<table>
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<tr>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Major General, USA
Acting The Adjutant General
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 12TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96266

AVBACA-SC 15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. General:

(1) The 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) during the period 1 May to 30 Jun 70 participated in the Cambodian campaign. Coordination for air support during the campaign was handled by 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) AAE (Army Aviation Element) located at II FFORCEV and a provisional AAE located at Go Dau Ha. The operation was divided into two phases in which US forces participated; Phase I, 29 Apr - 6 May, and Phase II, 6 May - 30 Jun. Information pertaining to 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) participation in the operation is located in subparagraph (2) below.

(2) The Group became directly involved with Improvement and Modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF I&M) during the reporting period. The involvement during this period pertained primarily to training and was conducted at unit level. This headquarters is and will continue to be responsible for planning and supervision of the program. I&M will continue to play a significant role in the 12th Group activities and will be included in the next CRL.

(3) The statistical results of the 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) aviation activities during the period are shown below:

(a) Rotary Wing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>42,406</td>
<td>50,406</td>
<td>36,574</td>
<td>129,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Lifted</td>
<td>174,250</td>
<td>170,106</td>
<td>153,730</td>
<td>498,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cargo</td>
<td>31,173</td>
<td>26,247</td>
<td>15,288</td>
<td>72,708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(b) Fixed Wing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>4,456</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>13,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Lifted</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,724</td>
<td>10,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cargo</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Crewmember Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crewmember WIA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crewmember KIA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crewmember MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Killed by Air</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) aviation support of Cambodian operations from 29 Apr - 30 Jun 70:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bn</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>Tons of Cargo</th>
<th>KBA</th>
<th>Structures Dest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>145th Avn Bn</td>
<td>4,216</td>
<td>26,710</td>
<td>3,909</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17th Air Cav</td>
<td>8,829</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269th Avn Bn</td>
<td>13,055</td>
<td>35,358</td>
<td>15,714</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222d Avn Bn</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Bn</td>
<td>15,973</td>
<td>99,316</td>
<td>34,185</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th Avn Bn</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>46,851</td>
<td>164,249</td>
<td>55,536</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Mission: No change.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat)
for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOA-65) (RL) (U)

c. Organization:

(1) On 1 May 70 the 73d SAC of the 210th Avn Bn was attached to the
164th Avn Gp (Cbt).

(2) On 2 May 70 D Troop, 3/17th Air Cav Sqdn was released from OPCON
to 25th Inf Div.

(3) On 5 May 70 D Troop, 3/17th Air Cav Sqdn was placed OPCON to the
1st Air Cav Div.

(4) On 6 May 70 the 334th AHC of the 145th Avn Bn moved to Phu Loi.

(5) On 1 Jul 70 D Troop, 3/17th Air Cav Sqdn was released from OPCON
1st Air Cav Div.

(6) On 5 Jul 70 D Troop, 3/17th Air Cav Sqdn was placed OPCON of the
25th Inf Div.

(7) On 9 Jul 70 the 116th AHC of the 269th Avn Bn was attached to the
212th Avn Bn (Cbt) for employment in I Corps for a 90 day period.

(8) On 15 Jul 70 USARV AH-1G and OH-6A transition training teams were
attached to the 12th Avn Gp (Cbt).

(9) On 22 Jul 70 the 3/17th Air Cav Sqdn was placed OPCON of II FFV.

(10) On 31 Jul 70 C Troop, 3/17th Air Cav Sqdn was attached to the 212th
Avn Bn (Cbt) for operations in MR 1.

d. Personnel:

(1) On 5 May 70 LTC Davis assumed duties of Executive Officer replacing
LTC Bretz.

(2) On 7 May 70 LT Shaffer assumed duties of Information Officer
replacing LT Costello.

(3) On 24 May 70 LTC Dantos assumed duties of Group S-3 replacing
LTC Dillard.

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On 26 May 70 CPT Thompson assumed duties of Group S-1 replacing MAJ Mitchell.

On 5 Jun 70 1LT Potter assumed duties as HHC XO replacing 1LT Brill.

On 15 Jun 70 1LT Latimer assumed duties as A&D Officer.

On 26 Jun 70 MAJ Frederick assumed duties as Group Surgeon replacing LTC Price.

On 26 Jun 70 CPT Thompson assumed duties as Group S-2 replacing MAJ Gaskins.

On 8 Jul 70 1LT Brill assumed duties as Avionics Officer.

On 9 Jul 70 MAJ Richardson assumed duties as Chief AAE replacing LTC Myers.

On 10 Jul 70 CPT Graham assumed duties of Duty Officer (AAE) replacing MAJ Richardson.

On 21 Jul 70 CW2 King assumed duties of Duty Officer (AAE) replacing CPT Alger.

On 26 Jul 70 CPT Tuller assumed duties as Group S-2 replacing CPT Thompson.

On 26 Jul 70 CPT Thompson assumed duties as HHC CO replacing CPT Tuller.

UNIT STRENGTH: Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) as of 31 July 1970:

(1) Military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(2) Civilians:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DMC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>3rd Nat'l Contractor</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
<td>Auth O/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Aircraft Status: As of 31 July 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1D/H</th>
<th>OH-58</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Avn Bde Fill Goal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Hand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Training:

1. From 14 May until 31 May a training team from the Pacific Jungle Survival School at Clark AFB, Philippines, visited all units in 12th Group. A three hour block of instruction was presented covering escape, evasion, use of survival equipment, jungle environment and rescue techniques.

2. During the reporting period all Group OH-6A's were replaced with OH-58A's. USAV training teams conducted initial training of 12th Group aviators in the OH-58; the Group has since assumed all OH-58 training requirements at unit level.

h. Security and Intelligence:

1. During the first week of May the S-2 Office participated in the planning and execution of a forward air mission command post during Phase I of the Cambodian Operation. The S-2 Office was part of the team that established the communication system to direct, control and supervise all Army Aviation assets that were being utilized to support ground units inside Cambodia.

* AVCOM - Attached
** Lycoming - Attached
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for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RM) (U)

(2) The S-2 Office prepared OPLAN 2-70, Sector Delta Defense of Plantation on 1 May 70. The OPLAN was drafted and put into effect and annotated with three (3) changes by the S-2 Section.

(3) The S-2 Office, in liaison with II Field Forces Commandant, performed inspections of the sector Delta perimeter to facilitate the improvement and upgrading of the perimeter defense.

(4) The classified repository and distribution facility operated by the S-2 Section processed approximately 1,094 CONFIDENTIAL and 150 SECRET documents during this period.

1. Safety:

(1) During the reporting period, the 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) accident rate was stable in May, decreased in June and rose again in July. The Group experienced 10 accidents in May for a rate of 21.5, 7 accidents in June for a rate of 15.8 and 9 accidents in July for a rate of 22.5.

(2) In May five accidents were caused by operator error and five resulted from material failure. In June two accidents were caused by operator error and five by material failure. In July four accidents were attributed to operator error and five to material failure. Of the 15 aircraft accidents resulting from material failure during the period, 11 were a direct result of engine failure.

(3) The 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) flew 571,467 hours and experienced 99 aircraft accidents for a FY 70 cumulative rate of 17.3, as compared to a rate of 23.2 for FY 69 and a rate of 25.1 for FY 68. The 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) rate of 17.3 was the lowest of the five units in USARV who flew over 300,000 hours in FY 70.

2. Logistics:

(1) The Group coordinated and supervised the utilization of the self help construction program and moved the 195th AHC and the 117th AHC from tents into 12 self constructed buildings.

(2) Classes were scheduled and presented to units in the 12th Avn Gp on ammunition and POL handling.

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(3) During the reporting period the 116th AHC and C Troop, 3/17th Air
Cav Sqdn were attached to the 212th Avn Bn (Cbt) in I Corps. Extensive
coodination was required for logistic support to ship and transfer unit
property. Problem areas will be addressed in paragraph 2g of this report.

k. Medical:

(i) During the quarter, the Group Medical Section participated in
Commanders’ Conferences, combined Group Surgeon’s Conference with other
Groups within the Brigade, and Flight Surgeon’s Conference conducted with
the Battalion surgeons assigned to our own 12th Group. Based on personal
observations and suggestions from Battalion surgeons, the Group Surgeon
recommended policy changes and provided guidelines for medical operations
with highlights on the following areas of medical concern:

(a) Interpretation of 1st Aviation Brigade message dated 7 May 70 on
the use of Dapsone for prevention of falciparum malaria in troops flying into
Cambodia. Recommendation was given that 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) crews not use
Dapsone unless flying frequent evening, night time and/or early morning
flights. Aviators were encouraged to use other individual protective
measures at all times.

(b) Necessity for reconnaissance of new company areas, from the stand-
point of environmental sanitation, prior to the “moving-in” of units.
Particular emphasis was placed on insuring that all potential employees
received medical examinations prior to employment.

(c) Drug abuse among troops continues to be the biggest problem in the
area of mental health. Round table discussions held on this subject resulted
in areas being outlined depicting the role of the surgeon in advising commanders
and NCO personnel in handling potential offenders. Although many offenders
have character and behavior disorders, and are generally ineffective, an
increasing number are using amphetamines and opiates. Flight surgeons
throughout the Group were encouraged to place more emphasis on these
“hard drugs” in their educational programs. The Group Surgeon subsequently
prepared a memorandum for record entitled “Drug Misuse – Recent Trends and
a Hopeful Education Approach”. Procedures and guidance for establishing
drug suppression programs and related extracts were distributed to all
Battalion surgeons to assist them in establishing their educational approach
to the existing problems. It was emphasized that each unit’s program be
tailored to the specific needs of the respective unit rather than stereo-
type after a command-wide teaching plan.

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(d) Education of military personnel in the prevention of venereal disease continued to be emphasized in all units. It was found that case finding programs directed toward the detection, source and the treatment of infected individuals greatly reduces the incidence of venereal disease among troops. Battalion surgeons were urged to continue their respective prevention programs in an effort to further reduce the incidence of this disease among all military personnel.

(e) It was noted that during previous years of operations in Vietnam, the months of July and August were characterized by a peak incidence of encephalitis in the Long Binh area. All surgeons were urged to stress the need for individual protective measures among troops against mosquitoes during this period.

(f) As a means of keeping abreast of existing trends and policies within all medical areas of particular concern in the combat environment, the Group Surgeon and all Battalion surgeons participated in joint conferences with other medical groups within the Brigade. The conferences included guest speakers whose topics were Psychiatry, Ophthalmology, Dermatology and Orthopedics as they relate to the hygiene of military personnel in Southeast Asia.

(2) Sanitation: Command emphasis on sanitation during the quarter provided the impetus that resulted in the upgrading of sanitary conditions within several units in the Group. Field Sanitation teams are continually being trained by the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit and their performance is monitored by Battalion surgeons in an effort to insure that the team personnel are fully trained and totally aware of the great responsibility involved in evaluating the sanitary conditions of their respective organizations daily.

(3) MEDCAP: The Group medical section in conjunction with the S-5 are actively participating in the formulative plans for the organization of a MEDCAP Coordination Committee. This committee is designed to coordinate MEDCAP activities within Bien Hoa Province in an effort to combine available resources that will eventually be applied to the particular areas that are desperately in need of MEDCAP services. This committee will attempt to prevent duplication of effort in areas serviced and thus provide the basis for a check and balance system which will aid significantly in ascertaining the overall success of the program.

1. Religious Activities:
(1) Troop visitations and frequent contact by the Group Chaplain continued to be emphasized during this period. As required, all replacement and rotating personnel were interviewed by a Chaplain. The Group Chaplain coordinated with Battalion Chaplains to insure that religious services and counseling periods were made available to all troops.

(2) Prime Time For God was again presented in the Group. This religious program shifted emphasis from Sunday morning services to evening worship/fellowship services in order that more troops might attend services scheduled outside normal duty hours.

(3) Chaplain activities in Group for this quarter are summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Change from Last Quarter</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Worship</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>+7.6%</td>
<td>22,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>+2.6%</td>
<td>5,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral Visits</td>
<td>11,119</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Including Counseling)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character Guidance</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>12,573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The decrease in Pastoral Visits and Character Guidance is due to the rotation of four of the seven Chaplains in Group during this quarter. Replacements in the 145th and 269th Avn Bn (Cbt) were not immediately available.
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m. Signal:

(1) Teletype traffic handled on the Group system decreased from 4,895 messages to 4,728 messages for the quarter. A slight increase in cable problems, since the onset of the monsoon season, has caused an increase in the use of courier service. All ground stations in the Group command FM radio net continued operations in the secure mode.

(2) The Group SOI section prepared special SOI's to support several parties of visiting dignitaries. Full signal support to include ground stations, airborne relay and air mission nets were provided for these visits. An evaluation is given in Section II.

(3) After initial installation of a completely self sustaining, forward communication's control center, the Signal section assisted during a displacement to a new location. The center was fully operational within three (3) hours after reaching the new sight. Problem areas are evaluated in Section II.

(4) Project "Touchdown" briefings were presented to 90% of the Group's subordinate units during the reporting period. These briefings are continuing.

(5) The signal section is currently working on the VNAF IAM program and an evaluation will be made in the next ORLL.

2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Observations: There is a correlation between 51 Cal. anti-aircraft positions and cache/base camp locations.

(2) Evaluation: In areas where 51 Cal. anti-aircraft fire has been observed over an extended period of time and troops have been inserted, substantial cache sites, base camps or training areas have been revealed. It is difficult for aviators to distinguish between
51 Cal. and 30 Cal. fire; however where reliable reports indicate a relatively permanent 51 Cal. site, a cache/base camp should be suspected.

3. Recommendation: Reports of this nature should be very carefully reviewed and if possible, confirmed. Resources should be made available to react to the suspected positions.

4. Command Action: Unit commanders have been made aware of this pattern through command briefings. Aviators are being made aware of these suspected locations and are requested to report the information as accurately and rapidly as possible.

c. Operations:

1. Forward rearm and refuel facilities.

   (a) Observation. There is a definite requirement in a deploying airmobile environment for a light weight, airmobile, forward area refuel and rearm facility.

   (b) Evaluation: The current refuel/rearm procedures require mission aircraft to return to major cantonment areas to rearm and refuel. The current system causes a loss of productive blade time in support of tactical operations. A light weight system capable of refueling from 8 to 10 aircraft simultaneously is required. The rearm capability would basically require only qualified ammunition specialists to provide ammunition breakdown and storage capability. Engineer support would be required to build protective berms for both POL and ammunition storage areas.

   (c) Recommendations:

      (1) That necessary POL dispensing equipment be made available at Aviation Battalion level for deployment as required in support of rapidly deploying airmobile operations.

      (2) That an SDR be developed for a light weight airmobile rearm/refuel facility to support deploying airmobile units.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RSC-CSFOh-65) (Hi) (U)

(2) Reduction in Daily Mission Time.

(c) OBSERVATION: OR rates during peak operations in Cambodia for all units involved declined somewhat as the required flying hours increased.

(b) EVALUATION: The units of 12th Group were committed to missions which required them to operate at or near maximum operational capability with a limited surge available.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Reduce daily mission for each unit involved from 6 hours/aircraft to 5 hours/aircraft. This would give the units a limited surge capability and reduce cost of operation while allowing unit maintenance personnel an opportunity to bring up the OR rate.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS: Units within 12th Avn Gp were directed to cut daily mission time from 6 hours/aircraft to 5 hours/aircraft from 1 Aug to 31 Aug. This headquarters will recommend that this reduction continue in effect beyond the 31 Aug cut off date if support can be properly maintained. This cut in mission time would significantly cut 12th Avn Gp aircraft operating costs.

d. Safety;

(1) Aircraft Accident Cause Factors:

(a) OBSERVATION: During the period from April through July 1970, an analysis of aircraft accident cause factors revealed that the number of material failure caused accidents exceeded the number of operator error caused accidents within the 12th Avn Gp.

(b) EVALUATION: The total number of accidents experienced during this report period was substantially less than the total number of accidents experienced during the previous two years for the same time period. It is evident that the intense accident prevention program in effect with the 12th Avn Gp has had a greater impact on the prevention of operator caused accidents than on material failure caused accidents. This is due to the fact that two thirds of the material failure caused accidents involved internal engine failure. Results of analysis of engine failure currently take an average of six months to reach this headquarters, which makes timely corrective action difficult.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS GSPGH-65) (RI) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) That programs currently in effect which have proven effective in reducing operator-caused accidents and in an overall lowering of the accident rate be continued.

(B) That additional programs be initiated in the area of maintenance and engine conservation to reduce the number of accidents resulting from material failure and maintenance error.

(d) COMMAND ACTION:

(A) An engine conservation program was developed and tested during June. This program was implemented throughout the command on 1 July 1970.

(B) A comprehensive analysis of engine failure cause factors for 250 engines, twice the number experienced by this command, has been requested from higher headquarters. Upon receipt of data requested, such additional programs as are deemed appropriate to reduce the number of engine failures will be implemented. It is hoped that the analysis will assist this command in establishing a more definite direction for our current conservation program.

(2) Oil Analysis Results and Release of Grounded Aircraft:

(a) OBSERVATION: Teletype messages grounding or releasing aircraft for flight, based on results of oil analysis from the spectrometric oil laboratory at Tan Son Nhut, have required up to 24 hours to reach HQ, 12th Avn Gp (Cbt). This is so even though these messages are given precedence of IMMEDIATE.

(b) EVALUATION: The timely receipt of messages, based on spectrometric oil analysis, grounding or releasing aircraft for flight must be accomplished to prevent the loss of life or equipment and to increase the operational capability of this command.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That a means be devised to insure the rapid transmission of grounding and releasing messages from the oil analysis laboratory to the unit involved.
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AVBACA-SC
15 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOR) (RI) (U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: On 24 July 1970 a conference was held between representatives of the 12th Avn Gp (Cbt) and the manager of the contract oil analysis laboratory at Tan Son Nhut. Arrangements were made for the oil analysis laboratory to telephone directly to 12th Group headquarters all messages grounding or releasing aircraft. 12th Group headquarters will then telephone the message directly to the subordinate unit involved. Normal teletype messages will continue to be sent as a backup.

c. Organization:

(1) Limited vision in the AH-1G.

(c) Observation: The seating configuration does not permit adequate observation of target areas.

(b) Evaluation: Aviators have experienced difficulty engaging targets when troops cannot mark targets or give radio instructions. Due to the obstructed vision from the seats of the aircraft. At night, the problem is more acute due to the lack of a visible horizon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a platoon of ten (10) armed OH-58 aircraft be assigned to the Aerial Weapons Company to give gun teams the capability to mark targets adequately and a limited reconnaissance capability.

(2) Basis of Issue for AH-1G's in Assault Helicopter Companies:

(c) Observation: The present basis of issue of six (6) AH-1G's for eight (8) UH-1C's gunships is not adequate.

(b) Evaluation: While this basis of issue is valid from the viewpoint of firepower, it is invalid when considering systems available to fly. The AH-1G has more complex systems to maintain than does the UH-1C. With six (6) AH-1G's assigned, the unit is required to maintain 67% of its aircraft on a mission ready status. This would commit four (4) of the six (6) aircraft daily.

(c) Recommendation: UH-1C's should be traded off on a one for one basis with the AH-1G in the weapons platoon of the assault helicopter company.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOR) (Rl) (U)

(d) Command Action: This headquarters has completed and forwarded to USARV a study on the basis of issue of the AH-1G in the AH with recommendations.

f. Training: None.

g. Logistics:

(1) OBSERVATION: There is a definite lack of published guidance as to documentation and procedure for processing requests for classified transportation support.

(2) EVALUATION: There is a definite need for published guidance to facilitate an efficient and smooth unit move. Units are normally required to move on very short notice and must spend numerous hours effecting coordination and liaison with supporting agencies to determine what documentation was required and the proper format. Supporting units are found to be operating under the same adverse conditions which either requires a breach of security to complete shipments on schedule or a delayed delivery date.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Traffic Management Agency publish written guidance outlining procedures and documentation required to facilitate rapid unit redeployment.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: The lack of published guidance was brought to the attention of the following:

(a) G-3 1st Aviation Brigade.

(b) G-3 USARV.

(c) G-2 MACV.

(d) G-4 TMA MACV.

A command letter was initiated on 31 July 1970 requesting guidance on processing classified unit moves.

h. Communication:
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AVBACA-SC

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

(1) OBSERVATION: Excessive traffic from ground stations degrade the overall effectiveness of air mission command nets.

(2) EVALUATION: Unnecessary and repetitive transmissions by ground stations during VIP visits caused unwarranted difficulties in controlling the air mission package. Interference with the air mission communications endangers the security and safety of such flights and could, in an emergency situation, prove costly.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: Establish a restricted air mission control net and a separate reporting net to higher headquarters.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Group has implemented the above recommendations.

(5) OBSERVATION: Communications operations in limited size, forward, tactical sites are more readily affected by heat, power requirements and proximity to other transmit antennas.

(6) EVALUATION: Security requirements and limited floor space often preclude positioning of communications equipment in the optimum location. Related dust, heat and uncertain power availability can reduce the overall effectiveness of communications and secure equipment. Multiple antenna arrays often cause mutual interference.

(7) RECOMMENDATIONS: All communications control centers deployed to tactical locations should be completely self sustaining. Additionally, fans when available, should be used to insure adequate ventilation and cooling of radios and secure equipment. Sufficient cable should be available to insure necessary antenna separation. Back up power sources should be installed and available for immediate use.
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(8) COMMAND ACTION: The above recommendations have been implemented by the group.

1. Material: None.

2. Medical: None.

JOHN C. HUGHES
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - CINCUSARFAC, ATTN: GPO-3-DT, APO 96550
3 - CG, USAFRV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
2 - CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBAGC-O, APO 96384
3 - CG, II FFGORDEV, ATTN: AVFEC, APO 96266.
AVFBG-RE (15 Aug 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Hq, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 28 SEP 1970

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVFA-C APO 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC-DST, APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning 51 Cal. antiaircraft positions and cache/base camp locations, page 10, paragraph 2b.

(1) This headquarters has reviewed its data concerning enemy 51 Cal. antiaircraft firings and cache/base camp locations and finds sufficient correlation to warrant a further investigation.

(2) It is recommended that further statistical correlations be evaluated at headquarters possessing a computer facility. Suggested correlations are: between 51 Cal. AA incidents reported or known AA sites and previously discovered caches or base camp locations; between all AA firing, regardless of caliber, and cache sites or base camps; and between AA firings reported and cache sites located during Cambodian operations. It is further recommended that, if confirmed, such information be made available to subordinate units, and resources be made available for exploitation.

(3) Raw data for such correlations within MR 3 is available through this headquarters, ATTN: AVFBR-ES, and Headquarters, 7th Air Force, ATTN: RUSVB-AA.

b. Reference item concerning "Forward Rearm and Refuel Facilities", page 11, paragraph 2c(1). Concur, however, this type of operation would require heavy lift effort to move engineer equipment to the site if it were not readily accessible by road. Also, recommend the POL dispensing equipment be made available at Support Command level for better utilization by all units operating in the area.
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AVFBC-RE (15 Aug 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970,
RCS OSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

c. Reference items concerning "Oil Analysis Results and Release of Grounded Aircraft", page 13, paragraph 2d(2). Since inception of policy of passing urgent messages by telephone, there appears no further justification for the precedence IMMEDIATE on the follow-up message via electrical means. General abuse of high precedence is precisely the reason for the fact that the IMMEDIATE messages get less preferential handling than some of them deserve.

d. Reference item concerning "Logistics", page 15, paragraph 2g. There is no difference between processing classified and unclassified requests except for normal security measures afforded classified material. Current directives concerning transportation and movement are MACV Dir 95-9, USARV Reg 55-4, and II FFV Reg 55-4.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AVBAGG-O (15 Aug 70) 2nd Ind  

DA, HEADQUARTERS 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384  1 OCT 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-OST, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
AVHDO-DO (15 Aug 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 12th Aviation Group (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS GFMPR-65) (R) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 12th Aviation Group (Combat) and comments of indomning headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Oil Analysis Results and Release of Grounded Aircraft," page 13, paragraph 2a(2). Oil samples are taken from all US Army Aircraft oil lubricated components IAW USARV Reg 750-14. Aircraft are not necessarily grounded when an apparently bad oil sample is taken. It is a command prerogative. Samples are sent to the laboratory by air shipment, hand carry or US mail. If the oil analysis indicates a failed or failing component a recommendation is provided the owning unit by telephone or message with a precedence of immediate. Commanders must act on the recommendation of the laboratory. Experience has shown that 2-5 days are required for oil samples from forward units to reach the laboratory but grounding information is usually received by the owning units the same day of analysis. Concur in the requirement for the rapid transmission of grounding information, however, telephonic notification or immediate message is considered adequate. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Limited Vision in the AH-1G," page 14, paragraph 2e(1); nonconcur. Recommend the unit submit an Equipment Improvement Report (EIR) if the observation from tandem seating is inadequate. Assignment of OH-58 aircraft to an AWC to mark targets and provide a limited reconnaissance capability is not in keeping with the mission and capabilities as described in TOW-117. Current production AH-1G helicopters have a clear canopy instead of blue tinted. This should improve night observation capabilities. Unit has been so advised.

   c. Reference item concerning "Basis of Issue for AH-1G's in Assault Helicopter Companies," page 14, paragraph 2e(2). The evaluation offered appears to be sufficient justification for a one-for-one trade-off of AH-1G's for UH-1C's. The command action cited is also appropriate. In view of the closed loop control on aircraft, further action is not advised until the study cited in paragraph 2e(2)(d) has been evaluated. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cly frym:
1st Avn Bde
12th Avn Gp

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
GPOP-DT (15 Aug 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 12th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 NOV 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. ORR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
UNIT                      LOCATION                        APO
12th Aviation Gr (Cbt)   Long Binh (Plantation)       96266
HQ & HQ Co                Long Binh (Plantation)       96266
11th Avn Bn (Cbt)        Phu Loi                           96289
HQ & HQ Co                Phu Loi                           96289
390th QM Det (OA)        Duc Hoa (Atch 25th Div)       96214
12th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)   Phu Loi                           96289
432d Med Det (OF)         Phu Loi                           96289
173d Avn Co (Aslt Hel)   Lai Khe                           96289
759th Med Det (O')        Lai Khe                           96289
205th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) Phu Loi                       96289
213th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) Phu Loi                       96289
235th Avn Bn (Cot)       Bien Hoa                          96227
HQ & HQ Co                Bien Hoa                          96227
324th Avn Spt Det        Bien Hoa                          96227
145th Sec Flt            Bien Hoa                          96227
391st QM Det (PETRL)     Xuan Loc                          96276
66th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)   Bien Hoa                          96227
430th Med Det            Bien Hoa                          96227
118th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)  Bien Hoa                          96227
190th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)  Bien Hoa                          96227
320th Med Det (OA)       Bien Hoa                          96227
334th Aerial Weapons Co   Phu Loi                           96289
210th Aviation Bn (Cbt)  Long Thanh                        96530
HQ & HQ Co                Long Thanh                        96530
192nd Med Det (O')       Long Thanh                        96530
83rd Med Det (OA)        Vung Tau                         96294
316th Avn Spt Det        Long Binh (Plantation)          96266
305th Avn Spt Det        Long Binh                        96530
25th Avn Co (Cpt)        Long Binh (Plantation)          96266
46th Avn Co (Util Apnl)  Long Thanh                        96530
74th Avn Co (Recon irl)  Phu Loi                           96289
104th Avn Co (Recon irl) Phu Loi                           96289
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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 12th Aviation Group**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970.

By CO, 12th Aviation Group

15 August 1970

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**ABSTRACT**