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**AUTHORITY**

AGC D/A ltr 9 May 1975; AGC D/A ltr 9 May 1975

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AGDA (M) (7 Jan 71) FOR OT UT 703214 13 January 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, USA TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT, QUI NHON
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96238

AVCF-TTC 14 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned for Headquarters,
United States Army Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui
Nhon, for the Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65)
(R27) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA QN-GO-H
APO 96238

Commanding General
US Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commanding General
US Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

   a. (U) Command Organization:

      (1) The United States Army Transportation Terminal Unit (USATTU, QN) Qui Nhon, was organized as a provisional unit under VOGC authority on 15 April 1970 by General Order 380, dated 8 April 1970, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. The USATTU, QN was activated on 15 May 1970 and assumed mission responsibility for operation of the Qui Nhon Port on 1 June 1970, relieving the 5th Transportation Terminal Command which deployed to Da Nang.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

1/ August 1970

(2) The USATTU, QN is primarily a military terminal management organization, in contrast with former military port operations of the 5th Transportation Terminal Command. As such, it employs a decidedly different managerial concept which envisions considerably increased responsibilities on the part of the contractor for actual terminal operations. The USATTU, QN is organized and staffed to provide military control, direction, and limited direct supervision over the operating activities of the contractor. This concept has permitted a sizeable reduction in the number of military personnel required to carry on water terminal operations at Qui Nhon. The aggregate authorized military strength of the USATTU, QN is 371 personnel, consisting of 26 officers, 5 warrant officers and 340 enlisted men. This strength represents 33 percent of the former aggregate military strength of the 5th Transportation Command and its subordinate elements.

(3) Although the operating concept under the USATTU, QN organization will of necessity force relinquishment of direct military site supervision, particularly commissioned officer supervision, this should not pose significant problems because of the considerable experience and unique capabilities of the contractor and his personnel.

b. (II) Personnel Discipline and Safety

(1) Military Strength:

(a) Enlisted strength has risen steadily from a low of 224 (65%) on 18 May 70 to 326 (95%) on 31 July, the end of the reporting period.

(b) Office strength has decreased from 27 officers and warrant officers (87%) assigned on 1 June 1970 to 23 assigned (74%) on 31 July. Warrant officer strength is particularly critical with only 2 of the 5 authorized WOs assigned as of 31 July.

(2) Local National Strength: LN strength has been steadily reduced, from 419 LNs assigned on 15 May 70 to 346 assigned on 31 July 70. Future reductions in LN strength are anticipated within the next three months.

(3) Awards: The following awards were presented to members of the USATTU, QN during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bronze Star</th>
<th>Army Commendation Medal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 31 May</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Safety: The USATTU, QN experienced no recordable motor vehicle accidents or personal injuries during the reporting period. During
this time USATTU, QN vehicles logged a total of 64,500 miles.

(5) Military Justice.

(a) Following is a listing of the number of enlisted personnel of this unit which have been punished under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Grade</th>
<th>Field Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 31 May</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) No personnel were tried by court martial during the reporting period.

(6) AWOLs: Following is a listing by month, of the number of USATTU, QN personnel reported as AWOL:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Command Group Activities: A list of distinguished visitors to the USATTU, QN is attached as Incl. 2.

d. Security/Provoest Marshal:

(1) The Security Company, USATTU, QN was activated on 15 May 70. The company consists of three platoons; internal security platoon, gate security platoon and the convoy escort platoon. The gate security platoon and the convoy escort platoon were already functional units in the Port Complex security system. The internal security platoon assumed responsibility for internal security of the Port Complex on 29 May 70. The internal security platoon is responsible for all guard towers and walking posts within the Port Complex excluding the posts in Headquarters and Headquarters Company compound, USATTU, QN, and security of the outpost on Hill 131. Thirteen personnel are presently assigned to the outpost. All personnel are armed with M-16 rifles. Four M-60 machine guns and two M-79 grenade launchers are also employed at that location.

(2) On 6 July 70, following a block of instruction on the operation, care and maintenance of the M-16 rifle, the entire Security Company fired the weapon for familiarization. All personnel in the Security Company now have the M-16 rifle as their basic weapon.

(3) Port Security, the name formerly given to the gate guard
platoon has been changed to Harbor Police and the platoon is receiving training to enable them to perform their duties in a more professional and police-like manner. Changes being made are the wearing of .45 caliber pistols and night sticks at the gates to provide stronger enforcement of command policies and use of minimum of force necessary to detain violators until military police assistance arrives.

(4) Increased emphasis has been placed on security at the gates in the Port Complex. The following policies have been initiated:

(a) Triangular wire barricades are used at the gates at all times during the hours of darkness.

(b) Gate #2 remains closed to all traffic during the hours of darkness except for convoys and A/VN trucks shuttling personnel.

(c) Gun jeeps, when not performing convoy duty, are deployed at the gates within the Port Complex during Yellow-Option III alert conditions and higher.

(5) For letter AVCF-TTC, HQ, USATTU, QN, 7 July 70, Subject: Special Instructions, the Security and Intelligence Section has the responsibility for 31 defensive/security maintenance and construction. The work crew for this function is made up of local national personnel supervised by military personnel. Future projects include:

(a) Relocation of the tower at Gate #2 and the north tower at Bridge #2 to allow the passage of the new rail spur.

(b) Construction of two guard towers on the new LST Beach.

(c) Construction of a guard tower south of Bridge #1.

(d) Completion of the hardened bunker projected to house the USATTU, QN Tactical Operations Center in the Headquarters and Headquarters Company Compound.

(6) The only significant enemy activity within the command defensive area of responsibility occurred 15 June 70. What is purported to have been a small satchel charge exploded on the shore near the armo wharf. Security advisory personnel from Support Command headquarters investigated and determined the explosion to be possible probe attempt.

e. (c) Operations

(1) Cargo operations

(a) Tonnage Handled:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>S/T</th>
<th>M/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91,692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AVCF-TC 14 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/T</th>
<th>M/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>97,837</td>
<td>196,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>83,484</td>
<td>174,325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Tonnage Discharged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69,180</td>
<td>72,269</td>
<td>55,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139,973</td>
<td>122,862</td>
<td>99,354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Tonnage Shifted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>333</td>
<td>2,225</td>
<td>1,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>970</td>
<td>6,476</td>
<td>3,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Tonnage Outloaded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,179</td>
<td>23,343</td>
<td>27,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56,797</td>
<td>67,646</td>
<td>71,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Class V Tonnage Discharged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,617</td>
<td>21,787</td>
<td>10,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,458</td>
<td>24,009</td>
<td>11,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Sealand Tonnage Handled:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,632</td>
<td>13,490</td>
<td>20,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40,501</td>
<td>30,031</td>
<td>45,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Rail Tonnage Handled:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>2,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/T</th>
<th>M/T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(h) Tonnage Handled by Service: (S/T)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>57,674</td>
<td>60,283</td>
<td>50,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3,561</td>
<td>6,144</td>
<td>2,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td>10,657</td>
<td>5,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>8,131</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) A total of 3,959 ROK troops debarked and 4,407 embarked during the reporting period.

(2) Operational Activities:

(a) ARVNization: During the months of May, June and July, ARVN terminal unit stevedores worked nine deep draft vessels at the Duong pier while discharging general cargo consigned to both US Forces and ARVN customers. In the middle of July ARVN discharged firebombs from the SS American Forwarder in the outer harbor. This was the first time ARVN stevedores had worked cargo in the stream to barge lightage. During the quarter two ARVN warrant officers worked in an OJT status with the OICs of the documentation and operations branches of the Port Operations Section.

(b) MILVAN operations: During the last quarter of FY70 the first three MILVAN shipments arrived at Qui Nhon. The first shipment, aboard the SS Seatrain Puerto Rico, consisted of 110 MILVAN chassis of which twenty percent had been damaged at sea due to insufficient shoring and lashing. The second shipment arrived aboard the SS Seatrain Maryland and consisted of 140 vans loaded on chassis and 15 vans without chassis. The third shipment arrived on the SS Seatrain Carolina. This latter shipment consisted of 64 vans on chassis and 33 vans without chassis. The Carolina was the first complete MILVAN operation, i.e. for each van discharged one was backloaded.

(c) LRC LX: The last LRC LX in the northern II Corps area
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was loaded aboard the SS Transcolumbus on the 22nd of July for shipment to CONUS.

(d) ST 1134: arrived on 2 July 1970 on the SS Transcolumbus. This tugboat will be turned over to ARVN as part of the Vietnization of Qui Nhon port.

(o) LCU: With the beginning of the new FY, Han Jin Transportation Company assumed operational and maintenance responsibilities for the two LCUs assigned to the USATIU. The LCUs are used for intrastatal movement of cargo to Vung Ro Bay and Chu Lai.

(f) LT 1977: On 1 July 1970 the Han Jin Transportation Company assumed operational control and maintenance responsibilities for the LT 1977. The tugboat is crewed for 24 hour operations.

(g) Controller (Contract Supervision): The FY 71 contract with Han Jin Transportation Company remains much the same as the FY 70 contract, with the following significant differences:

(1) The minimum guarantee for stevedoring is stated in terms of dollars per month, rather than in hours. For FY 71, the minimum guarantee is $564,000.00 (120,000 revenue tons) per month, as stated in Appendix I of the contract, whereas for FY 70 the minimum was 150,000 revenue tons per month. Corresponding to this charge, the Contractor is required to have available sixteen (16) stevedoring gangs, a 4 gang reduction from the required twenty (20) gangs in FY 70. Also, for FY 71, the Contractor will operate the retrograde wash facility which earns an additional 20% surcharge on top of the normal commodity rate, plus the prescribed 10% paid for backload cargo, a total of 30% above the commodity rate.

(2) The minimum guarantee per month for trucking services to the Contractor is $860,000.00 for FY 71. This allegedly equates to 170,000 equipment hours. For FY 70, the minimum was stated as 180,000 hours per month (see paragraph 21 (1)). The FY 71 contract expands linehaul operations to Pleiku in the West, and to Vung Ro Bay in the South.

(3) The FY 71 contract also provides for the use of Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) equipment. Such GOCO equipment covers 14 line items (12 pieces) including a 100-ton Barge Derrick, a 60-ton Barge Derrick, two mechanized landing craft, two utility landing craft, one large tug and one "Q" boat. The contractor is responsible for operation and maintenance of the above harbor craft up to, but not including, scheduled shipyard overhaul.

(c) Construction in the port area:

(1) The final rinse facility for cleaning Retrograde cargo became operational on 1 July 1970, and the facility is now fully operational. Insufficient lighting remains a problem. Lights are situated on poles high above the work area, allowing excellent vision for inspecting the top and outside of the cargo prior to loading on the vessels. But, with
the absence of lighting at the ground level, it is difficult to inspect the underside of the crane for dirt and trash. A safety hazard is present for laborers working on the wet concrete and wooden cat walks without sufficient lighting.

(2) The Keystone Retracto Vehicle Yard was completed in early July. The Yard was originally planned to be used only for Keystone Retracto cranes, but with the advent of MILVAN, and the lack of other suitable areas within the port for MILVAN operations, it was necessary to devote a large part of the area to MILVAN. Although planned for 24-hour operations, the contract for construction of the MILVAN Yard did not provide for lighting. This facility has usage limitations from lack of lighting. The lack of lighting detracts from efficiency but also presents a definite safety hazard when moving vehicles from the Yard to the pier for loading on vessels. Some retracto vehicles are without wheels and must be lifted on trucks for transportation to the pier. These vehicles are lifted with a 20 ton crane. During darkness the use of this crane to lift vehicles on the trucks is a safety hazard to both laborers handling retracto vehicles and the drivers of trucks transporting these vehicles.

a. (U) Maintenance: The heavy dredge "New Jersey" arrived Qui Nhon Military Port on 9 May 1970 to accomplish a series of maintenance dredging projects. Initially, three projects were approved and funded. They were: (1) dredging of channel leading to the inner harbor ammunition ship anchorage and dredging of the anchorage itself to a depth of 30 feet; (2) dredging a 1,000 foot length, 590 foot width and 30 foot depth "turning basin" northwest of Delong Pier; and (3) dredging of channel leading to the ammunition wharf and alongside the wharf to a depth of 22 feet. Spoil from the ammunition wharf dredging was pumped across and down the causeway to an area south of the Terminal Headquarters to form the base for a proposed new LST Beach. This additional, or fourth, project, which was later approved and funded, involved dredging a channel off the inner harbor main channel into the beachfront of the new LST Beach, then dredging along the beachfront for a linear distance of 670 feet. This latter project produced a large quantity of additional usable spoil which considerably enlarged the new LST Beach area. In all, more than 400,000 cubic yards of spoil were pumped into the new area. In conjunction with the development of the new LST Beach, four concrete LST ramps (114'x31' each), previously approved under an MC project for the existing LST Beach, have now been relocated to the new beachfront. These ramps will be constructed utilizing prefabricated five foot (L) by ten foot (W) by six foot (D) concrete piers placed together with cable to provide a measure of flexibility as sand unevenly shifts. It is expected that ramp construction will begin in August 1970.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (H) Personnel: None.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Observation: On 16 June 1970, a conference was held...
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...ing water security of Qui Nhon Harbor. The meeting was prompted by the fact that the Vietnamization Program has increased the number of personnel and units involved in Harbor security. The following topics were discussed:

(a) A request was made for greater coordination between units operating in water security functions.

(b) Scope of operations of Vietnamese Marine Police and discussion concerning site of construction for Vietnamese Marine Police Headquarters.

(c) Changes in EOD operations under Vietnamese Navy control.

(d) Boundary between PBR and IIWG patrol areas.

(e) Operational control of PBR unit.

(f) Naval fire and reaction force support for Army unit on Hill 131.

(g) Security of ammo vessels in the outer harbor.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) In the discussion that ensued the following determinations were made:

1. That the Vietnamese Marine Police would continue functioning with the PBR's until such time as they receive their own patrol craft and assume patrol duties in both the inner and outer harbor. The site for the Marine Police Headquarters is still under consideration.

2. That EOD operations performed by Vietnamese Naval personnel would continue with the same frequency and efficiency as previous operations performed by U.S. Naval personnel. No problems have been encountered thus far since the Vietnamese have assured EOD responsibilities.

3. That the boundary between PBR and IIWG patrol areas would be re-established as an imaginary line drawn between the peak of Hill 131 and the tip of LST Beach.

4. That the Port Commander directly task the PBR unit for support in 'emergency' situations.

5. That the Naval unit at Market Time Base would provide 81MM mortar support for Hill 131. No commitment could be made for reaction force support.

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That due to a lack of personnel, the 93rd Military Police Battalion could no longer provide security for ships anchored in the outer harbor. The commitment has been assumed by the Internal Security Platoon, Security Company, USA Transportation Terminal Unit.

(b) The meeting gave all attendees a better insight into the overall security makeup of the Qui Nhon Harbor Complex and they were made aware of the nature and function of all units involved.

(3) Recommendation: That similar conferences be held on a regularly scheduled basis to continue increasing coordination and form a better working relationship between Harbor Security units.

c. (U) Operations:

(1) ARVN stevedore operations:

(a) Observation: Coordination by USAATTU with Qui Nhon Transportation Terminal Command (ARVN) resulted in ARVN stevedores working eleven deep draft vessels during the May-July period. Ten of these vessels were worked at the DeLong Pier discharging approximately 1500 S/T of general cargo. One vessel was discharged into lighterage in the outer harbor; the cargo consisted of 125 S/T of fire bombs.

(b) Evaluation: The ARVN Transportation Terminal Command made consistent progress in all aspects of their stevedore operations during the past three months. Improvement was particularly noted in their concern with safety procedure.

(c) Recommendation (currently being implemented): ARVN stevedores will continue to be given cargo to discharge from deep draft vessels. Efforts to train ARVN stevedores will be expanded to include heavy lifts and vehicles as well as general cargo. The ultimate goal for ARVN is attainment of proficiency required to discharged ammunition into lighterage in a manner acceptable to U.S. Coast Guard ammunition inspectors.

(2) MILVAN operations aboard SS St. John Puerto Rico:

(a) Observation: MILVAN chassis were shipped from CONUS in bundles of 10 chassis. Chassis were married together in the 40' configuration and piled five layers high with the extra wheel bogies on top.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the weight of the bundles and inadequate shoring and lashing, eight of the bundles consigned to Qui Nhon arrived with damage to the bottom chassis landing legs and frames.

(c) Recommendation: If MILVAN chassis are to be bundled for ocean shipment they must be shored in a manner which prevents the weight of the bundle from causing to bear on the landing legs of the bottom chassis. Sufficient lashing must be used to insure that the chassis cannot shift during heavy seas.
SUNSET: Operational report - Lessons Learned

(3) MILVAN operations aboard SS Seatrain Maryland:

(a) Observation: The SS Seatrain Maryland arrived with 140 MILVANs on chassis and 15 vans without chassis. This vessel carried a manually operated frame for discharging vans and a set of wire rope slings to be attached to the frame for handling vans with chassis.

(b) Evaluation: Vans with chassis were located fore and aft of the hatch square and had to be towed to the hatch square before the ship's crane could reach them for discharge. In order to move vans to the square, a 5 ton commercial tractor with hydraulic fifth wheel was loaded aboard the vessel. (Initial attempts to move the vans were unsuccessful as the forklift was not heavy enough to lift the loaded van). Difficulty was encountered in backing the tractor under about half of the vans fixed on chassis. Those vans had been loaded without the landing legs fully extended and in several cases the landing legs had sunk into the asphalt pavement of the deck.

(c) Recommendation: When vans on chassis are loaded aboard Seatrain vessels, landing legs on the chassis should be fully extended and load spreaders should be used under the landing legs to prevent the legs from sinking into the deck pavement. The extra clearance provided by load spreaders will also provide additional clearance for the tractor fifth wheel.

(4) MILVAN operations aboard SS Seatrain Carolina:

(a) Observation: The SS Seatrain Carolina arrived with 97 MILVANS for discharge at Qui Nhon. 97 MILVANs were also planned for backload to CONUS. 82 of 97 vans for discharge were loaded on chassis which had been assigned to the ship by USA serial number.

(b) Evaluation: Since chassis aboard the Carolina had been assigned to the ship by serial number, each van which was discharged had to be changed to a chassis assigned to Qui Nhon, and each van going aboard the Carolina had to be taken off its Qui Nhon chassis, changed to a ship's chassis and then loaded aboard the ship. Therefore, in order to discharge one van and backload one van three chassis were required, one belonging to the ship and two to Qui Nhon.

(c) Recommendation: If Seatrain vessels, in their present configuration, continue to be used for MILVAN delivery, a system must be developed which will permit interchange of chassis between the ship and ROK ports. The necessity to make three-way chassis shifts merely to permit accounting for chassis by serial numbers is time-consuming, and costly. Furthermore, the error potential for loading the wrong van on the wrong chassis is increased by unnecessary handling.

d. (iv) Organization

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(1) Personnel: None

(2) Organization:

(a) Observation: The organization and management staff of the USATTU, QN, as originally set forth in its TDA, has proven, in some respects, to be inadequate for optimum mission performance. A MTDA is now being developed to correct some of the shortcomings of the TDA.

(b) Evaluation: The MTDA, now in the development phase, will correct many of the organizational and manning deficiencies of the USATTU, QN. It is anticipated that future modifications to the TDA may prove to be necessary as the unit is further tested and additional lessons are learned.

(c) Recommendation: That the organization of the TTU be periodically reevaluated by the Commanding Officer, USATTU, QN and his staff, for deficiencies which may become apparent as the unit performs its mission under a variety of conditions; and that such deficiencies be corrected by initiation of further modifications of the TDA.

e. (U) Training: None.
f. (U) Logistic: None.
g. (U) Communication: None.
h. (U) Material: None.
i. (U) Other (Contract Supervision):

(1) Contract changes:

(a) Observation: The FY 71 contract with the Han Jin Transportation Company, remains much the same as the FY 70 contract with only a few significant differences (See paragraph 1.k above). Among these differences is a change in the guaranteed trucking minimum from hours of utilization to an absolute dollar amount. The guarantee is presently in the amount of $980,000.00 per month for an anticipated equipment utilization of 170,000 hours. Early experience has shown that the guaranteed dollar amount cannot be reached unless there is equipment utilization of at least 190,000 hours. Further, the contract is not required to provide, by terms of the FY 71 contract, a sufficient number of trucks to achieve this minimum.

(b) Trucking Services. The inadequacies of contract item 002 and its related appendix II (Stevedoring rates for item 002) has made it necessary to search out new areas for equipment utilization in an effort to prevent paying under the contract minimum for services not actually rendered.
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AVCF-FFC

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned

(c) Recommendations. That USATTU, QN Contract supervision personnel be permitted by USAPAV to participate entirely in future contract negotiations and be permitted to work closely with price analysts, preventing recurrence of widespread difference between equipment rates and minimum guarantees.

(2) PDO Contractors:

(a) Observation. Many of the contractors who purchase materials from PDO then request USATTU, QN assistance in shipping their property in one shipment. An interagency support agreement (IASA) is not required for these one-time contractors and this situation makes collection of terminal service billings a speculative proposition. It has been suggested that collection be made for one-time contractors upon completion of services. Experience has shown that the agents representing these contractors leave Qui Nhon before billings can be accomplished.

(b) Evaluation. Past experience with at least one contractor has shown that independent agents working for these smaller companies have little or no real authority and their assurance of payment is of little value. These agents are also unavailable for the purpose of signing their terminal service billings as they move to other locations immediately upon completion of terminal services.

(c) Recommendations. That a standard practice be adopted which will require advance deposit totaling 75 per cent of projected total costs of terminal services, prior to the rendering of any services to non-IASA holding contractors.

(3) (U) Section 3, DA Survey Information: None

ROBERT E. SAILA
ITC, TO
Commanding

3 Incl
1. Command Organization Chart
2. List of Distinguished Visitors
3. Command Operational Chart
Incl 2 wd HQ DA
AVCF-GO-H (14 Aug 70) 1st Ind

SU"C : (Y [ional Report - Lessons Learned for Headquarters, United States Army Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon, for the Period Ending 31 July 1970 (RCS CFOR-65) (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning intelligence para 2b. Concur. Such references, if properly conducted, are an ideal method of establishing coordination between diverse agencies.

b. Reference item concerning ARVN stevedore operations para 2c(1). Concur. Action taken is considered to be adequate.

c. Reference item concerning Milvan operations para 2c(2) and 2c(3). Concur. Problems have been documented and forwarded to USARV. Recommend USARV furnish the information to loading authorities in CONUS.

d. Reference item concerning Milvan operations para 2c(4). Non-concur. The recommended transfers would require a complex accounting system which would negate any other advantages gained. The shifting of chassis is a genuine problem, but interchange between ship and RVN ports is not a good solution.

e. Reference item concerning organization para 2d(2). Concur. MDA 93361.01 is completed. This document is designed to provide changes in military manpower and government owned/contractor operated equipment required by changes in the FMic for contractor operation of the port.

f. Reference item concerning contract changes para 2i(1). Concur. Further efforts are being made to assure that contract dollar minima are met. The subject should be referred to US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam. The reference to para 1k should be changed to read 1f.

g. Reference item concerning PDO contractors para 2i(2). Concur. The problem should be referred to USARY G-4, ISSA/Procurement Branch.
3. The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bobby J. Rogers
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
USATTJ, QU
AGSCON, DA incl
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: POP-UT,
APO 9558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, United States Army Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon and comments of endorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "ARVN Stevedoring Operations," page 10, paragraph 2c(1): concur. The best way for ARVN to learn proper procedures and safety measures is to continue the learning period. ARVN has gained an expertise in Qui Nhon but additional training in other methods is required (i.e., heavy lifts and vehicles). Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "MILVAN Operations," page 11, paragraph 2c(4): nonconcur. There should be no instance in which vans are taken off a chassis, placed on a ship's chassis, and then loaded on the vessel. The ship's chassis should not be removed from the ship. The Seatrain vessel is being used as an interim measure pending availability of suitable container ships. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Contract Changes," page 12, paragraph 21(1): concur. With this year's budget limitations, representatives of the requesting organization should be allowed to sit in and assist in contract negotiations. Stevedoring and trucking should be negotiated separately to allow changes to be made to one item without endangering the other. Unit has been so advised.

d. Reference item concerning "PDO Contractors," page 13, paragraph 21(2): concur. Many independent contractors purchasing excess property from PDO are indeed "Briefcase Operators," and can be extremely elusive. USAPDAV requires complete payment prior to removal of property. Consideration is suggested for demanding 100% advance payment of transportation charges. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

For: USASUFCOM-QNH
USA Trans Terminal Unit, QNH
GPOP-DT (14 Aug 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, USA Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 6 NOV 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ, USA Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon.

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970

CO, US Army Transportation Terminal Unit, Qui Nhon

14 August 1970

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