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Best Available Copy
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
II Corps Tactical Zone, 18 November 1967
15 December 1967

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by Brigadier General John W. Barnes as Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone.

2. The contents of the report and the opinions expressed herein should not be construed as reflecting the official view or opinion of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam.

3. Brigadier General Barnes is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
1. The purpose of this report is to summarize significant occurrences within the II CTZ during the period of my tenure as Deputy Senior Advisor, 18 November 1967 - 15 December 1968. The report addresses primarily matters which directly affected the ARVN; however, changes in organization of the Advisory Group and related matters are also covered, but in less detail.

2. Dramatic improvements have occurred within the ARVN during this period. Many of these improvements resulted from normal evolution within this growing Army; others were due to greatly improved equipment furnished it; and much of it resulted from dedicated and increased advisory effort affecting all facets of ARVN activities. In my opinion, however, the most significant event, and one which favorably changed the course of the war effort in II Corps, was the realization by the ARVN and political leaders during the Communist TET offensive that the majority of the Vietnamese citizens were loyal and that the military and paramilitary forces were capable and willing to fight. Marked overall improvement in the RVNAF began at TET and has continued with increasing confidence and vigor. This spirit has been perpetuated constantly through the extremely competent leadership of the Corps Commander, Major General La Hong Lan, since his assumption of command on 1 March 1968.

3. Personnel Administration (Incl 1 and 1a):

   a. Inaccurate and untimely strength accounting procedures have presented the greatest problem area. Heretofore, accounting for personnel was accomplished primarily by the transmission of reports relating only to numbers of persons. Accounting will soon be improved appreciably by a system whereby personnel accounting will be accomplished by individuals' names. This improved system, with centralized control, should greatly reduce inaccuracies...
SUBJECT: Brief Report - Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone
(Brigadier General John W. Barnes)

In reporting by minimizing duplicative accounting, provide a method of closer, more accurate cross-checks, and more precisely account for absentees.

b. AWOL's and desertions remain a significant problem in most units. A comprehensive study by my staff for the purpose of identifying causes of high desertion rates has been completed and furnished to the Corps Commander, Senior Advisor, and ARVN J1. The study focused primarily on those aspects of the problem which are generally within the competence of the local commanders to correct. The ARVN II Corps staff contributed to this study and are enthusiastically cooperating in implementing the recommendations contained in it. (Annex A to Incl 1) Many contributing factors to desertion, such as inadequate appropriations for family housing, transportation means for persons on leave and restrictions on frequency and duration of leaves are beyond the capability of local commanders to correct. These should be addressed at the JCS level for resolution.

ii. Intelligence (Incl 2 and 2a)

b. Intelligence gathering capability within ARVN is grossly inadequate when compared to that of US units. This serious lack of sophistication was overcome to some degree through the formation of a Combined Interrogation Center composed of representatives from II Corps, 1st Infantry Division, and Company B, 5th Special Forces Group, where rapid dissemination of intelligence gathered from prisoners was effected. Additionally, combined tactical operations centers were established throughout the Corps, thus facilitating concurrent exploitation and dissemination of tactical intelligence.

c. Through excellent cooperative effort between US and ARVN major units, a long range reconnaissance patrol (LRP) training program was begun in mid-year. As a result of this program, a considerable LRP capability now exists in both ARVN Divisions. The 24th STZ LRP trainees are undergoing training at the present time. Generally, the LRP capability is being effectively utilized, although greater experience in its employment is needed by both staff planners and commanders to obtain full benefits from these elements.

d. A "Hand Hold Camera" program has been initiated throughout the II CTZ, including provinces. This program provides for more responsiveness to commanders in the field than does conventional aerial photographic means.

c. ARVN 02 staff and 02 Advisors now share office space or are collocated in most cases, again enhancing timely consultation and coordination. However, until such time as the RVNJF acquires more sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment, such as ground radar and radar equipped aircraft, starlight scopes, and infra-red detectors, ARVN will continue to depend to a significant degree on US intelligence assets. By combining ARVN-Advisor intelligence activities, advisors are in a position to rapidly provide to ARVN intelligence that is
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derived from the full spectrum of US assets. Concurrently, ARVN is especially helpful in assisting in the evaluation of intelligence from various sources due to their long experience and resultant expertise in evaluating VC and ARVN activity indicators.

5. Organization, Operations and Training (incl 3 and 3a)

a. Improvement in some ARVN units was such that a new concept of employment of advisors was initiated in August. The 22d ARVN Division advisory team was reduced by two-thirds of its personnel, thus permitting the Regimental and Battalion Commanders to employ their units with minimum advisory participation. This concept, employing Combat Assistance Teams (CAT), was implemented throughout the 22d Division by the end of my tenure as DSA. It is to be implemented throughout II CTZ as units reach a state of development where advisors are no longer needed. ARVN commanders have shown much enthusiasm for this concept, thus demonstrating tangibly their high confidence in both their own and their units' capabilities. Additional details of this innovation have been furnished by previous correspondences. End of Test Evaluation Report is at Annex A. One unresolved aspect of the CAT concept, which relates to Tech Service-type functions, particularly within Districts and Provinces, is under study at this headquarters. An example is signal support for advisors andsignal assistance to RF/FF and associated commanders when signal advisors with the ARVN divisions are withdrawn.

c. During recent months, combined operations have been the rule. Implementation of the "Fair OTW" concept has capitalized on assistance and support of nearby US units. This concept, wherein an ARVN unit is closely and habitually affiliated with a counterpart US unit for operations, including collocated command posts, has enabled ARVN to conduct sustained operations by battalions and larger units. Both ARVN and US capabilities have been enhanced by cross training of personnel in tactics and techniques unique to each nation's forces. This concept has contributed materially to promoting mutual confidence among the participating forces on the battlefield. Sustained operations of from ten to thirty days or longer have become routine as opposed to the three to five day pattern previously followed.

c. ARVN artillery units have demonstrated a high level of proficiency in basic artillery operations. Their exceptional spirit and initiative have greatly assisted advisors in developing helpful programs and in upgrading artillery procedures. Cooperation between ARVN and MACV artillery has also been greatly increased as the result of frequent seminars at Corps level and the Associate Battery Program. This latter program pairs off an ARVN artillery unit with a like MACV unit so that the latter may assist the ARVN unit in training, tactical and operational support. Improvements in artillery techniques, use of US-provided metro data, increased survey, frequent inspections, forward observer training (including RF/FP/AD cadre) and improved supply and maintenance procedures have combined to markedly improve the quality of ARVN artillery, as well as raise the confidence factor on the part of supported commanders.
d. A special study for evaluation of ARVN combat effectiveness was undertaken in Nov 67. Command programs resulting from this study significantly raised the standards of maneuver units, as has been subsequently demonstrated in combat. The MACV-initiated SEDR report also resulted from this study.

e. An Advisors Handbook was prepared and distributed to each advisor in II CTZ during my tenure. This handbook provides guidance in all aspects of advisory duty. Much favorable comment has emanated from recipients of this handbook, thus attesting to the need for such aid and assistance that has been derived from it.

f. Significant improvement in the ARVN II Corps force structure was realized during the period and additional increases in units and reorganizations are pending.

(1) During 1968, seven Regimental Reconnaissance Companies have been activated, trained, and deployed to each of the Infantry Regiments. This provided a much needed reconnaissance capability to each of the regiments.

(2) As a result of the National Mobilization Decree in March 1968, II Corps has activated and trained four additional infantry battalions. Three of these battalions were for the 53rd Infantry Regiment, 23rd Division and rounds the Division out at three Infantry Regiments. The 4/53 Battalion will be activated and complete its training by April 1969.

(3) The 21st STZ activated, trained, and will deploy the 4/122 Battalion in Kien Tu Province in December 1969. This rounds out the 42d Regiment with its authorized four battalions.

(4) In addition to the above activations, II Corps Artillery has formed two 105mm howitzer battalions, bringing the total battalions in II Corps to eight. This now provides some needed flexibility in the use of artillery. The 36th Artillery has deployed to the field; the 65th Artillery Battalion will complete training and deploy in February 1969.

(5) Two additional combat units, the 114th Armored Cavalry and an Armored Group Headquarters, are scheduled to be trained by February 1969. These activations will provide the Corps an Armored Cavalry Squadron in each of the Division Tactical Areas and the Special Tactical Zone. The Armored Group Headquarters will be the central headquarters for the three Armored Cavalry Squadrons assigned to the Corps.

5. Logistics (Incl 4 and 5)

a. During the past year, significant improvement has been evident in the ARVN logistical posture as well as that of the advisors who support them. The improvement in ARVN has been most noticeably evident in the improved posture of the combat units. Technical service units, however, lack many items that could enhance their capability. Among these major items of
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engineer and materials handling equipment, large capacity trucks for long haul convoys, and helicopter assets for movement of outposts and other outlying areas. Although increased stockage at sub depots has increased responsiveness, the primary shortcoming of the supply system is attributed to an innate dislike of ARVN subordinates to request assistance or to question the efficiency of a supporting activity. This lack of responsiveness and willingness not to seriously question what one receives is a major problem and one that the advisors are continuously striving to correct.

b. With the rapid build up of advisors at province and district levels, plus those assigned to new ARVN units, many problems occurred in providing adequate support under current funding limitations. Through the close cooperation of the MACV staff and the supporting USARV units, notably the 1st Logistical Command, the level of support has been raised to an acceptable level and is improving.

c. Specific items of interest in the logistics field are presented at the referenced inclusions, divided into those items pertaining to advisory support of ARVN (Incl 6) and those pertaining to the support of more than 2000 military advisors in II CTZ (Incl 6a).

7. Polvcr/Comm (Incl 5)

a. Radio Pleiku Psyops station, constructed in the latter part of 1967, was destroyed by enemy action in March of this year. Reconstruction was begun in June and the station is now scheduled for completion about the end of December. The new complex is larger in area, hardened, and the security force has been enlarged. The entire operation is far more secure than was the previous one. Although the generator and tower sections are somewhat vulnerable to enemy indirect fire, it is believed highly unlikely that the enemy can significantly damage this installation or cause cessation of operations for any appreciable period of time.

b. Improved coordination for combined PSYOPS has come about through the establishment of PSYOPS Support Centers in Pleiku and Binh Trang. The center located in Pleiku is responsible for six lowland provinces and the center located in Binh Trang is responsible for six lowland provinces, including Tuyen Duc. These centers analyze intelligence and extract that of PSYOPS value in order to draft themes and plan PSYOPS campaigns. They monitor the attitudes of the civilian populace within II CTZ and suggest public information programs. Members of the Centers draft leaflets and test them on sample target audiences to ensure their effectiveness. An air operations section processes all requests for aerial PSYOPS missions to ensure that there is a minimum of overlap and that adequate coverage is provided for all target areas. Centers are composed of representatives from PSYOP agencies of the three nation forces present in II CTZ.

8. Signal (Incl 6 and 6a) Expansion of Division Signal Companies to battalion size and, concurrently, establishment of an area communications
group will insure reliable area communications over all of the II CTZ. Battalions in Plei Ka and Imon Trau (one each) will provide this coverage. The group headquarters will also be located in Plei Ka. Completion of this program is planned for the end of CT 1969.

9. Engineer (Incl 7 and 7a) ARVN Engineers, while somewhat handicapped by shortages of critical major items and a preponderance of average heavy equipment, have made significant progress. They have accomplished many important tasks in support of combat operations, as well as upgrading LOC's in support of GVN programs. Equipment shortages are gradually being alleviated. As a result of close affiliation with US engineer units and advisor insistence, ARVN engineer maintenance is showing apparent improvement. Maintenance is one of the outstanding weak areas, however, and concerted and continuing emphasis by advisors will be required.

10. Broad Overview: During my first month as DS/i in November 1967, I toured all the provinces of II CTZ. In November 1968, I accompanied General Lr. Lan on a similar tour. The following observations are evidence of the significant improvements of RVNAF in II CTZ:

a. The PSDF is organized, identified by uniforms or distinctive insignia, is being trained and armed. Last year there was no PSDF.

b. The PP last year looked like today's PSDF. The PP is now better trained, organized and equipped than the PP was a year ago.

c. The RF last year looked like today's PP. Many RF companies are now better trained, organized and equipped than some of the ARVN units were a year ago.

d. Many ARVN units last year looked like today's RF. In my opinion, most of the ARVN battalions in II CTZ today could do an equal or better job than a comparable US unit, if equipped with similar firepower and mobility.

b. Last year, even before the TET aggression, the Vietnamese people wore exsanguinated, worn out, disorganized, without hope. This was reflected also in their armed forces. Today, the people are industrious, organized, alive with hope and confidence. And their armed forces are proud, increasingly competent, well-disciplined and confident. They know they can and will win this struggle for peace and freedom for their country. And so do I.

11. Comments/Recommendations:

a. Factors contributing to the high ARVN desertion rate that are beyond the cognizance of local commanders to correct should be addressed to the JCS. Priority of these factors are inadequate housing, insufficient means of reliable transportation for personnel going to/returning from
leave, and current restrictions imposed on soldiers that permit only 15 days
leave per year and which may be taken in not more than 7 or 8 day increments.
With regard to annual leave, it is recommended that a minimum of 20 days per
year be authorized, to be taken in increments of up to ten days, depending
on unit location and leave address. In exceptional cases, prerogatives
should be delegated to major subordinate commanders to adjust periods of
authorized leave upward to the full 20 days whose great travel distances
and/or other peculiar circumstances are involved.

b. Increased intelligence gathering capability by the RVNAF is mandatory
prior to withdrawal of major US combat forces from the area. The ARVN has
no electronic, aviation or other sophisticated intelligence gathering equip-
ment and must rely solely on the US and other RVNAF units for these assets.
Organic ARVN capability consists of recon patrols, agents and other human
means. It is imperative, therefore, that ARVN be trained and equipped in
advanced means of target acquisition and intelligence gathering. I recommend
that plans be formulated at the earliest practicable time for developing
such capabilities within the ARVN, to include personnel, tools and facilities.

c. The vulnerability of the Western Highlands, notably Kontum and Pleiku
Provinces, to infiltration and aggression by major enemy units is well known.
With the eventual withdrawal of the 4th US Infantry Division and other US
combat support elements, the remaining ARVN force will be grossly inadequate
for the mission of protecting the national borders and defending the cities
and hamlets. Even in the event of a cease fire and ultimate agreement for
withdrawal of all "foreign" forces, the Communist threat will remain. Al-
though ARVN equipment and fighting capability far exceeds that of the enemy,
it is reasonable to assume that the upgrading of enemy equipment, so notice-
able in the recent past, will continue - even accelerate - in the future.
I recommend, therefore, that the forces assigned to the 24th STZ be enlarged
to division size, along with sufficient aerial surveillance and fire support
means to fill the void that will be created by the withdrawal of the 4th
US Division.

d. Helicopter support furnished the ARVN by the VNAF is essentially
nil. On an average day, not more than two H34 aircraft are available for
these missions. Consequently, virtually all emergency medical evacuation
from the battlefields and other isolated areas is accomplished by US assets.
Similar conditions exist with respect to emergency re-supply of committed
forces. It is quite apparent that the ARVN cannot survive in combat with-
out this support, frequently needed on a massive scale. Moreover, without
such support, morale of the fighting elements would be intolerable. It is
recommending, therefore, that priority planning be aimed toward provision of
adequate organic (VNAF) helicopter airlift and aerial fire support, begin-
ning with up-graded aircraft (OH-1) for primary use in medevac. Command
arrangements or JGS policy permitting control of such aircraft by the major
MACTN-IIIC-DSA

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( Brigadier General John W. Barnes)

Although being supported would greatly enhance the benefits to be derived from them.

7 Incl.

J O H N  W. B A R N E S
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
Inclosure 1 to Brief Report - USA, II Corps Tactical Zone, 13 November 1967 to 15 December 1967

I. A/RV Support

a. General:

1. The volume of strictly US advisor administration has been, and still is, a chief contender for 3-1 advisor time and effort.

2. Prior to September the 3-1 advisor section was organized functionally to accomplish the US administration mission as a first priority. It was estimated that approximately 15 per cent of time and effort was devoted to the advisory role at that time. A request had been submitted for additional staff for the 3-1 Section in order to remedy this situation, but about the same time the Senior Advisor, II Corps announced his desire that administrative matters applicable to CORPS be assigned by that organization. With this possibility in view the request was not acted upon.

3. Since September and within the present scope authorization the 3-1 Advisory Section rearranged functional responsibilities which returned the Adjutant General Advisor and his two enlisted advisors virtually 100 per cent to the ARVN advisory role. In addition the Deputy 3-1 Advisor was given greater responsibility for supervision of US matters thus freeing to a greater extent the 3-1 Advisor to the advisor function.

b. It is expected that when the loss of the responsibility for administrative support of CORPS is fully realized, the 3-1 Advisor Section will be able to perform both US and advisory functions more satisfactorily.

II. A/RV Strength Accountability

A. A significant improvement in this important area has been made during the last year. From accounting for personal essentially by numbers, it has progressed to where by the end of 1967 all A/RV, including RVN, including SS/T, will be accounted for by name. Loss of accountability for A/RV personal who are in transit has been reduced. Despite improvement strength accountability remains a major problem essentially to the following:

1. Failure of R/V to realize the significance of accurate strength accountability.

2. Inaccurate input data at the lowest levels.

3. Poor communications.

4. The same or similar names and duplicated social numbers.

B. The first quarters of calendar 1968 should see a system initiated in RV which is similar to the monthly US personnel roster. This will be sent by US to the field, corrected by the unit and returned. This should greatly improve strength accountability; however, it is still dependent upon accuracy of input data at the lower levels.

incl f
III. AVI Interpreter Program: A significant improvement in this program was realized when the 25 advisor was successful in getting interpreters transferred for administrative support purposes to the ARV unit nearest his duty station. Prior to this all interpreters were assigned and administered by the II Corps at Pleiku. This required them to travel to Pleiku for any administrative requirement, including monthly pay, which resulted in much lost time.

IV. AVI Desertions: Despite a concerted effort to bring this situation within acceptable bounds, the number of desertions in 1966 far exceeded the previous year. Some units, those more favorably located in static positions, remain low in desertions, while others, particularly the maneuver regiments, remain high. As of November 1966 there is little concrete evidence of improvement in this area. See Annex A.

V. Effective 1 September 1966 ARV II Corps relinquished to JCS the responsibility for support of the Recruiting and Induction Center at Pleiku except for providing security. The advisor position at the RIC Center is to be transferred to JCS advisor level eventually.

VI. ARV Project Related Activities:

A. ARV Military Police activities throughout II Corps Tactical Zone have improved considerably during the past year in most all aspects of military police operations and functioning of the two prisoner of war camps.

1. Several programs to enhance military police and prisoner of war camp operations have been instituted and are effective. Examples are:

   a. Centralized Basic Sargent’s training course to improve and standardize this function throughout the Corps;

   b. Military Police photographic courses to train ARV technicians in the operation of photographic equipment and in photography techniques;

   c. Specific training programs designed to improve the performance of ARV officers and non-commissioned officers in their specific duty within the 2d OC Battalion and the QC Award Company at each POW camp;

   d. Combined military police patrols (US, ARV, AVI and National Police) are in effect in most of the Corps area.

     a. Work programs for the prisoners are very effective at the Pleiku (CS-let) POW Camp and are developing at the Qu Linh (Palmax) POW Camp.

     b. Considerable construction and/or renovation of facilities and defense structures has been accomplished at the 2d OC Battalion and each of the POW camps. The construction program has been directed at providing the following:

       a) Better fortifications and defensive measures for each installation.

       b) Better living and recreational facilities for the ARV soldier on duty at each installation.
(c) Improved working conditions for ARVN units on duty at each installation.

(d) Improved sanitation, medical, and living facilities at each ARVN camp.

(e) Improved facilities for advisors on duty at each installation.
1. (U) PROBLEM: To study the circumstance surrounding the II Corps desertion situation, to identify and isolate causes, and to make recommendations in an effort to eliminate the cause or reduce its effect.

2. (U) ASSUMPTIONS:

   a. That those activities normally considered as conducive to morale and welfare of the individual U.S. soldier are equally influential and applicable to the Vietnamese soldier.

   b. That the overall political and military situation will continue to exert a similar influence on morale and welfare of the ARVN soldier as it has in the past.

   c. That the slower moving projects requiring large appropriations of money and material such as family housing will not have an appreciable effect on the immediate desertion problem.

3. (U) FACTS:

   a. Past statistics on desertions are in such form, lacking, or sufficiently inaccurate as to make meaningful comparison and trend studies difficult or inconclusive.

   b. Except in the more obvious areas, i.e., prolonged operations in isolated areas, inadequate family housing, etc., it is difficult for an American advisor to identify and place in proper perspective the real influences which may contribute to the inclination to desert.

4. (C) DISCUSSION:

   a. (U) The continuing study and evaluation of the ARVN desertion problem within II Corps Tactical Zone consisted of the following during the month of October:

      (1) Continued analysis of the desertion statistics particularly as applicable to September. Tab 1 is a tabulation of the rates of desertion for every unit and detachment in the regular force and by Province for the regional and popular forces.

      (2) A questionnaire type survey was made of the majority of the battalion size units of the regular force within the Corps and is summarized in Tab 2.

      (3) An evaluation of ARVN efforts to comply with the requirements of JCS Memorandum 1317, 22 June 1966 (Tab 3) to assist individual soldiers on leave is discussed in para 3 below.
b. (C) An analysis of the statistical data from September as taken from the official QD 22 strength report revealed the following:

1. The reliability and accuracy of strength accounting and reporting beginning at the lowest level, remains a significant administrative problem in ARVN. As applicable to desertions it is difficult to know with accuracy just how many soldiers are actually in desertion status at a given time. Strength reports as they filter to higher headquarters are usually accepted at face value even though there may be cause to question their accuracy. An example of this is in the 23d Division which reported on 30 September to have 175 men in desertion. Advisory inquiry was made as to what prompted the significant improvement and it was learned that the actual figure should have been 320 which was only a slight improvement over August.

2. The ARVN desertion problem is heavily concentrated in the maneuver units. During the month of September 52 percent of the Corps regular strength was in the 2d Ranger Group and the seven infantry regiments, yet those units had approximately 86 percent of the total desertions for Corps regular forces. In several cases the problem within the regiment is concentrated in a single battalion. In September the 4th Battalion of the 22d Regiment had 66 percent of the regimental total; 23d Ranger Battalion provided 61 percent of the Group’s total; and the 2d Battalion 14th Regiment provided 51 percent of the regiment’s total.

3. Six regular force battalion size units (one the 1st Battalion 17th Regiment) reported no desertions for the month of September as did forty-five separate company and detachment size units.

4. II Corps regular force rate per thousand for September appears to be 15.9 as opposed to 17.8 per thousand among all RVNAF regular forces for the month of August.

5. Three of the infantry regiments, 11st, 22d and 52d, and the 2d Ranger Group showed decreases in September over August. A slight increase was experienced in the 10th, 14th and the 17th regiments. A significant increase was experienced in the 15th Regiment.

c. (U) The survey mentioned in para ha(2) above and summarized at Tab 2 was designed to evaluate those activities over which a division, regimental or smaller unit commander could reasonably be expected to exert some influence if he was so inclined. If implemented to the fullest such activities could be expected to contribute to the morale and welfare of the individual soldier and collectively reduce desertion rates. The 37th Artillery Battalion is considered to be an excellent example of success in this respect and the evaluation of that unit is shown at Tab 6.

d. (C) In the 24th STZ the conditions of enemy and isolation are such as to make assignment there something to avoid if possible. There is a strong indication that many are successful in doing so. Talk circulates among ARVN too freely not to have some basis in truth, that the 24th STZ and to a lesser degree the 23d STZ is the place to send the substandard soldier or the individual who may have proven unsatisfactory in another more desirable assignment or
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SUNJECT: Staff Study

If not actually true there is sufficient ARVN feeling to the contrary as to have the same effect as being true. This situation serves to present commanders in this area with a ready made disciplinary problem.

e. (U) JGS Memorandum 1849, 22 June 1968, prescribes procedures and responsibilities of the soldier's unit, Sector in which he is stationed and the Sector in which he will take leave, for assisting the soldier while on leave (Tab 3). If properly implemented this action should serve to appreciably reduce desertions. An individual delayed by transportation problems in this system need not be carried as absent without leave or in desertion. A preliminary survey of seven Provinces and the 24th STZ shows that compliance with this directive in Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, Phu Yen, Phu Bon and Binh Dinh has not yet been realized in the spirit intended. The 24th STZ, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces show marginal effectiveness.

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS: The study does not deal with those unavoidable conditions of prolonged combat, troops fighting in isolated areas, soldiers away from home, etc, but attempts to look at some of the smaller aspects of morale and welfare which a commander might exert some degree of influence at all levels and in spite of the larger problems. In this light the following have been concluded.

a. Despite any improvement in recent years in the area of positive and continued concern for the morale and welfare of the individual soldier it appears to remain a significant hangover at the unit level.

b. Directives from JGS which could be expected to improve morale and welfare if carried out are not being implemented at the unit level.

c. Special services type activities within the unit are not actively pursued particularly in the less desirable areas.

d. Troops are not relieved often enough from extended periods of operations in the field.

e. ARVN does not have a satisfactory sense of urgency in insuring that all soldiers are paid in full and on time all the time.

f. Whereas the handling of personal mail in most cases appears to be satisfactory there are cases where this is not given sufficient emphasis.

g. Orientation and continued troop information and education of the individual soldier is not effective in many cases.

h. Too many obstacles confront the individual soldier which prevent him from gaining the most from the restrictive leave authorized. Transportation is the essential drawback.

i. Recognition of the basic individual soldier in small ways can be greatly improved.
i. For the most part there is only token effort to stimulate pride of the individual soldier in his squad, platoon, company and to make him want to identify with it.

k. ARVN commanders, concerned with larger problems, often overlook the relatively small actions which they could take and which could contribute to improved morale and welfare.

6. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That increased emphasis be placed by ARVN commanders and staff to promote the less obvious aspects of morale and welfare as applicable to the individual soldier concurrently with emphasizing the larger and slower moving programs.

b. That all ARVN inspections, command staff visits, regardless of purpose, include an evaluation of morale and welfare activities and how well the unit cares for troops within its own resources.

c. That aggressive follow-up by ARVN commanders on directives be made to insure compliance by lower commanders, particularly as applies to leave and pass.

d. That positive assistance be given the lower commander by the higher commander in solving morale and welfare problems.

e. That ARVN look specifically into circumstances surrounding morale and welfare in the 24th STZ and 23rd DTA.

f. That more positive procedures be instigated to insure that trainees arrive in the unit after finishing basic training.

g. That ARVN commanders, particularly at battalion and company level, improve their day to day strength accounting.

h. That ARVN commanders be encouraged to establish activities on a continuing basis at battalion and company level designed to entertain and relax the soldier. Particular attention should be paid to supervised and organized athletic programs which require less equipment and funds. Stimulate athletic competition between squads and platoons. Search out local soldier and civilian talent for entertaining rather than rely essentially on the infrequent professional entertainers. That A&R officers and non-commissioned officers be appointed at company and battalion level.

i. That a more positive provision be made in all prolonged field operations, possibly connected with the resupply operation, to systematically return individuals or small units to the rear areas for rest, relaxation and diversion.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Staff Study

That ARVN commanders place greater emphasis on letter writing as a means of family contact. That where writing materials are not readily available provide them. That where illiteracy is a consideration the services of a literate assistant be made available.

That particular attention be given to the control of finance records, particularly when an individual transfers. That on payday the pay officers be given a higher priority on the available transportation. That where timely pay is unavoidable that corrective action be given a high priority.

That orientation be more on the positive side, in addition, to what an individual cannot do, dwell elaborately on what he can do. That current events, local and national be presented and discussed, in an effort to keep the soldier better informed. That where possible voluntary classes in other than strictly military subjects be presented using officers and NGOs as instructors.

Leave is greatly influenced by operational need for manpower. Each commander should review his practices and procedures in insuring that maximum leave opportunity is afforded all men, and that "operational necessity" does not continuously preclude leave. That the granting of leave and pass is on an equitable basis with accurate records kept to preclude overlooking anyone. That every effort be made at all levels to insure that, once leave is granted, the soldier is actively assisted in gaining the most from it.

That, in addition to recognition in the way of awards and decorations from the higher echelons, the small unit commander make maximum use of letters of appreciation and commendation. That individuals be singled out of formations and publicly recognized for any worthy accomplishment or action. That a system similar to the U.S. "soldier of the week, month, etc" be instigated. That honorary positions similar to "commanders orderly" be considered. That "best squad/platoon" competition be organized and exploited.

That housing continue to receive high priority attention.

That awards and decorations and any other type of recognition of the individual soldier continues to receive strong emphasis from advisors. That ARVN commanders continue to emphasize the value gained by recognition and that greater emphasis be paid to the lower ranks without lessening attention paid to the higher ranking soldiers.
## Personnel Status Report - As of 30 Sep 68

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Tab 1  
Incl 1
### KIN

**PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT - AS OF 30 SEP 68**

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| 40th Inf Regt Hq Hq Co      | 250       | 263       | 0     | 0         |
| Recon Co                    | 108       | 109       | 0     | 0         |
| 1st Bn                      | 638       | 591       | 12    | 20.3      |
| 2nd Bn                      | 638       | 587       | 9     | 15.1      |
| 3rd Bn                      | 638       | 589       | 5     | 8.4       |
| 4th Bn                      | 638       | 620       | 10    | 16.1      |
| Sub Total                   | 2910      | 2759      | 36   | 13.0      |

| 41st Inf Regt Hq Hq Co      | 520       | 244       | 0     | 0         |
| Recon Co                    | 108       | 115       | 1     | 8.6       |
| 1st Bn                      | 638       | 575       | 13    | 31.3      |
| 2nd Bn                      | 638       | 516       | 20    | 38.7      |
| 3rd Bn                      | 638       | 549       | 9     | 16.3      |
| 4th Bn                      | 638       | 572       | 17    | 29.7      |
| Sub Total                   | 2910      | 2571      | 65   | 25.2      |

| 47th Inf Regt Hq Hq Co      | 250       | 285       | 1     | 3.5       |
| Recon Co                    | 108       | 105       | 0     | 0         |
| 1st Bn                      | 638       | 532       | 0     | 0         |
| 2nd Bn                      | 638       | 583       | 1     | 6.8       |
| 3rd Bn                      | 638       | 571       | 5     | 8.6       |
| 4th Bn                      | 638       | 572       | 12    | 20.9      |
| Sub Total                   | 2910      | 2701      | 22   | 8.1       |

**TOTAL 22d INF DIV:**

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Incl 2
# PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT - AS OF 30 SEP 68

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| 11th Inf Regt HQ Co         | 250       | 277        | 6     | 21.6      |
| Recon Co                    | 108       | 116        | 3     | 25.8      |
| 1st Bn                      | 633       | 535        | 7     | 13.0      |
| 2nd Bn                      | 633       | 629        | 98    | 156.0     |
| 3rd Bn                      | 638       | 510        | 24    | 47.9      |
| 4th Bn                      | 638       | 609        | 42    | 69.0      |
| Sub Total                   | 2910      | 2676       | 180   | 67.3      |

| 45th Inf Regt HQ Co         | 250       | 254        | 1     | 3.9       |
| Recon Co                    | 108       | 105        | 0     | 0         |
| 1st Bn                      | 638       | 549        | 14    | 25.5      |
| 2nd Bn                      | 638       | 570        | 10    | 17.5      |
| 3rd Bn                      | 638       | 580        | 6     | 10.3      |
| 4th Bn                      | 638       | 570        | 26    | 47.4      |
| Sub Total                   | 2910      | 2628       | 57    | 21.7      |

| 53rd Inf Regt HQ Co         | 250       | 674        | 1     | 1.4       |
| Recon Co                    | 108       | 73         | 1     | 13.6      |
| 1st Bn                      | 638       | 553        | 39    | 61.0      |
| 2nd Bn                      | 638       | 609        | 15    | 24.6      |
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# PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT - AS OF 30 SEP 68

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**TOTAL REGIONAL UNITS:** 48269 53553 441 9.2

*Incl 5*
### Personnel Status Report - As of 30 Sep 68

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### Recapitulation:

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**TOTAL II CTZ:**

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Incl 6
SUBJECT: Causes for ARVN Desertion

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The Corps G-1 and G-1 Advisor have been given the requirement to restudy the desertion situation in ARVN, isolate causes and recommend corrective action. A deliberate course of action, including interviews, visits and inspections, with a review of past actions and accomplishments has been implemented, but will take more time than can be tolerated to effect immediate reduction in desertion rates.

2. Attached is a questionnaire type survey covering some of the many contributing factors to morale and welfare and, accordingly, influence desertion. The questionnaire does not pretend to cover all causes for desertion and advisors will include others which effect their particular units. The questionnaire is battalion oriented in the interest of obtaining an evaluation of the situation as it exists at troop level. Regimental advisors will complete a similar report as it applies at that level. Reports will be reviewed at intervening headquarters, additions made if necessary, but consolidation is not required or desired.

3. The final report will be completed and returned to this headquarters not later than 25 October 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Wayne M. Remie

/CPT, AGO Admin Officer

DISTRIBUTION:
Sl. ea DTA & STZ, Regt, Op, Bn, Sqdn - 1
Sl. ea Province & District - 1
INFO ISD DEPCORDS - 1

Tab 2
Special Service Type Activities

1. Describe the special services type program of entertainment, sports, reading material, radios, TVs, movies, etc., which is actually provided.
2. Do the officers and NCOs take an active interest in these activities?
3. Do you feel the program is satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
4. What recommendations have you made with respect to this program.

Mail Distribution

1. Describe the procedures for distribution of personal mail to the troops with particular emphasis on timeliness.
2. Are the soldiers encouraged to write letters and what are the procedures for getting soldier mail out? Is it expeditiously handled?
3. What problems are encountered in the handling of personal mail?
4. Do you feel the personal mail program is satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
5. What recommendations with respect to the handling of personal mail have you made?

Pay Procedures

1. Describe the procedures to pay the troops.
2. Are troops paid on time?
3. What is the approximate number of troops that do not get paid on time? What are the most common reasons?
4. Where a man does not get paid on time what are the procedures to correct this?
5. What are the essential problems in effecting timeliness of pay and allowances?
6. Are the pay procedures considered satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
7. What recommendations have you made in improving pay procedures?

Areas Where Desertion is Most Likely

1. Is there a particular category of soldier where desertion is more prevalent? (New trainees, etc.)
2. What are the practices and procedures to cope with this situation?

Inclosure #1
Orientation of Troops

1. Outline the procedures to effect orientation of soldiers on desertion.

2. On which aspect of desertion is the most emphasis placed, benefits to the unit and soldier by not deserting, or punishments if he does desert?

3. Do you feel the orientation efforts are satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

4. What recommendations have you made to improve the timely orientation of troops?

Information and Education

1. Is there an information and education program designed to keep the soldier informed?

2. Outline the practices and procedures used.

3. Is the information program satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

4. What have been your recommendations to improve the program?

Family Situations

1. Outline the present family housing situation as applicable to the unit you advise.

2. What are the plans for family housing in the future?

3. Do the soldiers know of these plans?

4. Do you feel the family housing is satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

5. What recommendations have been made to improve the housing situation?

6. What has been the commanders actions toward family housing?

7. Is there a PX immediately available?

8. Is there a commissary immediately available?

9. If there is no PX or commissary are there plans for such and do the soldiers know of these plans?

Leaves, Pass or Other Free Time

1. Does the unit have an active leave program?

2. Does the soldier know what his leave entitlements are?

3. Where leave is denied are the soldiers informed as to why?
1. What is the practice of the unit with regard to pass other than leave?

5. What is the practice of the unit with regard to free time for personal use after operations?

6. What is the practice with regard to special leave (emergency, hardship, etc).

7. Is the leave and pass program considered satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

8. What recommendations have been made to improve this program?

Individual and Small Unit Recognition

1. What is the practice and procedure with regard to recognizing individual and unit accomplishments?

2. Is there a practice of reward for low desertion rates to squads, platoons, companies?

3. What are the practices and procedures used to encourage a soldier to identify with his squad, platoon or company?

4. Are promotions, within regulations and authorizations, timely and equitable?

5. Are ceremonies held to publically recognize awards, promotions, etc?

Punishment

1. Within ARVN regulations is punishment for offenses fair, equitable, and commensurate with the offense?

2. Are the punishment practices considered satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

3. What recommendations have been made with respect to punishment?

Individual Equipment and Messing

1. Are troops equipped with those items of equipment normally issued to an individual soldier?

2. Is the equipping of the individual soldier, within ARVN authorization, considered satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

3. Is a high degree of interest shown by officers and non-commissioned officers in getting the troops fed on time and in the best manner?

4. Is troop feeding considered satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

5. What recommendations have been made in the areas of individual equipment and messing?
Discussion of Causes

List in the order of greatest influence the causes for JWVI desertion among soldiers of the unit you advise. Indicate for each actions you have taken and actions proposed. Indicate for each required actions which you feel cannot be taken at the level of the unit you advise.
SUMMARY OF SURVEY

1. Purpose: To evaluate ARVN efforts and accomplishments at providing for the individual soldiers in selected areas of interest which normally contribute to morale and welfare and which could be expected to influence desertions.

2. Background: JCS has continually issued directives to the field charging commanders to provide for the morale and welfare of the individual soldier as a primary prevention or reduction of desertions. Specific areas have been stressed, i.e., pay and allowances, dependent housing, PX and commissary, awards and decorations, promotions, rest and recuperation, leave, sports activities, troop information and education, punishment, material comforts, leadership, and command attention to the individual soldier. One of the continuously offered causes for desertion is the failure at unit level to effectively implement the directives of higher headquarters. The survey conducted in October attempts to gain an evaluation from the advisor of selected activities connected with morale and welfare.

3. Primary Areas of Interest:

   a. Special Services Type Activities.

      (1) Discussion: Essential to soldier morale are those social, entertainment, athletic and recreational activities designed to periodically divert attention from the daily rigors of combat. Though there are examples to the contrary, as in the 37th Artillery, such activities are not provided to an appreciable degree in ARVN units, particularly those on prolonged operations or in isolated situations. Even some units located or operating in favorable areas fail to realize the value of these activities and permit the individual soldier to find his own diversion. Sports activities, normally requiring a minimum expenditure of money and supplies, are not promoted at all in some cases and to a limited extent in others. Volleyball seems to be the only sport that gets attention. Small games of the chess-cheeker type are seldom in evidence. Radios are usually the property of individuals where they do exist. Motion pictures are few and far between and are sometimes in the English language. Live variety or musical type shows are seldom more frequent than once per month under the best of circumstances and usually do not go below regimental level. Commanders are hampered where funds are needed and where operations are necessary, but there is a serious lack of interest and effort in promoting this type of activity from within his own unit.

      (2) Conclusion: Special services type activities particularly as a battalion or company can provide for itself are not actively pursued. This is particularly true in units located in less desirable areas.

      (3) Recommendations: That ARVN commanders be encouraged to establish activities on a continuing basis at battalion and company level designed to entertain and relax the soldier. Particular attention should be paid to supervised and organized athletic programs which require less equipment and funds. Stimulate athletic competition between squads and Platoons. Search out local soldier and civilian talent for entertaining rather than rely essentially on the infrequent professional entertainers. That J&R officers and non-commissioned officers be appointed at company and battalion level.
b. Extended Operations Without Relief.

(1) Discussion: JCS and Corps have stressed the necessity for periodic resting of troops in the interest of improving morale and combat efficiency. Commanders at the unit level either cannot or will not give this similar stress. This situation is particularly true in the 116th and 22d Regiments and two battalions of the 2d Ranger Group. The effects on morale under these conditions can be partially offset by strong leadership as in the case of the 22d Ranger Battalion. Prolonged operations away from home station and under adverse conditions is given as a significant cause for desertion, but periodic relief on a small unit or individual basis is too often overlooked.

(2) Conclusions: Troops are not relieved often enough from extended periods of operating under field conditions for the purpose of rest and relaxation in the interest of morale and welfare.

(3) Recommendations: That a more positive provision be made in all prolonged field operations, possibly connected with the resupply operation, to systemically return individuals or small units to the rear areas for rest, relaxation and diversion.

c. Handling of Personal Mail.

(1) Discussion: GVN postal system is sufficiently unreliable as an efficient and rapid means of communication as to discourage ready reliance upon it by the individual soldier. Delivery from Saigon to Duc My, Kontum Province, may be as much as two weeks. Except where units are on operations mail is generally handled expeditiously with daily deliveries in many cases. An exception to this is in the 1st Battalion 53rd Infantry Regiment where command interest appears to be minimal and delays of one or two days are experienced within the battalion. Soldiers are generally encouraged to write letters as a means of contact with their families, however much greater emphasis could be placed here as well as providing writing material. Locator systems are not adequate to readily handle redirected mail for those who have transferred or otherwise left the unit. Delivery of mail to troops on operations is dependent upon transportation effective resupply, is irregular and infrequent.

(2) Conclusions: Where as the handling of personal mail in most cases appears to be satisfactory there are cases where this is not given sufficient emphasis. Encouraging the use of the mail as a form of contact with family is insufficient in many cases.

(3) Recommendations: That ARVN commanders place greater emphasis on letter writing as a means of family contact. That where writing materials are not readily available provide them. That where illiteracy is a consideration the services of a literate assistant be made available.

d. Pay Procedures.

(1) The RVNAF pay and allowance system is complicated and not exceptionally efficient, but at the unit level payment is generally made on time (for those on the payroll) except in cases requiring transportation of the pay officer. Finance records are occasionally lost and new men report to the unit without
records. Soldiers transferred to a unit in the last half of the month can
be paid advance pay by the losing unit, but where this is not done the soldier
waits until the second payday in his new unit before being paid. There are
many potential hindrances to timely pay but an increased realization of the
effects on morale when pay is delayed for even a short period of time would
serve to offset the effects of some of the unavoidable delays.

(2) Conclusions: ARVN in general does not have a satisfactory sense of
urgency in insuring that all soldiers are paid in full and on time all the time.

(3) Recommendations: That particular attention be given to the control
of finance records particularly when an individual transfers. That on payday
the pay officer be given a higher priority on the available transportation.
That where timely pay is unavoidable that corrective action be given a high
priority.

d. Orientation, Troop Information and Education.

(1) Discussion: The greatest source of desertions is from the newly
assigned trainees. Many of them desert before arriving at their duty stations
or shortly thereafter. An effective orientation, information and education
program should bear fruit in this area, but as a general rule such programs
in ARVN II Corps units are not effective. Such programs in the 45th and 42nd
Regiments are marginally satisfactory and are considered unsatisfactory in
the 53rd Regiment. Troops are generally not kept informed of the happenings
even in their immediate surroundings through the efforts of their units. As
applicable to desertions the orientation of troops normally takes the form of
a talk centered essentially around the subject of the punishment which can be
imposed, the disgrace to the individual and his family, with little emphasis
being placed on benefits accrue the individual, the unit, and the war effort
of the country, etc, by always remaining present and ready for duty.

(2) Conclusions: Orientation and continued troop information and
education of the individual soldier is not effective in many cases.

(3) Recommendations: That orientation be more on the positive side, in
addition, to what an individual cannot do, dwell elaborately on what he can do.
That current events, local and national be presented and discussed, in an ef-
fort to keep the soldier better informed. That where possible voluntary classes
in other than strictly military subjects be presented using officers and NCOs
as instructors.

e. Leave, Pass or Other Free Time. (see below)

(1) Discussion: JGS authorizes up to five percent of the command to be on
leave at any one time. A maximum of 15 days annually but no more than 7 or 8
days at one time. Special leave is also authorized over and above this when
an emergency situation warrants. Passes are authorized and encouraged

(A recent change affecting leave of trainees was not considered in making
this study. JGS Directive announcing the change is attached at Tab 5.)
communicate with the mission and the tactical situation. On the surface this might be considered reasonable under the war time circumstance, but there are so many interferences with the soldier's getting the most from his leave that it is no wonder that he would at least consider absenting himself. Transportation is the biggest hindrance—it just does not exist in many cases except as the soldier can manage for himself. JCS Memorandum 18h9, 22 June 1968, prescribes procedures and responsibilities of the soldier's unit, the Sector in which he is stationed, and the Sector in which he will take leave, for assisting the soldier while on leave (incl 4). If properly implemented this action should serve to appreciably reduce desertions. An individual legitimately delayed by transportation problems in this system need not be carried as absent without leave. A preliminary survey of six Sectors and the 21st STZ indicates that compliance with the directive in Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon are not really effective in the sense intended by the directive. The 21st STZ, Pleiku and Kontum Sectors are marginally effective. As of this date sufficient interest in assisting the individual soldier to get the most from his leave is not manifested by any reliable and substantive actions.

(2) Conclusions: Too many obstacles confront the individual soldier which prevent him from gaining the most from the restrictive leave authorized. Transportation is the essential drawback. Practices in some units are not in conformity with the new directives of higher headquarters or in the best interest of the individual soldier.

(3) Recommendations: Leave is greatly influenced by operational need for manpower. Each commander should review his practices and procedures in insuring that maximum leave opportunity is afforded all men, and that "operational necessity" does not continuously preclude leave. That the granting of leave and pass is on an equitable basis with accurate records kept to preclude overlooking anyone. That every effort be made at all levels to insure that, once leave is granted, the soldier is actively assisted in gaining the most from it.

6. Individual and Small Unit Recognition and Identification.

(1) Discussion: Within companies and battalions, with some exception, there is little or no effort to recognize accomplishment of individuals or subunits. There is little fostering of competition between squads, platoons or companies. There are few "best platoon", etc. Activities and actions designed to make a soldier proud of the fact that he is a member of given unit are weak. With particular respect to desertions it appears to be rare that a unit with low desertion rates is complemented or pointed up as a good example. Certificates of achievement or letters of appreciation at the lower levels are not often used. 1st Battalion 15th Regiment, 1st Battalion 53rd Regiment, and 2nd Battalion 22nd Regiment appear to be lacking or weak in these esprit developing activities.

(2) Conclusions: Recognition of the basic soldier is small ways can be greatly improved. For the most part only take effort is made to stimulate price of the individual soldier in his squad, platoon, or company to make him want to identify with it.
h. Family housing.

(1) Discussion: The lack of adequate dependent housing is undoubtedly a great influence on morale and welfare of the ARVN soldier. As of 30 Sep 68 units in II CTZ have requested 23,146 housing units. JOS has allocated a total of 6,991 during prior years. During FY 68, 816 more were allocated and 750 for FY 69. FY 69 allocation is distributed as follows: 22d Inf Div 350, 23d Inf Div 300, 2d Ranger Group and 12d Ross 50 each. Contracts are let for FY 68 housing units. Even if all units allocated were actually built and in use they would provide to only 36% of the requested (and assumed required). Whatever degree of influence inadequate housing may have on the present desertion rates will continue to be felt for many more months. Self-help programs have provided some relief, but limitations of materials are soon reached.

(2) Conclusions: That family housing is inadequate in quantity and in many cases quality. That the development of the program is slow and can not be expected to effect for the better the immediate desertion rates to any great extent.

(3) Recommendations: That housing continue to receive high priority attention.

i. Awards and Decorations.

(1) Discussion: The recognition of individuals by awarding of one of the established awards or decorations has improved in ARVN essentially through Advisory emphasis. Awards are made to officers and non-coms rather readily. Though these two categories would naturally receive the lions share, the lesser ranks could be recognized more often. It remains a continued push on the part of Advisors to stimulate officers at the lower levels to initiate a recommendation. Many officers still do not realize the value of recognition for valor and merit and without an outside stimulus would probably recommend very few. Particularly lacking is recognition in some small way of an individual soldier who has done well but the performance warrants recognition only at the lower level and does not qualify for one of the established awards.

(2) Conclusions: Whereas recognition by an award or decoration has improved it still requires continued emphasis particularly as applicable to the lowest ranks. That recognition in small ways for good performance could be greatly improved.

(3) Recommendations: That awards and decorations and any other type of recognition of the individual soldier continues to receive strong emphasis from advisors. That ARVN commanders continue to emphasize the value gained by recognition and that greater emphasis be paid to the lower ranks without lessening attention paid to the higher ranking soldiers.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Providing Assistance to Personnel on Leave

REFERENCE: Memorandum #112b/TT/1/CH/PH, 14 September 1967
Memorandum #8903/TT/1/VT/V/2, 9 December 1967
Memorandum #513/TT/1/PO/09, 4 March 1967

1. PURPOSE: Based upon the above referenced memorandums and actual case studies, JGS is cognizant that some servicemen may have to extend their leave beyond the time which has been authorized to them. In addition, JGS has determined that in some cases, the individual soldier had affected the necessary coordination with local agencies to declare being reported as a deserter, however, upon their return to their unit they had been dropped as a deserter. At the present time, this problem still exists due to the lack of cooperation among local authorities. With the purpose of helping servicemen on leave, JGS has set forth the following measures for units and agencies to study and execute.

2. DUTIES:

a. Parent Unit: The granting of leave does not only satisfy service-men's appropriate benefits but also affords them the opportunity to visit their family, settle family problems and relax after many days of work.

- Ensuring that all personnel in their unit are granted their leaves, particularly annual leave.

- Providing transportation so that personnel can enjoy all of their leave days.

- Providing sufficient information relating to procedures personnel must adhere to on the way to and from their leave address. Unit Commanders must pay particular attention to over extended leave cases as explained in referenced Memorandums 1 and 3 above.

b. Special Zones, Sectors and Special Sectors: Establish a Guidance Section to counsel and guide servicemen who are on leave. This Guidance Section will be operated by the Section S1, G1 and G2, to:

- Provide assistance and guidance to servicemen upon their arrival and departure. Specific attention must be paid to any over extended leave (apply referenced Memorandum 1 above).
Contact local boarding houses in the province in order to provide servicemen with room and board while waiting for return transportation (apply referenced Memorandum 2 above).

Arrange transportation for servicemen to and from their leave address.

c. Distribution: To help servicemen become thoroughly aware of the procedures they must follow prior to and while on leave, agencies and units will enlarge the attached chart and post it as guidance to all servicemen.

c. Inspection: Headquarters, Corps, CTZ's, Divisions, DMZ's, Special Zones and Sectors will conduct regular inspections of the Guidance Section to ensure satisfactory results are being obtained.

3. APPLICATION: This Memorandum is applicable to all servicemen of the Regular, Regional and Popular Forces.

BY ORDER OF CAO VAN VIEI
General
Chief, JGS/VNLF

TRUAN THUONG
Major General
Chief of Staff, JGS/VNLF
(Signed and Sealed)

ADDRESSES:
-Limited Distribution BCDL/WGI
"For Action"
-Pol "ar Agency "For inspection purposes"
-IDOD (Chief of Cabinet)
-Office, Chief, JGS/VNLF
-Office, Deputy Chief, JGS/VNLF
-Office, Chief of Joint Staff
"For Info"
On Leave Servicemen:

1. Prior to departure:
   - Pick up leave papers at Company or Battalion Headquarters.
   - Proceed to the Guidance Section of the Special Zone, Sector or Special Sector and request:
     - Departure visa.
     - Transportation to leave address.
     - Room and board while waiting for transportation.
   - Serviceman should check and be sure he has necessary luggage and papers.
   - Inform the messhall the number of days you will be on leave.

2. After arrival at destination:
   - Proceed to the Guidance Section of the Special Zone, Sector or Special Sector and request:
     - Arrival visa.
     - Return transportation.
     - Room and board while waiting for transportation.
   - Unexpected cases: parents, wife, children in serious illness or death, etc., serviceman will try all means of communications to contact the nearest military agency, requesting they inform his parent unit the cause of his lateness.
   - Request regional administrative and military agencies for certificate justifying the overstay.

3. After arrival at unit:
   - Report immediately to the Company or Battalion office, G1, AD and turn in the leave visa.
   - Report to unit chief the cause of being late.
   - Present certificate certifying the cause for the overstay.
   - Request refund on meals for the days while on leave.
   - Return to work.

EML 96
RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITS, AGENCIES
AND SERVICE. IN REGARD TO LEAVE POLICY

Company, Battalion,
Regiment and Division. . . . Remind Servicemen

- Of expiration date of his leave.
- To do his best to return to his unit on due date.
- Upon arrival at destination, request return transportation in advance.

Gl., AG at Sector,
Special Sector and Special Zone. . . . . . Responsible For

- Providing serviceman with arrival and departing visa.
- Furnishing serviceman with room and board while waiting for transportation.
- Providing transportation to and from leave address.
- Informing parent unit of any over extended leave cases.
In reference to questionnaire from your office, dated 7 October 1968, the following information is supplied:

a. Special Services Type Activities: The special services activities program of the 37th Artillery Battalion is very satisfactory. An officers club and NCO/EM club have been constructed. These facilities offer refreshments, ping pong, pool, radio, and a place for personnel of the battalion to relax occasionally. A small rock and roll band is also active in the battalion. A library has been built where a large quantity of reading material is available, including books and newspapers. The soldiers are encouraged to make use of these facilities during their free time. A volleyball court has also been constructed and games are played each day after normal duty hours. A tennis/basketball court is also slated for construction. Television is not readily available; however, movies are shown on the average of once a week by the advisory team personnel. Entertainment is also provided by members of the 20th Psywar Battalion on certain occasions. All the projects and programs listed above were suggested by members of the advisory team.

b. Mail Distribution: Mail distribution in the 37th Artillery Battalion is quite adequate and timely with mail call being held each morning at 0800 hours. The soldiers are encouraged to write letters and a mail drop is provided. Mail is collected each morning and fed into the Vietnamese mail system by personnel of the battalion SI office. I feel that the mail system is satisfactory. No major problems have been encountered in this area and the advisory team has not felt it necessary to make recommendations in this area.
c. Pay Procedures: Pay is generally distributed between the 25th and the end of each month. Personnel working in the battalion headquarters are always paid immediately after pickup of pay. Battery commanders arrive in the battalion to pick up pay for their batteries on the same day the headquarters personnel are paid. The only delays experienced have been due to transportation available; however, these have not been significant and personnel of the outlying batteries are always paid before the end of each month. We have had no problems in the area with the exception of newly-arrived personnel who may not get paid on time because their names have not yet appeared on the payroll. Usually people in this category are paid before the 10th of the following month. Pay procedures are deemed very satisfactory and no recommendations have been made in this area. However, the advisory team has arranged transportation for pay personnel on certain occasions to effect timeliness of arrival at outlying battery positions.

d. Areas Where Desertion Is Most Likely: The battalion has had no desertions this year.

e. Orientation of Troops: Newly-arrived personnel of the 37th Artillery Battalion are given a briefing on desertion by either the Battalion Commander or Executive Officer during their overall orientation in the unit. Emphasis during this briefing is placed on benefits to the unit and the individual by not deserting. The facilities available to the personnel are also pointed out at this time. Punishment is mentioned, however, as a deterrent to desertion. This type of orientation has been satisfactory as seen by the fact that the unit has had no desertions in the first nine months of 1968. This process of orientation was in effect before the arrival of members of the present advisory team and no recommendations in this area were deemed necessary.

f. Information and Education: There is at the present time an adequate information and education program within the battalion. This program is coordinated daily between the Headquarters Battery Commander and the Battalion S5. Daily information is supplied to personnel through the morning and afternoon formations and also by means of a bulletin board located in the battalion area. A library with abundant supplies of Vietnamese and English books and Vietnamese newspapers is provided and soldiers are encouraged to utilize these facilities. This library was suggested by the advisory team and has proved quite successful. An auditorium/classroom was also constructed for dissemination of information in a classroom atmosphere and for the staging of shows under direction of the Battalion S5. The construction of this building was also suggested by the advisors.
MACTN-IIC-3AT
SUBJECT: Causes of ARVN Desertion

24 October 1968

a. Family Situations: The present family housing situation of the battalion is deemed less than adequate by the advisory team personnel and the Battalion Commander. Housing consists of mud thatch buildings holding eight to ten families each. A new dependent quarters area is presently under construction. These buildings will be of more permanent cinder-block and tin material. The soldiers are aware of these plans and are eager for the completion of the new area. The commander is acutely aware of the family housing problem and has wholeheartedly endorsed the new dependent area. A PX and a commissary are both available at this time and their operation has been very satisfactory.

b. Leave, Pass or Other Free Time: The 37th Artillery Battalion does have an active leave program and the personnel are aware of their leave entitlements. In cases where leave cannot be granted, the individual concerned is informed by the Battalion Commander, either in writing or by direct meeting, of the reasons for disapproval. Passes are issued with proper respect for current tactical situations. With this in mind, certain percentages of battalion personnel (50% during periods of lulls in fighting and 25% during periods of increased activity) are released to visit their families at noon time and during evening hours. Passes are generally given freely on Sundays and holidays. At the conclusion of operations, personnel are given ½ to 1 full day of free time depending on the length of operations and the current tactical situation. This is likewise true when the battalion works extra hours preparing for inspections. Emergency leave is granted in almost all cases. The current leave program is deemed very satisfactory and very fair.

11. Individual and Small Unit Recognition: Individual and unit accomplishments are recognized through awards and decorations. The Battalion Commander recognizes those individuals who excel in performance of duty by writing letters of appreciation and recommendations for them. Occasionally medals are presented to those distinguishing themselves and recommendations for certificates are forwarded to Artillery Command in Saigon. The battalion also has its own small newspaper and pamphlet in which individuals and small units are cited. This pamphlet is printed once a month and circulated to all battalion personnel. There are at the present no rewards to smaller units for low desertion rates, as this has not been necessary. Transferring of soldiers between sections, platoons, or batteries is discouraged and kept at a minimum to enable personnel to identify with their unit. Promotions, especially during the past six months, have been very timely and equitable. Ceremonies are held to publicly recognize awards and promotions and the Battalion Commander personally congratulates and awards deserving individuals.
SUBJECT: Causes of ARVN Desertions

J. Punishment: My observance of punishment procedures within the 37th Artillery Battalion has always been favorable. Punishment for offenses has been fair, equitable, and commensurate with the offense. Practices in this area are considered satisfactory and recommendations have been made only in cases involving Vietnamese and US personnel.

k. Individual Equipment and Messing: Troops are satisfactorily equipped with those items of equipment necessary in the performance of their duties. Messing is quite satisfactory and officers and NCOs show interest in the proper feeding of their men. A mess hall has been built and paneled inside to keep out rain and dust. The kitchen has always been rated superior on inspections and is very capable of properly feeding the soldiers. The dining hall construction and paneling were suggested by the advisory team and have proved quite adequate.

l. Discussion of Causes: Since the 37th Artillery Battalion has experienced no desertion cases during the year I cannot reflect here major reasons for desertion. I feel that the facilities offered by the battalion and the awareness of the problem by the Battalion Commander have been the major influences in this negative desertion rate.

/s/William E. Thomas
/T/WILLIAM E. THOMAS
CPT, Artillery
Senior Advisor
SUBJECT: Annual and Graduation Leave Policy

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Attached is translation of Jl/JGS Postal Message Text Nr. 37565/TMN/1/ FCTT/TT, dated 5 October 1968; subject as above.

2. The purpose of this message is to establish firm policy on the granting of Annual and Graduation Leaves. There are basically no major policy changes in the granting of Annual Leave; however, your attention is invited to the policies set forth regulating the granting of Graduation Leave. This latter policy does differ from the policies and procedures outlined in Article 7 of JGS/RVNAP–Jl Directive HT 635-100, dated 10 August 1965.

3. Advisors are urged to discuss the provisions contained in this message with their counterparts so that they may have a clear understanding of these changes. Also, since policy is being promulgated by this message, it is recommended that this postal message be attached to and posted to the English translation of Directive 635-100.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/R. F. Tuckey
Major, USA
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:
II - C
Less: Dir SOG
Plus:
25 - MACJ11
5  - NACCORDS
2  - MACPA
2  - MACPB

Tab 5
POSTAL MESSAGE

FROM: J1/JGS
TO: Limited Distribution BDFGHI
INFO: Office, Chief of JGS
      Office, Deputy Chief of JGS, concurrently RF/PF Commander
      Office, Chief of Staff, JGS
      Office, Chief of Central Pol War Agency
"Request that Pol War cadre in units be directed to take
follow-up action on this problem and provide assistance."

TEXT #37565/TTM/1/PCTT/TT

Reference Directive #635-400, 10 August 1965; Postal Message #37628/TTM/
1/QS/DS, 11 November 1967; and Postal Message #26722/TTM/1/PCTT/TT, 18
July 1968. The JGS has noted that although many documents have been pub-
lished to provide guidance in the granting of leave to RWF personnel,
there still are some units and agencies that have issue leave to sub-
ordinate personnel in conflict with the above publications. To improve
this situation and until further notice, the issuance of leave to
personnel will be applied as follows:

1. Annual Leave:

   a. The granting of annual leave to personnel in Regular, Regional
      and Popular Forces, has been in effect from the second semester of CY 68
      without having any adverse effects as a result of 100% restriction to
      camp. The current procedure for granting leave is still applied in
      accordance with the above referenced directive.

   b. The granting of 15 days annual leave to personnel in each year
during wartime is also applicable to all categories of personnel whether
they are regular, reserve or assimilated personnel in the Regular, Regional
and Popular Forces.

   c. Particular attention is directed to the last six months of CY 68;
To assist everyone in taking annual leave, Unit Commanders may increase the
percentage of leave from 5% to 10% if this does not lower the PFO strength
which should be maintained at least at 80%, as compared with the TOE-authorized
strength.

2. Graduation Leave: In the present situation, the granting of graduation
leave will be applied on a temporary basis as follows:

   a. Officer and NGO Trainees: Graduation leave will be granted to these
individuals upon their graduation in accordance with the procedures and time
outlined in Article 7 of reference Directive.
b. **Category A Conscripts and Volunteers:** Graduation leave will be issued one week from the date they join their unit after undergoing indoctrination training and after becoming familiar with unit activities. If there are too many personnel reporting to the unit at the same time, the unit concerned may grant graduation leave to small groups, but not to all of them at the same time. The last group will not be required to wait more than three months from their graduation date, however, to take this type of leave.

c. **Category B Conscripts (Draft Dodgers):** Those conscripts will be granted graduation leave 2 months from the date they join the unit. Unit Commanders will, based on the sense of duty of each individual, allow those conscripts to take graduation leave in turn.

3. This Postal Message will be widely distributed by unit commanders to subordinate cadre for execution.

APO 4002, 5 October 1968

/s/CAO VAN VIEN
General
Chief, JGS, RVNAF
Inclosure Ia to Drum Report - DM, II Corps Tactical Zone, 10 November 1968 to 15 December 1968.

I. Personnel: By month tabulation of authorized and assigned is shown at Annex A. During the period the authorized strength increased 36 per cent while assigned strength increased 31 per cent. Throughout the year critical shortages developed in various areas, e.g. clerks, signal enlisted, security guards, senior medical specialists and military intelligence. As of November only the latter two are short to any significant degree. Availability of military intelligence personnel is improving.

A. Significant Additions to Strengths:

(1) Effective 1 June 1968, II Corps, USARV Intelligence Detachment was transferred to MACV as the Corps Intelligence Advisor Detachment Headquarters was converted to the 3-2 Advisory Section.

(2) MACV Field Joint Table of Distribution authorized the addition of 96 Mobile Advisory Teams by 26 May 1968. MIT's were initially introduced by the conversion of 12 Combined Mobile Instruction/Combined Mobile Training Teams on 15 April 1968. During Phase II, 1 June to 30 September, 20 more MIT's were fielded. The remaining 15 MIT/CTT's within II Corps were converted on 15 July 1968. During October and November (2/3 of Phase III) 22 MIT's have been deployed making a total of 79 or 82 per cent deployed.

B. Significant Reductions in Strengths:

(1) The conversion of the Advisory Team with the 22d Infantry Division to a Combat Assistance Team resulted in a reduction of 107 spaces (from 169 to 62).

(2) Twenty-two spaces were assessed by MACV in September 1968.

(3) Sixteen officers and non-commissioned officers were assessed by MACV to perform TDY in IV Corps Tactical Zone for approximately 120 days beginning in November 1968.

C. Casualties Among Advisors: 33 advisors were killed in action and 126 were wounded. The month of February 1968, TCT, had the largest number, 10 KIA and 33 WIA. Jan, Feb, May, Aug and Sep 1968 were the months in which the greatest numbers of wounded were experienced. Annex B.

D. Discipline, Morale and Welfare of Advisors:

(1) From all indications morale of advisors has been and remains excellent.

(2) Actions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

INCl. IA
(a) From October 1967 through November 1968 there were 153 individual cases of disciplinary action taken under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ.

(b) For the same period there were 11 Special and 3 Summary court-martials.

(3) Special Services Activities:

(a) During the period the AR program for II CTZ has increased from an average of 100 quotas per month to an average of 150 quotas per month (increase of 50 per cent) due mainly to increased publicity of the AR program and aggressive action on the part of Special Services Personnel. The management of the entertainment program improved to a point that USO and Soldiers' Shows were booked into the lower II Corps area where shows had never or seldom appeared. Twenty-six new motion picture projectors, which were leased down to and including Districts, were received during the period. Other items secured included television sets, day room furnishings, and photo laboratory kits. Motion picture accounts have been established for all advisory teams to District level. Expansible library reading material accounts, magazines and pocket books, have been established for all advisory teams. Soldier of the month savings bonds have been established through the Central Post Fund for II CTZ Headquarters, 22d and 23d Divisions and the 24th STZ.

(b) Many recreational projects were undertaken and completed by Special Services personnel during the period. Noteworthy of these was the construction of a 50 x 100 foot swimming pool and shower house facility on the MCV compound. A non-appropriated fund grant was secured through the Central Post Fund Council. The pool construction was supervised by a Japanese concern with a Vietnamese contractor performing the actual construction. Advisory personnel assisted in the construction of the pool which was opened in July 1969. In August of this year Special Services completed and opened an Entertainment Center to include musical instruments, pool and ping pong tables; installed a steam bath and exercise room; expanded the photo laboratory to encompass a photo gallery; installed a pocket book library; and opened television and taping rooms. A volleyball court has been rebuilt and the combination tennis/basketball court has been repaired to include new fencing and basketball goals. A grant was secured through the Central Post Fund and a Special Services Office and supply warehouse was refurbished. Presently a miniature golf course adjacent to the existing pool is being installed.

(4) Religious Activities:

(a) Through coordination and assistance of IPPV and other unit Chaplains the frequency of Chaplain visitations to Advisory Teams in II Corps Tactical
Zoe has doubled (more than doubled in some cases) during the past six months. Monthly mailings to all district teams now brings them a sampling of religious literature and the Character Guidance reading sheet. Increased awareness of the Chaplain's need for transportation has assisted in some degree in this increase.

(b) If coverage can be maintained at present level it could be considered adequate (average frequency of Chaplain visit is every second week). Inadequacies may occur in some areas of Catholic coverage. Some teams may still be relying on civilian Catholic coverage between visits of Catholic Chaplains.

(c) Transportation problems will never be completely solved under the circumstances.
### It Co. 3  Division Strength by Month Oct '67-KCV '68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oct '67</th>
<th>Nov '67</th>
<th>Dec '67</th>
<th>Jan '68</th>
<th>Feb '68</th>
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<td>1260/1272</td>
<td>1229/1296</td>
<td>1245/1246</td>
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<td>AUG 68</td>
<td>SEP 68</td>
<td>OCT 68</td>
<td>KCV 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
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<td>660/596</td>
<td>680/611</td>
<td>709/652</td>
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<td>812/715</td>
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<td>1297/1092</td>
<td>1810/1462</td>
<td>1855/1462</td>
<td>1926/1746</td>
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**ANNEX A to inclosure la**
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intelligence: During the past year the II Corps Military Intelligence Detachment has made significant improvements in its intelligence gathering capabilities and internal security. Programs have been initiated to intensify the existing surveillance effort. A Corps Combined Interrogation Center, presently under construction, will facilitate the exploitation of Prisoners of War. Some problem areas still exist in these programs, but corrective measures have been initiated to eliminate them.

A. (U) 32 Air

Hand Hold Camera Program.

(c) The Hand Hold Camera Program was initiated in II Corps in September 1966. The purpose of the program is to provide ARVN units with a readily available, real time photographic capability at a very low cost. Hand Hold Photography supplements the more sophisticated methods. An observer, with a hand camera, can cover smaller areas in greater detail.

(b) Cameras have been issued to the provinces and a training program, conducted by the 1st Hn (ARS), which includes use of cameras and film processing, as well as photographic techniques, has been initiated.

(c) Hand hold camera missions are being flown at present in several provinces with notable results.

B. (U) Visual Reconnaissance Program

1 At present, there is no ARVN Visual Reconnaissance capability within the Corps zone. All missions are flown by US aircraft under the operational control of respective Provincial Chiefs/Province Senior Advisors. ARVN Divisions have no organic aircraft for this purpose.

2) The II Corps 32 is being encouraged to request the initiation of a VNAF Visual Reconnaissance Program through command channels. Such a program would greatly enhance the aerial surveillance effort throughout the Corps.

C. (C) Long Range Patrols (LSP's)

1 In April 1968, a plan was presented jointly to the Commanding General, II Corps and the Commanding General, I ARVN, which proposed the addition of a ground reconnaissance capability to the ARVN divisions and regiments. The concept of the employment of LSP's is to attach them to the Rason Companies of the division and the Rason Elements of the regiments. The LSP's are under operational control of the Division 32.

2 The current ARVN TOS, approved by JCS Memorandum 1696, authorized ten teams per division headquarters and seven teams per regiment. The total teams authorized per division were: 22d Division, 31; 23d Division, 31; and 24th Siz, 17.
(3) At present, there are 28 LRP Teams in the Corps (16 teams in the 2nd Division; 12 in the 23rd Division and none in the 24th STZ). With 181 individuals now in training, 10 teams will be added, in the near future, to the 22nd Division; 12 teams to the 23rd Division, and 5 teams to the 24th STZ. The use of LRP's has significantly increased intelligence capabilities throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(h) Continued command emphasis is being encouraged to insure that the number of LRP Teams is brought up to the authorized level, and that the teams are properly trained and employed.

D. (d) Security Measures: With the completion of the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) in May 1966, the II Corps G2 instituted personnel control measures to insure its security. The CTOC was designated a "restricted area" and authorized ARMN personnel have been issued passes for admission.

3. (d) Interrogation of Prisoners of War

(1) Corps Combined Interrogation Center.

(a) In an effort to improve methods of exploiting Prisoners of War, plans for a Corps Combined Interrogation Center were drawn. With construction well underway, a target date of 15 Jan 69 has been set for completion of the center.

(b) A TO3 has been approved by JGS and authorized 76 men to staff the CCIC. The advisory staff will consist of one Interrogation Officer, two Interrogators, and two Clerks/Typists. Requests for equipment have been submitted through ARMN channels.

(c) In order to increase the operations potential of the Center, I FORGE, the RK ARD, and the 4th Infantry Division have been invited to provide permanent representatives. It is anticipated that these organizations will participate. The scope of the operation of the II Corps CCIC is continually being expanded in order to enhance exploitation capabilities and to speed the dissemination of interrogation and special reports.

(2) Handling of POW's and Captured Documents.

(a) The procedures for handling POW's and captured documents continues to be a problem. Lower echelons tend to control prisoners or captured documents though exploitation is beyond their capabilities.

(b) It has been recommended to the II Corps G2 that directives be issued outlining procedures for evacuation and setting forth time limits for each level of command. In addition, it has been recommended that this be made a subject of each command inspection.

P. (U) Training

(1) In December 1967, Mobile Training Teams were requested by II Corps G2 from J2, JGS in order to train ARMN S2 personnel in specialized techniques such as interrogation of Prisoners of War and maintenance of OB files. These
teams visited the 22d Division and 23d Division in July 1968. Training has also been requested in Document and Personnel Security Techniques and in the functioning of the G2 Staff Element at Regiment and Battalion level. This request is being processed by JCS.

(2) An effective visual reconnaissance program requires qualified permanent aerial observers thoroughly familiar with their territory. Toward this end ARVN personnel are being trained in visual reconnaissance techniques in Aerial Observer Schools given by the Recon Airplane Companies. This program is supervised at Province level by the Province 52/53 Air Advisor, and monitored by the II Corps G2 Air Advisor. ARVN observers have proven to be most effective, and, in the future, will perform the bulk of the visual reconnaissance missions in II Corps.

(3) The II Corps G2 Air has initiated a hand hold camera program, and is supervising the training of ARVN personnel in the techniques of hand hold photography.
Improvements in the Advisory Effort: Significant improvements have been made in the Administrative and Operations Sections of the G2 Advisory Element during the past year. All members of the Operations Advisory Section have been co-located with their ARVN counterparts. The need for closer and more effective coordination between intelligence advisors within the Corps, as well as among FMAF intelligence personnel, was partially alleviated by a series of conferences attended by nearly all intelligence agencies in the Corps zone. The system for payment of Collection and Classification of Information Funds was made more economical.

A. (U) Administrative Section:

(1) (C) Collection and Classification of Information Funds. In February 1968, the system for payment of agents was changed from a fixed salary to payment for information received. Initially, there was much opposition to this method from the ARVN; however, it has been demonstrated to them that with this system of payment more information is gained with less expenditure of money.

(2) (U) Improved coordination between intelligence advisors.

(a) As a result of the deactivation of the II Corps Military Intelligence Detachment (US) in June 1968, and the further realignment of intelligence responsibilities in August 1968, there arose a need for better coordination among the intelligence advisors at Province, Division and Corps level. The problem has been greatly alleviated through a series of Intelligence Advisor’s Conferences which are now held regularly on a quarterly basis. Other FMAF intelligence personnel are also invited to participate in these conferences.

(b) Two conferences have been held thus far: one in July 1968, the other in October 1968. The conferences provide the means for resolving differences between the various levels of the advisory teams. They provide a sounding board for the advisors to discuss their particular problems with their contemporaries. They serve, in addition, as a vehicle for the dissemination of new ideas, innovations and plans; policies announced by higher headquarters; and discussion of the means of implementing them. Records of the meetings are maintained and are furnished to each intelligence activity in the Corps.

B. (C) Operations Section:

(1) (C) General:

(a) (U) In November 1967, the Advisory Element to the ARVN II Corps Military Intelligence Detachment, which had previously been located apart from the IQD, was co-located with its counterpart. At present all sections of the advisory element are in the same room with their ARVN counterparts, and a free exchange of information is the basic foundation for operation within the G2 Advisory Element.
(b) (C) In late 1967, the analysis of Special Agent Reports (SPARS) was begun for the first time in the Corps and it was subsequently initiated by all Province Intelligence Advisors. This form of information has greatly aided the US and ARVN intelligence elements in their analysis of the enemy's probable courses of action.

(c) (U) Also in late 1967, the form of the Weekly Intelligence Summary (WIS) was changed to provide a more meaningful document and to conform with FM 101-5.

(d) (U) A G2 element from the II Corps Advisory Group was established within the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) in November 1967. The establishment of the element within the Corps Operations Complex greatly facilitates the coordination and timely dissemination of intelligence information throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(e) (U) In order to more rapidly and effectively employ Psychological Warfare as the enemy situation presents itself, a Psychological Warfare Team from the 8th Psyops Bn, USARV, was attached to the II Corps MID in mid-year. This team has successfully exploited leads provided by the MID Commander and the advisory element and is aiding in the program to decrease the enemy's political hold over his own forces.

(2) (U) Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW).

(a) In June 1968, during the enemy's "Second Offensive", the volume of prisoners from the different areas of conflict within the II Corps Tactical Zone made it imperative that the highest degree of coordination be established between tactical units in the zone. This was accomplished when the IPW section of the II Corps MID, 4th Infantry Division, and Company B, 5th SF Gp (Abn) combined their assets in order to rapidly interrogate all PW's and to produce a cohesive intelligence product. This spirit of cooperation has continued and will be a basis for cooperation during any subsequent large scale activity.

(b) The G2 Advisory Element recommended in November 1967 that the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) reproduce copies of captured documents in the Vietnamese language to facilitate analysis and coordination of information. The recommendation was accepted and implemented in March 1968. The results has been a more rapid and accurate interpretation of captured documents by ARVN military intelligence personnel throughout the Republic of Vietnam.
CONFIDENTIAL


Enemy Activity in II CTZ

A. Pre-Tet:

1. (C) During late October and throughout November 1967 the enemy began series of the largest attacks, to date, in the Central highlands. Large scale contacts were made in the Dak To/Tan Canh area with elements from the 1st NVA Division which eventually resulted in a fierce four day battle for Hill 875. Later, northeast of Tan Canh another multi-battalion size contact was made and friendly units were able to successfully attack the enemy headquarters group and rout a battalion size force. The enemy lost 1,664 killed (by body count), and numerous small arms and crew-served weapons in these actions.

2. (C) Enemy forces remained active throughout the month of December. Sixteen violations of the Christmas truce were reported in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

B. (C) Tet: The enemy's Tet Offensive, which began on 29 Jan 68, was the heaviest series of coordinated attacks in the history of the war. Scattered reports recoded the offensive in several areas throughout II Corps Tactical Zone. However, the extent and intensity of the attacks was not clearly indicated prior to the beginning of the offensive. Though enemy casualties from this offensive cannot be accurately assessed, all available intelligence indicates that the enemy suffered the greatest number of casualties of the war to date. (Est over 5,000 enemy KIA)

C. Post Tet:

1. (C) Enemy activity increased, as was expected, during May 1968. On 4 and 5 May, NVA outposts, military installations, airfields, and district headquarters in eight of the twelve provinces in II Corps came under attacks by fire and sporadic ground attacks. Enemy casualties are estimated at over 350 KIA.

2. (C) Large scale attacks were directed against 1/12th FSB (10 km SW of Polloi Klang) and FSB 29 (22 km N of Dak To) in late May. The 1/12th FSB received mixed mortar and recoilless rifle fire, and FSB 29 received mortars, B-40 rockets, SA fire followed by a ground attack by an estimated NVA battalion.

3. (C) The enemy "Third Offensive", which began in mid-August, was characterized by an increase in the frequency and intensity of enemy activity. Over thirty significant incidents were recorded on 23 August.

(c) In the first part of August intelligence reports indicated that the 24th NVA Regt, last identified northeast of Kontum City on 1 May, had moved into an area 20 km northeast of Pleiku City. The regiment was believed to be combat effective and capable of conducting up to multi-battalion sized
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operations. The 3rd Armered Cavalry engaged the Regiment along Highway 19 and NVA infantry penetrated the regimental base area in the Chu Phong mountains east of the highway. Total enemy killed in this operation is estimated to be over 500.

(b) The major enemy offensive during August began on the morning of 23 August when Dac Lap District Headquarters, C3OD Camp, and the 1st Scout Company at Ben Sa Par OP in Quan, Dac Province were attacked by a large enemy force. The enemy unit involved is believed to have been a task force composed of elements from the 320th, 66th and S-2 Regiments, 1st NVA Division, which were identified in contact. Enemy casualties for this action, which continued sporadically through the latter part of August and the beginning of September, are estimated to be over 1,000 NVA KIA.

D. (c) Summary and Probable Courses of Action:

(1) Within the past year (1 Nov 67 - 1 Dec 68), the enemy has committed greater forces to combat in II CTZ than ever before - and he has suffered unprecedented losses. His ability to wage war based on conventional tactics was put to the test, and repulsed in every major engagement. In addition, reports indicate that the problems of the VC/NVA have been compounded; he has been plagued with widespread shortages of food supplies, he has been unable to effectively check the spread of Malaria among his troops, and he is continually faced with low morale. As a result, he has been forced to devote his major efforts to resupply, and to the transportation of men and equipment to his units throughout II CTZ. There has been a general withdrawal of major NVA forces into safe base areas in Laos and Cambodia along the border. The enemy has, however, had ample time to reposition, reorganize, and retrain, and poses a serious threat along the border area. Two newly confirmed artillery units are believed to have been involved in recent attacks by fire on allied installations along the Cambodian border. Following the withdrawal of major NVA forces, an increase in small-scale activity by the LF and LF units has been noted. To supplement this effort the VC are increasing their propaganda and attempting to establish new "liberation" councils. All this is seen as calculated measures designed to increase the numbers of NVA forces under their control.

(2) The basic enemy tactic, therefore, is seen as one in which the NVA will continue the war with minimal losses to themselves while attempting to fix our forces in position by means of stand-off attacks and harassing raids. Meanwhile, the LF and LF units, supported by NVA, will work with the VC to increase their population and area control. Maximum effort will be made to seize and retain a psychological advantage by conducting attacks calculated to reduce the confidence of the people of SVN and the US.

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2
Inclusion 3 to Adjutant General Report - Area, XX Corps Tactical Zone, 15 November 1967, to 15 December 1968.

I. Training: Emphasis on training throughout the period has contributed greatly toward improved ARVN combat effectiveness. Some of the more important actions taken to improve ARVN units through combat training programs are listed below.

A. Special Study for Evaluation of ARVN Combat Effectiveness: A special study was initiated in November 1967 as the result of unsatisfactory performance by eight ARVN battalions as reported in Senior Advisor's monthly evaluation (SAME) reports. A study team, comprised of personnel drawn from US units, conducted an impartial evaluation of the eight battalions and concluded that the battalions were, in fact, not combat effective. Subsequent combat training programs significantly raised unit standards and the unsatisfactory units have since demonstrated greatly improved performance on combat operations. Further, the study group determined that the SAME report criteria were unrealistic and too subjective in nature. This report was subsequently restructured and the present SAME report (System for Evaluation of the Effectiveness of ARVN) was promulgated.

B. Organization and Training of New Units: The National Mobilization Act of 1968 was designed to provide additional forces to combat the rising enemy threat. Despite the tremendous influx of troops at training centers, successful training programs were carried, units were activated, trained and deployed. Within II Corps, three battalion regiment, two separate regimental battalions, one artillery battalion and seven recon companies have been added to the force. In addition, an additional artillery battalion, an armored cavalry squadron and an armor group headquarters are presently undergoing training and are scheduled for deployment to the field by March 1969.

C. Improvement of 2d Ranger Group Combat Effectiveness: Due to the unsatisfactory performance of the 2d Ranger Group during the Communist Tet Offensive, command attention was given to programs designed to raise the esprit and combat effectiveness of Ranger units. Detailed studies were made and specific corrective actions taken in the following areas: unit strength was increased by a approximately 200 men; leadership was improved by the replacement of the group commander and every newly assigned officer now goes through a concentrated five-day leadership course conducted at Group Headquarters; unit deployment has improved and the group has conducted several group-controlled operational missions; training has been given careful and continuing command attention and all battalions have rotated through a training cycle conducted by Group Headquarters; morale/esprit have been enhanced by a concentrated program to improve combat housing, overall living conditions, and to raise health standards. A new pass and leave policy was also initiated. Over a six month period, these programs raised effectiveness of Ranger units from that of a territorial security force to the level of an elite fighting organization. While this unit has not been engaged in decisive combat for the past several months, its conduct on recent combined operations with Task Force South in search of enemy forces indicates a significant improvement in its combat capability.
D. The Organization and Training of Low, Range and High Range Patrons

(1) In March 1966, command emphasis was placed upon increasing ARVN's effectiveness by providing a LRC capability from battalion level. Three cycles of training by US trainers were initiated in coordination with 256th INF by the end of December 1966. To date, 252 ARVN soldiers have been trained. Those are 176 ARVN soldiers now taking training in the third cycle.

(2) In order to increase the reconnaissance capability down to district level, ARVN has initiated the training of P7 units in full low-reconnaissance patrols. This training will be of two weeks duration and is to be conducted by 252 at P7 training centers. The first cycle started 2 December 1966 with 122 trainees.

II. Plans. The significant accomplishments in this area were numerous during the cited period and the following are considered noteworthy:

II. II Corps Combined Campaign Plan: This headquarters has closely coordinated with 256th INF and ROK-MO in the preparation of II Corps Combined Campaign Plans. During the year, three plans were written, in December 1967, June 1968, and November 1968. These plans provided specific guidance for Free World and ARVN combat and pacification efforts in the II Corps Tactical Zone. To supplement the Combined Campaign Plans, coordination was effected with Free World forces to write Combined LEX #1; subject: Defense in Urban Areas; and the II Corps Pacification Plan.

B. Monthly Senior Commanders' Conference: A program of Senior Commanders' Conferences conducted to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation and coordination between the three nations supplying combat forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone was begun during the period. These conferences, held alternately at ROK, II Corps and 256th INF headquarters, provide the Senior Commanders of the three national forces the opportunity to discuss accomplishments, problems areas and to coordinate combined combat operations. Some results of these conferences were: (1) Implementation of the "officer exchange program", (2) closer coordination for railroad security, (3) revision of Combined Campaign Plan goals which had become obsolete, (4) establishment of the "lock on" concept, (5) initiation of training RAP leaders by US and ROK units.

III. Operations. ARVN operations received continual emphasis during the period and showed positive improvement. Significant accomplishment were:

A. Improved Operation of II CTOC: During the first part of 1966, coordination between the ARVN TOC personnel and their US advisers was minimal, with the US personnel performing most of the operational staff functions such as maintaining unit night locations, posting all maps, sole coordination for clearance of areas of operation and planning of heliborne operations. After occupation of the new CTOC bunker in mid-year, the layout agreed upon by US/ARVN personnel was made at which maximum utilization of space, with emphasis directed toward increased efficiency and joint responsibilities. ARVN assumed responsibility for monitoring all ARVN and RVNF activities, but have primary responsibility for keeping US/ARVN situation maps current and posted. Current operations are maintained jointly on common maps.
B. Improved Reporting Procedures: Several problems areas and deficiencies in operational reporting procedures were recognized and isolated. The problems existed virtually every element of both the ARVN and RVN, as well as among the advisors. Following a series of staff visits throughout the zone and conferences at II Corps headquarters, positive action was initiated to standardize report format and procedures. Bi-weekly report reports are used to facilitate verification of information received through both advisor and ARVN channels.

C. Combined Operations, RVN/RVN: The effectiveness and accomplishments of ARVN forces has increased significantly over the past year. There were two major factors contributing to this increase. The first was complete re-equipment of the ARVN forces with the M16 rifle and the M60 machine gun. This greatly increased the fire power available to ARVN and added substantially to the confidence of the field units. The second factor which added to the effectiveness of the ARVN forces was the inception of the "Pair-Off" concept. Through this concept, US and ARVN forces have increased the number of coordinated and combined operations being conducted throughout the II Corps. An example of this effort is the 22d/173d Airborne Brigade (US) operation, Doc Sin/Coolidge. The 1st Infantry Division is "Paired Off" for combined operations with the 26th SIW and elements of the 23d Division. The "Pair Off" concept has resulted in maximum utilization of combat support assets, artillery, helicopter, and tactical air during combined operations. Coordination between the units has been established by US and ARVN control headquarters collocating during operations for mutual liaison and mutual support. Another notable benefit realized from the "Pair Off" concept is the increased duration of ARVN operations. Prior to the start of this concept, ARVN forces normally conducted operations of only two to five days duration. They now program operations routinely for from five to thirty or more days.

D. Operational Rations: ARVN operations were previously limited to short duration because of the inability of commanders to provide suitable field rations. Through efforts by the II Corps Commander, adequate stocks of operational rations are now available within II Corps to sustain battalion-size units in the field for virtually indefinite periods of time.

IV. Tactical Air Operations

4. Establishment of Policy Concurring Significant Targets and Ground Follow-Up Requirements. In February 1964, a policy was established requiring a ground follow up on any significant target that had been struck. Significant targets were defined as any units consisting of 20 or more VC/NVA. No additional guidance was provided in April requiring senior advisors to advise their counterparts to provide troops for a ground follow up whenever significant targets were sighted or when significant Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) was reported. Significant BDA was defined as any confirmed enemy killed by air or the or secondary explosions from an air strike on a significant target. This policy requiring ground follow up, resulted in more accurate BDA from the unit within the ground follow up. Many enemy areas were discovered and destroyed due to the quick reaction of (ground follow up units being lifted by helicopter into the strike area.
B. Establishment of Policy Concerning the Use of Tactical Air Strikes on Immediate Targets.

(1) In July 1968, II CTZ established new requirements for the use of tactical air sorties on "immediate" targets. Immediate air strikes were authorized only for troops in contact, visual sightings of enemy personnel, or when a F/C received ground fire. This policy greatly reduced the number of immediate air strikes employed on poor quality targets.

(2) This policy also emphasized the use of artillery to engage targets within artillery range to bring the target under fire by the fastest available means. All immediate air requests were compared against ARVN artillery ranges prior to II Corps G3 Air approval of the strike. This procedure resulted in the effective integration of artillery fire with tactical air strikes and insured that maximum fire power was placed on all immediate targets by the fastest available means.

C. Effective Utilization of Tactical Air Strikes and B-52 Strikes.

(1) Policies established by II Corps provided for efficient and economical use of tactical air strikes through tight control of pre-planned and immediate air strikes. II Corps consistently struck high quality targets and reported good BDA. Through direct coordination with Division Senior Advisors and ARVN Division Commanders, II CTZ advisors efficiently coordinated the use of B-52 strikes to support ARVN operations. Most significant were the B-52 strikes employed in the defense of Duc Lap Sub Sector and Special Forces camps which came under attack by an estimated 10,000 troops on 23 August 1968. Ninety-two sorties of B-52's were employed between 23 August and 6 September 1968 to break up the enemy's attack. These B-52 strikes, combined with constant tactical air sorties were major factors in the successful defense of the Special Forces Camp and the Subsector Headquarters.

V. Chemical.

A. Traildust Coordination: Traildust missions in II Corps Tactical Zone were habitually scheduled for the early morning hours. During the monsoon season this resulted in an excessive number of missions being cancelled due to the adverse weather conditions and, during the dry season, approximately 50% of scheduled missions were cancelled due to early morning ground fog blanketing the target area. To improve target coverage during the dry season, a recommendation was made that Traildust be scheduled between the hours of 0600 and 1100 to take advantage of favorable weather conditions. It was also recommended that primary and alternate targets be located in different areas of II CTZ to take advantage of local weather differences during both seasons. Both recommendations were adopted resulting in an improved Traildust program for II CTZ. In addition, as a result of a realignment of staff functions/responsibilities within II CTZ Headquarters, the 202 Committee (ARVN Corps Chemical Section) was tasked with the responsibility for obtaining and passing to I RVN the ARVN tactical and political clearance for all Traildust targets. To accomplish this task, coordination was effected to enable a 202 Committee representative to pick
up trail dust warning orders at II MARS and a telephone communications link was established with I-FW through the II Corps switchboard. Further, a new channel was established within the ARVN organization to obtain the required clearance from province officials.

B. ARVN: The acquisition of two aerial spray apparatuses (Lucasco), a helicopter mounted device used in the defoliation of confined areas, such as outposts and perimeters, provided II CTZ with its own defoliation capability. One hundred and eight sorties were flown and 197 drums of herbicide has been used so far this year.

C. Herbicide Operations: The 1966 Herbicide Plans for II CTZ were approved and implemented. The plans insured flexibility in planning and targeting of large areas for defoliation and enemy crop destruction. As of 1 August, a total of 369 C-123 trail dust sorties were flown under the 1966 Plan. The priority targets along the coastal regions are the Mui Fa mountain range, the mountainous passes along Highway 55 in Binh Dinh Province, and the close rice producing areas in all the coastal provinces. In the central highlands provinces of Kontum and Gia Lai, the Cambodian border area has received numerous monthly defoliation C-123 sorties. The close rice producing areas of both provinces have been sprayed within the last two months in order to destroy this season's rice crop. In Dak Lac, Quang Duc, and Long Dong provinces, the emphasis has been on LOC's and close rice producing areas. Due to adverse flying weather during the monsoon, the 1966 program is approximately 50% complete. In October of this year, JFS requested that a new 1967 Herbnicide Plan for each province be submitted prior to 30 November 1966. To date, the plans for eleven of twelve provinces have been received and submitted to JOS for approval.

VI. Artillery: ARVN Artillery greatly improved during the cited period due to emphasis placed on the following areas.

A. Improvement of Artillery Techniques:

(1) Use of Registrations: Headquartars II Corps artillery has published a directive calling for increased use of registrations but little interest is shown in a program of inspections to ensure compliance with the directive. There has been an increase in use of registrations but only in a few units. All artillery advisors continue to urge improvement in this area.

(2) Use of Meteorological Data: Meteor data is received by all ARVN units within range of US meter stations but many of these units do not use the data to employ corrections to firing data. All artillery advisors continue to stress improvements in this area. ARVN artillery does not currently have a capability to generate meter data.

(3) Increased Survey: Most ARVN artillery positions have been surveyed for accurate location. A survey is currently in progress from Phan Rang to Dalat to Bao Loc to the III Corps border which will provide survey to most of the remaining ARVN positions. A future survey from Nha Trang to Ban Ke Thuot will satisfy survey requirements to over ninety percent of ARVN artillery positions.
B. Improvement of Artillery Fire Support:

(1) Publications: Headquarters II Corps has published directives and
memorandums calling for Province Chiefs and maneuver unit commanders
effectively include artillery support in their overall planning and to ensure
that subordinates effectively use available artillery.

(2) Planning of Fire Support Coordination Centers: These centers
effectively integrate the fires of allied field artillery, tactical aircraft,
guidance, and naval gunfire. Centers are presently operational in Phan Thiet
and Nui Chu and more are planned in Tuy Hoa, Binh Din, Phu Yen and Darlac
Provinces. Headquarters II Corps has published guidance concerning the
organization of the Fire Support Coordination Centers.

(3) Forward Observer Training: ARVN artillery in II Corps Tactical
Zone is responsible for a continuing program to train ARVN infantry RF/F/R
commanders to be forward observers. Each ARVN infantry company, RF company,
PF platoon and RD team as well as each defended hamlet and outpost is to
have a minimum of one trained forward observer. The program was begun in
August and many personnel have already been trained. II Corps Artillery is
presently attempting to assess the number of companies, platoons, teams,
hamlets and outposts which still do not have a trained forward observer.

C. Coordination with Allied Artillery:

(1) Artillery Seminars: Two seminars have been conducted. The first
in June was hosted by TF W Artillery and the second in October was hosted
by II Corps Artillery. Both seminars were beneficial. They provided an
opportunity for allied artillery commanders to meet and to present problem
areas particularly affecting their units. Discussions have been lively and
actions have been taken in most instances to alleviate stated problems.
The ARVN artillery commanders appear to be gaining confidence in their
dealings with allied artillery, and participate more and more in constructive
discussion.

(2) Associate Battery Program: This program associates a US artillery
unit with a like ARVN artillery unit. The units exchange visits, ideas,
equipment and provide each other with supporting fires. ARVN artillery
has benefited by observing US techniques and by receiving hard-to-get
expendable items such as pensels, plotting pins and firing charts. ARVN
and US commanders cooperate much more closely in planning artillery support
as a result of this program.

(3) Attendance at US In-Country Artillery Schools: ARVN artillery units
have sent significant numbers of officers and FO's to the fire direction,
forward observer and survey schools at An Khe and the fire direction school
at Headquarters, 52d Artillery Group.

VII. Combat Support Coordination Centers: The defense of the Pleiku Complex
was greatly enhanced by the following innovations.
A. Air Traffic Coordination:

(1) Close coordination between the USAF and US Army has been established for all reconnaissance flights throughout II CTZ. All flights are called to CSSC by DSC "A" Reconnaissance. CSSC arranges to get the appropriate artillery shut down by coordinating with necessary ARVN divisions.

(2) Within the Pleiku area all artillery is reported to both the Air Force and Army air control centers and through the close working relationship that exists, it is now possible to fly aircraft over the Pleiku area and not require a complete artillery/mortar shut down which was necessary in the past.

B. Combined Defense:

(1) During the Tet offensive, it was found that the Pleiku complex should have both US and ARVN coordinators. Coordinators have since been appointed and their duties have been precisely outlined. Recurring combined inspections have been made of all US and ARVN compounds.

(2) A combined area defense plan was prepared that provides for a combined, mutually supporting defense of the Pleiku complex. The plan provides for a combined Combat Support Coordination Center which controls all of the artillery fires within the area, and coordinates all aircraft such as gunships, scoooky, moonshine, etc. The plan provides for a combined defense against rockets, mortars and ground attack out to a range of 11,000 meters around sites.

(3) An area of operation (AO) was established for the Pleiku Defense Sector. Within this AO, the CSSC is able to mass all available fire support means without clearance from external units. Establishment of a separate AO for the defense has greatly improved the capability of providing responsive artillery support.

C. Improved Area Defenses:

(1) Within the Pleiku Defense area, combined US and ARVN operations have increased greatly in quantity and quality. The largest combined operation within the defense consisted of two US 1st Infantry Division battalions and one ARVN battalion.

(2) Since approval of the combined defense plan, there has been intensive patrolling out of the rocket ring and it is felt that this patrolling combined with effective artillery fire has hindered the enemy in his effort to move in, stockpile ammunition and prepare position prior to attack.
SUBJECT: End-of-Test Evaluation of the Plan for Reconfiguration of the Advisory Effort in the 22d Infantry Division (U)

Deputy Senior Advisor
IV Corps Tactical Zone
Advisory Team 21
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96313

1. (U) References:
   b. Ltr, MACV-QN-SA, dtd 30 Sep 68, subj: Phase I Evaluation of the Plan for Reconfiguration of the Advisory Effort in the 22d Infantry Division.

2. (U) This is the final evaluation of the phased test of the Combat Assistance Team (CAT) concept conducted by MACV Advisory Team 22 from 15 July - 7 December 1968.

3. (U) Test Concept: The mission of Combat Assistance Team is to:
   a. Assist, as necessary, in coordinating 22d Division combat operations to include artillery and naval gunfire, airmobile operations, gunships, tactical air, combat intelligence, medical evacuation, and combat resupply.
   b. Accompany all multi-company and larger operations.

4. (U) Test Objectives: To determine the feasibility of replacing the current division and regiment advisory teams with smaller Combat Assistance Teams in order to:
   a. Reduce the advisory effort for ARVN units to correspond to increased ARVN capabilities to permit US advisor resources to be redispersed.
   b. Determine whether ARVN units are capable of making independent use of US combat support.
   c. Increase further ARVN leadership and initiative particularly at battalion level.
   d. Determine whether the proposed Combat Assistance Teams can provide adequate assistance in coordinating between ARVN, US, and F/NLF.
   e. Have, as the ultimate objective, the 22d Infantry Division assume total responsibility for planning, coordinating and executing combat operations with minimum US advisory effort, comparable to liaison officers currently with ROK units.
5. (C) Factors Bearing on the Test:

a. Division Mission: During the conduct of the test, the Division's mission
was changed to that of conducting mobile, sustained operations (less 1 battalion
in direct support of Revolutionary Development).

b. 11st Regiment:

(1) The 11st Regimental Advisory Team was converted to the Regimental Combat
Assistance Team (RCAT) on 31 July and was tested from 1 August to 30 November.

(2) From 1-15 September, the 11st Regiment turned over territorial responsi-
bility in its AO to Dinh Dinh Sector, thus freeing 3 battalions for mobile opera-
tions; on 5 September the 3d Battalion was placed under the operational control of
Phu My Subsector in direct support of Revolutionary Development.

(3) From 22 August to 28 September, the 1st Battalion operated independently
in Division Operation Dan Sinh Cochise 22/6 in the Bong Son Plain with good results.

(4) From 22-30 September, the Regiment engaged the 7/18th and 9/18th NVA
Regiment with 3-4 battalions and strong combat support with good results. The 3d
Battalion had no Battalion Combat Assistance Team (BCAT) during the fight.

(5) From 11 October to 30 November, the 2d Battalion operated in the Tuy Hoa
Valley under the operational control of the 47th Regiment.

c. 40th Regiment:

(1) The 40th Regimental Advisory Team was converted to the 40th RCAT en 14
October and was tested from 15 October to 30 November.

(2) From 15 October to 26 November, the 40th Regiment participated in Division
Operation Dan Sinh Cochise 22/6 with 3 battalions in the Bong Son Plain with good
results.

(3) From 26-29 November, 2 battalions participated in a combined operation
(Dan Sinh Cochise 40/98) in the Cay Giep Mountains.

d. 47th Regiment:

(1) The 47th Regimental Advisory Team was converted to the 47th RCAT on 31
October and was tested from 1-30 November.

(2) From 1-30 November the 47th Regiment had 1 battalion under operational
control of Phu Bon Sector. This battalion operated without BCAT except for short
periods when the battalion conducted multi-company operations.

(3) From 1-30 November the 4th Battalion with a BCAT, was under the operational
control of the 23d Division. The battalion had no contact.
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7 December 1960

SUBJECT: End-of-Test Evaluation of the Plan for Reconfiguration of the Advisory Effort in the 22d Infantry Division (U)

1. 22d Division:

   (1) The 22d Division Advisory Team was converted to the 22d Division Combat Assistance Team (DACT) on 31 October and was tested from 1-30 November.

   (2) From 1-30 November the Division maintained a high level of sustained, multi-battalion operations, including combined operations. These operations supported the II Corps Accelerated Pacification Plan (Nguyen Cong Tru) with search and clear operations to locate and destroy main force enemy units.

   (3) The absence of major enemy forces in the DTA and the reluctance of remaining forces to engage divisional units yielded low results for operations conducted after 1 October, particularly by the 67th Regiment.

   (4) During the test, the 63d Artillery Battalion, with 3-V advisors, was activated, trained, and became operational on 19 November.

   (5) During the test, each regiment formed a reconnaissance company, without advisors, that was trained at Duc My and became operational in mid-November.

   (6) During the test, the division reconnaissance company, without advisors, conducted combined and unilateral LARPs before going to Duc My for training on 8 November.

2. (U) Test Results:

   a. The Combat Assistance Team concept was well received by both ARVN and advisory personnel. Both groups prepared to make the test work well and did so.

   b. During the test period, all regiments maintained a high level of operations, ranging up to 4 battalions in size, and 28 days in duration. Operations conducted and results are listed in inclosure 1.

   c. There was no decrease in the use of US combat support. Inclosure 2 lists the US combat support used by the regiments during the test.

   d. The quality of combat leadership in the division did not deteriorate (less one battalion of the 67th Regiment). There was an aura of pride in being able to operate independently. Generally, there was a gradual shift in US-ARVN working relations at regimental and battalion levels. Under the advisory concept, the tendency is for an advisor to seek out his counterpart to conduct business; under the CAT concept, the ARVN commander or staff officer either seeks out CAT member or takes action on his own initiative. (The "paired" concept with the 173d Airborne Brigade also fostered leadership and initiative during the test period). There was no noticeable change in leadership at company level.

   e. There was no decrease in mission performance by division level commanders and staff officers who formerly had advisors. They maintained a high level of performance in: artillery, communications, engineers, ordnance, health and sanitation, equipment maintenance, personnel management, intelligence, operations, logistics, and political warfare (including information).

   f. Division reliance on and use of its own supply system (less helicopters) increased considerably.
5. The plan for having only 3 BCATs per regiment proved unsound because:

(1) Some battalions operated in the field without BCATs because none was available. Battalions operated in the field 80% of the time; BCATs 90%. The idea of forming a provisional BCAT from the regimental team proved unworkable, in most cases, in light of the necessity for maintaining 24 hr-a-day operations at the regimental TOC.

(2) There was insufficient time for BCAT's to assist, as necessary, in planning and coordinating the growing number of combined operations, since many BCATs moved directly from one battalion to another in the field.

(3) There were insufficient opportunities for the battalion commander and the BCAT to develop the mutual confidence and working SOP's which are absolutely necessary to facilitate rapid reaction to combat requirements. Language difficulties make it necessary that where he worked out beforehand. The practice of rotating BCAT's between battalions in the field was near-universally considered poor practice by both ARVN battalion commanders and BCAT commanders.

h. A solid manning level for RCATs is required for sustained 24 hr-a-day operations. Test manning levels were austere but adequate, except when the BCAT formed a provisional BCAT.

i. BCAT organization and manning level is adequate with minor internal rearrangements.

j. The substitution of Vietnamese civil guards for US military personnel was successful. A small number of US security guards is needed to supplement the civil guards at both division forward and main CP's to safeguard US personnel and property and to maintain the civilian personnel internal security system. In addition, the US security guards are being cross-trained to assist other team members.

7. (U) Conclusions:

a. That ARVN initiative and self-reliance has increased at battalion and higher levels.

b. That ARVN units can make independent use of US combat support.

c. That the CAT concept is sound.

d. That, as a result of the CAT test, the Division's mission emphasizing sustained mobile operations, and continued deployment of two battalions to the 25th Division and Phu Rung; a small increase in US personnel is desirable, as follows:

(1) Make minor adjustments in CAT resulting in a decrease of one man.

(2) Add a fourth BCAT to each BCAT resulting in an increase of six men.

8. (U) Personnel:

a. Proposed revised RCAT manning level and organization is inclosure 3; proposed revised BCAT manning level and organization is inclosure 4; duties of personnel is inclosure 5.
b. Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Team</th>
<th>Current CAT</th>
<th>Revised CAT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Regiments</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Thus, there is a total saving of 102 men at the proposed manning level.

c. Signal support is currently provided by Company B, 63d Signal Battalion. Its manning level was reduced from 23 men to 15 men on 16 October. No difficulties due to lack of personnel were experienced during the test period.

9. (U) Equipment: Proposed equipment authorizations are inclosure 6. There is considerable saving of equipment over current authorizations.

10. (U) C.G., 22d Division has been briefed on all proposals and expressed his agreement. He has requested, however, 2 advisors for a newly-formed Medical Battalion and 4 advisors for the 63d Artillery Battalion for 90 days.

11. (U) Recommendations: That, the following be approved:

a. Redesignation of "22d Infantry Division Advisory Detachment, Advisory Team 22" to "22d Infantry Division Combat Assistance Detachment, Combat Assistance Team 22" with the mission of assisting, as necessary, in coordinating 22d Division combat operations to include: artillery and naval gunfire, air mobile operations, gunships, tactical air, combat intelligence, medical evacuation, and combat resupply.

b. RGAT and DGAT organization and manning levels as shown in inclosures 3 and 4.

c. RGAT and DGAT equipment authorizations as shown in inclosure 6.

d. Authorization of 6 advisors for 90 days TDY as requested by C.G., 22d Division.

FREDERICK E. TIBBETTS III
Colonel, Armor
Senior Advisor

6 IncIs
1. Operations, Contacts and Results During Testing Periods
2. Use of US Combat Support During Testing Periods
3. Regimental Combat Assistance Team Manning Level and Organization
4. Division Combat Assistance Team Manning Level and Organization
5. Duties of DGAT and RGAT Personnel
6. DGAT and RGAT Authorization of Major Equipment Items
### OPERATIONS, CONTACTS AND RESULTS DURING TESTING PERIODS

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>40th RCAT 15Oct-30Nov</th>
<th>41st RCAT 1Aug-30Nov</th>
<th>47th RCAT 1-30Nov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. OPERATIONS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-company</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Days</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn Days Possible</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Battalion Days</td>
<td><strong>77%</strong></td>
<td><strong>75%</strong></td>
<td><strong>88%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. CONTACTS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad or smaller</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. RESULTS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Enemy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA CIA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS CIA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Friendly:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>WIA</td>
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<td>172</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA LIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS LIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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Inclosure 1
### Type Support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Support</th>
<th>40th RCAT (15 Oct-30 Nov)</th>
<th>41st RCAT (1 Aug-30 Nov)</th>
<th>47th RCAT (1-30 Nov)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Air</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gunships</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Assaults</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Resupply</td>
<td>85</td>
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### Medical Evacuations:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Night</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 2
REGIMENTAL CONFLICT ASSISTANCE TEAM MANNING LEVEL AND ORGANIZATION

RCAT

1 LTC TC CNDR
1 MAJ ASST TC CNDR
1 E7 OPNS HCO
1 E5 RTO

BCAT

1 CPT TN CNDR
1 E7 OPNS HCO

6 OFF
6 EM
TOTAL: 12

Inclosure 3
DIVISION COMBAT ASSISTANCE TEAM MANNING LEVEL AND ORGANIZATION

DCAT

1 COL Commander
1 LTC Deputy Commander
1 E9 SGM

DCAT

1 MAJ OPNS Officer
3 CPT Asst OPNS Officer
3 E7 OPNS NCO
1 E5 OPNS Clerk

DCAT

1 MAJ INTEL Officer
1 E7 INTEL NCO
1 E4 INTEL Clerk

DCAT

1 CPT DET OFCR
1 E6 DET SGT
1 E7 Det Spec
1 E5 Det Spec
1 E6 Det Coord
1 E7 Asst Spec
1 E7 Mess Steward
1 E5 Asst Mess Std
1 E5 Clerk
1 E5 Clerk
1 E4 Sfty Guards

50 DAY TM:

1 MAJ En Adv
1 LT Asst En Adv
2 E7 Asst Adv

1 CPT En Adv
1 E7 Asst Adv

8 OFF
TOTAL 23

Inclosure 4
DUTIES OF DCAT AND RCAT PERSONNEL

1. (U) DCAT:

a. DCAT Commander:

(1) Command the DCAT.

(2) Assist, as necessary, in coordinating combat operations.

b. DCAT Deputy Commander:

(1) Direct, supervise, and integrate the daily operations of the DCAT staff and Detachment Commander.

(2) Insure that RCAT Commanders are alerted to the actions required of them.

(3) Insure that all instructions disseminated to subordinate elements are in consonance with the policies and plans of the DCAT Commander.

(4) Act for the DCAT Commander in his absence.

c. Operations Officer:

(1) Assist, as necessary, the elements of the Division Headquarters (less G2) in coordinating combat operations.

(2) Supervise the activities of the assistant operations officers in the DTOC.

(3) Supervise the preparations of operational reports from the DCAT to higher headquarters.

(4) Coordinate, as necessary, the activities of the liaison teams to the division from FWMAF combat support units.

(5) Perform other duties as assigned by the DCAT Commander.

d. Intelligence Officer:

(1) Coordinate, as necessary, the flow of intelligence between Division and FWMAF intelligence agencies.

(2) Forward selected operational intelligence reports through intelligence channels to higher headquarters and other interested agencies.

(3) Perform as Security Control Officer and supervises functions for the DCAT as required by pertinent security regulations (AR 380-4, 5, 14, 381-9).

(4) Perform other duties as assigned by the DCAT commander.

e. Assistant Operations Officers:

(1) Operate the DTOC 24 hours per day.

(2) Assist, as necessary, the Vietnamese DTOC personnel in obtaining combat support from FWMAF.

Inclosure 5
DUTIES OF DCAT AND RCAT PERSONNEL (Continued)

(3) Coordinate continuously with the Vietnamese DTOC personnel to insure all information reported is available to both parties.

(4) Maintain, store, and distribute SOI material for Team 22 (Senior Assistant Operations Officer).

(5) Keep appropriate DCAT personnel informed of important or unusual developments on a continuous basis.

f. DCAT SHJ:

(1) Assist the DCAT commander.

(2) Advise the commander on the state of discipline and morale with Team 22.

(3) Insure communications with elements of Team 22 when the DCAT commander is in the field.

g. DCAT Operations NCO:

(1) Assist the assistant operations officers in operating the DTOC.

(2) Supervise the activities of the operations clerk.

h. Intelligence NCO:

(1) Assist the Intelligence Officer in the operations of the Intelligence Office and performs his duties in that officer's absence.

(2) Serve as the Secret documents custodian for Adv Tm 22.

(3) Supervise the activities of the Intelligence clerk.

i. Operations Clerk:

(1) Maintain the records required in the DTOC (logs, spot reports, crossbows).

(2) Assist in the transmission of information with other headquarters.

(3) Perform other duties as assigned by Operation NCO.

j. Intelligence Clerk:

(1) Maintain the files and records of the Intelligence Office.

(2) Prepare correspondence and reports required by the Intelligence Office.

(3) Perform other duties as assigned by the Intelligence NCO.

2. DCAT Support:

a. Detachment Commander:

(1) Responsible for discipline, billeting, and subsistence of personnel in the DCAT.

(2) Serve as headquarters commandant.
DUTIES OF DCAT AND NGOs (Continued)

(3) Responsible officer for supplies for Team 22.

(4) Responsible for compound maintenance, sanitation, defense, and overall supervision of civilian personnel employed within the compound.

b. Detachment Sergeant:

(1) Acts as team LSG.

(2) Assist the Det Commander in the performance of his duties.

(3) Responsible for all administration pertaining to personnel of Team 22.

c. Administration Specialist:

(1) Prepare reports and personnel actions and other administration to support personnel of the DCAT.

(2) Maintain unit files and records.

(3) Perform other duties designated by the detachment commander and administration NCO.

d. Supply Sergeant:

(1) Requisition, draw, transport, secure, and issue all supplies needed by Team 22.

(2) Maintain unit property book and other unit supply records.

(3) Act as team motor NCO.

e. Supply Specialist:

(1) Prepare supply reports and records.

(2) Perform such other functions as directed by the supply NCO.

f. Security coordinator:

(1) Coordinate the activities of the indigenous and US guards.

(2) Supervise the preparation and maintenance of the physical defenses of the compound.

(3) Supervise the indigenous pass system.

(4) Supervise the maintenance of weapons and equipment used in the compound defense.

g. Asst Security Coordinator: Assist the security coordinator in all assigned duties.

h. Mess Steward: Operate a unit mess for personnel at BaGi Compound.

i. Assistant Mess Steward: Assist the mess steward in the operation of the unit mess.
DUTIES OF RCAT AND RCT PERSONNEL (Continued)

3. Clerk Typist: Perform clerical duties assigned by the Detachment SGT.

4. RCAT:
   a. RCAT Commander:
      (1) Command the RCAT.
      (2) Assist, as necessary, the regimental commander in coordinating combat operations.
      (3) Assist the regimental commander as necessary in obtaining US combat service support.
      (4) Monitor the activities of the regiment from the command level.
      (5) Submit periodic evaluation of the regiment as required.
   b. Assistant RCAT Commander:
      (1) Assist the RCAT commander and assume his functions in the commander's absence.
      (2) Coordinate, as necessary, fire support provided by FWMAF.
      (3) Supervise the administration and logistic activity of the RCAT.
      (4) Coordinate the activities of the RCTs for the commander.
      (5) Serve as the RCAT liaison officer to other units as required.
   c. BCAT Commander:
      (1) Assist, as necessary, the battalion commander in coordinating combat operations.
      (2) Assist, as necessary, the battalion commander in coordinating US combat service support.
      (3) Keep the RCAT commander informed on battalion activities as they pertain to combat effectiveness, especially the proficiency of battalion sub-units.
      (4) Submit operation evaluation reports as required.
      (5) Assist in coordination and administration at the RCAT level when not in the field.
   d. RCAT Operations NCO:
      (1) Responsible for the 24-hour-a-day operation of the RCAT TOC.
      (2) Maintain situation maps for the RCAT.
      (3) Responsible for the administration and logistic activity of the RCAT.
      (4) Serve as the operations NCO of a BCT if required.
      (5) Perform other duties as assigned by the RCAT commander or assistant commander.
c. BCAT Operations NCO:

1. Perform duties as directed by the BCAT Commander.
2. Operate the radio for the BCAT in the field.
3. Serve as BCAT commander if required.

f. RCAT RTO:

1. Assist in manning the RCAT TOC.
2. Operate RCAT communications equipment.
### DCAT AND RCAT AUTHORIZATION OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS

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<thead>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Generator Set, 10 kw</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generator Set, Gas Engineer, 1.5 kw 28 Volt D.C.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Set, Gen. Illumination</td>
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<table>
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<td>Launcher, Grenade, 60 mm, M-79</td>
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<td>Machine Gun, 7.62 mm Light Flex, M-60</td>
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<table>
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### Miscellaneous

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACV Advisory Team Kit, 6 man team</td>
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Inclosure 6

I. Training:

A. II Corps Advisor Handbook: During staff visits to unit advisors, it was determined that many did not possess a detailed knowledge of their duties, nor were there any publications which they could consult. Following DMA guidance, an Advisor Handbook was prepared. This pocket guide provides unit advisors with detailed information on the ARVN personal, intelligence, and logistical systems, as well as a complete description of successful techniques for conduct of combat operations and training, employment of artillery, tactical air support and naval gunfire. This handbook has been of assistance to unit advisors throughout the Corps Tactical Zone.

B. Advisors Emphasis on ARVN Training Programs: Operations conducted by some ARVN Battalions during the Tet 1968 Campaign revealed that some units had not been adequately trained in (1) fire and maneuver tactics, (2) proper use of organic crew served weapons, and (3) combat in cities. Due to the poor showing of the 2d Ranger Group and 11th Infantry Regiment, the higher headquarters issued command guidance to all Sg. Maj. Div/STZ to install in their counterpart the increased need for training. As a result of this guidance, an in-place training program got underway throughout II CTZ. This program consists of 40 hours of combat-oriented subjects and is conducted monthly. To date, all units have received this training and the program is continuing with good results. A system of reports and after operation critiques have been implemented to assist in the monitoring the progress of original units.

II. Plans: The following provided methods to enhance ARVN combat effectiveness.

A. S ERROR: This headquarters has monitored and implemented a system of reports to evaluate the combat effectiveness of ARVN units. Monthly and Quarterly SERROR Reports (System of Evaluation of Effectiveness of ARVN) have been prepared to insure Headquarters DIV/STZ is kept current on the fighting capabilities of ARVN units.

B. Maneuver Battalion Progress Report: In early this headquarters began to compile complete data on each maneuver battalion in II Corps. This data includes combat and operational statistics and narrative summaries of ARVN effectiveness as submitted by Battalion Senior Advisors. This complete study of each battalion provides this headquarters with a complete and precise picture of each unit's past performances, capabilities, and limitations and form the basis for advisor discussions with their counterpart at this headquarters.

C. Combat Assistance Team (C/T): This headquarters working in conjunction with the advisory personnel of the 22d Division organized, tested and evaluated the Combat Assistance Team (C/T) concept in II Corps. This concept, made possible due to improved combat performance of ARVN units, was initiated on 31 July 1968 in the 1st Infantry Regiment. The Regimental...
Combat Assistance Team (RC T) eliminates a Regimental Staff Advisor and reduces the four, four-man battalion advisory teams to three mobile two-man Battalion Combat Assistance Teams (B-CAT). Because of the success of the CAT concept in the 11st Regiment, the 10th and 17th Infantry Regimental Advisory Teams were organized under this concept in October. On 16 October, the 22d Division Advisory Team was also reorganized into a Division Combat Assistance Team (DC T), reducing the number of advisory personnel at the Division Headquarters by two-thirds. Due to the favorable reaction to the CAT concept by both US and ARVN, personnel studies are now under way to reorganize the advisory effort in the 23d Division and the 24th Special Tactical Zone.

D. Measurement of Progress System: To insure that Senior Advisor, IX Corps, is informed of significant military operations and pacification activities in IX Corps Tactical Zone, this headquarters submits monthly reports of progress to the CO, IFFORCEV. A monthly review is also conducted, except on dates that Quarterly Reviews are scheduled. For each Monthly Review, briefings are prepared to inform the Senior Advisor of significant progress made by ARVN units toward Combined Campaign Plan Goals.

IX. Command Inspections: A semi-annual system of command inspections was established to insure that US Advisors throughout II CTZ are adequately provided for with regard to housing, messing, and security. Scheduled inspections are conducted by the DS, O1, O2, O3 and O4 twice annually and results are forwarded through channels to pertinent subordinate commands. These inspections are considered beneficial in that they provide Commanding General USARV and Province (CO US) advisory functions in August of this year, these semi-annual inspections were conducted by the II Corps DS and staff for each Province and District Advisory Team.
Inclomarch to Dreibert Report - USA, II Corps Tactical Zone, 18 November 1967 to 15 December 1968.

ANN LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

A. GENERAL: Numerous logistical programs were initiated during this period to upgrade and modernize the II Corps combat elements. Prior to the Tet Offensive the normal prescribed depot stockage levels were 30 days to 90 days depending on class of supply, location, lines of communication, and ability to store and service the supplies. The higher stockage levels were prescribed for depots in the highlands where road opening operations were required for resupply. During the Tet Offensive, the level of stockage proved to be inadequate. The Commanding General, II Corps, has since authorized a 90 days stockage for Class II, III and V throughout the western highlands. In addition to the authorized increased stockage of supplies, unit basic loads were also increased.

B. Food Service: Two programs were initiated to improve the diet of the ARVN soldier and his dependents: the issue of increased stockage of operational rations and the increase in the number of commissaries and variety of items available for sale. The operational ration has proven very successful. The allotted monthly consumption has been tripled and restrictions on use minimized, thus allowing units to remain in the field for extended periods without dependence on "A" type rations. The number of operational commissaries has increased from 27 to 47 during the past year. There are presently 14 under construction and 16 planned. When these are completed, 100% of II Corps soldiers will be within a reasonable distance of a commissary.

C. Weapon Distribution Program: The ability of the II Corps soldier to defend himself and conduct offensive operations has shown remarkable improvement. Much of this improvement can be attributed to the upgrading of his weapons. M-16 rifles have been issued to all ARVN combat maneuver battalions. The automatic weapons, M-2 carbines and Browning Automatic Rifles, replaced by the M-16 issue were redistributed to upgrade the R/PF weapons. The automatic fire power of the R/PF units has been increased by over 50%. Excess M-1 rifles, M-1 carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns generated by the ARVN and R/PF redistribution are being issued to the Civilian Self Defense Force. Approximately 11,000 weapons have already been distributed under this program. The M-60 machine gun was also introduced during the period to replace some of the .30 cal M-1919 series machine guns and to increase the number of machine guns authorized ARVN maneuver battalions. Over 350 of these weapons have been issued. The 79 grenade launcher has greatly increased the close-in defensive and offensive posture of the ARVN. Over 50% of the 3700 M-79 grenade launchers authorized II Corps units have been issued. To improve the ARVN anti-tank defense and increase their offensive capability against hard targets, 235 3.5 inch rocket launchers, 226 57mm recoilless rifles and 3250 M-72 light anti-tank weapons have been issued.

D. Transportation: The transport capability of II Corps units was significantly improved by the introduction of over 600 I-352 trucks. Some worn out vehicles were replaced and the overall 24 ton vehicle strength has been brought up to 90% of authorization. Each province is in the process of
receiving 5 V-100 combat cars which will provide the necessary ability for local air security operations, thus freeing ARVN units from this duty. During the Tet Offensive, it became apparent that II Corps did not have enough organic aerial resupply equipment to effectively resupply units in contact. Consequently, selected II Corps units have been authorized 28 sets of sling equipment. This will give II Corps the overall slinging capability to lift 120 tons of supplies in a single lift. This program is scheduled for completion by the end of this year, when the issue is completed, II Corps will have a considerable organic capability of helicopter resupply by sling delivery.

E. Barrier Materials: The barrier material allocated to II Corps for CY 60 was woefully inadequate. Through the efforts of the advisory staff and RNGS, the supplementary allocations were provided. These supplies increased the quantities of barbed wire by 20%, concertina by 100%, and sandbags by 10%. Even with these increases, there was insufficient barrier material available to satisfy all requirements. In an effort to correct this situation, II Corps requested increases for CY 61, which were submitted to RNGS and JCS. The CY 60 allocations provided II Corps did not equal the quantities requested, but they were a very significant improvement over CY 60. The allocation of barbed wire remained about the same, the allocation of concertina was increased by 350%, and the allocation for sandbags was equal by approximately 100%. In an effort to expedite the allocation of barrier materials received by the ALCS, the II Corps staff has streamlined the processing of requests. This was accomplished by standardizing the request form for the Corps 3-3 to approve the allocation of barrier materials to repair currently existing defensive systms. The procedures used by sectors for requesting barrier materials have also been changed. The sectors are no longer required to submit their requests direct to II Corps or to the RNIVS or JCS. II Corps will inurn allocate barrier materials direct to the sectors. This change should insure a more equitable distribution of barrier materials to the sectors.

F. Medical: The first phase of the reorganization of ARVN medical assets was accomplished as programmed with the deactivation of the 20th Medical Company and the activation of a sector hospital in each province. This program is designed to combine the two existing hospitals in each province, one military and one civilian, into a single, better equipped and staffed unit (Joint Utilization Program). This combined hospital will be under the operational control of the Province Chief. There has been an increased capability of the ARVN field units through extensive refresher training in advanced first aid conducted by division medical companies. The II Corps Surgeon initiated a medical training program to improve the skills of the ARVN medical personnel. In addition, the medical personnel of the RNIVS have had a salutary effect upon the ARVN medical corps and have increased interest in medical care and sanitation. This program seems to be working quite well. The formation of the medical battalion, infantry division and the medical group STZ, has been under study for the year. Implementation instructions have been received for the establishment for the establishment of them 1 January 1969. Increased assistance and guidance to the ARVN by medical advisors has improved their requisitioning procedures and reduced the time considerably for receiving supplies. During the period two serious outbreaks of disease were rapidly controlled. Immediately after the Tet Offensive a massive inoculation campaign in several locations
in II CVZ erupted a major outbreak of malaria. During the battle of the Lao in the fall of 1968 a high incidence of malaria was contracted by troops in the operational area. Prompt action by advisors, as well as US and ARVN medical personnel quickly brought the outbreak under control.

G. Logistical Personnel: Although perhaps the weakest part of the ARVN military system there has been a slow but constant improvement of personnel concerned with logistics. The 4th Section at the 23d Division was recently reorganized, a new 4th appointed and the responsiveness increased. Constant liaison with the AO's and the OC's is the rule rather than the exception. Dramatic improvement has been evident in some II MSL units with the creation of contact teams and inspection units. The reorganization and up rating of II MSL companies into A, B, & C type units continues, and additional spares generated by the reorganization are being filled. The OC's are continuing efforts to upgrade technical training through resident instruction at the OC's. The attitude at CVZ Headquarters towards logistic problems brought to their attention is excellent. They are eager to act on advice or suggestions and desire to do their best to expedite solutions. An attitude is developing that their main purpose is to provide service to the line units and they are responding to this concept.
Incloturj to Debraj Report - Do., II Corps Tactical Zone, 10 November 1967

to 15 November 1968.

Advisor logistical Support:

A. Construction Program

(1) Several programs have been initiated to improve the living and working conditions of the Field Advisors. During early 68 a need was recognized for a project to upgrade advisory facilities. The "Get Well Program" was initiated with a survey at each of the 75 advisory sites located within II Corps to determine the need for additional facilities. The survey was completed in April and submitted to ISAF. This survey was reviewed and revised several times before July and November. Any changes were brought about based on strength increases at district level which included the US, French, and other additional advisor deployments. A revision survey was completed during the first week of November and all changes have been submitted.

(2) Another problem uncovered during these surveys was the lack of "Land Use Consequences" (LUC). Only 20 of the 75 sites surveyed had valid JGS-approved LUC. LUC have not been prepared for all sites and 50% have been submitted through ISAF for JGS approval. The remaining 10% are under review at district level and should be completed before the end of this year.

(3) The 10th Engineer Brigade has been tasked to accomplish construction of 56 locations throughout II Corps. Work has begun at 10 sites. The 10th Engineer Brigade will continue to expand the project as LUC's are approved and labor and material become available.

B. Health and Sanitation: In addition to upgrading facilities, attention has been directed to improve the health and sanitation standards of the advisors. The health standards of the US advisors throughout II CTZ has been greatly improved, especially during the past six months. Checklists for inspections and interim sanitary standards were developed and distributed to the field in each of the following areas: Food service sanitation, malaria control, barber shop standards, sanitation requirements and water purification. Additionally, a program for the administration of Gamma Globulin to reduce the possibility of a hepatitis outbreak was initiated throughout II CTZ. This requirement later, in June 1968, became Vietnam wide for ISAF personnel. There have been no significant hepatitis incidence since the program's conception. Increased emphasis in the area of rabies control, i.e., rabies vaccination and registration, has reduced the number of rabies incidence in II CTZ. All domestic type animals on US compound are vaccinated and tagged.

C. Food Service: The II Corps Food Service Advisor conducted quarterly inspections of all mess associations and field ration messes. Periodic food service inspections of facilities and equipment have greatly improved the overall operation of ISAF mess facilities throughout II Corps. A total of ten field ration messes and five mess associations are presently in operation.
D. Equipment: Shortages of communication equipment, advisor vehicles, and generators have existed for the past year. To increase advisor support, several surveys have been conducted and the results forwarded to HCM.

(1) The adverse radio situation received some relief recently when 125 15/PAC-77 radios were distributed. The 15/PAC-25 radios, replaced by PRC-77’s, were redistributed to fill all known shortages in advisory teams.

(2) Advisor vehicle support is provided through AMV channels. This system is slow in providing replacement and new authorizations. However, during this past year, the overall posture has improved. In Corps advisor teams now have approximately 80% of their authorized vehicles.

(3) Information has been received from M&F that 40 each 10 kW and four each 30 kW generators will be available for issue in the near future. The issue of these generators will relieve the critical generator shortage within the corps area.
Inclosure 5 to Colonel Report - DSA, II Corps Tactical Zone, 18 November 1967 to 15 December 1968.

I. Psychological Operations: Psychological Operations by ARVN have improved significantly during the period. Such of this improvement was accomplished through advisory efforts to make II Corps units cognizant of the value of a well-coordinated psychological operations program.

A. Radio Makuk Military PSYOPS Station: Planning for this radio station began in November 1967 and led to the establishment of the transmitter on the southwest end of Makuk City. The radio began broadcasting in early February. This station received three enemy attacks in March and was destroyed. It was decided in April 1968 to re-establish Radio Makuk. New equipment was ordered and is on hand. Hardening of the site by US engineers was begun in June 1968 with the expansion of the perimiter, construction of fighting bunkers, and construction of the principal bunker to house the transmission facilities. Due to poor initial construction, the principal bunker was considered unsafe and was dismantled. A safer and better bunker was constructed in its place. The estimated completion date for the radio station is 15 December. A recommended plan for distribution of mini-radios has been forwarded to the CORD for comment and approval. This headquarters is now awaiting return of the approved or revised plan.

B. Improvement of ARVN PSYOPS: ARVN unit S-5's are receiving more detailed and explicit instructions on PSYOPS campaigns and policies. As a result, there has been an increase in ARVN aerial PSYOPS requests in the past few months.

(1) A SOP for a combined PSYOPS/CI Committee at province level is being drawn up. These committees will include all interested agencies in the provinces. They will ensure full coordination on all PSYOPS and CI matters and that maximum input from intelligence sources is realized.

(2) The 20th Political Warfare Battalion has its PSYOPS companies deployed in support of the DT's and STZ. There are two companies located in the 23d DTA, one company each in the 22d DTA and the 24th STZ. These companies have detached teams down to maneuver battalions.

(3) PSYOPS support centers have been operational since May 1968 in Nha Trang and Makuk. These centers ensure full coordination of all PSYOPS assets and preclude duplication of targets.

II. Civil Affairs: In the recent past, Civic Action tended to be directed wholly towards improving the living conditions of ARVN dependents. During the period of this report, however, considerable progress has been made in redirecting these efforts towards the civilian community.

A. Community Relations Committee was established in the Makuk City area to utilize all US unit capabilities for civic action in support of the GVN RD program. Projects have been suggested by the Province RD Council.
and are coordinated by the Province S-5 advisor. Several projects such as school construction, well drilling, house construction, and assistance to churches have already been accomplished. This is a continuing effort.

B. ARVN units are taking a more active interest in civic action. Funds have been made available by Commander General I N to the ARVN Battalions in a pilot program. Efforts have begun to have ARVN utilize civic action expertise in the form of the US 1st Civil Affairs Company Civil Affairs teams will advise and train ARVN Civil Affairs teams in the sociological and technical aspects of civic action while actually conducting projects.

III. Social Welfare for ARVN Dependents: The Social Welfare program has improved within the II Corps Tactical Zone. There is now a better coordinated effort to ensure that all measures are taken to improve the conditions of ARVN families.

A. Improvement of ARVN Social Welfare: The II Corps Social Welfare Director was sent to the United States in order to learn new techniques in administering social welfare programs and utilization of skilled personnel for more efficient activity.

B. A change was requested in July to the JTD to have one of the spaces in the GS section converted to that of Social Welfare advisor. If approved, this will give the POLAR GS Advisory Section a qualified officer in this field and will appreciably increase its effectiveness.

IV. Political Indoctrination: This program has been only marginally effective due to sporadic scheduling of classes and lack of trained personnel. Presently, all ARVN soldiers receive political education classes at least once a week.

A. A Political "enforce" course to train ARVN NCO's was begun in May 1968. This course trains the NCO in indoctrination, his national heritage, and psychological operations. CIB, II/35 and ARVN NCO's have been trained. This course gives ARVN the necessary instructors to bring the political indoctrination programs to troops at the lowest unit level.

B. The political indoctrination program which has been in existence for two years has undergone a change in curriculum beginning in June 1968. It provides the average soldier with a basis in how his government operates, its accomplishments in, and future plans for, national reconstruction, and Vietnamese history. This program emphasizes the soldier's role in the operation of the government and national reconstruction.
Inclines 6 to 6, II Corps Tactical Zone, 10 November 1967, to 15 December 1968.

**Signal Matters:** The reliability of ARVN communications over the past year has improved and in some cases exceeded parallel US communications; for example, there were no significant outages of ARVN communications during the 6th period in II CTZ. The ARVN signal troops know how to operate and take very good care of their equipment.

**A. Organization:** The ARVN G6 Office is authorized a total of 12 officers and 30 enlisted men. They are organized as follows:

![Diagram of G6 Organization]

**B. Territorial Communications:** Commencing in July 1968, the responsibility for territorial (Province, District and RF/TF) communications was transferred from Division direct to the Corps G6. This was started with the Provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Phu Bon. As direct communications facilities became available the remainder of the II Corps Provinces will report directly to the Corps G6.

**C. Division Signal Reorganization:** The division signal companies, in the 22d and 23d Divisions, are converting to division signal battalions. This is an 18 month conversion which started in July 1968 and is scheduled for completion on 31 December 1969.

**D. Area Communications Reorganization:** As a result of planning accomplished over the past several months a new ARVN Signal Group has been approved for II Corps. This will be an area communications group to replace the present 620th Signal Battalion. The group will consist of a headquarters and one area battalion in Phu Kien and a second area battalion in Phu Trang. This change will provide significantly improved command and control of ARVN area communications in the II Corps.
Signal Advisor Matters

A. Mission: The mission of the G6 advisor is to advise the II Corps (and G6) on all aspects of signal communications. The G6 advisor performs direct supervision over the advisors to the LNO, II Corps and 620th Signal Battalion, and staff supervision over the Division and Special Tactical Zone Signal Advisors within II Corps. Lastly the G6 advisor performs as the Signal Advisor for the DA, II Corps.

B. Organization: The G6 Advisor Section is authorized 6 officers and 5 enlisted men. While appearing on the TD as the Signal Advisor and a part of G3 this section is locally organized as a principal staff section as follows:

- G6 ADVISOR
  - DEP G6 LNV
  - SIG OPNS ADV
  - CHIEF SIG LNV
  - 620TH BN ADV SIG BN LNV
  - SOI CLAS

C. Advisor Radios: At the primary instigation of DA, II Corps, MACV J3 and J4 conducted studies in February and June 1966 which resulted in revised advisor communications equipment authorization from corps down to battalion and eventually to province and district. The results of this study are reflected in MACV TL 62-7 dated 14 September 1966. The current authorizations are considered adequate for known advisor communications requirements in the CTZ.

D. Tactical Secure Voice Equipment: As a result of planning done during the past year II Corps advisor teams will be receiving secure voice equipment, KY-50’s, KY-30’s, for FIl nets during the next one to six months. This will greatly improve both security and speed of message transmission in these nets and greatly reduce requirements for frequent FIl frequency changes.

E. Combat Assistance Team Concepts: Under the combat assistance team (C.A.T) concept the division level signal advisor is eliminated. This advisor formerly assisted Province and District Teams in addition to the Division Teams, as C.A.T is expanded signal support for CORDS advisor teams will be removed entirely. A study has been initiated by this headquarters to determine personnel and organizational requirements for advisory signal support for Province/District advisors.
2. US Signal Support for Advisors: During the past eleven months the support given to advisor teams by the 21st Signal Group, 1st Signal Brigade has been nothing short of outstanding. This has primarily been communications center and telephone support but in many cases has included actual operation of advisor radios.
Inclosure 7 to DfOB, II Corps Tactical Zone, 10 November 1967, to 15 December 1968.

I. General: The ARVN Engineers have accomplished projects in a variety of areas of responsibility. They have provided combat support to tactical operations, maintained and upgraded lines of communications, participated in Civic Action and base development construction projects, as well as the installation of deliberate defensive positions. Although hampered by old equipment and shortages of personnel, they have not only accomplished assigned tasks but also have found time to participate in self-improvement programs. Advisory elements of the Engineer section have assisted in providing advice and technical supervision to a large number of US construction projects.

II. Capabilities:

A. The overall capability of the ARVN Engineers in II Corps has improved. This has occurred for several reasons. First, they have had between five and ten percent of their officers and men in schools during the past year. Second, the projects that have been undertaken have provided excellent training vehicles for the junior leaders who, in turn, have gained additional self-confidence. These projects have included airfield and road maintenance, base development type work, i.e., mess halls, dispensaries, and compounds, as well as construction of reinforced concrete highway bridges that meet MACV standards. The third significant factor has been the effort of advisors in encouraging the ARVN commanders to assume full responsibility for the entire operation of their units and projects. The purpose of this approach was to force those commanders to develop confidence through doing, to make their supply system and maintenance programs function and to reduce their dependence upon the advisors to secure materials, repair parts and supplies for them.

B. There are, however, three primary factors that inhibit further improvement. First is the shortage of equipment. The 20th Engineer Group, for instance, was short in excess of fifteen percent of its major ordnance and engineer items. These shortages have been reduced during the year and hopefully this problem will be completely eliminated in the coming year. If any of the proposed plans to return US Engineer units to CONUS and to leave their equipment to ARVN takes place, this shortage problem could be solved. The second limiting factor is maintenance. ARVN has a documented preventive maintenance program that is good, but, unfortunately the documents alone cannot accomplish the maintenance. This problem really is paralleled with the third major one - the lack of an aggressive forceful attitude. The preventive maintenance system, which includes repair parts resupply, is predicated upon the implementation of aggressive follow-up. Due to a current lack of effective command emphasis, or a mere aggressive attitude toward maintenance programs, at least at the lower echelons, the equipment does not receive the attention that it should. The solution to these three problems may in part exist in the affiliation program that is receiving increased attention. This program pairs off an ARVN and a US battalion that are collocated and seeks to obtain close coordination/cooperation on their respective projects. In some cases, joint projects have occurred where the blending of the capabilities of each battalion resulted in a mutually supporting operation which worked out very well. This exposure to the day-to-day operations of a similar US battalion...
any particular of the beneficial effects, i.e, cross-training on equipment, con and emphasis on maintenance and aggressive follow-up attitudes, to spill over on to ARVN. When the attitude problem is solved and maintenance enjoys greater emphasis, the capabilities of ARVN Engineers will greatly improve.

C. Specific notable accomplishments of the II Corps Engineers are shown at Annex A.

III. Weaknesses:

A. Dependence upon the US advisors and their supply system has been a serious weakness in ARVN. This has prevented them from adequately testing their supply system to determine where improvement is needed. Although legitimate cases have existed where it was appropriate to assist ARVN, this has occurred too often. It would appear that they are too dependent on the US system and steps should be taken to encourage ARVN to use their own system exclusively so as to identify any weaknesses, while they have the US system to back them up. If they do not follow such a program, the consequences could be critical should the US have to withdraw unexpectedly.

B. Additional concern attention must be given to all preventive maintenance programs as discussed in paragraph b above. Future advisory effort will continue to stress the importance of a responsive preventive maintenance program.

IV. HACV "Get Well" Program: The HACV "Get Well" Construction Program was initiated in April 1966 by a requirement to survey all advisory facilities to determine what work was necessary to upgrade these facilities to minimum standards. This was accomplished during a four week survey conducted by the Engineer Advisors assigned to Task 21. Subsequently a report was forwarded in May to USARV with the stated requirements. Approximately two months later, construction directives were issued to the 18th Engineer Brigade to accomplish this work. This construction program is currently in progress.
ARVN ACCOMPLISHMENTS

I. Lines of Communications: During the period, the ARVN Engineers of II Corps Tactical Zone constructed 603 meters of permanent bridging while accomplishing repair work to 12 other permanent bridges. The hundred thirty-eight meters of tactical bridging (Bailey, False & BPC) were erected in support of operations, with an additional 109 meters of the same type of bridging recovered and returned to stock. Although limited by shortages of equipment and repair parts, the Engineers managed to construct 25 kilometers of secondary roads and 11 by-passes which included 180 meters of culverts. In addition, they maintained in excess of 130 kilometers of road throughout the province. Incorporated into this maintenance responsibility was the installation of over 500 meters of culverts necessary to maintain the minimum standards of drainage on these roads.

II. Combat Support: The ARVN Engineers received the equivalent of 45 Engineer platoon missions to support combat operations. These missions were to construct 15 bunkers, clear 30 acres of vegetation for road security, recover 2 airfields and the installation of 190,000 square meters of minefields. Each divisional battalion constructed a DTOC at their respective headquarters, while the 216th Engineer Co (Panel Bridge) constructed a very fine DTOC at II Corps Headquarters.

III. Civic Action: Some of the more noteworthy accomplishments in the civic action project included the construction of a Division 20 million gallon water reservoir, a market and three elementary schools. Additionally, several other schools were enlarged and some 100 acres of real estate was cleared for future land development.

IV. Base Development: In this particular area, significant contributions were made toward the betterment of ARVN units. Eight mess halls, two dining halls, one dispensary, two clubs, one large auditorium and several compounds were constructed. There was a great amount of effort devoted to improving the defense of various compounds by the construction of “live-in” bunkers.

V. Improvement Programs: Early in May, three concentrated improvement programs were initiated to assist ARVN in upgrading their facilities and ability to accomplish their assigned missions.

A. Tactical Operations Centers (TOC): Standard plans, to include Bills of Material, were developed and made available to provinces and divisions on request, in order that they could construct hardened facilities. All provinces now have hardened TOC's or they are under construction.

B. Bridge Security: This program began with an evaluation of some 147 bridges in II Corps Tactical Zone. Subsequent plans called for standardization of improvements to 82; all critical bridges up to a minimum standard of protection. This program is continuing under ARVN control.

Annex A
G.  NAVY Engineer Equipment and Ordnance Vehicle Utilization: This program was initiated as an effort to motivate the NAVY Engineers to increase the availability of authorized equipment by the following-up on outstanding requisitions and to apply added attention to obtaining repair parts for dead-lined equipment. So far, this program has enjoyed moderate success and is continuing to gain momentum.

VI. Troop and Dependent Facilities: The II Corps engineers contributed to the improvement of the health and welfare of dependents by constructing more than 50 sets of dependent quarters. This figure does not include the informal in-house programs of the various units to improve their respective living conditions.
Debrief Report - Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone, BG John W. Barnes

Sr. Officer Debriefing Report, DSA II Corps Tactical Zone, 18 Nov 67 to 15 Dec 68.

Deputy Sr. Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone

15 December 1968

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