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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 54th Signal Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR C1 UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 54th Signal Battalion (Corps), Period Ending 31 July, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General
I FFORCENV
ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT
APO 96350

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army

1. (C) Significant Organization Activities

   a. General:

   During the reporting period the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps) and its attached units continued to support combat operations within the II Military Region, formerly the II Corps Tactical Zone, by providing command control communications between Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam and units under its operational control. These communications included communications center services, high frequency radio teletype, single sideband voice radio, very high frequency multichannel radio, tropospheric scatter multichannel radio, FM radio wire integration, photographic services, air and ground messenger service, a Military Affiliate Radio Station (MARS), and an AM/FM broadcast station.

   b. Intelligence: None.

   c. Operations and Training Activities:

      (i) Plans:

      (a) With the closeout of the V-06A, V-06B and V-08 multichannel systems at Thien Giao and the relocation of V-07 to Phan Thiet, the battalion will inactivate Detachment 23 at Thien Giao in early August.

      (b) Proposed utilization of AN/TRC-97B tropospheric scatter multichannel communications equipment made available last quarter by the closeout...
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of the T-42 system between Dragon Mountain and Hon Tre Island has been
cancelled. This equipment was to be used to install a system between Head-
quartes, 1 FFORCEV and Headquarters, Task Force South, Phan Thiet, but
the unpredictable future of Task Force South prompted the cancellation of
the planned project.

(c) In connection with the Vietnamization Program, plans are currently
being developed and analyzed by this organization to assist ARVN Signal
Counterparts with improvements of their signal capabilities. Areas of par-
ticular emphasis in this "Buddies Together" program are electronic main-
tenance, operations and intelligence, radio wire integration, switchboard
operations, and generator maintenance. Proposed plans would provide on the
job training and evaluation of ARVN personnel by US counterparts. Training
would be conducted at battalion facilities for small groups of selected
individuals.

(2) Operations: Communications Detachments are shown in Inclosure #1.

(a) Communications in the Nha Trang Area:

1 The 54th Signal Battalion (Corps) with its base of operations in
Nha Trang provides the varied communications support listed below to the
following major units:

a Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam
b First Field Force Artillery
c 17th Aviation Group (Combat)
d Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
e Khanh Hoa Province Senior Advisor
f Units under the operational control and supporting First Field
Force Vietnam

2 High frequency radio teletype and single sideband voice communica-
tions terminate in the battalion's High Frequency Park located across
from the Grand Hotel. This communications facility is the hub of the
three high frequency radio nets that link Nha Trang to eight (8) differ-
et locations: Phan Thiet, Ninh Hoa, Qui Nhon, LZ English, Pleiku, Phu
Cat, Pho Trach, and Song Mao.

3 Very High Frequency multichannel communications terminate at the
Hotel site located on the Grand Hotel compound. One system is relayed
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from Hon Tre Island in the Bay of Nha Trang, 85 miles to Ban Me Thuot. Two systems interface with an AN/TRC-97B tropospheric scatter system providing access to the northern portion of the II Military Region thru Vung Chua Mountain.

These systems carry the command and control circuits which terminate in the Typhoon common user switchboard and TOC switchboard located in the Grand Hotel compound.

The Military Affiliate Radio Station (MARS) supports military personnel in the Nha Trang area. It is located next to the former location of the Camp John F. McDermott Post Exchange. In this station is also located the Net Control Station for HQ I FFORCEV and the battalion's Radio Wire Integration Net.

The AM/FM broadcast station serves the Nha Trang area and is located in the King Duy Tan Hotel. It broadcasts taped music and gives the correct time daily from 0500-2400 hours.

The First Field Force Vietnam Communications Center facilities are operated and maintained by the battalion's command operations company. This communications center handles an average of over 600 messages per day, more than half of which are of immediate or flash precedence.

The Tactical Operations Center Communications Center, located on the third floor of the Grand Hotel, maintains five (5) dedicated secure teletype circuits for the exclusive use of the I FFORCEV G-3 Tactical Operations Center.

The I FFORCEV Courier Section is operated by the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps). It provides ground and air message service in support of Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam.

The Quick Comm Communications System, by which the US Advisors at 12 provinces and 54 districts making up the II Military Region can pass immediate traffic reports to Headquarters, I FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center (TOC) via telephone circuits and radio wire integration facilities, is maintained by the battalion with three technical assistance teams which provide scheduled and demand maintenance. Each team is composed of a highly skilled radio operator, a radio repairman and a wireman.

The Battalion Pictorial Section, augmented by the 209th Signal Detachment (Photographic), is located in the Grand Hotel Complex; supporting HQ, IFFORCEV, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support and other units in the Nha Trang area with Department of the Army Record Photography, Information Office photographic requirements and other official US Army Photography.

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(b) Communications Support at Phan Thiet: The battalion supports Task Force South whose headquarters is in Phan Thiet. Included in this support are high frequency secure radio teletype, non-secure single sideband voice radio, common user secure teletype and dedicated secure teletype between Headquarters, First Field Force Vietnam, its Tactical Operations Center and Task Force South at Phan Thiet. The battalion's field operations company (Company B) maintains two very high frequency multichannel radio systems which link Phan Thiet and Song Mao with Task Force South Headquarters, its operationally controlled units and the other units as listed below. In addition to the above listed communications, the battalion's command operations company (Company A) provides communications center service at Phan Thiet. The systems are as depicted in inclosure #2. The supported units are:

1. Headquarters, Task Force South (Phan Thiet)
2. Binh Thuan Province Advisor (MACV Advisory Team #37 at Phan Thiet)

(c) Communications Support at Song Mao: The battalion supports units in Song Mao that are under the operational control of Task Force South with very high frequency multichannel communications between Song Mao and Phan Thiet. Additionally, a communications center in Song Mao is operated by the battalion. The units supported are:

1. Song Mao District Senior Advisor (MACV Advisory Team #37)
2. MACV Advisory Team #33 to the 44th Regiment, 23d Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
3. 2d Squadron of the 1st Armored Cavalry (US)
4. 5th Battalion of the 27th Artillery (US)

(d) Communications Support at Ban Me Thuot: The battalion supports Detachment B-50, 5th Special Forces Group (Command Control South) at Ban Me Thuot East. The V-13 multichannel system provides a secure common user teletype circuit to the First Field Force Vietnam communications center.

(e) Communications Support at Camp Swampy: The battalion supports the 19th Engineers at Camp Swampy with multichannel communications relayed through Buon Ba Yong to Ban Me Thuot. Telephone communications to the Ban Me Thuot and Typhoon (Nha Trang) Switchboard and direct voice communications with Headquarters, 19th Engineer Battalion at Nha Trang are provided.
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(f) Communications Support at Pleiku: The battalion provides multichannel communications support to the Deputy Senior Advisor to the II Military Region, the 32nd Artillery Group and the 20th Engineer Group located in Pleiku. DSA II Region receives secure high frequency radio teletype, non-secure single sideband voice radio, and a dedicated secure teletype circuit to the First Field Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC). Multichannel communications systems are terminated at Artillery Hill from Tan Canh and Hon Cong Mountain.

(g) Communications Support at Tan Canh: The 167th Signal Company (Radio Relay) provides very high frequency multichannel communications in support of the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery at Tan Canh.

(h) Communications Support at An Khe: The 167th Signal Company (Radio Relay), attached to the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps), supports the 4th Infantry Division with multichannel radio communications between Pleiku (Artillery Hill) and An Khe (Hon Cong Mountain) and between these locations and Headquarters, First Field Vietnam at Nha Trang. Additional communications systems link An Khe with LZ English and Vung Chua Mountain.

(i) Communications Support at LZ English: The battalion provides the 173rd Airborne Brigade at LZ English with communications center operators, secure high frequency radio teletype, single sideband voice and four very high frequency multichannel communications systems. These link Headquarters, 173rd Airborne Brigade with Headquarters, I FFORCEN and link the brigade with its subordinate units located at LZ Uplift and LZ North English.

(j) Communications Support at LZ North English: The battalion operates very high frequency multichannel communications at North English in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. By using V-23 systems, elements of this combat infantry unit can communicate with its headquarters at LZ English.

(k) Communications Support at LZ Uplift: The V-24 very high frequency system, operated by the battalion, links elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, based at LZ Uplift, with Brigade Headquarters at LZ English.

(l) Communications Support at Qui Nhon: The battalion provides secure high frequency radio teletype and non-secure single sideband radio voice communications to the US Liaison Officer to the Capital Republic of Korea Division at Qui Nhon. Vung Chua Mountain is a major communications nodal point for multichannel communications systems from Hon Tre Island and Hon Cong Mountain.

(m) Communications Support at Minh Hoa: The battalion provides secure high frequency radio teletype and non-secure single sideband radio communications support to the Deputy Senior Advisor to the II Military Region, the 32nd Artillery Group and the 20th Engineer Group located in Pleiku. DSA II Region.
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voice communications to the US Liaison Officer to the 9th Republic of Korea Division at Minh Hoa.

(n) Communications Support at Dalat and Bao Loc: The battalion provides and operates single sideband voice radio at Dalat and Bao Loc for Task Force South Security Net. The net control is operated by the battalion at Phan Thiet.

(o) Communications Support at Phu Cat: The battalion provides high frequency secure radio teletype and single sideband voice support to the Capital Republic of Korea Division's forward command post at Phu Cat.

(p) Continuing Battalion Projects: The battalion continues toward professional development through emphasis in the following areas:

1. Improvement of site facilities, listed by location in enclosure.

2. Improvement of communications center operations now that the Mode I Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment has been reoriented into the Phu Lien Automatic Switching Switching Center system.

3. Enhancing the reliability of communications to units under the operation I control of I Field Force Vietnam.

4. Quality control of multichannel communications systems.

5. Improvement of switchboard operation through cross-training of personnel.

6. Continued improvement of the "Quick Comm" system.

(q) New Projects and Significant Changes:

1. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Taylor assumed command of the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps) from Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Visscher on 4 May 1970.

2. The Battalion's support of the First Field Force Vietnam Forward Mobile Staff terminated on 2 May 1970 when the forward Mobile Staff began redeploying to Nha Trang. This support was rendered during the North Vietnamese Army force's siege of Dak Seang. The and other significant enemy activity in Kontum Province necessitated installation of rapid response communications by the battalion. Over fifty (50) men from the battalion provided switchboard, secure high frequency radio teletype, multichannel very high frequency radio, ground mounted secure FM radio, secure teletype and daily air courier service between Tan Canh, Kontum and Pleiku during this tactical operation that lasted from 4 April to 2 May 1970.

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Immediately after the closeout of the Forward Mobile Staff, the
battalion was directed to render support to the combined US-ARVN Cam-
bodian Operations. These commitments, which changed with the tactical
situation, lasted from 3 May to 27 June 1970. The following is a break-
down of the commitments:

A One AN/GRC-122 secure radio teletype was deployed to Plei Djereng
to support the 4th Division.

B One AN/GRC-142 secure radio teletype was deployed to Plei Djereng.

C One AN/MRC-73 from the 167th Signal Company (RR) was sent to
Plei Djereng.

D One AN/GRC-122 deployed to Duc Co to support MACV advisors
to the 22nd ARVN Division.

E One AN/GRC-122 deployed to Pleiku to support MACV Team 21, ad-
visors to 22nd ARVN Division.

F When the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division returned to its An Khe
base camp around 7 May, the AN/GRC-142 (see item 9) was sent to LZ Mer-
edith. Here it supported the 2nd Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment,
which was maintaining road security in the area. This unit was under the
operational control of the 4th Division.

G On 22 May the AN/GRC-122 no longer being utilized by the 4th Div-
ision was sent to Duc Lap in support of the MACV Advisors to the 23rd
ARVN Division which was operating in Cambodia at that time.

H On the same day the AN/GRC-122 previously committed at Pleiku was
sent to Ban Me Thuot to support the operation mentioned in part G above.

I Additionally, B Company deployed two AN/MRC-112 four channel Very
High Frequency rigs; one to Ban Me Thuot and one to Duc Lap.

J On 20 June the AN/MRC-112 and AN/GRC-122 at Duc Lap were redeployed
to Ban Don, the new forward base camp of the MACV advisors.

K On 10 May the battalion sent the Officer in Charge of the pictorial
section and one combat photographer to Cambodia with the 4th Division.
The mission lasted one week.

L On 22 May the battalion deactivated the V-25 system. This system
terminated at Tam Quan, providing communications between elements of 173rd
Airborne Brigade located there and at LZ North English. The system was
determined unnecessary by I FFORCEV Signal Office.

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One AN/VSC-2 deployed from Nha Trang to Ban Me Thuot on 9 June. This equipment supported the 2/1 Cavalry. On 13 June when this site encountered equipment failures, the AN/GRC-122 equipment from Detachment 29, Duc Lap, which "stood down" on 12 June, was utilized for the commitment. On 30 June the equipment finished Ban Me Thuot operations and relocated with the 2/1 Cavalry at Song Mao.

On 16 June 1970 the 4th Platoon 167th Signal Company (RR) which had been based in Pleiku moved to the company area in An Khe. The reason for this was the closeout of Engineer Hill. The V-73 and V-74 systems were transferred to Artillery Hill, and four men from the platoon remained to augment this detachment.

On 22 June an AN/GRC-122 deployed from Pleiku to Duc Co in support of the 22nd ARVN Division advisors. This detachment redeployed to Phu Cat 16 July to support the Capitol Republic of Korea Division.

During the second week of June, circuit XN3Z was deactivated at the I FFORCEV Communications Center. This was done after the successful sixty (60) day trial period of the MODE I Autodin Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment was completed. The deactivated circuit allowed the 459th Signal Battalion maintenance men to remove the older MODE V terminal which MODE I replaced. One month later the Communications Center MODE I Circuit was reterminated from the Nha Trang Automatic Switching Center to the Phu Lam Automatic Switching Center. At the same time the baud rate was increased from 150 to 300. Since the above two changes, the overall efficiency of the Communications Center has improved. There has been a smoother flow of traffic, and the perplexing problem of high reject rates has disappeared.

On 9-10 July the I FFORCEV Inspector General conducted the semi-annual inspection of the battalion. On the basis of a satisfactory or unsatisfactory, the battalion received a satisfactory rating. Two weeks later the 167th Signal Company (RR) was inspected and was rated satisfactory, also.

On 30 July 1970 the battalion committed one AN/GRC-122 secure radio teletype rig to Tuy Phuoc in Binh Dinh Province. This support was rendered to the forward command post of the 3/506th Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

During the quarter the four companies centralized all M-13 decontamination kits and atropine injectors in the unit supply rooms. This was in compliance with the I FFORCEV Chemical Officer's direction and served to eliminate the continuous problem of lost or damaged items that were previously kept in the M-17A1 CBR Mask Carrier and were not utilized.
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(r) Training:

1. The battalion continued the practice of holding replacement training twice weekly to enable replacement personnel assigned to the 167th Signal Company (RR) to depart to An Khe as rapidly as possible.

2. Paywar: None.

3. Chemical: None.

4. Safety: None.

5. Non-battalion formal training conducted during the past quarter:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Course</th>
<th>Length (Hrs)</th>
<th>Attended</th>
<th>Total Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projectionist (MP)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR/TRC-97B Operator</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCM (MEDCAP) Maintenance</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR/TRC-24 Operator</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCM (MEDCAP) Operator</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key System Installation Maintenance</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/GRC-106 Maintenance</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. For the first quarter of the 1971 fiscal year the battalion received the following school allocations from 1st Signal Brigade:

6. AN/TRC-97B Operator Course
7. AN/TRC-24 Operator Course
13. PCM (MEDCAP) Operator
1. AN/GRC-106 Maintenance Course
1. Key System Installation and Maintenance Course

(d) Logistics:

(1) The S-4 section is identifying battalion excess equipment, to include not only items on hand and not authorized, but also those items that are authorized but not essential for mission needs. A listing will be made of the above mentioned items to include those authorized items for which a request to "Stand Short" will be made to higher headquarters.

(2) The future coordination of this program will be implemented by the battalion S-3 which will rapidly expedite the S-4's recommendations.

(3) During the first half of July 1970 the battalion turned in excess items with a total dollar value of $2486.00 and also cancelled
requisitions for items in excess of need for a total dollar value of $1,206,647.13. Because this program was recently initiated, the future figures will reflect lower cutbacks in requisitions and higher amounts of equipment turned in.

(4) Transportation: Operational commitments required extensive use of air transportation during the quarter. The total amounts of cargo transported, in pounds, by the Air Force to and from detachments operated by this unit are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Pounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phan Thiet</td>
<td>4695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>33731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Khe</td>
<td>3320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>5800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ English</td>
<td>4725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao Loc</td>
<td>12907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>40453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
<td>26484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Mao</td>
<td>7850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>13985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) The Battalion Motor Maintenance Section continued maintenance operations in 5 vital areas.

(a) The Battalion Maintenance Shop, formed in May 1970, performed a total of 81 semi-annual services during the quarter.

(b) The Battalion Power Shop evacuated twenty-eight (28) generators to Direct Support Maintenance while deprocessing five (5) 45KW generators during the quarter.

(c) The Battalion Technical Inspection Team was responsible for insureing that 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance was being performed on all battalion vehicles prior to their dispatch. During the quarter an average of fifty-five (55) battalion vehicles were inspected daily.

(d) The Consolidated Battalion Dispatch Section controls vehicle dispatch on a daily basis. Three dispatchers are attached to the Battalion Maintenance Section and responsible for enforcing dispatch procedures.

(e) The Battalion Tire Facility processed approximately 380 tires for repair and issue to the respective companies.

c. Civil Affairs: Elements of the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps)

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supported three orphanages in the Nha Trang area with monetary donations, clothing, foodstuffs, manpower support and miscellaneous support. The following statistics indicate time and effort expended by troops of the battalion in support of the orphanages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity/Value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man Hours</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>VNS 5,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food 2,600 lbs</td>
<td>30,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing 30 lbs</td>
<td>3,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber 80 bd ft</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint 60 gal</td>
<td>4,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>VNS 45,194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Personnel:

(1) Religious Activities:

(a) During the past quarter, Protestant and Roman Catholic services were held in the Battalion Chapel each Sunday. Jewish personnel have been informed by the Battalion Chaplain concerning the local Jewish Program and their names have been given to the I FFORCEV Jewish Chaplain. Schedules of regular and special denominational services have been posted on company bulletin boards and in the barracks in the battalion area. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish literature was made available in the Battalion day room and at each of the remote sites.

(b) Chaplain site visitations were maintained on a regular basis with a goal of one visit to each site each month. Religious worship coverage at the sites was provided by the resident Chaplain in the area.

(c) Character guidance instruction was given on a regular basis to all companies of the battalion.

(d) The battalion Chaplain was appointed as the custodian of the Nha Trang Consolidated Chaplain's Fund effective July 1970.

(e) The Battalion Chaplain sent questionnaires to every member of the battalion in the Nha Trang area explaining Chapel activities and asking for any suggestions which would make the religious program more meaningful and effective.

(f) A Battalion Amnesty Drug Program in Nha Trang was inaugurated during the first week in July. Two panel discussions were presented to audiences of over 600 officers and enlisted men. The panel consisted of a military legal expert, a doctor, the Battalion Chaplain and one of the unit commanders. Additionally, comments were made by a former drug
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, 54TH SIGNAL BATTALION (CORPS),
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The battalion, who had sought help through the Amnesty Program.
During the first month of the program, there were about 15 participants
seeking help from the program. The Battalion Chaplain found that no
facilities were available to confine patients, so he made two beds avail-
able in the Battalion Chapel. A patient of the Amnesty Program is given
a complete physical, and then given an injection of Thorazine to help
him sleep. Next, the individual visits a psychiatrist in Cam Ranh Bay.
After he returns to Wha Trang, he is given Thorazine for seven days and
visits with an Amnesty Representative or the Chaplain to discuss his pro-
blems. He can seek help anytime he feels the urge to return to drugs.
While the program has gained momentum, much needs to be done to make it
more effective.

(g) Every Friday the Chaplain visits four locations with two other
Chaplains and holds religious services, leaving by helicopter at 0630
hours and returning at 1430 hours.

(b) The Chaplain accompanied by his amnesty representative visited
the 167th Signal Company (RR) at An Khe and arranged for an Amnesty Pro-
gram to be implemented in the 167th Signal Company in the middle of
August.

(i) 500 questionnaires were sent out to the troops in the battalion
dealing with local problems that effect the welfare of the men. Upon
compiling the statistics these problems will be discussed to see if they
can be corrected.

(2) S-1:

(a) Rest & Recreation: During the period of 1 May 1970 - 31 July
1970, the battalion received 135 allocations and utilized 124 with 5
cancellations. In the month of July allocations for R&R decreased con-
siderably due to the cutback of troop strength in Vietnam.

(b) Courts and Boards:

The Battalion Commander acts as Special Courts-Martial Convening
authority for the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps) and all attached units
of:

1 5TH CAV, 3rd FFORCEN
2 4TH BATTAY, 3rd FFORCEN ARty
3 MACV Advisory Team 25
4 MACV Advisory Team 26
5 MACV Advisory Team 28
6 MACV Advisory Team 30
7 MACV Advisory Team 31
8 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 32
9 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 36
10 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 37
11 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 38
12 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 41
13 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 42
14 M.A.C.V Advisory Team 45

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MACV Advisory Team 46
5th PI Det
11th PI Det
13th Military History

55th MI Det
64th Engineer Det
272nd MP Co
297th Trans Co (Car)

2 Additionally, the Battalion Commander acts as Field Grade Commander
for Article 15 actions and appeals to Article 15 Actions for the above
units less HQ Battery, I FFORCEV Arty and the 13 MACV Teams.

3 Non-Judicial Punishment: A total of 67 Article 15's were admin-
istered. Thirteen of those were field grade Article 15's. There were
three appeals to Article 15 actions.

4 Summary Courts-Martial: Four Summary Courts-Martial were assembled
during the quarter. There are two Summary Courts-Martial pending.

5 Special Courts-Martial: Four Special Courts-Martial were assembled
during the quarter. There are 2 Special Courts-Martial pending.

6 One General Court-Martial was referred to the CG, I FFORCEV during
to the quarter.

(c) Emergency Leaves: Sixteen emergency leaves were granted during
the quarter.

Promotions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>PX</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>PT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Awards: The battalion processed 75 award recommendations consisting
of 25 Bronze Star Medals, 38 Army Commendation Medals, 2 Air Medals.

(b) Awards: The battalion processed 75 award recommendations consisting
of 25 Bronze Star Medals, 38 Army Commendation Medals, 2 Air Medals.

(3) The following is a breakdown of the battalion's enlisted personnel
utilization as of 18 July 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIE</th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>167th</th>
<th>202nd Sig Det</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AWOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TID &amp; Leave</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Stockade

| 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 |

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Motor Pool  24  44  11  17  0
Personnel On Sites  5  59  78  94  0
EHI  0  3  0  0  0
Guards  7  8  14  19  0
HF Park  0  78  0  0  0
Typhoon  0  34  0  0  0
Aviation  24  0  0  0  0
Comm Center  0  66  0  0  0
Photographers  21  0  0  0  6
Electronic Maintenance  40  2  0  8  0
Miscellaneous  60  42  33  20  0

Total  196  294  150  173  6

* The following duties fall into this category: Cooks, orderly room, operations, supply, KP, telephone trouble teams, Technical Control, battalion details, Chapel Details, S-1, S-2/3 and MARS Station.

** Artillery: None.

** Other:

(i) Communications Statistics:

(a) Average daily number of messages (sent and received) at I FFORCEV Communications Centers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landline</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Teletype</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Average handling time (in minutes) for all originating and terminating messages by precedence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flash</td>
<td>36.38</td>
<td>22.77</td>
<td>20.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>83.84</td>
<td>58.23</td>
<td>61.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>56.95</td>
<td>57.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine</td>
<td>77.15</td>
<td>46.21</td>
<td>66.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Precedence of Total Transmissions in percentages:

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flash</td>
<td>28.51</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>7.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>26.86</td>
<td>51.08</td>
<td>52.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>22.26</td>
<td>21.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine</td>
<td>19.77</td>
<td>12.46</td>
<td>17.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(d) Switchboard Operations (Typhoon, Typhoon TOC):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Typhoon Subscribers</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Typhoon Trunks</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Typhoon TOC Subscribers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Typhoon TOC Trunks</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Peg Count</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>2511</td>
<td>2117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) MARS Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone Patches Completed</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Photographic Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Negatives Exposed</td>
<td>5246</td>
<td>4346</td>
<td>4185</td>
<td>13777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Prints Made</td>
<td>16485</td>
<td>10215</td>
<td>13315</td>
<td>40015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Color Slides Made</td>
<td>3140</td>
<td>2480</td>
<td>2820</td>
<td>8440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feet of Motion Picture Film</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Aviation Activities:

(a) The period covered in this report was characterized by rendering air messenger support to Headquarters 1 PPORCEV and administrative and aerial resupply to the 54th Signal Battalion (Corps). During the period a total of seven aircraft were assigned: 1 UH-1D, 5 UH-1H's and 1 OH-58A.

(b) The following table reflects the aircraft status and flying hours for the past quarter.

**AIRCRAFT STATUS AND FLYING HOURS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE A/C</th>
<th>SERIAL #</th>
<th>HOURS FLO wn</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>AVAILABILITY</th>
<th>DAYS ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-1D</td>
<td>66-1033</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>66-15328</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>66-16764</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>68-15972</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>68-15662</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H</td>
<td>69-15100</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-58A</td>
<td>68-16901</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The total tonnage transported for the quarter was 169 and there were 2198 passengers carried.

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2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Observation: CPMI team from USARV discovered that "Unnamed Campaign" was not entered in pencil on personnel records and reports of changes were not submitted to OPO for Senior Enlisted and Officers stating same. This deficiency area on the records alone caused an error rate of 6.0. Areas must be graded 2.5 or below to be considered passing.

(2) Evaluation: Purpose of recording entry is to insure award of Enlisted Promotion points when individual is recommended for promotion.

(3) Recommendation: That requirement be deleted. Automatic award of points can be made on promotion packet at time of preparation for any unnamed campaign. As a minimum, reduce error rating to minor deficiency with a point rating of one (1).

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Channel Checks:

(a) Observation: Regulations require that channel checks be made only on an hourly basis, allowing an undetected loss of contact with the distant station.

(b) Evaluation: Tactical circuits and equipment frequently drift off alignment sufficiently in one hour to cause loss of contact. Experience has shown that channel checks every 30 minutes will reveal any such drifting and maladjustment as they result in garbles, rather than a total loss of contact resulting from an uncorrected drift over a large interval.

(c) Recommendation: Tactical Communications Center operations doctrine be revised to require channel checks at half hour intervals if no traffic is passed.

(2) Multiple Tape Processing:

(a) Observation: Tactical equipment and doctrine for Corps communication centers do not provide equipment or procedure for multiple tape processing. This causes excessive delay of messages by using alternate Tape Recovery Method.

(b) Evaluation: Use of Tape Recovery Method of passing multiple
transmission messages from circuit to circuit results in an accumulated handling time that is frequently unacceptable. Further, messages are sometimes inadvertently held at a circuit which is backlogged when it should be passed to other circuits and returned to the non-operating circuit after all other transmissions have been made. Experience has shown that making a separate tape for each transmission by the Multiple Call Processing method reduces handling time significantly.

(c) Recommendation: That tactical communications center equipment and doctrine be altered to allow for multiple call processing at all headquarters above the Division level.

(3) Ringing Distant Switchboards:

(a) Observation: When a subscriber wishes a trunk circuit the operator rings the distant switchboard. Normally this causes a drop on the board or a light depending on the type of switchboard. If, however, the distant switchboard fails to plug in, the subscriber requests another ring and the operator states, "I'll ring again, Sir."

(b) Evaluation: The distant switchboard will not in reality be rung again unless the initial ring did not produce a drop. Therefore, the subscriber is not receiving another ring and will remain unanswered until the drop is answered on the distant end.

(c) Recommendation: That subscribers be made aware of this phenomenon or that another electrical circuit be devised to cause a second type of signal to the distant end.

(4) Radio Teletype Support to Combat Units:

(a) Observation: Combat support signal units provide radio teletype support to combat units which have their own operators and equipment. When these units required radio teletype capability for the Cambodian and subsequent operations, they could not provide these communications.

(b) Evaluation: There is a great tendency to misutilize communications personnel in positions such as clerks, drivers or other non-TO&E positions. The result is that the operators are not kept proficient in their job, and they become indispensable in their secondary job.

(c) Recommendation: Radio teletype equipment and operators should be pooled at higher headquarters such as at signal battalion level in a division or brigade or artillery group level. This would allow more flexibility in assigning radio teletype teams to accomplish mission essential requirements for these organizations.
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(5) Motion Picture Photography:

(a) Observation: Some of the motion picture footage returned to this unit indicated camera movement. The photographer did not or could not hold the camera perfectly still while shooting. This effect can be held to a minimum by using the wide angle lens, but this is not always practical or desirable.

(b) Evaluation: Except under combat circumstances the use of a tripod with the camera would eliminate nearly all unsteadiness of the camera during shooting. However, the motion picture tripod is extremely heavy and takes considerable time and effort to carry, set up, and level.

(c) Recommendation: That an additional individual be assigned to all DA Record motion picture assignments for the purpose of carrying and setting up the motion picture camera on the tripod. While insuring steady shots, this teamwork would also free the photographer to concentrate on the composition of his shots and to gather caption material.

d. Logistics:

(1) Electronic Tube 5654

(a) Observation: Unit experienced critical shortage of electronic tube 5654, utilized in AN/TRC-24 and AN/TCC-7.

(b) Evaluation: According to TM 11-5820-287-12, dated April 1967, FSN for electronic tube 5654 was 5960-262-1357. Unit made several demands for tube. Investigation disclosed that FSN for this tube was different on the box that tube was shipped in to unit. Reordered tube under new FSN 5960-045-8639 and soon received sufficient quantities to continue smooth operation. FSN had been changed for this tube and appropriate change had not been issued or received by this unit.

(c) Recommendation: That FSN changes be furnished through appropriate channels for items and running spare parts.

(2) Fuel and Oil Filters

(a) This unit experienced problems procuring fuel and oil filters for 60 KW generators through normal supply channels.

(b) Evaluation:

1 Without replacement filters the generators experienced difficulties which led to inefficient operations and deadline of equipment.
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2 It was found that with slight modifications fuel and oil filters from 2½ ton vehicles could be interchanged with 60 KW generators as a field expedient.

(c) Recommendation: That field expedient utilization of 2½ ton truck, M35A2, fuel filters and oil filters be made when necessary, in lieu of 60 KW generator fuel and oil filters.


(1) Observation: Increasing the baud rate improves the quality and reduces the backlog.

(2) Evaluation: It has been found, for reasons unknown, that increasing the baud rate has cut down the reject rate. Increasing the baud rate has also cut down the backlog because of the greater speed.

(3) Recommendation: That MODE I remain at 300 baud, and if there is a significant increase in traffic, that it be upgraded to higher baud.

g. Materiel:

(1) Cleaning the Line Packs on SB-86 Switchboard:

(a) Observation: When repairing and cleaning the SB-86 switchboards in a damaged AN/HTC-10 switchboard, the insides of several of the cord packs were corroded.

(b) Evaluation: TM 11-2134 does not specifically authorize the opening of cord packs on the SB-86 at organizational level. While it does state that the entire SB-86 should be cleaned inside and out, there is some question as to who can perform this maintenance.

(c) Recommendation: In areas of tropical climate, such as Southeast Asia, cord packs should be opened and inspected and air-dried out as a part of the quarterly maintenance at organizational level.

(2) Photographer's Caption Book:

(a) Observation: Photographer's Caption Book, DA Form 11-178, becomes easily waterlogged under jungle conditions. When handled frequently and stored in the breast pocket, the pages and cover become wet from the photographer's perspiration which makes it difficult to write captions with pen or pencil. It makes pages more prone to tearing. Due to method of binding, the continuation sheet overleaf can only be used for about half of the page.
(b) Evaluation: The format of this caption book needs revision to resist dampness and to make use of continuation sheet more convenient.

(c) Recommendation: DA Form 11-178, Photographer's Caption Book, be given a waterproof cover and the binding changed to permit greater use of the continuation sheet.

(3) Loading Motion Picture Camera:

(a) Observation: Loading and unloading film in the Bell and Howell 70 HR 16mm Film motion picture camera is both clumsy and time consuming, taking up to five minutes to complete (including slating). Under combat situations, this prevents the photographer from maintaining continuity between rolls. It is also hazardous because the photographer must remain in one place while friendly forces are moving.

(b) Evaluation: A faster, less complicated means of loading camera is needed. Cartridges similar to those now used commercially in Super 8 cameras might be used.

(c) Recommendation: Investigate the possibility of a cartridge loading 16mm motion picture camera.

(4) Supervisory Capability for Switchboard Operators:

(a) Observation: Typhoon's incoming locals, when going to trunk circuits, do not have supervisory capability for the operators.

(b) Evaluation: Due to this lack of supervisory capability, the subscriber at times is left plugged in after completing call.

(c) Recommendation: That a system be devised on an AN/MTC-1 or AN/MTC-7 to allow supervisory capabilities on incoming locals to trunk circuits.

(5) Mounting of the AM-3349:

(a) Observation: The power amplifier, AM-3349 in the AN/GRC-122/142 radio teletype shelters, has occasionally fallen off the mount when traveling over rough terrain.

(b) Evaluation: The crossbar in the AN/GRC-106 mounting has no positive locking device.

(c) Recommendation: That a thumb-screw be placed in the upper rail of the crossbar and a hole be tapped in the amplifier housing to insure positive lockdown. As an interim solution, recommend that rope be used to secure the power amplifier when the radio set is in transit.
h. Other: Amnesty Program.

(1) Observation: The amnesty program for drug abuse is not as effective as it should be. Positive steps must be taken to upgrade the effectiveness of the Amnesty Drug Program.

(2) Evaluation: This unit has endorsed the amnesty program wholeheartedly. Facilities necessary to treat personnel, especially addicts of hard drugs, are not adequate. In implementing the amnesty program, this unit conducted two one-hour classes. The first class was given to the officers and NCO's of the battalion and was primarily concerned with presenting basic information on drugs and imparting knowledge on how the program was to function. The second class, given to the enlisted personnel of the battalion, dealt more with dangers of drug abuse and more specifically with what the program entailed and how to go about requesting amnesty. In both classes, medical and legal experts presented information. A former addict made a short testimonial on what the amnesty program had done for him. Response from both classes was highly satisfactory and generated four applicants of the amnesty program within two days. Limited facilities available to this unit became all too apparent. Mental hygiene for this area is located in Cam Ranh Bay and is not easily accessible. Long waits for appointments and extremely short counseling sessions result from great demands placed upon the few personnel available at that location. It becomes very difficult to treat addicts for withdrawal syndromes unless the personnel are transferred to a medical facility. For these reasons the amnesty program becomes bogged down more deeply as applicants for the amnesty program increase. In the end, as the amnesty program becomes more successful in number of applicants, it becomes more ineffective in its treatment. Facilities and trained personnel have to be made available or the amnesty program is ineffective.

(3) Recommendation: For the amnesty program to be successful, certain procedures should be introduced. These include: streamlining of appointments for applicants for the amnesty program so that personnel administering the program are aware of the essentials of each case; hospital beds and medical supervision should be made available for patients undergoing the immediate effects of withdrawal pains.

JOSEPH W. TAYLOR
LTC, SigC
Commanding
AVFA-SD-00

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 54th Signal Battalion (Corps),
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8 Incl
1 - List of Detachments (Confidential)
2 - 54th Sig Br (C) Communications Systems Map (Confidential)
3 - Key Personnel
4 - Organizational Chart
5 - 54th Sig Br (C) and Attached Units NFOE
6 - Letter of Appreciation from MS McKey, CO, 4th Infantry Division and
   Endorsement by LTC Selinger, CO, 1st BCT
7 - Letter from COL Jarratt, Senior Advisor, 23rd INF Div

8 - Chronology (Confidential)
   Incl 3, 5, 6 and 7 wd HQ DA

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4 - CO, I FFORCEN, ATTN: AVFA-GD-OT, APO 96350
2 - CINCUSAR PAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
3 - DCG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
2 - CO, I FFORCEN, ATTN: AVFA-SC, APO 96350
1 - CINC, USASCS
1 - CO, USASSCS, ATTN: DIR OD
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 54th Signal Battalion (Corps),
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS, C5F08-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam APO S.F. 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST,
APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report—
Lessons Learned and concurs.

2. Reference paragraph 2a (Personnel), concur with the recommendation that
requirement for entrance of "Unamed Campaign" in pencil on qualification
records be deleted in its entirety. Current procedures of this headquarters
insure that all personnel being considered for promotion are awarded credits
for all campaigns in which they have attained eligibility. Individuals are
required to verify points awarded and initial the total points column.

3. There is some merit in the criticism of LTC Taylor regarding limited
facilities immediately available in Nha Trang at the moment. Most of these
problems associated with the 575th dispensary will be alleviated in the near
future. There is a delay in getting Mental Hygiene Consultants at this time and
follow-up action is not optimum due to the lack of personnel. Basically drug
abuse is a sociological problem with medical implications and problems but it
is not to be considered a basically medical disease. Most victims of drug
abuse can be adequately treated on an outpatient basis and actually do better
than when hospitalized. It has been conclusively proven that recidivism rates
are much higher when patients are hospitalized for all of their treatment
than when they are treated on an outpatient basis. An exception to the need
for hospitalization may be the severely addicted user of "hard" drugs, chiefly
heroin in our environment, and even this hospitalization should be terminated
immediately after the acute withdrawal symptoms are alleviated and the patient
then followed on an outpatient basis. It is impractical to establish a so-
called drug treatment center for the hospitalization and treatment of all victims
of drug abuse for several reasons:

(a) There are not enough hospital facilities available to hospitalize
all such people in RVN.

(b) There are not enough personnel available to care for this large num-
ber of "patients" in a hospital environment.

(c) There is no need to hospitalize the vast majority of drug abusers.

(d) Secondary gain problems on the part of the patients would assume
gigantic proportions.

(e) Recidivism rates would defeat the purpose of the amnesty program.
Steps are being taken by medical personnel to facilitate and reinforce our existing and developing programs.

(a.) Consolidation of existing Army and Air Force psychiatry assets in the area at Cam Ranh Bay to streamline procedures is currently under way. Information on this should be available to the troops by 1 Sept 70.

(b.) A familiarization and education program for medical personnel in dispensary and non-hospital situations is to be instituted to facilitate treatment and follow-up on an outpatient basis with the man continuing to work in his unit.

(c.) Close coordination between medical and non-professional unit personnel is to be encouraged as an absolutely essential part of the program.

Other recommended steps to be considered as essential are:

(a.) Familiarization and "education" of unit officers and NCO's with the drug abuse problem—its recognition, the treatment and the support so valuable in the follow-up phase.

(b.) Utilization of other personnel such as chaplains in guidance roles.

(c.) Establishment of a buddy system or other system of personal identification to give the ex-drug user confidence and to stimulate a feeling of "belonging" and/or unit identity.

(d.) Establishment of a unit group therapy program wherein ex-drug abusers lend mutual support to each other.

(e.) Improvement of unit and area recreational facilities and support activities to assist all GIs to be constructively occupied in off-duty and slack times.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 54th Signal Battalion (Corps),
Period Ending 31 July 1970, ECS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT E. O'HAN
CPT, AGC

CF:
2 - ACSFOR, DA
1 - CO, 54TH SIG BN (LESS ORLL)
AVHDG-DO (15 Aug 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 54th Signal Battalion (Corps),
Period Ending 31 July, EN-OSWOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 18061770

THRU Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications-
Command Pacific, APO 96558

TO Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 54th Signal
Battalion (Corps) and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Unnamed Campaign," page 16, paragraph 2a(1),
and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2: nonconcur. The entry pertaining to
"Unnamed Campaign" on personal records is required to insure that each
individual receives credit for his service in Vietnam, and points when recom-
mended for promotion. The campaign is in effect and should be so reflected on
the personal records to authorize the wearing of that particular battle
star on the campaign ribbon. In addition, the removal of the requirement for
this entry will possibly result in those individuals departing Vietnam prior
to termination of the campaign being penalized at their next assignment in
relation to promotions, and will create unnecessary administrative burdens
in attempting to determine the individuals' eligibility. It should never
be assumed that there will be an "automatic" award of anything that is not
supported by a recorded entry. Assessment of a moderate deficiency for
omission of this entry is considered appropriate due to the effect on an
individual's selection for promotion. No action by USARPAC or DA is
recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Channel Checks," page 16, paragraph 2c(1),
More frequent channel checks than called for in regulations is dependent upon
local operating conditions, and is within the purview of the local commander
to establish those procedures required for effective record communications.
Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Multiple Tape Processing," page 16,
paragraph 2c(2). The observation, evaluation and recommendation are
excellent. Development of suitable doctrine and equipment should be
evaluated by CHC to determine the economic impact of this proposal, and if
favorable, appropriate action should be taken to realize the goal.
d. Reference item concerning "Ringing Distant Switchboards," page 17, paragraph 2c(3). Once a call has been registered on a switchboard, operator response to the call depends upon proficiency, traffic load, and motivation. Response time can be improved through training, supervision and adequate switchboard manning. If a call does not register on the switchboard, the problem is normally the circuit path, and appropriate action must be taken to restore the path. All switchboards have multiple signaling capabilities (audio and visual) already, and to add another would not significantly improve response time. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Radio Teletype Support to Combat Units," page 17, paragraph 2c(4). Nonconcur. The malassignment of technically skilled individuals is a command problem, and should be rectified by command emphasis and education rather than through altering valid communications doctrine. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

f. Reference item concerning "Motion Picture Photography," page 18, paragraph 2c(5). Nonconcur. The recommendation, as written, does not make clear whether it is asking for an additional man through MTOE/assignment action or merely suggesting that an individual already assigned to the unit be given the additional duty of carrying and setting up the tripod. If the recommendation implies MTOE action, it does not appear that there is sufficient justification to warrant such a change. If, however, the unit makes such a recommendation, the justification must also identify the trade-off space by paragraph and line number in the detailed MTOE since USARV cannot support strength increases at this time. Unit has been so advised.

g. Reference item concerning "Electronic Tube 5654," page 18, paragraph 2d(1). FSN changes are furnished through supply channels. The Direct Support Unit is responsible for notifying supported units of FSN changes.

h. Reference item concerning "Fuel and Oil Filters," page 19, paragraph 2d(2). Nonconcur with recommendation contained in paragraph 2d(2)(c) that field expedient utilization be made by modifying and substituting fuel and oil filters from 2½ ton vehicles for that required by the 60 KW generator. This Headquarters is sending an LAOV (NECOM) representative to the Signal Brigade to evaluate this problem area. A final determination will be made after the assistance visit by LAOV. Unit has been so advised.

i. Reference item concerning "Photographer's Caption Book," page 19, paragraph 2g(2). The Photographer's Caption Book is a DA Form. The 54th Signal Battalion should submit their recommendation through field commands
AVO-DO (15 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 54th Signal Battalion (Corps),
Period Ending 31 July, RCS-CHFON-65 (E2)

with actual experience in use of DA Form 11-176, and forward to TAG, ATTN:
AGAR, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20335 for consideration.
Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy from:
I FFORCSV
54th Sig Bn
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2c(1), page 16 and paragraph 2b, 2d Ind: More frequent channel checks than specified by current regulations should be used only as an interim method to prevent loss of contact. Action should be taken to determine cause of drift with appropriate remedial action to prevent or decrease drifting.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L. W. O'Leary
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

Cy furn:

CG USARV
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**COMMUNICATION DETACHMENT LOCATIONS**
(as of 31 July 1970)

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<td>Camp Swamy</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Chu Cat</td>
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<td>CP 06355350</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Pleiku (DSA II Corps HP)</td>
<td>AR 76555165</td>
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Other Significant Locations During the Quarter

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<td>Dan Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plei Djarang</td>
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<td>Thy Phuoc</td>
<td>CR 02232910</td>
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CHRONOLOGY

1 May 70 1) Bn Commander directed Bn S-3 to coordinate transportation for the Forward Mobile Staff (FMS) back from Phan Thiet & Tan Canh with I FFORCEN
   C-4.

2) 167th Sig Co (RR) vehicle went off the road at Yen Chua Mtn injuring one man slightly and moderately damaging the vehicle.

2 May 70 1) Air Force Quality Assistance Team from Clark AFB Philippines arrived and checked AN/TRC-97B equipment at Hon Tre Island, Yung Chua Mtn and at the Bn Motor Pool.
   2) Officer in Charge, FMS closed down Alpha Net RTT and PW secure Voice at Kuntum as well as V-04 & V-05 VHF systems at that location.
   3) CPT Joseph P. Kissal assumed command of Company A from CPT Sam N. Marshall Jr.

3 May 70 1) Phan Thiet withstood a sapper attack last night, no casualties to Bn personnel and no damage.
   2) Aviation section picked up a new OH-58A Kiowa rotor wing aircraft.

4 May 70 LTC Joseph W. Taylor assumed command of the 54th Sig Bn (C) from LTC Robert E. Wisscher, previous commander from 5 May 1969 to 4 May 1970.

5 May 70 FMS departed Pleiku to convoy to Qui Nhon.

6 May 70 1) Pleiku went on Red alert as three 122mm rockets hit DSA II Corps area, No 54th Sig Bn (C) personnel injured.
   2) Plans Officer, I FFORCEN Signal Section, informed Bn S-3 that battalion may be tasked to support the 4th Division during the Cambodian operations.
   B Company prepared VHF equipment for possible deployment.
   3) Bn Commander toured operating facilities in Nha Trang including
7 May 70 I FORCEN Signal Officer directed one officer and one combat photographer to go into Cambodia and cover the 4th Division’s Operations for DA Record Photography.

8 May 70 1) Camp McDermott received four 107mm rockets at 0600. Moderate equipment damage incurred by the Bn Motor Pool where one of the rockets landed. Rockets hit again at 0915. No damage resulted.

2) Signal Section directed Bn to move an AN/GRC-122 from Det 22 near Qui Nhon to Pleiku to support 35th Division.

3) One AN/GRO-122, one AN/GRO-142 and MRO-73 were sent to Pleiku to prepare to support 4th Division at Plei Djereng. One AN/GRO-122 was sent to Dac Co to support MACV Team #2 and 22nd ARVN Div. Another AN/GRO-122 deployed to Det 25, Pleiku, and Det 25's RAT rig assisted with the commitment resulting in five (5) Radio Teletype rigs being utilized.

9 May 70 Equipment used by FMS is on standby status ready to support MACV and 4th Infantry Division operations.

11 May 70 Two RTT rigs (one AN/GRO-122 and one AN/GRO-142) deployed from Pleiku to Plei Djereng in support of the 4th Division. Additionally, an AN/VRC-47 and one back-up radio with secure Nestor equipment located in the 4th Division TOC, Pleiku.

12 May 70 Det 27, Plei Djereng, logged in Alpha and Charlie Nets.

14 May 70 I FORCEN Signal Section informed 3-3 that the two AN/GRO-122 rigs at Plei Djereng will be committed to Ban Ne Thuot and are to return to Pleiku.

15 May 70 The AN/GRO-142 that had supported the 4th Division at Plei Djereng re-directed to LZ Meredith in support of the 2/1st Armored Cavalry which was

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maintaining road security for the 4th Division.

16 May 70 1) Bn Commander and CSM visited An Khe for 167th Sig Co's Organization Day.
2) B Company was directed to deploy two AN/MRC-112's to Ban Me Thuot in support of MACV Advisors to the 23rd ARVN Division's Cambodian operations.

18 May 70 1) S-3 was informed by Signal Section that 22nd Rangers (US), operating in Cambodia, were permitted to enter Charlie Net at Duc Co.
2) LZ English went on Red Alert at 1120.
3) Ban Me Thuot went on Red Alert at 1800.

19 May 70 LTC Jack A. Lucido, new Deputy Signal Officer, visited Southern sites on initial orientation tour.

22 May 70 1) Signal Support Order directed Bn to deactivate E-25 system from LZ North English to Tan Quan at 221200H May 70.
2) Det 28, Ban Me Thuot, came up in the Charlie (Voice) Net.

24 May 70 1) I FFORCEV conducted a meeting with Bn S-3 to discuss Province Senior Advisor and District Senior Advisor radio systems & repair priority.
2) V-71 between Engineer Hill & Arty Hill at Pleiku was deactivated.

28-29 May 70 LTC Ways, now I FFORCEV Signal Officer, visited Bn and received a briefing from Bn S-3. He toured all Nha Trang area facilities.

30 May 70 1) LZ Meredith AN/GRO-142 commitment ended and the rig returned to Pleiku.
2) Dalat and Tan Canh went on Red Alert.

3 Jun 70 Signal Section, I FFORCEV alerted the Bn of an impending Signal Support Order to provide 2/1st Armored Cavalry communications.

4 Jun 70 1) Camp McDermott received incoming rockets at 1800. No damage or casualties in Bn area.
2) Camp McDermott received incoming rounds again at 2350. Again no damage or casualties in Bn area.

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6 Jun 70  Bn Commander held weekly staff meeting and stressed LTG Collins, CG, I FFORCENV, accident prevention and military courtesy policies.

7 Jun 70  CPT Francis M. Creighton assumed command of HNC from CPT Wunderly.

8 Jun 70  1) AN/VSC-2 was deployed to 2/1st Armored Cavalry at Camp Jerome, Ban Me Thuot, on a combat essential (CE) air mission.

2) 2/1st Armored Cavalry requested WD-1 wire to be installed from Det 16 VHF to Traveler Forward Svc at the Squadron CP.

3) Signal Section, I FFORCENV, directed 4 miles of WD-1 wire be forwarded to 2/1st Armored Cavalry in Ban Me Thuot. B Co assisted with installation.

9 Jun 70  1) Storm hit Det 21 Camp Swampy causing water damage to back-up equipment.

2) CPT Edmond D. Boone assumed command of Company B from CPT Robert A. Wysocki who becomes assistant S-3.

10 Jun 70  167th Sig Co (RR) tested V-72 and V-74 systems (Arty Hill to Tan Canh) under guidance from Technical Control.

11 Jun 70  1) CO, 167th Sig Co (RR) notified Bn of a fire at the Engineer Hill motor pool. Investigating Officer appointed and directed to fly by chopper to investigate. Four (4) 2½ ton trucks, tools and repair equipment destroyed.

2) Co B was directed to send one AN/MRC-73 multichannel VHF radio to Ban Me Thuot to support the 2/1st Armored Cavalry. G-4 transportation arranged a CE flight.

12 Jun 70  Co A was directed to move an AN/GRC-122 radio to Camp Jerome (near Ban Me Thuot) to replace VSC-2. RTT communications was operational at 1530 in the Alpha Net.

13 Jun 70  54th Sig Bn (C) hosted 5th Railway Security Bn (ARVN) in a volleyball match.

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14 Jun 70
1) LTC Keenan, 1st Signal Brigade, toured Comma Center; had his team remove the remaining Node V today.
2) Tan Me Thuot went on Red Alert for 40 minutes at 1710 due to incoming 82 MM mortars. No casualties or damages reported.

15 Jun 70
1) Technical Assistance Team departed for a four day project checking LZ English, North English, LZ Uplift and Vung Chua Mtn.

16 Jun 70
1) 55th MI arrived in Bn to perform a pre-AGI courtesy inspection. Results indicated that there were no discrepancies.
2) USAF CPKI Team arrived for 3 day inspection of personnel management.

20 Jun 70
1) The Bn received a letter from MG Walker, CG, 4th Infantry Division and indorsed by LTG Collins complimenting the Bn's outstanding support of Cambodian operations.
2) One AN/GRO-122 and one AN/HRO-112 at Duc Lap were moved to Tan Don at 0905. This is the new MACV forward area CP for 23rd ARVN Division Cambodian operations.

21 Jun 70
1) Signal Section, I FFORCEV directed the Bn to install an additional Typhoon line for the Khanh Hoa Province Senior Advisor.
2) Signal Section directed Bn to prepare RTT rig for a CE mission to Pleiku in support of DSA II Corps.

24 Jun 70
128th Sig Co TI Team conducted 100% inspection of Photo Section. Results: Satisfactory rating.

25 Jun 70
Tan Canh received incoming 122 MM rocket at 1500. No casualties or damage.

26 Jun 70
AN/GRO-122 at Duc Co supporting MACV team 21 needed power supply which will be forwarded by air.

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29 Jun 70
Co B closed V-05 system from Det 48, Ban Me Thuot, to Camp Jerome and returned equipment to Nha Trang.

1 Jul 70
AN/GRC-122 from Dets 28 and 29 arrived back in Nha Trang.

2 Jul 70
Class was given to all Officers, NCO's and EM by the following military experts: doctor, lawyer and chaplain to explain the Drug Amnesty Program.

6 Jul 70
Tan Canh was hit with two mortar rounds. No damage to personnel or equipment.

8 Jul 70
Signal Section representative departed to Song Mao and Phan Thiet to conduct IG at those detachments.

9 Jul 70
Colonel Gorler, I PFORECEV IG, arrived, briefed on Officers and introduced the IG team. Inspection continued thru the next day.

10 Jul 70
1) Tan Canh received incoming mortars. No damage or casualties resulted.
2) I PFORECEV IG conducted exit briefing. Results: Satisfactory rating.

11 Jul 70
Model 3 Autodin Subscriber Terminal Equipment in Comm Center was reterminated to the Phu Lam Automatic Switching Center.

12 Jul 70
LT Lindley, CO, 209th Sig Det (Photo), briefed LT Collins on photographic capabilities of the 54th Sig (C) Pictorial Center. After the briefing LT Collins directed AN to shoot combat footage to include armor, artillery and infantry activities and any aches discovered.

14 Jul 70
Liaison Officer to Capitol ROK Division requested that an AN/GRC-122
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Radio be deployed to Phu Cat for an operation starting 15 July, Signal Section approved request and 14th Aerial Port Sqdn booked rig on CE flight.

15 Jul 70 RTT rig arrived at Qui Nhon and deployed to Phu Cat and became operational.

18 Jul 70 1) Information office coordinated with 209th Sig Det (Photo) motion picture coverage of 2nd Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment operations at Task Force South.
2) CPT Robert A. Wysocki assumed position as Bn S-3.

19 Jul 70 2/1st Armored Cavalry Signal Officer requested a system between Phan Thiet and Camp Blackhawk, Song Mao, in the event that Thien Giao closes down.

20 Jul 70 1) S-3 coordinated installation of SB-675 at Hon Cong Mountain, An Khe, with 586th Sig Bn.
2) Task Force South Area Commo Officer reported 1st Bn, 50th Infantry Division (Mechanized) departed Thien Giao today and V-06A, V-06B, V-07 and V-08 systems to that location will no longer be needed.

22 Jul 70 1) Bn Commander directed S-3 to coordinate closeout of Det 23 tomorrow. A system will be installed between HQ, Task Force South, Phan Thiet and Camp Blackhawk, Song Mao, the 2/1st Armored Cavalry Headquarters.
2) Bn CO directed S-3 to draft DF to unit commanders concerning upgrading safety procedures at the sites.

24 Jul 70 1) Bn conducted B-Band VHF test between LZ English and LZ Uplift under direction of Tech Control. The system worked well and will be given consideration for use in the near future.
2) CPT David I. Drummond assumed command of 167th Sig Co (RR) from former commander CPT Lee F. Woodward.

25 Jul 70 One MTC-10 switchboard was airlifted by Chinook helicopter to 2/1st Armored Cavalry, Song Mao.
26 Jul 70  1) Bn Commander informed S-3 that HACV COC Teletype circuit will be re-terminated at TOC C/C NIT 5 August.

2) S-3 provided itinerary for COL Natter, 21st Signal Group Commander to visit Province Senior Advisors from 28-31 July. I FFORCE Signal Officer and Bn Commander will escort.

29 Jul 70  Signal Section I FFORCE directed Bn to deploy AN/GRO-122 on C4 flight to Tuy Phuoc tomorrow. Equipment and personnel supported 3/506 Infantry Bn 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

30 Jul 70  Det 26, Tuy Phuoc, went on air in Alpha and Charlie Nets.

31 Jul 70  The Bn received letter from COL Braum, Senior Advisor to 23rd ARVN, complimenting the Bn's outstanding support of Operation Binh Tay II and III in Cambodia during months of May and June 1970.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 54th Signal Battalion**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CO, 54th Signal Battalion

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PROJECT NO.
N/A

ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER
703238

OTHER REPORT NO. (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310

ABSTRACT

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310