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<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td>AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975; AGO D/A ltr, 9 May 1975</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVOS: X: MEX

21 AUG 1970


To: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DCT, APO 96375

Cc: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities a. (U) Command: During the absence of the Commanding General, COL Robert A. Pearson was in command of U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon, for the first fifteen days of this reporting period. COL John W. Gephart became Chief of Staff on 10 June.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline (1) (C) Strength: The command strength at the conclusion of this quarter was 395 commissioned officers, 228 warrant officers, and 14,542 enlisted personnel.

(2) (C) Chaplain: This headquarters has initiated a monthly training conference for chaplains of this command and the Long Binh area. The sessions during this reporting period have emphasized the character guidance program, and guest speakers have been invited to help chaplains explore ways of making their role more relevant.

c. (C) Operations: (1) (C) Operation Keystone Robin began on 1 July. This command is responsible for logistical support required to redeploy tactical units located in III and IV Military Regions and units of this command.

(2) (L) CE requests ranged from a high of 55 processed during May to a low of 4 during July.

(3) (U) This command was tasked to provide logistical support to
Southern II Military Region. From 10-24 July, 39C ran seven convoys to Bao Loc, and delivered 10,000 drums of asphalt to the 815th Engineer Battalion for its LOC program.

Support of the Cambodian operation was the most demanding activity of this command during the reporting period. It was the first multi-divisional Allied offensive during the Vietnam conflict, and represented a major challenge to Army logisticians. To meet that challenge, this command maintained a twenty-four hour operation each day. It was a tribute to the basic logistical structure that standard procedures and existing systems could absorb the additional burden without impairing the normal mission. The Cambodian operation demonstrated the impressive flexibility of the logistical system in III & IV Military Regions and revealed the high degree of responsiveness which it possesses.

One week prior to the beginning of the operation this headquarters dispatched maintenance personnel to provide technical assistance to tactical units which would be deployed to Cambodia. Technical inspections of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the 5th Infantry Division (ARVN) revealed numerous deficiencies, and personnel from this headquarters assisted ARVN personnel in making necessary repairs. The discovery and repair of these deficiencies prevented costly malfunctions in later tactical operations. Two maintenance inspectors also went into Cambodia to provide assistance to the 5th ARVN. In addition to providing assistance to ARVN units, this headquarters assisted in the maintenance coordination for the movement of the 2/34th Armor and the 2/47th Mechanized Infantry to Cambodia. Personnel from Saigon Support Command conducted on-site inspections, made preparations for contact team support, and aided in expediting parts.

The task of providing major sub-assemblies and parts for both ARVN and US equipment was a demanding one, and this command constantly sought the needed items in all available locations. The most single important measure in supplying tactical units with end items was an ambitious program based upon Keystone Cardinal assets. After establishing priorities and repair criteria to make Keystone assets available for use in Cambodia, the equipment was returned to use throughout May and June. The following table of tracked vehicles used to support the Cambodian operation reveals the magnitude of the task.
On the eve of the Cambodian operation, this headquarters anticipated an increasing demand for final drives, transmissions, and engines. Closed Leop items were largely furnished from assets on hand, although some items had to be transshipped from Qui Nhon and Da Nang. Throughout the operation, normal procedures were able to absorb the higher consumption rates. In order to insure that repairable items were returned to the system, this headquarters issued detailed instructions and developed documentation procedures for declaring combat issues. The inability to retrieve certain Closed Leop items produced a mild burden on the system; helicopter support was often unavailable, and although some units did carry unserviceable items with them for later evacuation, much had to be destroyed in place. The following table shows the quantity of Closed Leop items issued in support of the Cambodian operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M5A1, Heavy Tank</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Engineer Vehicle</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M88, Vehicle, Track, Recovery</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M578, Light Recovery Vehicle</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M68A1, Ammunition Carrier</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M132, Flame Thrower</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M123, Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113, Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113A1, Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M125, Mortar Carrier</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M110, 8&quot; Howitzer, S.F.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M42, Duster</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVLB, Bridge Launcher</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M577A1, Command Vehicle</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effective utilization of Keystone assets insured that tactical operations were not compromised due to a dwindling supply of end items in the field.
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The myriad of supply transactions gave the system a thorough test, and it was repeatedly found efficient, responsive, and rapid. Requests came from II Field Force throughout the day and night, but the response was uniformly rapid. For example, in less than one and one-half hours from receipt of the request, this headquarters processed and shipped a gun-tube to the using unit. It was also necessary to test certain items before sending them to Cambodia to insure that using units would not receive unserviceable equipment. These tests revealed that some bridging materials in Depot stocks were not serviceable, and thus prevented burdening using units with them.

This command supported 85% of the Class V requirements of US units in Cambodia. To support those operations, Saigon Support Command had to increase its stockage objective from 71,906 STON (April) to 78,598 STON (May) and 90,000 STON (June). This headquarters coordinated the receipt of ammunition from Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang as well as from off-shore locations. During the months of May and June, Saigon Support Command received 113,000 STON of ammunition and issued 114,000 STON, the second highest issue/receipt activity for any two-month period in FY70. Throughout the operation, the two Delta A3Ps, Vinh Long and Soc Trang, issued more than twice as much ammunition than in any previous month of FY70. Long Binh Ammunition Depot received more than 2000 STON daily for four consecutive days, a new record for that installation. Air shipments of Class V increased dramatically, and averaged 250 STON daily throughout May. The highest total tonnage was issued on 1 May, and included 1753.9 STON by motor transport, 24.5 STON by water, 241.2 STON by air, and 109.5 STON by unit pickup for a total of 2354.4 STON. Even when many of the A3Ps came under attack in June, Class V support continued unabated.

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(a) (U) Additional line of support requirements were met by establishing temporary facilities at an LZ near Chu Lai, which facilitated resupply by returning to Than Hoa for refueling, and source at an LZ was resupplied by Y-tanks from Huu Trang. The transports were continually being moved, barrels were able to receive shallow rivers and canals to resupply them. The operation at Chu Lai was a unique one, because the LZ was not resupplied by road, and fixed wing aircraft, US tankers, moored off the coast of Huu Trang, also charged JP-4 into 500-gallon collapsible drums located on an adjacent collocation range. The drums were then moved by helicopter to Huu Trang and were pumped into 10,000-gallon collapsible storage tanks.

(b) (U) Transportation requirements for the Cambodian operation placed heavy demands on Saigon Support Command's assets. Reinforced medium truck platoons were sent to both Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, and the operation at each of these points became a miniature movement control center. They were responsible for receiving transportation requests, coordinating convoy security, and supervising the dedicated reinforced medium truck platoons as well as assisting in the offload and turn-around of the Abrams assets. Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, formerly final destinations, became transship points, with SSC trucks moving beyond to Long Ninh, to Copter, Thien Ngon, and into Cambodia. An additional burden was placed upon this command when tactical units utilized their trucks in the rear area while requesting SSC transportation support in the forward areas, a practice which impairs the combined support capability.

(c) (U) Virtually all transportation requests were combat-related, but unit moves continued to command priority. The nature of the operation altered the cargo mix, and ammunition became the primary commodity for the units. Although frequently as many as 150 trucks required loads in a single load, a tremendous burden on 3rd Ordnance Battalion, only one convoy was delayed. To supplement normal resupply channels, this command requested an ammunition waiver at Newport to receive Class V transshipped from Cam Ranh Bay. When the waiver was refused, the cargo was received at Vung Tai, where for two five-day periods, thirty trucks of the 48th Transportation Group cleared the cargo and transported it to Long Binh.

(d) (U) To meet the extraordinary line haul commitments, joint support and local hauls were reduced by approximately 40%. The 48th Group curtailed its port and beach clearance activities and FSRU, the commercial truck contractor, reduced its role in port and beach clearance; and at Newport rose from 7,000 to 30,000 STON. Immediately after the initial phase of the Cambodian operation, 48th Group returned to its port and beach clearance role, and reduced the tonnage at Newport to a more manageable 7,000 STON.
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**Subject:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1970, KCS CPX U 65 (B2) (U)

(6) (U) Terminal operations at Cat Lai and Cozido also reflected the basic theme which characterized this command's role in the Cambodian operation: the established structure and procedures of the logistical system enabled it to absorb a major new support requirement in a responsive and efficient manner. Although the number of ships awaiting discharge increased, the situation was brought under control by adding only one Vietnamese stevedore gang to the normal complement of three gangs per ship. In addition to off-loading record tonnage, Cat Lai also processed three combat essential missions to the Delta, in spite of the fact that fueling facilities were not available at Nha Be. Ten US personnel were sent from Cat Lai to Cozido to assist in ammunition discharge which increased from 150 to over 3000 S/LA.

(7) (C) As allied forces uncovered massive enemy supply caches, US personnel in Cambodia rigged captured material for helicopter evacuation. While 350 trucks joined DISCOM assets in bringing the tons of equipment yielded by the caches to initial collection points at Quan Loi and Lay Minh, a main collection point was established at Kien to display the spectrum of weaponry contained in the sanctuaries. Weapons and associated parts were later moved to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. By the end of the reporting period, the following weapons and ammunition had been delivered to MACV for further shipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm assault Rifle, M 47</td>
<td>1692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm LMG, Ffsh41 (Type 50)</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm LMG, Type 56, RFD</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm HkG, Type 57</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm mortar</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm mortar</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPO-2 Launcher</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPO-7 Launcher</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm HkG, Type 54</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm RR, Type 56</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm RR</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5mm Rifle, H&amp;G 36</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5mm auto Rifle</td>
<td>14</td>
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Ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity (Rounds)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm LMG</td>
<td>18,487</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62mm AK</td>
<td>2,662,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm HMG</td>
<td>105,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm (Fist &amp; SnG)</td>
<td>136,096</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG 7</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG 2</td>
<td>3,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line, .30</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line, Directional</td>
<td>5,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenade, .30</td>
<td>1,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade, Rifle</td>
<td>7,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5mm AA</td>
<td>74,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm Mortar</td>
<td>3,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>6,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7mm HMG</td>
<td>2,137,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm RL</td>
<td>5,590</td>
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<tr>
<td>75mm RL</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5mm (French)</td>
<td>408,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56mm ball (US)</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 ga. shotgun shells (US)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tear gas grenades (US)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 caliber ball (US)</td>
<td>41,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Hg (US)</td>
<td>2,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Illum (US)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Training (a) During the reporting period, Project Buddy was expanded to include new 450 training in the fields of technical supply, electric forklift operations, harbor-master liaison and communications procedures, and 60-ton crane operations. 277 ARVN personnel began training programs during May and June, and 563 completed training during May and June.

(b) The III Military Region Instruct and Advise Team completed its training programs with ARVN DSOs in the Saigon area, and has provided assistance to units in Thu Duc as well.

e. Organization (Inclosure 2)

(U) Logistics (1) Maintenance (a) Throughout the period, continued emphasis was placed on maintenance awareness within the demand, subordinate unit performance during Command Maintenance Management Inspections and results of Roadside Vehicle Spot Check inspections were
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Regular reviews are a topic at regular Commanders Conferences. Additional engines was given to ongoing schools, and new training was initiated in the areas. The engine diagnostic school continues to graduate direct support mechanics better equipped to handle the diagnoses of engine replacement. Participation of support mechanics from outside this command attests to the professionalism of the school as well as the importance being placed on maintenance awareness throughout the Military Region. Classes for refrigeration and air conditioner repairmen were continued with practical on-the-job training in a maintenance company. With this approach, practical, realistic training is combined with tangible, increased productivity. NCOIC representatives conducted a school on the repair of the AV (S) compressors for the M991 Sheridan, and provided special assistance and instruction concerning the 500 Amp Test Bench. Classes were conducted on installation, operation, repair, and troubleshooting; by utilization of the component test bench. Classes were also presented to tactical units on the operation and installation of fire suppression kits for the M113 armored personnel carriers, and several kits were installed as a result.

(b) Progress continued on the Keystone projects, as parts continued to be received and equipment was repaired and returned to stock or released for immediate issue. Preliminary plans were made and trial procedures were tested on the processing line operations to be employed during the next Keystone exercise, Robin, which will get into full swing during the next reporting period. The backlog from previous Keystone projects was reduced, and the majority of equipment processing will be completed prior to scheduled receipt of Keystone Robin equipment. Considerable effort was devoted to movement of the equipment to designated repair facilities. Some equipment has been evacuated to CONUS vehicles and weapons were shipped to Okinawa, and hundreds of vehicles were shipped to contractor repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

(c) The gradual reduction of US troops has continued to take its toll on maintenance units. During the reporting period, the 590th Maintenance Company (Div) (Os) was reduced to zero strength when troop units in the area of operations were reduced. In addition, the 58th Light Maintenance Company was relocated from Tay Ninh to Long Binh to take advantage of available assets for in-country repair of Keystone equipment. As additional areas are turned over to ARVN, additional shifts will occur. In planning for the eventual phase-down, studies have been made for contractor operation of the entire maintenance activity on Long Binh. Contractor operation of the General Support Maintenance capability and the Transportation Motor Pool is both feasible and probable. Expanded use of contractors for such diverse equipment repair as typewriters, fuel drums, and tire retreading was accomplished during the period; the first
repairs to fuel drums returned to depot and the first recapped tires were processed during the month of June.

(d) Shortages of certain high usage items such as vehicle batteries, truck tires, and certain major assemblies continue to be problems; specialized problems such as contaminated hydraulic oil, barrel erosion of M-16 rifles, and transport damage to MILVAN equipment required special consideration. Full implementation of SCRAM procedures continued, and many local regulations were revised to facilitate ease with which a unit may turn in unneeded or excess equipment. As the budget squeeze continues, such economy measures will continue to receive primary consideration throughout the command.

(e) The inactivation of the First Logistical Command provided a nucleus of experienced Instruct and Adviser team members who were reassigned to the command. They were utilized in checking performance of supply and Management activities within our supporting maintenance units. In some cases, the team completely realigned unit records, inventories, re-warehoused, and relocated entire Class IX facilities, and trained unit tech supply personnel in proper operation techniques.

(2) Services (a) Numerous engineering projects were advanced and completed during the reporting period. The 900-man cantonment project at Linh Binh has been completed. The fire station at Newport was completed on 27 July, and construction on the railroad and bridge is now 50% complete. Engineer personnel are nearing completion of the LOT slip pier. At Cat Lai, the final fendering system on one mooring system was completed. The project to redeck and rebrace the two barge wharves at Bien Hoa was completed by Fako on 24 July. At Long Binh, seventy-nine concrete culvert headwalls in the Ammunition Supply Depot were installed. A project at the Depot to install a trolley system for a series of hoists in the Care and Preservation building is nearing completion. Progress continued on the railroad with the addition of spurs in the 208 yard, FDC yard, and 22G area.

(b) Field laundry locations have been reduced from eight to six with elimination of the Laueries at Vung Tau and Tay Ninh. Of these six locations, three are in competition with contract laundries and process largely flatwork items (sheets, pillow cases, and mattress covers). Bath unit support was requested and received in four locations during and immediately after the Cambodian operations. The bath units were in place, and provided service within a reasonable time after receipt of the request. For FY71, nineteen laundries are providing support within III and IV Military Regions. Eighteen of these laundries are providing sewing service for the attachment of name tapes and insignia.
(c) The need for flexibility in food service activities, especially with regard to tactical units, makes control of subsistence items a difficult problem. In recent months efforts to control these items have been tightened. Mess personnel have been advised to delete items in excess when submitting requisitions to Class I Ration Breakdown Points. Headcount Officers were appointed to take spot headcounts of personnel served in unit messes. Because these controls proved to be ineffective, all unit dining facilities of this command will be required to account for subsistence by signature headcount. This procedure will guarantee that unit messes will requisition subsistence items for the accurate number of personnel being served in each dining facility.

(3) Retrograde and Disposal

(a) A retrograde regulation (USASUCOM, SGN Reg No 741-1) was published on 8 July. The regulation encompasses all previous policies and procedures regarding the identification, classification, preparation, shipment, and reporting of retrograde cargo. The Keystone Bluejay operation is closed. There remains, however, items and vehicles turned in under Bluejay that are awaiting shipment out of country to rebuild facilities in PAVN and CRU. On 20 July the processing locations were opened to receive equipment turned in under the Keystone Robin Project. On 21 July a turn-in of excess equipment and supplies on a "no questions asked" basis was initiated for units in Saigon Support Command. This turn-in of unit excess will be in effect through 31 October.

(b) During the reporting period, the PDO yard at Ho Nai picked up 114,000 STON of scrap metal on their accountable records. This tonnage was picked up as a result of an inventory requested by US Army Property Disposal agency, Vietnam (P). Until the truck scales were installed at PDO in December 1969, incoming scrap weights were estimated. Since the scales were installed, it became obvious that the incoming scrap weights were underestimated.

(4) Petroleum (a) Construction of the Dong Nai POL Jetty Project, initiated on 24 February 1970, is now 95% complete. The jetty itself is finished as well as the dolphins in front and on the side of it. The earth and crushed rock roadway from the shore end of the jetty to the pump station has been completed. The construction of the welded steel pipeline from the end of the jetty to the pump station remains to be completed. It was determined that the platform on the end of the jetty was not capable of supporting the transfer feeder pumps originally planned to be located there. A small BK barge was obtained for use as a floating pump platform to be anchored next to the jetty's end. This barge will be anchored in place by the Engineers in the near future. The original jetty
contract called for the construction of a welded, buried pipeline from the jetty pump station to the Long Binh Tank Farm. Due to lack of funds, however, only that part of the pipeline outside Long Binh Post perimeter will be buried. Monsoon rains have made it necessary to postpone construction on this pipeline until 15 September 1970.

(b) Two 10,000-barrel bolted steel tanks located at the Long Binh Tank Farm developed bottom leaks, and had to be taken out of service. Both tanks were drained, flushed with water by the Long Binh Post Fire Department, and cleaned as a self-help project by 29th General Support Group. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to repair one of these tanks with sealing compound and plastic steel. Another attempt, using epoxy sealant, is being made on a self-help basis by the 512th J. Company. This tank will be tested once sealing operations are complete.

(c) Approval was obtained to construct a 6-inch coupled pipeline from the Long Binh Tank Farm to Sanford Army Airfield to supply the three new 500-barrel storage tanks that have been constructed there. This project has not been started due to the immediate requirement for repairing the leaking storage tanks and improving the security around the Dong Nai Barge Site.

(5) During the reporting period, command emphasis was placed on the identification, reporting, and shipping of unit, DSU and G-I Excesses. Simplified procedures were established which encouraged customers to dispose of all excesses through their supporting DSU's. During the period from 12 May 1970 through 31 July 1970, 44,651 lines of excess were reported to USADIB by the several Support Command DSU's for disposition.

(6) Information (a) During this reporting period, this office received notice that Hometown News Releases for arrivals in-country were no longer being accepted by the Army Hometown News Center. Overall, monthly Hometowners submitted dropped to approximately 700 from the previous reporting average of more than 1,000. Command emphasis was placed on obtaining DA Forms 1526 on promotions, achievements and decorations (PADs). During July, the number of PADs was greater than at any other time in the Command's history. Meetings continually were held with subordinate commands so that 1526s from PADs could be increased and thereby offset as much as possible the losses from in-country arrivals. A new program has been established whereby recommendations for awards are accompanied by the 1526.

(b) With the phase-out of 1st Logistical Command Information Office, greater emphasis has been placed on obtaining news releases from Saigon Support Command to publish in outside media. All personnel within the
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Infor:tion offize have been assi. neq monthly quotai to increase the number of news releases submitted. More articles about the command have been published, particularly by the Army Times, Army Reporter, and for the first time, the LASY Observer. Inquiries by civilian correspondents have been more numerous. The resulting stories have all reflected favorably on Satic Support Command.

(c) The command newspaper, H1-LIT, has been distributed twice monthly. There has been increased emphasis on publishing representative articles written by the information offices of the 4th Transportation Command and the US Army Depot, Long Binh. The office is now in the process of having the paper commercially printed by Stars and Stripes. Approval from USAO already has been given for the project.

(d) A program was initiated during this reporting period of monitoring command information classes throughout the command with a view to increasing their effectiveness and relevancy. This program is continuing.

1. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence. None
c. Operations. Stevedore Strike at Newport and Cat Lai

(1) OBSERVATION: On 24 June all contract stevedore personnel from USAT of Newport and Cat Lai went on strike. USASUPCOM, 30N OPLAN 94-70 was implemented after a 24-hour period had elapsed. During the strike period, operations continued, but at a reduced rate.

(2) EVALUATION: It is essential that the personnel selected to fill positions in the port during strikes have the skills required to continue discharge operations. These individuals must remain in their positions throughout the strike. Daily rotation of individuals reduces the possibility of developing any proficiency through OJT.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Units which are levied for personnel in accordance with USASUPCOM, 30N OPLAN 94-70 should select personnel who can be made available for the duration of the strike.

d. Organization. None
AVCS 00-3X

3. Training. None

1. Logistics. (1) Offloading of beer and beverages.

   (a) OBSERVATION: Shipments of B2 are arriving in the quantities beyond the storage capability of the Exchange Depot.

   (b) EVALUATION: The problem has been a continuous one. It creates a serious burden upon the transportation system in that the port becomes a storage depot and the clearance system continuously suffers due to slow offload and poor turnaround ratio of port clearance vehicles. For example, during the month of July, Newport received 9,920 STM of B2. The normal receiving capability at the Exchange Depot is approximately 500 STM per day; however, the Depot was already filled to capacity. Consequently, clearance of the port was extended over a thirty (30) day period.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the movement of B2 into the theater be regulated to coincide with the receiving capability of the Exchange Depot. Furthermore, consideration should be given to increased utilization of Sealand containers rather than general cargo vessels.

(2) Use of Y-Tankers in POL Resupply during Cambodian Offensive.

   (a) OBSERVATION: Y-tankers and POL barges have proven efficient for operating in shallow waters for areas where road and fixed wing air resupply of petroleum is impossible.

   (b) EVALUATION: Too many transportation and POL assets are tied down by this type of operation where Y-tankers are used as floating storage and tugboats must remain in an isolated area for a long time.

   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That similar methods employed during the Cambodian operations to supply bulk POL in the Delta (IV Military Region) be restricted to those occasions when expediency transcends the economical employment of transportation assets.

(3) Disposition of Unserviceable and Excess Class VII Equipment

   (a) OBSERVATION: USARV Msg DTG 091147Z, Jul 70, subject as above, rescinded the authority of maintenance units to provide property book turn-in credit to units.

   (b) EVALUATION: The rescission of this authority placed the responsibility for acceptance and retrograde of Class VII at the supply
DSU level. This added responsibility increases requirements for storage space and transportation. Equipment required for loading heavy equipment, i.e. bulldozers, graders, vehicles, etc., is not organic to supply DSU's. Personnel familiar with the documentation and classification procedures are also not in supply DSU's.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that thru-put of excess or unserviceable Class VII be accomplished to the maximum extent possible with unit transportation assets. The unit representative presents his turn-in document to the DSU. The DSU prepares its turn-in shipping document and sends the unit representative to the turn-in point with the item. The unit representative brings the signed shipping document back to the DSU for his turn-in credit.

(4) Errors in TAI2S reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION: A review of TAI2S (formerly TAE3S) forms submitted to higher headquarters indicates improper preparation at the unit level.

(b) EVALUATION: During a 45-day period when this headquarters monitored and surveyed TAI2S forms, more than 500 forms were returned for correction. In nearly every case, reporting errors could have been prevented had the first line supervisor followed the instructions of this and higher headquarters or adhered to the instructions outlined in accordance with the appropriate directives.

. Communications. None

h. Material. None

i. Other. hometown News Releases.

(a) OBSERVATION: The exclusion of in-country arrivals has meant a sharp decrease in the over-all Hometown News Release Program. The number obtained through promotions, achievements and decorations has increased.

(b) EVALUATION: Obtaining a Hometown News Release on an arrival was much easier than obtaining them on promotions, achievements and decorations.
AVCS GCXM


(c) RECOMMENDATION: That command interest in the Hometown News Release Program be continued, and that all cooperation be given the program by subordinate commands.

TEL: LBN 2404

H.B. GIBSON, JR.
Brigadier General, USA Commanding

2 Incl
1. Distinguished Visitors List
2. Organizational Chart
Incl 1 w/d HQ DA
AVM-DU (24 Aug 70) 1st Ind

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96556

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-11,
    APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

2. Reference item concerning "Offloading of Beer and Beverages," para 2f(1). The Vietnam Regional Exchange is conducting a study to determine actions necessary to improve their distribution system. The same problem currently applies to Sealand containers utilized for exchange cargo. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cliff W. Clancy Jr.

Cy from:
USASUPCOM-SGN
GPOP-UT (24 Aug 70) 2d Ind (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  6 NOV 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. CCAI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON

HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY
SPT CMD, SGN

2 TH
35 GP

4TH

3D ORD BN

70 MRT

73 FSB

ROCP CMD
(PROV)

UNITED STATES
ARMY
DEPOT
LONG BINH

DELTA
LSA
(PROV)
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970.

**CG, US Army Support Command, Saigon**

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