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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

31 July 1970

AVCA G0-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS OSF0R-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPFR-OT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

(1) Safety: In April, 1970 a survey of Annual General Inspection reports was made and indicated that many unit safety programs were below acceptable standards due to the frequent changeover of personnel. To correct this, a Safety Continuity SOP was established for all levels of the command. It requires safety records to be consolidated and brought under the direct control of the USASUPCOM Safety Director. All safety officers are required to have a continuity binder to include prior safety personnel reports, coordination requirements and major projects under way with a list of all files required to insure continuity. The Safety Director also began a program of pre-AGI's designed to uncover deficiencies before they become serious.

(2) Non-appropriated Funds: New controls implemented by USARV have sharply reduced the requirement for Post Exchange investigations and has allowed a reduction in the number of investigations in progress. This quarter also saw the shipment of the last of the Sarl Electronics amusement machines following the end of their contract operation. The machines were containerized by Sea-Land Corporation and transported to Long Binh for storage in the Saigon Customs Warehouse.

(3) Personnel Services: During this quarter the operations of the Civilian Personnel Division were integrated into the Personnel Services Division, and an analysis was begun of the Local National employment program. In view of the planned transfer of military space authorizations to Local National spaces, this analysis will determine the recruitment, training and utilization actions required for maximum utilization of available Local National
employees. At the same time, this section is working with the staff of Security, Plans, and Operations to identify the military spaces that can be converted to skilled Local National positions. To further insure a coordinated program for Local Nationals, Direct/Daily Hire procedures have been included as part of future Annual General Inspections of subordinate units.

(4) Civil-Military Operations: During the reporting quarter, the Civil Military operations division made particular efforts in the areas of public health, youth activities, fire prevention and support of ARVN self-help programs. The local MADCAP program was re-aligned after several months of low activity and a MEDCAP Council established to put program emphasis on upgrading GVN Public Health facilities rather than supplanting them. A revised and expanded youth program was initiated at a jointly sponsored Youth Jamboree. A volunteer Fire Brigade has been established in Cam Ranh Village with USASUPCOM assistance in organization and training. Finally, extensive support in the form of used lumber and other materials is being given to ARVN units engaged in self-help programs with their US advisors in upgrading defense positions, operations areas, barracks, dependent housing and like facilities.

(5) Information Office:

(a) Hometown News Releases dispatched:
   Editorial 444
   Pictorial 170

(b) News Releases dispatched:
   With Photos 68
   Without Photos 36

(c) Photo Assignments: 183

(d) Radio Programs: A total of 14-15 min. programs were produced and aired over AFVN Radio each Friday at 1130 hours and Saturdays at 0900 hours.

(e) Television Programs: A total of 12-15 min. programs were produced and viewed over AFVN-TV on Wednesdays and Thursdays following the regular 1930 and 2300 hours News and Sport Programs.

(f) Visiting Correspondents: John Meekins, MACV Card No. 441, Courier Tribune, Bloomington, Ind., did hometown interviews with personnel from that area. Miss Christel Pilz, MACV Card No. 249 did a story of Vietnamese Economy.
for German Radio. DASPO, the US Army Special Motion Picture Team visited here and filmed a story on the EZ. John U.D. Page, a prototype vessel with the 124th Transportation Command.

(6) Reenlistment: The Reenlistment Program has continued the outstanding performance that was achieved in the First Quarter of this year. USARV Reenlistment Incentives Awards Program was led by Cam Ranh Bay achieving an average of 88.1% of our objective. The success achieved in this program is due to the excellent support by unit commanders, our reenlistment personnel and strong command emphasis. A total of 133 persons reenlisted during this past quarter.

(7) Personnel Management: A continued decrease in Command strength is evidenced by the figures listed below. Efforts are geared toward replacing key personnel losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>422 355</td>
<td>411 351</td>
<td>414 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>121 123</td>
<td>122 119</td>
<td>122 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>7595 7585</td>
<td>7391 7458</td>
<td>7391 7413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>915 9063</td>
<td>9224 9227</td>
<td>9227 7848</td>
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</table>


(9) Chaplain:

(a) The percentage of personnel attending Chapel services is approximately 12 per cent of the total present for duty strength. Emphasis on deterring use of drugs is stressed through orientations, Character Guidance meetings and classes, and the Amnesty Program.

(b) Closer liaison has been established with the Air Force and Navy Chaplains to provide more effective area coverage in the Cam Ranh Bay and Dong Ba Thin areas. Chaplains have been encouraged to spend more time with the troops and especially to visit LSAs and to conduct field services where practical.

(c) Future planning includes inventory of ecclesiastical and other equipment within each Chapel and office and retrograde of items no longer needed for the effectiveness of the Chapel Program. A study will be made to determine which Chapels will close first as the troop drawdown becomes a reality in the Cam Ranh area.
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(10) Casualties: See Inclosure 2.


(13) Visitors: See Inclosure 5.


b. ACoS, Security, Plans and Operations

(1) ARVNization:

(a) The number of ARVNization projects throughout the Support Command is increasing sharply. These increases are the result of recent announcements by the United States Government concerning increased troop withdrawals. As a result of the increases, MACV has suspended earlier, time-consuming requirements such as the previously mandatory MACV Form 13 which had to be approved before Memoranda of Agreement could be drafted. By deleting this particular form, project “SWITCH” can be widely applied and expeditiously finalized.

(b) Current ARVNization projects under project “SWITCH” include:

1. Small Tugboat #1978: The small tugboat #1978 of the 10th Transportation Battalion, 124th Transportation Command has been inspected and repaired by the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam (USAMMAV) and is ready for turnover to the ARVN. Although the exact time and location of the transfer is still being negotiated, the boat will be used in the Can Tho/Saigon area. The ARVN will gain possession of the boat as well as the responsibility for it’s operation and maintenance.

2. POL Facility of the Nha Trang LSA: In April 1970, actions were initiated to turn over the POL facility of the Nha Trang LSA to the ARVN. The 351st ARVN POL Depot is the unit designated to take over the facility. The first phase of the turnover was the OJT training of two ARVN officers and two ARVN NCO’s from the 351st POL Depot. The objective of this initial training was to acquaint the ARVN with US POL operating procedures as well as to prepare the facility for turnover. At this time, no formal agreement has been reached concerning “how” or “where” the facility will be transferred. The ARVN have sufficient personnel to man the facility; however, they want seven major improvements made to the facility as well as the construction of billets to house 50% of the personnel assigned to the facility. Negotiations will continue.

3. ARVNization of the Nha Trang Outport: In July of this reporting period coordination was made with the 5th Area Logistics Command to insure

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the orderly turnover of the Nha Trang Outport. At 010001H Aug 70, the actual turnover of the outport will take place, the 5th ALC taking full responsibility. Advantages and benefits realized from the ARVNization of the Outport include:

(a) Relief for US forces, 124th Trans Comd (Terminal A), of command responsibility.

(b) Establishment of a major port completely under the control of the ARVN forces giving them valuable experience while US advisors are still available.

(c) Proposed ARVNization projects include:

1. Small Tugboat #2107: Small Tugboat #2107, currently assigned to the 10th Transportation Battalion, 124th Transportation Command and located in Kaoshuang, Taiwan is scheduled to be transferred to the 5th ALC in Nha Trang in the near future. The tugboat will be used by the ARVN for port operations at Nha Trang when they take over operations of the Nha Trang Outport. Although no deep draft cargo vessels are planned to be used at Nha Trang, POL tankers and barges will require the use of the tug.

2. LCU's: The 97th Heavy Boat Company of the 10th Transportation Battalion, 124th Transportation Command has 12 LCU's, three of which are administratively deadlined for lack of personnel. Plans are being drafted which would train ARVN personnel to take over the three LCU's or to integrate ARVN on to existing LCU's thereby freeing US personnel to operate the three that are now administratively deadlined. The 10th Transportation Battalion will have the responsibility for training the ARVN.

3. Y-Tanker: The Y-Tanker of the 10th Transportation Battalion will eventually be turned over to the ARVN. The tanker is now undergoing trials and is scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay in the near future. The 10th Transportation Battalion will have the responsibility for training the ARVN.

4. Yankee Ammunition Area: The 191st Ord. Bn of the 54th General Support Group currently has three ammunition storage areas in the Cam Ranh Bay area. Presently the ARVN has plans to construct a new ammunition storage area near Dong Ba Thin. The 191st Ord Bn is moving out of the Yankee ammunition area and the area is being offered to the ARVN as a temporary ammunition storage area in lieu of the proposed area near Dong Ba Thin. If the ARVN accept the Yankee ASP, a great deal of money would be saved. Additionally, the relative security of the peninsula could be viewed as an advantage to the ARVN.

5. ARVNization of Miniports (POL): Plans are now in the final stages for the ARVN takeover of the POL miniports at Phan Thiet, Dalat, Bao Loc, Ban Me Thuot and Gia Nghia. Three ARVN will arrive at each of the above locations on
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6 and 7 August for OJT. Negotiations will be initiated to effect turnover of equipment at the miniport. The exact date is not known at this time. The US will continue to be responsible for bulk refueling of the miniport and direct support maintenance as required until the equipment is officially turned over.

6. Duffle Bag: The Cam Ranh Bay Duffle Bag Facility is programmed for eventual turnover to the ARVN. The target date for the complete turnover is 31 December 1972. There will be a gradual influx of personnel. By October 1970, 14 ARVN are scheduled into the facility, and by December, 1970, 125 more should be receiving training. For the past several months, two ARVN officers have been training at the Duffle Bag Facility. These officers have become so proficient that they are used to train new US personnel assigned to the facility. Indications are that the supplying of ARVN for the Duffle Bag Facility will have top priority of personnel assets.

(d) Project "HIT": (RF/PF Family Housing) Following a recommendation by USARV to MACV that future issues of Project "HIT" materials emanate from ARVN supply points, an area at Nha Trang formerly used as the PX Storage area was proposed for the storage and issue of "HIT" materials. It was recently noted that the ARVN have expressed tentative acceptance of the proposed area for the "HIT" materials. Use of the area (approximately 2.3 acres) and of the concept will permit ARVN to receive materials in bulk and sort them for assembly into housing kits before issue. In general this will permit broader utilization of the ARVN supply system. The occupancy date of the storage area and start date for receipt and issue of materials have not yet been established.

(e) ARVN Training Status: As the ARVNization Programs increase, the number of ARVN being trained by the Support Command have been increasing accordingly, and indications are that the number of ARVN’s receiving training here will triple in the coming 90 days. In addition to the massive Duffle Bag training requirement that will be in complete operation by the end of the calendar year, the number of personnel being trained in current programs such as engineering maintenance will be growing rapidly. Finally, as requirements dictate, new training courses will be established. For the most part this will come under the concept of Project "Buddy". This trend of increased training can be seen by the following training analysis:

Total ARVN trained this quarter prior to 1 July 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Repair &amp; Calibration of Test Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Technical Inspection of Laundry Units</td>
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<tr>
<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aluminum Welding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>POL Handling &amp; Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cadre for Future POL Classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Radar Repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Carrier Repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Radio Repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
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</table>

Total ARVN being trained at the present time:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Duffle Bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Marine Maintenance and Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LCM-8 Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Winch Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Generator Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Air Conditioner and Refrigeration Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
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Anticipated future training (until 31 Dec 70):

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<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Seamen for LCU’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oilers for LCU’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Seamen for Y-Tanker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oilers for Y-Tanker</td>
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31 July 1970


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER TRAINED</th>
<th>AREA OF TRAINING</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Generator Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Air Conditioner and Refrigeration Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Duffle Bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>POL Mini-port operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Small tug operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Port Documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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TOTAL 266

(2) Operations:

(a) Asphaltic Logistical Support to Bao Loc Complex: During June this command experienced ever increasing commitments for transportation assets. This coupled with high demands for asphaltic products in the Bao Loc area caused this command to seek other means of transporting asphaltic products to the area. A study showed that because of a shorter turnaround distance, transportation from Long Binh to Bao Loc would prove more profitable. As a result of coordination with the Saigon Support Command, 18th Engineer Brigade, and the 35th Engineer Group, arrangements were concluded on 8 July for the shipment of 10,000 drums of asphaltic materials from Long Binh to Camp B'Sar, Camp Smith (Bao Loc), and the Dillard Industrial Complex (Di Linh) by the USASUPCOM-SAI GON. During the period from 10 July 1970 to 24 July 1970, the following products were transported:

1. Camp Smith:
   a. AP3 - 4600 drums
   b. RC800 - 200 drums
   c. MC70 - 500 drums

2. Camp B'Sar:
   a. MC70 - 3000 drums
   b. RC800 - 200 drums
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2. Dillard Complex:
   a. AP3 - 1000 drums
   b. MC70 – 500 drums

(b) SOP for Emergency Reaction to Prevent Drowning:

1. On 12 June 1970, a Standing Operating Procedure was written and distributed by the ACoS, SPAO to cover Emergency Reaction to prevent drowning.

2. The purpose of the SOP was to provide guidance to anyone having immediate knowledge of a person who may be drowning and to establish a single control agency which will coordinate the deployment of rescue personnel.

3. A complete listing of all personnel to be notified and their telephone numbers were included in the SOP. Also included is a detailed description of what action should be taken in the event an accident is discovered.

(c) Relocation of 870th Transportation Company:

In January 1970, Cam Ranh Spt Comd initiated plans for the relocation of the 870th Trans Co (TML SVC) to MR I. The impact of this move was to diminish both the operational and security capabilities of the 124th Trans Comd. The 870th had the dual task of performing and supervising stevedoring functions and furnishing port security at Cam Ranh Bay. Additionally, the requirement to secure My Ca Bridge was assigned to the 124th, further contributing to the manpower problem. The move was accomplished in three parts. A 30 man element moved to Dong Ha on 27 May 1970 for LST discharge operations. The advance party departed this station 29 May 1970 for Da Nang and the main body completed the move 9 June 1970. The major problems were the security of the port at Cam Ranh and the ability to continue port operations with reduced strength.

(d) Operation Binh Tay III:

In May 1970, the 262nd Quartermaster Battalion was tasked to establish and operate a refueling point (Miniport) to serve the move into Cambodia. Although some prior preparation was made at the site, the 262nd was not to establish the miniport until 18-19 May 1970 to preclude revealing the planned operation. The complex coordination required to insure that transportation, supplies, equipment, and personnel were on site at the proper time was carried out with resounding success. Beginning operations on 20 May 1970, the miniport received 250,000 gallons JP-4 and issued 235,000 gallons in 37 days of operation.
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(e) OPLAN 131-70:

1. Realignment of Logistical Support in Military Region II (South). During this reporting period the command continued to see a reduction of authorized strength with the execution of the first phase of the Keystone Robin troop redeployment increment. Major action toward realignment and withdrawal of personnel from outlying stations included the phase down of the Bao Loc LSA to a liaison team.

2. The Ammunition Supply Point at Dalat was closed in favor of a "throughput" system. This and other techniques are being implemented to accelerate the integration of ARVN personnel into operations exclusively operated by the US.

3. USASUPCOM-CRB OPLAN 131-70 which addresses realignment of logistical support in Military Region II (South) was updated during this reporting period to reflect and include current capabilities of the command and new conditions and requirements.

(f) Operation Otter:

1. In February 1970 the command began to integrate fixed wing Otter aircraft into the transportation system for delivery of repair parts from Cam Ranh Bay to the outlying Logistical Support Activities (LSA): Bao Loc, Dalat, Ban Me Thuot, and Phan Thiet. During the first three months of the operation (February thru April 1970) the Otter delivered an average of 21,575 lbs per month and retrograded to Cam Ranh Bay an average of 5,800 lbs per month.

2. During the three months (May-July 1970) of this report Otter moved an average of 17,520 lbs per month. The average for the quarter period ending in July 1970 reflects a period wherein the Otter was used exclusively, whereas the first three months of operation included numerous sorties of USAF C7A, Caribou aircraft.

3. The benefits derived from the Otter program continue to include:
   a. Reduction of order-ship time from 15-20 days to 7-10 days.
   b. Accelerated retrograde of repairables from 15-21 days to 4-7 days.
   c. Deadlined equipment awaiting parts reduced from 15-20 days to 7-10 days.

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Appropriate acknowledgement is given the Transportation Division of G4, Headquarters, I Field Force-Vietnam (Nha Trang) for their cooperation in furnishing aircraft (Otter and C7A) for this purpose.

3) Forces Development

(a) Unit Action:

1. The following unit actions occurred during the reporting period:

   D Co 51st Inf     Assigned to CRB Sup Com     Eff. 26 April
   870th TC Co       Moved to Da Nang Sup Com   8 June
   253rd QM Det     Inactivated                25 June
   651st TC Det     Inactivated                25 June
   611th TC Det     Inactivated                25 June
   603rd TC Det     Inactivated                25 June
   613th TC Det     Inactivated                25 June
   635th TC Det     Inactivated                10 July

2. D Co 51st Inf:

   D Co 51st Inf was assigned to this Support Command to function as a Security Guard Co. In addition, the mission of guarding the Nha Trang and Phan Rang outports was assumed with the assignment of this unit. A second security guard company is scheduled for activation at Cam Ranh Bay in the near future.

3. 870th TC Co:

   The move of the 870th TC Co (TML SVC) presented numerous problems for this Support Command. When this company moved, all Local National stevedoring slots within the unit went with it. A large portion of the stevedoring mission, to include all Sealand operations, was being performed by these local national stevedores. In order to maintain the stevedoring capability, immediate steps were taken to create LN stevedoring slots in the 155th TC Co (TML SVC). This action resulted in the conversion of damage yard laborer slots in the 155th TC to stevedore slots and hiring of personnel formerly with the 870th TC to fill these slots.
(b) Base Camp TDA:

On 25 June LTC Williams and Mr. Smith, USARV G3, arrived at Cam Ranh Bay. The purpose of their visit was to study the feasibility of and the requirements for a Base Camp TDA for this support command. Working in conjunction with personnel from the ACofS, SF&O CHB SUPCOM, a rough draft TDA was compiled to include personnel and equipment with justifications. This information was returned to HQ, USARV to be compiled along with information from other areas in Vietnam as a basis for decision on the establishment of Base Camp TDA.

(c) Civilization of Military Spaces:

One of the major projects initiated during this period is the civilizedation of military spaces. The initiation of this project required coordination with USARV, G3, Cam Ranh ACFO, the major subordinate commands, and various staff sections in this headquarters. This program involves not only the civilization of military spaces but also upgrading of LN spaces and skill levels, CTI training, OJT training, and realignment of both military and civilian spaces to better manage available manpower resources.

(4) Training

(a) Korean OJT: On 16 May 1970, five Korean military personnel (2 Off, 3 N.O) completed a six week OJT program on the LARC V amphibious vehicles here at Cam Ranh Bay. After completion of the training these personnel returned to Korea to form the nucleus of a LARC V training program for the Korean Army.

(b) Packaging and Preservation Class: Cam Ranh Bay was designated as host for the Packaging and Preservation Classes in Vietnam. These classes were presented by personnel from the Joint Military Packaging Training Center, Aberdeen, Maryland. The classes were in two sections: Basic Packaging and Preservation Course, 1-12 June; and Preparation of Freight for Air Shipment, 15-19 June. Personnel from throughout Vietnam attended these classes at Cam Ranh Bay.

(c) On 25 through 26 June 70, 515 individuals (161 officers and 354 enlisted men) attended thirteen Communications Security Classes. The classes were held in the Support Command Conference Room. An instructor from 101st Radio Research Unit, Nha Trang, presented the classes. Some of the topics presented included enemy interception of our communications, enemy communications gathering units and equipment and capabilities, ways to detect and prevent the enemy from entering our radio nets, and positive measures to preclude the disclosure of classified information over non-secure means of communications.
(5) Security and Intelligence

(a) Personnel Security Clearance Actions: During the reporting period, a total of 425 requests for personnel security actions were received and 330 clearances were granted or validated. At the close of the period, there were 95 actions pending.

(b) Document Security: All classified documents in the S&I Division repository were reviewed for the purpose of regrading or destruction. This resulted in the formal destruction of 171 separate documents which were either obsolete or unneeded.

(c) Security Inspections: Fourteen separate units were inspected in conjunction with the command's annual general inspection (AGI).

(d) War Trophy Registration: A total of 119 war trophies were screened for intelligence value in accordance with UCARV Reg 643-20 during the reporting period.

(e) Ground Defense:

1. A total of 42 reconnaissance patrols were conducted in isolated areas of the Cam Ranh Peninsula with no significant findings.

2. Land clearing and barrier construction continued around critical ammunition and POL storage areas to enhance the capability to detect the approach of the enemy.

3. Field Force V Arty provided two mobile and one fixed searchlight in permanent support of the Cam Ranh Bay Peninsula as well as one AN/PPS 5 Ground Surveillance Radar on a trial basis.

4. Acquired four AN/PPS 4 Ground Surveillance Radar on 180 day loan and arranged for training 3 operators per set. Sets will be emplaced at pre-selected positions in the 54th General Support Group area.

5. Three training exercises were conducted for withdrawing personnel from the My Ca Checkpoint to support the defense of the My Ca Bridge in event enemy attacks the Checkpoint in strength which cannot be held off.

(f) Intelligence:

1. There were a total of 29 significant enemy contacts in the Cam Ranh Special Sector during the period of 1 May - 31 July. Of these 29, 19 were rocket/mortar attacks; 5 were sapper attacks; 3 were ambushes; 2 were sabotage. The ordnance used by the enemy has consisted of B-40 rockets, 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 107mm rockets, 140mm rockets, satchel charges, and small arms.
2. The majority of these attacks have occurred between the 8th and 12th day of each month which has been during the period of low lunar illumination each month. These were coordinated rocket/mortar and sapper attacks on two or more installations. One or more installations would be attacked by rockets and/or mortars and at the same time another installation would be attacked by sappers.

Chronological List of Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT INVOLVED</th>
<th>NATURE OF ATTACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>22nd Replacement Battalion</td>
<td>2x1½ lbs C-4 charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>Sector II, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>1x107mm rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>Sector II, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>2x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>2x140mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>4x140mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>36x82mm mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1970</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>6x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>1x140mm rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>3x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>2x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>4x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Sector II, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>15 satchel charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun 1970</td>
<td>22nd Replacement Battalion</td>
<td>5 satchel charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Air Base</td>
<td>2x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Sector II, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>2xunk ord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Vietnam Naval Training Center</td>
<td>1x140mm rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Naval Air Facility</td>
<td>10-12 sappers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jun 1970</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>8-16xunk type mortar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned

**Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT INVOLVED</th>
<th>NATURE OF ATTACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 1970</td>
<td>QL-1 (two bridges)</td>
<td>sabotage-damage required bypass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 1970</td>
<td>Sector II, Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>7x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 1970</td>
<td>My Ca Checkpoint</td>
<td>8x60mm mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 1970</td>
<td>100th ROKA Log Compound</td>
<td>15 satchel charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 1970</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>3x107mm rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 1970</td>
<td>ROKA Force</td>
<td>ambush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 1970</td>
<td>Train</td>
<td>mine - small arm fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul 1970</td>
<td>ROKA Force</td>
<td>ambush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul 1970</td>
<td>ARVN platoon</td>
<td>3x40mm rounds - small arm fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jul 1970</td>
<td>My Ca Checkpoint</td>
<td>5x40mm rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**C. ACofS, Supply**

(1) Representatives of ACofS, Supply made liaison visits to the following areas and customers in these areas on the dates indicated below:

(a) 16 May 1970  Nha Trang  
(b) 25 May 1970  IFFV  
(c) 27 May 1970  Nha Trang  
(d) 19 Jul 1970  Phan Rang  
(e) 19 Jul 1970  Song Mao  
(f) 29 Jul 1970  Dalat  Phan Thiet  Song Mao
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(2) Liaison visits were made to the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV), 1st Logistical Command or G-4, USARV on the following dates for the purpose indicated:

(a) 29 May 1970 ICCV Liaison
(b) 22 Jun 1970 ICCV Liaison
(c) 4 Jul 1970 ICCV Liaison
(d) 17 Jul 1970 G-4, USARV Liaison
(e) 22 Jul 1970 Qui Nhon
(f) 26 Jul 1970 ICCV Liaison
(g) 28 Jul 1970 ICCV Liaison
(h) 31 Jul 1970 ICCV Liaison

(3) Special assistance visits were made to the following locations on the dates indicated:

(a) 7 Jun 1970 54th Signal Bn
(b) 12 Jun 1970 35th Engineer Gp
(c) 24 Jul 1970 USAID/CORDS MR II (South)
(d) 30 Jul 1970 Nha Trang - Vietnamization Planning

(4) In early May eleven new 7½ ton refrigerator vans were released to the 124th Transportation Command. This has facilitated the proper movement of perishable subsistence to end stations.

(5) In preparation for the implementation of the new Self Service Supply Center allocation system, a standard allowance for mess hall supplies was established in coordination with the Command Food Service Personnel. During the 1st Quarter FY 71 an allowance of $366.20 per 100 personnel per quarter based on head count will be tested.

(6) In coordination with command maintenance personnel a standard allowance of $431.53 per quarter per average motor pool was also established.
(7) In late May a study was made to determine the cost and feasibility of relocation of the 6" AVGAS pipeline at Phan Rang to parallel the 8" JP/4 pipeline. The objective of relocation was to have the pipeline by-pass high density population areas where high pilferage incidents have occurred and to concentrate the efforts of security forces from two areas of responsibility to one. It was determined that if the line could be removed without damaging the individual sections and if extra needed parts could be obtained from the salvaged materials being evacuated from the An Khe area the material cost of relocating the pipeline would be negligible. The problem would come in obtaining the labor for the project. The 262nd Quartermaster did not have the personnel assets to assume a project of this magnitude. The only way the project can be accomplished is to develop an in house capability. An alternate solution has been adopted. AVGAS is being transported to Phan Rang using 5,000 gallon tankers in lieu of resupply by T-1 tanker and 6" pipeline. All hatches and valves on the tanker are sealed to insure delivery of quality POL products. Tankers arriving at the supply point with broken seals are discharged into a holding tank until test results show that the product is on grade. The Line Haul of AVGAS will substantially reduce pipeline losses, however, it is dependent upon availability of 5,000 gallon tankers.

(8) On 5 June 1970 the Nha Trang Vietnam Air Force fuels management branch discovered contaminated AVGAS in their aircraft refueler and 50,000 gallon collapsible storage tank. Further investigation determined that the 18th Terminal Operating Platoon's 420,000 gallon storage tank contained 241,300 gallons of contaminated AVGAS. Laboratory samples were taken and sent to Cam Ranh Bay for analysis. As a result of the contaminated AVGAS, it was necessary to line haul approximately 15,000 gallons per day to maintain average consumption rates until the contaminated fuel was replaced.

(9) Planning was completed for the construction of a two mile 6" pipeline to supply diesel fuel for the new Cam Ranh Bay Vinnell Power Plant. It was deemed more economical to use a pipeline to supply fuel to the 3,000 barrel tanks than to haul the products. The pipeline will run from the T-5 Jetty to the Power Plant.

(10) On 11 June 1970 the T-1 Tanker "Notaway" was added to the USASUPCOM-CRB fleet of shuttle tankers as a replacement for the "Chattahooche".

(11) On 21 June 1970 implementing instructions were disseminated to all customers of the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang Self Service Supply Centers for the 1st Quarter FY 71. Major changes were that the Self Service Supply Center allocation would be computed and controlled by USARV major subordinate commands. The centers were reorganized into three departments (I-General Supplies, II-Hand Tools, and III-Mess Hall Supplies and Equipment). As a control measur.
this Command classified all customers in four categories (A - Access to all Departments, B - Access to General Supplies and Hand Tools, C - Access to General Supplies and Mess Hall Supplies, D - Access to General Supplies only).

(12) On 27 June 1970 a class was conducted for the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang Self Service Supply Center personnel. New internal and external procedures were explained in detail by the USASUPCOM-CRB SSSC Project Officer.

(13) On 2 July 1970 the T-2 Tanker "Saugatuck" joined the USASUPCOM-CRB fleet of shuttle tankers to replace the "Chepachet".

(14) On 10 July 1970 the T-2 Tanker "Santa Ynez" joined the USASUPCOM-CRB fleet of shuttle tankers to replace the "Cowanesque".

(15) During the past the two Army Oxygen Generating Plants at Cam Ranh Bay experienced considerable down time due to extended periods of maintenance. The Army has to depend on the US Air Force oxygen plant at Cam Ranh Bay to satisfy requirements. In addition to assisting the Army, the Air Force supplied the requirements of two major Army contractors, Vinnell Corporation and Pacific Architects and Engineers. In July 1970 it was found that the Air Force plant was scheduled to be retrograded. Immediate action was taken by the ACofS, Supply to request that the plant be transferred to USASUPCOM-CRB to replace the two worn out Army Plants. On 18 July 1970 approval was received from USARV to take possession of the modern plant. This plant has five times the production capacity of either of the old Army Plants.

(16) On 27 July 1970 directives were received from USARV implementing Project ART (Accelerated Reduction of Tonnage). This project establishes FY '71 quarterly tonnage goals for the reduction of Class II and IX, Class IV, and Class VII supplies at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. The 1st Quarter FY '71 goal requires that Class II and IX be reduced from 77,829.3 short tons to 57,000 short tons. Class IV is to be reduced from 82,862.0 short tons to 70,000 short tons and Class VII is to be reduced from 19,378.9 short tons to 11,000 short tons.

(17) On 31 July 1970 instructions were issued to the US Depot, Cam Ranh Bay for Project "RED" (Rapid Excess Disposal) to be implemented as of 1 August 1970. This project is to identify, nominate, inventory, and process high dollar value, high tonnage, or bulk items which may be excess.

(18) During the period representatives of the ACofS, Supply participated in the May, June and July USASUPCOM-CRB Logistical Conference for representatives of major supported organizations. Brief general items of information were discussed. Detailed presentations on Self Service Supply Center Operations and reduction of high priority requisitions were given as main topics.
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(19) During the last quarter 407 lines of excess with a value of $216,074.14 were reported under Project "Thru-Put". Redistribution of 1,090 lines with a value of $43,047.55 was made during the period.

(20) Class II, IV and VII: The Cam Ranh Bay Class II, IV and VII DSU continued to exceed the command goal of 70% demand satisfaction. The DSU received 22,272 ASL request and filled 16,726 for a 75.1% demand satisfaction. Demand accommodation attained was 53.4% for this quarter.

(21) The USASUPCOM-CRB Self Service Supply Centers continued to exceed the command goal of 90% demand satisfaction. The Nha Trang store received 2,979 requests and filled 2,847 for a 95.6% demand satisfaction. Combined statistics for both stores show a demand satisfaction of 96.9% for the month of July 1970. Zero balances decreased from 8.8% average for the month of June to a combined figure of 8.5% during the month of July 1970.

(22) At the close of the reporting period the groundwork is being laid for a combined USASUPCOM-CRB/CORDS plan to implement a CORDS supply organization which will be capable of providing future support to MACV Teams in the MR II (South) subsequent to future anticipated drawdowns of US Army personnel. The main purpose of the plan will be to accomplish logistical training of a prototype CORDS organization while the present expertise is still available within USASUPCOM-CRB personnel assets.

d. ACofS, Transportation

(1) Project SLAM: Class V support to Qui Nhon was continued during the quarter utilizing the Sealand Ammunition Movement (SLAM System). A total of 22 shipments were made moving 5180 S/T. Eight of these shipments were made break-bulk due to a lack of trailer assets.

(2) MILVAN Pilot Program: The MILVAN Pilot Program was initiated with the arrival of 300 chassis on the Seatrain Puerto Rico (28 Jun). The first containers arrived on the Seatrain Maryland (7 Jul) along with 90 additional chassis. Eighty (80) of these chassis were transshipped to Saigon and ten (10) retained at Cam Ranh. The Seatrain "Maryland" contained 31 vans for discharge. An additional 24 vans arrived on the "American Racer" (11 Jul) and 75 more on the Seatrain "Carolina" (18 Jul). Currently there are 320 chassis on hand and 133 containers. Three containers were received from Qui Nhon in an inter-Support Command shipment. The first retrograde shipment of 80 containers is scheduled for the Seatrain "Ohio" which is due in Cam Ranh on 16 August.

(3) Records set by 124th Trans Comd (Tal A)

a. 3 May 70 - Total handled by all vessels - 19,848 S/T

b. May 70 - Discharge by one unit - 60,465 S/T

May 70 - Outload by one unit - 46,144 S/T

4. May 70 - Total Outload - 104,710 S/T

5. May 70 - Handled by one unit - 106,609 S/T

6. May 70 - Total Handled - 240,388 S/T

22 May 70 - Discharged from one vessel - 10,589 S/T

12 Jun 70 - Discharged by one unit (24 hrs) - 10,833 S/T

NOTES: All figures include Sealand discharge and loading.

e. ACofS, Services

(1) Engineering:

(a) Previous attempts to repair POL Tanks at Cam Ranh Bay had proved unsuccessful. A concrete slab had been poured in the bottom of unserviceable tanks and covered with an epoxy compound; however, when tested the tanks still leaked. During this period the 497th Engr Co (PC) repaired a POL Tank at Cam Ranh Bay using a modified method of repair. A concrete slab was poured, caulking compound was applied to the interior circumference, the caulking compound was covered by epoxy, burlap strips soaked in epoxy were applied, and a epoxy was applied. The tank had no bottom leaks when inspected.

(b) The 497th has started to repair a POL Tank at Iha Trang as part of the test program. An additional tank at Cam Ranh Bay will be repaired. When the results of the test program are known a contract for repair of POL Tanks country-wide will be let.

(c) The 497th Engr Co (PC) continued work on the deep draft port area bulkheads. The bulkhead south of pier 1 has been completed. Work has started on the bulkhead between piers 1 and 2 and on the RO-RO Pier.

(d) A project to install security lighting around POL Tank Farms #1 and #2 was started. Vinnell has connected the system to the main power system. Installation of the lights by PA&E remains to be accomplished. A request for security lighting around Tank Farm #3 and the POL package yard has been submitted.
(2) Field Services:

(a) Graves Registration: GH Points in the Support Command processed 182 remains during the quarter. The Collection Points at Bao Loc and Nha Trang have been closed. The former for lack of demand and the latter because of ARVNization of the 8th Field Hospital.

(b) Field Laundry: The Field Laundry processed 2,470,526 lbs during the quarter. This is an increase of 515,654 lbs over the previous quarter.

(c) Contract Laundry: The Cost of Contract Laundry for the quarter was $282,899.00. The cumulative cost for January - June 1970 was $547,428.16 which is $113,764.19 under the ceiling of $661,492.35.

f. ACofS, Comptroller

(1) Combat Support Efficiency Program

Increased efforts by this command during the final two months of the fiscal year resulted in the submission of thirteen cost reduction actions to ILC within that period with a value of $351,000. Four of these actions plus eight actions previously submitted to the US Army Audit Agency were validated between May 1 and June 30 for $968,000.

FY 70 Performance:

Validations $7,669,000
Pending Validation 1,818,400

TOTAL $9,487,400

(2) Audit of Non-appropriated Fund Activities.

Six audits and four courtesy reviews on non-appropriated fund activities were performed. Numerous special reviews were also performed resulting from the monthly analysis of financial statements and minutes of the participating funds.

g. ACofS, Ammunition

(1) Ammunition Receipts and Issues: During the quarter ammunition received and shipped amounted to 110,308 short tons. The increased issues in May and June reflect the military operations in Cambodia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RECEIPTS</td>
<td>9,592</td>
<td>26,215</td>
<td>20,133</td>
<td>56,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>26,981</td>
<td>22,397</td>
<td>13,717</td>
<td>62,995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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31 July 1970

BREAKDOWN (Issues in short tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSAs</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>3,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>10,845</td>
<td>12,015</td>
<td>4,852</td>
<td>27,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>7,825</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>10,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>2,703</td>
<td>3,895</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>8,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td>4,370</td>
<td>12,705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stockage level as of 31 July 70: 58,810 short tons.

h. ACoFS, Maintenance

(1) The FY 70 GS Overhaul Program was concluded on 30 June 1970. Examples of key major component production include 600 1/4 ton engines produced of 600 scheduled, 884 3/4 ton engines produced of 870 scheduled, and 250 21/2 ton transmissions produced of 250 scheduled. Overall, of the 142 lines in the FY 70 Program, 90% of scheduled production was completed.

(2) Implementation of Special Criteria for the Retrograde of Army Materiel (SCRAM) was accomplished with the distribution of CRB Circular 750-33, dtd 17 July 70, to units in CRB for further dissemination to units in the field. The system was primarily designed for rapid classification of large amounts of Keystone generated assets. Pursuant to a suggestion by CINCUSARPAC, USARV requested authority to apply the procedures to all equipment designated for retrograde. Permission was granted and implementing instructions followed.

(3) Presently, due to the programming of insufficient funds, delays are being encountered in obtaining repair parts to repair non-standard, low density engineer construction equipment in the contractor field maintenance shop at Cam Ranh Bay. Many of the required repair parts are not available in the supply system. Therefore, certificates of non-availability are being issued for these items. Due to the lack of funds, these parts cannot be procured.

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2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Safety Inspections:

(a) Observation: Courtesy safety inspections by the USASUPCOM Safety Director prior to unit AGI's have been very successful in pinpointing problem areas in time for corrective action.

(b) Evaluation: Of fifteen units inspected prior to the AGI, eleven passed the AGI safety inspection without any difficulty. The four units that received an unsatisfactory rating in this area did so because they failed to take action on recommendations made at the courtesy inspection. The unit safety officers have been enthusiastic about this program since it represents tangible command assistance and enables them to take advantage of the professional competence and experience of full time safety personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That this program of courtesy inspections be expanded and that commanders be required to ensure followup action is taken on the recommendations.

(2) Drug Amnesty Program:

(a) Observation: The drug amnesty program has drawn little response despite wide publicity.

(b) Evaluation: In the past the program has been largely administered by company personnel. This has often resulted in news about an individual's past drug use circulating through his company after he has turned himself in. This has naturally tended to discourage others from taking advantage of the amnesty program.

(c) Recommendations: Implement a new approach that relies upon medical personnel and chaplains to administer the program to insure that information about an individual’s former use of drugs is not spread through his unit.

(3) Availability of qualified or trainable LN replacements:

(a) Observation: Due to the restricted nature of the Cam Ranh Peninsula and the lack of nearby urban areas, the number of skilled local nationals is extremely low. The local population consists primarily of farmers and fishermen. There has been no requirement for skilled Vietnamese labor in the past and, as a result, there are no local resources to draw upon.
(b) Evaluation: At the present time, all LN replacements require some form of training, either extensive OJT or formal Central Training Institute (CTI) training. The number of LN available for hire in this area presents further limitations on this program. Due to RVN Military requirements, present military employment levels and civilian farm duties, the number of employables is below identified needs. Further, this number includes many personnel who are unemployable due either to age, infirmities, or sex. In the majority of cases, any training program undertaken with local nationals from this area will have to include English language and basic education courses in addition to training in the desired skill. Some of the recruitment to fill these identified slots will have to be done from other areas in Vietnam. The limited housing available in the Cam Ranh Bay area provides little incentive to come to this area. What housing is available is expensive and in poor condition. In summary, the housing problem, isolation, and the lack of facilities in the Cam Ranh Bay area offers little inducement for skilled workers to move to this area to work.

1. Training available in the area:

a. There are two types of training presently available in the Cam Ranh Bay area. These include CTI classes and OJT programs. Many of the CTI courses can be taught here at Cam Ranh Bay and do not require that personnel go to Saigon for training. During the month of June personnel from Cam Ranh received instruction in the following areas:

   - Conversational English
   - Auto Mechanics
   - Basic Warehousing
   - Basic Stevedoring
   - Material Handling Equipment
   - Tow Motor Operations
   - Typing
   - American Language I
   - American Language II

   The majority of OJT instruction is carried on as a continuation of formal classroom training and as a result, the areas of OJT closely parallel the CTI classes.

b. Conversion of LN/N spaces to higher skilled positions will require an extensive training program, as will the conversion of military spaces to civilian. This headquarters is coordinating with the ACPA to expand existing programs.

2. Time Required for Training and Conversion:

a. Due to the recruitment and training period required for conversion of military spaces, it is recommended that conversion take place in phases over a
period of time. The normal time period will be required for CTI training and
approximately 60-90 days for OJT. Phasing of this training is desirable for
several reasons:

Phasing would allow for careful selection of the most qualified personnel.

Training in blocks of 150-200 persons would aid the development of a corp.
of knowledgeable LN personnel who would aid in OJT training for other LN per-
sonnel.

Groups of this size would facilitate their handling and initial OJT train-
ing with on-hand military personnel.

Experience with Program 6 has demonstrated that a crash program to fill
spaces is not desirable.

b. Serious consideration must be given to a program whereby additional or
dual authorizations will be allotted for training purposes. Spaces must be made
available for personnel to fill during their training period. This command can
not afford to give large numbers of spaces for training purposes without hurting
the capability of units within the command. Provisions must also be made for
dual military and civilian staffing for a period of 2-3 months between the time
a civilian position is created and a military space is deleted.

c. Regardless of the amount of training an individual has received the
assumption of a job position within the U.S. structure will be difficult for
both U.S. and Vietnamese, at least at first. Unless phasing is adhered to, and
dual staffing is allowed, a unit's mission capability could be seriously impaired
during this period.

b. Operations:

(1) MILVAN Operations:

(a) Observations: The first shipment of 31 MILVANS arrived at CRB on 7 July
1970 aboard the Seatrain "Maryland". The 24th Transportation Battalion had pro-
positioned ten 5-ton tractors with empty chassis to handle pier-to-Marshalling
Yard operations; however, clearance could be handled just as efficiently by ten
tractors supporting the discharge operations. The Marshalling area is approxi-
mately 1/3 mile from the main port pier area. The vans were discharged with
the aid of the MILVAN spreader assembly. A second spreader assembly is being
constructed by the Vinnell Corp. and is expected to double the discharge capa-
bility. The initial 31 van shipment was discharged in five and one-quarter
hours. On 11 July 1970, the "American Racer" arrived with twenty-four MILVANs
and they were offloaded in eight hours. On 18 July 1970 the Seatrain "Carolina"
arrived with 75 MILVANS. They were discharged in fourteen hours. The discharge
operation was interrupted for a period of ten hours due to the requirement to
discharge USAF aircraft.
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1. Below is listed the discharge/performance summary of the aforementioned shipments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VESSEL</th>
<th>ARR/DPT</th>
<th>NR OF VANS</th>
<th>AVERAGE LIFT TIME PER VAN</th>
<th>AVERAGE SHUTTLE TIME PER VA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seatrain</td>
<td>7 Jul/10 Jul</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10 Min</td>
<td>30 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Maryland&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;American Racer&quot;</td>
<td>11 Jul/12 Jul</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15 Min</td>
<td>30 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatrain</td>
<td>18 Jul/21 Jul</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5 Min</td>
<td>20 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Carolina&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Of the 130 initial MILVANS that were received, one hundred twenty-four were consigned to the USA Depot CRB, three to the Vinnell Corp., and three to 5th Special Forces, Nha Trang. Within 12 to 36 hours after receipt in the marshalling yard they were spotted for discharge. The delivery of loaded vans from the marshalling yard to the depot and the return of empties were performed using two tractors. The US Army Depot coordinated receipt, unstuffing, and release of MILVAN equipment. Of their fourteen van simultaneous receiving capability, nine to twelve ramp locations were allocated to MILVANS during peak delivery periods. Time required to unstuff a twenty foot van is 45-60 min. The average cycle (staging yard to depot, unstuff, and return of the empty) has averaged about 12 hours. The three MILVANS consigned to the 5th Special Forces, Nha Trang were moved via line haul convoy to the consignee on 10 July 70 and were returned on 14 July 70. Distance involved was 96 miles.

3. Accountability for MILVAN equipment and movement has been supplemented with a van and chassis card system, a gate logbook, and daily yard checks. This local innovation, similar in nature to the system used to account for Roll-on/Roll off (RO/RO) trailer equipment, had reduced administrative detail and enhanced container accountability. 

(b) Evaluations: Receipt, discharge, and staging operations have progressed without major difficulties or problems. There are equipment failures that have been noted. They are:

1. Brake and Landing Gear Deficiencies: Of the fourteen chassis inoperable all are due to brake and landing gear malfunctions. Basic AMC guidance outlines a ten per cent deadline rate; however, we expect deadline in excess of ten per cent due to the vulnerability of the equipment to the Vietnam terrain. The primary problems are the vehicle brakes are open to the environment i.e., sand, dust, water, etc... In addition the landing leg structures are tubular steel and not of sufficient strength to withstand load pressure.
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2. Air Hose Connections: The hoses have a spring loaded, quick release mechanism that will become inoperative due to routine use, sand, and dirt. They are also open to the elements. The hoses are not protected by the longitudinal members of the chassis frame, which increases the vulnerability to external damage.

3. Land Gear Locking and Chassis Coupler Retainer Pins: The locking pin in the landing legs are secured to the body of the chassis by a small chain. The coupler retainer pins are not secured to the chassis. These pins are likely to become lost during routine operations, which will adversely affect the capability of the van.

4. Landing Gear Constructions: Extreme caution must be exercised in lowering the landing legs of the MILVAN chassis after they have been lowered. When the legs are not fully extended, it is possible to push the locking pins in place and at the same time, miss the receiver holes in the leg brace, which will result in the legs collapsing and the van tipping over on its front. The potential danger to personnel requires constant close supervision of the staging and spotting of the MILVANs. The landing gear is also less durable and more mechanically complicated than those of conventional or Seaboard chassis. The MILVAN chassis is of commercial design, and will accept a single dual commercial tractor. It is not particularly suited to a M-52 5 ton military tractor. The landing gear appears to be a major deadlining item.

5. Bogie Locking Pins: The bogie wheels are held in place by one spring loaded locking pin, on either side of the chassis frame. If the pins should break or become disengaged, the bogie wheel assembly would slide off the chassis frame (an I-beam rail) as there is no stop on the assembly.

6. Unprotected Wheel Bearings: The wheel hub is not a sealed unit and it is possible that the wheel bearings will deteriorate in sand and dirt.

2. Incompatibility with the M-52 Tractor: Extreme caution must be taken to insure that the vans are at an exact 90 degree angle when engaging or disengaging the king pin so that the wheels of the tractor will not interfere with the landing legs of the MILVAN. If the van is placed at a slight angle to the military tractor, the landing legs on one side of the van will hit the tire of the tractor and will be blocked from extending completely down into proper position. There is approximately 11 inches difference in height between the front and rear of the chassis when engaged to the M-52 military tractor, negating the possibility of using the chassis in the coupled (40 foot) configuration. It further raises the center of gravity that in turn increases the instability of the equipment tipping.
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8. Forklift Access: The MILVAN containers tend to be top and nose heavy due to the short distance between landing leg and bogie wheels. The combination of a low-mast forklift and heavy cargo in the front of the van often results in the van pivoting on the landing legs as the rear wheels are raised off the ground. The distance that the landing legs are placed back from the nose of the van adds to this condition. This Command has taken action to fabricate a stand to be placed under king pin plate of the trailer when being discharged.

9. Incompatible with RO/RO Vessels: A test conducted 9 July 70 revealed that the MILVAN container on its chassis cannot negotiate the ramp of the USNS "Comet" when engaged to the Walter Tractor. The overhead clearance and ramp inclination is so configured that it does not allow ramp access to the vessel of the container/chassis combination. Though RO/RO vessels are not programmed to handle MILVAN traffic, this feature limits the flexibility of its use.

10. Roadability: MILVAN units moving in convoy to Nha Trang were observed to be top heavy and often swayed sufficiently to lift the tandem bogies completely off the road. This could be extremely dangerous particularly when operating on wet roadways and on mountainous highways.

11. Clearance Lights: The clearance lights are encased in an unprotected plastic case that will be easily damaged. The light bulbs are of a nonstandard federal variety. The reflectors likewise are encased in plastic. These items will not resist expected routine operational use and are quickly becoming non-operational.

12. Retrograde Applications:

a. This Command is finding a number of products offered for retrograde that are MILVAN container compatible. There should be in excess of 50 containers loaded with retrograde cargo when the Seatrain "Ohio" arrives on 16 August with its cargo of eighty loaded containers.

b. This Command has found out that C5A Galaxy aircraft departed CRE without cargo. It has been proposed to USA RV that MILVAN containers loaded with retrograde cargo be loaded, to test the flexibility of the equipment.

(c) Recommendations: To provide safer and efficient MILVAN operations, it is recommended that a series of modifications be made to the MILVAN chassis in the areas of landing gear and its compatibility with tactical (tractor) vehicles, and stability.
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C. Training:

1. Malassignments

(a) Observation: A high level of malassignments to this command is causing classroom and OJT training to be used not as refresher and improvement training but rather as initial training in job areas.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases training that is designed to bring previously trained personnel up to a high level of efficiency in a particular field is being forced into use as basic training in many fields. This places a greater burden on specialized unit operations such as a stevedore company which requires highly trained personnel to perform effectively.

d. Intelligence: None

f. Logistics:

1. Overstockage of Class I Frozen Items

(a) Observation: The US Army Depot - Cam Ranh Bay has experienced a series of excessive overstockage positions during the reporting period due to erratic receipt of perishable Class I supplies and over-estimates of resale requirements.

(b) Evaluation: Perishable Class I requirements must be reevaluated in light of expected troop reductions and reductions in resale requirements. Perishable subsistence shipments must be scheduled so as to coincide with required delivery dates (RDD).

(c) Recommendations: That information concerning troop reduction be made available so that troop issues can be accurately forecast sufficiently in advance of the 109 day order ship time. That coordination be effected with the transportation channels to provide orderly receipt of perishable Class I supplies and that continued evaluation of resale requirements be maintained.

2. Reporting Weapon/Ammunition Malfunctions

(a) Observation: Units experiencing weapon/ammunition malfunctions are required by AR 75-1, dated Nov 69, and USARV Supplement to AR 75-1 to submit two reports: one an immediate telephonic report within 24 hrs directly to the ammunition surveillance office at USARV, and a second detailed report through channels within 30 days.
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(b) Evaluation: The immediate report is of critical importance because it allows spontaneous local, i.e., theatre suspension to be initiated in order to prevent further malfunctioning until an investigation can be completed. Several incidents of weapons/ammunition malfunctions occurring this quarter were not given the proper immediate attention.

(c) Recommendation: That this subject be emphasized at all unit levels and the widest possible dissemination of requirements be effected.

6 Incl
as

Incl 3 thru 6 w/d HQ DA

H. R. DEL MAR
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 18 OCT 1970

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GCPD-DA, APO 96558
   Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Milvan Operations," page 25, paragraph 2b(1): concur. An intensive Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) program is being initiated for the MILVAN equipment. Unit has been so advised.

   b. Reference item concerning "Overstockage of Class I Frozen Items," page 29, paragraph 2f(1): concur. USARV Commodity Manager personnel, in conjunction with subsistence personnel of CRB, are exerting every effort to divert cargo from CRB during this critical period of overstockage, warehousing and inventory. As of 11 September 1970 a total of 42 vans (not all contain frozen items), manifested for CRB, have been diverted to other Army Depots. In addition to diversions of cargo close coordination action with the transportation division is being accomplished in an effort to improve and control ship arrival schedules. Every effort is made to have the ships arrive on designated RDD. Coordination includes requesting the assistance of DPSG Alameda in overcoming this problem. Troop reduction information is available to commodity managers and is used to apply the proper factor and to accurately forecast requirements. These factors are furnished depot Class I personnel to assist them in preparing requirements. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

\[Signature\]

Cy Turk
USASUPCOM-CRB
GPOP-DT (31 Jul 70) 2d Ind (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco, 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. Ozaki
CPT, AG
Asst AG

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### 39TH BASE POST OFFICE
#### Mail Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Incoming Mail</th>
<th>Outgoing Mail</th>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>717,477 lbs.</td>
<td>895,255 lbs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>529,233 lbs.</td>
<td>463,567 lbs.</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>523,330 lbs.</td>
<td>490,789 lbs.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Money Orders</th>
<th>Stamps</th>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>$1,533,740</td>
<td>$24,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>$1,245,127</td>
<td>$21,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>$1,358,307</td>
<td>$23,602</td>
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Inclosure 1
CASUALTIES

1. 54th General Support Group
   a. May 1970
      (1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 2
      (2) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 2
   b. June 1970
      (1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1
   c. July 1970
      (1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1
      (2) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 3

2. 124th Transportation Command
   a. May 1970
      (1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1
      (2) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 5
   b. June 1970
      (1) ETHER (Killed in action) 1
      (2) FRIAR Elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 2
      (3) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 4
   c. July 1970
      (1) REACH (Non-hostile death, after reaching medical facilities) 1
      (2) LOYAL (Non-hostile, VSI or SI) 1
      (3) FRIAR Elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 1
      (4) FRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 2
      (5) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 3

3. USAMMNAV
   a. May 1970
      (1) SPECIAL CATEGORY (Not VSI or SI, unable to communicate with next of kin) 1
      (2) FRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 1
   b. June
      None
   c. July
      None

Incl.

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4. USAD-CRB
   a. May 1970
      (1) REACH (Non-hostile death, after reach medical facilities) 1
   b. June 1970
      (1) PRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 1
      (2) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 2
   c. July 1970
      (1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1
      (2) PRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 6

5. USA.SUPCOM-CRB
   No casualty reports of any kind

6. HQ, Special Troops
   No casualty reports of any kind
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CG, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

31 July 1970

N/A

N/A

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310