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<td><strong>TO:</strong> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
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<td><strong>FROM:</strong> Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Specific Authority; 13 AUG 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force, Attn: FOR-OT-UT (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10TH Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS: GSPOR-65(R2)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. Historical Events.

   (1) During the period 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970 the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) provided the majority of aviation assets utilized by units in the seven southern provinces of the II Military Region. The major units supported were: Task Force South (TF5), 9th (White Horse) Infantry Division (WHRID), 23rd Infantry Division (ARVN), I Field Forces Vietnam (FFV) Artillery, DSA II Military Region, RECONDO, and 5th Special Forces Group.

   (2) At the beginning of the reporting period (May 70) the 10th AB(C) was committed to the resupply effort of Operation Eagle 70-1 in which the 9th ROK Div (-) had been airlifted into an AO NW of Tuy Hoa on 28 April 70. The operation continued until 16 May 70. The 10th AB(C) furnished eight (8) UH-1H’s, four (4) gunships, and two (2) CH-47 aircraft on a daily basis for resupply, command and control and fire support. The operation was considered successful and resulted in 275 enemy KIA, 3 POW’s captured, 168 small arms and 20 crew served weapons captured. A large ammunition cache was found and destroyed. The AO was a staging area from which enemy units directed attacks against the coastal regions of Tuy Hoa and Phu Hiep. In mid April the 10th AB(C) began rendering support in the Pleiku, Kontum, Dak Seang area and was heavily committed on 1 May 70 to the Cambodia Campaign. The 10th AB(C)’s most significant contribution to that effort was made by the 281st Avn Co (AH) which moved its entire operational assets to Pleiku. The duration of the operation was from 4 May 70 to 17 May 70, and during this period the unit was in support of Operation Pheh Tay I in Cambodia. This operation was supported by twenty (20) UH-1H’s, eight (8) gunships, and four (4) CH-47’s on a daily basis. The 10th AB(C) losses included two (2) aircraft destroyed and five (5) personnel killed. On 20 May 70 the 23rd Inf Div (ARVN) began the first phase of Operation Pheh Tay III which took place west of Duc Lap in Cambodia. The 45th Regiment and one FSP were air lifted into the AO by twenty-four (24) UH-1H’s, eight (8) gunships and ten (10) CH-47 aircraft. The 8th Cav Regiment marched into the AO. The 10th AB(C) provided all aviation support for the assault with the exception of six (6) CH-47’s. Initial enemy contact was light; however, the operation was considered successful due to the numerous weapons, ammunition and medical caches found. The 155th Avn Co (AH) experienced two stand-off attacks during May which resulted in minor damage to four (4) UH-1H aircraft. A new type of personnel bunker was constructed in several area of the battalion headquarters.
The bunker was constructed of half-round steel culvert, heavy timbers and Solid Plate Steel (SSP). The bunkers appear to withstand weather conditions much better than those of sandbags or conex containers.

On 8 June 1970, the 10th AP(C) inserted the 30th Regiment, 9th ROK Div into an area twenty (20) miles SW of Phan Rang. Using rappelling ropes the Pathfinders were inserted into several locations prior to the operation to blast out a landing zone. This practice has been terminated due to lack of fire support and security for the Pathfinders. One of the two ROK companies which marched into the AO met unexpected heavy resistance on D-3. This action forced several changes of plans and relocation of LZ's. The operation was not considered successful. The ROK units were hindered by a shortage of adequate LZ's, slow ground movement through mountainous jungles, and lack of close ground support due to unfavorable weather. Enemy forces in the area were well entrenched and had operated there unchecked for the past three years. During the operation, an enemy radio intercept unit acquired an FM frequency of a friendly ground unit. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the enemy to direct gunships from assigned missions to fire on friendly elements. On 12 June 1970 the 3rd Avn Co ('AH) experienced a stand-off mortar attack. The unit sustained negligible damage to maintenance equipment. On 20 June 1970, the 2nd phase of Operation Binh Tay III began in Cambodia west of Ban Don Special Forces Camp. Two battalions each of the 41st and 25th Regiments, 3rd Ind Div ('AVN) and two FSB's were staged out of Ban Don, utilizing twenty six (26) UH-1H's, ten gunships and twelve (12) CH-47 aircraft. The 'AVN units were inserted 12 kilometers inside Cambodia directly west of Ban Don. The mission requirements necessitated the establishment of a forward aviation fuel point at Ban Don. This requirement severely taxed the FOL capabilities of the 10th AP(C). The operation was considered successful. Caches of weapons, ammunition and medical supplies were captured. The 155th Avn Co ('AH) experienced a stand-off mortar attack on 9 Jul 70 and sustained damage to two UH-1H's and two gunships.

On 4 July 1970 in support of Operation "Hancock Gold" the 10th AP(C) was to insert the 3/506 Inf Bn, 1/50 Mech Inf Bn, C Company 75th Ranger Bn and 44th Rgt ('AVN) and three FSB's within a twelve hour time frame into MR-6. Location of MR-6 was approximately 25 miles NNW of Phan Thiet. Required aviation assets for this operation were forty seven (47) UH-1H's, sixteen (16) UH-1C gunships and twelve (12) CH-47 aircraft. On D-Day weather conditions in the AO forced 24 hour delay. On the morning of D+1, weather conditions had improved. However, at approximately 1000 hours improving weather conditions in the eastern sector of the AO permitted the operation to begin. At 1000 hours on D+2 the ANC advised the 150th that forecast weather conditions did not appear satisfactory for continuing the operation as originally planned and that it would be advisable to formulate an alternate plan. By 1300 hours on D+2 an alternate was in effect. The alternate plan required the 10th AP(C) to insert the 3/506 into LZ's along the SE edge of their original AO. Two companies from the 1/50 Bn were to be inserted into an alternate AO located 15 miles NE of Phan Thiet. The insertion of the 3/506 though hampered by severe weather conditions which included low cloud cover and moderate turbulence was completed at 1800 hours. The insertion of the 1/50 Bn began at 1500 hours and was completed by 1700 hours. The 44th Rgt ('AVN) was inserted into its original AO which was completed by 1730 hours. On D+2, the 1/50 Bn was inserted into original AO without problems experienced.
Support of Handcock Gold continued for nine (9) days. The operation was considered very successful. On 9 July 1970 the 92d Avn Co (AH) received a 107MM rocket which caused moderate damage to the operations building. There were no casualties. On 18 July 1970 the 155th Avn Co (AH) experienced one standoff mortar attack and three gunships sustained moderate damage.

(5) The 10th AB(C) instituted several new training programs during the reporting period. The Pathfinder Detachment began conducting classes on demolitions, air traffic control, and other related subjects. Instruction is to be given on a weekly basis. A six hour program of instruction was initiated for newly assigned aviators who will receive the instruction during their first two weeks in the battalion. The class has been quite successful thus far. An eight hour program of instruction for supported tactical unit commanders is near completion. These classes define responsibilities between the supported unit and the aviation unit, and describes the proper use of assault aircraft. Presentations will begin in the near future. Additionally, the battalion continued its program of aviation safety training and replacement training for newly assigned enlisted personnel.

(6) A vigorous intelligence gathering effort was conducted on the part of the battalion S-2 Section during the reporting period. (See Part II) Enemy antiaircraft fire accounted for fifty seven (57) aircraft taking hits, and ten (10) more being shot at. It is interesting to note that the greatest number of aircraft hits were taken at a location and time when an operation was being conducted. As a result no definite patterns can be developed from the hit reports. The 10th AB(C) validated seventy-nine (79) secret clearances, and granted fourteen (14) new secret clearances.

b. (U) Changes in Unit Mission:

There were no changes in the mission of the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) during the reporting period.

c. (U) Organizational Changes:

There were no organizational changes in the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) during the reporting period. An organization chart is attached as inclusion 1.

d. Key Personnel Changes:

(1) On 29 May 1970 Captain Larry R. Maddox, Inf, 402-62-2718, assumed duties as the Battalion S-1 of the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) from Major Rodney D. Lester, Inf, 229-52-7763.

(2) On 29 May 1970 Captain James E. Roberts, Jr., FA, 320-34-7787 assumed command of the HHC, 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat), from Captain Randall Stringham, Inf, 519-40-7743.

(3) On 4 June 1970 Major James L. Higginbotham, Inf, 258-56-1269 assumed command of the 92d Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter) from Major John P. Jones, Ri, 001-30-2223.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS: GSF0IU65(R2)

(4) On 9 June 1970 Major Rodney D. Lester, Inf, 229-50-7553 assumed duties as the Battalion S-3 of the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) from Major Ray S. Louty, Inf, 467-54-8953.


(8) On 15 June 1970 Captain Andrew M. Harkel, ORDC, 290-40-9889 assumed duties as Battalion S-4, of the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) from Captain Chetlin D. Craig, FA, 533-28-2115.

(9) On 15 June 1970 Captain James W. Hugoe, Sr., TO, 261-52-4734 assumed duties as Battalion Aviation Maintenance Officer of the 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat) from Captain Vincent P. Harewso, Inf, 152-30-3098.


c. Unit Strength:

Authorized and present for duty civilian and military strength as of 31 July 1970 is listed below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
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13 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, NGS: GSP0165(2)

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Thero are two technical representatives working with the battalion.

1. Aircraft Status as of 31 July 1970.

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2. Operational Statistics

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2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

(a) (U) Personnel: None

(b) (C) Intelligence:

(i) Observations:

(a) The enemy has generally reverted to Phase I of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Military Region II(MR II), employing his forces in small unit configurations.

(b) Capabilities: The enemy is capable of maneuvering small units in the Can Binh Bay/Dong Ba Thin area during periods of limited visibility when...
he can remain undetected by friendly ambush patrols. The enemy has limited
his attacks on Dong Ba Thin during this reporting period to that time
immediately following the period of least lunar illumination, usually between
the sixth and thirteenth of the month.

(c) Tactics: The enemy ambushes convoys to obtain necessary war materials. He also conducts stand-off rocket and mortar attacks combined with miner attacks on U.S. and Allied Installations, and employs terror tactics on indigenous personnel to gain required support.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) An aggressive observation/surveillance program will hinder enemy
movements into the Cam Ranh Bay/Dong Ba Thin area and will provide a ready
reaction capability against hostile attacks on U.S. and Allied Installations. This program includes direct interdiction of known infiltration routes by
helicopter gunships and indirect interdiction by aerial adjusted artillery.

(3) Recommendations: An airborne patrol be established during the hours
of darkness to detect, monitor, and destroy enemy patrols infiltrating into
local area.

(4) Command Action:

The 10th AB(C) is developing a Standard Operating Procedure for night
deployment of the battalion assets contingencies. A nightly dusk patrol
composed of an OH-58A Light Observation Helicopter and two UHIC armed heli-
copters perform reconnaissance of suspected infiltration routes in the Dong
Ba Thin area. Night Observation surveillance is provided by an O-1 Bird Dog
and a UH1H Helicopter with a Night-Hawk system which includes a door mounted
mini-gun, a million and a half candle power xenon search light and an infrared
night vision device. Surveillance is conducted from 2200 hours to 0400 hours
nightly.

c. (U) Operations: None
d. (U) Organization: None
e. (U) Training: None
f. (U) Logistics:

(1) Observations:

Several recent operations have required refueling of aircraft at a FP
away from a major POL bulk distribution point. Minimizing blade time and
turn around time for timely insertion of troops has necessitated the use of
those remote POL sites. Due to the present doctrine of the Cam Ranh Bay
Support Command, logistics support of forward POL operations is virtually

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS: GSFOR-65(R2)

The task of providing POL equipment, personnel, and resupply of POL at forward refueling areas has fallen upon the 10th-AB(C). This requirement for logistic support places a severe demand on the mission capability of the 10th AB(C) as the battalion is not authorized equipment and personnel needed to support it.

(2) Evaluation:

At present, all forward area refueling equipment is drawn on USAREV 180 day loan and POL handlers must be provided by the personnel of the aviation companies. Twice the battalion has been required to furnish CH-47's to carry 500 gallon blivets to forward refuel area when an adequate road existed that would permit ground transportation via 5,000 gallon tankers. It is noted that the 45th General Support Group provides all necessary logistic support to the 52d Aviation Battalion in MR II North. This includes the provision of personnel and equipment and its installation at all forward areas.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) It is desirable that the 54th General Support Group provide the POL equipment and personnel to install, operate, and maintain a forward area for a forward area refueling system, as well as the resupply of POL from the nearest bulk delivery point. Higher headquarters should initiate this action.

(b) An alternative proposal is that the 10th AB(C) be authorized by MTOE the additional personnel and equipment necessary to sustain forward area refueling and resupply.

(4) Command Action:

This unit will retain and continue to operate 180 day USAREV loan equipment until such time that a satisfactory arrangement has been devised. For this battalion to adequately accomplish its mission, it is necessary that forward POL points be available upon request.

- Communications: None
- Medical: None
- Material: None
- Other: None

1 IncI as

JACK A. WALKER
LTC, Inf
Commanding
DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96240 23 August 1970

TO: Department of the Army (CSFOR, Da), Washington, D.C. 20315
     Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents except as indicated:

a. Paragraph 1(c), Operations: Significant Activities.

(1) The reference in Para 1a(2), to "Operation EAGLE 70-1", should read "Operation Dok Suri 70-1", the official title of the operation.

(2) The reference in Para 1a(4), to "Operation Handcock Gold", should read "Hancock Gold".

(3) Paragraph 1a(6) should contain more data on the disposition of enemy units and their movement.

b. Paragraph 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations: Concur with recommendations stated in Paragraph 2f(2). This problem should be resolved at Field Force level. Past attempts to coordinate support for forward refuel and rearm facilities with CCHH Binh Ba Support Command have been unsuccessful.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BILLY W. COWARD
CPT, AGE
Asst Adjutant

CP: CO, 10th AB(C)
This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report—Lessons Learned and forwarding indorsement and concurs, except para 2(f):

The establishment and operation of forward refuel points is the responsibility of the predominant user. The support commands provide wholesale POL support only. The operation of retail refuel points by support commands in the past has been done as an exception to policy. The support commands do not have units authorized to draw the equipment necessary to operate a forward refuel point. Customers of the support commands may draw the equipment on a temporary loan basis or by modification to the TO&E. Recommend 10th Avn Bn (CBT) submit appropriate modification to the unit TO&E.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT P. OLIN
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG

1 - CO, 17TH AVN OP (C), (LESS ORLL)
1 - CO, 10TH AVN BN (C), (LESS ORLL)
AVBAGC-0 (13 Aug 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 10th Aviation
Battalion (Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG5, COROB-63

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 15 SEP 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DSH,
APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents
   as indorsed.

2. The following additional comment is considered pertinent:

   Paragraph 2(f) addresses problems associated with forward refueling points.
   This headquarters concurs with I FFV and is advising the major subordinate command
   of options available to resolve this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WARREN A. PETERSON
CPT, AGC
ASST AG
AVHDO-Do (13 Aug 70) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10TH Aviation Battalion
(Combat), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS: GSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 10 NOV 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 10th
Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "logistics;" page 6, paragraph 2f(1):
Nonconcur with recommendation that 54th General Support Group provide POL
equipment and personnel to install, operate, and maintain forward area
refueling systems in support of the 10th Aviation Battalion. Units of
the 54th GS Group are not equipped or staffed to operate forward Class III
points. Concur that forward Class III points be supported by 5,000 gallon
tankers when tanker assets and road/convoy security permit. Concur with
proposal that NTOE action be initiated to authorize Class III personnel and
equipment to provide for forward area refueling operations incident to
the 10th Aviation Battalion's missions. The problem should not be
resolved at I Field Force level but should be resolved by the 10th
Aviation Battalion submitting NTOE action through the chain of command.
Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy from:
1st Avn Bde
10th Avn Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 10th Aviation Battalion (Combat), for the Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 Dec 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

I. M. Ozaki
CPT, AG
Asst AG
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Incl 1
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 10th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CO, 10th Aviation Battalion

13 August 1970

N/A

N/A

N/A

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310