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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (5 Jan 71) FOR OT UT 703099 11 January 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96484

AVMAC-6C

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (O).

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities

   a. (C) General

      (1) This report covers the period from 1 May 1970, through 31 July 1970, and is submitted in accordance with AR 525-15, USARV Regulation 525-15, and 17th Aviation Group (Combat) Regulation 525-15.

      (2) Mission: To perform reconnaissance, surveillance and security for Free World Forces in the II Military Region. To engage in combat as an element of a larger unit and provide limited anti-tank defense. One element of the units may be placed in support of a major ground unit.

      (3) Organization Structure: The Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry is located at Camp HOLLOWAY (ARVN), KHE, Republic of Vietnam, and is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph B. DeFrance. Troop A, B, and D are collocated with Squadron Headquarters and Troop C is stationed at Camp BACCRILL (ARVN), KHE, Republic of Vietnam. The Squadron has its full complement of cavalry troops as per MTCE 17-95T. (See Inclosure 1 for a list of subordinate units reflecting the organizational structure).

         Tactical Posture: At the beginning of this reporting period Troops A, B and D were under operational control of the Fourth Infantry Division. Troop C was in direct support of the ARVN II Military Region. Additional changes in the tactical posture of the Squadron occurred during this reporting period. Troop A was deployed from 19 May to 5 June 1970 in support of the 23rd Division (ARVN) operating in MONDOL KHE Province, Cambodia to the west of Ben Ma Thuot and returned to Camp HOLLOWAY on 5 June 1970. On the 31st of June 1970 Troop A was placed in direct support of II Military Region, Troop B was placed in direct support of the 4th Infantry Division, Troop C was placed in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Troop D remained under Squadron control.

   b. (C) Personnel

      (1) During the reporting period, the following major changes in command and staff occurred:

      FOR CT UT 7/3/70

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AVMCS-3C

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, 1970 (RS 65-32) (U)

(a) MAJ Walter W. Wolfe 565-6-1976 assumed duties as Squadron Executive Officer on 9 July 1970, replacing MAJ Ronald G. Makson 537-6-6146.

(b) CPT Clyde A. Harris 526-6-4366 assumed command of C Troop on 31 June 1970, replacing MAJ James S. Hall 316-3-5286.

(c) CPT Michael J. Fisher 537-6-6570 assumed duties as Squadron Safety Officer on 2 May 1970, replacing CPT James F. Roberts 320-3-7767.

(d) CPT Arthur H. Thomas 431-4-1766 assumed duties as Squadron Surgeon on 6 June 1970, replacing CPT Joseph P. Chollack, Jr. 201-3-7767.

(e) WO1 Ernest P. Luulananovit 263-6-3118 assumed duties as Squadron S-5 on 24 May 1970, replacing WO1 Ray H. Majors 262-8-6213.

(f) CS1 Leonard E. Cruse 263-6-4372 assumed duties as Command Sergeant Major on 4 July 1970, replacing CS1 Perry Adams, Jr. 407-2-4535.

(2) Unit Strength and miscellaneous related data is attached as Inclosure 3.

c. (C) Intelligence:

(1) During the reporting period, the S-2 Section activities included:

SECRET Clearances Validated - 70
SECRET Clearances Granted - 5
SECRET Clearances Initiated - 10
TOP SECRET Clearances Validated - 6
TOP SECRET Clearances Initiated - 2
Security Debriefings - 104
Escape and Evasion Debriefings - 0

(2) Intelligence Summary for the Squadron's tactical area of interest is as follows:

(a) KONTUM Province: Enemy activity in KONTUM Province during the month of May was maintained at a fairly high level. There were no sustained stand off attacks or major ground contacts during this period, however sporadic stand off attacks were conducted against the DAK FEX, DAK SEANG, and SEAMET Special Forces Camps. The enemy employed 75mm recoilless rifles, 3-40 rocket, and 82mm mortar fire during the attacks on the Special Forces Camps. Frequent small ground contacts were also initiated during this period. On 16 May the 6th PF Platoon in KON HOI NG Village, approximately nine kilometers southeast of TAHN CANH received a 20 round 82mm mortar stand off attack and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. Documents captured during the attack identified the C-3 Company/306th Local Force Battalion. Intelligence reports indicated there would be an increase in
attacks against small RF/PF units. During the rest of the month of May, enemy activities remained at a high level, however marked decrease in enemy activity was noted by the middle of June. At this time the enemy initiated contacts dropped to a low level. The only significant enemy contact was an attack by fire against the 12th ARVN Regimental Headquarters on 25 June. At that time agent reports indicated that enemy forces would concentrate their activities against ARVN and RF/PF units. The enemy intent was to reduce civilian confidence in the Government of Vietnam ability to protect itself and the population at large.

(b) PLEIKU Province: Enemy activity in the early days of the month of May was at a moderate level. The primary areas of enemy activity were LE TRUNG District Headquarters located 15 kilometers East of PLEIKU CITY, Camp HOLLOWAY located 3 kilometers East of PLEIKU CITY, and the DUC 00 Special Forces Camp. LE TRUNG District Headquarters was subject to stand off attacks from 16 to 19 May. On the 17th of May, the compound received 11 rounds of 107mm rockets followed by a small unsuccessful ground probe. Camp HOLLOWAY and the 112 Military Region Headquarters were the targets of attacks by fire from 17 to 22 May. The enemy employed 122mm rockets during the attacks by fire. Highway 19 between PLEIKU CITY and the Special Forces Camp at DUC 00 was also targets by the enemy during this period. On the 21st of May a truck convoy received small arms and B-40 rocket fire destroying three trucks and damaging two 5000 gallon fuel tankers. During the month of June the enemy began to increase terrorist activities in the small hamlets in PLEIKU Province. On the morning of 4 June, there were four terrorist incidents resulting in three abductions. Six civilians were abducted, and in the fourth incident 25 houses were burned by an unknown size unit. On the 12th of June the 11th RF Company received 13 rounds of 60mm mortar fire wounding 12 personnel. Enemy units in PLEIKU Province began to conduct harassment attacks against ARVN and RF/PF units. As in KHE TUKH Province, the enemy harassment attacks were planned to reduce the confidence of the people in the Government of Vietnam's ability to protect itself. Rocket attacks on targets in the PLEIKU Area have stopped, and there has been a significant decrease in attacks by fire employing mortars.

(c) BINH Dinh Province: During the month of May activity in BINH Dinh Province decreased slightly, with ground attacks and attacks by fire being the predominant type of incidents. On 20 May KHANH LE Hamlet received small arms, B-40 rockets, and mortar fire. On 18 May, the 119th and 992nd RF Companies and MAT Team 2/15th received approximately 75 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar fire. Attacks were intense and were designed to economize forces and maintain maximum pressure on Free World Forces. The strategy continued into early June. On the night of 4 June, a partially
successful sapper attack was launched against QUI Nhon Tank Farm 90. During late June enemy activity increased slightly and included terrorist attacks aimed at disrupting Government elections. On 22 June, a terrorist attack against a pre-election meeting killed 2 Government officials and wounded 13 civilians. During the first week of July, there was a marked increase in terrorist activity with the purpose of undermining the people's confidence in the Government's ability to protect them and to disrupt pacification and development programs. At the same time infiltration into western BINH TAY Province by elements of the 3rd NVA Division has been increasing. These enemy forces have so far been avoiding contacts with Free World Forces.

(d) CAMBODIA: Enemy activity in CAMBODIA was characterized by defensive reaction of enemy forces to the Free World Forces' BINH TAY operations. Enemy activity consisted of efforts to remove operational facilities and critical logistical supplies. Enemy defensive operations consisted of the employment of anti-aircraft fire designed to deny Free World Forces access to enemy base areas. Operation BINH TAY I encountered the greatest enemy resistance with sporadic but intense contacts. Aircraft supporting Operation BINH TAY I received frequent and intense ground to air fire in the area of operations. Major logistical caches discovered in the area of Operation BINH TAY I included 600 tons of rice, 32,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 3,570 mortar and rocket rounds. Free World Forces in Operation BINH TAY II met little resistance except in the vicinity of major caches, which were fewer than those found in Operation BINH TAY I. Only small unit contacts were made, and caches found were small and well dispersed. The enemy avoided significant contacts during Operation BINH TAY III and caches discovered were again small and dispersed. Material captured included 133 crew served weapons, 20 tons of ammunition, and 412 tons of rice. Operation BINH TAY IV facilitated the evacuation of Cambodian Military personnel, their dependents, and other civilian refugees from the LABANG SIEK/BA KEV area of CAMBODIA. There was very little enemy contact made during this operation.

(1) Quarterly Operations by Troop

(a) Troop A during this reporting period operated in support of the 1st Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA West of DUC CO, the 21th STZ (Now 22d Div Forward) in the DAK TO, BEN HET, and DAK SEANG area, and the II Military Region Northeast and Southwest of the PLEI DUONG TAOR. During the month of May, Troop A operations in support of US and ARVN forces were directed against enemy base areas 701, 702, and 740. At the beginning of the reporting period Troop A was in support of Task Force PURSUIT with no significant activities. Beginning 6 May, Troop A supported the 1st Infantry Division for two days in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA to the West of PLEI DUONG. Operations were characterized by the discovery of large bunker and living structure complexes with light enemy contacts in the vicinity of the complexes. On 8 May the Troop began support of the 22d ARVN Division operating in Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA to the West of DUC CO. Several structures and 2 tons of rice were destroyed during the three days with the 22d ARVN Division.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
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Light enemy contact was made with 4 NVA KIA. From 12 May to 17 May the
Troop supported the 4th Infantry Division continuing its operation in
CAMBODIA. The significant finding during that operation was an airfield
with a POL storage area. The remainder of the operation was characterized
by light enemy contacts typified by sporadic ground to air fire by small
enemy elements. On 19 May Troop A was deployed to BAN ME THOUT to support
the 23rd ARVN Division conducting Operation BINH TAY III in MONDOI KERI
Province, CAMBODIA. The move to BAN ME THOUT was made without incident on
19 May and operations began on 20 May. The most significant activity for
the remainder of the month was the destruction of several enemy APCs.

On 5 June Troop A was released from support of Operation BINH TAY
III and returned to Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop A was in direct support of II
Military Region from 5 June to 23 June and was employed in the DAK TO, BEN
NIT area and to the South of DUC CO. No major operations were conducted by
the Troop within this period of time. On 21 June the Troop assumed the
mission of screening for the 22nd ARVN Division's Operation BINH TAY IV in
CAMBODIA. The objective of this operation was to evacuate approximately
12,000 CAMBODIAN military personnel and their dependents, with all of their
equipment and personal belongings, from the towns of BAKI and LABANG SIX.
Light contact with the enemy was made but with no significant effect on the
primary mission of evacuation successfully completed. During the remainder
of the month of June the Troop supported II Military Region to the North of
KONTUM and in the PLEIKU TAOR with few significant activities and light
enemy contact. Throughout the month of July Troop A continued to support the
II Military Region and Company B 5th Special Forces Group. Operations were
significantly restricted during the first half of the month due to the monsoon
weather. Significant operations for July began on the 21st of July to the
Northeast of the PLEIKU TAOR. Troop A initiated contact with elements of an
enemy support battalion on 21 July. The next day a large number of enemy
soldiers were spotted by the Acre-Scouts and the area was immediately taken
under fire. Continuous gunship, artillery, and Tactical Air firepower was
plied until the next day. It is felt that a large portion of the enemy
unit was killed, but because of the effects of the massive firepower employed
it was impossible to ascertain the extent of enemy losses. On 30 July the
troop again made contact with an enemy unit, this time to the South of
PLEIKU. By the use of massive firepower from gunships and Tactical Air
strikes, within a period of six hours the Troop killed, or was responsible for
the death of, 65 NVA. At the end of the reporting period Troop B
continued to support the II Military Region.

(b) During this reporting period Troop B supported the II Military
Region in the vicinity of DAK TO, DAK SEANG, and DUC CO. Troop B supported
the 4th Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA, and in the AN NIT
area. Troop B also supported II Military Region in the PLEIKU area. During
the period from 1 May to 4 May, Troop B operated Southwest of DAK TO with
little enemy contact. Troop B next supported the 4th Infantry Division from
5 May to 16 May in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA. In the initial assault of
Operational Report - LANDING ZONES for the air transport of South Vietnamese forces into CAMBODIA and then to strategic areas throughout the country, the 22d ARVN Division in Operation Binh Tuy II was established. The division was supported by the 3d ARVN Division in Operation Pleiku TAOR and the 17th Air Cavalry Operations. The division was responsible for the air transport of South Vietnamese forces into CAMBODIA and then to strategic areas throughout the country.

During the period 23 June through 30 July the 22d ARVN Division in Operation Binh Tuy II was established. The division was supported by the 3d ARVN Division in Operation Pleiku TAOR and the 17th Air Cavalry Operations. The division was responsible for the air transport of South Vietnamese forces into CAMBODIA and then to strategic areas throughout the country.

During this period the division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support. The division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support. The division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support. The division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support. The division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support. The division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support. The division was inserted seven times into CAMBODIA to develop the situation or to secure ground support.

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Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65, (R2) (O).

(c) Troop C during this reporting period supported TASK FORCE PURSUIT Southwest of AN KHE, the 7th Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA and in the vicinity of AN KHE, the 22nd ARVN Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA, and in the BEN HET, DAK SEANG area. Troop C also supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the LZ English area. Beginning 1 May through 7 May, the troop supported TASK FORCE PURSUIT to the Southwest of AN KHE with no significant activities.

On 8 May, the troop supported the 22nd ARVN Division in the Rocket Ridge area to the Southwest of DAK TO with little activity. Beginning 5 May through 7 May the troop operated in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA in support of the 22nd ARVN Division's Operation 5TH HUE II with the mission of assisting Free World Forces in their assault on NVA base areas within CAMBODIA. Numerous large bunker complexes were located in Base Area 702. Intense ground to air fire was received throughout the area of Operations resulting in one IOKI being downed by enemy fire. Several sets of trucks made by heavy tracked vehicles were spotted by the troop. Indications were that the vehicles had moved to the South, however, no tracked vehicles were sighted. Troop C supported the 4th Infantry Division in Base Area 702 in Eastern CAMBODIA from 8 May through 12 May. On 9 May the troop located two M-3 scout cars and a dump truck that had been destroyed by an air strike. Numerous large bunker complexes were located and destroyed by the employment of gunships, Artillery, and Tactical air strikes. Ground to air fire in the area was intense throughout the operation. Beginning 13 May through 25 May, the troop supported the 22nd ARVN Division to the West of DUC CO in CAMBODIA. The troop continued to locate bunker complexes and caches of enemy supplies. Ground to air fire continued to be intense. Troop C supported the 22nd ARVN Division in the BEN HET and DAK TO area from 29 May to 31 May. On 31 May one of the troops aircraft received what was believed to be 37mm anti-aircraft fire. The Cobra gunships were employed against the suspected enemy location and observed several secondary explosions. When a tactical air strike was employed on the suspected enemy location four more secondary explosions were observed. Beginning 1 June through 3 June, Troop C worked for the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to the South of Fire Support Base BLACK HAWK. The troop was credited with one enemy KIA on 2 May. Troop C supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the vicinity of LZ English from 5 June through 23 June. Activities throughout the area were characterized by moderate enemy contact. Ground to air fire was sporadically intense. Numerous caves and bunkers were destroyed by the troop utilizing combined arms firepower. The troop was credited with 24 enemy KIA during this period. Troop C supported the 4th Infantry Division to the North of AN KHE from 24 June through 28 June and was credited with one enemy KIA. Troop C returned to the LZ ENGLISH area to work in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade from 29 June through 31 July. Operations were limited primarily to the detection and destruction of bunker and structure complexes. The entire area of Operations had numerous indications of large enemy troop movements but enemy contact was light and characterized.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

by the engagement of small groups of enemy soldiers. During this reporting period the troop was credited with 49 enemy KIA'S and 1 detainee. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted 14 times to develop the situation and secure downed aircraft.

(c) Troop D, during this reporting period, operated in support of the 4th Infantry Division at PLEI DJERENG, I Military Region to the West of PLEIKU TACR, and was on standby as a ready reaction force for the Squadron. At the beginning of the period, Troop D conducted a search and destroy operation to the West of PLEIKU. On 6 May, two platoons of D Troop conducted a road march to PLEI DJERENG to assist the 4th Infantry Division in the security of PLEI DJERENG Airfield. This operation lasted until 15 May at which time D Troop returned to Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop D conducted unit training on individual and crew served weapons while providing convoy escorts to DUC CO, Fire Support Base OASIS, and Fire Support Base BLACKHAWK. One platoon from D Troop provided convoy escort and perimeter security for A Troops move to BAN ME THUTH. On 5 July, while D Troops was conducting a search and destroy operation to the West of PLEIKU, they sustained 1 U.S. KIA and 2 US WIA from an enemy command detonated mine. A continued sweep of the area produced no more significant activity. At the end of the reporting period, D Troop was continuing to provide convoy escorts and a ready reaction force for the Squadron.

(e) (U) Organization: No change since last ORLL.

(f) (U) Trainings

(1) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School Program: The maintenance program of the Squadron was greatly enhanced as a result of refresher training provided by these courses. (See Inclosure 5).

(2) Aviation Training: (See Inclosure 5).

(3) Special Training: Both A Troop and B Troop Aero-Rifle Platoon personnel conducted classes at KONTUM for the training of ARVN Scout personnel from the 22d ARVN Division as Aero-Rifle Platoons. This training included an orientation on Air Cavalry Operations with special emphasis on repelling training.

(h) The Squadron engaged in training a total of 92 days during the Quarter. (See Inclosure 5).

(g) (C) Logistics:

(h) Supplies:

(a) Class I - A Troop, B Troop, and D Troop drew rations from the 08th S & S Battalion, PLEIKU, RVN. C Troop drew rations from
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (H2) (U).

the 4th Infantry Division at AN KHE, RVN. D Troop operates a consolid-
ated field ration mess for D Troop and Headquarters and Headquarters
Troop.

(b) Class II - Supplies were requisitioned from the 83th
S Battalion.

(c) Class III - Package POL products were requisitioned
through the 83th S Battalion and issued by S-4 to the troops.
Dies I and JP-2 were requisitioned through 473rd S & S CO, PLEIKU, RVN.
Forward rearming sites were established on a mission basis at DUC CO,
BLACKHAWK, PHU KHEN and OASIS.

(d) Class IV - Construction material was acquired through
Local convtrctor by Troop Commanders.

(e) Class V - Ammunition was requisitioned from Ammunition
Supply points PLEIKU, 6th Infantry Division (AN KHE) and CUI NHON.
Effective 25 June 70 ammunition drawn in the PLEIKU area came under the
control of the ARVN ASP. PLEIKU. Ammunition was positioned forward at
LZ TWO STIE, LZ ENGLISH, KONTUR, PHU NHON, DUC CO, OASIS, BLACKHAWK, and
ARMAGEDDON in support of operations. A Troop and B Troop operated a
rearming point at CAMP HOLLOWAY.

(f) Class VII - Major and items, less aircraft and armament,
were requisitioned from the 88th S & S Battalion.

(g) Class VIII - Medical material was requested thru the
71st Evacuation Hospital, PLEIKU, RVN.

(2) Requisitions submitted during 1 May thru 31 Aug 1970:

Non-expendable - 199
Completed - 29
Cancelled - 87
Turn-In - 146

(3) A reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions is made
with the 88th S & S Battalion each quarter.

(4) Reports of Surveys Submitted - 8

(5) Combat losses Submitted - 31
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AER CB-GC 10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(h) (u) Communications: Signal and Message Center Operations

(1) General: Having completed the construction of the new Communications Center at Camp Holloway early in the quarter, operations during this quarter have been relatively stabilized. On 3 May 1970 a land line was installed, and the 7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron Communications Center resumed responsibility for transmission and reception of electrical messages from and to 17th Aviation Group (Combat). The 43rd Signal Battalion maintained responsibility for traffic on the World Wide Net.

(2) On 5 May 1970, the AN/GRC-106 and two operators returned from their forward position at Tan Canh. During the period 19 May 1970 through 1 June 1970, A Troop maintained a forward AN/GRC-2 at Ban Me Thuot, to provide radio teletype communications with their operations. The Squadron Communications Platoon operated the AN/GRC-112 in Ban Me Thuot during this time, maintaining radio teletype communications with the Squadron Headquarters as a back-up system. On 25 June 1970 three men with an AN/GRC-106 mounted on a ½ ton truck were dispatched to IAC CO from the Squadron Communications Platoon to assist in setting up and operating a navigational beacon for A Troop and to report on its operations. They returned to Camp HOLLOWAY on 28 June 70.

(3) Operational Statistics: (See Inclosure 6).

(i) (u) Materials

(1) Aircraft maintenance support is provided to the Squadron by the 604th Direct Support unit as indicated below:

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<tr>
<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>DSU/Location</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>A Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KIZ</td>
<td>604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
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(2) Vehicle maintenance support is provided by direct support units as indicated below:

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<th>DSU/Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KIZ</td>
<td>5th Maint Bn, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU</td>
<td>62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU</td>
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(3) When A Troop was located at BAN ME THUOT, a portion of the unit's maintenance element was located with the troop to perform unscheduled

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Maintenance and light combat damage repairs. All heavy maintenance was accomplished at Camp HOLLOWAY.

(b) Statistics on aircraft strength and availability are included in Inclosure 7.

j. (U) Civil Affairs

(1) General: Major areas of S-5 activity during the last quarter were education, sanitation, recreation, sponsoring of social events, and sponsoring the Catholic Orphanage of TU TAM.

(2) Operation and Training Activities:

(a) PLEI POO NGO (AR830365): During the 2nd Quarter, the Civil Affairs team gave instruction in the building of bunkers and other fortifications and the setting up of their perimeter.

(b) LA SON (AR817376): During the past quarter, the Civil Affairs team helped to repair one mile of road that runs through the village.

(c) TU TAM Orphanage: The S-5 team in conjunction with D Troop is helping to support the orphanage of TU TAM.

1. Supplying edible garbage for the livestock.

2. Presenting additional clothing, food, and toys for the children.

3. Organizing a picnic for the children at Bien Hoa Lake.

(3) Logistics: The Civil Affairs Team received support from LE TRONG District, The Squadron Chaplain, D Troop, PLEIKU Air Base S-5, personal resources of team members, PLEIKU Hospital, and the 71st Medical Evacuation Hospital.

(h) Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) Sanitation:

1. The S-5 team supplied soap for the Montagnard villagers.

2. A general clean-up project was conducted in PLEI POO NGO.

(b) Recreation: The S-5 team conducted ten hours of organ-
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10 August 1970

SUSJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

ized sports for the children of both villages.

(c) Social Events: One picnic to BIEN HOA LAKE was
sponsored for the children in the orphanage of TU TAM.

(d) Psychological Operations: During the past Quarter,
many reports of NVA troops and areas of concentration were received by
the S-5 team from the Montagnards. One NVA mine was found that was
intended for use against the S-5 team but was noticed by some Vietnamese
civilians and reported to the S-5 team. The villagers in both PLEI
POC NGO and IA SON are most cooperative.

(e) Transportation: The S-5 team provided transportation
for the people of both villages to medical facilities, market, and
school.

(f) Miscellaneous: The team distributed 10,000 lbs. of food.

1. (U) Accident Prevention

(1) The accident rate per 100,000 flying hours was 35.00 for
this Quarter. The previous reporting period was 32.00.

(2) Accident rate statistics and accident summaries are attached
as inclusion 8.

1. (U) Religious Functions

(1) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the Quarter, conducted a
total of 11 Sunday and 17 weekday Protestant services, with a total
attendance of 1286.

(2) Catholic Mass was conducted 13 times with a total attendance
of 756.

(3) Religious services were conducted at Camp HOLICHU, AN KHO,
PHU LAI, and AN SON.

(4) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the Quarter, made 866
visits to troop areas and made contact with 1,332 individuals. The
Chaplain visited 25 men in hospitals.

(5) The 7/17th Cav is supporting the TAM Catholic Orphanage.
Support is also being given to missionaries in the HAIKU area by way
of designated offerings and supplies.

(6) The 7/17th is also giving assistance to the Christian and
Missionary Alliance Leprosarium.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
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(7) Because of reduced number of chaplains in-country, the
7/17th Chaplain was assigned TDY to the 268th Aviation Battalion during
the last three weeks of June. In the absence of a chaplain for the
52nd Aviation Battalion the 7/17th Chaplain is also acting as Post Chaplain
for Camp Holloway.

m. (U) Medical Section:

(1) The medical section of this squadron consists of a flight
surgeon, a section sergeant, and fifteen medics. There are two medics
with each aero-rifle platoon, one with each of the three platoons in
D Troop, and one with the S-5 Team. With the exception of C Troop, all
personnel receive their primary medical support from the Camp HOLLOWAY
Dispensary. The dispensary is jointly run by the Flight Surgeons and
medics of the 52nd Avn Bn (Cbt), and the 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav. C Troop
receives its primary medical support from the 4th Aviation Dispensary of
the 4th Infantry Division at Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE.

(2) At Camp HOLLOWAY, the dispensary receives laboratory and
X-ray support from the 71st Evacuation Hospital. Medical supplies are
obtained from the 2/32nd Medical Depot in QUI HNON, and thru the 52nd
Aviation Bn (Cbt).

(3) Medical Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Previous QTR</th>
<th>REPT QTR</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Patient Visits</td>
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<td>1519</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immunizations</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
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<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations
and Recommendations.

a. (U) PERSONNEL: None

b. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

c. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Stereotyping of Air Cavalry Tactics.

(a) Observation: Air Cavalry tactics can become stereotyped
which leads to unfavorable situations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(b) Evaluation: It is easy for an air cavalry unit to become stereotyped in its missions. When working the same areas of operation this can lead to a dangerous situation. The enemy can recognize units, and it is not too difficult for the enemy to set up anti-aircraft weapons against the unit that does not vary its tactics.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that air cavalry units employ a variety of techniques to keep the enemy off balance. The unit that employs a variety of tactics will lose fewer aircraft and be much more successful in the accomplishment of its mission.

(d) Command Action: Each troop is to conduct an informal meeting whenever it is felt necessary to discuss a change in tactics. This type of meeting has led to a variety of tactics which have helped to break the stereotyping of air cavalry tactics and has kept the enemy off balance.

(2) Use of Scouts in the Air Cavalry Mission.

(a) Observation: Light observation helicopters (LOH) are in grave danger when hovering or spending extended periods of time over any one area while conducting visual reconnaissance.

(b) Evaluation: Each troop in the squadron has suffered casualties and aircraft damage in the past as a result of LOH's hovering too long in one area.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that all scout pilots be continually briefed on the hazards of hovering or staying in one place too long while conducting visual reconnaissance.

(d) Command Action: The squadron has made continuous efforts to eliminate this problem through briefings and on the spot corrections.

(3) Use of Tactical Air Support.

(a) Observation: The squadron has been able to achieve excellent results in the destruction of enemy forces and equipment through the proper utilization of tactical air support.

(b) Evaluation: In the past, troops in the squadron have lost many opportunities to bring the full brunt of tactical air support against the enemy due to lengthy briefings conducted over the radio with forward air controllers just arriving on station. Tactical air support was not responsive to the squadron's needs due to a lack of knowledge concerning the squadron's area of operations. This continuously caused a delay in air support responsiveness.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that each air cavalry troop effect coordination with their supported units to obtain a forward air controller to support the troops in their areas of operation. The FAC has available pre-planned air strikes which can be diverted to meet the needs of the air cavalry troop.

(d) Command Action: Coordination has been made with units providing FAC's in the squadron's areas of operations and provisions have been made for forward air controllers to receive a daily briefing of planned air cavalry operations. At these briefings the exchange of radio frequencies are made and the FAC receives all intelligence reports concerning possible lucrative targets in the areas of operation.

(4) Improved Effectiveness of Marking Targets in Densely Wooded Areas.

(a) Observation: Gunships often have trouble determining where to shoot in relation to a mark as well as determining angle of attack.

(b) Evaluation: The point detonating fuze of the 2.75" FFAR severely limits its effectiveness in dense terrain because of height of foliage around the target. The smoke from the white phosphorous or smoke grenade often drifts long distances prior to coming through the upper canopy. This causes the gunships difficulty in determining where to shoot in relation to the mark and what angle of attack would be most effective as far as reaching the ground.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that the scout elements give an approximate tree height as well as density of trees.

(d) Command Action: The aero-scouts and aero-weapons platoon crews have been briefed on this procedure. This procedure has improved the rocket accuracy and damage to enemy positions.

(5) Vehicular Movement Through Restricted Terrain.

(a) Observation: Recently, platoons moving through terrain severely restricted by vegetation have been ambushed by enemy elements up to 50 meters off the road or trail. These ambushes have been well concealed and camouflaged, and detection has been impossible beyond five meters.

(b) Evaluation: When movement is limited to one road or trail, and visibility is restricted by close vegetation, the organic infantry squad of the cavalry platoon is insufficient to provide adequate flank security for the point element. The infantry squad cannot screen more than 12 to 15 meters from the flanks of the column.
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(c) Recommendation: That sufficient infantry be made
available to the lead platoon in column to sweep both flanks for a
distance of at least 30 meters. This can easily be accomplished by
attaching the infantry squad from the next platoon to the lead platoon.
This gives flank protection not only to the lead platoon but to the
whole column. Column speed is not restricted, because column movement
is restricted to the speed of the point mine sweep team.

(d) Command Action: Personnel of this unit are to be
trained in this method of movement.

(6) Standardized Training for Similar Sections in Each Platoon

(a) Observation: During operations, elements of one platoon
attached to another platoon for tactical reasons have been unable to
work effectively together.

(b) Evaluation: Training conducted by each platoon, while
resulting in some improvement in troop morale and esprit, results in a
loss of flexibility for the troop as a whole. Individuals usually become
proficient in only the favorite tactical maneuver of their squad or
platoon leader.

(c) Recommendations: That training of the individual and
of squads and sections be conducted on a troop rather than a platoon basis.
Classes in tactics, battle drill, and general subjects should be given by
the same instructor to all personnel and their platoon leaders who desire
more intensive training may conduct individual training and methods of
employment.

(d) Command Action: Training in the troop is being conducted
on a standardized basis.

d. (U) ORGANIZATION: None

e. (U) TRAINING: None

f. (U) LOGISTICS: The Establishment of Forward Class III and Class V
Points.

(1) Observation: This squadron has been required to support
ARVN operations at great distances from the Camp HOLLOWAY area. Most
of these operations have been on a single troop support basis and required
the establishment of at least two separate forward staging areas. The
distance from the area of operations to the base camp (Camp HOLLOWAY)
was the determining factor in selection of the forward staging areas
and the means by which the Class III and Class V were transported to the
staging area. If roads were available and secured to a staging area,
truck convoys were used to transport materiel and equipment. If roads

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

are inaccessible or not secured, then the use of CH-47 aircraft was required to transport the Class III and V to the staging area.

(2) Evaluation: Initially, good weather conditions were favorable for the use of CH-47's and good roads were available for truck convoys. With the onset of the monsoon season limitations were placed on the use of CH-47's due to low ceilings, and road conditions slowed down travel time of convoys. Daily mission changes and weather conditions caused delays in getting the required Class III and V forward.

(3) Recommendations: That a limited operational load of Class V be prepositioned at selected fire bases and special forces camps within the current areas of operations. This would allow limited rearming capabilities until the normal operational load reached the forward staging point. JP-4 would be transported forward in a 5000 gallon tanker and 500 gallon collapsible drums would be ready in the base camp waiting to be slung or trucked out to the forward staging area.

(4) Command Action: Limited operational loads have been moved forward to fire support bases for operations conducted from QL 19 to the Cambodian border. One organic 5000 gallon tanker with a 100 gpm pump for backup is sent forward on a daily basis and ready for use upon arrival at the forward staging area.

g. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: None

h. (U) MATERIEL: None

i. (U) MEDICAL: None

j. (U) SAFETY: None
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10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending July 31, RCS C3 FOR-65 (R2) (U).

RUDOLPH I DDaFRANCE
I2C, AR
Commanding

Inclosure 1: Organizational Structure.
Inclosure 2: Major Command and Staff.
Inclosure 3: Unit Strength and Miscellaneous Data.
Inclosure 4: Operational Statistics.
Inclosure 5: Funding.
Inclosure 6: Signal and Message Center Statistics.
Inclosure 7: Aircraft Strength and Availability.
Inclosure 8: Quarterly Accident Summary.

Inclosures 2, 3, 5, and 6 wd, HQ DA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOF-01, APO 96558
2 C3, USARV, ATTN: AVBACB-DST, APO 96375
2 CG, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBACB-D, APO 96381
7 CO, 17th AG (Cbt), ATTN: AVBACB-SC, APO 96240

INFO COPIES:
C3, Headquarters II Military Region
CG, 4th Inf Div, ATTN: AVDDH-GC, APO 96262
1 Each Organic Troop

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, JCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

TO: Department of the Army (JCSFOR, D4), Washington, D.C. 20315
   Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

BILLY W. COUGHLAN
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant

CP:
CO, 7/17th AGS
AVP-00-HIST (10 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROJ, CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.F. 96350 2 SEP 70

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report—Lessons Learned and forwarding endorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ROBERT R. OMN
CPT, AGC
A&1 AG

CF:

1 - CO, 17TH AVN GP (G), (LESS ORLL)
1 - CO, 7TH SQM, 17TH CAV, (LESS ORLL)
AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS POH-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96575

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-U1,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron,
17th Cavalry and concurs with comments of Indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CIP W. Stevens Jr.
Cop: KG
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fnr: I FFORCEY
7th Squadron, 17th Cav
GPOP-D1 (10 Aug 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 33° TP 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
ZLT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH OF SUBORDINATE UNITS AS OF 31 JULY 1970 (C)

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T, and is equipped with 5 UH-LH Helicopters.

2. Troop A, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LCH, and 6 UH-LH Helicopters. The 566th TC Detachment and the 236th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

3. Troop B, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LCH, and 6 UH-LH Helicopters. The 569th TC Detachment and the 236th Signal Detachment provide direct maintenance and avionics support.

4. Troop C, Camp HOXCLIFF, AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LCH, and 5 UH-LH Helicopters. The 112th TC Detachment and the 236th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.

5. Troop D, Camp HOLLOWAY, is a standard wheel vehicle mounted ground control troop organized in accordance with MTOE 17-97T.

6. See Page 2 of this inclosure for organizational charts.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS FOR 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Signal Detachment
per Air Cavalry Troop

HEADQUARTERS

OFF 23
WO 7
EM 181

AIR CAVALRY

OFF 19
WO 32
EM 180

CAVALARY

OFF 0
WO 0
EM 127

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP

TOE 17-93T

OFF 23
WO 7
EM 181

SQUADRON

HEADQUARTERS

TROOP
HQ
SOM
HQ SLC
COMM
PLAT
SUPPORT
PLAT
MAINT
PLAT
AV
PLAT

Inclosure 1

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AIR: CAVALRY TROOP

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Signal Detachment per Air Cavalry Troop

One (1) Transportation Detachment per Troop

TROOP

HEADQUARTERS

AERO

SCOUT

PLATOON

AERO

WEAPONS

PLATOON

AD

REPL.

PLATOON

CAVALRY TROOP

TOE 17-9T

TROOP

HEADQUARTERS

CAVALRY

PLATOONS

PLATOON

HQ

SCOUT

SECTION

ANTI-TANK

SECTION

RIFLE

SECTION

MORTAR

SECTION

Inclosure 1

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# Operational Statistics for the Period

## Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>COMBAT</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>LIFTED</th>
<th>(Tons)</th>
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<th>UNCONF</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>19,431</td>
<td>2057</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,093</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>703</td>
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</table>

**Detainees:**

- 6

**Enemy Material Captured:**

- 1 x SKS Rifle
- 1 x AK-47 Rifle
- 1 x Chi Com Model 56 MG
- 1 x B-10 Rocket Launcher
- 1 x M-16 Magazine
- 1 x Rucksacks
- 10 x lbs of Medical Supplies
- 1 x Sand Bags Full of Rice
- 1 x Rucksack Full of Documents
- 1 x Canteen
- 1 x Pouch

**Enemy Material Destroyed:**

- 20 - 20 Gallon Drums of Fuel
- 8 - Rucksacks
- 3,000 + Lbs of Rice
- 3 - Bridges
- 7 - Bicycles
- 6 - 2½ Ton trucks
- 24 - Boxes of Ammunition
- 1 - Ox Cart

## Ground to Air Fire for the Period

### May 1970 - July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>OH-6A A/C RECV</th>
<th>A/C G/A FIRE</th>
<th>AH-1G A/C RECV</th>
<th>A/C G/A FIRE</th>
<th>UH-1H A/C RECV</th>
<th>A/C G/A FIRE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
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<td>A TROOP</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>C TROOP</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>138</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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---

Enclosure 1

---

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#### Table: Aircraft Loss and Damage

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>UH-1H</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AH-10</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** Two Combat Loss, one Extensive Maintenance, one Combat Damage

**Note 2:** One Crash

**Note 3:** One Crash

**Note 4:** Six Combat Loss, three Extensive Maintenance, one Combat Damage
NOTE 5. One Extensive Maintenance

NOTE 6. Two Combat Loss, two Extensive Maintenance

NOTE 7. Two Crash, one Combat Loss

NOTE 8. One Combat Damage

1. (C) **Flying Hour Statistics for the Period**
   (Based on DA Form 1352)

   a. The average flying hours by type aircraft, by troop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>154</td>
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<td>TROOP B</td>
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<td>163</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>158</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

   b. The average flying hours by type aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. The cumulative flying hours by troop and by type aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-10</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>791</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP A</td>
<td>1417</td>
<td>1677</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>4427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP B</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>3668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP C</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>4589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4535</td>
<td>5446</td>
<td>4234</td>
<td>13185</td>
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5. Units supported and maintenance stand down by number of days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>1st Inf Div</th>
<th>173d Abn Bde</th>
<th>22d Div ARCIN</th>
<th>23d Div ARVN</th>
<th>23d Div Special Forces</th>
<th>TF</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>Maint</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>DEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop C</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop D</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

-Inclusion A-
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

1. (C) Aircraft Strength as of 31 July 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>OH-6A AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>AH-1G AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>AH-1G AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>UH-1H AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>UH-1H AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>TOTAL AUTH/ASG</th>
<th>TOTAL AUTH/ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 8</td>
<td>9 / 9</td>
<td>8 / 8</td>
<td>7 / 5</td>
<td>7 / 5</td>
<td>27 / 25</td>
<td>27 / 25</td>
<td>27 / 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 10</td>
<td>9 / 8</td>
<td>8 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 26</td>
<td>27 / 26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 10</td>
<td>9 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TROOP</td>
<td>10 / 10</td>
<td>2 / 2</td>
<td>8 / 8</td>
<td>27 / 27</td>
<td>27 / 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30 / 28</td>
<td>27 / 26</td>
<td>31 / 29</td>
<td>88 / 83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (U) Average Aircraft Availability by Troop and by Type Aircraft
1 May - 31 July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ TROOP</td>
<td>85% OR</td>
<td>79% OR</td>
<td>82% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11% NORM</td>
<td>11% NORM</td>
<td>9% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2% NORS</td>
<td>9% NORM</td>
<td>9% NORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A TROOP</td>
<td>78% OR</td>
<td>79% OR</td>
<td>82% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>9% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12% NORS</td>
<td>11% NORS</td>
<td>9% NORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B TROOP</td>
<td>85% OR</td>
<td>70% OR</td>
<td>89% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% NORM</td>
<td>22% NORM</td>
<td>8% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% NORS</td>
<td>8% NORS</td>
<td>3% NORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C TROOP</td>
<td>69% OR</td>
<td>76% OR</td>
<td>77% OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21% NORM</td>
<td>21% NORM</td>
<td>22% NORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7% NORS</td>
<td>2% NORS</td>
<td>1% NORS</td>
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</table>
SAFETY STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD (Based on OPEP-5 Flying Hours)

1. (U) 1 May 70 - 31 July 70.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>2516</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>3556</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>2516</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>175.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>13519</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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</table>

2. May 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>142.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>C Troop</td>
<td>2516</td>
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<td>80.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>4589</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75.0</td>
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3. June 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td>274</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
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<td>81.5</td>
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<td>7/17th</td>
<td>4589</td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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</table>

4. July 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TROOP</th>
<th>HOURS FLOW</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Troop</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop</td>
<td>1384</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/17th</td>
<td>4014</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclusion 0
(U) ACCIDENT SUMMARIES BY MONTH

1. May: Three accidents:

   a. On 3 May 70, Troop C, AH-10 Sn 68-15179, Pilot CPT Vester. The aircraft had an engine failure. An autorotation was performed resulting in a hard landing with major damage to the aircraft. Both the pilot and the co-pilot suffered back injuries and abrasions. Engine analysis to determine the cause of the engine failure is not yet complete.

   b. On 10 May 70, Troop A, AH-10 Sn 68-15006, Pilot CW2 Stephanski. On takeoff from the Christmas Tree Heliport there was a tail rotor failure and then separation of the 90 degree gear box. Because of the resulting loss of anti-torque control and the forward shift of the center of gravity the aircraft crashed. The cause of the tail rotor failure and subsequent separation of the 90 degree gear box has not been determined. Complete analysis of the tail rotor assembly is still in progress. Both pilot and co-pilot were seriously injured and evacuated to COMUS.

   c. On 23 May 70, Troop A, UH-1H Sn 69-15115, pilot CPT Blake. In an effort to avoid wires across the takeoff path collective pitch was reduced rapidly. The aircraft rolled on its side after impact with the ground resulting in damage to the main rotor blades and separation of the tailboom aft of the synchronized elevator. The Crewchief was fatally injured in the crash but the other crew members suffered only minor injuries.

2. June: Two accidents:

   a. On 23 June 70, Troop C, UH-1H Sn 67-17266, Pilot WO1 Yetmar. The aircraft had an engine failure in cruise flight. A downward autorotative landing was performed resulting in a hard landing and major damage. Although there was a full crew and five passengers aboard, no one was injured. The cause of the engine failure is unknown pending completion of teardown analysis of the engine.

   b. On 24 June 70, Troop A, OH-6A Sn 69-15961, Pilot WO1 Dalby. The aircraft had an engine failure. An autorotative landing was performed into a rice paddy, with no injuries. Originally classified as an incident, subsequent inspection revealed that depot level resources would be needed to repair structural damage. Investigation of the accident showed that the main fuel line had been disconnected and not reconnected prior to flight. The aircraft was able to start and fly using overflow fuel. The engine failed due to fuel starvation. An E I R has been submitted for a modification of the fuel inlet valve to prevent an engine start if the fuel line is disconnected.

### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970.**

**CO, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DATE</th>
<th>10 August 1970</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>PROJECT NO</td>
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</table>

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C.