colonels entered in 1950-1951; and 68.2 percent of all field grade officers had been commissioned by 1953. In comparison, by 1953 only 13.4 percent of all company grade officers were in the service, and only 10 percent of all ranks in the present officer corps had joined. Of the total company grade officers, 51 percent joined the service between 1960 and 1966, although from 1953 to 1954 almost 25 percent of

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<sup>24</sup>(C) The consequences of this apparent "de-infantryzation," however, on prestige, morale, and interservice rivalry in the RVNAF have not been systematically explored. Similarly, no systematic analysis has been done of the extent to which the changing structure of the RVNAF has affected the formation of factions within the officer corps. Such analyses are essential to any assessment of the RVNAF's ability to survive -- both politically and militarily -- the consequences of an American withdrawal.

<sup>25</sup>(U) Temporary commissions are given in cases where an officer is assigned to a position intended for a rank higher than the one he currently holds.

<sup>26</sup>(U) *Time*, February 3, 1967, p. 32.

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the company grade officers and 30.2 percent of all field grade officers had entered. The major periods of entry -- 1946-48, 1950-51, 1953-54, and 1960 to the present -- correspond to important phases in the evolution of the Republic of Vietnam's army and political system.<sup>27</sup>

(C) Since the major growth of the RVNAF occurred primarily in the 1960s, one of the main characteristics of the RVNAF is that its ranks are filled with men of approximately the same generation or age range. Almost half of the South Vietnamese officers (49.8 percent) fall into the 25-32 age group, although the general officers tend to be about a decade older. General officers range in age from 36 to 52, and 70 percent are between 39 and 45 years of age. The following other ranks had significant numbers within the latter range: colonels, 52.6 percent; lieutenant colonels, 45.5 percent; majors, 42.2 percent; and captains, 31.1 percent.

(C) The ages of field grade officers range from 29 to 55 and reflect the variety of career patterns in the RVNAF officer corps. Almost 50 percent of field grade officers are between 35 and 40, and 79.4 percent of all field grade officers are between 35 and 46 years old. Full colonels similarly span twenty years in age (33-53) while half of them fall between 37 and 42. The widest range of all is found among company grade officers (22-55 years old), although 42.8 percent of them are between 26 and 31. Officer candidates, while generally the youngest men (73.5 percent are between 25 and 32), are characterized by a similarly wide range in age (from 20 to 52). The lower the rank, the larger its population and the greater the diversity in age. Thus, each rank below full colonel includes two kinds of officers: those who have risen rapidly from other ranks and those who have not.

(C) Perhaps the greatest differentiating characteristic within the officer corps relates to education and training. Early advisory missions repeatedly noted the predominance of French over American

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<sup>27</sup>(U) As will be pointed out in Part Two, the officers who entered at these times constitute essentially different factions within the RVNAF, and year of entry can serve as an index of such factionalization.

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training and the tactical differences that such education produced. In his study of advisor-counterpart relations in South Vietnam, Gerald Hickey found that

In the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, French influence continues to be strong. All members of the high command of the Joint General Staff are French-trained. Some of them are graduates of St. Cyr, and most of the officers served in the French army during the Indochina war.<sup>28</sup>

While the influence of French doctrines and concept of counterinsurgency on the RVNAF officer corps is no doubt still significant,<sup>29</sup> the proportion of officers receiving training in France has declined over the years.

(C) From 1954 to 1957, 1258 ARVN officers were sent to the United States, and an additional 261 received training at other U.S. installations outside CONUS. From 1957 to 1958, 778 officers were sent to the United States primarily to study standard infantry training. Since that time the number of Vietnamese attending school in the United States has increased, and between 1964 and 1968, almost 3000 Vietnamese officers received training in the United States. By mid-1967 less than one percent of all RVNAF officers had training in France listed on their service records, while 8 percent had listed training in the United States, though now the proportion of U.S.-trained officers is over 20 percent. Thus, approximately 10 percent of RVNAF officers benefited from training outside Vietnam. Almost all officers view overseas training as a way to escape domestic purges and make important family business connections to

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<sup>28</sup>(C) *The American Military Advisor and His Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam* (U), The Rand Corporation, RM-4482-ARPA, March 1965 (Confidential), p. 14. In contrast, John Vann, a long-time Vietnam hand and then the Director of CORDS IV Corps operations, estimated in 1967 that less than 10 percent of the RVNAF officer corps had ever served with the Viet Minh, and our data on source of commission indicate that only 15 officers had ever had this experience and also wanted it to appear in their service records.

<sup>29</sup>(C) RVNAF officers trained at St. Cyr and the Ecole Militaire had the benefit of the excellent courses offered at those institutions that used as field exercises the problem of the planning and execution of military coups.

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supplement their income. Indeed, travel to the United States with all its perquisites has become so valued a prize that the Command and General Staff College has had difficulty getting qualified students to attend its course in lieu of a similar course offered in the United States. However, the RVNAF officer corps appears to be well endowed with the foreign language skills that provide access to modern technology. More than a third of the officers can speak at least French, and more than half can speak at least English.<sup>30</sup> Finally, the impact of both French and American advisory missions is reflected in the high proportion of officers proficient enough to serve as interpreters, and English language training is a popular and increasingly necessary training assignment.

(U) As a profession, the RVNAF provides few legitimate economic incentives to encourage the development of a sense of national duty and *esprit de corps*. The RVNAF pay scale ranges from approximately \$55 per month for officer candidates and second lieutenants to about \$175 per month for general officers. The South Vietnamese military establishment does not, like its American counterpart, have extensive fringe benefits: little actual medical care is provided for the troops; there are no post exchanges; and often necessities and luxuries alike have to be bought on the black market. More important, as far as can be determined, the army does not feed either its enlisted men or officers. Instead, each man is given a food allowance (except when on operations, where U.S. "C" rations are supplied in lieu of rice) to buy necessary foodstuffs and rice from local markets. American advisors consider this allowance in most cases inadequate even for one person. To support a family necessitates stretching the few piastres a day beyond the limits of even the most frugal of intentions. In short, the burden of dependency among officers is great.

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<sup>30</sup>(C) In the data on foreign language presented in Table 23, p. 66, a high proportion of officers indicated they can speak Laotian. This may be suspect since it seems implausible for Vietnamese officers to be that proficient in the language of a neighboring country to which passage is restricted by war.

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(C) More than half of the RVNAF officers are married, and of those who are, 34.4 percent have one to five children to support. The tendency to marry and have children increases with rank and age. For example, almost 60 percent of the officer candidates are single, while only 6.4 percent of the field grade officers are unmarried. The majority of field grade officers and above have two to six children, and about 30 percent of the company grade officers have one to four. In addition, Vietnamese men often are responsible for the support of their parents, and this makes the burden of dependency even greater. Undoubtedly, the dependency equation figures prominently in the propensity of officers to engage in corrupt enterprises. Thus, mobility and advancement in the military are directly linked to improving one's way of life and chances for survival; consequently, loyalty to the service often is contingent upon the conditions of service rather than any commitment to institutional or national goals.<sup>31</sup> When choosing political sides is perceived as the way to advance, and there are few other incentives, officers find it the path of least resistance.

(U) Moreover, the lack of an effective and regularized system of advancement has produced the wide ranges and fluctuations in age and experience within the ranks of the RVNAF officer corps. With the politicized promotion system, intensified in periods of erratic mobilization, older and often more experienced members of the officer corps have been passed over in favor of younger, politically oriented officers. In 1967, the RVNAF offered officers an uncertain career at best. The RVNAF itself was characterized by a system of internal administration that reflected and was dependent upon the vagaries of domestic South Vietnamese politics. Circumstances that, a decade ago, had promoted cohesion within the military and nonintervention in politics had been eroded by the

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<sup>31</sup>(U) See Janowitz, "Military Elites," p. 14. The potential this presents for VC exploitation, of course, helps account for the three-pronged attack by the VC against ARVN from 1964 to mid-1967 (see Douglas Pike, *The Vietcong*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968). Significant for the policy of Vietnamization in 1969 would be an estimate of the extent to which this potential still exists and might surface in the wake of, say, a mini-Tet offensive led by fresh NVA troops as the trend of U.S. withdrawal appeared irreversible.

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pressures of the war; the necessity for a large officer corps, coupled with the failure of civilian government, contributed to the rise of factions within the military establishment and to its subsequent intervention in politics.

(U) The foregoing partial study of the RVNAF officer corps as a military elite suggests the extent of the corps' deficiency in professionalism and some of the obstacles to the development of that requisite of a competent modern defense force. It is hoped that future research will extend this analysis and update these findings by conducting field interviews to elicit data on officers' morale, motivation, and ideology.

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## IV. REFORM OF THE RVNAF

(U) There is little mystery about what is wrong with the RVNAF, but there is considerable debate about how it can be reformed. The experience of the 1968 Tet offensive led to the conclusion that while the RVNAF has improved, it is not better than the NVA (North Vietnamese Army). Three major points of view are advanced about the capacities of the RVNAF. The first maintains that the RVNAF is rapidly improving and that the prognosis for a self-sufficient force able to withstand an internal threat is good. The second stresses that the RVNAF is making only limited progress and in order to meet future responsibilities must undertake major reforms. The third position contends that the RVNAF can never become an effective fighting force. What is remarkable about these positions is that their proponents all seem to draw upon the same body of evidence to support their conclusions. While most official and informed observers agree that the battlefield situation has improved since 1967, for example, all give as a reason a relative decline in the capabilities and morale of the Viet Cong rather than a substantial improvement in those of the RVNAF.

(C) The RVNAF has changed since 1967, but the meaning and evaluation of such change is ambiguous. The RVNAF's total strength has increased 27 percent since 1967; the number of regular battalions engaged in combat operations rose approximately 11 percent in 1968; from March 1968 to March 1969 ARVN battalion effectiveness (as measured by enemy KIAs) increased 8 percent over the previous 12-month period, and morale has improved since the 1968 Tet offensive as a result of the program instituted to increase RVNAF firepower and combat support capabilities. There has not been a fundamental quantum jump in RVNAF effectiveness, however. Regular force operations have actually declined since the first quarter of 1968, as have the number of enemy KIAs per contact; the number of small unit operations with contact is about half the 1967 figure; desertion rates have continued to be high since 1966; and unit performance still varies considerably, some units in II<sup>nd</sup> Corps having actually declined in effectiveness ratings despite an overall increase in average performance by the end of 1968. The multiplicity

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and periodicity of such assessments tend to blur the fundamental determinants of RVNAF performance and potential. Put simply, RVNAF leadership lacks the incentives to foster professionalism in the officer corps. The immediate priority, therefore, should be to professionalize the corps in addition to the current program of modernizing force structure and firepower.

(U) The development of professionalism was hampered initially by the failure to reduce the military's linkage with the Vietnamese political system. Ever since 1954, when the United States Mission undertook to train and equip a South Vietnamese army, a tradition of national loyalty and unified commands and politics has been lacking. At best, the military was itself in transition from a French auxiliary force to the nascent National Republic Army to, finally, a complex organization whose complexity (recommended by the American Mission) only increased its susceptibility to political control. Often it seemed that the military was engaged in a factional struggle to control the government rather than in the struggle in the countryside against the Viet Cong. ARVN's first problem, then, was that as initially conceived, its existence depended upon a kind of government that was not present in Vietnam. The kind of military organization that the United States advised constructing in 1954 did not accord with the political milieu required to support it; consequently, the first years of the ARVN's existence were marked by more fighting among the non-Communist South Vietnamese than between ARVN and the Viet Cong.

(U) If the development of professionalism in the RVNAF has been hindered by the vagaries of Vietnamese and world politics, it has also been hindered by internal problems within the corps. Foremost has been the problem of leadership. American advisors to the RVNAF have consistently cited the lack of effective leadership as the most frequent cause of ineffective or marginal ratings for the units they advised, and poor leadership has without exception been cited in all major evaluations of unit effectiveness. In addition, many advisors reported that the traditional centralization of Vietnamese military organization and hence operating authority worked against victory on the battlefield. The advisory system, however, failed to

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realize the political connection between poor leadership and poor performance. The American advisor's exhortations to his counterpart to be more militarily aggressive were not productive, because such actions were not supported by the counterpart's superiors. The advisory system thus focused attention at the wrong level of command. Not realizing the organizational realities, advisors erroneously tried to introduce change by example at lower levels instead of promoting change in RVNAF's top echelons. What was wrong with the RVNAF was also wrong with the Vietnamese political system, and the American advisor -- hardly trained in diplomacy -- was bucking the latter in his effort to assist the former.

(U) Closely related to the lack of a regularized pattern of civilian-military relations and frustration of the advisors' efforts to improve the quality of RVNAF leadership is the RVNAF's administration and promotion system. A disheartened RVNAF major who had served with the French Foreign Legion, Viet Minh, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese forces over a twenty-year career, observed:

Our soldiers are good, as good as the VC or the North Vietnamese, but the problem is leadership. . . . We have officers who spend 15 years in Saigon, and they get medals and get promoted . . . we have soldiers who spend 10 years in Dakto, and they get nothing. It is a matter of knowing the right people and paying the right people.<sup>32</sup>

In any army the key to supplying qualified leadership is the promotion system, and in Vietnam, promotions depend upon support from a strong faction.

(U) While on paper the RVNAF has a "reformed" promotion system, it has changed little in operation. The promotion system responds to the politics of the senior generals rather than to the needs of the professional military or the war itself. Before 1966 no objective promotion or officer evaluation system existed in the RVNAF. Decree/Law 13, implemented in late 1965, stated the general bases upon which

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<sup>32</sup>(U) Quoted in Bernard Weinraub, "Major Deplores Saigon's Forces," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1968.

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promotions were to be awarded, but the accompanying regulations only centralized the authority for promotions at the general officer level and did not specify the actual criteria upon which officer eligibility was to be evaluated. In practice, then, the tradition was maintained of general officers securing promotions for their protégés through negotiation and compromise at promotion boards. In mid-1968, a former South Vietnamese lieutenant colonel (later a Lower House deputy) characterized the process as follows:

We have a board of promotion and everything, but despite that every general officer has to deal with other generals to survive, so promotions are actually handled in . . . [this] way: If you want your men to be promoted, you have to [agree to] promote those the other generals suggest. So when the list comes around, tradition has it that two-thirds of those suggested by each general actually get promoted.<sup>33</sup>

This process is especially conspicuous in the promotion and placement of field grade officers.

(C) The price paid for the promotion system's responsiveness to the politics of the senior RVNAF generals is its professional autonomy. The RVNAF has been unable to effectively meet the requirements of professionalism and the war itself. First, the selection system has tended to reinforce and exacerbate the gap between the GVN and the population. In particular, the educational requirements for officer candidacy (i.e., the equivalent of a high school diploma) and the means employed (i.e., occupational and educational drafts) to provide compensatory numbers of cadets to parallel the uneven growth of the RVNAF have produced officers more interested in the perquisites of rank than in military leadership. The urban orientation of the well educated has widened the gap between officers and soldiers. The peasant army is unwilling (often with good reason) to follow a "Saigon cowboy"; the officer, in turn, generally seeks to avoid the hardships of rural and jungle life. The requirement that officers be well educated has also meant that the armed forces have been competing for scarce talent while unable to offer pay and living conditions comparable with those available in civilian life.

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<sup>33</sup>(U) In private conversation.

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Ultimately, the RVNAF resorted to conscription to fill the officer corps and staff the army. This produced situations where the ordinary soldiers would be more experienced than the unwilling bourgeois cadet or officer who led them. To remain in the service beyond the initial period of commitment required either coercion by the national police or persuasion through the promise of trips to the United States or staff appointments in Saigon or at provincial and corps headquarters. As officers (having acquired valuable operational experience) moved to the better jobs, inexperienced cadets and junior officers replaced them and consistently reduced the already short supply of experienced leaders for the RVNAF. Furthermore, the majority of other promotions made in the RVNAF are not for military skills. Special, "other than battlefield," promotions in 1966-67 and 1967-68 accounted for 19 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of all promotions; less than 2 percent of all officers in those years owed their rank to combat performance.

(C) In addition, although the quality of the RVNAF officer corps could be significantly and almost immediately improved by relaxing the educational requirements for commissions, the JGS has continually refused to do so. It refused in 1954 when ARVN was organized, again in 1958 when it was reorganized, and again in early 1969. Only 7 percent of all RVNAF officers have received commissions from the ranks,<sup>34</sup> and this proportion declined to only 4.8 percent in the 1967-68 class of officer candidates. Any concerted JGS effort to raise the overall quality of officer leadership must take advantage of the experienced leaders from the enlisted ranks.

(C) Realities of force requirements have moderated the influence of army politics in the sense that the need for more officers and hence promotions has outstripped the capacity of the RVNAF political system to sanction such promotions. In fact, leadership density in the regular forces declined from 1967 to 1968: leadership density increased by less than one percent over the previous level, while the regular

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<sup>34</sup>(C) Many of these commissions, moreover, are from the French Army (which had the same educational requirements for Vietnamese noncoms as the RVNAF now has for officers) and thus represent older rather than fundamentally different kinds of officers.

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forces increased by about 19 percent. Thus, in comparison with past two-year periods, the annual promotion rate actually declined despite the constant growth of the regular forces in size and leadership needs. Current estimates suggest that it will take the RVNAF a minimum of 2.5 years to fill the mid-1968 requirement for officers.

(U) Finally, the rapid expansion of the RVNAF filled the officer corps with men of approximately the same age (50 percent of all officers, for example, are between 25 and 31 years old). This relative chronological homogeneity has created gaps between those officers who spend a lucrative career in the national, provincial, or corps capitals and those who bear the brunt of the fighting (with few rewards) in the hinterlands. Morale is understandably low among Vietnamese field officers who have held the same rank for 8 or 10 years while witnessing the rapid advance of their Saigon and corps colleagues through favoritism.

(U) Currently the "political" officers are divided between Thieu and Ky, and there are some indications that officers bearing the brunt of the fighting, who are forming a third faction, are opposed to both. Thus, the hope that Thieu's apparent victory over Ky in the struggle for control of the executive and the army will bring stability and effectiveness to RVNAF command may well be frustrated. The Thieu consolidations represent the victory of one faction over another, rather than the end to the causes of such factionalism. Indeed, as is elaborated in Part Two, the Thieu consolidations represent but another act in the continuing drama of coup and countercoup in the Vietnamese military. Unless the promotion system is regularized and given immunity to the vagaries of general officer politicking, Thieu may well be opposed by a growing coalition of "fighting" officers. And until the promotion system is liberalized and regularized, any increase in RVNAF effectiveness after the Thieu consolidations will be marginal.

(C) Without major reform of the RVNAF command and selection system, it is unlikely that the present RVNAF will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Viet Cong. Moreover, as the GVN's chief representative in the countryside, the RVNAF will only continue to widen the gap between the government and the rural population. Such a reform program should, of course, concentrate on

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organizational and command changes to improve RVNAF strategic capability to assume a greater share of the overall military burden and to counter the enemy's military and political infrastructure.

(C) Fundamentally, however, RVNAF reform requires immediate, top-level action to make the basis of promotion and assignment professional competence rather than political loyalty. This is essential if the RVNAF is to emerge as an effective professional military establishment in South Vietnam. President Thieu has succeeded in replacing the senior generals and other influential officers loyal to Vice President Ky, but political loyalty as the major criterion for advancement has not been changed. If politicking and intrigue remain the basis of command assignment in RVNAF, rank and military skill will continue to be inversely correlated, and the Thieu consolidations may have only temporary effect. The tension between supporters of General Cao Van Vien and those of former Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, for example, reflected the basic antagonism between northerners and southerners in Vietnamese society and was symptomatic of the partisanship that threatens to further divide the RVNAF generals and weaken Thieu's hold over them. Similarly, at the battalion level and throughout the field generally, the tension between those officers who have fought hardest and advanced least and those who have had little fighting experience but have rapidly advanced is likely both to hamper the ability of the GVN to successfully assume major fighting responsibilities and to spur the current drive to elevate more southerners to command positions. Unless the closed system of loyalties and regionalism is replaced in the promotion and assignment of officers, inept leadership and corruption will continue to paralyze the RVNAF regardless of the magnitude of future U.S./Allied assistance to the GVN.

(C) South Vietnam's need for a professional rather than a political military establishment is great. So also are the opportunities to develop one. But the impetus for reform must come from the top. Fundamentally, such a transformation will depend in the long run upon the ability of President Thieu to begin now to build a political base outside the RVNAF and thereby insulate the officer corps from the vagaries of Vietnamese politics. Central to increasing the chances for

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successfully Vietnamizing the war is the need to anticipate now the tensions which continued reliance upon political rather than professional criteria for officer advancement will generate. Reform by executive initiative would also greatly reduce the chances of the GVN's falling victim once again to factional warfare within the military.

(U) The military has the matériel but lacks the skill to effectively govern South Vietnam. Consequently, the military's aspiration for continued domination of the government is likely to be frustrated by this lack. Most South Vietnamese, when assessing chances of postwar stability, still consider the present leadership a minority government, and this belief will persist unless the government's future performance improves its image. To do this will require a professional rather than a political army. The question is whether it is possible to stimulate professionalism in the RVNAF by reform rather than by revolution.

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## V. SUPPORTING DATA

### GENERAL DESCRIPTION

(U) The service records of the RVNAF officer corps current to August 1967 (N = 25,016; see Table 7) comprise the main body of data used in this analysis. These service records, modeled on the reporting format used by the U.S. Army, contain vitae on Vietnamese officers that permit a "demographic" survey of the officer corps. The contents of the service records include the following:

source of commission	type of commission
parent branch	marital status
month of entry into service	number of children
year of entry into service	place of birth
month of birth	military education
year of birth	civilian education
month of permanent rank	civilian occupation
year of permanent rank	airborne code
month of functional rank	foreign language proficiency
year of functional rank	permanent rank
nationality	type of rank
religion	functional rank

(U) These records were gathered and then transferred to computer tape. As with any large body of data, particularly those that have been obtained and processed in a war zone, both systematic and random errors may abound. It was impossible to track down what later appeared to be errors in coding. In Table 7, for example, we have assumed the "Other" rank category to consist of officer candidates: they are similar enough in age, education, and other characteristics to warrant this assumption. In other cases, however, extrapolation and regrouping were not advisable. Fortunately, these variables did not prove essential to the analysis. In most cases the data were relatively intact, with total error ranging no higher than a few percent of the total sample. A summary of missing data over all variables in the service records is presented in Table 8.

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(C) Table 7

## RANK STRUCTURE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) OFFICER CORPS (U) (August 1967)

Rank	No. of Officers on Active Duty <sup>a</sup>	Percent (N = 25,016) <sup>b</sup>
General Officer		
General	2	
Lieutenant General	8	
Major General	12	
Brigadier General	<u>18</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	40	0.2
Field Grade Officer		
Colonel	82	0.3
Lieutenant Colonel	366	1.5
Major	<u>1,315</u>	<u>5.3</u>
Total	1,763	7.0
Company Grade Officer		
Captain	4,058	16.2
First Lieutenant	6,638	26.5
Second Lieutenant	<u>4,624</u>	<u>18.5</u>
Total	15,320	61.2
Officer Candidate	7,480	29.9
Other <sup>c</sup>	413	1.7
Grand total	<u>25,016</u>	<u>100.0</u>

<sup>a</sup>Totals derived from a compilation of RVNAF service records obtained in Saigon.

<sup>b</sup>Percentages not given where they round off to 0.0.

<sup>c</sup>Individuals listed in this category are probably Officer Candidates, but verification of the code was impossible because of faulty IBM card records.

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(C) Table 8

## RVNAF OFFICER CORPS STUDY: SUMMARY OF MISSING DATA (U)

Category	Missing Data	
	Blanks & Mispunched Records	Percent (N = 25,016)
Source of commission	268	1.04
Religion	237	0.94
Age	423	1.69
Parent branch	142	0.56
Year of entry into service	219	0.86
Civilian occupation	320	1.24
Airborne degree	16	0.06
Military education	11	0.04
Marital status	178	0.71
Family size	382	1.52
Nationality	137	0.54
Regional origin	269	1.07
Type of commission	112	0.44
Type of rank	785	3.13
Foreign language proficiency	2,232	8.92
Foreign language	2,137	8.54
Military training	158	0.63
Civilian education	3,403	15.45
All categories		2.63

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SOCIAL ORIGINS OF RVNAF OFFICERS

(U) Tables 9 through 13 present data from RVNAF service records on the sociopolitical backgrounds of RVNAF officers. Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage. Percentages are not given when they round off to 0.0.

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(C) Table 9  
NATIONALITY OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	Vietnamese	Cambodian-born Vietnamese	Chinese-born Vietnamese	Other Foreign-born Vietnamese	Nung Tribe	North and North Central Tribe	Rhade Tribe	Cham Jarai, and Muong Tribes	Thai
Gen	2 (100)								
Lt Gen	8 (100)								
Maj Gen	12 (100)								
Brig Gen	18 (100)								
Total Gen Officers	<u>40 (100)</u>								
Col	81 (98.8)	2 (0.5)			1 (1.2)		1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)
Lt Col	358 (97.8)	2 (0.5)			1 (0.3)				
Maj	1,295 (98.5)				6 (0.5)				
Total Field Grade Off	<u>1,734 (98.4)</u>	<u>4 (0.2)</u>			<u>8 (0.5)</u>		<u>1 (0.1)</u>		<u>1 (0.1)</u>
Cept	4,003 (98.6)	6 (0.1)			8 (0.2)	3 (0.1)	15 (0.4)	6 (0.1)	5 (0.1)
1st Lt	6,577 (99.1)	4 (0.1)	4 (0.1)		14 (0.2)	2	5 (0.1)	2	8 (0.1)
2nd Lt	4,540 (98.2)	13 (0.3)	6 (0.1)		6 (0.1)	2	7 (0.2)	2	4 (0.1)
Total Co Grade Off	<u>15,120 (98.7)</u>	<u>23 (0.2)</u>	<u>10 (0.1)</u>		<u>28 (0.2)</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>27 (0.2)</u>	<u>10 (0.1)</u>	<u>17 (0.1)</u>
Officer Candidate	7,372 (98.6)	26 (0.3)	12 (0.2)	1	5 (0.1)	1	11 (0.1)	2	13 (0.2)
Other <sup>a</sup>	<u>403 (97.6)</u>	<u>1 (0.2)</u>	<u>1 (0.2)</u>					<u>1 (0.2)</u>	<u>1 (0.2)</u>
Grand Total	24,669 (98.6)	54 (0.2)	23 (0.1)	1	41 (0.2)	8	39 (0.2)	13 (0.1)	32 (0.1)

<sup>a</sup> Individuals listed in this category are probably Officer Candidates, but verification of the code was impossible because of faulty IBM card records.

REGIONAL ORIGINS OF RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)

PLACE OF BIRTH GEN	LTCEN	M GEN	MG	TOTAL GEN	COL	LTC	MAJ	TOTAL FIELD	CPT	1LT	2LT	TOTAL CO	OC	OTHER	TOTAL
South Viet-Nam**									1	3		4	15 (0.2)		17 (0.1)
An Giang					1 (1.2)	7 (1.9)	26 (2.0)	36 (1.9)	62 (1.5)	137 (2.1)	117 (2.5)	316 (2.1)	193 (2.6)	8 (1.9)	551 (2.2)
An Xuyen							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	16 (0.1)	9 (0.1)		26 (0.1)
Ba Kuyen	1 (12.5)		1 (5.6)	2 (5.0)		7 (1.9)	21 (1.6)	28 (1.6)	59 (1.5)	95 (1.4)	55 (1.1)	207 (1.4)	95 (1.3)	7 (1.7)	559 (1.4)
Bien Hoa	1 (12.5)	1 (8.5)		2 (5.0)		3 (0.8)	15 (1.1)	18 (1.0)	45 (1.1)	88 (1.3)	49 (1.1)	152 (1.2)	152 (1.8)	5 (1.2)	539 (1.4)
Binh Duong						4 (1.1)	16 (1.1)	18 (1.0)	61 (1.5)	86 (1.3)	86 (1.8)	251 (1.5)	121 (1.6)	20 (4.8)	590 (1.6)
Binh Long							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	2	8 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	15 (0.1)	2		18 (0.1)
Binh Tuy										1		1	1		2
Chuong Thien						1 (0.5)		1 (0.1)							1
Oanh Tuong	1 (12.5)			1 (2.5)	5 (6.1)	16 (5.8)	60 (4.6)	79 (4.5)	162 (5.5)	196 (5.0)	184 (4.0)	522 (5.4)	560 (4.5)	16 (5.9)	958 (5.8)
Gia Dinh			2 (16.7)	1 (5.6)	5 (7.5)	4 (4.9)	7 (1.9)	59 (5.0)	50 (2.8)	128 (5.2)	256 (6.5)	208 (3.7)	345 (6.6)	19 (4.6)	987 (3.9)
Kien Gieng		1 (8.5)		1 (2.5)	2 (2.4)	5 (1.4)	15 (1.1)	22 (1.2)	73 (1.8)	82 (1.2)	61 (1.5)	216 (1.4)	105 (1.4)	2 (0.5)	366 (1.4)
Kien Hoa		1 (8.5)	1 (5.6)	2 (5.0)		17 (3.5)	28 (2.1)	40 (2.3)	99 (2.4)	179 (2.7)	178 (5.8)	456 (3.0)	363 (4.9)	18 (4.4)	879 (3.5)
Kien Phong						1 (0.5)	2 (0.2)	5 (0.2)	5 (0.1)	8 (0.1)	12 (0.3)	25 (0.2)	16 (0.2)	2 (0.5)	46 (0.2)
Kien Tuong										1	1	2	1		5
Long An			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	1 (1.7)	11 (5.0)	50 (2.5)	62 (2.4)	110 (2.7)	160 (2.4)	146 (5.2)	416 (2.7)	236 (5.2)	24 (5.8)	719 (2.9)
Long Khanh										1	5 (0.1)	4	3		7
Phong Dinh					5 (3.7)	14 (3.8)	46 (5.5)	63 (5.6)	125 (3.0)	166 (2.5)	117 (2.5)	406 (2.7)	176 (2.3)	6 (1.5)	669 (2.6)
Phuoc Long											1	1			1
Phuoc Tuy					1 (1.2)	1 (0.5)	15 (1.0)	15 (0.9)	23 (0.6)	50 (0.8)	45 (0.9)	116 (0.8)	64 (0.9)	6 (1.5)	201 (0.8)
Phuoc Thanh					1 (1.2)			1 (0.1)	1	1		7	1		4
Tay Ninh						5 (1.4)	17 (1.5)	22 (1.2)	40 (1.0)	68 (1.0)	62 (1.5)	170 (1.1)	119 (1.6)	14 (5.4)	325 (1.5)
Vinh Binh		1 (8.5)		1 (2.5)	3 (5.7)	6 (1.6)	14 (1.1)	25 (1.5)	51 (1.3)	73 (1.1)	77 (1.7)	201 (1.3)	116 (1.6)	2 (0.5)	363 (1.4)
Vinh Long			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	4 (4.9)	22 (6.0)	52 (4.0)	78 (5.4)	154 (5.8)	227 (5.5)	149 (5.2)	525 (3.4)	289 (5.9)	20 (4.8)	913 (5.6)
Salgon	1 (50.0)	1 (12.5)	5 (16.7)	5 (12.5)	4 (4.9)	20 (5.5)	101 (7.7)	125 (7.1)	534 (8.2)	549 (8.5)	431 (9.3)	1314 (8.6)	581 (7.8)	35 (8.5)	2060 (8.2)
Bac Lieu			2 (11.1)	2 (5.0)	2 (2.4)	4 (1.1)	18 (1.4)	24 (1.4)	56 (1.4)	56 (0.8)	162 (1.2)	68 (1.1)	6 (0.9)	6 (1.5)	262 (1.0)
Go Cong					1 (1.2)	3 (0.8)	17 (1.3)	21 (1.2)	42 (1.0)	67 (1.0)	52 (1.1)	161 (1.1)	151 (2.0)	8 (1.9)	361 (1.4)
Hau Nghie										3	6 (0.1)	9 (0.1)	6 (0.1)		15 (0.1)
Chau Doc					1 (1.2)	1 (0.5)	16 (1.1)	16 (0.9)	35 (0.8)	54 (0.8)	60 (1.3)	147 (1.0)	99 (1.5)	9 (2.2)	271 (1.1)
Con Son										1	1	2			2
Se Dec					1 (0.5)			1 (0.1)	2	2		4	13 (0.2)		18 (0.1)
Binh Dinh			2 (11.1)	2 (5.0)		2 (0.5)	6 (0.5)	8 (0.5)	18 (0.4)	41 (0.6)	40 (0.9)	99 (0.6)	136 (1.8)	5 (0.7)	246 (1.0)
Binh Thuan					2 (0.5)	1 (0.1)	5 (0.2)	18 (0.4)	61 (0.9)	48 (1.0)	127 (0.8)	93 (1.2)	5 (1.2)		228 (0.9)
Khanh Hoa					4 (1.1)	25 (1.9)	29 (1.6)	70 (1.7)	170 (2.4)	100 (2.2)	340 (2.2)	171 (2.3)	9 (2.2)		549 (2.2)
Binh Thuan	1 (12.5)			1 (2.5)		5 (0.4)	5 (0.5)	18 (0.4)	59 (0.9)	40 (0.9)	117 (0.8)	60 (0.8)	1 (0.2)		186 (0.7)
Phu Yen						1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	10 (0.2)	25 (0.4)	18 (0.4)	55 (0.3)	61 (0.8)	3 (0.7)		118 (0.5)
Quang Nam					5 (6.1)	4 (1.1)	22 (1.7)	31 (1.8)	111 (2.7)	292 (4.4)	166 (3.6)	549 (5.7)	530 (4.4)	5 (1.2)	935 (3.7)
Quang Ngai						4 (1.1)	4 (0.3)	8 (0.5)	11 (0.3)	59 (0.9)	49 (1.1)	119 (0.8)	125 (1.7)	1 (0.2)	255 (1.0)
Quang Tri		2 (16.7)		2 (5.0)	4 (4.9)	15 (4.1)	28 (2.1)	47 (2.7)	88 (2.2)	198 (3.0)	114 (2.5)	400 (2.6)	223 (3.0)	12 (2.9)	606 (2.7)
Thua Thien	1 (12.5)	1 (8.3)	2 (11.1)	4 (10.0)	15 (15.9)	43 (11.7)	125 (9.5)	181 (10.5)	480 (11.8)	923 (15.9)	452 (9.8)	1855 (12.1)	774 (10.3)	31 (7.5)	2865 (11.4)

\*\* INR denotations; presumably mean "not further specified."

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(C) Table 10 (cont.)

PLACE OF BIRTH	GEN	LTCEN	M GEN	MG	TOTAL GEN	COL	1ST	MAJ	TOTAL FIELD	CPT	1LT	2LT	TOTAL CO	OC	* OTHER	TOTAL
Hghe An							1 (0.3)	6 (0.5)	7 (0.4)	19 (0.5)	36 (0.5)	35 (0.8)	90 (0.6)	41 (0.5)	3 (0.7)	141 (0.6)
Quang Binh					1 (1.2)		13 (3.6)	40 (3.0)	54 (3.1)	83 (2.0)	133 (2.9)	72 (1.6)	348 (2.3)	90 (1.2)	4 (1.0)	496 (2.0)
Quang Tin											3 (0.1)	9 (0.2)	12 (0.1)	12 (0.2)		24 (0.1)
Thanh Hoa							1 (0.3)	10 (0.8)	11 (0.6)	33 (0.8)	46 (0.7)	19 (0.4)	98 (0.6)	37 (0.5)	4 (1.0)	150 (0.6)
Ha Tinh							1 (0.3)	7 (0.5)	8 (0.5)	18 (0.4)	22 (0.3)	12 (0.3)	52 (0.3)	19 (0.3)	3 (0.7)	82 (0.3)
"Highlands" *							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)			1		1			2
Derlac										20 (0.5)	15 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	42 (0.3)	12 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	55 (0.2)
Kontum							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)		2 (0.1)	9 (0.1)	8 (0.2)	19 (0.1)	16 (0.2)		36 (0.1)
Lam Dong										2	1	4 (0.1)	7 (0.1)	6 (0.1)		(0.1)
Pleiku										6 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	12 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	1 (0.2)	17 (0.1)
Tuyen Duc					1 (1.2)	2 (0.5)	2 (0.2)	5 (0.3)		9 (0.2)	37 (0.6)	30 (0.6)	76 (0.5)	50 (0.7)	3 (0.7)	134 (0.5)
Phu Son										3 (0.1)		2	5	1		6
Central Viet-Nam														1		1
Bac Can										3 (0.1)	1	3 (0.1)	7	1		8
Bac Giang							2 (0.5)	3 (0.2)	5 (0.3)	21 (0.5)	34 (0.5)	19 (0.4)	74 (0.5)	16 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	96 (0.4)
Bac Ninh			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	2 (2.4)	5 (1.4)	20 (1.5)	27 (1.5)	77 (1.9)	74 (1.1)	50 (1.1)	201 (1.3)	44 (0.6)	4 (1.0)	277 (1.1)	
Cao Bang						1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	4 (0.1)	8 (0.1)	2	14 (0.1)	2		19 (0.1)	
Ha Dong			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	4 (4.9)	7 (1.9)	44 (3.3)	55 (3.1)	114 (2.8)	152 (2.3)	82 (1.8)	348 (2.3)	121 (1.6)	11 (2.7)	536 (2.1)	
Ha Giang						1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)			1		1		3	
"North Viet-Nam" *							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	9 (0.1)	10 (0.1)		21 (0.1)	
Ha Nam						9 (1.2)	36 (2.5)	46 (2.7)	87 (2.6)	120 (2.1)	81 (1.8)	288 (1.9)	107 (1.4)	5 (1.2)	446 (1.9)	
Hanoi		2 (16.7)		2 (5.0)	3 (3.7)	30 (8.2)	116 (8.8)	149 (8.8)	288 (8.7)	256 (7.1)	178 (3.9)	722 (3.8)	199 (4.7)	15 (2.7)	1087 (3.6)	
Ha Duong			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	5 (3.7)	10 (2.7)	24 (1.8)	37 (2.1)	60 (1.5)	97 (1.5)	68 (1.5)	225 (1.5)	87 (1.2)	7 (1.7)	357 (1.4)	
Hai Ninh					1 (1.2)	4 (1.1)	13 (1.0)	18 (1.0)	28 (0.7)	33 (0.5)	22 (0.5)	83 (0.5)	26 (0.3)	2 (0.5)	129 (0.5)	
Hoa Binh						2 (0.5)	9 (0.7)	11 (0.6)	5 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	12 (0.1)	3		26 (0.1)	
Hung Yen			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	1 (1.2)	5 (1.4)	14 (1.1)	20 (1.1)	68 (1.7)	91 (1.4)	51 (1.1)	210 (1.4)	65 (0.9)	6 (1.5)	302 (1.2)	
Xian An						4 (1.1)	27 (2.1)	31 (1.8)	59 (1.5)	105 (1.6)	56 (1.2)	220 (1.4)	68 (0.9)	5 (1.0)	323 (1.3)	
Lai Chau							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	11 (0.3)	1	3 (0.1)	15 (0.1)	5 (0.1)		21 (0.1)	
Lang Son					1 (1.2)	2 (0.5)	6 (0.5)	9 (0.5)	20 (0.5)	12 (0.2)	16 (0.3)	8 (0.3)	65 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	70 (0.3)	
Lao Cai							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	1	6 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	11 (0.1)	1		14 (0.1)	
Nam Dinh					2 (2.4)	18 (4.9)	67 (5.1)	87 (4.9)	202 (5.0)	325 (4.9)	212 (4.6)	739 (4.8)	272 (3.6)	20 (4.8)	1118 (4.5)	
Ninh Binh		1 (12.5)		1 (2.5)		6 (1.6)	18 (1.4)	24 (1.4)	76 (1.9)	142 (2.1)	98 (2.1)	316 (2.1)	122 (1.6)	9 (2.2)	472 (1.9)	
Phu Tho							4 (0.3)	4 (0.2)	12 (0.3)	11 (0.2)	10 (0.2)	33 (0.2)	16 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	54 (0.2)	
Phuc Yen						1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	10 (0.2)	16 (0.2)	11 (0.2)	37 (0.2)	13 (0.2)		52 (0.2)	

\* 1MB denotations; presumably mean "not further specified."

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(C) Table 10 (cont.)

PLACE OF BIRTH	GEN	LTCEN	M GEN	BC	TOTAL GEN	COL	LTC	MAJ	TOTAL FIELD	CPT	1LT	2LT	TOTAL CO	OC	* OTHER	TOTAL
Quang Yen					1 (1.2)	1 (0.5)	5 (0.4)	7 (0.4)	16 (0.4)	27 (0.4)	9 (0.2)		52 (0.5)	19 (0.5)		78 (0.5)
Son La									1		1	2				2
Son Tay	1 (12.5)	1 (8.5)			2 (5.0)		9 (2.5)	11 (0.8)	20 (1.1)	42 (1.0)	44 (0.7)	29 (0.6)	115 (0.8)	29 (0.4)	2 (0.5)	148 (0.7)
Thai Binh							2 (0.5)	35 (2.5)	55 (2.0)	91 (2.2)	123 (1.9)	67 (1.4)	281 (1.8)	107 (1.4)	2 (0.5)	425 (1.7)
Thai Nguyen							2 (0.5)	1 (0.1)	5 (0.2)	5 (0.1)	12 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	22 (0.1)	8 (0.1)		53 (0.1)
Tuyen Quang									4 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	8 (0.1)		2		10
Vinh Yen								2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	8 (0.2)	8 (0.1)	10 (0.2)	26 (0.2)	5 (0.1)		53 (0.1)
Yen Bai									6 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	14 (0.1)	4 (0.1)			18 (0.1)
Foreign Countries	1 (50.00)				1 (.5)	4 (6.9)	2 (0.5)	16 (1.2)	22 (1.2)	58 (1.4)	88 (1.5)	60 (1.3)	206 (1.5)	17 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	267 (1.0)
Laos												1	15 (0.2)			16 (0.1)
Cambodia											2	2	45 (0.6)	1 (0.2)		48 (0.2)
France											1		1	1		2
China											1		1	2 (0.2)	1	4

\* INR denotations; presumably mean "not further specified."

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(C) Table 11

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	Catholic	Buddhist (Mahayana)	Protestant	Hoa Hao	Cao Dai	Con-fucianist	Others	Un-declared
Gen		1(50.0)				1(12.5)		1(50.0)
Lt Gen	2(25.0)	4(50.0)				3(25.0)		1(12.5)
Maj Gen	3(25.0)	6(50.0)				2(11.1)		2(11.1)
Brig Gen	8(44.4)	6(33.3)						
Total Gen. Off.	<u>13(32.5)</u>	<u>17(42.5)</u>				<u>6(15.0)</u>		<u>4(10.0)</u>
Col	13(15.9)	55(67.1)				5(6.1)		8(9.8)
Lt Col	66(18.0)	216(59.0)	6(1.6)	1(0.3)	2(0.5)	45(12.3)		29(7.9)
Maj	308(23.4)	791(60.2)	8(0.6)	2(0.2)	5(0.4)	122(9.3)	1	67(5.1)
Total Field Grade Off.	<u>387(22.0)</u>	<u>1062(60.2)</u>	<u>14(0.8)</u>	<u>3(0.2)</u>	<u>7(0.4)</u>	<u>172(9.8)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>104(5.9)</u>
Capt	891(22.0)	2608(64.3)	50(1.2)	1	14(0.3)	293(7.2)	3	189(4.7)
1st Lt	1370(20.6)	4494(67.7)	66(1.0)	2	47(0.7)	409(6.2)	7	204(3.1)
2nd Lt	860(18.6)	2657(57.5)	50(1.1)	3	70(1.5)	836(18.1)	15	78(1.7)
Total Co Grade Off.	<u>3121(20.4)</u>	<u>9759(63.7)</u>	<u>166(1.1)</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>131(0.9)</u>	<u>1538(10.0)</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>471(3.1)</u>
Off Candi-date	<u>1258(16.8)</u>	<u>4470(59.8)</u>	<u>75(1.0)</u>	<u>33(0.4)</u>	<u>175(2.3)</u>	<u>1221(16.3)</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>161(2.2)</u>
Other	<u>76(18.4)</u>	<u>245(59.3)</u>	<u>2(0.5)</u>		<u>9(2.2)</u>	<u>69(16.7)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7(1.7)</u>
Grand total	4855(19.4)	15,553(62.2)	257(1.0)	39(0.2)	322(1.3)	3006(12.0)	58	747(3.0)

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(C) Table 12

## CIVILIAN EDUCATION OF RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)

Civilian Education	CWO	LTJG	M CWO	FC	TOTAL			MAJ	TOTAL			2LT	TOTAL		OC	OTHER	TOTAL
					CWO	COL	LTC		FIELD	CPT	1LT		CO				
Elementary School					2	24	110	144	366	280	99	745	159	5			1051
					(2.4)	(6.6)	(9.0)	(8.2)	(9.0)	(4.2)	(2.1)	(4.9)	(2.1)	(0.7)			(4.2)
Graduate from Vocational School									2			2					2
Graduate from Home Economics School							1	1									1
							(0.5)	(0.1)									
Secondary School, 1st level, high-elementary	1	3	4	7	15	26	97	351	474	1037	1570	160	2767	1144	145		6565
	(50.0)	(37.5)	(33.5)	(38.9)	(37.5)	(51.7)	(26.5)	(26.7)	(26.9)	(25.6)	(23.7)	(5.5)	(18.1)	(15.3)	(55.1)		(18.2)
School of Applied Arts & Crafts									5	5	8	14	5	2			21
									(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.5)		(0.1)
Secondary School, 1st level, technical section						5	2		5	11	49	5	65	45	7		118
						(3.7)	(0.5)		(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(1.7)		(0.5)
Technical School of Radio								1	1	4	1		5	6			12
								(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)				(0.1)			
Baccalaureate I		5	4	4	11	10	52	162	224	442	1359	2271	4072	5558	126		7991
		(37.5)	(53.5)	(22.2)	(27.5)	(12.2)	(14.2)	(12.5)	(12.7)	(10.9)	(20.5)	(49.1)	(26.6)	(47.6)	(30.5)		(31.9)
Baccalaureate I, Technical Section								5	5	5	35	34	72	71	1		147
								(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.9)	(0.2)		(0.6)
Baccalaureate II	1	2		2	5	6	36	128	170	358	1161	1573	2892	1444	89		4600
	(50.0)	(25.0)		(11.1)	(12.5)	(7.3)	(9.8)	(9.7)	(9.6)	(8.8)	(17.5)	(29.7)	(18.9)	(19.5)	(21.5)		(18.4)
Baccalaureate II, Technical Section								1	1	4	16	25	45	58	1		85
								(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.2)		(0.5)
Graduate from National School of Commerce											2	20	22	58	2		62
												(0.4)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.5)		(0.2)
Graduate from Technical School of Health									1	5	9	15		64	2		79
												(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.9)	(0.5)		(0.5)
Graduate from Pedagogy School (3 years)									4	5	42	49		36	5		90
									(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.9)	(0.3)		(0.5)	(1.2)		(0.4)
Graduate from Polytechnic School									5		9	14		21			55
									(0.1)		(0.2)	(0.1)		(0.3)			(0.1)
Higher School of Professions							2	2	5	11	73	39		65	1		107
							(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.3)		(0.9)	(0.2)		(0.4)
National School of PTT										1	1	2		5			7
														(0.1)			
<b>Technical Colleges:</b>																	
Agricultural Technician									2	5	6	15		46	2		61
									(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.6)	(0.5)		(0.2)
Architectural Technician									1	1	7	9		23	2		34
											(0.2)	(0.1)		(0.5)	(0.5)		(0.1)
Architect											1	1		3			4
Public Works Engineer						1	5	4	5	1	1	7		7			18
						(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)					(0.1)			(0.1)
Electricity Engineer									5			5					5
									(0.1)								
Industry Engineer						5	5				1	1	2				7
						(0.2)	(0.2)										
Agriculture Engineer											1	5	4	4			8
												(0.1)		(0.1)			
Radio Engineer										2			2				2
Higher School of Commerce						5	5										3
						(0.2)											
Statistic Technician										1		1					1
Advanced Technical School															3		5
Public Works Technician														20			20
														(0.5)			(0.1)
Land Registry Technician														5	2		7
														(0.1)	(0.5)		
Land Registry Engineer														5			3

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(c) Table 12 (cont.)

Civilian Education	TOTAL				TOTAL				TOTAL				OTHER	TOTAL		
	CGM	LTCM	M CGM	SG	CGM	COL.	LTC	MAJ	FIELD	C/T	L/T	ZLT			CD	OC
Forestry Engineer (Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry)												2	2	6 (0.1)	8	
Animal Husbandry, Engineer											2	4 (0.1)	6	16 (0.2)	20 (0.1)	
Engineering Engineer								1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)						1	
Industry Engineer														11 (0.1)	11	
Engineer unknown								1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)			2	2		3	
<b>Administrative Law:</b>																
Law licentiate		1 (0.3)			1 (2.3)	4 (4.9)	16 (3.8)	19 (1.4)	37 (2.1)	8 (0.2)	15 (0.2)	33 (0.7)	56 (1.4)	63 (0.6)	3 (0.7)	140 (0.6)
Doctor of Law												1	1	1	2	
Doctor of Public Law														1	1	
National Institute of Administration										1	1	2	1		3	
Licentiate unknown								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	1	3	4 (0.1)	2		7	
<b>Pharmacy &amp; Sciences:</b>																
Medical Doctor					1 (1.2)	3 (0.8)	12 (0.9)	16 (0.9)	41 (1.0)	6 (0.1)			47 (0.3)			63 (0.3)
Medical Doctor							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)		26 (0.4)		24 (0.2)			23 (0.1)	
Dentist					1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	18 (0.4)	9 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	30 (0.2)	1				32 (0.1)	
Pharmacist								19 (0.3)	28 (0.4)	2	49 (0.3)	1			50 (0.2)	
Higher School of Veterinary							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	1	2	1	4	2		7	
Licentiate of Mathematics							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	1	1	1	3	2	1 (0.2)	7	
Licentiate of Physics & Chemistry									1	1	2	4	4 (0.1)		8	
Licentiate of Natural Science										1		1	2		3	
Licentiate of Science										2	3 (0.1)	3	7 (0.1)		12	
<b>Letters and Pedagogy:</b>																
Licentiate of Vietnamese Chinese Studies					1 (0.3)			1 (0.1)	2	1	3 (0.1)	6	2		9	
Licentiate of English Studies													1		1	
Licentiate of French Studies													1	1 (0.2)	2	
Licentiate of Letters (free)					1 (0.3)	4 (0.3)	3 (0.3)	2	3 (0.1)	9 (0.2)	16 (0.1)	13 (0.2)	1 (0.2)		37 (0.1)	
Doctor of Letters									1	1		2	1		3	
Teacher of First Level Secondary School									2	2	17 (0.4)	21 (0.1)	31 (0.4)	1 (0.2)	53 (0.2)	
Teacher of Letters, Modern Languages, Level II											3 (0.1)	3	13 (0.2)		18 (0.1)	
Teacher of Sciences, Level II									2	3 (0.1)	12 (0.3)	19 (0.1)	10 (0.1)		29 (0.1)	
Licentiate of Theology									2	1		3			3	
Coastal Navigation											3 (0.1)		4		4	
Maritime Navigation							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)				2	4 (0.1)		8	
Engineer Navigation, Class I					1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	1	2	10 (0.1)	4 (0.1)			17 (0.1)	
Skipper					1 (1.2)	1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	3 (0.2)		1	1	2			3	
Engineering Navigation, Class II					1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	9 (0.2)			9 (0.1)	1			12	

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(C) Table 12 (cont.)

Civilian Education	GEN	LTCEN	MGEN	BG	TOTAL GEN	COL	LTC	MAJ	TOTAL FIELD	CAPT	1LT	2LT	TOTAL CO	OC	OTHER	TOTAL
Illiterate							2 (0.5)	1 (0.1)	3 (0.2)	1	2		3	1		7
PhD in Letters							1 (0.3)	19 (1.4)	20 (1.1)	81 (2.0)	63 (0.9)	58 (1.3)	202 (1.3)	75 (1.0)	1 (0.2)	298 (1.2)
PhD in Mathematics	1 (8.3)		1 (5.6)		2 (5.0)	11 (13.4)	35 (9.6)	188 (14.2)	234 (13.2)	634 (15.6)	468 (7.1)	89 (1.9)	1191 (7.8)	104 (1.4)	2 (0.5)	1533 (6.1)
PhD in Sciences (Not further specified)								2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)			1	1			3
Doctor of Sciences												2	2			2
Doctor of Physics and Chemistry										1	1		2			2
Doctor of Natural Sciences										2	2		4			4
Advanced School of Law											1		1			1

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(C) Table 13

**CIVILIAN OCCUPATION OF RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)**

Page 1 of 4

Civilian Occupation	Gen	Lt Gen	M Gen	Br	Total Gen	Col	Lt C	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CD	OC	Other	Total
Occupation Undeclared	1 (50.0)	5 (62.5)	5 (61.7)	13 (72.2)	24 (60.0)	20 (26.4)	126 (36.4)	377 (28.7)	523 (29.7)	852 (21.0)	1502 (22.6)	852 (18.4)	3206 (20.9)	418 (5.6)	13 (3.1)	4104 (16.7)
Fishery											2		2			2
Hunting											1		1	1		2
Well-digger														1		1
Metal-coating worker									4 (0.1)				6			4
No occupation											1		1			1
Housewife						1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)	1	1			1			2
Student	3 (27.5)	6 (50.0)	2 (11.2)	11 (27.5)	27 (32.9)	84 (22.9)	407 (31.0)	1518 (29.3)	1469 (36.2)	3454 (52.0)	2143 (45.4)	7066 (46.1)	3124 (41.8)	193 (46.7)		10,912 (63.6)
Veteran (recommissioned)									5 (0.1)	7 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	17 (0.1)	5 (0.1)			22 (0.1)
Soldier's son (educated in barracks)					2 (2.6)	1 (0.3)	4 (0.3)	7 (0.6)	25 (0.6)	49 (0.7)	17 (0.4)	91 (0.6)	78 (1.0)	1 (0.2)		177 (0.7)
Landlord					1 (1.2)	1 (0.3)	7 (0.5)	9 (0.5)	6 (0.1)	1	1		8 (0.1)			17 (0.1)
Oyster-reising									1	1			2			2
Seaman									2				2			2
Navigation Officer						1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	8 (0.2)	3	1		12 (0.1)	5 (0.1)		19 (0.1)
Support Officer														1		1
Navigation Officer Specialized in mechanics					2 (2.4)	4 (1.1)	4 (0.3)	10 (0.6)				1	1	4 (0.1)		15 (0.1)
Forestry instructor										2	4 (0.1)		6	7 (0.1)	1 (0.2)	16 (0.1)
Animal husbandry											1	1	1			2
Veterinarian							3 (0.2)	3 (0.2)		1	1		2 (0.1)	10 (0.1)		15 (0.1)
Agricultural Engineer*												5 (0.1)	5	3		8
Farmer			1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)		6 (1.6)	17 (1.3)	23 (1.3)	104 (2.6)	114 (1.7)	83 (1.8)	301 (2.0)	108 (1.4)	3 (0.7)		436 (1.7)
Planter					1 (1.2)		2 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	1	2	4 (0.1)	7	4 (0.1)			14 (0.1)
Instructor for Agricultural service							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)		2	7 (0.2)	9 (0.1)	20 (0.3)			30 (0.1)
Mining Foreman														1		1
Mining Engineer											1	1				1
Caster														1		1
Blacksmith														1		1
Light metal pipe maker							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)			1	1	1			3
Metal objects maker															1 (0.2)	1
Bike & motorbike repairing & assembling											1		1			1
Fitter (metal)									4 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	1		10 (0.1)	1		11
Weapon repairing & assembling														1		1
Industrial machine worker							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	9 (0.2)	30 (0.5)	8 (0.2)	47 (0.3)	18 (0.2)	1 (0.2)		68 (0.3)
Motor mechanic									3 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	10 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	1 (0.2)		16 (0.1)

\* Code book in Vietnamese states: "engineer graduated from School of Agriculture, Forestry, and Animal Husbandry."

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(C) Table 13 (cont.)

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Civilian Occupation	Com	Lt Com	M Com	MC	Total Com	Col	Lt C	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
Machine repairing & assembling														3		3
Industrial turner											2		2			2
Locomotive repairing worker											2		2			2
Aircraft repairing worker												1	1			1
Engineering draftsman									1	1			2	2		6
Coarse soldering worker											1		1	2		3
Watch repairman											1		1			1
Electrical apprentice														2		2
Electrical mechanic														6		6
Household electrician									6	6	5		15	9	1	25
									(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Telephone adjusting worker														1		1
Electrician											1		1	1		2
Coll repairman														1		1
Electrical machine assembling worker														2		2
Radio set assembling worker														1	1	2
															(0.2)	
Radio repairman						1	6	7	12	8	6		26	7	1	61
						(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Radio operator									7	6	5		16	15	2	33
									(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.1)
Nuclear technician											1	1	5			6
													(0.1)			
Chemist technical worker														7		7
														(0.1)		
Water pipe assembling worker														2		2
Mason														1		1
Public works technician						2	6	6	2	5	10		17	10	3	36
						(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)		(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.7)	(0.1)
Concrete draftsman									1				1			1
Public works engineer						1		1	1	1	1		3	5		9
						(0.3)		(0.1)						(0.1)		
Decorative painter									1				1			1
Public works technician						1		1					6	1	8	
						(0.3)		(0.1)					(0.1)	(0.2)		
Architectural draftsman									1	2	1		4	9		13
														(0.1)		
Artistic sculptor											1	1		1		2
Artistic painter							2	2	6	7	8		19	19	1	61
							(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)		(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Architect									1	1	3		5	3	1	9
												(0.1)			(0.2)	
Dyer														2		2
Paper manufacturer														2		2
Chemicals & microbiology specialist											1		1	2		3
Sugar boiler											1	1	2			2
Hand-loom weaver						1		1	2	2			6			5
						(0.3)		(0.1)								
Power-loom weaver											1		1	1	1	3
															(0.2)	
Spinning-factory executive														1		1
Weaving-factory executive												1	1			1
Tailor							2	2	3	15	3		21	17		60
							(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)		(0.1)	(0.2)		(0.2)
Hand-sew worker														1		1

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(C) Table 13 (cont.)

Civilian Occupation					Total Gen				Total Field				Page 3 of 4		
	Gen	Lt Gen	M Gen	SG		Col	Lt C	Mal		Cpt	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CD	OC	Other
Wood painter										1		1	1		2
Joiner												1			1
Carpenter								3 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	1		8 (0.1)	3		11
Wood cutter												1			1
Wood sculptor												1			1
Typographer								1				1	1		2
"lino" typographer									1			1			1
Wooden seal engraver						1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)							1
Printing machine operator										3		3	1		4
Camera man							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	2	11 (0.2)	4 (0.1)	17 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	1 (0.2)	23 (0.1)
File recorder										4 (0.1)		4	2		6
Goldsmith										1		1	2	1 (0.2)	4
Railway service's employee					3 (3.7)			3 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	3	2	12 (0.1)	6 (0.1)		21 (0.1)
Railway station Master											1	1	4 (0.1)		5
Meteorologist								1				1			1
Employee paid by the day (occasional laborer)							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	1	4 (0.1)	2	7	8 (0.1)		17 (0.1)
Cashier										1	6 (0.1)	7			7
Bank's employee					1 (1.2)			1 (0.1)	2	1	2	5	5 (0.1)		11
Treasurer									1			1			1
Businessman					2 (2.4)	13 (3.6)	60 (4.6)	75 (4.3)	159 (3.9)	126 (1.9)	99 (1.3)	344 (2.2)	85 (1.1)	3 (0.7)	507 (2.0)
Advertiser											1	1			1
Assurance-accounting agency's employee													2		2
Barber										1		1			1
Public health assistant										1	1	2			2
Physician of sino-Vietnamese medicine							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	2		1	3	1		5
Public Health assistant					2 (0.5)	4 (0.3)	6 (0.3)	23 (0.6)	59 (0.9)	20 (0.4)	102 (0.7)	28 (0.4)	3 (0.7)		139 (0.6)
X-ray expert												1			1
Social relief office's employee										1		1	2		3
Druggist's salesman						1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	2	13 (0.1)	27 (0.4)			41 (0.2)
Dentist												1			1
Health technician											6 (0.1)	6	78 (1.0)	1 (0.2)	85 (0.3)
Physician (medical doctor)					1 (1.2)	1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	4 (0.2)	14 (0.3)	37 (0.6)	1	52 (0.3)			56 (0.2)
Dentist						1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	10 (0.2)		16 (0.1)	1			18 (0.1)
Pharmacist								15 (0.4)	22 (0.3)		37 (0.2)				37 (0.1)
Surgeon													1		1
Veterinarian						1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	1	4 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	11 (0.1)	4 (0.1)			16 (0.1)
Supervisor								1		2	3	2			5
Clerk (civil service)	1 (50.0)				1 (2.5)	4 (4.9)	31 (8.5)	131 (10.0)	166 (9.4)	416 (10.3)	272 (4.1)	166 (3.6)	854 (5.6)	260 (3.5)	1302 (5.2)
Keeper of storeroom													2		2
Shorthand typist					2 (2.4)		3 (0.2)	5 (0.3)	18 (0.4)	7 (0.1)	1	26 (0.2)	6 (0.1)		37 (0.1)

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(C) Table 13 (cont.)

Civilian Occupation	Total				Total Field				Total						
	Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd	Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd	Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd			
Accountant clerk					1	3	13	19	96	41	20	155	60	5	239
					(1.2)	(0.8)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(2.3)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(1.2)	(1.8)
Scout										1	2	3	1	4	
Number of village authorities (Constabulary)										1		1		1	
Manager										1	1	2	5	8	
										(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)		
Government employee (civil servant)					2	2	5	25	79	107	2772	203	211	693	965
					(11.1)	(3.0)	(8.1)	(6.5)	(6.8)	(0.1)	(6.8)	(5.1)	(4.6)	(4.5)	(12.8)
Contractor										2	2	14	3	20	
										(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	
Land Surveyor Grade I					1	2	4	7	7	7	5	19	21	1	45
					(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Land Surveyor Grade II										1		1		1	
Map Drawer Grade 21										1	1	2		2	
Land surveying engineer													1	1	
Translator										1	8	9	18	23	45
					(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.5)
Journalist										2	1	3	7	10	23
					(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Cashier										1	1	2	1	2	
										(0.1)	(0.1)				
Publicizing house													1	1	
Printer													1	1	
													(0.1)	6	
Information service's employee										1	1	2	5	9	
					(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.1)						(0.1)		
Schoolteacher					2	15	46	83	201	215	110	736	1005	56	1878
					(2.4)	(4.1)	(5.0)	(6.7)	(5.0)	(3.2)	(8.9)	(4.8)	(13.4)	(15.8)	(7.5)
Information service chief										1	2	3		3	
Headmaster										2	4	7	13	26	
										(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	
Professor					1	5	36	30	44	109	441	694	608	27	1359
					(1.2)	(1.4)	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.1)	(2.8)	(10.0)	(4.5)	(8.1)	(4.5)	(5.4)
Monk										1	9	10	21	19	42
					(0.3)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Barkeeper*														1	
Chief clerk (of the court)										1	1	3	2	8	
										(0.1)	(0.1)				
Chief clerk of the court										1		2	1	3	
Lawyer												2	3	5	
												(0.1)	(0.1)	11	
Notary's clerk										1	1	3	16	1	
					(0.3)		(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	
Judge					1									1	
					(1.2)		(0.1)	(0.1)						(0.2)	
Seetheyer													1	1	
Tarrier													1	1	
Gymnastic instructor										1	3	4	20	3	
					(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.5)			(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	
Singing master										1		2	3	3	
Actor												1	1	2	
														(0.2)	
Musician										1	3	1	3	2	
Speaker (radio station)													1	1	
Theater manager													1	1	
Security policeman					1	3	12	16	47	27	19	93	28	137	
					(1.2)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.2)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.5)	
Customs personnel										1	2	2	5	3	
					(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)							10	
Public health office's employee													1	1	
Merchant Marine Officer					1									2	
					(0.3)		(2.5)	(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)		(0.1)		16
														(0.1)	
Miscellaneous laborer														1	
														(0.2)	
Controller										2	1	2	5	7	
														(0.1)	
Technician													1	1	
														15	
														(0.2)	
Foreman														2	
Drawer										7	4	3	14	26	
										(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.3)	
Industrial engineer										1	1	2	1	4	
					(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)								
Technician													1	1	

\* Code book to Vietnamese states: "person in charge of carrying on a lawsuit"

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CAREER PATTERNS OF RVNAF OFFICERS

(U) Tables 14 through 26 present data from RVNAF service records on the service history of RVNAF officers. Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage. Percentages are not given when they round off to 0.0.

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(C) Table 14  
SOURCE OF COMMISSION OF RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)

Source of Commission	Gen.	Lt Gen	M Gen	MG	Total Gen	Col	LtC	MaJ	Total Field	Cpt	1Lt	ZLt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
VN Air Force Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (0.5)	2 (0.2)	4 (0.2)	13 (0.4)	185 (2.8)	237 (3.1)	435 (2.8)	63 (0.9)	0	504 (2.0)
France Air Force Academy	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1.2)	1 (0.3)	12 (0.9)	14 (0.8)	0	0	0	0	0	0	14 (0.1)
Bien Hoa Military Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.3)	4 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	0	0	7 (0.0)	0	0	11 (0.0)
Phan Thiet Cadres Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.3)	0	1 (0.1)	2 (0.0)	0	0	2 (0.0)	0	0	3 (0.0)
Religious sects Army	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.3)	0	1 (0.1)	2 (0.0)	0	1 (0.0)	3 (0.0)	8 (0.1)	0	12 (0.0)
French Troops	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 (0.1)	0	0	5 (0.0)	1 (0.0)	0	4 (0.0)
VN Navy Academy	0	0	1 (8.3)	0	1 (2.5)	15 (3.7)	19 (4.1)	37 (1.4)	102 (2.1)	205 (2.5)	117 (3.1)	424 (2.5)	4 (2.8)	0	0	466 (1.9)
France Navy Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (0.3)	4 (0.3)	6 (0.3)	9 (0.2)	0	0	9 (0.1)	0	0	13 (0.1)
Other countries' Navy Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	4 (0.2)	0	1 (0.0)	0	1 (0.0)	0	0	5 (0.0)
Military medical Academy	0	0	0	0	0	2 (2.4)	3 (0.8)	11 (0.8)	16 (0.9)	127 (3.1)	229 (3.4)	54 (1.2)	410 (2.7)	2 (0.0)	0	428 (1.7)
Hanoi Military Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.3)	4 (0.2)	12 (0.3)	0	1 (0.0)	13 (0.1)	0	0	17 (0.1)
Hong Cai Military Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.3)	0	1 (0.1)	0	1 (0.0)	0	1 (0.0)	0	0	2 (0.0)
Nam Dinh Academy	0	1 (12.5)	2 (16.7)	0	3 (7.5)	5 (6.1)	16 (3.8)	46 (3.5)	65 (5.7)	22 (0.5)	3 (0.0)	0	25 (0.2)	0	0	93 (0.4)
Hue Officer Academy	0	2 (23.0)	3 (23.0)	4 (22.2)	9 (22.3)	11 (13.6)	26 (6.6)	27 (2.1)	62 (3.5)	11 (0.3)	0	0	11 (0.1)	0	0	82 (0.3)
Quang Trung Regional Military Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (1.1)	25 (1.9)	29 (1.6)	55 (1.4)	8 (0.1)	0	63 (0.4)	3 (0.0)	0	95 (0.4)
Phu Bai Regional Military Academy	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1.2)	15 (4.1)	22 (1.7)	38 (2.2)	52 (1.3)	12 (0.2)	3 (0.1)	67 (0.4)	2 (0.0)	1 (0.2)	108 (0.4)
Nam Dinh Regional Military Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (0.3)	16 (1.1)	16 (0.9)	34 (0.8)	9 (0.1)	1 (0.0)	44 (0.3)	0	0	60 (0.2)
Far Eastern Military Academy	0	1 (12.5)	1 (8.3)	1 (5.6)	3 (7.5)	0	0	0	0	1 (0.0)	0	1 (0.0)	2 (0.0)	0	0	5 (0.0)
Hue Ngot Officer Academy	0	0	0	2 (11.1)	2 (3.0)	2 (2.4)	1 (0.3)	0	3 (0.2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 (0.0)
Tong Officer Academy	0	0	1 (8.3)	0	1 (2.3)	0	1 (0.3)	0	1 (0.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (0.0)
Vung Tau Military Academy	1 (50.0)	0	0	0	1 (2.3)	3 (3.7)	6 (1.6)	4 (0.3)	13 (0.7)	8 (0.2)	0	0	8 (0.1)	0	0	22 (0.1)
Kien An Officer Academy	0	0	0	1 (3.6)	1 (2.5)	0	1 (0.3)	0	1 (0.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (0.0)
Other Side (enemy returnees)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	5 (0.1)	2 (0.0)	4 (0.1)	9 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	0	13 (0.1)
Dalet Military Academy	1 (50.0)	0	3 (25.0)	8 (44.4)	12 (30.0)	24 (29.5)	118 (32.2)	449 (34.1)	391 (33.5)	1319 (32.5)	849 (12.8)	318 (11.2)	2686 (17.5)	12 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	3502 (13.2)
Thu Duc Military Academy	0	0	0	2 (11.1)	2 (3.0)	9 (11.0)	86 (23.5)	440 (53.5)	555 (30.3)	1625 (40.0)	3673 (55.4)	3260 (70.1)	8558 (55.7)	6955 (92.7)	409 (99.0)	16419 (65.6)
Thu Trang Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	12 (0.3)	669 (10.1)	38 (1.3)	739 (4.8)	8 (0.1)	0	750 (3.0)
Young Troopers' Academy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0.3)	11 (0.8)	12 (0.7)	50 (1.2)	62 (0.9)	56 (0.8)	148 (1.0)	19 (0.3)	0	179 (0.7)
Foreign Military Academy	0	2 (23.0)	0	0	2 (3.0)	3 (3.7)	3 (0.8)	6 (0.3)	12 (0.7)	4 (0.1)	0	0	4 (0.0)	0	0	18 (0.1)
Assimilation*	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1.2)	7 (1.9)	21 (1.6)	29 (1.6)	36 (1.4)	47 (0.7)	6 (0.1)	109 (0.7)	2 (0.0)	1 (0.2)	141 (0.6)
Requisition*	0	1 (12.5)	0	0	1 (2.5)	1 (1.2)	7 (1.9)	8 (0.6)	16 (0.9)	31 (0.8)	91 (1.4)	2 (0.0)	124 (0.8)	1 (0.0)	0	142 (0.6)
Enlisted Ranks*	0	0	1 (8.3)	0	1 (2.3)	11 (13.4)	34 (9.3)	119 (9.0)	164 (9.5)	410 (10.1)	477 (7.2)	273 (5.9)	1162 (7.6)	359 (4.8)	1 (0.2)	1687 (6.7)
Blank Category**	0	0	0	0	0	2 (2.4)	15 (3.6)	42 (3.2)	57 (3.2)	56 (1.4)	20 (0.3)	6 (0.1)	82 (0.5)	1 (0.0)	0	140 (0.6)
TOTALS	2 (0.0)	8 (0.0)	12 (0.0)	18 (0.1)	---	82 (0.3)	366 (1.3)	1313 (3.3)	---	4058 (16.2)	6638 (26.3)	4624 (18.3)	---	7480 (29.9)	413 (1.7)	25016

\*,\*\* [See next page.]

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(C) Table 14 (cont.)

(C) \* A more precise explanation of the difference between these categories was not available. It appears plausible that "assimilation" and "requisition" denote soldiers whose tours of duty were extended during times of need or who were "drafted" into the officer corps. That the bulk of officers in these categories fall within periods of time when this was practiced tends to support this thesis. These "requisitioned" officers are thus different from those who volunteered and actively sought commissions while serving as enlisted men in the 1940s. Also included among the requisitioned and assimilated officers would probably be Vietnamese in the professions who were sent to school at RVNAF expense or who were drafted into the officer corps to fill a special demand. A check of the service records of officers in these categories under civilian occupation revealed that the great majority were lawyers, civil servants, doctors, priests, and Buddhist monks. The July 1951 conscription law aimed at drafting such professionals to age 35. Requisition and assimilation probably represent an occupational draft to provide the RVNAF with skilled specialty officers trained in fields not part of service academy curricula. Because there were few incentives for civilian professionals to seek army commissions, the army had to resort to conscription to secure certain skills. While requisitioning served to broaden the base of skills of the officer corps, it may also have brought into the ranks professionals with aspirations for political careers. The politics of these professionals may yet surface in ARVN as they have in the national assemblies, to which a substantial number of military officers have been elected.

(U) \*\* I.e., source of commission unknown or unreported.

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(C) Table 15

## PARENT BRANCHES OF RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)

PARENT BRANCH	COL	LTJG	PLT	1LT	TOTAL COL	LTJG	PLT	1LT	TOTAL FIELD	COL	LTJG	PLT	1LT	TOTAL	OC	OTHER	TOTAL
Infantry	1 (50.0)	7 (87.5)	6 (50.0)	14 (77.8)	28 (70.0)	47 (57.3)	204 (55.7)	886 (52.2)	937 (53.1)	1880 (46.3)	2896 (43.6)	5537 (5.1)	1008 (47.7)	4896 (65.2)	385 (93.2)	13554 (54.2)	
Sp. Forces						4 (4.9)	10 (2.7)	25 (1.9)	39 (2.2)	88 (1.7)	150 (2.3)	37 (0.8)	5 (1.7)	15 (0.2)		309 (1.2)	
Rangers			1 (8.3)		1 (2.5)	1 (1.2)	3 (0.8)	33 (2.5)	37 (2.1)	84 (2.1)	286 (4.3)	124 (2.7)	494 (3.2)	14 (0.2)		546 (2.2)	
Airborne	1 (50.0)		1 (8.3)	1 (5.5)	3 (7.5)	4 (4.9)	10 (2.7)	31 (7.4)	45 (2.6)	51 (1.3)	81 (1.2)	60 (1.3)	192 (1.3)	13 (0.2)		253 (1.0)	
Armor			2 (16.7)		2 (5.0)	3 (3.7)	18 (4.9)	23 (1.7)	44 (2.5)	61 (1.5)	64 (1.0)	69 (1.5)	194 (1.3)	130 (1.7)		370 (1.5)	
Engineer				1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)		13 (3.6)	48 (3.7)	61 (3.5)	316 (7.8)	391 (5.9)	254 (5.5)	961 (6.3)	334 (4.5)	21 (5.1)	1378 (5.5)	
Artillery				1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	2 (2.4)	13 (3.6)	60 (3.4)	177 (3.4)	476 (4.4)	139 (7.2)	792 (3.0)	571 (5.2)	1 (7.6)	1 (0.2)	1425 (5.7)	
Communications						1 (1.2)	9 (2.5)	60 (4.6)	70 (4.0)	229 (5.6)	281 (4.2)	85 (1.8)	595 (3.9)	309 (4.1)	1 (0.2)	975 (3.9)	
Transportation						3 (3.7)	4 (1.1)	24 (1.8)	31 (1.8)	31 (0.8)	92 (1.4)	49 (1.1)	172 (1.1)	109 (1.5)		312 (1.2)	
Ordnance						1 (1.2)	11 (3.0)	46 (3.5)	58 (3.3)	209 (5.2)	212 (3.2)	138 (3.0)	559 (3.6)	171 (2.3)		788 (3.1)	
Supply						3 (3.7)	3 (0.8)	20 (1.5)	26 (1.5)	76 (1.9)	84 (1.3)	107 (2.3)	267 (1.7)	83 (1.1)		376 (1.5)	
Medical						1 (1.2)	3 (0.8)	28 (2.1)	32 (1.8)	219 (5.4)	519 (7.8)	184 (4.0)	922 (6.0)	410 (5.5)	2 (0.5)	1366 (5.5)	
Military Security						1 (1.2)	4 (1.1)	18 (1.4)	23 (1.3)	67 (1.7)	62 (0.9)	59 (1.3)	188 (1.2)	10 (0.1)	3 (0.7)	224 (0.9)	
Military Intell.							2 (0.5)	5 (0.4)	7 (0.4)	22 (0.5)	36 (0.5)	51 (1.1)	109 (0.7)	6 (0.1)		122 (0.5)	
Admin. Finance						1 (1.2)	3 (0.8)	24 (1.8)	28 (1.6)	22 (0.5)	42 (0.6)	57 (1.2)	121 (0.8)	173 (2.3)		322 (1.3)	
Psywar							4 (1.1)	21 (1.6)	25 (1.4)	42 (1.0)	44 (0.7)	78 (1.7)	164 (1.1)	8 (0.1)		197 (0.8)	
Martial Law						2 (2.4)	5 (1.4)	9 (0.7)	16 (0.9)	9 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	14 (0.1)			30 (0.1)	
General Mgmt.							13 (1.0)	13 (0.7)	27 (0.7)	21 (0.7)	2 (0.3)	2 (0.3)	50 (0.3)	1 (0.1)		64 (0.3)	
Military P. O.							3 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	11 (0.3)	3 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	15 (0.1)				18 (0.1)	
Mil. Police Scout Dog										1			1			1	
Military Police							2 (0.5)	10 (0.8)	12 (0.7)	40 (1.0)	27 (0.4)	21 (0.5)	88 (0.6)	10 (0.1)		110 (0.4)	
Military Music							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)			2 (0.1)	3 (0.1)		6 (0.1)	
Soc. Affairs Service							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	8 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	12 (0.1)			14 (0.1)	
Catholic Chaplain							1 (0.3)	7 (0.5)	8 (0.5)	17 (0.4)	20 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	38 (0.2)			46 (0.2)	
Protestant Chaplain							1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	3 (0.1)			3 (0.1)			5 (0.1)	
Buddhist Chaplain							1 (0.3)	5 (0.4)	6 (0.3)	17 (0.4)	19 (0.3)		36 (0.2)			42 (0.2)	
Air Force			1 (8.3)	1 (5.6)	2 (5.0)	3 (3.7)	15 (4.1)	64 (4.9)	82 (4.7)	193 (4.8)	436 (6.6)	327 (7.1)	956 (6.2)	160 (2.1)		1200 (4.8)	
Navy			1 (8.3)		1 (2.5)	3 (3.7)	20 (5.5)	31 (2.4)	54 (3.1)	130 (3.2)	267 (4.0)	138 (3.0)	535 (3.5)	28 (0.4)		618 (2.5)	
Marines		1 (12.5)			1 (2.5)	2 (2.4)	4 (1.1)	18 (1.4)	24 (1.4)	33 (0.8)	92 (1.4)	48 (1.0)	173 (1.1)	5 (0.1)		203 (0.8)	

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(C) Table 16

## RANK STATUS OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	Permanent	Temporary
Gen		1(50.0)
Lt Gen	2(25.0)	4(50.0)
Maj Gen	7(58.3)	1(8.3)
Brig Gen	<u>15(83.3)</u>	
Total Gen. Off.	<u>24(60.0)</u>	<u>6(15.0)</u>
Col	22(26.8)	6(7.3)
Lt Col	215(58.7)	19(5.2)
Maj	<u>1,031(78.4)</u>	<u>9(0.7)</u>
Total Field Grade Off.	<u>1,268(71.9)</u>	<u>34(1.9)</u>
Capt	3,836(94.5)	68(1.7)
1st Lt	6,570(99.0)	1
2nd Lt	<u>4,571(98.9)</u>	<u>5(0.1)</u>
Total Co. Grade Off.	<u>14,977(97.8)</u>	<u>74(0.5)</u>
Off Candidate	<u>7,463(99.8)</u>	
Other	<u>385(93.2)</u>	
Grand total	24,117(96.4)	114(0.5)

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(C) Table 17

TYPE OF COMMISSION OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	Regular	Reserve	Military Service	Assimilation	WAC
Gen	2				
Lt Gen	7(87.5)	1(12.5)			
Maj Gen	11(91.7)	1(8.3)			
Brig Gen	<u>18</u>	<u>          </u>			
Total Gen. Off.	<u>38(95.0)</u>	<u>2(5.0)</u>			
Col	73(89.0)	8(9.8)		1(1.2)	
Lt Col	324(88.5)	37(10.1)		4(1.1)	
Maj	<u>1,054(80.2)</u>	<u>234(17.8)</u>		<u>22(1.7)</u>	
Total Field Grade Off.	<u>1,451(82.3)</u>	<u>279(15.8)</u>		<u>27(1.5)</u>	
Capt	2,900(71.5)	1,099(27.1)		50(1.2)	
1st Lt	2,832(42.7)	3,711(55.9)		64(1.0)	4(0.1)
2nd Lt	<u>1,228(26.6)</u>	<u>3,367(72.8)</u>		<u>4(0.1)</u>	<u>1</u>
Total Co. Grade Off.	<u>6,960(45.4)</u>	<u>8,177(53.4)</u>		<u>118(0.8)</u>	<u>5</u>
Off Candidate	<u>444(5.9)</u>	<u>6,957(93.0)</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>32(0.4)</u>
Other	<u>4(1.0)</u>	<u>406(98.3)</u>			
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>8,897(35.6)</b>	<b>15,821(63.2)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>146(0.6)</b>	<b>37(0.1)</b>

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(C) Table 18

## AIRBORNE DEGREES OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	No Paratroop Degree	Ordinary	Instructor	Intermediate	Expert
Gen	2(100.0)				
Lt Gen	8(100.0)				
Maj Gen	11(91.7)	1(8.3)			
Brig Gen	<u>17(94.4)</u>				<u>1(5.6)</u>
Total Gen. Off.	<u>38(95.0)</u>	<u>1(2.5)</u>			<u>1(2.5)</u>
Col	74(90.2)	6(7.3)	2(2.4)		
Lt Col	344(94.0)	10(2.7)	4(1.1)	2(0.5)	1(0.3)
Maj	<u>1,273(96.8)</u>	<u>24(1.8)</u>	<u>8(0.6)</u>	<u>5(0.4)</u>	<u>2(0.2)</u>
Total Field Grade Off.	<u>1,691(95.9)</u>	<u>40(2.3)</u>	<u>14(0.8)</u>	<u>7(0.4)</u>	<u>3(0.2)</u>
Capt	3,982(98.1)	53(1.3)	5(0.1)	11(0.3)	3(0.1)
1st Lt	6,545(98.6)	75(1.1)	1	13(0.2)	3
2nd Lt	<u>4,608(99.7)</u>	<u>10(0.2)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4(0.1)</u>	
Total Co. Grade Off.	<u>15,135(98.8)</u>	<u>138(0.9)</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>28(0.2)</u>	<u>6</u>
Off Candidate	<u>7,466(99.8)</u>	<u>5(0.1)</u>	<u>6(0.1)</u>	<u>1</u>	
Other	<u>413(100.0)</u>				
Grand total	24,743(98.9)	184(0.7)	27(0.1)	36(0.1)	10

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(C) Table 19

## YEAR OF ENTRY INTO THE RVNAF (U)

Year of Entry Into Service	Com	Lt Com	H Com	ME	Total Com	Col	Lt C	Plt	Total Field	Cor	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CO	OC	ORNG	Total
1930													1			1
1931													1			1
1932													1			1
1934													1			1
1935													2	1		5
1936							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)				5 (0.1)		3	7
1937													2			2
1938													4 (0.1)	2	1	7
1939							1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	5 (0.2)				1		5	7
1940							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)	2	1	2	5		2	8
1941										2	2	2	6		1	7
1942							1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	5 (0.2)	6 (0.1)	2	5 (0.1)	11 (0.1)	9 (0.1)		25 (0.1)
1943								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	2	5 (0.1)	1	8 (0.1)		7 (0.1)	16 (0.1)
1944								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	3	2	9 (0.1)	3		15 (0.1)
1945										1	2	3 (0.1)	6	5		9
1946	1 (30.0)	1 (12.5)	1 (8.3)	2 (11.1)	5 (12.5)	5 (6.1)	2 (0.5)	5 (0.6)	12 (0.7)	20 (0.5)	13 (0.2)	12 (0.5)	45 (0.3)	22 (0.5)		84 (0.5)
1947		1 (12.5)	1 (6.5)	5 (16.7)	5 (12.5)	11 (13.4)	14 (5.8)	14 (1.1)	39 (2.2)	51 (1.5)	32 (0.5)	40 (0.9)	125 (0.8)	35 (0.5)		202 (0.8)
1948		5 (37.3)	1 (5.6)	1 (5.6)	5 (12.5)	8 (9.6)	15 (4.1)	30 (2.3)	55 (3.0)	35 (0.8)	26 (0.4)	27 (0.6)	86 (0.6)	20 (0.5)		166 (0.7)
1949			1 (8.5)	2 (11.1)	5 (7.5)	5 (6.1)	55 (9.0)	57 (2.6)	75 (4.5)	61 (1.5)	46 (0.7)	29 (0.6)	136 (0.9)	22 (0.5)		236 (0.9)
1950				2 (16.7)	2 (11.1)	4 (10.0)	9 (11.0)	36 (9.8)	95 (7.1)	138 (7.8)	72 (1.1)	17 (0.4)	219 (1.4)	51 (0.4)	1 (0.2)	395 (1.4)
1951	1 (30.0)	2 (25.0)	5 (25.0)	6 (33.3)	12 (30.0)	25 (30.3)	136 (37.2)	378 (28.7)	535 (30.6)	365 (8.5)	172 (2.6)	61 (1.5)	578 (5.8)	56 (0.7)	1 (0.2)	1166 (4.7)
1952			2 (16.7)		2 (5.0)	11 (13.4)	47 (12.8)	229 (17.4)	287 (16.5)	362 (8.9)	175 (2.6)	46 (1.0)	585 (5.8)	56 (0.7)	1 (0.2)	927 (5.7)
1953				1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)	4 (4.9)	50 (15.7)	322 (24.5)	376 (21.5)	1405 (36.6)	561 (6.5)	89 (1.9)	2055 (15.4)	66 (0.9)	4 (1.0)	2500 (10.0)
1954		1 (12.5)			1 (2.5)	2 (2.4)	15 (4.1)	140 (10.6)	157 (6.9)	847 (20.9)	455 (6.6)	51 (1.1)	1555 (6.7)	56 (0.7)	1 (1.9)	1555 (6.2)
1955						1 (1.2)	4 (1.1)	15 (1.1)	20 (1.1)	155 (5.8)	146 (2.2)	44 (1.0)	365 (2.5)	41 (0.5)		406 (1.6)
1956			1 (8.5)	1 (5.6)	2 (5.0)	1 (1.2)	5 (0.8)	12 (0.9)	16 (0.9)	164 (4.0)	122 (1.8)	36 (0.7)	320 (2.1)	55 (0.5)	1 (0.2)	574 (1.5)
1957							5 (0.8)	6 (0.5)	9 (0.5)	115 (2.8)	262 (4.2)	22 (0.5)	417 (2.7)	26 (0.5)	1 (0.7)	435 (1.8)
1958								5 (0.4)	5 (0.5)	95 (2.3)	252 (3.6)	17 (0.4)	366 (2.4)	26 (0.4)	3 (0.7)	400 (1.6)
1959								7 (0.5)	7 (0.4)	104 (2.6)	583 (8.8)	17 (0.4)	704 (4.6)	39 (0.5)	4 (1.0)	756 (5.0)
1960								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	46 (1.1)	565 (8.5)	29 (0.6)	638 (4.2)	41 (0.5)	2 (0.5)	682 (2.7)
1961							1 (0.5)	2 (0.1)	30 (0.1)	1270 (0.7)	61 (19.1)	1381 (1.8)	112 (9.0)	9 (1.5)		1504 (6.0)
1962									30 (0.7)	1168 (17.6)	212 (4.6)	1410 (9.2)	471 (6.5)	81 (19.6)		1962 (7.8)
1963								2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	14 (0.3)	430 (6.6)	1855 (40.1)	2307 (15.1)	457 (6.1)	52 (12.6)	2816 (11.5)
1964							1 (0.5)	4 (0.4)	7 (0.4)	15 (0.4)	66 (1.5)	1870 (40.4)	1971 (12.9)	404 (5.4)	6 (1.5)	2388 (9.5)
1965								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	55 (0.8)	37 (0.8)	96 (0.6)	2720 (36.4)	216 (52.5)	3055 (12.1)
1966										5 (0.1)	1	6	2645 (55.4)	21 (5.1)		2672 (10.7)

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(C) Table 20

## AGES OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Year of Birth	GRM	LTCGRM	W GRM	SG	TOTAL GRM	COL	LTC	MAJ	TOTAL FIELD	CPT	1LT	2LT	TOTAL CO	DC	OTHER	TOTAL	
1900													1			1	
1905									1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)						1	
1909										7 (0.2)			7			7	
1911									2 (0.5)	2 (0.1)	3	1	4	1		7	
1912										1	2		3	1		4	
1913									4 (0.3)	4 (0.2)	7	5	12 (0.1)			16 (0.1)	
1914									4 (1.3)	7 (0.3)	11 (0.4)	8	26 (0.2)	1	1	37 (0.1)	
1915									3 (3.7)	3 (0.8)	9 (0.7)	13 (0.9)	24 (0.5)		3	40 (0.2)	
1916			1 (8.3)		1 (2.5)	4 (4.9)	8 (2.2)	10 (0.8)	22 (1.2)	32 (0.8)	30 (0.2)		42 (0.3)	7 (0.1)	3 (0.2)	73 (0.3)	
1917									3 (0.8)	11 (0.8)	16 (0.8)	35 (0.9)	16 (0.2)	3 (0.1)	54 (0.4)	12 (0.2)	80 (0.3)
1918			1 (8.3)		1 (2.3)	1 (3.2)	33 (3.0)	32 (2.4)	64 (2.5)	38 (1.4)	9 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	71 (0.5)	6 (0.3)		122 (0.3)	
1919						5 (6.1)	9 (2.3)	35 (1.6)	42 (2.0)	14 (3.0)	4 (0.2)	60 (0.1)	19 (0.4)	19 (0.3)		114 (0.3)	
1920		1 (12.3)			1 (2.5)	6 (7.3)	6 (1.4)	23 (1.7)	33 (2.0)	67 (1.7)	14 (0.2)	5 (0.3)	86 (0.6)	21 (0.3)	3 (0.2)	144 (0.4)	
1921	1 (30.0)		1 (8.3)		2 (5.0)	3 (3.7)	9 (2.3)	40 (3.0)	32 (2.9)	96 (2.4)	17 (0.3)	11 (0.2)	124 (0.8)	13 (0.2)		191 (0.8)	
1922						3 (3.7)	21 (3.7)	54 (4.1)	78 (4.4)	104 (2.6)	42 (0.6)	21 (0.5)	167 (1.1)	30 (0.4)		273 (1.1)	
1923		3 (37.3)	1 (8.3)	1 (5.6)	5 (12.3)	2 (2.4)	13 (3.6)	62 (4.7)	77 (6.4)	157 (3.9)	38 (0.9)	27 (0.6)	242 (1.6)	18 (0.2)		362 (1.4)	
1924				2 (11.1)	2 (3.0)	3 (3.7)	16 (4.4)	38 (6.4)	77 (6.4)	129 (3.2)	49 (0.7)	29 (0.6)	207 (1.4)	24 (0.3)		310 (1.2)	
1925	1 (30.0)			1 (3.6)	2 (3.0)	4 (6.9)	18 (4.9)	64 (6.7)	86 (6.8)	146 (3.6)	37 (0.9)	34 (0.7)	237 (1.3)	24 (0.3)	1 (0.2)	368 (1.4)	
1926		1 (12.3)	2 (16.7)	6 (33.3)	9 (22.5)	8 (9.8)	23 (6.3)	67 (3.1)	98 (5.4)	162 (4.0)	73 (1.1)	26 (0.6)	261 (1.7)	29 (0.4)		397 (1.6)	
1927				1 (3.6)	1 (2.5)	8 (9.8)	27 (7.4)	79 (6.0)	114 (6.3)	213 (5.2)	88 (1.3)	28 (0.6)	329 (2.1)	23 (0.3)	1 (0.2)	468 (1.9)	
1928				3 (23.0)	3 (7.5)	9 (11.0)	38 (10.4)	110 (8.4)	137 (8.9)	208 (5.1)	96 (1.4)	36 (0.8)	340 (2.2)	44 (0.6)		564 (2.2)	
1929		2 (25.0)	1 (8.3)	3 (16.7)	6 (15.0)	9 (11.0)	31 (8.5)	117 (8.9)	137 (8.9)	267 (6.1)	123 (1.9)	36 (0.8)	406 (2.7)	37 (0.5)		606 (2.4)	
1930			1 (8.3)		1 (2.3)	1 (1.2)	48 (13.1)	109 (8.3)	158 (9.0)	253 (6.2)	163 (2.3)	34 (0.7)	432 (3.0)	41 (0.5)	2 (0.3)	634 (2.6)	
1931		1 (12.3)		2 (11.1)	3 (7.3)	7 (8.3)	32 (8.7)	103 (7.8)	142 (8.1)	291 (7.2)	196 (3.0)	33 (0.7)	520 (3.4)	51 (0.7)	3 (0.3)	718 (2.9)	
1932			1 (8.3)	2 (11.1)	3 (7.3)	4 (4.9)	21 (3.7)	67 (9.3)	104 (8.3)	167 (9.0)	204 (3.1)	54 (1.2)	623 (4.1)	84 (1.1)	3 (0.7)	860 (3.4)	
1933						1 (1.2)	14 (3.8)	107 (7.0)	373 (6.1)	247 (9.2)	43 (3.7)	663 (0.9)	75 (6.3)	4 (1.0)	1 (1.0)	869 (3.4)	
1934								58 (4.4)	318 (3.1)	331 (7.8)	83 (5.0)	732 (1.8)	71 (6.8)	7 (0.9)	7 (1.7)	868 (3.5)	
1935						1 (1.2)		34 (2.6)	33 (2.0)	235 (5.8)	392 (5.9)	101 (2.2)	728 (4.8)	113 (1.5)	4 (1.0)	880 (3.3)	
1936								10 (0.8)	11 (5.6)	167 (3.6)	450 (6.8)	142 (3.1)	739 (4.8)	171 (2.3)	5 (1.2)	926 (3.7)	
1937								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	114 (2.8)	444 (6.7)	388 (12.7)	1,146 (7.5)	183 (2.5)	8 (1.9)	1,713 (5.4)	
1938								2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	74 (1.8)	647 (9.7)	620 (13.4)	1,341 (8.8)	337 (4.8)	13 (3.1)	1,713 (6.8)	
1939								4 (0.3)	4 (0.2)	50 (1.2)	725 (10.9)	284 (6.1)	1,059 (6.9)	824 (11.0)	39 (9.4)	1926 (7.7)	
1940										51 (1.3)	883 (13.3)	270 (5.7)	1,206 (7.9)	945 (12.6)	124 (30.0)	2,273 (9.1)	
1941										15 (0.4)	362 (8.5)	320 (6.9)	897 (5.9)	1197 (16.0)	39 (9.4)	2,171 (8.5)	
1942										8 (0.2)	342 (5.2)	535 (11.6)	895 (5.8)	883 (11.8)	19 (14.3)	1827 (7.3)	
1943										1 (2.0)	132 (2.0)	504 (10.9)	637 (4.2)	572 (7.8)	41 (9.9)	1,250 (5.0)	
1944										2 (0.8)	36 (10.4)	481 (3.5)	519 (3.5)	6 (1.2)	34 (5.2)	1,189 (4.8)	
1945										5 (0.1)	187 (4.0)	192 (1.3)	668 (5.4)	12 (2.9)		672 (2.7)	
1946								3 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	3 (0.6)	27 (0.6)	28 (10.2)	2 (0.5)	2 (0.5)		298 (1.2)	
1947								3 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)			1 (0.9)			72 (0.3)	
1948													1 (0.2)			16 (0.1)	
1949																1	
1950													1			1	

(C) Table 21

LOCATION OF RVNAF OFFICERS' ADVANCED MILITARY EDUCATION (U)

Rank	Vietnam	United States	France	Japan	Malaysia	Korea	Philippines	Formosa
Gen		2(100.0)						
Lt Gen		8(100.0)						
Maj Gen		7(58.3)	3(25.0)				1(5.6)	
Brig Gen		12(66.7)					1(2.5)	
Total Gen. Off.		29(72.5)	3(7.5)				2(5.1)	
Col	15(18.3)	36(43.9)	5(6.1)	12(3.3)	2(0.5)	1(1.2)	1(0.3)	
Lt Col	108(29.5)	140(38.3)	15(4.1)	33(2.5)	21(1.6)	4(1.1)	3(0.2)	
Maj	435(33.1)	394(30.0)	34(2.6)	45(2.6)	23(1.3)	9(0.7)	4(0.2)	
Total Field Grade Off.	558(31.7)	570(32.3)	54(3.1)	70(2.4)	46(1.8)	14(0.8)	8(0.3)	
Capt	1487(36.6)	821(20.2)	51(1.3)	118(2.9)	73(1.8)	10(0.2)	5(0.1)	2
1st Lt	1856(28.0)	304(4.6)	22(0.3)	21(0.3)	137(2.1)	4(0.1)		4(0.1)
2nd Lt	827(17.9)	112(2.4)	6(0.1)	7(0.2)	23(0.5)			5(0.1)
Total Co. Grade Off.	4170(27.2)	1237(8.1)	79(0.5)	146(1.0)	233(1.5)	14(0.1)	5	11(0.1)
Off Candidate	215(2.9)	8(0.1)	2	1	3	1		
Other	2(0.5)							
Grand total	4945(19.8)	1844(7.4)	138(0.6)	192(0.8)	259(1.0)	29(0.1)	10	11

NOTE: This table indicates countries of advanced military training only; of the total officer corps, 17,586 officers were listed as not falling into any of the above columns.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Table 22

## MILITARY TRAINING EXPERIENCE OF RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)

Military Education*	Gen	Lt Gen	M Gen	Br	Total Gen	Col	Lt C	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
None in process		2 (18.7)	5 (27.8)		7 (17.5)	25 (30.5)	83 (22.7)	383 (29.1)	491 (27.9)	1481 (38.5)	4281 (64.5)	3635 (78.8)	9397 (81.3)	7248 (96.9)	411 (99.5)	17552 (70.2)
<b>Instructors:</b>																
Strang Specialist										2			2			2
Distrib Specialist										9 (0.2)			9 (0.1)			9
Mail Specialist								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	7 (0.2)			7			8
PT Instructor							1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	4 (0.1)		11 (0.1)	1		15 (0.1)
Interpreter										3 (0.1)	1		4			4
T Unit Logist										23	15		38			60
Logist Manag					2 (2.4)	2 (0.5)	18 (1.4)	22 (1.2)	23 (0.6)	15 (0.2)			38 (0.2)			60 (0.2)
Log of Uchlef tac										2			2			2
Army Supp Manag										6 (0.1)	4 (0.1)		10 (0.1)			10
Regular Aspirant cad										1		1	2			2
M Cps Supply of							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	42 (1.0)	43 (0.6)	8 (0.2)		93 (0.6)	5 (0.1)		99 (0.4)
<b>Training Unit (now Assigned to):</b>																
CCZ Training														3		3
English Basic							2 (0.5)	15 (1.1)	17 (1.0)	52 (1.3)	49 (0.7)	2	103 (0.7)	1		121 (0.5)
Interpreter							1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	1			1			3
Refresher Training								8 (0.5)	8 (0.3)	18 (0.4)	10 (0.2)	8 (0.2)	36 (0.2)	3		45 (0.2)
Leadership training							2 (0.5)	10 (0.8)	38 (0.7)	18 (0.9)	3 (0.3)	3 (0.1)	59 (0.4)	1		72 (0.3)
Basic Combat Training										1	3		4		1	5
Clear Guerrilla opn					5 (6.1)	7 (1.9)	21 (1.8)	33 (1.9)	84 (2.1)	86 (1.3)	5 (0.1)		175 (1.1)	2		210 (0.8)
Command Training					1 (1.2)	4 (1.1)	19 (1.1)	35 (1.1)	7 (0.9)	1 (0.1)			43 (0.3)			82 (0.2)
Pltn Leader School					1 (1.2)	2 (0.5)	1 (0.1)	4 (0.2)	11 (0.3)	3	9 (0.2)		23 (0.2)	7 (0.1)		34 (0.1)
Cny Commander							7 (1.9)	27 (2.1)	34 (1.9)	76 (1.9)	21 (0.3)	3 (0.1)	100 (0.7)			134 (0.5)
Bn Training											18 (0.3)	1	19 (0.1)			19 (0.1)
Bn Qndr Training							4 (1.1)	14 (1.4)	23 (1.3)	25 (0.6)	1		26 (0.2)			49 (0.2)
Pltn cdr trng					1 (1.2)		9 (2.5)	3 (0.2)	13 (0.7)							13 (0.1)
Cdenca teach Staff								2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	3 (0.1)			3			5
CI Staff Training	(50.0)	3 (37.5)	3 (25.0)	5 (27.8)	12 (30.0)	6 (7.3)	33 (9.0)	138 (10.5)	177 (10.0)	289 (7.1)	31 (0.5)	2	322 (2.1)		1 (0.2)	512 (2.0)
Command Gail Staff	(50.0)	3 (37.5)	3 (25.0)	3 (16.7)	10 (25.0)	11 (13.4)	24 (6.6)	28 (2.1)	63 (3.6)	39 (1.0)			39 (0.3)			112 (0.4)
Special Force Off							3 (0.8)	1 (0.2)	6 (0.3)	13 (0.3)	22 (0.3)	1	36 (0.2)			42 (0.2)
Infant off Orient							1 (0.3)	12 (0.9)	13 (0.7)	31 (0.8)	2		33 (0.2)			46 (0.2)
Infant off Famili							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)			1	1			2
Ass cad of Staff of		1 (12.5)			1 (2.5)	1 (1.2)	2 (0.5)	11 (0.8)	14 (0.8)	11 (0.3)	2		13 (0.1)			28 (0.1)
mech trng										4 (0.1)			4			4
Infant commu off										2			2			2
Infant fg off Refr							1 (0.3)	3 (0.2)	4 (0.2)							4
Ass inf of Career		1 (12.5)	1 (8.3)		2 (5.0)	2 (2.4)	17 (4.6)	26 (2.0)	45 (2.6)	10 (0.2)	1		11 (0.1)			58 (0.2)
Infant off Career				2 (11.1)	2 (5.0)	2 (2.4)	15 (4.1)	37 (2.8)	56 (3.1)	24 (0.6)			24 (0.2)			80 (0.3)
Paywar Research				1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)											1
Division Technique							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)							1

\* I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Table 22 (cont.)

Military Subunit	Com	Lt Com	H. Com	Pl	Total Com	Col	Lt C	Pl	Total Field	Col	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
<b>Ranger:</b>																
Rang unit training									1		1		2			2
Jung camp								8	6	26	116	80	218	26	(0.3)	250
								(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.6)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.4)	(0.3)		(1.0)
Ranger								6	6	42	108	6	156			162
								(0.3)	(0.3)	(1.0)	(1.6)	(0.1)	(1.0)			(0.6)
<b>Airborne:</b>																
Airborne					2	2	12	16	29	59	7		93	3		114
Intermediate training					(2.4)	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.2)	(0.6)				(0.3)
										2	3	3				3
											(0.1)					
<b>Armor:</b>																
Recruits									1				1			1
AR Weapons Off								2	2	1	1		2			4
								(0.2)	(0.1)							
Ar platoon ldr					2	1	3	1	2	3		6				9
					(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)			(0.1)						
Adv section Cdr					1		1	1					1			2
					(0.3)		(0.1)									
Armor Off Bde	2				2	3	6	9	16	11	7		34			43
	(16.7)				(3.0)	(0.6)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)				(0.2)
Armor Off Orient						1	1				1		1			2
						(0.1)	(0.1)									
Armor Commnd Off						1	1	4					4			3
						(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)								
Armor Mnt off								1					1			1
Ass Armor off car								1					1			1
Armor off carrier					3	6	9	16	3				3			23
					(3.7)	(1.6)	(0.7)	(1.0)	(0.1)							(0.1)
<b>Engineers:</b>																
Tubst enr opn mnt											1		1			1
Tubst eng const								1	1	1			1			2
								(0.1)	(0.1)							
Engin equi mnt HC								1	1							1
								(0.1)	(0.1)							
Public Works Engineer					1	3	4	30	10	9			49			33
					(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)					(0.2)
Engin O off Bdr								2	1				3			3
Emplo equ off									1				1			1
Mtr equip rep off								6	10	11			27	8		33
								(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)		(0.1)		(0.1)
Engin equip off								2	1				3			3
Airport road off								4	(0.1)				4			4
								(0.1)								
Eng sup rep par of						1	1	3	4				7			6
						(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)							
Engin off orient					3	11	18	129	128	62			299			315
					(1.4)	(0.6)	(0.9)	(3.2)	(1.9)	(0.9)			(2.0)			(1.3)
Engin eq mnt off								7	1				6			6
								(0.2)	(0.1)				(0.1)			
Topograp engin off								2	7				9			9
								(0.1)	(0.1)				(0.1)			
Engineer eny eder					1	1	3	9					12			13
					(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)				(0.1)			(0.1)
Engin off carrier					3	13	16	27	1				28			44
					(0.8)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.7)					(0.2)			(0.2)
<b>Artillery:</b>																
Artill Mtr Troop									1				1			1
Battery eder						3	3	17	17				34			39
						(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)				(0.2)			(0.2)
Art Ballea mtour inspection off								3					3			3
								(0.1)								
6 Field Artill					3	1	4	6	21				27			31
					(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.3)				(0.2)			(0.1)
6 Field Artill					1		1									1
					(0.3)		(0.1)									
Parcill off Orient								3	3	1			9			9
								(0.1)	(0.1)				(0.1)			
Artill survey off						1	1	3	1				8			7
						(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)								
Artill commnd off						1	1	3	2				7			6
						(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)								
Artill off Basic					2	19	21	83	184	60			309	1		331
					(0.3)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.6)	(2.6)	(1.3)			(2.0)			(1.3)

<sup>1</sup> I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C)Table 22 (cont.)

Military Education	Gen	Lt Gen	M Gen	Br	Total Gen	Col	Lt C	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
<b>Artillery (cont)</b>																
Artill off Career				1	1	2	5	10	17	32			32			50
				(3.6)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(0.8)			(0.2)			(0.2)
<b>Signal:</b>																
Microwave radio												1	1			1
CC2 teletype opter									1	4			3			3
Wire communication									3				3			3
Off vat repair										2			2			2
Off whf repair									1	4	3		10			10
									(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)			
Officer cryptograp							1	1	4	13	1		22			23
							(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)			(0.1)			(0.1)
Al so signal cny of						1	1	2	15				13			17
						(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.4)				(0.1)			(0.1)
U cps commnic off						1	1	17	4	18	4		41	4		46
						(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(0.4)			(0.3)	(0.1)		(0.2)
Signal off Orient						1	2	3	1	1			2			5
						(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)								
Signal emi main off						1	1	3	4				7			8
						(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)							
Signal supp off						4	4	13	1				14			20
						(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)				(0.1)			(0.1)
Off message ctr									2	3			5	2		7
Off who carr rep										11	1		12			12
										(0.2)			(0.1)			
Officer radio						1	3	4	13	4	3		22			26
						(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)			(0.1)
Ass signal off car							3	3	2				2			3
							(0.2)	(0.2)								
Teleph telety off										3			3			3
Off signal Bolo						3	26	29	87	98	9		194	1		224
						(0.8)	(2.0)	(1.4)	(2.1)	(1.5)	(0.2)		(1.3)			(0.9)
Signal off career						1	3	13	21	9			9			30
						(1.2)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(0.2)			(0.1)			(0.1)
<b>Transportation:</b>																
CC2 Transportation														1		1
Mtr transp op main										2			2			2
Bolo off transp						7	7	11	37	7			35			42
						(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.2)			(0.4)			(0.2)
Transp supply off								4	3	1			10			10
								(0.1)					(0.1)			
Stevedore officer								2					2			2
Transp off refresh						1		1								1
						(0.3)		(0.1)								
Transp off orient							2	2	3	2			3			7
							(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)							
Transp off career						1	2	3	1				1			4
						(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)								
<b>Ordnance:</b>																
Mil vcle w cpe rep									2	1			3			3
Armment w cpe rep									1				1	1		2
Amunit recrd WCO							1	1								1
							(0.1)	(0.1)								
B2 Ordnance														3		3
Ord Intermediate Trng									1				1			1
Ord Expert									2	1			3			3
Auto char									1				1			1
Auto Svc Ord Vehicle						1	1	2	28	13			41			43
						(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.7)	(0.2)			(0.3)			(0.2)
All chem off orient							1	1								1
							(0.1)	(0.1)								
Chemic off orient						1	1	7	3				10			11
							(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)				(0.1)			
Ordee off famili									1				1			1

\* I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Table 22 (cont.)

Military Education	Com	1st Com	2nd Com	3rd	Total Com	Col	1st C	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1st Lt	2nd Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
<b>Ordnance (Cont)</b>																
Arms maint rep off								1	1	6	6	1	15			16
								(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)		(0.1)			(0.1)
Ordnance section off					1			9	10	52	45	31	128	1		139
					(1.2)			(0.7)	(0.6)	(1.3)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)			(0.6)
Ordnance supply off								2	2	9	11	1	21			23
								(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)		(0.1)			(0.1)
Auto maint rep off										9	2		11	1		12
										(0.2)			(0.1)			
Ordnance ammuni off								4	4	14	23	2	39	2		45
								(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)		(0.3)			(0.2)
Ordnance off orient								1	1	5	8	2	15			16
								(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)			(0.1)
All ass ord Coy of								2	2	6			6			6
								(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)						
Ordnance off career					1	3		14	16	12			12			30
					(1.2)	(0.8)		(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.3)			(0.1)			(0.1)
Career Ord Repair Technician								3	3							3
								(0.2)	(0.2)							
<b>Quartermaster:</b>																
QM supply										1			1			1
Para pack M deliv										1			1			1
Graves regis off														1		1
Army supp Hqs off										2	1		3			3
QM maint superv								2	2							2
								(0.2)	(0.1)							
Officer QM basic					1			5	6	20	20	45	65	1		92
					(1.2)			(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(1.0)	(0.6)			(0.4)
QM Company off										5			5			5
										(0.1)						
Patrol pdct sup of								1	1	2	7	2	10			12
								(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)		(0.1)			
Ass N off career					1	1		4	6	1			1			7
					(1.2)	(0.3)		(0.3)	(0.3)							
QM officer career								2	4	6						6
								(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.3)						
<b>Army Medical Corp:</b>																
CCl Medical													1			1
Dentistry adv													1			1
Medical inspectors: Various Classes													1	4		5
													(0.1)			
" " "								1								1
								(0.3)	(0.1)							
" " "													1	2		3
													21			21
													(0.3)			(0.1)
" " "								1	1							1
								(0.1)	(0.1)							
" " "										1			1			1
" " "										7	3		10			10
										(0.2)			(0.1)			
" " "								1	1	2	4		6			7
								(0.1)	(0.1)		(0.1)					
" " "													1			1
													2			2
Ptve med orient													1			1
Order surgeons										4			4			4
										(0.1)						
Amade emy g off BF										1			1			1
Amade off orient								4	4	36	72	16	126			126
								(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.3)	(0.6)			(0.5)
Medical supp off										2	1		3			3
Medical adm off								5	5	31	60	14	85			90
								(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.3)	(0.6)			(0.4)
Hospital Adm								1	1	2	2		4			5
								(0.1)	(0.1)							
Amade off career													1	1	2	2

\*I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Table 22 (cont.)

Military Education	GEN	Lt Gen	M Gen	MG	Total Gen	Col	Lt C	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total Co	OC	Other	Total
Adjutant General (Cont)																
Pers manag Special										2	5 (0.1)		7			7
Off adj gal Basic								20 (1.5)	20 (1.1)	43 (1.1)	76 (1.1)	3 (0.1)	124 (0.8)	3		147 (0.6)
Pers manag Officer							1 (0.3)	4 (0.3)	5 (0.3)	6 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	1	13 (0.1)			18 (0.1)
Milit pers Officer									3 (0.1)		1		6			6
Adj gal off Orient									3 (0.1)		3	1	7			7
Adj gal off Career							1 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	3 (0.1)			3			6
Canine Corps:																
Sentry dog										1			1			1
Canine Corps Off										2	3 (0.1)		7			7
												1	1			1
Military Police:																
Criminal investg.							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)	1	1		2			3
MP officer										1			1			1
MP officer							1 (0.3)	4 (0.3)	3 (0.3)	12 (0.3)	11 (0.2)	1	24 (0.2)	1		30 (0.1)
MP off refresher														2		2
MP officer orient							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	8 (0.2)			1	9 (0.1)			11
MP officer career							3 (0.2)	3 (0.2)	6 (0.1)				6			9
Military Musical Corps:																
Various grades								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)					1		1
Air Force																
Air ctrol war hel												1	1	3		4
Air Radio syst hel												2	2			2
Ac Mco helper													2			2
Weather obs hel														1		1
Transport hel											1	2	3	5 (0.1)		6
							1 (0.3)		1 (0.1)							1
Pilot helicopter								2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	8 (0.2)	30 (0.6)	48 (1.0)	106 (0.7)			106 (0.4)
Pilot transport							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	12 (0.3)	21 (0.3)	4 (0.1)		37 (0.2)			38 (0.2)
Pilot tact flight							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	28 (0.7)	66 (1.3)	49 (1.1)		143 (1.1)			146 (0.7)
Pilat twin engine											1		1			1
Pilot light air							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)	2 (0.4)	24 (1.3)	70 (0.6)		96 (0.6)	2		100 (0.4)
Squadron oh							3 (0.8)	7 (0.5)	10 (0.6)			2	2			12
Navigator							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	10 (0.2)	29 (0.4)			39 (0.3)			40 (0.2)
Observer									3 (0.1)	23 (0.3)	39 (0.8)		63 (0.4)	67 (0.9)		132 (0.3)
Instructors							2 (0.2)	2 (0.1)		1			1			3
Intel officer										1	4 (0.1)	8 (0.2)	13 (0.1)	7 (0.1)		20 (0.1)
Organisation														1		1
Photograp off							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)								1
Commander - staff off		1 (6.3)	1 (3.6)	2 (3.0)	2 (2.4)	5 (1.4)	3 (0.8)	12 (0.7)				1	1			13 (0.1)
Weather off											3 (0.1)	4 (0.1)	9 (0.1)			9
Air traffic ctrol											2	2	4			4
Flight safety off							1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)								1
Communication off										5 (0.1)	9 (0.1)	2	16 (0.1)			16 (0.1)

\*I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.



# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Table 22 (cont.)

Military Education	Gen	Lt Gen	M Gen	Br	Total Gen	Col	Lt C	Maj	Total Field	Cer	1 Lt	2 Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
<b>Intelligence:</b>																
CC2 security milit														2		2
Intel security MCO										2	2	4				4
Intel Clerk					5	10	15	38	(0.9)	(0.9)	4	1	43	(0.3)		58
					(1.4)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.1)						(0.2)
Aer photo letarp								7		18	5	30		12		42
								(0.2)		(0.3)	(0.1)		(0.2)	(0.2)		(0.2)
Reconnaissance interrog								3				3				3
								(0.1)								
Combat Intel					5	9	14	38	(1.4)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.9)	40	14	92	13
					(1.4)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.2)		119
Territorial Intel					2	8	10	12	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.3)	33	10	55	1
					(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.4)					66
Intel battle order						1	1				2		2			3
						(0.1)	(0.1)									
Strategic Intel					1	1	2									2
					(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)									
Stret Intel reaser											2	4	8			8
												(0.1)				
Intel security off					1	15	16	63	(0.3)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(1.8)	41	5	109	1
					(0.3)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(1.8)	(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.7)					126
Mintel staff of Sg						1	1				3		3			4
						(0.1)	(0.1)									
Instal Intel off										1			1			1
Pow interrog off						1	1	1		4	1		6	1		8
						(0.1)	(0.1)			(0.1)						
Intel staff off					1	6	7	18	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.2)	14	1	33	(0.2)
					(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.2)						40
Intel research off								1		4			5			5
										(0.1)						
Image letarp off										2			2			2
Area Intel officer								3		2			5			5
								(0.1)								
Mil Intel off cer					2	2	8	12	(2.4)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.7)	25	8	34	(0.2)
					(2.4)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.1)						46
											1		1			1
<b>Admin. Finance:</b>																
Milit accounting										1	2		3			3
Fin manag budget								2		2			2			4
								(0.2)	(0.1)							
Adm end file off					1	13	14	39	(0.3)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(1.0)	40	27	108	5
					(0.3)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.7)		(0.1)		125
Finance off refres								1					1			1
Finance off orient						2	2	6		(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	3	9		11
						(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)					(0.1)			
Finance off career					1	5	6	3	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.1)		3		9
					(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.1)								
<b>Paywar:</b>																
Paywar practice					4	10	14	23	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	4		27	1
					(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.1)				(0.2)	1	43
Paywar off					1	6	42	49	(1.2)	(1.6)	(3.2)	(2.8)	126	95	39	260
					(1.2)	(1.6)	(3.2)	(2.8)	(3.1)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(0.1)		319
Psychol opn off								4		1			5			5
								(0.1)								
Paywar Film Officer											1		1			1
Off pay riv affair					2	7	9	10	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.2)	5		15	24
					(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.1)				(0.1)			(0.1)
Information and press off						1	1	1		(0.1)	(0.1)		1			2
						(0.1)	(0.1)									
Staff off paywar					1	3	3	7	(1.2)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.1)	4		11
					(1.2)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.1)							
<b>Provost Marshal:</b>																
								2		2	1		1			3
								(0.2)	(0.1)							
Provost Marshal - "various grades"					1			1	(1.2)		(0.1)					1
					(1.2)			(0.1)								
<b>Adjutant General:</b>																
Stenograp hy										3	2		5			5
										(0.1)						
ADPS										2			2			2
Pers adm special											1		1			1

\*I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.

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(C) Table 22 (cont.)

Military Education	Gen	Lt Gen	M Gen	MG	Total Gen	Col	LtC	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1Lt	2Lt	Total Co	OC	Other	Total
Navy (Cont)																
Weight trans and traffic management										1			1			1
Electronic							2	2	2				2			4
							(0.2)	(0.1)								
Translations unavailable							1	1								1
Frog man							(0.1)	(0.1)	1	1			2			2
Disaster control									1				1			1
General line						8	5	13	8				8			21
						(2.2)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.2)				(0.1)			(0.1)
Mine sweeping							2	2	7				7			9
							(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)							
Personnel OH						1		1			4		4			5
						(0.3)		(0.1)			(0.1)					
Basic naval OH											2	115	117	5		122
												(2.5)	(0.8)	(0.1)		(0.5)
Shipyard manag									6	1			7			7
									(0.1)							
Naval Architect									1				1			1
Underwater demolition											1		1			1
Hydrographic eng							1	1			1		1			2
							(0.1)	(0.1)								
Prospective engineering officer									1				1			1
Translations									1				1			1
Marines:																
Jungle							2	2	1				1			3
							(0.2)	(0.1)								
Basic						1	3	4	8	7			15			19
						(1.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)			(0.1)			(0.1)

\* I.e., current (August 1967) type of training received.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Table 23

## FOREIGN LANGUAGES SPOKEN BY RVNAF OFFICERS, BY RANK (U)

Foreign Language	Gen	LtGen	M Gen	MG	Total Gen	Col	LtC	Maj	Total Field	Cpt	1Lt	2Lt	Total CO	OC	Other	Total
French											1		1			1
French-English		2 (25.0)			2 (5.0)			9 (0.7)	9 (0.5)	22 (0.5)	35 (0.5)	129 (2.6)	166 (1.2)	367 (4.9)	13 (5.1)	577 (2.3)
French-Chinese										2	13 (0.2)	90 (1.9)	105 (0.7)	272 (3.6)	11 (2.7)	366 (1.6)
French-Cambodian							2 (0.5)	6 (0.6)	10 (0.6)	41 (1.0)	84 (1.3)	276 (6.0)	401 (2.6)	1596 (21.4)	92 (22.3)	2101 (8.4)
French-Laotian	1 (50.0)	1 (12.5)	1 (8.3)	3 (16.7)	6 (15.0)	11 (13.4)	67 (18.3)	335 (25.5)	413 (23.4)	1233 (30.4)	1826 (27.5)	842 (16.2)	3901 (25.5)	742 (9.9)	31 (7.5)	5093 (20.4)
French-Thai											1		1			1
English								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	1	2	1	4			5
English-French				1 (5.6)	1 (2.5)		23 (6.3)	53 (4.0)	76 (4.3)	83 (2.0)	149 (2.2)	470 (10.2)	702 (4.6)	751 (10.0)	62 (15.0)	1592 (6.4)
English-Chinese						3 (3.7)	3 (0.6)	6 (0.5)	12 (0.7)	6 (0.2)	26 (0.4)	345 (7.5)	379 (2.5)	566 (7.6)	51 (7.5)	966 (3.9)
English-Cambodian						3 (5.7)	13 (3.6)	45 (3.4)	61 (3.5)	234 (5.6)	592 (8.9)	731 (15.8)	1557 (10.2)	1776 (25.7)	105 (22.4)	3499 (14.0)
English-Laotian	5 (62.5)	9 (75.0)		13 (72.2)	27 (67.5)	49 (59.8)	215 (58.7)	729 (55.4)	993 (56.3)	2090 (51.5)	3175 (47.6)	1352 (29.2)	6617 (43.2)	567 (7.6)	27 (6.5)	8251 (33.0)
Chinese-French											5 (0.2)	10 (0.2)	13 (0.1)	15 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	29 (0.1)
Chinese-English												2	8 (0.1)			10
Chinese											3	4 (0.1)	7	13 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	21 (0.1)
Chinese-Laotian						1 (1.2)	5 (1.4)	8 (0.6)	14 (0.8)	17 (0.4)	21 (0.3)	13 (0.3)	51 (0.3)	6 (0.1)	1 (0.2)	72 (0.3)
Cambodian-French								1	1			2	2			5
Cambodian-English													1			1
Cambodian-Chinese												1	1			4
Cambodian-Laotian							2 (0.5)	6 (0.5)	8 (0.5)	9 (0.2)	7 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	22 (0.1)	6 (0.1)		36 (0.1)
Laotian																1
Laotian-Chinese																1
Laotian-Cambodian							1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	6 (0.1)	1	1	7			9
Thai-Cambodian										1	2	1	4			5
Japanese-French														2		2
Japanese-English														1		1
Japanese-Cambodian								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	2	3	1	6			7
German-French												7 (0.2)	7	10 (0.1)		17 (0.1)
German-English												1	1	4 (0.1)		5
German-Chinese										1	4 (0.1)	1	6	13 (0.2)		19 (0.1)
German-Cambodian						1 (1.2)	1 (0.3)	7 (0.5)	9 (0.5)	12 (0.3)	17 (0.5)	16 (0.3)	45 (0.3)	2		56 (0.2)
Spanish-French														5 (0.1)		5
Spanish-English												1	1		1 (0.2)	2
Spanish-Chinese												1	1	6 (0.1)		7
Spanish-Laotian	1 (50.0)				1 (2.5)		1 (0.3)	1 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	1	2		5	3		9
South Korean-English								1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)	1			1	1		3
South Korean-French														3		3
South Korean-Japanese										5 (0.1)	1		6	1		7
South Korean-Chinese							2 (0.5)	9 (0.7)	11 (0.6)	20 (0.5)	12 (0.2)	2	34 (0.2)	1		46 (0.2)

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(C) Table 24

**LEVEL OF RVNAF OFFICERS' FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY (U)**

Rank	Interpreter	Translator	"Fair Comprehension"	"Read and Write"	Level Not Specified <sup>a</sup>
Gen	2 (25.0)			1 (50.0)	1 (50.0)
Lt Gen	1 (8.3)				6 (75.0)
Maj Gen	6 (33.3)				9 (75.0)
Brig Gen					11 (61.1)
Total Gen. Off.	<u>9 (22.5)</u>			<u>1 (2.5)</u>	<u>27 (67.5)</u>
Col	31 (37.8)	1 (1.2)			38 (46.3)
Lt Col	124 (33.9)	2 (0.5)			207 (56.6)
Maj	483 (36.7)	2 (0.2)	2 (0.2)		731 (55.6)
Total Field Grade Off.	<u>638 (36.2)</u>	<u>5 (0.3)</u>	<u>2 (0.1)</u>		<u>976 (55.4)</u>
Capt	1,539 (37.9)	9 (0.2)	7 (0.2)	2	2,227 (54.9)
1st Lt	3,098 (46.7)	18 (0.3)	3	1	2,757 (41.5)
2nd Lt	2,142 (46.3)	13 (0.3)	2		2,149 (46.5)
Total Co. Grade Off.	<u>6,779 (44.2)</u>	<u>40 (0.3)</u>	<u>12 (0.1)</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7,133 (46.6)</u>
Off Candidate	<u>3,402 (45.5)</u>	<u>49 (0.7)</u>	<u>12 (0.2)</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3,320 (44.4)</u>
Other	<u>198 (47.9)</u>		<u>1 (0.2)</u>		<u>176 (42.6)</u>
Grand total	11,026 (44.1)	94 (0.4)	27 (0.1)	5	11,632 (46.5)

<sup>a</sup>Or no foreign language capability. Further specification of this category was impossible because of the limitations of the code book.

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(C) Table 25

## MARITAL STATUS OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	Single	Widower	Married	Divorced	Separated
Gen			2		
Lt Gen			8		
Maj Gen	2(16.7)		10(83.3)		
Brig Gen	<u>2(11.1)</u>		<u>16(88.9)</u>		
Total Gen. Off.	<u>4(10.0)</u>		<u>36(90.0)</u>		
Col	6(7.3)	1(1.2)	75(91.5)		
Lt Col	25(6.8)	3(0.8)	335(91.5)	2(0.5)	
Maj	<u>82(6.2)</u>	<u>6(0.5)</u>	<u>1,214(92.3)</u>		<u>1(0.1)</u>
Total Field Grade Off.	<u>113(6.4)</u>	<u>10(0.6)</u>	<u>1,624(92.1)</u>	<u>2(0.1)</u>	<u>1(0.1)</u>
Capt	505(12.4)	7(0.2)	3,528(86.9)	5(0.1)	2
1st Lt	2,957(44.5)	6(0.1)	3,625(54.6)	2	3
2nd Lt	<u>3,141(67.9)</u>	<u>4(0.1)</u>	<u>1,422(30.8)</u>		<u>1</u>
Total Co. Grade Off.	<u>6,603(43.1)</u>	<u>17(0.1)</u>	<u>8,575(56.0)</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>
Off Candidate	<u>4,332(57.9)</u>	<u>6(0.1)</u>	<u>3,091(41.3)</u>	<u>1</u>	
Other	<u>224(54.2)</u>		<u>186(45.0)</u>		
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>11,276(45.1)</b>	<b>23(0.1)</b>	<b>13,512(54.0)</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>

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(C) Table 26  
NUMBER OF CHILDREN OF RVNAF OFFICERS (U)

Rank	None	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six	Seven	Eight	Nine
Gen	1 (12.5)	1 (8.3)	1 (50.0)	2 (25.0)	1 (50.0)		1 (12.5)			
Lt Gen	2 (16.7)	1 (8.3)	3 (37.5)	1 (12.5)	1 (12.5)		3 (25.0)		1 (8.3)	
Maj Gen	4 (22.2)	1 (5.6)	1 (8.3)	3 (16.7)	2 (11.1)		4 (22.2)		1 (5.6)	2 (11.1)
Brig Gen										
Total Gen Off	7 (17.5)	2 (5.0)	6 (15.0)	5 (12.5)	5 (12.5)		4 (10.0)		2 (5.0)	2 (5.0)
Col	12 (14.6)	1 (1.2)	13 (15.9)	8 (9.8)	6 (7.3)		8 (9.8)	9 (11.0)	7 (8.5)	4 (4.9)
Lt. Col.	44 (12.0)	23 (6.3)	42 (11.5)	34 (9.3)	43 (11.7)		54 (14.8)	28 (7.7)	23 (6.3)	14 (3.8)
Maj	129 (9.8)	108 (8.2)	129 (9.8)	146 (11.1)	184 (14.0)		165 (12.5)	116 (8.8)	84 (6.4)	33 (2.5)
Total Field Off	185 (10.5)	132 (7.5)	184 (10.4)	188 (10.7)	233 (13.2)		227 (12.9)	153 (8.7)	114 (6.5)	51 (2.9)
Capt	776 (19.1)	330 (8.1)	386 (9.5)	505 (12.4)	535 (13.2)		378 (9.3)	260 (6.4)	188 (4.6)	95 (2.3)
1st Lt	3,739 (56.3)	661 (10.0)	560 (8.4)	424 (6.4)	354 (5.3)		192 (2.9)	114 (1.7)	92 (1.4)	30 (0.5)
2nd Lt	3,442 (74.4)	359 (7.8)	231 (5.0)	129 (2.8)	111 (2.4)		57 (1.2)	49 (1.1)	32 (0.7)	16 (0.3)
Total Co Grade Off	7,957 (51.9)	1,350 (8.8)	1,177 (7.7)	1,058 (6.9)	1,000 (6.5)		627 (4.1)	423 (2.8)	312 (2.0)	141 (0.9)
Off Candidates	5,122 (68.5)	809 (10.8)	596 (8.0)	295 (3.9)	181 (2.4)		107 (1.4)	82 (1.1)	40 (0.5)	29 (0.4)
Others	278 (67.3)	57 (13.8)	29 (7.0)	27 (6.5)	6 (1.5)		4 (1.0)			
Grand Total	13,549 (54.2)	2,350 (9.4)	1,992 (8.0)	1,573 (6.3)	1,425 (5.7)		969 (3.9)	658 (2.6)	468 (1.9)	223 (0.9)

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Part Two: The Political Structure  
of the RVNAF Officer Corps

VI. INTRODUCTION

(U) Part Two examines salient institutional characteristics of the RVNAF to understand how the officer corps has confronted the war and affected political life in South Vietnam.

(U) The RVNAF is a product of the political struggle among factions during the Diem era and of the intensified military struggle against the Viet Cong in the latter half of the 1960s. As such, it has experienced rapid and uneven growth (see Table 27). In the last decade, the size of the regular armed forces increased by 100 percent, having grown from 1949 to 1957 by a factor of six. This development reflects increases both in U.S. military assistance to the Republic and in the intensity of the war itself. The unevenness with which the RVNAF grew during its first decade, however, is only partially related to the erratic U.S. commitments (later characterized as "piecemeal escalation") made under various Military Assistance Programs. The growth of the RVNAF has also been a function of South Vietnamese politics.

(U) Indeed, control of the armed forces in South Vietnam has been the springboard for political action, and the command and control system that developed in the RVNAF served to ratify and facilitate political combat. Prior to 1958, units and commands of the RVNAF were under no single authority. Early in his rule, Diem sought to control the armed forces, particularly the officer corps. By the end of 1958 he had consolidated support in the officer corps, reduced the size of the army, and through a Presidential Decree/Law, created the first unified command in the RVNAF and specified a single commander for all Vietnamese armed forces. Likewise, the corps commander system was established in 1964 with the intention of consolidating the shifting alliances of the 1963 coup participants, although ostensibly it was designed to facilitate the introduction of American combat units in 1965 and later the kind of operations required for mobile war.

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(C) Table 27

ESTIMATED RVNAF STRENGTH, 1949-1967 (SELECTED YEARS),  
BY SERVICE (U)

Year	Total Regular Forces	ARVN	VNAF	Navy	Marine Corps
1949	25,000	25,000			
1950	50,000	50,000			
1951	65,800	65,800			
1952	128,000	128,000			
1953	151,345	150,000	1,345		
1954	204,956	200,000	3,434	1,522	
1955	174,956	170,000	3,434	1,522	
1956	163,518	156,000	3,336	4,182	
1957 <sup>a</sup>	145,463	136,481	4,164	4,818	
1958					
(Jan)	140,238	131,343	4,025	4,870	
1958					
(Oct)	147,855	138,165	4,590	5,100	
1963	216,000				
1964	250,000				
1965	302,600				
1966	311,458	274,667	14,760	15,491	6,540
1967	325,255	285,905	16,073	16,105	7,172

<sup>a</sup>The almost 30 percent reduction in RVNAF strength of this year reflects Diem's action to disarm certain religious sects and other forces considered politically and militarily unreliable.

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(U) Both systems of command instituted in the RVNAF in 1958 and 1964 centralized and limited initiative as well as control. Ultimately, the command system (like the promotion system)<sup>35</sup> became bogged down by the incapacity of the higher echelons to respond to the needs of the subordinate units. Excessive centralization also tended to inhibit the development of military initiative, and the political constraints on RVNAF officers tended to make the display of such initiative risky indeed. Centralization provided the key to political control and enforced the mandate to place only loyal officers in the powerful commands. Loyalty rather than achievement was the basis of advancement in the RVNAF. Moreover, lacking any established tradition of civilian supremacy over the military, the military tended to view post-Diem governments as the opponent in its factional warfare.

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<sup>35</sup>(U) See Section IV, above.

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## VII. POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE CORPS

(U) Since the fall of Diem, control of government in South Vietnam has been determined by the outcome of a series of power struggles within the RVNAF officer corps. Thus, in politics, the differentiation between military and civilian is weak, particularly in the countryside, where the military establishment is the main administrative apparatus of government. In the 1967 national elections, for example, military service constituted a major occupational category, and RVNAF officers won 21 percent and 13 percent respectively of the Upper and Lower House seats. The war, moreover, has tended to prolong the military's monopoly on developmental resources, and the continual intrusion of the military sector into South Vietnamese life has not been paralleled by a comparable development in the viability or capabilities of civilian political organizations. Indeed, the consistent failure of nominally civilian organizations to exercise power effectively has tended to reinforce rather than reduce the military's control over South Vietnamese government and politics.<sup>36</sup>

(U) It is a well-documented finding of comparative research on military participation in politics that the capacity to intervene in politics or produce stable leadership in government is related to the social cohesion of the officer corps. Social cohesion, in turn, is a product of a variety of interrelated elements such as training and operational experiences, indoctrination, inter-generational affiliations, and the changing political fortunes of key officers. If social cohesion determines the capability of the officer corps to intervene in politics, it also contributes to the propensity to do so. When, in effect, the social cohesion of the military exceeds that of the incumbent government during a major crisis, it would seem that intervention -- in the absence of any firm tradition of civilian control over the military -- would be the inevitable result. As a base upon which to build up government or

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<sup>36</sup>(U) For example, from the 1963 revolution until the 1967 election, nominally civilian governments were in power a little more than 10 months compared with the more than 3 years of government by military juntas.

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staff development programs in the countryside, however, the military contributes little to the viability of the GVN. As an institution, the RVNAF officer corps mirrors the social and political tensions of the society at large. The nature of politics within the RVNAF has helped reinforce the widely held image of the GVN as a minority government that serves the interests of only a minority of the Vietnamese population.

(C) In a society characterized by highly politicized social forces, the RVNAF officer corps is no less so. In the RVNAF there appears to be an inverse relationship between rank and military ability, and it is generally acknowledged that a rise in rank or change in assignment signifies a change in political fortune rather than a recognition of service on the battlefield.<sup>37</sup> The steady expansion in the size of the RVNAF because of the war and the GVN's 1968 general mobilization program, however, have now outpaced promotion politics in the sense that the need for more officers and thus more promotions has outstripped the capacity of the system to "sanction" such promotions. Indeed, it is estimated that under the present promotion system it will take the RVNAF at least 2.5 years to fill mid-1968 (i.e., pre-general-mobilization) requirements. In addition, the relatively rapid expansion of the RVNAF in the 1960s, which filled the officer corps with men of approximately the same age,<sup>38</sup> coupled with the limited opportunities for advancement produced by the promotion system, fostered the development of factions to which officers could look for support and advancement.

(U) The factions within the RVNAF officer corps tend to reflect divisions in the Vietnamese political system generally. That is, the RVNAF factions reflect the tensions between northern Catholics and southern Buddhists, between the supporters of President Thieu and

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<sup>37</sup>(U) From 1966 through 1968, for example, less than 2 percent of all RVNAF promotions were made on the basis of battlefield performance.

<sup>38</sup>(C) Fifty percent of all RVNAF officers are between 25 and 31 years old, with the following breakdown by grade: 51.4 percent of all officer candidates are between 27 and 30 years old; and 43 percent of all company grade officers are between 27 and 32 years old.

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those of Vice President Ky, and between officers who have benefited from the war (the "staffers") and those who have had to fight it (the "fighters"). From late 1965 to mid-1968, however, the basic regional and religious tensions within the officer corps were subordinated in the struggle between Generals Thieu and Ky for control of the military and the executive branch of the government.

(C) The basis of what has been called the Thieu-Ky conflict was actually laid two decades ago. The first class (1946) at the Hué (now Dalat) National Military Academy graduated 63 RVNAF officers, including President Nguyen Van Thieu (see Table 28 for a list of those graduates still on active duty). The first graduating class of the Nam Dinh (now Thu Duc) Reserve Officer Training system included Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky (see Table 29). The graduates from these service academies today constitute an important part of the GVN's power elite, and government in South Vietnam has depended upon their sanction. By 1967, the military officers in the RVNAF could be characterized as either pro-Ky, pro-Thieu, or neutral, as Table 30 depicts.

(C) The Thieu-Ky conflict became apparent in 1967 about the beginning of spring, with the appearance of a sign throughout the countryside proclaiming that "the government of Nguyen Cao Ky is the government of the poor people." Near the end of June, the terms of the conflict were set by the stated desire of both to run for election to the presidency of the Republic. This contest, which threatened to divide the military, or, more precisely, reduce the chances of a victorious military ticket in the September elections, was resolved during a three-day meeting of the Armed Forces Council (composed of all active-duty general officers of the RVNAF and controlled by the senior generals commanding the corps, divisions, and special warfare units) beginning June 30. The denouement of what was from all accounts a highly emotional conference produced a single military ticket headed by Nguyen Van Thieu. This decision, perhaps more than any other single event, indicated the strength of Thieu's support among the senior RVNAF generals. By August 1967 the Thieu supporters included three corps commanders and five division commanders, plus the commanders of the airborne, ranger, and artillery units. In contrast, Ky had the

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(C) Table 28

RVNAF GENERAL OFFICERS: HUE-DALAT GRADUATES (U)

Officer	Year of Service Entry	Religion	Birthplace (Region)	Position (August 1967)
Gen Tran thien Khiem	1946	Buddhist <sup>a</sup>	SVN	Ambassador, Taiwan
Lt Gen Nguyen van Thieu	1946	Catholic	CVN	Chief of State
Lt Gen Nguyen Khang	1946	Buddhist	SVN	Ambassador, Spain
Lt Gen Tran ngoc Tam	1946	Buddhist	SVN	Chrmn, FWMAF
Lt Gen Dang van Quang	1948	Catholic	SVN	C, Arty; Min Nat'l Plng
Lt Gen Hoang xuan Lam	1950	Buddhist	CVN	CG, I Corps
Lt Gen Vinh Loc	1950	Buddhist	CVN	CG, II Corps
Lt Gen Le nguyen Khang	1952	Buddhist	NVN	CG, Marines
Maj Gen that Xung	1948	Buddhist	CVN	Unassigned
Maj Gen Nguyen van Manh	1949	Buddhist	SVN	CG, IV Corps
Maj Gen Lu mong Lam	1950	Buddhist	CVN	Dir, Cen Trng Agency, JGS
Maj Gen Du quoc Dang	1951	Buddhist	SVN	CG, Airborne
Maj Gen Tran thanh Phong	1951	Buddhist	SVN	J-3(Opns), JGS
Brig Gen Nguyen van Kiem	1946	Catholic	SVN	DC/S(Pers), JGS
Brig Gen Cao hao Hon	1946	Unknown	SVN	Unassigned
Brig Gen Bui dinh Dam	1948	Catholic	NVN	C, Mobilization Directorate
Brig Gen Tran van Trung	1948	Catholic	CVN	DC/S(Psywar), JGS
Brig Gen Lam quang Thi	1950	Buddhist	SVN	CG, 9 Div
Brig Gen Nguyen van Hieu	1950	Catholic	China	CG, 22 Div
Brig Gen Nguyen xuan Thinh	1951	Unknown	SVN	Dep CG, III Corps
Brig Gen Phan quoc Thuan	1951	Catholic	NVN	CG, 5 Div
Brig Gen Nguyen viet Thanh	1951	Buddhist	SVN	CG, 7 Div
Brig Gen Phan trong Chinh	1951	Buddhist	NVN	CG, 25 Div
Brig Gen Lam quong Tho	1951	Buddhist	SVN	CMDT, Thu Duc Inf School
Brig Gen Nguyen Cao	1951	Buddhist	SVN	Unassigned
Brig Gen Nguyen vinh Nghi	1952	Catholic	SVN	C/S, I Corps
Brig Gen Truong quang An	1952	Buddhist	SVN	CG, 23 Div

<sup>a</sup> Buddhist upon entry into service.

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(C) Table 29

RVNAF GENERAL OFFICERS: NAM DINH-THU DUC GRADUATES (U)

Officer	Year of Service Entry	Religion	Birthplace (Region)	Position (Aug. 1967)
AVM Nguyen Cao Ky	1951	Buddhist	NVN	Premier, CG, VNAF
Lt Gen Nguyen Bao Tri	1951	Catholic	NVN	Min Info and Chieu Hoi
Maj Gen Tran van Minh	1951	Buddhist	SVN	Amb, Korea
Maj Gen Nguyen duc Thang	1951	Catholic	NVN	ADC/S(RD), JGS
Maj Gen quang Truong	1953	Buddhist	SVN	CG, 1 Div
Brig Gen Nguyen ngoc Loan	1951	Confucian	SVN	Dir Gen, Natl Police
Brig Gen Nguyen van Minh	1953	Buddhist	SVN	CG, 21 Div

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(C) Table 30

RVNAF COMMANDERS AND THEIR POLITICS (U)

Officer		Position		
Rank 1967	Name	August 1967	Change (if any) During Thieu-Ky Conflict, Sept. 1967-May 1968	During Thieu Consolidation, June 1968-Jan. 1969
<b>Thieu Supporters</b>				
Gen	Tran thien Khiem	Amb, Taiwan		Min Interior
Lt Gen	Dang van Quang	Min Nat Plng		Spec Asst to Preident
Lt Gen	Do cao Tri	Amb, Korea		CG, III Corpe
Lt Gen	Hoang xuan Lam	CG, I Corpe		
Lt Gen	Vinh Loc	CG, II Corpe		Mil Adv, Paris Talka
Maj Gen	Lu mong Lam	Comdr, Gen Trng Ag		
Maj Gen	Nguyen van La	IG, RVNAF		
Maj Gen	Nguyen van Manh	CG, IV Corpe		
Maj Gen	Du quoc Dung	CG, Airborne		
Brig Gen	Nguyen van Minh	CG, 21 Div		
Brig Gen	Nguyen xuan Thinh	Comdr, Arty		Comdr, CMD (Saigon-Gia Dinh)
Brig Gen	Pham quoc Thuan	CG, 5 Div		
Brig Gen	Nguyen viet Thanh	CG, 7 Div		
Brig Gen	Lam quang Thi	CG, 9 Div		
Brig Gen	Phan trong Chinh	CG, 25 Div		
Col	Tran van Hai	Comdr, Rangers		Dir Gen, Nat Police
<b>Ky Supporters</b>				
Gen	Cao van Vien	C/S (JGS); Min Def	C/S, JGS	
Lt Gen	Pham xuan Chieu	SYG, Nat Leadership Co	Unassigned	
Lt Gen	Le Nguyen Khang	CG, III Corps; CG, Marines		CG, Marines
Maj Gen	Nguyen duc Thanh	ADC/S (RD), JGS		Spec Asst to C/S, JGS;
Maj Gen	Nguyen bao Tri	Min Info and Chieu Hoi		Comdr Arty
Maj Gen	Linh quang Vien	Min Nat Security		Unassigned
Brig Gen	Nguyen ngoc Loan	Dir Gen, Natl Police		Unassigned; prom to Maj Gen
<b>Identified with Tran van Huong's Southern Old Students Assn (Lien Truong)</b>				
Lt Gen	Tran ngoc Tam	Chrmn, FMAF		
Lt Gen	Do cao Tri	Amb, Korea		CG, III Corpa
Maj Gen	Nguyen van La	IC, RVNAF		
Maj Gen	Tran thanh Phong	DC/S(J-3), JGS		
Brig Gen	Cao hao Hon	ADC/S(RD), JGS		Prom to Maj Gen
Brig Gen	Nguyen van Minh	CG, 21 Div		Comdr, CMD (Saigon-Gia Dinh)
<b>Unidentified with Any Group to Date<sup>a</sup></b>				
Lt Gen	Tran van Minh (1)	Amb, Tunisia		
Maj Gen	Nguyen van Vy	C/S, RVNAF		Min Def and Veterans;
Maj Gen	Chang tan Cang	CMDT, C&GSS		prom to Lt Gen
Brig Gen	Tran van Trung (2)	DC/S (Peywar), JGS		Prom to Maj Gen
Brig Gen	Nguyen van Khiem (2)	DC/S (Pere), JGS		Prom to Maj Gen
Brig Gen	Ngo Dzu	ADC/S (RD), JGS		
Brig Gen	Doan van Quang	CG, Spec Fce		Prom to Maj Gen
Brig Gen	Nguyen Cao (2)	Unassigned		
Brig Gen	Nguyen xuan Thinh (2)	Dep CG, III Corpe		Prom to Maj Gen
Brig Gen	Ngo quang Truong (1)	CG, 1 Div		Prom to Maj Gen
Brig Gen	Nguyen xuan Trang	CH, Arty Br, JGS		DC/S (Pera), JGS
Brig Gen	Tran van Minh (1)	DCG, VNAF		Prom to Maj Gen
Col	Do ke Giai	ACO, 18 Div		CG, 18 Div
Col	Nguyen thanh Hoang (1)	C/S, III Corpe		CG, 7 Div; prom to Brig Gen
Col	Tran ba Di (2)	C/S, IV Corpe		Comdr, 9 Div
Col	Nguyen van Hieu (2)	CG, 22 Div		
Col	Bui dinh Dam (2)	CH, Mob Dir		Prom to Brig Gen
Col	Dong van Khuyen (1)	Adj Gen, JGS		Prom to Brig Gen
Col	Hoang van Lac	Unknown		Prom to Brig Gen
Col	Le ngoc Trien	Comdt, Quang Trung Trng Cen		Prom to Brig Gen
Col	Nguyen vinh Nghi (2)	C/S, I Corpe		CG, 21 Div; prom to Brig Gen
Col	Vu ngoc Hoan	CN, Med Dir		Prom to Brig Gen
Col	Lam quang Tho (2)	Cmtd, Thu Duc Inf Sch		Prom to Brig Gen
Copt	Tran van Chon	Comdr, Navy		Prom to Commodors
Col	Truong quang An (2)	CG, 23 Div		Prom to BG; KIA Sept 1968
Col	Nguyen van Toan (1)	CG, 2 Div		Prom to Brig Gen

<sup>a</sup> Numbers in parentheses refer to service academies: (1) = Thu Duc; (2) = Dalat

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support of only one corps commander, in addition to the Secretary General of his junta's National Leadership Committee, the director of the police, and three cabinet ministers. Thus, Thieu and Ky had essentially different rather than competing bases of support.

(C) Nguyen Van Thieu was a member of what can be called the traditional military elite, and like most senior line officers was a graduate of the National Military Academy (the Hué-Dalat system). He had risen through the command structure without much notoriety, and to observers of the 1963 coup group, he did not particularly stand out. Nguyen Cao Ky's career reflected a more flamboyant rise to power, and he necessarily drew his support from a different sector of the officer corps. First, while Ky apparently considered his academy experience a significant basis on which to draw supporters, there simply were fewer active duty generals from Thu Duc than from Dalat (where Thieu had been an instructor and later Commandant). Second, Ky had been faced with the problem of running a government for almost 18 months, an effort that required his most powerful supporters in the ministries and administrative posts. Since the cabinet had no police of its own, Ky relied heavily on his Thu Duc classmate General Loan to use the powers of the police to keep the opposition in check. The Thieu candidacy provided the generals with an alternative to the continued support of the Ky government and made a choice between them necessary.<sup>39</sup> Third, Ky's supporters in the officer corps tended to be younger than Thieu's. Thus by 1967 they probably had not made general officer rank and were more likely to hold staff posts in the provincial, corps, and national capitals than important division posts.

(C) The generals most openly committed were those most affected in the Thieu-Ky conflict that unfolded after the September 1967 presidential elections. But the threat that Thieu and Ky posed to each other had changed: Thieu had become the hunter. Thieu's greatest fear, during the first six months of his administration, was a coup led by Ky. Not without design did he place one of his supporters in

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<sup>39</sup> (C) Thieu's initial hesitancy to oppose Ky followed by his entry into the race may indicate that the RVNAF generals did indeed want to make such a choice.

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command of the anti-coup division and transfer Marine units loyal to Ky out of the Saigon area, replacing them with Rangers. Ky probably found himself increasingly unable to mount a coup, being pressured by the embassy not to do so and seeing all his major supporters removed from power. Almost half of all province chiefs were replaced or reassigned, partly because of an anti-corruption drive. Actually, Thieu also replaced province chiefs to destroy the bases of support for the general officers (particularly in the corps commands) whom he had had to replace.<sup>40</sup> The Thieu-Ky conflict faded somewhat after the operational threat of a coup had been substantially reduced and Ky had been posted to the Paris peace talks. Finally, between June 1968 and January 1969, Thieu's Dalat classmate General Khiem returned as Minister of Interior and Thieu assumed control over all the corps commands, the police and intelligence services, and the Capital Military District.

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<sup>40</sup> (C) The replacement of province chiefs, coupled with the installation of "corps civilian deputies," agents of the Minister of Interior to whom province chiefs are now supposed to report, has diminished corps commanders' traditional autonomy. However, as the Thieu consolidations tapered off near the end of 1968, there was increasing evidence that the corps commanders (now all Thieu men) were resuming their customary authority and privileges and that the power of the corps civilian deputy was on the wane.

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## VIII. LEGACIES OF THE THIEU-KY CONFLICT

(U) What are the likely effects of the Thieu-Ky conflict? With the victory of Thieu, many Ky supporters have been systematically displaced by Thieu men. However, to the extent that President Thieu consolidates his support, there will be political restrictions on mobility within field grade ranks. Thus the hope that Thieu's victory over Ky for control of the executive and the army will both restore stability and increase the RVNAF's effectiveness may well be frustrated. Essentially, the Thieu consolidations represent the victory of one faction over another rather than an end to either the causes of factionalism or the prevailing mode of resolving basic social and career tensions in the RVNAF. Unless Thieu significantly reduces the level of politicking within the RVNAF by building support outside the officer corps, young turk and reform movements -- composed of officers frustrated by the lack of advancement which the placing of Thieu men in power represents -- are likely to arise. The fading of the conflict has not fundamentally altered the processes that contributed to Ky's vulnerability with respect to the kind of military support he lacked when challenged by Thieu in 1967.

(C) Because of the politics of the promotion system, a sizable portion of field and company grade officers may already be frustrated. It appeared in early 1969, for example, that the north-south conflict was once again being revived in former Prime Minister Huong's drive to elevate more southerners to command positions<sup>41</sup> and is now being continued in the feud between III Corps commander General Do Cao Tri and Chief of Staff Cao Van Vien. There is also much potential for

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<sup>41</sup>(C) This drive was reportedly sponsored by Huong's Lien Truong (Southern Old Students Association), with Lieutenant General Tri and Major Generals Nguyen Van Minh and Tran Thanh Phong as key organizers, and Lieutenant Generals Tran Ngoc Tan and Nguyen Van La, Major General Cao Hao Hon, and several brigadier generals among its sympathizers. In addition, a Vietnamese captain informed me in conversation that classes at Dalat in the early 1960s had consciously formed a young turk movement including two senators, about six Lower House deputies, and one close associate of former Prime Minister Huong.

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conflict between those we have called the "fighters" and the "staffers." Resentment is no doubt already high among those officers who have shouldered the brunt of the fighting in the hinterlands and have also held the same rank for 5 to 10 years while witnessing the rapid advancement of political officers assigned to Saigon and Corps staffs.

(C) In the future, factions within the RVNAF are likely to be based on groups of officers who entered the service during the 1950s. The most significant period of entry for field grade officers, for example, was 1951-1954, when 77.1 percent entered the service. Of that number 60 percent were commissioned at either Dalat (27 percent) or the Nam Dinh- (located in North Vietnam, 1951-1953) Thu Duc system (33 percent). In contrast, 90 percent and 71 percent respectively of the Thieu and Ky supporters among the general officers had already been commissioned by the end of 1951. The significance of service academy ties as a basis for future factions is that after 1951, and particularly after 1954, Dalat and Thu Duc began to attract officers with essentially different backgrounds. Dalat in the 1950s was associated with officers of central Vietnamese Buddhist origins, while Thu Duc, having been established in Tonkin, attracted the northern-born refugees. By 1953, the career patterns of those institutions' alumni diverged. Starting in 1953, Nam Dinh-Thu Duc classes have been larger, though fewer of their graduates have advanced to higher ranks than have Dalat graduates of the same period; fewer of both institutions' graduates after 1952 advanced to field grades. As long as a military career is subject to the same social and political tensions as in the society at large, the formation of factions among disgruntled officers will continue to make coups and counter-coups within the military a predominant feature of South Vietnamese politics.

(U) From the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, Vietnam's army was organized into five divisions. One was on active duty and the other four were held in reserve, their soldiers and officers being allowed to return to their villages and farms. This army of soldier-farmers fought the brilliant campaigns that resulted in the conquest of most of Indo-China and successfully resisted the Chinese invasion led by Kublai Khan. With this pattern of military organization the army

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produced its greatest generals, and the central government was able to sustain an effective military organization without substantially disrupting the economy of the countryside. As long as this model of the agrarian army was employed, the Vietnamese court was unusually free from warlordism and factional strife. It is significant that leaders in the National Assembly today consider this an important lesson of the past and a model for the present.

(U) It is this conception of what Vietnamization means and this kind of mobilization that an increasing number of prominent Vietnamese are willing to support.

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10. ABSTRACT  (U) An analysis of the social origins, career patterns, and political structure of the officer corps to determine its ability to assume responsibility for the war, which is central to the success of Vietnamization. The ethnic homogeneity of the officer corps, coupled with the urban orientation that the educational requirement fosters, isolates the RVNAF officer from the society he is charged with defending and from the men he commands. Professionalism has not been developed, and political loyalty--not battlefield performance--has dominated the promotion system. Unless this system is regularized and given immunity to the vagaries of general officer politicking, President Thieu may well be opposed by a growing coalition of "fighting" officers. The military has the materiel but lacks the skill to effectively govern South Vietnam. A professional rather than a political army is required, and the question is whether professionalism can be stimulated by reform.		11. KEY WORDS  South Vietnam Military Organization Southeast Asia Vietnamization	
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