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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO: UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY:

PCC 0660, 27 Mar 72

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SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

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AGDA-A (M) (20 Jan 71) FOR OT UT 703146 3 February 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. The Flame Fuel Dropper Rack discussed on pages 68 and 71 of the enclosed report has been tested by ACTIV. Test results were forwarded to Department of the Army on 20 November 1970. Pending further study of the ACTIV test results by the US Army Combat Developments Command, Army-wide use of the rack is not recommended.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Chu Lai Base (BT 555035), RVN.
Reporting Officer: Major General Albert E. Milloy
Prepared by: Captain William H. Offutt, Jr., 3d Military History Detachment.


A. Command.

1. (U) Background. The Americal Division continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Operation (TAO) during the reporting period. Heaviest contact occurred in Operation Frederick Hill in the vicinity of Hiep Duc. In continual heavy action, Americal units decimated elements of the 1st NVA Regiment, killing 590 in a two-month span. Division cavalry units commenced Operation Pennsylvania Square on 29 June. Operation Elk Canyon was started on 12 July in the vicinity of Kham Duc, and has resulted in little contact to date. Rice denial, pacification and joint operations with the 2d ARVN Division continued successfully.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. General Officers.

Brigadier General E. L. Powell, ADC (M), departed the command on 28 July 1970 and was replaced as ADC (M) by Brigadier General T. C. Mataxis.

b. Brigade Commanders.

(1) LTC (P) E. L. Kennedy assumed command of the 196th Inf Bde on 1 May 1970 from Colonel J. M. Lee.

(2) Colonel W. B. Richardson assumed command of the 198th Inf Bde on 12 July 1970 from Colonel J. Clemons.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division—PFCI
Ending 31 July 1970, RGCS GSPOR—65 (R2) (U)

The following are comments on the overall effectiveness of the
Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division—PFCI.

c. Colonels.

(1) Colonel J. L. Insani became the Chief of Staff in succession to
replacing Colonel (P) A. G. Hume.

(2) Colonel R. S. Silver assumed command of the 16th Combat Avn
Group on 8 June 1970 from Colonel D. L. Townsend.

d. Battalion Changes.

(1) 2d Bn, 1st Inf. LTC A. H. Coleman assumed command from LTC F. A.
Nerone on 10 May 1970.

(2) 5th Bn, 46th Inf. LTC R. J. Werewynski assumed command from LTC
M. G. Snyder on 10 May 1970.

(3) 4th Bn, 3d Inf. LTC P. D. Brumfield assumed command from LTC S. V.
Wielga on 12 May 1970.

(4) 4th Bn, 31st Inf. LTC T. A. Breen assumed command from LTC R. L.
Skaer on 14 June 1970.

(5) 1st Bn, 6th Inf. LTC F. F. Weilrner assumed command from LTC R. W.
Schwarzkopf on 7 July 1970.

(6) 1st Bn, 20th Inf. LTC G. P. Lynch assumed command from LTC A. P.
Fischer on 10 July 1970.

(7) 3d Bn, 21st Inf. LTC C. P. Saint assumed command from LTC M. M.
Misch on 10 July 1970.

(8) 4th Bn, 21st Inf. LTC R. A. Witter assumed command from LTC E. L.

(9) 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav. LTC E. E. Saint assumed command from LTC F. G.
Graves on 12 July 1970.

(10) 3d Bn, 82d Arty. LTC F. M. Zabick assumed command from LTC C. E.
Paulkner on 29 May 1970.

(11) 1st Bn, 82d Arty. LTC R. F. James assumed command from LTC R. F.
Garcia on 10 June 1970.

(12) 3d Bn, 18th Arty. LTC A. R. Foster assumed command from LTC A. E.
Hayden on 14 June 1970.
SIBJZCTz
Operational Report—Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ECS CSPOR—65 (R2) (U)


(14) 3d Bn, 18th Arty. LTC R. G. Schmidt assumed command from LTC A. R. Foster on 22 July 1970.

(15) 14th Obt Avn Bn. LTC D. G. Boyle assumed command from LTC E. L. Ketteler on 12 June 1970.


(17) 523d Sg Bn. LTC J. Shumway assumed command from LTC R. H. Bartos on 12 July 1970.

3. (U) Staff Changes.

a. MAJ (P) H. E. Moreland became ACoS, G4, on 13 May 1970, replacing LTC F. D. Grimm.


d. MAJ (F) F. J. Casey became the ACoS, G1, on 7 June 1970, replacing LTC E. H. Fernandez.

e. LTC R. S. Holmes became the ACoS, G2, on 14 June 1970, replacing LTC E. H. Knight.

f. LTC H. L. Miller became the Staff Judge Advocate on 24 June 1970, replacing LTC T. H. Davis.

g. LTC W. E. Henschel became the ACoS, G1, on 1 July 1970, replacing LTC F. J. Casey.

h. LTC G. A. McGee became the ACoS, G4, on 2 July 1970, replacing MAJ (F) H. E. Mooreland.

i. MAJ W. F. Gabella became the Information Officer on 16 July 1970, replacing MAJ J. T. Pauli, who departed the command on 18 June 1970.


k. LTC J. H. Gasper became the Division Finance Officer on 23 July 1970, replacing LTC W. F. Cate.

INCL 3
4. (U) Distinguished Visitors.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
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<tr>
<td>MG Woolwine</td>
<td>CG, 1st LOG Command, USARV</td>
<td>9 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Lindsey</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Dietrich</td>
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<td>11 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Schrader</td>
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<td>11 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSP Dickinson</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Hallock</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSP Cubber</td>
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<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSP Stratton</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Slatinshak</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Reddan</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Lally</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>RADM Christians</td>
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<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Cotman</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Lushin</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Powell</td>
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<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ Kremes</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ McLaughlin</td>
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<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT Brady</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Toan</td>
<td>CG, 2D ARVN Div</td>
<td>15 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Hunter</td>
<td>USAF Sup Cdr, Qui Nhon</td>
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<td>BG Henion</td>
<td>HQ, USMACV</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Sherriff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Vance</td>
<td>PM, XXIV, Corps</td>
<td>19 May</td>
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<td>COL Fern</td>
<td>Dep Ann Ctr, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Kanzai</td>
<td>CG, 1st Sig Bde</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Widdecke</td>
<td>CG, 1st Mar Div</td>
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<td>COL Smith</td>
<td>CG, 1st Sig Bde</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Zais</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps</td>
<td>20 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Lutz</td>
<td>CG, I Corps</td>
<td>20 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Miller</td>
<td>DSA, I Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGT Wildren</td>
<td>DCG, USARV</td>
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<td>BG Miller</td>
<td>ADC, 1 Mar Div</td>
<td>23 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Shedd</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps</td>
<td>23 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Insani</td>
<td>incoming Chief of Staff, Americal Div</td>
<td>25 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL McCoid</td>
<td>CO, ACTIV</td>
<td>25 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Fraser</td>
<td>CO, Australian Forces, Vietnam</td>
<td>26 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Conley</td>
<td>AWG, 1st MAW</td>
<td>26 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Carmiglia</td>
<td>Dir, American Red Cross</td>
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<td>BG Thomas</td>
<td>CO, USARMEDCOMV</td>
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10 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

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<td>BG Jackson</td>
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<td>MG Sutherland</td>
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<td>9 June</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Dulski</td>
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<td>9 June</td>
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<td>LTG Leis</td>
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<td>BG Muller</td>
<td>USAV, I Corps</td>
<td>12 June</td>
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<td>COL Welan</td>
<td>CO, Qui Nhon Support</td>
<td>15 June</td>
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<td>LTG Meldran</td>
<td>DCG, USAV</td>
<td>16 June</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Toan</td>
<td>CG, 2D ARVN Div</td>
<td>16 June</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Smith</td>
<td>Da Nang Support Command</td>
<td>16 June</td>
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<td>GEN Abrams</td>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>18 June</td>
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<td>MG Bowen</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
<td>22 June</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Doehler</td>
<td>outgoing ADC, 1st Mar Div</td>
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<td>BG Simmons</td>
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<td>22 June</td>
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<td>CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION</td>
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<td>Mr. Firfer</td>
<td>I Corps, CORDS</td>
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<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>LTG McCaffrey</td>
<td>DCG, USAV</td>
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<td>COL Cam</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, 2D ARVN Div</td>
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<td>BG Toan</td>
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<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>LTG Lam</td>
<td>CG, I Corps</td>
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<td>BG Toan</td>
<td>CG, 2D ARVN Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Jackson</td>
<td>Sr Advisor, I Corps</td>
<td>29 June</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Weaver</td>
<td>MACV SJA</td>
<td>2 July</td>
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<td>COL Newman</td>
<td>USAV SJA</td>
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<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>MG Baldwin</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Foster</td>
<td>CG, USASTRATCOM—PAC</td>
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<td>MG Baldwin</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Shira</td>
<td>Assistant Surgeon General (Dent)</td>
<td>7 July</td>
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<td>COL Richardson</td>
<td>CG, 196th Inf Bde</td>
<td>8 July</td>
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<td>GEN Bossom</td>
<td>DCG, USMACV</td>
<td>9 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Howell</td>
<td>Dep Dir I DASC Office</td>
<td>10 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Noble</td>
<td>Engr Condr USMACV</td>
<td>10 July</td>
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<td>COL Sullivan</td>
<td>LOG GWB USAWAR Avn Off</td>
<td>10 July</td>
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<td>COL Bergner</td>
<td>CG, 34th Gen Supply</td>
<td>10 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Westmoreland</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff</td>
<td>11 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Sutherland</td>
<td>CG, XXIV Corps</td>
<td>17 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Hockaday</td>
<td>Chief, Surface Ops MACV</td>
<td>18 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Shedd</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps</td>
<td>19 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Cody</td>
<td>ACoFs, Operations, J-3, USMACV</td>
<td>20 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Latta</td>
<td>CG, USASTRATCOM</td>
<td>22 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Thomas (British)</td>
<td>Chief of Staff and CG, British Forces</td>
<td>23 July</td>
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Far Eastland Forces
**AVDF-3L**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, AGS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

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<th>NAME</th>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Anderson (British)</td>
<td>Chief Engr, HQ, RFELF</td>
<td>23 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Graham-Bell (British)</td>
<td>CMGR Army Avn, Singapore</td>
<td>23 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL B. J. Combs</td>
<td>Defense Attaché for British</td>
<td>23 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Finfer</td>
<td>CMGR CORDS</td>
<td>23 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Seesaw</td>
<td>CG, USA Depot, Qui Nhon</td>
<td>24 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Collins</td>
<td>DCG, USASA</td>
<td>24 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Morris</td>
<td>CO, Support Command, Da Nang</td>
<td>25 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Bowen</td>
<td>USAHV Neuropsychiastrist</td>
<td>26 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Hart</td>
<td>Military Judge</td>
<td>28 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Reiser</td>
<td>Dep ACofS, Opns, MACV, J-3</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Hill</td>
<td>16th MP Group Commander</td>
<td>31 July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. (U) Personal.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. During the period, Military Justice/Military Affairs continued to comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter May-Jul 70, this command tried 1 general courts-martial, 19 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge was authorized, and received 147 special courts-martial and 3 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 1,340 Article 15, UCMJ proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USAFSC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions during this quarter include 27 Line of Duty determinations; 48 Article 15, UCMJ appeals for advice; 106 Reports of Survey; 94 Reports of Investigation; 52 elimination proceedings; 36 Congressional inquiries; and 2 Collateral Investigations forwarded to DA.

Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were .48, .84, 6.59, and 0.18 respectively.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2,130 cases during the quarter, including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, and general counseling and advice.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainees treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the Americal Division Combat Center; and to the Americal Combat Center Leadership Course. Instruction is also given on the Military Justice Act of 1968. In addition, unit instruction is provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior NCOs.

d. During the quarter 152 claims were received for payment for loss or damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

2. (U) Information Office.

a. In July the Division Information Office was concerned with the announcement of the Kham Duc operation. According to press rules, the MACV Office of Information (MACOII) is the sole releasing authority on allied operations. A civilian correspondent visiting in the AO at the time happened to hear about the operation. He was escorted to Kham Duc and photographed the Americal portion on the operation. Upon returning to Saigon after a three-day visit to Kham Duc, he queried MACOII which then formally released information about the operation.
AVDF-EL

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, EFS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

Press interest in the operation was moderate. All correspondents requesting to go out with the ARVN were referred to the 2d ARVN Division Information Office at Quang Ngai. The Division Information Office and the 196th Infantry Brigade Information Office escorted members of the press to Kham Duc to view the Americal part of the operation. All visits by the press to Kham Duc were coordinated with the 196th Infantry Brigade and the 00, 2/1 Infantry.

b. In July, the Americal Division History was completed and taken to Tokyo for publication by the project officer, ILT Leland K. Smith. The Division History will be a 104-page soft cover book with copy and both black and white and color photographs. Each battalion and separate company-sized element has a history of the unit included. The history will be completed in September and distributed free of charge to all members of the division.

3. (U) Division Surgeon.

a. The following figures represent the malaria statistics for the Americal Division during the period 1 May through 31 July 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No Cases</th>
<th>Rate Malaria*</th>
<th>Rate Vivax*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>44.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cases per 1000 men per year.

b. Malaria and vivax rates have decreased some what from a peak during May. Judging from previous years' experience these rates should continue to decline until September or October when mosquito breeding increases slightly at the beginning of the monsoon season.
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (M2) (U)

C. Intelligence

1. (C) Intelligence Summary

a. Quang Tin (P)

(1) During the first week of May, the level of enemy activity in Quang Tin (P) continued to increase over that of April. LZ Siberia, LZ West, Tien Phuoc, Chu Lai and Tam Ky received several attacks by fire. The focal point of this increase in activity being the Hiep Duc area. In this area, the enemy had forces equivalent to two regiments plus support elements of the 2d NVA Division. The second week of May saw a decrease in the level of enemy activity, especially in the Hiep Duc area. The Chu Lai and Tam Ky areas continued to receive light attacks by fire. The focal point of enemy activity switched to the Tien Phuoc Camp area. During the third week in May, the enemy activity level remained about the same but the focal point switched back to the Hiep Duc area. LZ West, LZ Siberia, Chu Lai Base and Tam Ky continued to receive attacks by fire. The 409th WSapper Bn was identified in an attack on Que Son (D) HQ but the majority of the battalion remained in the Chu Lai Front. The last week in May saw a significant decrease in enemy activity. The enemy continued to maintain pressure on the Hiep Duc area with both LZ Siberia and LZ West receiving attacks by fire. The enemy also conducted insignificant attacks by fire on Tam Ky and Chu Lai.

(2) On 1 May, F/8 engaged an UNSEF vic AT 9124, resulting in 46 NVA KIA. 1/5 ARVN, vic AT 9124, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 44 NVA KIA, 11 WKG and 2 CSW. Also on 1 May, LZ West received 4 separate attacks consisting of 9 82mm mortar round (2 with CS agent). On 2 May, 1/5 ARVN, vic AT 912246, round 15 NVA killed by AM fire. In the same area, vic AT 911249, 1/5 ARVN engaged an estimated 80 NVA, resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 11 WKG and 60 Chicom H/Grens and 2000 rounds of SA Ammunition destroyed. On 3 May, LZ Siberia received 5 separate attacks totalling 13 82mm mortar rounds and 3 unknown type ER rounds. That same day, 3/5 ARVN engaged an UNSEF vic AT 9426 resulting in 9 NVA KIA and 1 NVA CIA (from 1st Bn, 3d NVA Btg). D/1-1 Cav, vic AT 90250, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 14 NVA KIA. 4 May was characterized by attacks by fire: LZ West received a total of 14 82mm mortar rounds; LZ Siberia received 10 82mm rounds and 5 unknown type ER rounds; 1/5 ARVN, vic AT 916244, received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire; the Chu Lai Base received 57 122mm rockets. On 5 May, 60 VC/NVA attacked and over-ran Duong Uoi OP, vic BT 148122. Chu Lai Combat Base received 24 122mm rockets.

(3) On 8 May, 3/5 ARVN, vic AT 925269, received SA fire and an unknown amount of 82mm mortar rounds, followed by a ground attack from an UNSEF; this action resulted in 12 NVA KIA, 2 WKG and 2 CSW CIA. That same day, Tam Ky received 200 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
and a ground attack, causing heavy civilian casualties. Hawk Hill received 2 122mm rockets. LZ Bayonet received 20 60mm mortar rounds and a ground attack from an UNSF. On 10 May, F/17 Cav, vic BT 298333, received 15 RPG rounds from an UNSF; fire was returned resulting in 14 NVA KIA, 4 NVA CIA, 9 DMC and miscellaneous equipment destroyed. A/4-31 Inf, vic AT 868239, received 40-45 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSF. 3/4 ARVN Cav accounted for 12 VC KIA in a contact with an UNSF vic BT 300230. On 12 May, Tam Ky (D), vic BT 312115, 293328 and 291229, received 3 122mm rocket rounds from an UNSF. Tien Phuoc CLG/USSE, vic BT 1215, received 50 82mm mortar rounds and an unknown number of RPG rounds from an UNSF. Also, RF #118, vic BT 253216, received 25 rounds of mixed 60/82mm mortar fire and RPG rounds, followed by a heavy ground attack from an UNSF. On 13 May, Chu Lai Combat Base received 5 122mm rockets. Later that day, C/2-1 Inf, vic AT 877244, received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. B/1-46 Inf, vic BT 231074, engaged an estimated NVA platoon resulting in 9 NVA KIA and 2 DMC. On 16 May, 2/5 ARVN vic AT 880283, received 25 82mm mortar rounds and 15 rounds of unknown type HR fire from an UNSF.

(4) On 17 May, A/4-31 Inf, vic AT 960250, received 20 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSF. 2/5 ARVN, vic AT 894276, received 18 82mm mortar rounds plus RPG, RR and SA fire from an UNSF. 4/6 ARVN engaged an UNSF vic AT 904268 resulting in 10 NVA KIA. Nearby, 2/5 ARVN, vic AT 902257, AT 904269, received an unknown number of 75mm RR, 82mm mortar and 60mm mortar rounds, followed by a ground attack from an UNSF. Fire was returned resulting in 8 NVA KIA. Attacks by fire characterized 18 May: Tam Ky (D), vic BT 3221, received 5 122mm rockets; 4/6 ARVN, vic AT 902268, received 20 82mm mortar rounds and LZ Center received 6 82mm mortar rounds. The following day, 19 May, also had several attacks by fire: Ho Chi Minh (D), vic 903267, received 30 82mm mortar rounds, 3 75mm RR rounds from an UNSF; CAP 1-1-7, vic BT 273254, received 10 60mm mortar rounds, 5 82mm mortar rounds and 2 RPG rounds; 2/5 ARVN, vic AT 902272, received 2-3 rounds of 120mm mortar fire; 3/6 ARVN, vic AT 904250, received 20 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSF. On 20 May, Thang Binh (D), vic BT 1741, received an estimated 20 rounds of 107mm rocket fire from an UNSF. LZ Siberia received 9 82mm mortar rounds, 8 of which contained a CS agent. C/1-1 Cav, vic AT 846262, received 15 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSF. A/4-1 Cav, with D/1-46 Inf, vic AT 942272, received an unknown amount of RPG, RR and SA fire from an UNSF; fire was returned resulting in 10 NVA KIA and 1 DMC. On 21 May, LZ Siberia received 15 82mm mortar rounds and 7 unknown type HR rounds from an UNSF. Chu Lai Combat Base received 8 122mm rocket rounds.
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(5) On 23 May, 2/6 ARVN, vic AT 903259, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 20 NVA KIA, 6 DEC, 1 CSW, and 6 VN detained. LZ Center received 10 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. 4/6 ARVN, vic AT 900260, engaged 10 NVA resulting in 10 NVA KIA. On 25 May, LZ West received 7 attacks by fire, totalling 22 60mm mortar rounds and 1 82mm mortar round. On 27 May, LZ West received 3 attacks by fire consisting of a total of 13 82mm mortar rounds. On 28 May, 5/4-31 Inf, vic AT 977227, received 13 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. Then Phuoc GID/UNSEF forces, vic BT 01107, found 20 VC KIA. On 31 May, LZ Siberia received 6 attacks by fire consisting of 52 82mm mortar rounds and 2 60mm mortar rounds.

(6) During the month of May, American forces accounted for 612 VC/NVA KIA. The enemy expended 600 60/82mm mortar rounds and 109 mixed 107/122mm rockets. The 1st MF Regt and the 3d NVA Regt, along with some of the support battalions of the 2d NVA Division, were deployed in the Hiep Duc area. With the exception of the element of the 409th MF Sapper Bn that attacked the Que Son (D) HQ, MF and LF battalions operated in their normal AO’s. During the reporting period, all LF companies operated in their normal AO’s.

(7) In the first week of June, there was a substantial increase in activity, with LZ’s Siberia and West being the focal point of activity. Both of these LZ’s received several attacks by fire each day. The second week of June evidenced a continued increase in enemy activity. While activity in the Hiep Duc area reached its highest level since the campaign began, the enemy conducted attacks by fire in the coastal plains of Thang Binh and Tam Ky (D). By the beginning of the third week of June, activity had almost ceased in the Hiep Duc area indicating the withdrawal of enemy forces. There were mortar and rocket attacks in the eastern portion of the province. The final week of June saw further reductions in the level of enemy activity. Indications were that enemy units had withdrawn to their base areas to regroup and resupply. There were no major attacks by fire or ground attacks during this week.

(8) On 1 June, 3/6 ARVN, vic AT 923247, found 10 VC KIA, 6 NVA KIA/S. On 3 June, 2/6 ARVN, vic AT 912268, received 5A, AW fire from an UNSEF; an A/S was processed resulting in 21 NVA KIA. On that same day, there were two significant attacks by fire: 4/5 ARVN, vic AT 897216, received 75 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF; Hawk Hill received 6 122mm rockets and 12 82mm mortar rounds. On 6 June, 3/4-31 Inf, vic AT 884215, received 30 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. On 7 June, elements of the 409th MF Sapper Bn conducted an attack against Thang Binh (D) PF’s, vic BT 125416. This attack resulted in 18 VC KIA, 3 VC CIA and miscellaneous military equipment CIA. Reports

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indicated that the attacks in the Hiep Duc area were diversionary; their intention being to draw friendly forces off the coastal p.s.c. so that the enemy could operate against the SVN pacification program.

(9) On 8 June, Thang Binh PFs, vic BT 175475, received 22 82mm mortar rounds and 21 60mm mortar rounds from an USNCF. The following day, vic BT 183347, Thang Binh PFs received 20 82mm mortar rounds, an unknown number of RPG rounds, and a ground attack from an USNCF resulting in 2 VC KIA. PF #5 vic BT 119334, received 20 82mm mortar rounds. Also on 9 June, Thang Binh PFs, vic BT 245376, received 75 82mm mortar rounds, and a ground attack from an USNCF. LZ Siberia received 32 82mm mortar rounds and 3 75mm BR rounds. On 10 June, there were 4 significant attacks by fire: LZ Siberia received 24 82mm mortar rounds; A/3/2-46 Inf vic AT 949244, received 30 82mm mortar rounds; B/1-46 Inf, vic AT 960854, received 35 82mm mortar rounds. On 11 June, 2/6 ARVN, vic AT 900260, received 100 unknown type BR rounds, 30 60mm mortar rounds and an unknown number 82mm mortar rounds from an USNCF. LZ Siberia received 69 82mm mortar rounds from an USNCF. LZ Was received 39 82mm mortar rounds, 15 of which contained a C/S agent. On 12 June, LZ Siberia received 25 60mm mortar rounds and 42 82mm mortar rounds in 5 separate attacks by fire. On the same day, B/1-46 Inf, vic AT 965246, received 75 82mm mortar rounds, 10 60mm mort. heavy H-79 fire, and RPG fire from an USNCF. Fire was returned resulting in 29 NVA KIA, 5 Wg and 1 CSSC. Also on 12 June C/3-46 Inf, received 42 82mm mortar rounds and 4/3 ARVN received 40 82mm mortar rounds, vic AT 992249 and AT 941359 respectively. 72st Avn engaged an estimated 40 NVA, vic 93520, in support of C/3-46 Inf; 71st Avn accounted for 10 NVA KIA in this action. 4/3-21 Inf, vic AT 913258, received 15 75mm BR rounds and 10 82mm mortar rounds from an USNCF. On 13 June, LZ Siberia received 25 82mm mortar rounds and 10 75mm BR rounds.

(10) The week of 15 - 22 June found the activity level in Quang Tin (P) substantially decreased. On 16 June, 3/5 ARVN, vic BT 200161, received an unknown amount of 82mm mortar fire, RPG rounds and 60mm fire from an USNCF. On 19 June, Ch: Le Combat Base received 3 122mm rockets. From this time until the end of June there were no major ground attacks or attacks by fire in Quang Tin (P). On 26 June, 2 UH-1H's were lost as a result of combined .50 cal fire and RPG fire vic AT 964044.

(11) During the month of June, American forces operating in Quang Tin (P) accounted for 1,577 VC/NVA KIA. The enemy expended 794 mixed mortar rounds and 1,122mm rockets during the month. During the first two weeks of June, the 1st Bt and the 3d NVA Bt remained in the Hiep Duc area, supported by subordinate battalions of the 2d NVA Division. These units withdrew to their base areas during the end of the second week of June. Local Force and Main Force battalions and all Local Force companies operated in their normal AO's throughout the month.
The low level of activity that began in the middle of June continued into and throughout the month of July. While the number of enemy-initiated incidents decreased, the number of friendly-initiated incidents increased. This was due mainly to friendly operations in the enemy's rear base areas around Kham Duc. Indications were that the Allied operation in this area caught the enemy off guard.

On 1 July, A/5-46 Inf, vic BT 218001, engaged an estimated VC platoon resulting in 5 VC KIA, 5 VN detained and 1 DMC. On 2 July, E/2-1 Inf, vic BT 170470, engaged an UNSEF in support of PA #88 resulting in 6 VC KIA and 1 DMC. B/4-46 Inf, in two separate attacks vic BT 228065 and BT 294062, received a total of 12-14 60mm mortar rounds and 30-50 Cl/630 H/3/63 from an UNSEF. On 4 July, Tan Ky FP's vic BT 24617, received 20 82mm mortar rounds and 8-9 RPG rounds from an UNSEF. On the same day, FF #85, vic BT 163479, engaged an estimated 40 VC resulting in 15 VC KIA and 3 DMC. On 5 July, FF #195, vic BT 260169, engaged an estimated 30 VC resulting in 12 VC KIA and 1 DMC.

On 12 July, 1/6 ARVN vic VC 988094, received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. D/2-1 Inf vic VC 014608, received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. C/3-21 Inf, vic BT 165170, received 12 82mm mortar rounds, 5 RPG rounds and 34 infantry from an UNSEF. Tan Ky FP's, vic BT 219169, received 75 60mm mortar rounds and a ground attack from an UNSEF, this contact resulted in 5 VC KIA. Tan Ky, vic BT 292268, received 2 122mm rockets.

On 15 July, C/5-46 Inf, vic BT 296136, received 10 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. On 16 July BF #178, vic BT 2930160, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 9 VC KIA, 4 DMC and 2 GSAC. D/5-46 Inf, vic BT 294013, found and destroyed 22 structures and 22 bunkers with 2 tunnels. A/3-21 Inf vic BT 100231, received 45 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. On 17 July, R/3-21 Inf, vic BT 096028, received 15 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. On 18 July, Tien Phuoc CIDG forces, vic BT 980117, engaged an estimated VC platoon resulting in 5 VC KIA and 2 DMC. On 19 July, D/2-1 Inf, vic ZB 029901, found an abandoned 18 bed dispensary with 5 structures and 2 bunkers. On 21 July, D/2-1 Inf, vic ZB 024901, received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an UNSEF.

On 24 July, HHC/2-1 Inf, vic BT 900956, engaged 60mm mortar rounds, 5 82mm mortar rounds, an unknown type H/3/63 round and an 82mm rocket from an UNSEF. On 25 July, 4/6 ARVN, vic ZB 069942, found 5 VC dead over 24 hours. C/3-21 Inf found a recently used base camp vic BT 132268 consisting of 8 structures, 6 bunkers and a tunnel complex. On 26 July, R/2 ARVN, vic VC 952056, found and destroyed 30 structures and found and evacuated 38 bicycles and miscellaneous ordnance. A/4-6 Inf, vic AS 900956, was pinned down by an estimated NVA company for several hours. On 27 July, 1/6 ARVN, vic ZE 024032, found and evacuated...
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12 122mm rockets, 82 RPG rounds and miscellaneous equipment. On 27 July
4/6 ARVN, vic YB 835986, received an unknown number of 60/82mm mortar
rounds from an UNSEF. On 30 July, activity in the Kham Duc area showed
a marked increase. 4/6 ARVN, vic YB 836986, received 15 82mm mortar
-rounds. B/2-1 Inf, vic ZC 007072, received 6 82mm mortar rounds. On
31 July, 3/6 ARVN, vic YC 890928, received 122mm rockets and 4/6 ARVN,
-vic YC 833022, received 40 60mm rounds from an UNSEF.

(1) During the month of July, Americal Forces accounted for 441
VC/NVA KIA. The enemy expended 283 60/82mm mortar rounds against
US installations and NDP’s along with 122mm rockets. During the
first part of the month, the Ist NF Regt and the 3rd NVA Regt completed
their movement into the western portion of Quang Tin (P). They have
remained out of contact probably to refit and resupply. Main Force
and Local Force battalions as well as LF companies have remained in
their normal AO’s throughout the month.

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) Enemy activity in Quang Ngai (P) while following basically
the same pattern as that in Quang Tin (P), never reached the height
or intensity that activity did in Quang Tin (P). Enemy activity
was somewhat delayed by Allied exploitation of the CO, 23d Sapper
Co, 21st NVA Regt, and the APO 70th Bn 21st NVA Regt. Their
information concerning original and alternate attack plans of the
21st Regt against Nghia Hanh (D) HQ were instrumental to the Allied
pre-emptive operations in this area. The light to moderate contact
which existed throughout the latter part of April continued into the
beginning of May, but with an increase in attacks by fire.

(2) On 4 May, C/5-46 Inf, via BS 556976, found and evacuated 42
122mm rockets. On the same day R & D/4-1 21 Inf, vic BS 64772, found
and evacuated 5000 lbs. of rice. 1/6 ARVN, vic BS 662934, found 19
VC killed by SAF, dead less than 24 hours. D/3-1 Inf, vic BS
599712, FSB 441, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA. A
company FO from the 2d Co, 406th LF Sapper Bn was captured on 7 May
and identified elements of the 406th Sapper Bn as having taken part
in the attack on FSB 441.

(3) On 8 May, CAP 1-3-2, via BS 554892, received 25 RPG rounds
50 unknown type mortar rounds, saturation fires. SAF fire and a ground
attack from an estimated 100 VC. In the resulting contact, CAP 1-3-2
accounted for 27 VC KIA. CAP 1-3-2 vic BS 669678 received 5 122mm
mortar rounds 18 82mm mortar rounds. 15 RPG rounds and a ground
attack from an UNSEF. Also on 8 May, MACV Tk #13, vic BS 759895,
received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds, 12 RPG rounds and 1 75mm BR fired
from an UNSEF. 2/6 ARVN, vic BS 726895, received 30 rounds of 60mm

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mortal fire from an UNSEF. B/1-82 Arty. at LZ Snoopy received 20-30 rounds of unknown type mortar fire from an UNSEF. 3rd Tr CIDG forces, vic BS 550355, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 VC KIA. On 12 May, A/4-21 Inf, vic BS 840296, found and evacuated 15,000 lbs of rice. 3/6 ARVN, vic BS 659919, received 20 rounds of same mortar fire from an UNSEF. On 13 May, PF's at OP #1, vic BS 575780, received 40 fire from an UNSEF. Fire was returned resulting in 13 VC KIA and 3 NVA Casualties. On the same day, vic BS 580650, 3/4 ARVN engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 VC KIA. B/1-22d Avn, in support of 3/4 ARVN, vic BS 595605, accounted for 20 NVA KIA. On 14 May, A/4-21 Inf, vic BS 8430, found and evacuated 28,000 lbs of rice. 3/4 ARVN, vic BS 997573, found 20 NVA KE Sa fire.

(5) Enemy activity for the week of 17-23 May decreased and consisted mainly of sporadic attacks by fire. On 18 May, A/4-21 Inf, vic BS 847318, found and evacuated 5,000 lbs of rice. 0/36 Engr, vic BS 7751, found and destroyed 20 bunkers. On 23 May, Lt. Thanh CIDG forces, vic BS 471665, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA.

(6) During the month of May, American forces accounted for 257 VC/NVA KIA. The enemy expended 212 60/82mm mortar rounds and a total of 5 122mm rockets. In the beginning of the month, the 21st Regt HQ and the 60th Bn moved from Base Area 128 to the northern portion of the Song Ve Valley to take part in the attacks in Nghia Hanh (D); the 70th Bn moved form the lower Song Ve while the 80th Bn moved to Nghia Hanh (D) from Minh Long (D). They maintained this deployment for approximately two weeks, after which the HQ and 60th Bn withdrew to the southern Song Ve Valley. The 403d NVA Sapper Bn remained in Base Area 124. The 107th NVA HVW Bn remained near Base Area 121 but with an element deployed with the 80th LF Bn, west of the Batangan Peninsula. The majority of the 406th LF Sapper Bn deployed in the Nui Da Ne area, with elements conducting operations as far east as FSB 411. The 38th LF Bn and the 120th LF Montagnard Bn, as well as all LF companies, operated in their normal AOs throughout the month.

(7) The month of June commenced with a sizeable increase in enemy initiated activity. The enemy utilized the dark phase of the moon to initiate several attacks throughout Quang Ngai (P) in the first few days. After this offensive period, enemy units withdrew and started a long period of reorganization and resupply. This logistical activity continued throughout the rest of the month and prevented any large scale offensive moves. This lack of enemy offensive activity indicated that the enemy logistical activity was hampered by Allied operations in major
The week ending 6 June was characterized by an increase in enemy activity. The first week of June was the focal point of the entire month for enemy initiated activity. The week started slowly with a few contacts and caches being found. On 2 June, B/1-52 Inf., vic BS 591836, received 4 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. On the same day, 2/4 ARVN, vic BS 594468, found and evacuated 40 82mm mortar rounds and 4/4 ARVN, vic BS 578208, engaged an estimated NVA squad resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 3 WIA and 2 CSMC. Also on 2 June, A/3-40 Inf. vic BS 749567, found and evacuated 20,000 lbs of rice. On 4 June, the enemy launched several attacks throughout the province. A/1-52 Inf at LZ Stinson received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. BF #275, vic BS 629335, received 12 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. Dan Quang Refugee Camp, vic BS 737128, and PF #721, received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and a ground attack from an estimated VC Co. B/3-1 Inf., FSB #1, received 10-12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. D/3-4 Inf., vic BS 234774, found and evacuated 6000 lbs of rice and 2000 lbs of potatoes. 174th AVM, in support of 1/4 ARVN, vic BS 635643, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 NVA KIA. B/6-11 Arty, in support of 2/4 ARVN, vic BS 630689, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 VC KIA. 5 June was the last day of numerous attacks. C/1-52 Inf vic BS 595337, received 80 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. LZ Stinson received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. 1/4 ARVN, vic BS 635644, received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF. C/3-18 Arty, vic BS 605497, in support of 2/4 ARVN engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 VC KIA. The week ended when Binh Son (D) and 3d CA CO HQ, vic BS 60990, received 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. 7 HPG rounds and Sa fire from an UNSEF. 174th AVM, vic BS 608588, engaged an UNSEF in support of 3/4 ARVN resulting in 15 NVA KIA.

During the week of 7-13 June there was a considerable decrease in enemy activity. On 8 June, C/1-52 Inf, vic BS 730535, received 15 82mm mortar rounds, 10 HPG rounds and Sa fire from an UNSEF. B/4 ARVN, vic BS 355612, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 VC KIA. On 11 June. In conjunction with this contact, a weapons and ammunition cache was found. Total items captured were: 4 102mm rockets, 100 B-40 and B-41 rounds, 120 82mm mortar rounds, 70 82mm rounds, 2 102mm rocket war heads, 20 AK-47's and 50 7.62mm magazines.

The following week of 14-20 June again showed a decrease in enemy activity. Although the total number of KIA's (47) was average for a typical week, they were obtained mainly through numerous small contacts. The only two significant incidents were on 16 June. C/1-52 Inf, vic BS 599832, received 14-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an UNSEF with N/C and 3/4 ARVN, vic BS 639534, found and evacuated 6000 lbs of rice.

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(11) From 21 June to the end of the month, several caches were found and there were two significant attacks by fire. On 21 June, B/4 AAN, vic BS 282645, found and evacuated 240 B40 rockets, 30 60mm mortar rounds and two cases of rocket batteries. A/2-6 Inf, vic BS 691839, on 20 and 21 June found and evacuated a total of 12,575 lbs of rice. The first attack by fire occurred on 23 June when BF #239, vic BS 725895, received 32 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEP. The second attack by fire came the following day when C/4-21 Inf, vic BS 885328, received 10 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEP with MCP. On 26 June, B/1-6 Inf, vic BS 684824, found and evacuated a cache which consisted of 15,000 lbs of rice. The last cache of the month was found on 28 June when C/1-20 Inf, vic BS 746439 found and evacuated 10,000 lbs of rice.

(12) During the month movement was minimal for most units operating in Quang Ngai (P) with the exception being the 21st NVA Regt. The beginning of the month found the 21st Regt deployed both in the Song Ve Valley area of southern Nghe Anh (D) and near the Nghe Anh Base Area in EA 128. In the first week of June the regiment made a radical change in disposition. All elements congregated in the southwest of Nghe Anh S/S for a planned attack of sizable proportions. The attacks were not carried out to their full extent and after the attacks the entire regiment again retired to their normal AO and engaged in logistical activities as previously stated. All other NVA and LF units stayed in close proximity to their base areas for refitting and training throughout the entire month. Any movement was usually for two reasons. Small elements were engaged in logistical activity or, the unit was moving to avoid contact with allied forces.

(13) American Forces accounted for 322 VPA/NVA KIA during June. The enemy expended a total of 364 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 3 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. There were 69 AA incidents during reporting period with only 2 aircraft lost. On 4 June a HH-1C from 174th Avn, vic BS 331783, received minor AA fire and called a fire with an unknown number of hits. The aircraft crashed and was not recoverable.

(14) The low level of activity that prevailed at the end of June carried over into the beginning of July. Enemy disposition was generally static with only minor moves to avoid Allied operations. The 21st NVA Regt HQ remained in Base area 128. The 1st and 2nd Bn deployed in southern Nghe Anh (D) and one bn deployed in northern Nghe Anh (D); the 1/3 TD deployed in the Song Ve Valley. The 103d NVA Seppar Bn was unlocated in the southern portion of the province. The 107th NVA Nha Trang Bn operated just east of EA 121. The other LP BN’s operated in their normal A0’s throughout the month as did all LF companies. Agent reports indicated an upswing in enemy activity was planned to coincide with the dark phase of the moon, however, the enemy failed to utilize
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this period to conduct any significant offensive activity. The majority of ground activity involved non-American forces.

(15) On 2 July, 4/4 ARVN, vic BS 472643, accounted for 5 VC KIA and 10 structures destroyed. On 4 July, PF #184, vic BS 754747 along with PF #126 received fire from an NSF. Fire was returned resulting in VC KIA and 1 DMC. On 5 July, PF #188, vic BS 883056, received 15 82mm mortar rounds from an NSF. 3/6 ARVN accounted for 6 NVA KIA and 1 DMC following an engagement of an NSF vic BS 882806. On 8 July, PF #3, vic BS 574272, received heavy SA fire and 7 RPG rounds from an estimated VC platoon. Fire was returned resulting in 5 VC KIA. OP #1 received 2 attacks by fire of 12 mortar rounds each, one on 6 July, the other on 10 July. Phuoc Phuc (II), vic BS 555773 at the base of OP #1 received 25 RPG rounds and SA fire from an NSF. A/3-1 Inf. found and evacuated a total of 8,800 lbs of rice vic BS 5077, BS 4977, BS 5075, BS 4975, and BS 4875.

(16) Activity for the third week of July remained at the same low level as the previous weeks. Most enemy activity consisted of small attacks by fire directed against RF/PF units. Most ground activity was friendly initiated. Reports were received that the enemy planned an increase in activity to coincide with the anniversary of the signing of the 1945 Geneva Accords on 20 July; however, this highpoint failed to materialize. On 12 July, PF #240 in Binh Kiem (V), vic BS 609952, received 30 60mm mortar rounds and heavy SA fire from an NSF. There were negative enemy casualties reported; sixty structures were destroyed. A/3-1 Inf, vic BS 525780, found and evacuated 10 tons of rice. On 14 July, Quang Ngai City received 2 140mm rockets; one impacted near the 2d ARVN Division Training area and the other hit near the 4th CAB Squad HQ. On 15 July, a Returnee led elements of 1/4 ARVN to a weapons cache, vic BS 506743, consisting of 90 TW's and 10 CSW's. The only significant incident on 20 July was friendly initiated. Forces from Ha Thang CIDG/USSF Camp assaulted 2 NVA platoons, defending a base area vic BS 3461. The attack resulted in 18 NVA KIA.

(17) A third reported period of high enemy activity occurred during the end of July as the dark phase of the moon approached. On 22 July, PF #108, vic BS 607626, received 10 60mm mortar rounds. On 24 July, PF #963, vic BS 733894, received 30 60/82mm mortar rounds from an NSF. On 26 July, PF #934, vic BS 507725, engaged an NSF resulting in 5 VC KIA and 3 DMC. On 28 July, PF #106, vic BS 743668, received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

(18) During the month, there were 205 VC/NVA KIA by American Forces. There were 31 60/82mm mortar rounds directed against US installations and NDP's. This amount of mortar fire is indicative of the level of activity for the month.
2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities

a. As of 31 July 1970, the Americal Division Duffle Bag project has a personnel strength of six (6) officers and sixty-seven (67) enlisted men. They operate the division sensor detachment, three brigade sensor management teams, eleven ground monitoring stations, and one organic low air monitoring station. A three man team provides technical assistance and maintenance of line sensors buried along the Chu Lai complex perimeter. A total of 241 radio-linked and 54 line sensors are being monitored in the AO. Preparations are under way to train all personnel in phase III equipment. This training is scheduled to start on 26 August 1970 for Americal and 2nd ARVN Division personnel. As pacified areas expand there has been a marked increase in the lack of political clearances for reactions to sensor activations. The division continues to react to sensor activations with small arms, artillery, air strikes, and combat assaults.

b. The G2 Air sections reconnaissance missions continue to obtain timely information of enemy location and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 572 Infrared missions, 132 SLAR missions, 81 APD missions, 361 missions, and 896 VR missions were flown. The IR and SLAR missions produced a total of 2,742 targets of these 1,136 were engaged by artillery fire.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities

a. Counterintelligence Section

(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion, or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a marked increase during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period this office conducted 50 investigations, as compared to 6 reported last quarter. Of this number 13 involved separate investigations of prostitutes, apprehended for unlawful entry into Chu Lai Base.

(3) This office provided the following CI services:

- Announced CI Inspections
- Unannounced CI Inspections
- Courtesy CI Inspections
- DMA Assists
- Miscellaneous Investigations
- PSI

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<th>Service</th>
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<tr>
<td>Announced CI Inspections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unannounced CI Inspections</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Courtesy CI Inspections</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Investigations</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) During the reporting period the CI Section Case Officers conducted 152 Source Meetings and turned in 542 Information Reports. During the previous quarter there were 155 Source Meetings and 476 Information Reports prepared.

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0 21.2 65.1 4.4 1.3 4.4 3.5 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)

(a) The emphasis was correctly placed on obtaining intelligence information, rather than obtaining ordnance, by MACV Directive 381-2; USARV Regulation 381-6, 8 May 1970; and Letter, HQ, Americal Division, AVIF-GB, subject: Volunteer Informant Program, 22 April 1970.

(b) The last quarter of FY 70, ending 30 June 1970, showed a marked increase in expenditures under the VIP.

(c) It appears that awards, not tailored to the social and economic conditions of the area, will only invite trouble by encouraging persons to set booby-traps to safeguard ordnance to be sold to US troops or to deal one or two items at a time from a cache of ammunition instead of telling the US troops where to find the whole cache. It is imperative that each purchase be bargained for in the amount of the award and for additional information.

(d) The constant change-over of VIP officers without clearing the account causes funds to be tied up and unavailable for full utilization. It is mandatory that each VIP officer clear his account before being transferred out of that position. The VIP functions more smoothly and efficiently when the VIP officer is assigned for a period of not less than six months or, preferably, longer.

(e) With each budget cut there is always considerable confusion. The best proven way to solve this problem is to advance the VIP officer an amount of 10,000$ and reimburse him on the basis of vouchers turned in. This reduces the risk of a large amount of money being lost and makes more money available to those who have a need.
b. Interrogation Section

(1) During the reporting period, the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1,121 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification compared to the previous period illustrates that the significant proportional changes in detainee levels are in the categories VC/PW, Civil Defendant and Innocent Civilians.

<table>
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<th>Feb 70 - Apr 70</th>
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<tr>
<td>NVA/PW</td>
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<td>Unclassified</td>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Fifty (50) man days were spent in support of tactical, cordon and search, screening operations and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field.

(3) Information from 109 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The breakdown by classification of detainees providing such information is as follows:

| Returnees | 19 |
| PW        | 18 |
| CD or IC  | 72 |

Tactical units reacted to such information as location of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemy base areas.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section

(1) During the reporting period, the Imagery Interpretation Section moved its operation to the Chu Lai West Airfield, co-locating with the direct support Mohawks aircraft. This move greatly facilitated the processing of photography and infra-red missions, resulting in more rapid response to unit
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AVDP-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGSCFOR-65 (R2) (U)

requests. The section also continued to update its trail studies throughout the Americal Division TAOR, making a major contribution to Order of Battle's Rice Study.

d. Order of Battle Section

(1) During the reporting period the importance of PWs/KTNs as a source of intelligence was impressed on the order of battle section. Timely PWs from the 1st NF Bde, 3d NVA Bde and 21st NVA Bde made it possible for this section to make accurate estimates of enemy intentions with regards to the two focal points of activity, HISP DUC and NGHIA HANH, for this period. The composition of the order of battle section was altered to better facilitate the handling of the Division's intelligence requirements. The majority of the section, along with an IW and II representative, established a Combined Intelligence Center at the DTOC for immediate response capability to the requirement of both G2 and G3. A Projects section remained at the Section's previous location. This section is co-located with G2 Plans and is tasked with the long-range intelligence requirement of the Division.

(2) During the month of July the OB Section was tasked through the G-2 by order of the Commanding General to work up a detailed study concerning rice production, rice transportation areas where VC/NVA obtain their rice. The sources used and the data obtained are as follows:

(a) Interrogation of Hoi Chanks, Detainees and Kit Carson Scout students

(b) CI interviews at 7 DIOCC's and 2 PIOCC's

(c) OB Data (Past 6 months) obtained from intsums, agent reports, 1 PW report, field information reports and ARVN summaries.

(d) II Data Base provided trail, waterways and infiltration routes, also cultivated areas used by the GVN and the enemy.

(e) Liaison visits with:

CICV Saigon
G-2, XXIV Corps
G-2, 2d ARVN Div

The information obtained was plotted on a series of overlays which when combined depicted priority areas for future operations in a rice denial program. The results of the study were then presented to the following:

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08 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPGB-65 (Ex) (U)

XXIV Corps OG and G-2, OG Americal Div. and general staff, all Bde and BN CO's, CO 1/1st Cav, and MACV advisor teams at Quang Ngai and Tam Ky Cities.

The rice denial program of the Americal Division was based on the completed study.

e. Kit Carson Scout Section

(1) With the appointment of a Division Scout and a pay raise retroactive to 1 May 70 the overall ECS program has been improving at an increasing rate.

(2) The continuing problem of draft deferments has caused many difficulties for the Americal ECS program. No single form can be found to present an acceptable certificate of valid draft deferment. Therefore, the Americal ECS program continues to carry the original draft deferment. The loss, destruction, and possible sale of these draft deferments continues to complicate the problems of GVN detention. The issuance of a MACV ID and draft deferment will simplify this problem.
D. Operations.

1. (C) Operations Summary:

   a. General: Americal Division Forces continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, with contact ranging from light to heavy in Operation Frederick Hill and light throughout the rest of the Americal Division's AO. The main area of enemy activity was in the Frederick Hill area of operations. Operation Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, and Iron Mountain continued throughout the period. In addition, Operations Pennsylvania Square and Elk Canyon were initiated. All operations were conducted in conjunction and close coordination with the 2d ARVN Division.

   b. Major Engagements: During the three month reporting period, Americal forces were involved in two major engagements with enemy forces. One was reactive in nature and took place in the Hiep Duc area of Operation Frederick Hill during May 1970. Americal and 2d ARVN Division forces combined to drive back a large scale enemy attack on the government's pacification program and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy forces. The second was pre-emptive in nature and was conducted in the Nghia Hanh area of Operation Iron Mountain from 11 May to 14 May 1970 to thwart a planned enemy attack on the Nghia Hanh resettlement center.

   c. Operations by AD:

      (1) Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period. Emphasis was on combat operations to increase the level of security of pacification operations near the coastal area and the destruction of Main Force and NVA units in the western portion of the combined TAOR. Contact was heavy at the beginning of May 1970, but action lessened towards the end of the month and remained light thereafter. The enemy opened an offensive in the Hiep Duc area with a ground attack against C/4-31st Inf, in the vicinity of AT933227, early on the morning of 1 May. The enemy lost 5 NVA KIA and one individual weapon at a cost of 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Throughout the rest of the day the enemy conducted attacks by fire against various American units. D/1-1st Cav suffered 5 US WIA(E) at BT253190, D/4-31st Inf had 14 US WIA(E) at AT910268, and A/3-21st Inf lost 19 US WIA(E) in the vicinity of AT896250. Americal Aviation struck back that evening as F/8th Cav killed 46 NVA from an unknown sized enemy force in the vicinity of AT91224. Gunships from the 71st Ava Co added 4 more NVA KIA in the same area. The action continued on 2 May, with an enemy attack on A/3-21st Inf and B/4-31st Inf at AT896250. A/3-21st Inf had 9 US WIA(E) and C/4-31st Inf lost 4 US WIA(E). D/1-1st Cav killed 5 NVA of a 15 man force at AT903245. D/4-31st Inf
received fire at AT912263 and lost 6 US WIA(E). 123d Avn engaged an unknown sized enemy force at AT912246 and killed 15 NVA. B/4-31 lost 7 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E) in a fire fight at AT892232. The next day 9/8 Cav found 5 NVA KIA at AT940228. B/1-1 Cav had 3 US WIA(E) in an engagement that cost the VC 6 KIA, 1 WIA and 2 WIA(C). D/1-1 Cav killed 14 NVA from a force of unknown size at AT922258. On 4 May B/1-46 Inf detonated an 81mm mortar round boobytrap resulting in 16 US WIA(E) at BT250107. On 6 May C/4-31 Inf, searching in the vicinity of AT852533, found 22 NVA KIA from previous fighting. The next day 12 Siberia received enemy mortar fire resulting in 2 US KIA and 12 US WIA(E) from C/3-82d Arty. On 8 May the artillery struck back as A/3-82 Arty caught an NVA Company in the open and killed 25 of the enemy before they could scatter. The enemy replied with a mortar attack on B/4-31 Inf in which there were 5 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(O). Two days later, F/17 Cav was attacked and a total of 15 RPG rounds in the vicinity of BT298329. Results of the engagement were 14 NVA KIA and 9 WIA with no friendly casualties. Later that afternoon the NVA launched a heavy mortar attack on A/4-31 Inf at AT885109. US losses were 5 WIA(E) and 5 WIA(M). The NVA lost 3 KIA in the abortive ground probe that followed. US artillery struck back on 11 May as A/3-81 engaged targets at BT275360 and BT295340 simultaneously, killing 16 VC at the first location and adding 9 more at the second. On 13 May B/1-46 Inf engaged 25 to 30 NVA at BT231074, killing 9 NVA and capturing 2 individual weapons without loss to themselves. On 14 May C/1-1 Cav suffered 5 US WIA(E) in a fire fight at AT922250. Enemy losses were unknown at the time, but the next day A Company found 6 NVA KIA at the same location. On 16 May F/17 Cav engaged 20 to 30 NVA in the vicinity of BT094362. Results were 8 NVA KIA, 5 detainees and 4 WIA, with no US casualties. On 17 May B/2-1 Inf killed 1 NVA in ambush at BT864212. Boobytraps continued to take their toll as A/3-21 Inf had 6 US WIA(E) on 18 May at BT095225. Action flared on 20 May as C/1-1 Cav killed 2 WIA(E) and captured 1 individual weapon at AT947262. US casualties were 5 WIA(E). That afternoon C/1-1 Cav and elements from D/1-46 Inf came under heavy enemy fire and sustained 4 US KIA and 12 US WIA(E) at AT942270. A/1-1 Cav with elements from D/1-46 Inf reacted, killing 10 NVA and capturing 1 individual weapon in the same area. There were no further US casualties. Two days later B/2-1 engaged 15 VC at BT281446 and killed 7 of the enemy and captured 2 individual weapons without friendly loss. Two days after that B/1-46 Inf found 15 enemy individual weapons at BT276107. On 25 May C/3-21 Inf had 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US KIA in an engagement at AT958229. Enemy losses were unknown. A short time later at BT033209 R/3-21 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force at AT95222, killing 8 NVA while suffering 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). In a 7 hour engagement at AT987278, D/1-46 lost 2 US KIA, 1 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(O). Enemy losses were again unknown. On 27 May D/3-21 Inf received mortar and heavy small arms fire at AT953228 and suffered 1 US
KIA, 4 US MIA and 7 US WIA(E). A/1-1 Cav lost 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA to small arms fire and RPG rounds at AT957273. On 28 May B/3-16 Arty pounded 2 VC companies in the vicinity of BT011216, killing 20 of the enemy. On 29 May B and D/3-21 Inf found the bodies of 5 US WIA at AT955230. At almost the same location, AT955229, C/3-21 Inf found a like number of NVA KIA. A/3-82 Arty killed 5 VC from a 15 to 20 man enemy force at BT135328. US fire power closed out the month's significant contacts on 30 May. C/3-82 Arty engaged an NVA platoon at AT900246 and killed 5 of the enemy, B/3-16 added 8 VC KIA at AT989850, and the 71st Avn Co killed 5 VC from a 20 to 30 man force at BT193230. On 1 June F/17 Cav detonated a 155mm round boobytrap with 2 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(N) at BT 255159. B/2-1 Inf lost 1 KIA and 8 WIA at BT198181 from another boobytrapped 155mm round. B/2-1 Inf caught a mixed NVA-VC force in an ambush that same night and killed 5 NVA and 2 VC at BT131227. The next evening C/3-16 Arty on LZ Siberia had 9 US VIA(E) and 3 US VIA(N) as the result of an enemy mortar attack. A short time later B/3-21 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force at AT976220 and killed 4 NVA. B/3-82 Arty fired in support of the infantrymen and killed 6 more NVA. Early in the morning of 4 June A/4-31 at AT963217 had 9 US VIA(E) in an enemy mortar and hand grenade attack. One enemy crew served weapon was captured. A/3-82 Arty engaged a suspected enemy location at BT141221 and killed 15 VC. B/3-21 Inf suffered 5 US VIA(E) in a fire fight at AT970230. On 5 June B/2-1 Inf eliminated a 6 man NVA patrol at BT104440 at a cost of 1 US VIA(E). One individual weapon was captured. On 6 June A/4-31 Inf was engaged by an unknown sized enemy force at AT963234. Results of the four hour conflict were 1 NVA KIA, 3 US MIA, and 5 US VIA(E). At the same time, D/4-31 Inf was engaged in a sharp fire fight at a short distance away at BT967749. Enemy losses were unknown; US losses were 1 KIA and 3 VIA(E). The next day B/3-21 Inf suffered 1 US KIA and 6 US VIA(E) in a day long battle in the vicinity of AT972222. Enemy losses were 6 NVA KIA. Riflemen from 1-46 Inf on an observation post engaged 10 NVA at BT256114. Results were 7 NWA KIA. A few minutes later they engaged and killed 1 VC at BT256117. C/3-82 Arty eliminated a 7 man VC detachment at AT896420. Later that day A/1-46 suffered 7 US VIA(E) at AT954240 in an engagement with an unknown sized enemy force. Enemy losses were unknown. On 8 June LZ West received recallies of a VC fire. US casualties from E/3-21 Inf were 5 VIA(E) and 3 VIA(N). Mortar crews from H/2-1 engaged 8 VC at BT175355, killing 7. B/1-46 Inf killed 6 NVA at AT953225 and captured 5 individual weapons. Friendly casualties were 5 US VIA(E). A/1-46 Inf engaged another enemy walk at AT911246. Casualties were 4 NWA KIA, 2 US KIA and 7 US VIA(E). B/3-16 Arty caught an enemy force at BT112126, resulting in 10 VC KIA. Artillery continued to pound the enemy the next day as A/3-82 Arty killed six VC at BT183347 and 5 more at BT 187347 in two early morning fire missions. B/3-82 Arty continued the action, adding 6 VC KIA at BT245770. An enemy attack on G/1-46 Inf at AT 958243 left 2 US KIA and 8 VIA(E). Enemy losses were 5 NWA KIA. The enemy attacked again that evening, this time mortaring C Company at AT 954245. US losses were 1 US KIA and 5 US VIA(E). Air Force aircraft added their fire power in an air strike at BT170304. The Forward Air Controller, Halix 02, counted 6 VC killed in the attack. On 11 June
A/3-21 Inf found 8 NVA KIA from a previous mission fired by B/3-82 Arty at AT972227. That night the enemy attacked at A/3-21 Inf with boobytraps and less rifles at AT987221. Results were 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). B/1-46 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force early on 12 June in the vicinity of AT965246. Results of this morning long contact, perhaps the most significant of the reporting period, were 1 US KIA, 15 US WIA(E), 33 NVA KIA, 5 IWC and 1 CSWC. C/1-46 Inf accounted for 4 more VC KIA at AT960252. The enemy retaliated that afternoon with 9 US WIA(E) in a mortar attack on C Company at AT959249. 14th Avn Bn gunnips flying in support killed 10 NVA from a 40 man enemy force in the same vicinity. A few hours later C/1-46 lost 5 more US WIA(E) in another mortar attack at AT955243. F/17 Cav engaged 0 or 7 VC at BT200204, killing 4 and detaining 2 others. An unknown type of boobytrap cost the cavalrymen 5 US WIA(E) later that day at BT253178. D/2-1 Inf engaged an enemy force at BT102238 and killed 6 VC without a loss. On 13 June C/3-21 Inf had 1 US KIA and 16 US WIA(E) in an attack by fire at AT980223. The next day C/3-82 Arty caught an enemy force at AT954253 and killed 6 NVA. On 16 June D/2-1 lost 5 US WIA(E) to a boobytrap at BT147227. C/3-82 Arty continued to punish the enemy, killing 5 NVA in an artillery preparation for 1/6 ARVN near AT951240. On 17 June C/1-1 Cav had 5 US WIA(E) from a large mine at BT236210. A similar incident cost A/1-1 Cav 5 US WIA(E) and A/2-1 Inf 1 US WIA(E) at BT210245. D/2-1 Inf was able to kill 5 VC of the 6 VC engaged at BT140048. On 19 June 3-1 Inf was moved by C-130 aircraft from Quang Ngai to Tam Ky and by CH-47 helicopters from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc to reinforce 196th Inf Bde elements. The next day C/3-1 Inf seized hill 482 (AT875175) for the establishment of a fire support base for B/1-14 Arty. The rest of the battalion made a combat assault into the vicinity of AT875125. On 23 June B/2-1 Inf killed 6 VC from an unknown sized enemy force they engaged at BT182488. Two days later B/3-1 Inf found a cache of 5 individual weapons at AT836130. The company received small arms fire while in the area and suffered 4 US WIA(E). On 26 June D/1-1 Cav inserted a zero rifle platoon at AT960171. One UH-1H helicopter received ground fire and crashed. Casualties were 22 US WIA(E) and 1 US KIA who was later recovered with minor injuries. In the same incident F/8 Cav lost 1 US WIA(E) and a UH-1H. The next day F/8 Cav engaged an unknown sized enemy force at BT168183 and killed 5 NVA. Action continued at a slower pace through the month of July. On 1 July B/3-1 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force at AT853089. The enemy escaped with only 1 NVA KIA but left 5 individual weapons behind. On 2 July 3-1 Inf returned to the 11th Bde and the Iron Mountain area of operation. On 6 July C/1-46 Inf engaged and killed 3 NVA at AT935889. 2 individual weapons were captured while 7 US soldiers suffered minor injuries. A short time later B/1-46 Inf killed 5 NVA and captured 3 individual weapons at AT942888. The next day B/1-46 Inf received 5 Ho Chi Mains in the vicinity of AT961998. More of the enemy surrendered two days later to C/4-31 Inf as seven Ho Chi Mains rallied with 2 individual weapons near AT970131 and six more rallied at AT991113. On 12 July C/3-21 Inf tripped 2 boobytrapped 82mm mortar rounds in the vicinity of BT102179. Total US losses in the twin incidents were 4 US KIA and 12 US WIA(E). Late the next night F/8 Cav nighthawk killed 6 VC in 2
engagements at ZC208150. On 14 July B/3-21 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force at BT138228, with 1 VC KIA, 4 NVA KIA, and 2 WIA. The next evening B/3-21 Inf received small arms fire and M-79 fire at BT142839, resulting in 8 US WIA(M). On 26 July A/1-46 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force in a day long contact at AT900958. US casualties were 4 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). The bodies of the missing were recovered the next day with their weapons. Enemy losses were unknown. The next day B/1-46 Inf found 6 individual weapons at AS924992. In an incident starting on 29 July in an area east of P53 Center, vicinity DT104294, gunships from the 116th Avn Co observed and engaged 0.50 NVA, resulting in 3 IVA KIA. A short time later, 3/3-82 Arty fired on the same area, resulting in 2 EVA VIA. Finally at about 1630 hours, 196th Idn Avn engaged the area, resulting in 4 EVA KIA. Total enemy losses for the operation were reported as 9 NVA KIA. Results for Operation Frederick Hill for the reporting period were:

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<th>FRIEND</th>
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</table>

(2) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period as the 198th Infantry Brigade and the 6th ARVN Regiment concentrated on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City or the Chu Lai base complex. Activity was light as American units searched the Rocket Pocket around Chu Lai, targeting against elements of the 78th Main Force Rocket Bn. Saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushes, preplanned air strikes, scheduled artillery fires, and sensor devices were used to inhibit enemy attempts to attack the populated areas. Early on 4 May the enemy launched a heavy attack by night as Chu Lai received 57 122mm rockets resulting in 15 US WIA(E). Prompt reaction by C/5-46 Inf, who conducted a first light CA to BS06976, resulted in the capture of 43 more rockets, in place and ready for firing. The next morning the enemy fired 24 additional 122mm rockets. US casualties were 1 KIA and 5 WIA(E). Two days later B/5-46 Inf detonated an anti-tank mine at BT443036, losing 1 KIA and 4 WIA(E). On 8 May LZ Stimson received 60mm and 81mm mortar fire. There were 7 US WIA(E) from C/1-52 Inf and 6 US WIA(E) from D/1-16 Arty. On 11 May H/17 Cev had 5 US WIA(E) when an M-551 Sheridan detonated a 250 lb bomb rigged as a boobytrap at BS564913. The next day A/5-46 Inf had 6 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M) from a boobytrapped artillery round at
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BT377067. On the evening of 13 May C/1-52 Inf suffered 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E) in an enemy mortar attack vicinity BS532898. On 17 May C/5-46 found a weapons cache of 6 individual weapons at BT354047. Four days later the same unit suffered 7 WIA(E) from a boobytrap at BT340074. On 24 May H/17 Cav was again the victim of a boobytrap, losing 5 WIA(E) at BS520889. Mines and boobytraps continued to plague the cavalrymen as they had 1 KIA and 4 WIA(E) on 26 May when they detonated a 750 lb. bomb at BS518687. Two days later they were the victim of an unknown type mine at BS516885, losing 1 KIA and 4 WIA(E). B/26 Engr Bn also had two men wounded and evacuated in this incident. In early June the enemy initiated several attacks by fire against Americal units. Early on 4 June A/1-52 Inf on LZ Stimson received 20 to 30 82mm mortar rounds, sustaining casualties of 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). The next morning the enemy fired 60 to 70 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire at BS599832, resulting in 3 US WIA(E). Two hours later the enemy added 20 to 25 more rounds, resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). One VC was also killed in this second attack. On 10 June an ambush from C/5-46 Inf suffered 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA(E) at BS515705. Enemy losses were unknown. Also on 10 June R/5-46 found a cache with 11 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon at BT351064. Three days later R/1-52 Inf suffered 5 US WIA(E) when they detonated an M-16 anti-personnel mine at BS537857. On 20 June R/1-52 Inf detonated a 155mm round boobytrap at BS487852. Results were 3 US KIA, 5 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The next day A/1-1 Cav engaged an unknown sized enemy force at BT206188, killing 4 NVA and capturing 3 individual weapons while suffering 2 US WIA(E). On 27 June P/17 Cav ambushed an unknown sized enemy force at BT237158, killing 6 NVA and capturing 3 individual weapons without friendly loss. On 7 July R/5-46 detonated an anti-personnel mine at BT297052, resulting in 5 US WIA(E). On 19 July H/17 Cav had 5 US WIA(E) when they detonated an unknown sized mine at BS512886. B/1-52 Inf caught an enemy force in an ambush that evening, killing 5 VC. On 29 July, R/1-52 detonated 2 Bouncing Betty mines tied together with trip wire at 1635 hours vicinity BS574846. This resulted in 6 US WIA(E). On 30 July, C/5-46 detonated a boobytrapped 155mm round while receiving resupply in a day defensive position vicinity BT254135, resulting in 4 US KIA, 16 US WIA(E), 1 KGS KIA, 1 VN interpreter KIA, 3 VN interpreters WIA(E). The results for Operation Geneva Park for the period were:

FRND

25 KIA
267 WIA(E)
39 WIA(M)

ENEMY

200 KIA
2 DET
1 FW/NVA
38 CIV DEF
60 IN CIV
88 IWC
4 CSWC

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(3) Operation Nantucket Beach was conducted on the Batangan Peninsula in the 198th Infantry Brigade TAOI by elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment and the 1-6 Infantry. Constant operations were conducted throughout the reporting period in support of the SVN pacification program. Contact remained light and scattered as numerous casualty-producing boobytraps and mines were reported. On 5 May B/17 Cav detonated a boobytrap at BS720820 and lost 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). On 11 May A/1-82 Arty pounded an enemy force at BS726780, killing 8 VC. On the morning of 28 May B/1-6 Inf entered a heavily mined area and detonated 4 mines or boobytraps before they could be extracted. Total losses were 2 US KIA and 30 US WIA(E). On 11 June A/1-6 Inf ambushed an unknown sized enemy force at BS728790, killing 6 VC with no friendly casualties. The next day C/1-6 Inf engaged 6 VC at BS716836, killing 5 of the enemy and capturing 4 individual weapons. On 26 June D/1-82 Arty engaged 40 VC at BS672995 and killed 5 of the enemy. Action remained sporadic for nearly a month until 21 July when B/1-6 Inf killed 2 VC at BS689855 while suffering 1 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(H). Total results for Operation Nantucket Beach for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 KIA</td>
<td>79 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 WIA(E)</td>
<td>1 WIA/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 KIA/VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 CIV Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43 UN CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 WMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CSW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting period, concentrating on security of major lines of communications and supply as well as combat operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations being conducted along the coast. Enemy activity continued to be light throughout the reporting period as the 11th Infantry Brigade continued its operations with the 4th ARVN Regiment. On 7 May 11th Bde Ava eliminated a 9 man NVA force at BS640560. Late that evening the enemy made a determined attack on FSB 411. The defending forces from D/3-1 killed 10 VC sappers and detonated 2 others while capturing 4 individual weapons and 2 crew served weapons. There were no US casualties. Following this action the enemy launched a mortar attack against FSB 411 early on 10 May. Total losses from D/3-1 Inf and D/6-11 Arty were 2 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(H). That evening 11th Bde Ava engaged and killed 5 VC at BS803485. On the next day B/4-3 Inf suffered 8 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E) when they detonated a large unknown type of boobytrap at BS782344. D/3-1 Inf sustained two attacks that day losing 5 WIA(E) to small arms fire at BS601625 and 1 KIA and 4 WIA(E) to enemy mortars at BS617642. Americal Aviation fire power supported 3/4 ARVN as 123 Ava Gunships killed 11 NVA at BS595005 on 13 May. 174th Ava Gunships killed 32 more NVA in a day long action in the same vicinity. C/3-18 Arty caught an unknown sized enemy force at BS51514 on 10 May.
killing 13 VC before they could escape. On 26 May at BS646572 3/4 ARVN found 4 NVA killed by gunships from a previous engagement. Credit was given to 174th Avn Co. In 8/8 engagement at last light that evening 174th Avn Co engaged and killed 4 more NVA at BS634584. Three days later B/1-20 Inf and 11th Bde Avn teamed up to kill 6 VC at BS813412. They also detained 1 individual and captured 1 individual weapon. There were no friendly casualties. On 4 June B/6-11 Arty killed 15 VC when they caught an unknown sized enemy force at BT241221. Gunships continued to punish the enemy as the 174th Avn Co killed 15 NVA in the vicinity of BS635643 while supporting ARVN ground troops on the afternoon of 4 June through the morning of 5 June. C/3-18 Arty accounted for 15 VC KIA at BS605497 on 5 June. 174th Avn Co struck again the next day killing 15 NVA at BS608588. On 6 June B/6-11 Arty wiped out a 5 man NVA patrol at BS745678. B/3-1 found a weapons cache at BS515705 two days later and captured 7 individual weapons. On 19 June A/4-3 Inf triggered 3 successful ambushes in the vicinity of BS740300 which resulted in 4 NVA KIA and 2 individual weapons captured. On 22 June B/4-21 Inf detonated an unknown type of boobytrap at BS852381. Results were 3 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Boobytraps continued to take their toll as D/4-21 Inf had 5 US WIA(E) at BS769313 on 26 June. On 2 July B/1-20 Inf suffered 6 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(H) when they detonated 3 boobytraps in quick succession in the vicinity of BS710569. On 6 July an E/1 Cav ACAV detonated an unknown type of mine at BS543774. US casualties were 1 KIA and 4 WIA(E). On 12 July D/1-20 Inf ambushed and killed 4 VC at BS746571, capturing 1 individual weapon. The next evening B/1-20 ambushed 5 or 6 VC at BS776379, killing 4 VC and capturing 2 individual weapons. On 17 July E/1 Cav detonated a 250 lb bomb at BS513787. There were 4 US KIA and 11 US WIA(E). The next day D/4-3 Inf ambushed an unknown sized enemy force at BS623522 with 3 NVA KIA and 3 individual weapons captured. On 22 July B/1-20 Inf suffered 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(H) in a night engagement at BS750630. Known enemy losses were 1 VC KIA and 1 individual weapon captured. The next day A-21 Inf Sn's Recon Platoon trapped and killed 5 VC at BS846314. 1 individual weapon was captured. Three days later B/3-1 Inf engaged and killed 3 VC at BS510751, capturing 3 individual weapons. On 31 July B/4-21 Inf, vicinity BS908321, detonated a boobytrap consisting of 2 hand grenades resulting in 5 US WIA(E). Later, A/3-1 Inf, vicinity BS447643, was hit by a command detonated 155mm round resulting in 5 US WIA(E). Results for Operation Iron Mountain during the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAN</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>WIA(E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>WIA(H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>245</td>
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<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5) Operation Pennsylvania Square commenced 291200 hours June 1970 as 1-1 Cav, with F/17 Cav attached, assumed responsibility for the open terrain in the northeastern portion of the American Division AO. That afternoon A/1-1 Cav engaged 8 VC at BT216246, killing 5 of the enemy and detaining one. Two individual and 1 crew served weapons were captured. On 2 July mortars from B/2-1 Inf, firing in support of FF platoon 135, eliminated a 6 man VC unit at BT170470. US reported 1 IVC. Later that morning an AC1V from F/17 Cav dropped a 250 lb bomb at BT220161. The vehicle was destroyed and there were 5 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). On 8 July the 71st Avn Co killed 3 VC at BT21071 shortly after first light. They returned to the area that afternoon and accounted for 9 more NVA. A/1-1 Cav captured 3 NVA wounded by 71st Avn at BT13322. 3 individual weapons were also captured. On 15 July B/1-1 Cav received 1 RPG round and small arms fire. The cavalrymen returned fire, killing 2 VC and capturing 1 individual weapon and 1 crew served weapon. US losses were 2 WIA(E). On 22 July A/1-1 Cav detonated a nitro satchel mine at BT209200 and suffered 5 US WIA(E). Results for Operation Pennsylvania Square during the reporting period were:

**FRID**  
8 KIA  
42 WIA(E)

**ENEMY**  
48 KIA  
1 DET  
1 FW/VC  
6 CIV DET  
11 IN CIV  
18 IWC  
2 CSWC

(6) Operation Elk Canyon was initiated at 121200 hours July 1970 with the mission of interdicting enemy lines of communication and supply lines to disrupt his logistics system. The initial phases of the operation began when the 6th ARVN Regiment and 2-1 Inf Rn seized the old Special Forces camp at Kham Duc as a logistics and fire support base. Contact has been light and scattered. On 18 July, B/2-1 Inf found 4 VC killed by gunships from 71st Avn Co. The infantrymen captured 2 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon. On 30 July A/2-1 Inf engaged an unknown sized enemy force at 28078998. The results of the contact were 4 VC KIA, 1 US KIA, and 1 US WIA(E). Total results for Operation Elk Canyon for the reporting period were:

**FRID**  
1 KIA  
29 WIA(E)  
3 WIA(N)

**ENEMY**  
29 KIA  
17 IWC  
6 CSWC

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2. (U) Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effect or were initiated during this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 1-70 and OPORD 3-70 superseded OPORD 3-69 and OPORD 5-69 respectively. OPORD 4-70 (Elk Canyon) was published on 9 July 1970.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley—Relief/Reinforcement of CIDG Camps), OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Emergency, Relocation and Evacuation), OPLAN 11-69 OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsal), OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction), OPLAN 14-69, OPLAN 1-70 (Security for High Ranking Officials), OPLAN 2-70, (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 7-70 (Golden Fleece), and OPLAN 20-70 remained in effect as published contingency plans. OPLAN 9-69 (Natural Disaster Relief) was superseded by OPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan) on 31 July 1970.

(3) Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to Operations FREDERICK HILL, GENEVA PARK, NANTUCKET BEACH, IRON MOUNTAIN and PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE have been published.

b. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUFP) continued, and reports were submitted to XXIV Corps as required.

3. (U) Organization

a. Effective 7 May 1970, the 3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery, previously attached to the Americal Division, was released from attachment and returned to the control of their parent unit, Battery G, 29th Artillery.

b. Effective 29 June 1970, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was relieved from attachment to the 196th Infantry Brigade and attached to the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry for Operation Pennsylvania Square.

4. (U) Training

a. The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of 03 who are assigned or attached to the division. During the reporting period, 67 courses were completed for 4945 personnel.

b. The Americal Combat Center completed 2 Combat Leadership Courses for 85 students and two Support Leadership Courses for 88 students.

c. 2 Unit Reconnaissance Courses were completed, graduating 82 personnel.

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The Division Sniper School graduated two classes totalling 43 students.

Training of Territorial Forces junior officers continued. The RF/FF Leadership and Orientation Course was modified on 10 June 1970 to incorporate 57 hours of artillery forward observer training. The modified course is now titled the RF Leadership and Forward Observer Course to reflect the changed emphasis of the course. During the reporting period, a total of 117 RF/FF junior officers completed the course.

The Americal Combat Center continued support of a Mine and Boobytrap Mobile Training Team that conducted classes on countering enemy mines and boobytraps for the remaining units of the division that had not received previous training.

The 16th Combat Aviation Group conducted CH-47 Sling Load classes during the month of July for 91 supply personnel.

Instructors from the Division Sniper School conducted marksmanship refresher training for elements of the 11th, 196th and 198th Infantry's and the division's aero rifle platoons. A total of 665 personnel received this training.

The Americal Support Command continued to conduct a monthly PII Clerks Course for all elements of the division. A total of 119 personnel attended this course.

Americal Division Artillery conducted 3 classes in Advanced Fire Direction Techniques for Division Artillery personnel.

5. (C) Close Air Support

During the period 1 May through 31 July 1970, the Americal Division employed 794 close air support (CAS) missions and 1057 Combat Sky Spot (CSS) missions for a total of 1,851 missions using 2,226 sorties. This is a slight increase from the 2,146 aircraft sorties flown the previous quarter.

1. CSS missions. Combat Sky Spots totaled 1,057 missions with 725 sorties during the reporting period as compared with 1,264 missions using 943 sorties in the previous quarter. The BEAV flew 16 missions using 13 sorties; The USSN flew 21 missions using 13 sorties; and the USMC flew 1,020 missions using 680 sorties in support of Americal Division.

2. CAS missions. A total of 794 close air support missions were flown using 1,051 sorties. This is a slight increase from the previous quarter in
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which 594 CAS missions using 1,023 sorties were flown. The increase can
be attributed to the increase of USAF, Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and
USN missions during the quarter. The USAF flew 185 missions using 361
sorties, an increase of 105 missions. VNAF flew 34 missions using 66
sorties in support of Americal Division, an increase of 22 missions. USMC
aircraft flew 552 missions using 1,020 sorties.

(3) Ordnance expended. Total ordnance expended by GAS and CSS missions
during the reporting period was 6,784 tons of bombs. This is an increase
of 1,234 tons over the last reporting period. 900 tons of napalm and 226
rockets were used, a decrease of two tons of napalm and 404 rockets. The
sharp decrease in rocket expenditures can be attributed to increased con-
trol on their use by IDASC.

b. Arclight strikes were placed on three target boxes using nine air-
craft sorties with a total of 243 tons of bombs dropped. These strikes
were employed against enemy base camps, staging areas and logistic com-
plexes to disrupt command and control, training and resupply activities.

c. Bomb damage assessments made by Forward Air Controllers (FAC's)
during the period related the following: 442 structures destroyed, 115
structures damaged, 155 secondary explosions, 233 secondary and sustained
fires, 131 fighting positions and spider holes destroyed, 50 tunnels
destroyed, 19 AA/AW and mortar positions destroyed, 2 caves collapsed and
64 enemy killed by air strikes (KEAS).
6. (C) Artillery

   a. On 27 May 3x155 howitzers of B Battery 3d Bn 16th Artillery were moved from TIN PHUOC to NEW HAU DUC (BT00062) in reaction to a buildup of enemy structures and forces in an area west-southwest of HAU DUC. Between 27 May and 3 June, a total of 1102 missions were fired, expending 3195 rounds, resulting in 28 KBA's, 7 PUBA's, 24 structures destroyed, one concrete building damaged, four bunkers destroyed, four bunkers damaged and four secondary explosions. On 3 June the operation ceased to be classified an artillery raid, however, the howitzers remained to support CIDG forces operating west and northwest of HAU DUC.

   b. During the period the 3d Battalion 82d Artillery remained in direct support of the 196th Infantry Brigade in the FREDERICK HILL and ELK CANYON areas of operation, rendering support initially from LZ HAWK HILL (BT226319). On 3 July the battalion fire direction center moved to LZ WEST (AT990250) for a more centralized location.

   (1) A/3-82 initially supported from HAWK HILL. On 14 June, three howitzers moved to LZ WEST to increase fire support available to elements of 196th Bde in contact from HAWK DUC east. On 26 June, these same howitzers moved from HAWK HILL to TAM KY (BT301183) to provide support for 1st Squadron 1st Cav in operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE.

   (2) B/3-82 remained at LZ CENTER (BT050250) providing support to 4th Bn 31st Inf. On 23 May, 3x105 howitzers were moved from LZ CENTER to LZ WEST (AT990250) to provide complete coverage to the area of operations of 4-31 Infantry. As contact in the area increased, on 14 June the battery was consolidated on LZ CENTER and support rendered on LZ WEST with howitzers from A Btry. On 18 June, three howitzers were moved to LZ PREP (AT007148) in support of operations by 2-1 and 3-1 Inf. At present the battery remains split with three howitzers on LZ CENTER and three on LZ PREP.

   (3) C/3-82 continued to support the 4th Bn 31st Inf from LZ SIBERIA (AT903232). On 23 June, one howitzer was moved to LZ PREP and temporarily attached to B Btry for additional support. On 25 July, two howitzers were moved to LZ MEAN (AT80128L) in support of elements of 4-31 Inf. At present the battery remains split with three howitzers at LZ SIBERIA, two at LZ MEAN and one at LZ PREP.

   (4) B/1-14 Arty remained attached to 3d Bn 82d Arty and initially provided support to 1st Bn 16th Inf from LZ PROFESSIONAL (BT173076). On 20 June the battery moved to HILL 482 (AT875175) in support of 3d Bn 1st Inf in operations south of HILL 482 and returned to PROFESSIONAL on 2 July at termination of operation. On 12 July the battery's four howitzers were moved to KHAI DUC (20000022) to support 2d Bn 1st Inf and elements of (ct)

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ARVN Batt, operating in extreme western portion of 196th AO. At present the battery remains at KHAM DUC.

c. The 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery remained in direct support of the 198th Inf Bde in the GENEVA PARK and NANTUCKET BEACH areas of operation. The battalion headquarters and operations center remained at LZ BAYONET (BS588003).

   (1) A/1-14 continued to provide support to 1st Bn, 6th Inf from split positions. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located on LZ BAYONET and four howitzers were located on LZ DOTIE (BS680853).

   (2) C/1-14 is located at LZ FAT CITY (BS1440077) and provides support for 5th Bn, 46th Inf. On 20 June, two howitzers were moved to LZ PROFESSIONAL to complete coverage of AO as elements of 3-82 Artillery moved west. These howitzers returned to FAT CITY on 2 July as 3-82 moved back to LZ PROFESSIONAL. On 25 June, one howitzer from FAT CITY and two howitzers of D/1-14 moved to KY TRA (BS136089) in support of elements of 5-46 Infantry operating west-southwest. On 3 July an additional howitzer was moved from FAT CITY to KY TRA to replace one of the howitzers of D/1-14 which moved back to LZ STINSON. On 20 July, the D Btry howitzer was returned to LZ STINSON, and replaced by another howitzer from FAT CITY. Presently the battery remains split with three howitzers at FAT CITY and three at KY TRA.

   (3) D/1-14 continued to provide support for 1st Bn, 52d Inf from LZ STINSON (BS539821). On 24 May, two howitzers were moved to TRA BONG (BS343883) to support road clearing operations and provide convoy cover. On 6 June, two additional howitzers were moved to TRA BONG to support operations of elements of 1-52 Inf south of TRA BONG. At end of operation on 14 June, all four howitzers returned to LZ STINSON. On 25 June, two howitzers were moved to KY TRA (BS136089) to aid C/1-14 in support of 5-46 Inf. On 3 July one of the howitzers was replaced by C Battery and returned to LZ STINSON and the last howitzer returned on 20 July. On 30 July, three howitzers were moved to CHIPPEWA (BS475967) in support of operations by elements of 1-52 Inf. At present the battery is split with three howitzers at LZ STINSON and three at CHIPPEWA.

d. The 6th Bn, 11th Arty continued direct support to the 11th Bde from LZ BRONCO (BS682396).

   (1) A/6-11 provided direct support to 4th Bn, 21st Inf from LZ DEBBIE (BS683939). Between 8 June and 20 June, two howitzers were moved to CHARLIE BROWN (BS928220) to support pacification operations in the vicinity. At present the battery is split with four howitzers at DEBBIE and two at CHARLIE BROWN.

   (2) B/6-11 remained at SAN JUAN HILL (BS634380) providing support to...
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4th Bn, 3d Inf. From 28 May to 3 June, two howitzers were moved to MINH LONG in support of operations to west, southwest. On 30 June, four howitzers were moved to LZ CADET (BS562244) in support of elements of 4-3 Inf operating south, southwest of MINH LONG. Weapons returned to SAN JUAN HILL on 6 July upon termination of operation. On 16 July, two howitzers were again moved to MINH LONG and supported operations until 27 July at which time the howitzers returned to SAN JUAN HILL.

(5) C/6-11 provided support to 1st Bn, 20th Inf from LZ BRONCO (BS812396). On 11 May, two howitzers returned to BRONCO from LZ DRAGON (BS375255). From 3 May to 6 June, two howitzers returned to LZ DRAGON in support of land clearing operations by 26th Engineers. These same howitzers moved to LZ SKOOPY (BS708610) on 8 June for a two-day operation by 1-20 Inf in a land clearing operation. On 21 June the howitzers again moved to LZ SKOOPY as land clearing operations moved north. At present the battery is split with four howitzers at LZ BRONCO and two at LZ SKOOPY.

(4) D/6-11 provided support to 3d Bn, 1st Inf from split locations with Hq and four howitzers at HILL 411 (BS539731) and two howitzers at NGHIA HANH (BS618642). On 13 May support on NGHIA HANH was increased by the movement of an additional howitzer from HILL 411. On 26 May the three howitzers at NGHIA HANH returned to HILL 411 as enemy activity in the area decreased. On 1 June, four howitzers were moved to BS625275 in support of elements of 3-1 Inf operating east, southeast of BA TO. Howitzers returned to HILL 411 on 4 June as operations ended. From 2 July to 16 July, two howitzers again emplaced at NGHIA HANH to support 3-1 Inf and increase fire power of forces protecting the city. At present the entire battery is located at HILL 411.

The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support reinforcing fires for the southern half of the AO, IRON MOUNTAIN, NANTUCKET BEACH and a portion of GENEVA PARK AO's. In addition, late in the reporting period, weapons were moved to provide reinforcing fires for ELK CANYON AO. The battalion headquarters and operations center is located at HURRICANE (BST515040).

(1) A/1-82 Artillery initially reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery from LZ DOTTIE (BS680383) with 4x155's and ARTILLERY HILL (BST515040) with two howitzers. On 12 July the two howitzers from ARTILLERY HILL and one from LZ DOTTIE were moved to KHAN DUC (ZC007082) reinforcing fires of B/1-14 Artillery.

(2) B/1-82 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 6-11th Artillery with 4x155 howitzers on LZ SKOOPY (BS708610) and 2x155 howitzers on LZ STINSON (BS539824).

(3) C/1-82 Artillery continues delivery of reinforcing fires to 6-11
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Artillery from LZ LIZ (BS757432) and LZ DEBBIE (BS869319).

(4) D/1-82 Artillery (8-inch) provided support to both 1-14 Artillery and 6-11th Artillery from LZ DOTTIE (BS630853) and LZ BRONCO (BS812396).

f. 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided general support reinforcing fires in GENEVA PARK and FREDERICK HILL AO's. In early June, C Btry was placed in direct support of 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry in PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO. The battalion headquarters and operations center is located at ARTILLERY HILL (BT515040).

(1) A/3-16 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery. Initially the battery headquarters and three howitzers were located at HAWK HILL (BT228311) and the remaining three howitzers on LZ WEST (AT990250). On 7 July, one howitzer was moved from HAWK HILL to TAM KY (BT301188) in conjunction with move by C Btry to support operation by 1-1 Cav. On 24 July this howitzer moved to FAT CITY (BT440077) continuing support of 1-1 Cav. At present the battery has two howitzers on HAWK HILL, three on WEST and one on FAT CITY.

(2) B/3-16 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery from TIEN PHUOC (BT102440). At start of operation period, two howitzers were located at NEW HAU DUC (BT070042). They returned to TIEN PHUOC on 15 May as the operation ended. On 27 May, three howitzers were moved back to NEW HAU DUC to conduct an artillery raid and support CIDG operations in area. On 4 June, one howitzer returned to TIEN PHUOC as fire support requirements were reduced. On 7 June the base was closed and all howitzers returned to TIEN PHUOC. On 24 June, three howitzers were again moved to NEW HAU DUC (BT050 046) reinforcing fires of B/3-82 Artillery. At present the battery is split with three howitzers each at TIEN PHUOC and NEW HAU DUC.

(3) C/3-16 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 1-14 Artillery from FAT CITY (BT440077). On 15 May, two howitzers returned to FAT CITY from NEW HAU DUC as operation, which started during last reporting period, ended. On 4 June, two howitzers moved to LZ SIBERIA (AT903232) to reinforce fires of C/3-82 and returned to FAT CITY as operation ended on 6 June. Again on 19 June, SIBERIA was again without 155 support as two howitzers moved to MARY ANN (BT 102440) to increase support at that location. On 7 July, one howitzer was moved from FAT CITY to TAM KY (BT301188) with one howitzer from A Btry for direct support of 1-1 Cav. On 24 July, one howitzer from TIEN PHUOC and one from TAM KY (BT301188) were moved to SIBERIA reinforcing fires of C/3-82. At present the battery headquarters and two howitzers are at FAT CITY, two at SIBERIA and two at MARY ANN.

g. 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general support fires for the Americal TAOI, from its headquarters and operation center located at ARTILLERY...
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HILL (BT515040).

(1) A/3-18 Artillery supported operations in the 198th Brigade AC from LZ CINDY (BS343882) during the period. It also provided direct support to Special Forces/CIDG operations conducted in and around TRA BONG and HA THANH.

(2) B/3-18 Artillery remained at TIEN PHUOC (BT102140) supporting operations in the 196th Brigade AO. It also provided support to Special Forces operations in the TIEN PHUOC, HAU DUC areas and responded to numerous sensor missions in the area.

(3) C/3-18 Artillery continued to support the 11th Brigade AO from LZ CRUNCH (BS534515) and provided support to Special Forces/CIDG operations in the GIA VIET, BA TO, and MINH LONG areas.

h. Ammunition expenditures by caliber for the period 1 May to 31 July 1970 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>312,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>130,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-in</td>
<td>24,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>12,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>480,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Countermortar Radar Detachment

(1) The 251st FA Detachment (CM Radar) remained located at OP 1 (BS 518778) where it covered LZ STINSON and FSB 411. The detachment also participated in registration for artillery units that were within range.

(2) The 252d FA Detachment (CM Radar) remained in operation at ARTILLERY HILL (BT51040) with primary sector of scan to the west into the northern rocket pocket. The radar assisted artillery units located in the area to fire precision registrations.

J. Ground Surveillance Radar Detachment.

(1) The organic AN/TTS-25 radar continued surveillance from OP 1 (BS 517778) with primary sector of scan to the west over the SONG TRA KHUE RIVER. On 30 July the radar was moved to CHIPPEWA (BS489967) where its sector of scan is to the south over the TRA BONG RIVER.

(2) The 271st FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP 3 (BS754421). Its primary sector of search was west covering the primary infiltration routes into districts of MD DUC and DUC PHO.

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k. Quad .50 Machineguns.

Battery G, 55th Artillery (NG) continues to be deployed throughout the Americal Division AO in support of ground defensive plans of fire bases. In addition the unit provides security on all road convoys.

1. Meteorological Stations.

(1) During the period the 3-18 Artillery meteorological section remained at ARTILLERY HILL (BS515042) where it provided metro data to the north and central coastal area of AO. It also provided weather data to the Air Force weather unit located at CHU LAI.

(2) The meteorological station of 3-16 Artillery remained at TIEN PHUOC (BS102140) providing metro data to the northwestern portion of the AO.

(3) The 2-11 Artillery meteorological station remained attached to the 6-11 Artillery and was located at DUC PHO (BS14382) where it provided metro data to the southern portion of the AO.

7. (U) Aviation - A separate OELL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 10 August 1970.

8. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 May to 31 July 1970, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities:

a. 546 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 20 EL58 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed in conjunction with APD missions to initiate enemy movement.

c. 71 APD missions were flown.

d. 8 FSB's were defoliated by ground spray of 1800 gallons of Agent WHITE and 1200 gallons of diesel.

e. 4 FSB's were defoliated by helicopter spray of 1000 gallons of Agent WHITE.

f. Approximately 2000 acres of enemy crops were destroyed by helicopter spray of 2200 gallons of Agent BLUE.

j. 268 drums of thickened fuel were dropped on suspected enemy positions and minefields.
9. (c) Engineer

9. (a) Activities for the quarter 1 May to 31 July 70 consisted of the divisional engineer effort being devoted to direct combat support of the division, while non-divisional units devoted primary effort to the construction of secondary LOC's and operational support construction. One change in engineer troop disposition occurred during the reporting period as MCB-7 was redeployed to the United States in June.

9. (b) LOC Program. During the reporting period as QL-1 neared completion the majority of engineer effort was shifted to construction of secondary and "Farm to Market" roads and to road opening operations to support tactical convoys.

(1) QL-1

9. (b) The 26th Engr Bn continued to provide tactical bridge support for restoration of QL-1 within the TAOI.

9. (b) The 39th Engr Bn provided expedient maintenance from the II Corps boundary (BS607120) to Binh Son (BS667420). The Battalion continued construction of concrete headwalls on QL-1 between Binh Son and Duc Pho and is currently providing haul support to MCB-10 for asphalt overpave operations south of Duc Pho.

9. (b) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Seven (MCB-7) performed expedient maintenance from Binh Son to Vic LZ BALDY (BT145460) and continued paving operations from Tu Ky (BT213368) to the Ba Rang Bridge (BT102510) until their redeployment in June.

9. (b) MCB-62 is currently conducting paving not completed by MCB-7. Completion is scheduled for 1 Sep 70.

9. (b) The 9th Engr Bn (USMC) initiated base course construction of the Tam Ky streets 25 Jun 70, in preparation for paving. On 19 July, the responsibility for this project was assumed by MCB-5.

9. (b) Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 301 (CBMU 301) continued to provide mineral products for engineer construction throughout the Americal TAOI.

(2) Secondary LOC's

9. (b) Due to the increased commitment of engineer effort on the secondary LOC's, 44 km of the total 256 km of road have been completed to prescribed standards. Another 103 km are under construction as of the end of this reporting period. Of this, 72 km are to be constructed to single lane all weather, 44 km to minimum all weather and 143 km to dry weather standards.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFDB—65 (R2) (U)

(b) The 39th Engr Bn continued to be the primary unit committed to upgrade of secondary LOC's, with significant contributions being made by the 26th Engr Bn, the 103d ARVN Engr Bn and the Ministry of Public Works, Quang Ngai Province.

c. Land Clearing.

(1) On 12 May 70 land clearing operations began in the eastern portion of Mu Duc District to deny cover and concealment to the enemy and enhance pacification and subsequent agricultural development of that area. This area of 1,668 acres was designated as the Division's first priority. It was later increased by 1,000 acres. Operations in this new area are nearly completed.

) The Division's second and third priority areas were established as the Batangan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province (5,100 acres) and the Pineapple Farm area in Quang Tin Province (6,430 acres).

(3) Clearing operations on the Batangan commenced on 15 June with the 39th Land Clearing Platoon. This element was replaced on 9 July by the 69th Land Clearing Company (45th Engr Co) a 45th Engr Gp unit. To date, 3,906 acres have been cleared. Additional requests for clearing by Quang Ngai Province have significantly increased the area to be cleared.

d. Airfield Rehabilitation.

(1) Tien Huoc. This airfield was completed to Type II, C-123 standards on 24 Jul 70. During rehabilitation the requirements for upgrade were expanded to include the establishment of a six point refuel facility.

(2) Minh Luong. On 15 Jul 70 repairs were initiated on this airfield to prevent closure. Recon is 12% complete as of the end of this reporting period.

e. Combat Support.

(1) FSB Construction. During this reporting period seven FSBs were opened and one FSB is currently in the process of being closed. Numerous FSBs were upgraded during this reporting period.

(2) Minesweep Activities. Transfer of minesweep responsibilities to Territorial Forces continued during this reporting period as follows:

(a) The 39th Engr Bn was relieved of minesweep responsibility for the section of QL-1 from Binh Son to Duc Pho by RF/PF units in that area.

(b) Minesweep training programs are being conducted in Duc Pho District in Quang Ngai Province and Thang Binh District in Quang Tin Province. The training is 'in' continued by the 26th Engr Bn in an attempt to expedite transfer of this responsibility.

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(c) Dry Weather Road Program:

1. The 26th Engr Bn has completed 14 km of road to date. A total of 20 km of road have been started but not completed due to higher priority commitments.

2. The following roads are currently under construction:
   a. Thanh An Road (BS697633 - BS740665) (70%)
   b. New Hau Duc Road (BT111139 - BT081072) (10%)

3. The following roads were suspended due to higher priority commitments:
   a. HL 531 (BT323219 - BT332750) and (BT33251 - BT359252)
   b. Nghia An Dong Road (BS619718 - BS621695)
   c. Dong My Road (BS695637 - BS723654)
   d. Route 527, QL-1 to LZ STINSON (BS635801 - BS536825)

4. The following roads were completed:
   a. QL-1 to Binh Yen Nol, north of LZ GATOR (BS729773 - BS589378)
   b. Hai Mon Road (BS806680 - BS832598)
   c. My Trang Road, south of Duc Pho (BS835333 - BS833391)
   d. An Phong Road (BS719594 - BS722594)

(d) FSB Construction:

1. During the reporting period seven FSBs were opened. Work consisted of clearing helipads and fields of fire, digging emplacements and clearing mines and boobytraps. The majority of the clearing was accomplished by the use of demolitions and organic airmobile dozers. The following FSBs were opened:
   a. NUI PHO TINH (BS648936)
   b. PLEASANTVILLE (BT51047) 9 Jun 70.
   c. MARY ANN (BS962598) 26 Jun 70.
   d. LZ CADET (BS832444) 5 Jul 70.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR-62 (R2) (U)

1. KALI (YC988C94) 12 Jul 70.
2. DAK ROSE (YB864989) 10 Jul 70.
3. MELON (AT905184) 25 Jul 70.
4. FSB PROFESSIONAL (BSI 776) is presently being closed.
5. Operation Elk Cany.

1. The battalion, supported by men and equipment from MCB-62, began operations to reopen Kham-Luc Airfield in support of the above operation. Support from MCB-62 consisted of the following airmobile equipment with operators: three dump trucks, two Case 450 dozers, one asphalt distributor, one vibratory roller, two front loader/backhoes, two graders and three hand tampers. Rehabilitation of the airfield and facilities consisted of clearing ordnance and debris, repair of craters using soil-cement stabilization, repair of the off-load area and the building of berms to protect fuel bladders. A "hook-out" pad was constructed adjacent to the off-load area.

2. In addition to airfield rehabilitation, combat engineer support was provided to the 2-1st Inf Rn.

3. One Case 450 dozer was made available to ARVN personnel for the establishment of LZ KALI and LZ DAK ROSE.

(f) Relocation. The battalion was relocated from the old MAG 12 area (BT530772) to Camp Shields (BT549059) formally occupied by MCB-7. B Company moved from FSB BAYONET to join HHC, D and E Companies in the new area. The move began on 20 Jul 70 and was completed on 29 Jul 70.

(g) The battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

1. HHC, B Co, D Co, E Co - Chu Lai.
2. A Co - FSB HAWK HILL.
3. C Co - FSB BRONCO.
4. 39th Engineer Battalion.
5. LOC Upgrade.
6. The primary efforts of the battalion were concentrated on the upgrade of LOC's. The majority of this effort was committed to LOC's
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AVN-HL

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

(3) Road Opening Operations. During this period HL 529 from Binh Son to Tra Bong was opened for four Division convoys and HL 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc was opened to support fifteen convoys.

f. Engineer operations in the Americal TAOI.

(1) 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat).

(a) Land Clearing:

1. No Due District, Phase I. On 14 May 70, the 26th Engineer Land Clearing Platoon initiated clearing operations v/c BS7653. This platoon was composed of six D7E tractors, two CEV and one M548 cargo carrier. The operation was completed on 6 Jul 70. The results were 1,668 acres cleared, 64 mines and boobytraps destroyed, 125 bunkers destroyed, 135 linear meters of tunnel and 67 fighting positions found and destroyed. In addition, 64 large caliber and 81 small caliber rounds were found. Casualties included twenty-four US WIA, four ARVN WIA, two US KIA and two ARVN KIA. There were three D7E tractors destroyed by mines.

2. No Due District, Phase II. On 16 Jul 70 the 26th Engr LCP joined with the 39th Engr LCP to form a Provisional Company to conduct clearing operations. This company consisted of eleven D7E tractors, one CEV and one M548 cargo carrier. To date 876 acres have been cleared, 17 mines and boobytraps, 101 bunkers and 78.5 linear meters of tunnels have been found and destroyed. Casualties to date include two US WIA and two ARVN WIA. One D7E tractor was damaged by a mine.

(b) Road Openings.

1. HL 529. During this reporting period the Battalion conducted four road opening operations from Binh Son to Tra Bong to support Division convoys. During these operations, 2821 of 36" CHF were installed, ten fores were constructed or upgraded and 2.5 km of road were upgraded. One Sheridan AR/AAV, one ACAV and one CEV detonated mines and were declared combat losses. Fifteen mines and boobytraps were found and destroyed. Casualties for the operation included...

2. HL 533. The battalion opened this road for Division convoys fifteen times during this reporting period. Results of these operations were thirty-seven mines and boobytraps found and destroyed, twelve culverts and thirteen impassable sections of the road repaired. Three 5 ton dump trucks one ACAV, one AVLB, one 25 ton trailer and one 5 ton cargo vehicle detonated mines on the road. All the above vehicles were combat losses. Eleven US WIA resulted from the operations.

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10 August 1970

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on the Batangan Peninsula, HL 521, HL 523, HL 524, HL 525 and the Tien Phuoc Road (HL 533).

2. A total of 117 kilometers were tasked to the Battalion; 30 kilometers were completed this reporting period and another 52 kilometers are currently under construction.

(b) Maintenance and Upgrade of QL-1.

1. A 480' steel stringer, concrete slab bridge across the Song Ve River was completed this reporting period. The bridge was officially accepted by GVN at ceremonies on 31 Jul 70.

2. A pothole repair project was completed south of Duc Pho on QL-1.

3. The battalion is currently providing haul support to MCB-10 for overpave operations on QL-1 between Duc Pho and LZ DEBBIE.

(c) Land Clearing Operations.

1. The 39th Engr Land Clearing Platoon (LCP), attached to the 9th Engr Bn (USMC) Provisional Company returned from the Barrier Island II Operation on 24 May 70. A total of 10,043 acres were cleared during this Operation.

2. On 15 May 70 the 39th Engr LCP commenced clearing operations in the original Batangan area. Prior to their replacement by the 59th LCC on 9 Jul 70, they cleared 971 acres, found and destroyed 131 bunkers, 230 linear meters of tunnel and 15 mines and boobytraps. Friendly casualties included one US KIA and seven US WIA. Enemy casualties included one KIA and two WIA.

3. Since 9 Jul 70 the 59th LCC has cleared 2,935 acres, found and destroyed 78 bunkers, 1,630 linear meters of tunnels and 40 mines and boobytraps. Casualties as of the end of this reporting period include one US KIA when a dozer overturned, nine US WIA and one RF WIA.

(d) Airfield and Helipad Rehabilitation.

1. The airfield at Tien Phuoc was upgraded to include reworking of the subgrade and the placement and anti-skid painting of new matting.

2. The airfield at Minh Long is currently being repaired to include partial replacement of the existing matting.

3. The 176th Aviation Helipad was rehabilitated. This included stabilization of the subgrade and placement of new matting.

(e) Vertical Construction.

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The battalion completed repairs for the hospital roof and began construction of a new mess hall for the 23d Med Bn at FSB BRONCO.

Support was provided the Americal Division with construction of gunpads at FSB FAT CITY, Tien Phuoc, Minh Long and Chu Lai.

(f) Minesweep Activities.

1. A/39th Engr Bn mineswept QL-1 from the Song Ve Bridge (BS696635) to Duc Pho (BS809378) until 1 Jul 70.

2. On 1 Jun 70, a training program was begun, with the 39th Engr Bn and RF/PF forces conducting joint operations.

2. On 1 Jul 70, minesweep responsibilities from Duc Pho to Mo Duc were assumed by territorial forces. On 27 Jul 70 minesweep responsibilities from Mo Duc to the Song Ve Bridge were assumed by territorial forces.

4. The 39th Engr Bn presently has no minesweep responsibilities on QL-1.

(g) The battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows.

1. HHC, A Co, C Co, 137 (LE), 522 (PB) - Chu Lai.

2. B Co - LZ DOTTIE.

3. D Co - Tam Ky.

4. 59th LOC - Batangan Peninsula.

(3) Mobile Construction Battalion Seven (MCB-7).

(a) Construction operations during this period consisted of:

1. Taxiway and runway shoulder repairs at Chu Lai West.

2. Repair of bridge at BT226347 damaged by enemy activity on 9 May 70.

3. Repair of the south abutment and decking on the bridge at BS593933 on QL-1.

4. Water well installation at FSB 411 and FSB LIZ.

5. Wiring of the MACV compound and PSB Detention Center in Quang Ngai City.


(b) On 25 Jun 70 the battalion completed phased redeployment to CONUS.
E. Logistics.

1. (U) General: The period 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1970 was highlighted by the support realignment, increased emphasis on tactical resupply by convoy and fixed-wing aircraft, continued reductions of excesses and an improved maintenance posture.

2. (U) Services Division: The missions of Facilities Engineering and High Voltage Power were assumed by contractors on 1 July 1970.

3. (U) Supply Division: a. Tactical resupply of forward units with increased emphasis on the use of roads and fixed-wing aircraft instead of rotary wing aircraft highlights the supply activity during the quarter. Additional truck assets have been requested and 500 gallon collapsible drums remain a critical item in the resupply of JP-4.

   b. The US Navy SEWMART terminated operations on 25 May 1970. The facility was reopened on 1 June 1970 as the Chu Lai Self-Service Supply Center (SSSC) operated by the 226th Supply and Service Company, 80th General Support Group, Da Nang Support Command. Initial support from the SSSC has been somewhat limited. The installment of initial stockage levels has been restricted and, to date, some items cited on the ASL are not available in the quantities required.

   c. The loss of NSAD, Chu Lai and Da Nang as a source of Class IV and as a back-up source for common use Class II has had a detrimental effect on supply support. This and the resultant overload in the Da Nang Depot has caused demand satisfaction to fall from 57 to 53 per cent and has increased the OST (Order Ship Time) for these items.

   d. A review of the ASL of the 23d Supply and Transportation Battalion was conducted to determine which items were no longer demand supported and to identify duplicate items or those for which suitable substitutes are available. These items and those transferred to the Self-Service Supply Center were dropped from the ASL which reduced the number of lines from 1738 to 1239.

   e. The reduction in number of lines on the ASL and continued efforts to identify excesses resulted in the retrograde of 524 line items valued at $1,155,308.00.

4. (U) Maintenance Division: a. As of 8 May 1970, the M16 Rifle Exchange Program was completed.

   b. The Americal Division CMMI Team conducted eight courtesy and ten recorded inspections during the quarter. Five units received a satisfactory rating on the second inspection. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 677 Roadside Spot Check Inspections during the quarter.
c. As of 31 July 1970, the installation of M13A1 Belly Armor Kits was 90% complete with 122 of 139 kits installed.
F. Civil Military Operations

1. (U) Organization

   a. Maj Juris Lapine assumed duties as Deputy G5 on 30 May 1970, and
      Maj Gordon W. Dahlquist assumed duties as PSTOP officer, Assistant G5,
      on 30 May 1970.

   b. The Friendship Councils established by the Americal Division G5, the
      196th and 198th Infantry Brigades for the districts they encompass
      continue to enhance the civil affairs/civic action programs and provide
      a focal point for discussion of problems involving relations between
      FMNAP, GVN agencies and the local populace. A Community Relations Coun-
      cil was established by the 11th Infantry Brigade on 23 July 1970, with
      the primary purpose of establishing Friendship Councils within the 11th
      Brigade area of operations.

2. (U) Operations

   a. On 12 May 1970, civil affairs/civic action responsibility for the
      villages surrounding the Chu Lai Installation Complex was realigned to
      adjust for the redeployment of certain units. The new civic action/civil
      affairs responsibility for villages surrounding Chu Lai is as follows:

      (1) Ly Tin District

         - Ky Khong (V) - 26th Eng Bn
         - Ky Sanh (V) - 5/66 Inf Bn
         - Ky Lien (V) - 5/66 Inf Bn
         - Ky Chanh (V) - MAC 13
         - Ky Ha (V) - DIVARTY and GEMU 301
         - Ky Hoa (V) - DIVARTY
         - Ky Iuan (V) - DISCOM
         - An Tan Protestant Orphanage - 16th CAG
         - Chu Lai Catholic Orphanage - Headquarters Commandant

      (2) Binh Son District

         - Binh Thang (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, EOS GSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Binh Nghia (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn
Binh Sa (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn
Binh Son Catholic Orphanage - 1st CAG

b. Rice Denial: The American Division continues to support the program to deny vital resources to the enemy. During the reporting period, 403,185 lbs of rice were captured.

c. Refugees: Refugees still represent an acute problem within the American Division TAOI; however significant progress is being made in resettling refugees as territorial security improves. During the reporting period, the 4th, 6th and 9th AA Platoons of the 29th Civil Affairs Company, in conjunction with MACORDS refugee advisors in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin, continued to work toward alleviating the refugee problem in the TAOI. The refugee population in the American Division TAOI numbers approximately 26,555, as of 20 June 1970.

d. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) material: This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to Quang Ngai and Quang Tin during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Medical Supplies</td>
<td>19 Pallets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Poles</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification

a. The American Division continues to support the GVN Pacification and Development Program throughout Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces.

b. Progress in the pacification program in the American TAOI during the reporting period:

(1) Security of population (as of 30 June 1970, A, B, and C status):
(a) Quang Tin                  406,354  84.1%
(b) Quang Ngai                 656,174  87.4%

(2) VCI neutralised (as of 25 July 1970):
(a) Quang Tin                  929
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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROG G-100-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Quang Ngai

(3) Peoples Self Defense Force (as of 31 July 1970):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>ORGANIZED</th>
<th>TRAINED</th>
<th>ARMED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Quang Tin</td>
<td>84,452</td>
<td>84,135</td>
<td>15,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Quang Ngai</td>
<td>102,782</td>
<td>85,592</td>
<td>14,414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The Americal Division is continuing its support of pacification and development through MEDCAF II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MEDCAPS</th>
<th>PERSONS TREATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>(1) 196th Bde</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>14,464</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) 198th Bde</td>
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<td>10,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 11th Bde</td>
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<td>14,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) DVIARY</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>6,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 26 Eng Ba</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(6) 1st GAG</td>
<td>747</td>
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<td>(7) MAG 13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 1-1 CAV</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. PSYOP Activities (May - July 70)

a. Leaflets dropped by aircraft by campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMPAIGN</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Ho (QR)</td>
<td>445,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Ho</td>
<td>6,625,000</td>
<td>9,412,000</td>
<td>18,612,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>1,255,000</td>
<td>2,979,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC/NVA (QR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>445,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC/NVA</td>
<td>2,996,000</td>
<td>5,295,000</td>
<td>5,584,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report—Leasome Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, SGS CSFOR-65 (E2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
<td>2,584,000</td>
<td>3,810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Denial</td>
<td>967,000</td>
<td>1,218,000</td>
<td>7,016,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Family Reunion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,602,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by the 9th SOS in support of the Americal Division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>426</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>1,362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Total newspapers distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>9,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Aerial Loudspeaker targets during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerial tape targets</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>1107</td>
<td>1331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial tape time</td>
<td>181:28</td>
<td>173:02</td>
<td>183:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early word targets</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early word time</td>
<td>14:32</td>
<td>22:26</td>
<td>12:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliborne targets</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliborne time</td>
<td>42:24</td>
<td>47:48</td>
<td>90:40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast hours</td>
<td>155:35</td>
<td>149:55</td>
<td>215:40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 August 1970

f. Waterborn Loudspeaker broadcast:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast time</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>2:30</td>
<td>6:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Movie missions conducted during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movie missions</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movies shown</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie hours</td>
<td>30:20</td>
<td>39:00</td>
<td>38:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>11,080</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>13,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Number of Hoi Chans in the Americal Division TAP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>292</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) a. Recent significant developments:

(1) During the reporting period the Americal Division PSYOP program has continued to expand and emphasise the identification and targeting of specific enemy units and individuals. G5 has closely integrated the PSYOP planning with the G2 section, thereby capitalizing on enemy vulnerabilities as they develop. Results of this timely exploitation are demonstrated by over 100 special leaflet requests having been originated by the Division. In addition, 1,716 special tape broadcasts have been directed against known enemy units or personalities.

(2) The Division has placed increased emphasis on organic helicopter support for PSYOP operations. This organic support provides nightly broadcasts and leaflet coverage over the entire Americal TAP. The night PSYOP missions have provided for timely exploitation of troops in contact, and immediate follow up on air and artillery strikes.

(3) Continued emphasis is being placed on Hoi Chanh exploitation. In coordination with the G2 a PSYOP questionnaire was developed for utilisation by the interrogation teams now established at the Quang Ngai and Quang Tin

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Provincial Chieu Hoi Center. The questionnaire is designed to detect enemy PSYOP vulnerabilities, identify Key Hoi Chanhs, and serve as an aid for evaluating the effectiveness of the Division’s PSYOP programs.

b. New PSYOP Campaigns: During the reporting period a special PSYOP Campaign "Operation Family Reunion" was initiated. This special psychological operations campaign is being conducted to persuade family members and friends of the VC to make personalized appeals encouraging the VC to return to their families and friends and live in peace. Every effort is being expended to have the true relative, friend or sweetheart record or write the propaganda appeal. Coordination is made with the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to obtain suggested messages and timing as well as appropriate persons of the correct age and sex for specific family member propaganda appeals. To date there have been 3,200,000 leaflets printed in support of this campaign. These leaflets represent seven specific appeals by appropriate family members. The Brigades have initiated eight special family reunion leaflets, and produced 121 personalized broadcast appeals. In addition the district chief of Binh Son district in coordination with the S5 of the 198th Inf Bde, has made plans to develop and employ three "family reunion teams." The teams consist of representatives from VIS, Chieu Hoi, the National Police, and US/ARVN PSYOP. The teams will be utilized in selected villages for the expressed purpose of obtaining propaganda appeals in support of this PSYOP campaign.

c. Enemy propaganda: There was no significant increase in enemy propaganda incidents reported during the last quarter. There were five enemy loudspeaker broadcasts, all in Vietnamese and directed primarily toward local PF units. One broadcast was coordinated with a mortar attack on TRA BINH DONG (H) (BS 391837) and was directed at the Civilian population. Of the enemy propaganda leaflets reported, two were directed against US Military personnel, and stressed opposition to the war at home as part of their propaganda appeals, and ten were directed at the Vietnamese people. A chronological listing of the reported enemy propaganda incidents is listed in paragraph 6.

6. (C) Enemy Propaganda Incidents.

a. On 142300 May 70, CAP 1-1-3, heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast (BT 336173). The broadcast was in Vietnamese and told the local PF's to join the VC or die, it also requested the night locations of the CAP teams in that area.

b. On 150430 May 70, CAP 1-1-3, captured enemy propaganda leaflets from a VC KIA. Leaflets were written in Vietnamese and directed toward the people. Text was do not support the allies.

c. On 20 May 70, Co C, 1-1 Cav, found enemy leaflets in the vicinity of AT 955275. Leaflets were written in Vietnamese and directed at the Vietnamese people. Texts were Anti-GVN.
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d. On 21 May 70, Co A, 2/1 Inf Bn, 196th Inf Bde, found enemy leaflets in the vicinity of BT 178178. The leaflets were written in English and directed toward US military personnel. The texts told the US soldiers to demand an end to the war.

e. On 29 May 70, Co C, 3/21 Inf, 196th Inf Bde, found two enemy leaflets in the vicinity of AT 956228. The leaflets were written in Vietnamese and directed at the local populace. The texts were Anti-Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF).

f. On 022225 Jun 70, 2/1 Inf Bn, at OP #83 heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast (BT 239226). Broadcast was in Vietnamese: theme was unknown as artillery was fired at speakers, terminating broadcast.

g. On 042015 Jun 70, PF #178 heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast (BT 209184). The broadcast was in Vietnamese and theme was Anti-GVN.

h. On 042015 Jun 70, Co C, 4-21 Inf Bn, 11th Inf Bde, heard loudspeaker broadcast of VC voices, one male and one female in vicinity of BS 884304. Text of appeal was Anti-GVN telling local populace to return to the VC.

i. On 051500 Jun 70, Co C, 196th Inf Bde, found an enemy leaflet written in English and directed toward the US Military personnel. The text was Anti-American and directed the soldier to join the fall offensive at home.

j. On 110600 July, MACV, Duc Pho found enemy leaflets in vicinity of BS 780437. Leaflet was written in Vietnamese. Leaflets were evacuated to CDEC before theme could be determined.

k. On 130830 July, CAP 1-4-1, with PF's heard enemy loudspeaker broadcast (BS 591837). Broadcast was used in coordination with a mortar attack. Broadcast was in Vietnamese and warned the populace to leave the village.

l. On 171500 July 70, Co C, 3-11 Inf Bn, 11th Bde, found several leaflets on a wounded VC nurse captured in action (BS 5671). All of the propaganda material was written in Vietnamese. The following is a description of the leaflet text:

   (1) Leaflet #1. "Don't join the PSDF, you will be a puppet of the GVN. If you join the PSDF you will soon be drafted by the GVN, because when the US leaves, the ARVN will need more men."

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(2) Leaflet #2. "All the people are against the Americans and the puppets".

(3) Leaflet #3. "Choose independence and freedom".

(4) Leaflet #4. "Remove all Americans from Vietnam".

(5) Leaflet #5. Same as #1.


(8) Leaflet #8. Ho Chi Min's "will".


(10) Leaflet #10. "Follow the example of Ho and defeat the Americans and the Puppets".

(11) Leaflet #11. Remember the famous Ho Chi Minh.

(12) Leaflet #12. VC rally propaganda aimed at ARVN and National Police.

"VC killed 38,000 enemy in May 1970". 
Destroyed 400 airplanes. 
Destroyed 700 vehicles.


m. 172045 July 70, 39th Eng Bn, with PF's found signs written in Vietnamese in vicinity of BS 648448. The text of the signs read "personnel found in this area will be beheaded."
II. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel. None.

B. Intelligence.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Division Combined Intelligence Center

   a. Observation: There is a historical problem area within the intelligence community in which the various agencies fragment into areas of special interest and work on information purely for the sake of intelligence. Much of it is not passed on to those who can exploit it.

   b. Evaluation: In June 1970, an intelligence center was established in the Americal Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC). Using the Order of Battle Section as a nucleus, one analyst for each of the two provinces in the Division area of operations (AO) were co-located with representatives from the Imagery Interpretation Section, Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section and the Sensor Detachment. Additionally, the Operations Section of the Division Ranger Company moved to the DTOC. This Combined Intelligence Center now provides:

      (1) The integration of all collection efforts against the same targets at the same time.

      (2) An immediate reaction by all or any of the agencies represented to requests from DTOC personnel, and subordinate units.

      (3) An awareness of the friendly and enemy situation by the different sections of the intelligence community.

      (4) A more timely dissemination of intelligence for exploitation.

      (5) The rapid consolidation and organization of information at one location.

   c. Recommendation: The integration of collection assets may prove useful at brigade level.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Americal Division G2 Intelligence Conference

   a. Observation: The assignment of untrained, inexperienced personnel to intelligence positions at battalion level has adversely affected the utilization of collection assets and the timely passing of information for exploitation.

   b. Evaluation: The Americal Division G2 conducted a one-day intelligence conference for brigade and battalion level S-2 personnel. Opened by
the Division Commander, the conference emphasized a complete description of the collection assets available in the Division Area of Operations and the proper requisition and utilization of those assets. The format included 30 to 50 minute presentations by the Assistant G2 Operations Officer, the Order of Battle Section Chief, the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section Chief, the Imagery Interpretation Section Chief, the Ranger Company Executive Officer, the Sensor Program OIC and a representative from a District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). The result was a lively exchange of ideas and information among those present.

c. **Recommendation:** Division Intelligence Conferences be conducted every six months in order to provide the same service to newly assigned S2 personnel.

3. *(U)* **SUBJECT:** Americal Division Intelligence Booklet

   a. **Observation:** Personnel at the battalion level need a ready reference which would consolidate the references normally consulted by the S2 during everyday operations in his specific Division Area of Operations.

   b. **Evaluation:** The Division G2 published an Intelligence Booklet which consolidated report formats, captured materials SOP, common reference data on weapons, phonetic pronunciations of common military terms in Vietnamese, Volunteer Informant Program price list, requisition procedures for intelligence assets at Division level and detainee classification criteria. Much of this reference data is printed on pocket-size pages for use in the field.

   c. **Recommendation:** The Division Intelligence Booklet be reviewed every quarter by the contributing agencies for update and inclusion of more pertinent information.

4. *(C)* **SUBJECT:** Americal Division G2 Support of Operation Elk Canyon

   a. **Observation:** In July 1970 the 196th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, provided the US Army portion of the combined Operation Elk Canyon. At the same time, the remainder of the Brigade continued their long-term Operation Frederick Hill. The collection assets normally supporting the Brigade would have been seriously dissipated supporting both operations.

   b. **Evaluation:** The Division G2 provided a G2 Task Force to Operation Elk Canyon consisting of the Assistant G2 Plans Officer in charge of four Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, a Sensor Monitoring Team with sensor strings, a Radio Research Unit, and representatives from the Order of Battle Section, the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section and the Imagery Interpretation Section with its scheduled daily reconnaissance flights. This arrangement reserved the normal Brigade assets for support of Operation Frederick Hill while providing Operation Elk Canyon with daily visual reconnaissance, both air
and ground, an immediate photo request source, the immediate exploitation of captured documents and prisoners, and a consolidated intelligence data base of the area from the Order of Battle maps. Additionally, sensors provided intelligence and economy of force efforts against the enemy.

c. **Recommendation:** A G2 Task Force may be useful in support of short-term operations which are distant from the current brigade intelligence effort.

5. **(U) SUBJECT:** Use of Old B52 Strike Areas as Base Areas

a. **Observation:** It has been observed by G2 aerial observers that VC/NVA have adopted the concept of building base camps close to, or in, old B52 strike areas.

b. **Evaluation:** These old B52 strike areas are often not programmed as visual reconnaissance targets resulting in the enemy establishing relatively secure bases in these areas.

c. **Recommendation:** Recommend that old B52 strike areas be visually reconnoitered and photographed for possible enemy base areas.

6. **(U) SUBJECT:** Montagnard Interpreter

a. **Observation:** On several occasions there has been a need for a Montagnard interpreter.

b. **Evaluation:** Lack of such an interpreter has made interrogation of Montagnard detainees difficult, often slowing down the ability of the interrogator to obtain information by one or two days.

c. **Recommendation:** A montagnard interpreter be assigned and made available to the Division IPW Section and subordinate MI teams.

7. **(U) SUBJECT:** E-38 Photo Lab

a. **Observation:** The Imagery Interpretation Section has experienced many problems with its ES-38 photo lab during the past quarter.

b. **Evaluation:** The problems have been caused by equipment failures, lack of repair parts and insufficient qualified technical representatives. At present there are only two civilian technical representatives in country qualified to work on the ES-38B, causing delays in repair work to this critical item of equipment. The ES-38B, when shipped to Vietnam, came with a small repair parts kit. No two kits are the same nor do they contain the necessary parts to repair an equipment failure larger than a blown fuse.

c. **Recommendation:** That more qualified repairmen be trained and sent to Vietnam with adequate parts to cope with the maintenance problems of the major components of the ES-38B.
SUBJECT: Unattended Ground Sensor Battery Changes (MAGID)

a. Observation: Monitoring teams have experienced difficulties in replacing MAGID batteries while on sensor maintenance missions.

b. Evaluation: The process of replacing batteries while on a sensor maintenance mission is time consuming. TNF personnel have found that it is easier and faster to replace sensor batteries in the rear area. While on missions the operators prefer to replace the entire MAGID pickup assembly. The use of this procedure enables a normal three-man team to replace an entire sensor string (four sensors) in 1 1/2 hours.

c. Recommendation: That MACV J3-04 authorize using units to requisition and store MAGID pickup assemblies to be used as floats for battery changes.

9. (C) SUBJECT: Sensor Location

a. Observation: Americal TNF has discovered an increase in the number of unattended ground sensors that are removed from the field by unknown persons.

b. Evaluation: The periodic maintenance conducted on the sensor strings permits the extension of their useful life. This extension permits the relocation of sensor strings throughout the entire AO in response to changing patterns of enemy movement. Since the arrival of phase ID equipment, primarily MINISID ID which is equipped with a self-destruct feature consisting of a piston actuator rather than pyrotechnic material, the number of lost sensors has increased considerably. Other are found in enemy base camps.

c. Recommendation: That authority be granted to using units to booby-trap and emplace dummy sensor strings for the purpose of discouraging tampering by unknown persons.

10. (C) SUBJECT: Instant Intelligence

a. Observation: Operations conducted outside the normal TAOR often fail to yield optimum productivity due to the lack of timely intelligence.

b. Evaluation: Because of the size of the TAOR/TAOI assigned to a maneuver battalion and the increased emphasis on operating from the temporary firebases, it becomes imperative that the commander and his staff be provided with more timely intelligence. One method of doing this is to schematically divide an assigned TAOR/TAOI into equal sections and assign a number or letter to each of the sections. As intelligence is received, it is plotted by use of a color code within its respective section and file card prepared which explains the incident/action. Several maps are used to indicate various types of information, i.e. separate maps reflecting (1) Mines and Booby-traps,
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(2) Caches found, (3) Unit contacts, (4) URI's etc. Color codes are
particularly effective to indicate the month in which an action occurred,
and numerical codes can be used for type of incident. Use of this system
greatly reduces the time required for obtaining the intelligence of a
given area and allows the Commander/S3 more flexibility in planning.
With the continuing change-over of personnel this system takes very little
time to learn and pass on to replacement personnel, insuring continuous
intelligence and planning within a unit.

c. Recommendation: That the system of instant intelligence be used
by all maneuver battalions in RVN.

C. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Stay-Behind Sniper Posts

a. Observation: Use of sniper teams in stay-behind sniper posts have
effectively denied VC/NVA freedom of movement along trail networks.

b. Evaluation: A sniper team consisting of five personnel was inserted
into A Company 1/46th Inf during a normal resupply. The sniper team leader
was briefed concerning the terrain and tentative locations of sniper posts.
Early the next morning the entire company was redeployed from the area leave-
ing the sniper team in a well-concealed sniper post covering a large valley.
Approximately 30 - 40 minutes later, a squad-sized VC force began movement
through the valley. The sniper team held their fire until the enemy force
was 75 - 100 meters away. The well-distributed M14 and M16 fire resulted in
5 VC KIA and 3 VC WIA. Another recent similar action paid off with two NVA KIA.

c. Recommendation: The above technique indicates that the enemy soldiers
are creatures of habit and are vulnerable to ambush tactics. This stay-behind

technique is advocated; however, sole reliance on this technique is not
recommended.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Night Movement

a. Observation: NVA forces have demonstrated the capability of launching
coordinated attacks against US elements as they depart or are preparing for
movement from night defensive positions.

b. Evaluation: Enemy forces can be kept off balance by movement at night.
Prior to dawn on 12 June 1970, Company B, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry assaulted
a well-entrenched, company size, NVA force. By use of fire and maneuver, and
night assault techniques, Company B was able to overrun the enemy position,
killig 23 NVA and destroying 14 bunkers while loosing one man KIA. The unit's
proficiency in night operations enabled the company to close within 100 meters
of the enemy positions before the NVA company was aware of their presence.
This action clearly demonstrated that US forces can effectively operate against enemy forces at night with marked success.

c. **Recommendation:** Units should be required to move at night until they can gain confidence and become proficient in night-fighting techniques. Effective night operations can deny the enemy the capability of resupplying his forces, disrupt the massing of his forces to attack friendly elements, and inflict unacceptable casualties on him.

3. (C) **SUBJECT:** Effective Small Arms Fire

a. **Observation:** Some personnel have considerable difficulty in effectively engaging the enemy at small arms range. The main problem is the inability of riflemen and machinegunners to identify the beaten zone of their rounds.

b. **Evaluation:** The inability of riflemen and machinegunners to place effective fire on targets is partially attributed to a lack of observation of rounds striking the target area. Additionally, an excessive amount of ball ammunition is used to neutralize enemy targets. This deficiency can be overcome by loading the first three to five rounds in the magazine with tracers, then interspersing tracer/ball ammunition on a 1:5 ratio. Through the use of more tracer ammunition riflemen will be more able to adjust on target. Additionally, armed helicopters can more readily observe the location of friendly elements thereby affording more responsive suppressive fire.

c. **Recommendation:** That units stress use of tracer ammunition in training personnel on effective techniques of fire. Units should encourage use of tracer ammunition day and night in order to place rapid and effective fire on enemy targets.

4. (C) **SUBJECT:** Mechanical Ambush Techniques

a. **Observation:** The enemy has developed counter-mechanical ambush techniques.

b. **Evaluation:** The basic technique used by small sized enemy units is to follow and observe US units, especially when elements set up night defensive positions. Upon securing the NDP, mechanical ambushes are placed on likely avenues of approach or on trail networks near the NDP. The enemy observes small groups of US personnel placing these devices and sets up an ambush when the squad returns to retrieve the claymores.

c. **Recommendation:** All US units must vary their techniques for emplacing mechanical ambushes. Company commanders must insure that members of the mechanical ambush patrol are well-briefed concerning use of stealth and...
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security. Security should be well-established in the immediate area to
protect individuals emplacing or retrieving mechanical ambushes. Another
technique recommended is to instruct squads to emplace mechanical ambushes
enroute to the NDP, thereby precluding unnecessary movement out of the
established NDP. If mechanical ambushes are put out after a unit occupies
an NDP, these devices should be emplaced just prior to EENT.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Employment of Mechanical Ambushes

a. Observation: The failure to follow the proper safety measures in
emplacing the mechanical ambush has caused unnecessary casualties to the
individual soldier.

b. Evaluation: The emplacement of a mechanical ambush should be well-
thought out in advance. It appears that the employment team is well-briefed
and trained in the employment procedures, however, many do not follow them.

c. Recommendation: The mechanical ambush team which consists of four
men (two emplacers, two security) must be alert to the possibility that some
unknown force (static electricity, wind, etc.) might detonate the mechanical
ambush before the team has left the ambush site. Once the emplacement team
has hooked the claymore with det-cord and trip wire to the clothes pin, they
must move to the rear of the trip wire, followed by the security team, to
the location of the battery. All members should then be directly to the
rear of the man making the final connection of the battery to the claymore
wire. The team should be lying down behind some form of cover should the
back-blast be in their direction. By following these simple safety measures
the possibility of an uncalled for injury is greatly minimized.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Police of Lagers

a. Observation: The VC continually search US unit day/night lager
sites and resupply landing zones for items of military value and for food.
In the 3-21 Infantry’s area of operations, this “police call” is usually
conducted within three hours of the friendly unit’s departure.

b. Evaluation: This check of day/night lager sites and resupply
landing zones can be made very costly for the VC through the use of well-
camouflaged, stay-behind mechanical ambushes. The concept of employment is
as follows:

(1) The two or three best routes into the lager site or landing zone
are selected to be covered by mechanical ambushes. The squad which has been
designated as the last element in the unit’s order of march emplaces the
ambushes.
(2) The mechanical ambush is carefully camouflaged at the edge of the laager site or landing zone. Normal activity in the site will conceal the emplacement. Note that the claymore wires are not to be connected to the battery until the main body has departed the area and everyone is a safe distance away. Normal safety precautions must be observed in setting up these ambushes.

(3) After the last squad surreptitiously completes the mechanical ambush connections, it departs the area in the same direction as the main body and travels approximately 300 meters (the distance depends on the terrain and vegetation). The squad halts and becomes a stay-behind ambush. Snipers can also be employed as a supplement to the stay-behind mechanical ambushes. The use of snipers is dependent upon the terrain and vegetation. The last squad can provide security for the sniper team.

(4) If a mechanical ambush is detonated the squad initially fires its grenade launchers into the area to prevent anything from being carried away. The squad then maneuvers to the laager site or landing zone, deactivates the remaining mechanical ambushes, checks the impact area and rejoins the main body.

C. Recommendation: That company/troop commanders be informed of the success which can be achieved by the emplacement of stay-behind mechanical ambushes at day/night laager sites and resupply landing zones.

7. (C) SUBJECT: Exploitation of Contact Areas

a. Observation: An OH-6 aircraft from the Brigade Aviation section, while flying a visual reconnaissance mission, was completely destroyed when the aircraft landed to retrieve what appeared to be a bag of enemy documents.

b. Evaluation: The LOH has sighted and engaged three enemy soldiers, killing two and wounding one. The aircraft landed and a crew member captured the casualty, retrieved two bags of documents and weapons. The aircraft returned to the Fire Support Base, released the prisoner to medical personnel, turned in the weapons and documents to the S2, refueled and proceeded back to the same area. The pilot saw what appeared to be a third bag of documents exposed. He landed and a crew member retrieved the bag and was putting them in the LOH when an explosion occurred, engulfing the aircraft in flames. One crew member was killed and one required medical evacuation from shrapnel wounds and burns received. It was not determined if the bag was booby-trapped, or if the crew member or prop wash triggered a booby-trap in close proximity to the LOH. However, a sufficient amount of time had elapsed from the initial engagement and the return trip for the enemy to have baited a trap in the form of a booby-trapped bag.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFLICTUAL AVDF-MU

10 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, AES CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)


8. (C) SUBJECT: Infiltration of Maneuver Elements in Coastal Plains

a. Observation: When operating in the coastal plains the problem arises of how to successfully infiltrate a unit into a known enemy area without being detected or compromised by the enemy or civilian populace.

b. Evaluation: (1) Infiltration by Amphibious Assault. This technique has been employed when targeting against enemy units operating in close proximity to the South China Sea. Previous experience has shown that airmobile assault and overland movement techniques many times failed to achieve the desired surprise necessary to gain contact with the enemy. As a result, the technique of night amphibious assault was initiated. The technique involves prepositioning the maneuver element at the Vietnamese Naval Junk Base located east of Quang Ngai City. From that point the element loads on "junk" and moves to a pre-selected beach site during the hours of darkness. Upon reaching the beach site, the element rapidly off-loads and moves by stealth to predetermined ambush sites. Coordination required for such an operation can be effected directly with the US Naval Advisory Team serving with the Vietnamese Junk Patrol and normally requires two to three days notification prior to the operational date desired.

(2) Infiltration by Vehicle. This technique has also been successfully employed by elements within this unit. Trucks were used, under the guise of daily logistical traffic from battalion rear to forward firebases, to move a maneuver element to a pre-determined ambush position. Ambushes have been sprung successfully in areas where movement by foot or helicopters during daylight hours proved unsuccessful.

c. Recommendation: The infiltration techniques discussed herein have proven to be successful and have achieved desired surprise on the enemy. It is recommended that these techniques be disseminated to other units.

9. (C) SUBJECT: Use of Air Cavalry in Conjunction with Ground Cavalry Operations

a. Observation: Movement of ground Cavalry through an area is very expensive in terms of crop damage and wear and tear on equipment. Repeated and prolonged movement results in an increase in the laying of mines by enemy forces.

b. Evaluation: Air Cavalry, with its ability to cover large amounts of terrain in a rather short period of time, and Armored Cavalry, with its
ability to rapidly maneuver and provide a large amount of sustained fire power, represent a combination that can find and destroy enemy forces with a relatively low cost in friendly personnel and equipment losses.

c. Recommendation: That whenever possible, armored and Air Cavalry forces operate together, making maximum use of the unique capabilities of each, to find and destroy the enemy. This technique should result in a lessening of the loss of personnel and vehicles to mine damage, also it should reduce the amount of time ground cavalry spends in looking for the small enemy groupings that are generally being encountered at the present time.

10. (C) SUBJECT: Equipment and Personnel Losses from Mines Planted in a Well-used Stream Crossing Point

a. Observation: Stream crossings at a well-used crossing point are extremely dangerous because the enemy will invariably plant mines at these points. Mines often are planted in pairs, one in the crossing itself and one in the approach usually within 100 meters of the crossing site.

b. Evaluation: The use of a new crossing site each time a stream crossing is made should lessen the chance of a vehicle hitting a mine. Even though a new crossing site is used it should still be blown with 40 lb. shaped charge and detonating cord.

c. Recommendation: A new site be selected for each stream crossing and the site be blown using 40 lb. shaped charge to cave in the banks and detonating cord for the approach.

11. (C) SUBJECT: Flame Fuel Dropping Rack

a. Observation: A method was desired in which flame could be employed over a large area by helicopter.

b. Evaluation: The Division Chemical Section was given the requirement to provide large area flame coverage. The first attempt was made using large cargo nets. The CH-47 helicopter pilots objected to this method for the following reasons: (1) when the load is released, the net trails badly back and strikes the aircraft causing skin damage to the aircraft; and (2) if the net is too long, there is a danger that the net might strike the blades. One drop was made by loading 55 gallon drums internally and rolling them out the rear of the aircraft. Objections to this method were: (1) damage to the aircraft by drums striking hydraulic lines; (2) the aircraft had to come to a hover over the target area; and (3) the load could not be jet-ignited in case of engine failure.
The idea of an externally slung rack was developed by the Division Chemical Section. The concept was explained to the Division Engineer Section, who did the stress analysis and engineer designing of the rack. The rack was constructed by the Navy Seabees. The flame rack is a steel frame constructed of angle iron, measuring 14 feet by 7 feet by 3 feet. Loaded to its capacity of 14 drums of thickened fuel, the rack weighs 7000 pounds, and empty it weighs 1200 pounds. It has a spring loaded gate that is controlled by a lanyard running up inside the aircraft through the hook hole. The area coverage pattern from 1500ft AZ is approximately 150m x 50m. The rack is used solely for flame drops, and when not in use it is kept loaded and ready for immediate employment.

c. Recommendation: That the 2nd Engineer Battalion construct two additional flame racks so that each brigade will have a safe, efficient, and rapidly employable flame capability.

D. Organization. None.

E. Training.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Noise and Light Discipline

a. Observation: The American Soldier tends to forget about the importance of controlled noise and light discipline.

b. Evaluation: Continuous training of all personnel is needed to insure that patrol movements and night defensive positions are disciplined from the man's first day of combat field duty to his last. Noise and light discipline on patrol will always prove beneficial. A lack of discipline will compromise the unit's location and serve as a target direction device for enemy mortar tubes. Leaders at all levels must continually emphasize the need for strict adherence to light and noise discipline measures.

c. Recommendation: Recommend that a class be initiated as soon as possible with emphasis on the importance of noise and light discipline both in the field and on the fire base. The instruction should be conducted by an experienced Junior Officer and enlisted man and clearly cite examples of instances where such things as men talking while on patrol had compromised their position and given the enemy a chance to prepare himself for retaliator. Units could be trained at FSBs when they are in for FSB security.

F. Logistics. None.

G. Communications. None

H. Materiel. None

I. Other. None.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDF-ML

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period ending 31 July 1970, ECS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN L. INSANI
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
Americal Div Troop List

DISTRIBUTION:
2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3-CO, USAVE, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
1-COMDHQ
6-CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT
2-CO, 11th Inf Bde
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde
2-CO, 208th Inf Bde
2-CO, Americal Div Arty
B-CC, Americal DISCOM
2-CC, 16th CAG
1-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
1-CO, 523d Sig Bn
1-CO, 23d MP Co
1-CO, HHC, Americal Div
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf
1-CO, 6th Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 5th Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 2d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52d Inf
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
1-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 16th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty
1-CO, 1st Bn, 82d Arty
1-CO, E Troop, 1st Cav
1-CO, F Troop, 17th Cav

1-CC, H Troop, 17th Cav
1-CC, 123d Avn Bn
1-CC, 14th Avn Bn
12-CC, 3d Mil Hist Det
1-ACoFS, G1
10-ACoFS, G2
10-ACoFS, G3
1-ACoFS, G4
1-ACoFS, G5
1-Chemical
1-Engineer
1-Signal
1-Aviation
1-Provost Marshall
1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-Information Officer
1-Inspector General
1-Surgeon
1-Chaplain
1-Adjutant General
1-XXIV Corps LNO
2-TACP (ALO), Americal Div

CONFIDENTIAL
AVII-GCT (10 August 1970) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period
Ending 31 July 1970, (RCS COSOR-65 (R2)) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349 1 SEP 1970

TO: Commanding General, USAEC, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The ORELL for the Americal Division has been reviewed by this head-
quartes in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (C) This headquarters concurs with the report with the following comments:

   a. Reference item concerning Montaguard Interpreter, page 61, paragraph
      II, B, 6; nonconcur. The unit has been advised that requests for interpreter
      assets should be submitted through personnel channels, with appropriate justi-
      fication.

   b. Reference item concerning E-38 Photo Lab, page 61, paragraph II, B, 7;
      concur. However, it should be noted that difficulties often result from in-
      sufficient preventative maintenance. XXIV Corps has submitted to USAEC a
      list of deficiencies and design faults of the ES-38B as well as problems in
      the support system which have been experienced in Military Region 1.

   c. Reference item concerning unattended Ground Sensor Battery Changes,
      page 62, paragraph II, B, 8; concur. Unit will be informed to submit recom-
      mendation with justification through appropriate channels.

   d. Reference item concerning Sensor Location, page 62, paragraph II, B, 8;
      nonconcur. Booby traps present substantial danger to friendly troops during
      sensor recovery or service missions.

   e. Reference item concerning Flame Fuel Dropping Rack, page 68, para-
      graph II, C, 11; concur. However, the limited welding and metal fabrication
      capability that exists in a division, is normally only adequate for mainten-
      ance of the organic engineer battalion equipment. Complete plans and speci-
      fications for the device will be forwarded to ACTIV for consideration and
      testing. Photographs of the device are included as inclosures 2 and 3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. H. Smith
Capt, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

3 Incl
1 nc
2 added
2. Flame Rack
3. CH47 w/Flame Rack

CF:
CG, Americal Division

CONFIDENTIAL
AVHD-DO (10 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, Americal Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "ES-38B Photo Darkroom Group," page 61, paragraph 2B(7). These difficulties were made known to the team chief of the CONARC Liaison Training Team on his visit to RVN during the period 11 - 24 May 1970. The Trip Report of the visit recommended that the preventive maintenance coverage in the operator's courses for the ES-38B be reviewed for adequacy. The CONARC Team is presently in RVN on another visit and these training implications were reiterated. Action by DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy from:
XXIV Corps
Americal Div
GPOP-DT (10 Aug 70) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ Americal Division, for Period Ending 31 July 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 NOV 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. CRAWL
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 31 July 1970)

1. HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)
Trp F, 17th Cav

26th Engr Bn

523d Sig Bn
COMMSEC CONTACT TEAM #2

23d MP Co
146th MFlat, 504th MP Bn

328th RR Co

635th MI Co

3d Mil Hist Det

OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty
Metro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty

1st Bn, 14th Arty (-)

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Bn, 18th Arty

1st Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 82d Arty
Btry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty

Btry G, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)

25lst FA Det (Radar)

Inclosure 1
252d FA Det (Radar)
271st FA Det (Radar)

3. **AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND**

HHC and Band
23d Med Bn
23d SAT Bn
723d Maint Bn (-)
23d Admin Co
Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf
63d Inf Plat (CTT)
Americal Combat Center (PROV)
Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. **16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP**

HHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)
14th Combat Avn Bn
71st Avn Co
132d Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)
174th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)
176th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)
178th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)
534th Med Det
756th Med Det

123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)
Troop D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
Co E, 723d Maint Bn
Troop F, 8th Cav

335th Trans Co

5. **11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE**

HHC, 11th Inf Bde

Inclosure 1
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
1st Bn, 29th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
Trp E, 1st Cav
59th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
31st Public Information Det
90th Chem Det
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 1

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
HHC, 196th Inf Bde
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
1s Bn, 46th Inf
46th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
10th Public Information Det
27th Chem Det

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf

Inclosure 1
1st Bn, 52d Inf
Trp H, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
87th Chem Det

2. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS
6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
Dat 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)
USASMG, ACSI, DA

Inclosure 1
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Americal Division**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CG, Americal Division

**REPORT DATE**
10 August 1970

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**ABSTRACT**

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