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APO JAN FRANCISCO 96375

SU 1 C             
Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by Brigadier General M. McD. Jones, Jr. as CG, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

2. The contents of this report and the opinions expressed herein should not be construed as reflecting the official view or opinion of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam.

3. Brigadier General Jones is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incl as (trip).  2 cy wd HQ DA

CURL Y. BRAD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report by: Brigadier General M. McD. JONES, JR.


Inclusive Dates: 1 July 1967 - 9 November 1968

Date of Report: 9 November 1968

1. (U) The mission of the US Army Support Command, Saigon throughout the period covered remained as follows: "Provide logistical support (less aviation and avionics, repair parts, medical service/supplies, cryptographic service and missile services/supplies) to US Forces in III and IV CTZ, RVN, and provide common user supply maintenance and service support to Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in III and IV CTZ, RVN." The major forces supported at the beginning of the period of this report consisted of 2/3 division equivalents plus an Engineer Brigade, two Field Artillery Groups and the MACV advisory structure throughout the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones - a total of some 156,000 US and Free World Military Assistance Forces. This number has grown to some 220,000 and now includes four US Divisions, 2 separate brigades, an armored cavalry regiment and sufficient Australian, Thai, Philippine and Korean elements to bring the total of units supported to exceed 6 division equivalents.

2. (U) To perform its assigned mission this command has, as its major elements, two General Support Groups, a Transportation Command (Terminal C), a Field Depot, a Motor Transportation Group and a-Quartermaster Battalion (POL). An organizational diagram is at Incl 1.

3. (U) The mission, scope, structure and command relationships of this command are such that this report cannot be adequately presented in the format contained in USARV Regulation 1-3. Therefore, I will discuss the support rendered by functional area.
Because transportation is, in my view, the keystone of logistical support I will discuss it first, beginning with port operations.

Tremendous progress was achieved in many areas of port operations during the period July 1967 to November 1968. The steady upward climb in the amount of tonnage handled per month is the best indicator of the port's efficiency. During the period July 1967 through December 1967 an average of 410,801 short tons of cargo were handled per month, whereas during the first nine months of 1968 this had increased 27 per cent to an average of 522,339 short tons per month. Concurrently, ship turn-around time showed a marked decrease from a high of over forty days during the latter stage of the build-up of US and Allied Forces, to a low of six days during 1968 as complete fluidity was achieved in the Saigon Port Complex. During this same period, the number of ships waiting for open berth space in Saigon Port Complex showed a corresponding drop from over thirty to an average of less than four.

This was achieved despite an ever increasing workload. Military interest cargo handled by the 4th Transportation Command totaled over 7,563,000 short tons during the period from 1 July 1967 through 31 October 1968. This means that, during the average calendar month, 472,701 short tons of cargo were discharged or loaded at facilities operated by the 4th Transportation Command. Of the total tonnage handled, 55.5%, or 4,197,975 short tons, was discharged from or backloaded onto deep draft vessels or LSTs. An additional 3,365,216 short tons of cargo were discharged from or loaded onto barges and self-propelled lighters under the operational control of the command.

During the period covered by this report the 4th Transportation Command handled over 1.8 million short tons of ammunition, 700,000 short tons of vehicles, and three million short tons of general cargo in support of Free World Forces in the III and IV CTZ. In addition, 190,000 short tons of Sea Land cargo were discharged and backloaded at the command's Newport facility. The steady upward climb of the tonnage handled was interrupted only during the TET offensive in the month of February. This decrease actually reflects favorably upon the efforts of the personnel of the command as close to 400,000 short tons of cargo, including 140,000 short tons of desperately needed ammunition were moved despite lack of availability of local national stevedores. Increased enemy activity only heightened the determined efforts of the 4th Transportation Command to further improve operations in order to provide the Army with the most aggressive and timely logistical support it has ever known. While handling an ever increasing workload, it is significant to note that the operating costs of port activities did not show a commensurate upward trend. The increasing volume of tonnage was combined with a lowering of port operating costs. This was accomplished through intense management efforts whereby operating procedures were constantly updated, and the proper utilization of existing resources was perpetually stressed.
The principal problem encountered in port operations was the lack of sufficient, skilled military stevedore personnel. To perform the mission great reliance had to be placed on contract operation of the deep draft ports. While this relieved the personnel problem by substituting local nationals for military, it created additional problems of security against pilferage, labor relations and unreliability of the work force at crucial times such as the TET Counter-offensive. In a situation such as exists currently in Vietnam the troop list of terminal service and terminal transfer units should consist of a mix of Type A and Type B units. The Type A units would be used to operate principally at remote ports such as Can Tho, and Dong Tam and to furnish a mobile port capability which can be readily shifted as the volume of work shifts from port to port in response to changes in the tactical situation. The Type B units would be used to supervise the local national work force and furnish the necessary clerical personnel at berths operated by contract. These units could also supervise military personnel temporarily assigned to stevedore duty during times of labor unrest or a rise in the level of enemy activity which prevented civilians from working. The use of contract labor is definitely preferable to direct hire for reasons of control, efficiency and reliability.

Considerable reliance is placed on boat and barge movement of all classes of supply in the IV CTZ. In addition to normal resupply missions and support of the Mobile Riverine Force, craft of this command are occasionally employed in unit moves in the Delta. The principal problem here is the age of the fleet which results in an undesirably high percentage of boats down for maintenance. Here again contract tugs, barges and POL tankers are used extensively to augment military assets. The best work has been done by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, a Philippine concern. Additional water craft units recently joined the command enabling us to stay abreast of the increasing task in the Delta.

The motor transport assets of the command are considerable but barely equal to the requirement. The military portion of the task is performed by the 46th Transportation Group.

The basic organization of a group headquarters and two battalion headquarters was in existence on 1 July 1967. Operating units under the battalions included five 2½-ton cargo truck companies, one 5-ton cargo truck company, and five medium truck companies, one of which was augmented by attachments to form a provisional refrigerator van company. Two trailer transfer point detachments were also assigned to the Group.

In mid-November 1968, the Group included three 2½-ton companies, three 5-ton companies, and five medium truck companies, plus a provisional refrigerator van company, a substantially more efficient structure than existed at the beginning of the period.
The principal change in military truck capabilities was the reduction of 2½-ton cargo trucks from 360 authorized to 180 authorized with a concurrent increase in 5-ton cargo trucks from 60 authorized to 160. The importance of the substitution of 5-ton for 2½-ton trucks was enhanced by introduction of the truck/dolly converter/S&P trailer combination which has made the 5-ton cargo truck the most productive equipment, in terms of tons hauled per driver, available for general support hauling.

Refrigerator van capabilities were reduced during the period, as equipment was washed out through wear and tear, without replacement. The increasing age of the truck fleet, with only limited replacement equipment available, impaired capabilities by generating an increasing breakdown rate.

Inadequate repair parts supply from CONUS has made it impossible for field maintenance support to keep the aging truck fleet from developing a high deadline rate.

Continued emphasis was placed on increasing truck operating capabilities without increasing manpower requirements. Significant actions along this line included:


b. Initiation of an ENSURE request for 5-ton capacity, wagon-type trailers for use with 2½ and 5-ton cargo trucks.

c. Initiation of an ENSURE request for 30-ton capacity semitrailers for use with 5-ton tractors in local and short haul operations.

d. Conversion of the principal ammunition barge point clearance operation from cargo trucks to semitrailers.

From July 1967 to November 1968, military trucks moved approximately 2.4 million short tons of cargo in support of combat forces in the III and IV CTZ, for a total of about 53 million ton-miles.

Support was furnished to the 1st, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 199th Infantry Brigade, the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division and various Free World Forces. Every major combat operation in the III and IV CTZ was supported by truck units of this command. Ground LOC's were established as far north as CATUM and LOC NH and as far south as CAN THO. Operations were maintained during periods of general hostilities such as the 1968 TET Offensive and under continuing hazard of ambushes and land mines.
The entire period was marked by increasing flexibility in use of available resources to satisfy operational requirements, improved coordination of military and contract truck capabilities, and ever more responsive relationships with supported divisions and other commands and activities.

Details of the pattern of highway support have changed in response to shifting deployments of combat forces, but the general pattern has remained essentially unchanged. TAY NINH Province was a primary operating area throughout the period and received a high proportion of available support. Increasing activity in the Delta beginning in the late spring of 1968 generated additional highway operations into the Delta concurrently with build-up of other support activities in that area.

A significant change in the distribution of effort was the almost complete turnover of port clearance work, except for ammunition, from military to contract truck capabilities.

Introduction of an advance cargo offering system in September 1966 made a useful and long-needed improvement in truck operations planning and programming.

At the end of the period, in the Long Binh - Saigon area, the 48th Transportation Group picked up freight from and delivered to about 100 local installations and activities. Daily convoys were run to VUNG TAU to supplement the water shipments which provided primary support to that area. The Thai Division at BEAR CAT was supported and daily convoys were run to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment bases at LONG GIAO and XUAN LOC. A large convoy was sent every six weeks or two months to PHUOC VINH. Deliveries were made daily to the 1st Division base camp at LAI KHE and two-day convoys were run three times a week to QUAN LOI. In the 25th Division area, daily runs were made to CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG. The 9th Division was supported in the Delta, primarily at DONG TAI, HY THO, and TAN AN. A few convoys had gone as far as VINH LONG and CAN THO. The new requirements of the 1st Cavalry Division increased highway support tonnages and frequency of operations to PHUOC VINH, QUAN LOI, and TAY NINH, with indications that reopening of roads to LOC NHN and KATUN might shortly be required.

Military truck operations can be improved in many ways. Among the most significant areas requiring increased emphasis are the following:

1. Continuation of efforts to replace small trucks with higher productivity equipment.
2. Continuation of efforts to bring equipment on hand to authorized levels, especially S&G trailers, 5T tractors and reefer vans.
3. Improvement in parts supply from CONUS.
4. Better use of support transportation by the divisions to reduce...
loss of potential capability through unloading delays and late releases of equipment from commitment.

5. Timely replacement of worn-out trucks.

6. Continued attention to improvement of organizational maintenance.

One of the most productive improvements which could be made in this area would be the inclusion of hands-on maintenance training for company officers in basic officer courses.

7. Continued emphasis be placed on substituting large capacity equipment for small trucks in line and local haul operations.

8. Organizational maintenance shop buildings be completed in truck units to replace maintenance tents, with the object of improving maintenance efficiency and reducing maintenance costs.

9. Continued emphasis be placed on cost analysis of highway movement operations, in order to identify opportunities for significant future economies.

10. Further consideration be given to programming increased heavy lift capabilities for SSC against foreseeable requirements for support of eventual roll-up.

In addition to military assets the command has four commercial trucking firms under contract with combined assets exceeding 640 cargo trucks. The contracts total more than $14,000,000 annually. Recently a comprehensive study was completed of a commercial trucking rate system which was specified in the FY 69 - 70 contracts. The rate system that had been in existence was not sufficiently flexible for the rapid expansion and contraction required in the movement of cargo. A rate per loaded trip system was developed which is expected to result in a 30% savings in overall contract trucking costs. The projected saving to the US Army is $4,300,000 over a one-year period. The cost per short ton moved, starting at $5.60, is projected to decline to $3.10. To improve our trucking support for port and beach clearance in the III CTZ and to augment our line haul capability, a new tractor-trailer commercial contract began operations in October 1968. This contract provides for 220 contractor furnished 35 foot, 20 ton capacity trailers; 26 heavy duty 40 ton capacity trailers; 120 tractors, 5 ton; and 11 tractors, 10 ton. All of this equipment is interchangeable with its military counterparts. In addition, the government will furnish 150 military design 12 ton trailers to the contractor. This contract will give us the capability of hauling approximately 5,000 short tons per day in port and beach clearance and line haul. The tractor-trailer fleet replaced
90 flatbed trucks also operated under contract. The tractors/trailers will modernize our trucking fleet, reduce port clearance cost, improve the efficiency of the port clearance system and provide flexibility for expansion of the system by either contractor operations or military units.

Use is also made of the Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS). Interdicted by mines and vulnerable to attack, the VNRS suffered periods of nearly complete immobility. In November 1967, several new procedures were established which resulted in renewed emphasis on shipments to and from Saigon Port, Di An, Bien Hoa and the Ho Nai Railhead. In addition, there was a complete renovation of the Ho Nai Rail Station. By working closely with the station masters as well as the Joint MACV/USAID Planning Committee and with the President of the Vietnamese Railway System, including shipping and receiving agencies, the tonnages transported by rail have gone from a low of 1,630 S/T in February 1968 (TET Offensive) to a high of 10,300 S/T in August 1968. In addition to providing jobs for many Vietnamese civilians, this build-up in the VNRS helped to relieve congestion on Vietnamese highways and reduced the heavy workload of US Army transportation and civilian contract truck equipment and personnel. This effort is being expanded to provide delivery to second destination consignees for types of cargo that is compatible to rail. Additionally, the Ho Nai Railhead operation has been expanded to a 24 hours daily operation as of 1 November 1968.

During the period a Movements Control Center (Prov) was organized and staffed with personnel nominally assigned to the 4th Transportation Command. An MTOE which would provide the necessary personnel spaces has been pending approval for several months. Expedient action to approve this request would assist in alleviating the currently critical personnel shortage throughout the command.

The USAD, Long Binh has the responsibility for providing wholesale supply of Classes I, II, IV and VII in the III and IV CTZ. This activity provides supplies directly to major tactical units and to this Support Command's organic DSU. The major tactical units, utilizing organic capability, accomplish the retail supply to supported units. This Support Command's DSU's accomplish the retail supply mission by utilizing the area support concept.

JSAD, Long Binh accomplishes the wholesale supply of Class I by a combination of unit and supply point distribution. The 29th GS Gp operates retail supply points at Saigon, Long Binh, Phuoc Vinh, Long Giao, Tay Ninh, and Bear Cat. There are two retail activities operated by 53d GS Gp at Vung Tau and Can Tho. Stockage objectives vary, depending on the particular location of the activity. Bakery support is provided by the 266th S&S Bn, Long Binh, 228th S&S Co, Cu Chi, the 490th GS Co at Vung Tau and local contractors. There are 33 ice cream machines located throughout the III & IV CTZ. Fifteen are operated by this SUPCOM's DSU's and the remainder by the tactical units. In addition, ice cream is provided by Foremost Dairy. There are 30 ice plants installed
throughout the III & IV CTZ. Thirteen are operated by our DSU's and the remainder by various tactical units.

USAD, Long Binh accomplishes the wholesale supply of Classes II and VII by a combination of unit and supply point distribution. In the III CTZ, this SUPCOM operates retail supply points at Saigon, Long Binh, Long Giao, Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Phu Loi and Bear Cat. There are also two retail activities in the IV CTZ at Vung Tau and Can Tho. Can Tho, however, presently provides only expendable items. The new LSA under construction, adjacent to Can Tho at Binh Thuy, will enable that activity to provide a full range of Class II and VII supplies. The stockage objective for these activities is 45 days of supply.

Self-Service Supply Centers in the III CTZ are located at Saigon, Long Binh, Long Giao, Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh and Bear Cat. In the IV CTZ, Self-Service Supply Centers are located at Vung Tau and Can Tho. USAD, Long Binh accomplishes the wholesale supply of Class IV by a combination of unit and supply point distribution. The Class IV portion of USAD, Long Binh is operated by PACE on a contract basis. In the III CTZ this SUPCOM operates one retail supply point at Tay Ninh. In the IV CTZ, the ECHY, at Vung Tau provides all the Class IV supplies for that area. That facility is also operated by PACE.

The USAD, Long Binh is the world's largest Depot. The Depot ASL is comprised of approximately 115,000 lines. In Jan 68, the Depot converted to the 35 VN system. This system is composed of a 7010/1160 computer and peripheral equipment. The full implementation of the system will be completed with the interface of the Depot system and USAICC-V system. This integration is scheduled for completion by 31 December, 1968.

The recent supply management actions initiated by this command materially contribute toward the increase of the level of supply support provided to supported units. The most important of these actions, Project Count, is a 100% inventory of all classes of supply in the Depot and all DSU's. This inventory is being conducted with minimum restrictions on processing of supplies consistent with sustaining an adequate level of support to supported units. The goal of this project is to develop a data base by 15 Jan 69 that is 95% accurate. In addition to the actual inventory, locations are being surveyed and consolidated or stocks re-housed.

In the III CTZ, Field Laundries are operated at Long Binh, Long Giao, Tay Ninh, Phu Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Bear Cat, Quan Loi, Lai Khe, Ch Chi and Dau Tieng. In the IV CTZ, Field Laundries are operated at Vung Tau and Dong Tam. In addition, commercial laundry contracts are in force throughout the III and IV CTZ. Service is provided to divisional as well as
non-divisional units.

Field bath units are operational at Saigon, Long Binh, Long Giao, Tay Ninh, Phu Loi, Dear Cat, Quan Loi, Lai Khe and Bien Hoa. In the IV CTZ, field bath units are operational at Dong Tan. Service is provided to divisional as well as non-divisional units. The supply activities of the USASUPCOM, SGW, increased significantly during the period Jul 1967 to Nov 1968. During this period of time an additional three supply points in III CTZ became operational.

The US Army Depot has almost completed its relocation to Long Binh which will provide increased storage and operations facilities.

The following depicts the change in depot operations during the period of this report. The figures are in thousands of short tons.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jul 67</th>
<th>Sep 68</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipts</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On hand</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>160</td>
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The rate of demand accommodation has increased from 82% in July 67 to 89% in Sep 68, while the rate of demand satisfaction has increased from 45% in Jul 67 to 53% in Sep 68. In Jan 1968 the USAD, LB converted to 36 VN. As a result of this sophistication, the overall supply support provided has increased. Concurrent with this system change, the number of customers authorized to receive supplies directly was drastically reduced from over 400 to approximately 65. The majority of the units eliminated did not have sufficient volume to warrant being satellite directly on the depot. As a result of this customer thinning, the Depot was able to get out of retail supply activities and function on a wholesale basis.

The quality of the "A" ration has improved during the past months. In September the amount of commercial ice cream production rose to approximately 100,000 gallons. Similarly the quantity of commercially produced milk rose to approximately 600,000 gallons. In addition, there have been improvements in the quantity and quality of fresh produce distributed throughout the III & IV CTZ.

Food service activities have also increased since Jul 1967. The food advisor, this headquarters, now provides assistance to 54 mess halls, and 4 bakeries. In addition, this headquarters has conducted classes of instruction on mess operations for ROK and THAI personnel.
In the area of services, the field laundry production has risen sharply since Jul 67. The amount of laundry processed in Sep 68 was 715,000 lbs as compared with 464,000 lbs in Jul 67. The production of bath activities declined from 110,000 in Jul 67 to 40,000 in Sep 68. This is a result of the increase in installation shower facilities throughout III & IV CTZ. An especially noteworthy accomplishment has been Project "Rapid Arrow."

In late April 1968, a special project to provide expedited supply support for isolated HMW advisory teams in the Delta was initiated by this Support Command. Each advisory team telephonically submitted requests for critical items to G-4, IV Corps Advisor. Those requests were relayed to the Director of Supply, then personnel from that directorate arranged for the release of the items from the various supply sources, requested transportation and escorted shipments to Bien Hoa Air Base. The items were air shipped to Can Tho ISA and subsequently transported by helicopter to the appropriate advisory team. A total of 122 "Rapid Arrow" requests were received and to date 120 requests totaling over 900 short tons, have been shipped.

During the period of this report the 64th Quartermaster Battalion supplied all US Forces and Free World Forces in the III CTZ with their bulk and package petroleum requirements. On the average over 45 million gallons of product were delivered monthly to customers by longline road haul or by pipeline. The mission responsibility also includes supplying all the jet aircraft fuels to Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases. The battalion accomplished its mission without a single instance of any military operation failure due to fuel shortage even during the TET Offensive when equipment and personnel were taxed to the utmost and long haul capability was reduced by 25% with two transportation platoons and a squad being on extended TDY to I CTZ.

The single most important accomplishment during the period of this report is placing in operation the 86,000 barrel and 40,000 drum Long Binh POL Terminal on 1 Mar 68. The activation of this facility significantly improved the posture of this battalion to perform its mission and to provide a 5 to 7 day bulk product reserve and a 60 day reserve of package products. Another important accomplishment was the Apr 68 opening of the base POL Laboratory with its expanded facilities and subsequent freeing of a mobile laboratory for employment at Vung Tau.

The amount of support rendered can be illustrated by the following statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>Gallons Hauled</th>
<th>Tactical Miles Driven</th>
<th>Gallons Piped to Tan Son Nhut AB</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 67</td>
<td>43,000,000</td>
<td>873,600</td>
<td>24,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov - 31 Jan 68</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>874,300</td>
<td>22,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb - 30 Apr 68</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
<td>707,100</td>
<td>26,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May - 31 Jul 68</td>
<td>25,700,000</td>
<td>731,727</td>
<td>23,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug - 31 Oct 68</td>
<td>29,200,000</td>
<td>771,200</td>
<td>23,900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Areas in need of increased emphasis:

a. The battalion is unable to obtain replacements of unserviceable M315, 5000 gallon semitrailers and T52, 5 ton tractors. ICCV has the valid requisitions; however, replacements in quantity have been due out for months.

b. The Dong Nai POL jettty discharge site is quite unsatisfactory. A floating pump station is presently positioned at the end of the hastily repaired pier. Breasting dolphins are required at the minimum to preclude further pier damage. Also, another pier or off-shore pump platform must be constructed to replace the temporary and unwieldy 600 meter catwalk.

c. The planning and construction of the Thanh Ky An - Tan Son Nhut pipeline must be watched carefully. The present known plans call for the bare minimum operating facility. Consideration must be given to security, lighting, road access, administrative and living space and above all communications.

The Command's maintenance mission is to provide direct and general maintenance support on all equipment, less aircraft, avionics, cryptographic, medical and missiles to all US Army and Free World Military Assistance Forces units located in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) of the Republic of Vietnam; back-up direct support and all general support maintenance to division maintenance battalions; maintenance support as directed for Free World Military Assistance Forces and United States equipment on loan to the Army of Vietnam; and organizational maintenance support directed by interservice support agreements. The basic premise for the assignment of maintenance missions to units is that support will be provided on an area basis.

In July 1967, the USA Support Command, Saigon organization for providing maintenance support on an area basis consisted of the 29th General Support Group supporting the III CTZ except Phuoc Tuy Province and Binh Tuy Province South of Highway 1, and the 53d General Support Group supporting the IV CTZ and Phuoc Tuy Province and Binh Tuy Province South of Highway 1.

Within the 29th General Support Group, support on an area basis consisted of the 105th Maintenance Battalion in the Long Binh area with one light maintenance company supporting the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and units in Xuan Loc area; the 610th Maintenance Battalion in the Eastern portion of III CTZ; and the 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS) in the Saigon/Cholon area. Within the 53d GS Group, the 2d Maintenance Battalion supported the Vung Tau Sub-Area and the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

With the move of the 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS) to Long Binh
and the availability of the fixed GS maintenance shops in December 1967
and January 1968, the 79th Maintenance Battalion assumed an increased role
of providing general support, functionaHizing missions within the companies
of the battalion, and reorganizing along the lines of a proposed TDA.
The 99th IMCDO remained in Saigon to provide DS and organizational
maintenance support for customer units in that area.

Implementation of the country store concept in May and June 1968 resulted
in small maintenance and supply teams being located throughout the Delta.
These teams, furnished by the 51st Light Maintenance Company, furnished
support to the various MACV Advisory Teams.

In August and September, the F3A/LSA/Area concept was further expanded
and battalion missions realigned to give the senior USASURCOM, Saigon,
representative the responsibility for all support in his area of interest.
This resulted in ISA's being formed in Saigon and at Bearcat, and the
placement of both supply and maintenance companies under the battalion
headquarters in the area, or under an ISA Commander.

Under this concept, areas of responsibility are as follows:

277th Supply and Service Battalion - 25th Inf Div TAOR
610th Maintenance Battalion (DS) - 1st Inf Div TAOR
265th Supply and Service Battalion - Operates the Long Binh Maintenance
facility to provide maintenance support for Long Binh based non-tactical
units.
185th Maintenance Battalion (DS) - Other units in the Long Binh/Bien
Hoa area and 11th ACR and 199th Light Infantry Brigade TAOR's.
Bearcat ISA - Bearcat and Long Thanh Airfield areas.
Saigon ISA - Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhat metropolitan area.
2d Maintenance Battalion - Phuoc Tuy Province and that part of Binh
Tuy Province south of Highway 1.
Can Tho ISA - The IV CTZ southwest of the BASSAC river
Dong Tam ISA - The IV CTZ northeast of the BASSAC river
79th Maintenance Battalion - GS maintenance support for III and IV
CTZ's
Under the COG'TAR configuration, numerous modified TOE actions were initiated to stay within country space allocations and in an effort to maintain capability in balance with requirements.

The GOSTAR organization of maintenance units does not permit flexibility and ready fragmentation of these units when necessary to provide back-up direct support and direct support to isolated units or activities in the Vietnam environment which require extensive contact team-type support. In order to provide adequate support, it has been necessary to draw personnel and equipment from several organizations to obtain the proper mix. This complicates the command and control problems and has an adverse effect on the efficiency of operation of unit shops.

Standardized MTOE's have been developed which will realign the maintenance companies to provide for increased capabilities in the engineer, automotive and communications areas by reducing capabilities in the chemical and Light Oil areas.

Throughout the period there has been an imbalance between direct support maintenance units and general units. General Support Companies, out of necessity, have had to be assigned backup direct support and direct support missions due to the lack of sufficient direct support units. With the input of additional direct support - type units this imbalance has been reduced; however, three MTOE's still remain fully employed in the direct support. Conversion of these three companies under the standardized MTOE program to Standardized Light Maintenance Companies will bring the DS capabilities in line with requirements.

As of this date, the most critical imbalance of maintenance support required and support available is for engineer construction equipment. This incompatibility of direct support maintenance and engineer equipment results from several factors.

1. COSTAR direct support units have too few engineer equipment repairmen.

2. Two of the Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies had this capability deleted by MTOE action prior to arrival in RVN.

3. The density of engineer units in a given area constantly changes.

A heavy rotational hump in October, and implementation of the civilianization program has resulted in some of the battalions being 30% or more under authorized strength. Security requirements have also reduced the personnel available for mission accomplishment.

Currently assigned to the support command are four general support
maintenance units (61st IDISO, 140th IDISO, 536th IDISO, and 5th IDISO) who are not performing a general support mission. As mentioned previously, this has resulted from a shortfall in capability of assigned direct support units. It is planned to convert these companies to Light Maintenance Companies under the standardized MLOS program.

During the past year there has been an increasing number of 1405V advisory teams located throughout III and IV CTZ, and small units and detachments in the Saigon area requiring organizational maintenance support. These units and detachments have no organic capability provided by TOE to perform organizational maintenance on their equipment. As a consequence, a considerable portion of the direct support capability is expended on organizational maintenance. In the Saigon metropolitan area, the 536th IDISO does organizational maintenance for 871 units with a total of 171 wheel vehicles. Similar organizational maintenance support is also being provided to other small units and detachments throughout the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

Maintenance support has had extreme demands placed upon it due to the nature of the operations, and long hours of equipment utilization under adverse weather and highway conditions. Deadlines in many areas have been a continuing problem due to many factors including a lack of maintenance capability and experienced personnel in using units, ineffective preventive maintenance programs, failure to requisition and maintain an adequate PLL, vehicle abuse, untrained operators and chronic zero balances at the DSU's and depots for such fast moving items as tires, tubes, batteries, brake lining, spark plugs, and repair parts kits for the repair of such DX items as hydrovacs, generators, regulators, and starters.

A comparative example of selected items of deadline equipment indicates a general decline in equipment deadline rate until June 1968, when many repair parts, including clutches and engines for 2½ and 5-ton vehicles, became almost non-available resulting in rapidly rising deadlines. With maintenance units at 70% strength, and continuing high equipment utilization, some time will be required to reduce the accumulated backlog.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>July 67</th>
<th>JAN 68</th>
<th>Jul 68</th>
<th>Sep 68</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Tractor 5-Ton</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forklift, Commercial</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
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*Projected
Throughout the period, intensive field operations have kept combat vehicle usage at a high rate and deadline has been correspondingly high. Lack of repair parts is the primary reason for deadlines with lack of stand-downs for maintenance a major factor in engine failures. Some of the high mortality parts are engines, transmissions, and portions of the suspension system, i.e., torsion bars, road wheels, sprockets, and track. The tank deadline rate has generally averaged from 8 to 10 per cent but has for short periods been up to 15%. The deadline rate is now about 10 per cent with high mileage or extensively damaged tanks being replaced under the closed loop support program.

The high usage rate of all types of artillery has placed a high demand on maintenance support for artillery pieces. Support has been mainly provided by on-site repair and support by contact teams with only weapons requiring expensive repairs being evacuated. SP artillery has presented the major area requiring maintenance; however, deadline rates for these weapons have consistently been less than 9% and generally 6% or less.

The area of repair parts availability has been one requiring concentrated efforts. The lack of repair parts has been a constant factor facing maintenance activities in the performance of their mission and significantly contributing to the deadline rate. Using units have experienced difficulty in obtaining such common high-demand items as tubes, batteries and spark plugs for wheel vehicles. The Red Ball requisitioning system is responsive to deadline requirements when needed repair parts are available in the system; however, required repair parts are all too frequently not immediately available in the supply system. Recent examples of out of stock items are 5-ton multifuel engines, 5-ton diesel engines, 3/4 ton engines, 900X20 and 1100X20 tubes, and 2½ & 5-ton batteries. As a consequence, the Red Ball system cannot respond and deadline rates rapidly increase. Continued emphasis has been placed on establishing adequate PLL's and ASL's with technical assistance visits and inspections. Direct and general support units of the Saigon Support Command have recently completed an ASL reduction designed to reduce the repair parts stockage to manageable levels. Two units, the 185th Maintenance Battalion and the 79th Maintenance Battalion, had in excess of 30,000 lines on their ASL's. This reduction, amounting to about 40%, will enable better management of the fast moving and critical line items. A wall-to-wall location survey and inventory is now being conducted, and reconciliation of requisitions accomplished. Despite this effort, zero balances of 50% or more is common.

A program using Material Readiness Expeditors (MREs) has been in effect to expedite action on critical problems of supply and maintenance in units, organizations and activities supported by this command. Officers, Warrant Officers and WCO's are appointed on orders and given personal letters signed by me authorizing their entry into supply and maintenance activities. The MRE's duty is to determine the most critical problems
of supply and maintenance in supported units and to expedite solutions to these problems. They have pursued their duties with intent to solve the basic problem, and to provide an immediate source of solution to critical supply and maintenance requirements. This program has been controlled by the Director of Maintenance and kept on a level of handling critical, priority and deadline requirements. Command deadline rates have been kept at a minimum through the successful operations of the INEM program. While the INEM's should have had a primary mission of determining why the supply system did not supply the required parts, this facet has been obscured by the more immediate problem of satisfying operational requirements.

Continual improvements have been made in the maintenance facilities at all levels. As working conditions have improved, the quantity and quality of support rendered has improved. Since the relocation of the 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS) to Long Binh and occupancy of the fixed shops in January 1968, the 79th Maintenance Battalion has been actively engaged in providing back-up direct support and general support maintenance. Units have been functionalized with the 147th INEM operating a shop for the repair of communications and electronic items and office machines; the 53d INEM has concentrated on component rebuild; while the 632d has concentrated on major assemblies and end items. This functionalization has enabled better management, and concentration of skills, tools and equipment. As a part of the civilization program, the 79th Maintenance Battalion is scheduled to be replaced by contractor maintenance effective 1 March 1969.

Support for isolated units continues to be provided by on-site contact teams and FSA/LSA. Support of the numerous isolated MACV teams has resulted in the establishment of country stores at the sub-sector level, and the use of mobile teams for scheduled organizational and field maintenance support.

Principal areas requiring added emphasis are organizational maintenance, operator training, and increased GS in-country capability. Experience has shown that ineffective organizational maintenance and inadequate operator training are the major factors in high equipment deadline. Limited GS capability is required in IV CTZ to preclude extensive evacuation of high density items, principally generators.

A steadily growing function was that of retrograde and disposal. Prior to October 1967, little material was evacuated from the Saigon Support Command area. Since October 1967, statistics indicate the following tonnages were shipped out of country.
The above figures constitute more than 47% of the total retrograde program for the US Army in Vietnam.

In addition to the above, which represent only US Army activities, USMACVCON, Saigon is responsible for total US Government property disposal functions in the III and IV CTZs. Recoveries have included everything from salvage canvas to a two-man submarine, turned in by the State Department. A total of 54,639 S/T were received with original acquisition cost of $81,303,133. Proceeds from sales have returned $500,811. to the US Government for a return of 5.8% on the dollar.

An additional savings to the US Government has been effected by re-issue of 37,604,795, worth of material.

Generally, the evacuation of material from the forward areas is in proportion to the intensity of enemy activity. Principal difficulties involve enemy actions such as road interdiction, road barriers, isolated sniping, land mines and bridge damage. Experience has proven that small items move with relative consistency on returning truck convoys. Considerable quantities of material such as tracked and wheeled vehicles, generators and construction equipment remain in forward areas for considerable periods of time, thus becoming subject to cannibalization. At times, these items cannot be evacuated due to the tactical situation; however, in most cases they are not retrograded due to lack of heavy lift capability.

Lack of adequate heavy lift transportation for movement of cargo exceeding 10 tons impairs the ability of all agencies to evacuate equipment. For example, each division has two "Dragon Wagons" while the COSS activity has four. Additional vehicles do exist within General and Direct Support units; however, they are very limited in numbers and are mission assigned. Under the FASCOI concept the Field Depot COS Co relies upon forward elements to evacuate material to them. Civilianization programs together with no intermediate collection and evacuation units may cause serious problems in future operations.
A heavy lift convoy from Long Binh to Tay Ninh is frequently required, taking three days for the round trip. This includes loading, unloading, and maintenance in addition to travel and convey waiting times. These factors have forced port clearance and delivery to forward units of tanks and APC's as drive away vehicles. This, together with administrative redeployments, add many non-tactical miles to tactical vehicles.

A hard look should be taken at present doctrine and organization within the US Army to assess evacuation policy and adequacy of amounts of equipment and units to support present doctrine.

Consideration should be given to assigning heavy lift truck elements to functional transportation commands responsible for common USA Land Transportation.

Ammunition activity in USASUPCON, Saigon is centered around the Ammunition Supply Depot at Long Binh (LBASD). This depot has a capacity of 120,000 tons. In addition there are ASPs at Vung Tau, 14,000 tons; Tay Ninh, 8,000 tons and Dong Tan, 2,000 tons. As of this date plans are well along for the operation of additional ASPs at Binh Tuy (2,000 tons) Quan Loi, 1,200 tons and Phuc Vinh 1,000 tons. In addition we have recently assumed responsibility for rearming points saving helicopter gunships at Vinh Long, Can Tho, and Soc Trang. These latter points will average about 150 tons each.

A continuing problem has been the availability of trained ammunition handlers and clerks. An ammunition company was recently added to the command; but, with the assumption of the additional missions mentioned above, the personnel posture of the ammunition units will remain unsatisfactory.

Continued emphasis has been placed on the overall upgrading of ammunition facilities in III and IV CTZ. Some small improvement has been noted; however, little has been accomplished in support of the efforts for concrete pads and improved road nets within existing ammunition facilities operated by units of the command. Action in this area has been initiated by the subordinate elements and is now dependent upon available funds.

A request for contract personnel has been developed which should enhance the overall Class V service within the command. It is believed a contract would, if approved, further maintain the continuity required in personnel management. US supervision is intended and a contract would eliminate the problems caused by personnel drawdowns for daily security and housekeeping chores.
Increased emphasis on engineer construction support is necessary to maintain and insure continued progress in upgrading ammunition facilities. Experience in this area has indicated that any minor slippage in applied effort means many hours and dollars needed to maintain costly ammunition items in a serviceable condition.

Of particular concern throughout my tenure as commander, was the steadily worsening personnel situation of the command. In July 1967, while supporting some 156,000 troops, the assigned strength was approximately 22,000. Currently, while supporting 220,000 troops the assigned strength is about 19,000. New and expanded contracts plus an increase in the direct hire force has compensated for the military personnel shortage to a degree but there is still much that should be done that is not done or is being done too slowly because of lack of personnel. Nor is assigned strength an accurate indicator of available strength. The necessity to use trained mechanics, clerks, drivers, etc. for security purposes and the requirement for provisional units, filled from the command's existing personnel assets creates vacancies in the work force not apparent in a direct comparison of authorized and assigned strength. Personnel shortages in addition to reducing the quantity and quality of the work produced, impact on other areas. Accidents both vehicular and "industrial" increase when short handed units cut corners to get the job done, deadline rates increase as scheduled maintenance is deferred or hastily performed and clerical personnel make more errors when two are doing the work of three.
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