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AD NUMBER

AD513243

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

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TO:
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:
Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

GDS, DoD 5200.1-R; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (5 Jan 71)

FOR OT UT 703099

11 January 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96194

AVEACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FCR-65 (R2) (U).

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities:

a. (C) General:

(1) This report covers the period from 1 May 1970, through 31 July 1970, and is submitted in accordance with AR 525-15, USARV Regulation 525-15, and 17th Aviation Group (Combat) Regulation 525-15.

(2) Missions: To perform reconnaissance, surveillance and security for Free World Forces in the II Military Region. To engage in combat as an economy of force unit and provide limited anti-tank defense. One element of the units may be placed in support of a major ground unit.

(3) Organization Structure: The Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry is located at Camp HOLLOWAY (AR 870465), TLEIKU, Republic of Vietnam, and is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph B. DeFrance. Troop A, B, and D are collocated with Squadron Headquarters and Troop C is stationed at Camp RADCLIFF (BR 170180), AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam. The Squadron has its full complement of cavalry troops as per MTOE 17-95T. (See Inclosure 1 for a list of subordinate units reflecting the organizational structure).

Tactical Postures: At the beginning of this reporting period Troops A, B and D were under operational control of the Fourth Infantry Division. Troop C was in direct support of the ARVN II Military Region. Additional changes in the tactical posture of the Squadron occurred during this reporting period. Troop A was deployed from 19 May to 5 June 1970 in support of the 23rd Division (ARVN) operating in MONDOL KERI Province, Cambodia to the West of Ban Me Thuot and returned to Camp HOLLOWAY on 5 June 1970. On the 31st of June 1970 Troop A was placed in direct support of II Military Region, Troop B was placed in direct support of the 4th Infantry Division, Troop C was placed in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Troop D remained under Squadron control.

b. (C) Personnel:

(1) During the reporting period, the following major changes in command and staff occurred:

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1

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AVRACB-OC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(a) MAJ Walter W. Wolfe 465-46-1097 assumed duties as Squadron Executive Officer on 9 July 1970, replacing MAJ Ronald G. Maxson 537-44-6346.

(b) CPT Clyde A. Hennis 526-50-4866 assumed command of C Troop on 11 June 1970, replacing MAJ James S. Hahn 316-36-6528.

(c) CPT Michael F. Fisher 537-80-6570 assumed duties as Squadron Safety Officer on 2 May 1970, replacing CPT James F. Roberts 320-34-7787.

(d) CPT Arthur H. Thomas 431-84-1766 assumed duties as Squadron Surgeon on 6 June 1970, replacing CPT Joseph P. Chollack, Jr. 201-32-2170.

(e) WO1 Ernest P. Igublanovits 265-92-8148 assumed duties as Squadron S-5 on 24 May 1970, replacing WO1 Roy H. Majors 262-86-0193.

(f) CSM Leonard E. Cruse 263-60-4372 assumed duties as Command Sergeant Major on 4 July 1970, replacing CSM Perry Armes, Jr. 407-24-6535.

(2) Unit Strength and miscellaneous related data is attached as Inclosure 3.

c. (C) Intelligence:

(1) During the reporting period, the S-2 Section activities included:

SECRET Clearances Validated - 78
SECRET Clearances Granted - 5
SECRET Clearances Initiated - 10
TOP SECRET Clearances Validated - 6
TOP SECRET Clearances Initiated - 2
Security Debriefings - 104
Escape and Evasion Debriefings - 0

(2) Intelligence Summary for the Squadron's tactical area of interest is as follows:

(a) KONTUM Province: Enemy activity in KONTUM Province during the month of May was maintained at a fairly high level. There were no sustained stand off attacks or major ground contacts during this period, however sporadic stand off attacks were conducted against the DAK PEK, DAK SEANG, and BEN HET Special Forces Camps. The enemy employed 75mm recoilless rifle, B-40 rocket, and 82mm mortar fire during the attacks on the Special Forces Camps. Frequent small ground contacts were also initiated during this period. On 16 May the 64th PF Platoon in KON HONONG Village, approximately nine kilometers Southeast of TANH CANH received a 20 round 82mm mortar stand off attack and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. Documents captured during the attack identified the C-3 Company/304th Local Force Battalion. Intelligence reports indicated there would be an increase in

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2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1970

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).**

attacks against small RF/PF units. During the rest of the month of May, enemy activities remained at a high level, however marked decrease in enemy activity was noted by the middle of June. At this time the enemy initiated contacts dropped to a low level. The only significant enemy contact was an attack by fire against the 12nd ARVN Regimental Headquarters on 25 June. At that time agent reports indicated that enemy forces would concentrate their activities against ARVN and RF/PF units. The enemy intent was to reduce civilian confidence in the Government of Vietnam ability to protect itself and the population at large.

(b) PLEIKU Province: Enemy activity in the early days of the month of May was at a moderate level. The primary areas of enemy activity were LE TRUNG District Headquarters located 15 kilometers East of PLEIKU CITY, Camp HOLLOWAY located 3 kilometers East of PLEIKU CITY, and the DUC CO Special Forces Camp. LE TRUNG District Headquarters was subject to stand off attacks from 16 to 19 May. On the 17th of May, the compound received 11 rounds of 107mm rockets followed by a small unsuccessful ground probe. Camp Holloway and the II Military Region Headquarters were the targets of attacks by fire from 17 to 23 May. The enemy employed 122mm rockets during the attacks by fire. Highway 19 between PLEIKU CITY and the Special Forces Camp at DUC CO was also targets by the enemy during this period. On the 21st of May a truck convoy received small arms and B-40 rocket fire destroying three trucks and damaging two 5000 gallon fuel tankers. During the month of June the enemy began to increase terrorist activities in the small hamlets in PLEIKU Province. On the morning of 4 June, there were four terrorist incidents resulting in three abductions. Six civilians were abducted, and in the fourth incident 25 houses were burned by an unknown size unit. On the 12th of June the 14th RF Company received 13 rounds of 60mm mortar fire wounding 12 personnel. Enemy units in PLEIKU Province began to conduct harassment attacks against ARVN and RF/PF units. As in KONUM Province, the enemy harassment attacks were planned to reduce the confidence of the people in the Government of Vietnam's ability to protect itself. Rocket attacks on targets in the PLEIKU Area have stopped, and there has been a significant decrease in attacks by fire employing mortars.

(c) BINH DINH Province: During the month of May activity in BINH DINH Province decreased slightly, with ground attacks and attacks by fire being the predominant type of incidents. On 20 May KHANH LE Hamlet received small arms, B-40 rockets, and mortar fire. On 18 May, the 49th and 992nd RF Companies and MAT Team 2/45th received approximately 75 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar fire. Attacks were intense and were designed to economize forces and maintain maximum pressure on Free World Forces. The strategy continued into early June. On the night of 4 June, a partially

CONFIDENTIAL

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AV:ACB-CC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS AAR-05 (R2) (U).

successful sapper attack was launched against QUI NIKON Tank Farm #2. During late June enemy activity increased slightly and included terrorist attacks aimed at disrupting Government elections. On 22 June, a terrorist attack against a pre-election meeting killed 2 Government officials and wounded 13 civilians. During the first week of July, there was a marked increase in terrorist activity with the purpose of undermining the people's confidence in the Government's ability to protect them and to disrupt pacification and development programs. At the same time infiltration into western BINH BINH Province by elements of the 3rd NVA Division has been increasing. These enemy forces have so far been avoiding contacts with Free World Forces.

(d) CAMBODIA: Enemy activity in CAMBODIA was characterized by defensive reaction of enemy forces to the Free World Forces' BINH TAY operations. Enemy activity consisted of efforts to remove operational facilities and critical logistical supplies. Enemy defensive operations consisted of the employment of anti-aircraft fire designed to deny Free World Forces access to enemy base areas. Operation BINH TAY I encountered the greatest enemy resistance with sporadic but intense contacts. Aircraft supporting Operation BINH TAY I received frequent and intense ground to air fire in the area of operations. Major logistical caches discovered in the area of Operation BINH TAY I included 600 tons of rice, 32,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 3,570 mortar and rocket rounds. Free World Forces in Operation BINH TAY II met little resistance except in the vicinity of major caches, which were fewer than those found in Operation BINH TAY I. Only small unit contacts were made, and caches found were small and well dispersed. The enemy avoided significant contacts during Operation BINH TAY III and caches discovered were again small and dispersed. Material captured included 133 crew served weapons, 20 tons of ammunition, and 412 tons of rice. Operation BINH TAY IV facilitated the evacuation of Cambodian Military personnel, their dependents, and other civilian refugees from the LABANG SIEK/BA KEV area of CAMBODIA. There was very little enemy contact made during this operation.

(1) Quarterly Operations by Troop:

(a) Troop A during this reporting period operated in support of the 14th Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA West of DUC CO, the 24th STZ (Now 22d Div Forward) in the DAK TO, BEN HET, and DAK SEANG area, and the II Military Region Northeast and Southwest of the PLEIKU TAOR. During the month of May, Troop A operations in support of US and ARVN forces were directed against enemy base areas 701, 702, and 740. At the beginning of the reporting period Troop A was in support of Task Force PURSUIT with no significant activities. Beginning 6 May, Troop A supported the 14th Infantry Division for two days in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA to the West of PLEI DJERENG. Operations were characterized by the discovery of large bunker and living structure complexes with light enemy contacts in the vicinity of the complexes. On 8 May the Troop began support of the 22d ARVN Division operating in Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA to the West of DUC CO. Several structures and 2 tons of rice were destroyed during the three days with the 22d ARVN Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1970

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).**

Light enemy contact was made with 4 NVA KIA. From 12 May to 17 May the Troop supported the 4th Infantry Division continuing its operation in CAMBODIA. The significant finding during that operation was an airfield with a PQL storage area. The remainder of the operation was characterized by light enemy contacts typified by sporadic ground to air fire by small enemy elements. On 19 May Troop A was deployed to BAN ME THOUT to support the 23rd ARVN Division conducting Operation BINH TAY III in MONDOL KIRI Province, CAMBODIA. The move to BAN ME THOUT was made without incident on 19 May and operations began on 20 May. The most significant activity for the remainder of the month was the destruction of several enemy $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks. On 5 June Troop A was released from support of Operation BINH TAY III and returned to Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop A was in direct support of II Military Region from 5 June to 23 June and was employed in the DAK TO, BEN ME area and to the South of DUC CO. No major operations were conducted by the Troop within this period of time. On 24 June the Troop assumed the mission of screening for the 22nd ARVN Division's Operation BINH TAY IV in CAMBODIA. The objective of this operation was to evacuate approximately 12,000 CAMBODIAN military personnel and their dependents, with all of their equipment and personal belongings, from the towns of BA KEV and LABANG SIEK. Light contact with the enemy was made but with no significant effect on the primary mission of evacuation successfully completed. During the remainder of the month of June the Troop supported II Military Region to the North of KONTUM and in the PLEIKU TAOR with few significant activities and light enemy contact. Throughout the month of July Troop A continued to support the II Military Region and Company B 5th Special Forces Group. Operations were significantly restricted during the first half of the month due to the monsoon weather. Significant operations for July began on the 21st of July to the Northeast of the PLEIKU TAOR. Troop A initiated contact with elements of an enemy sapper battalion on 21 July. The next day a large number of enemy soldiers were spotted by the Aero-Scouts and the area was immediately taken under fire. Continuous gunship, artillery, and Tactical Air firepower was employed until the next day. It is felt that a large portion of the enemy unit was killed, but because of the effects of the massive firepower employed it was impossible to ascertain the extent of enemy losses. On 30 July the troop again made contact with an enemy unit, this time to the South of PLEIKU. By the use of massive firepower from gunships and Tactical Air strikes, within a period of six hours the Troop killed, or was responsible for the death of, 44 NVA. At the end of the reporting period Troop A continued to support the II Military Region.

(b) During this reporting period Troop B supported the II Military Region in the vicinity of DAK TO, DAK SEANG, and DUC CO. Troop B supported the 4th Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA, and in the AN KHE area. Troop B also supported II Military Region in the PLEIKU area. During the period from 1 May to 4 May, Troop B operated Southwest of DAK TO with little enemy contact. Troop B next supported the 4th Infantry Division from 5 May to 16 May in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA. In the initial assault of

CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, 1969 ON FORM-65 (R) (7).

NVA sanctuaries in CAMBODIA, the Troop was given the mission of selecting Landing Zones for the airmail resupply of Five World Forces into CAMBODIA and then to screen for the airmail landing. The Troop located and destroyed, through the use of gunships and Tactical air strikes, numerous bunker and structure complexes used to cache weapons and supplies. Throughout the operation intense ground to air fire was encountered but no aircraft were seriously damaged. On the 17th and 18th of May the Troop worked in the PLEIKU TAOR with no significant findings. From 19 May to 26 May, Troop B supported the 22d ARVN Division in Operation BINH TAY II as it conducted a search of Base Area 702 in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA to the West of BUC TO. Large bunker complexes were located by the Troop and destroyed by the use of Tactical air strikes. Enemy contact was light throughout the operation. Tactical air support during Operation BINH TAY II was outstanding. On several occasions bombs were delivered on target within 15 minutes of request. This can be attributed to LTC Hyland, Senior Forward Air Controller supporting the 22d ARVN Division. His personal interest in Air Cavalry operations and his rapport with the Troop was phenomenal. Troop B operated in the PLEIKU TAOR in support of the II Military Region from the 27th of May to the 31st of May. Operations were contained in the Northeast portion of the TAOR and resulted in one enemy KIA and one Detainee. Troop B next supported the 22d ARVN Division to the South of DAK TO from the 1st of June to the 31st of June. The operation was characterized by light enemy contact with the location and destruction of large bunker complexes through the employment of Tactical air strikes. Beginning 6 June, Troop B supported the 1st Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division in Operation Wayne Hurdle to the South of FSB Blackhawk. Light enemy contact typified the operation. Numerous new bunker and structure complexes were found and destroyed by the Aero-Scouts and gunships. Troop B terminated support of Operation Wayne Hurdle on the 23d of June. On 24 June the Troop supported the 2/3d Infantry (Mech) in operation BINH TAY IV with the mission of maintaining road security along the route to be utilized in the evacuation of CAMBODIAN military personnel and their dependents. The operation was completed without incident on the 27th of June. During the period 28 June through 30 July the Troop supported the 4th Infantry Division to the North of AN KHE and along the SONG BA River Valley to the Southwest of AN KHE. The only significant contact during that period was on 24 July. The Aero-Scouts discovered a large enemy force Northwest of AN KHE. The enemy was engaged with all available fire support to include Aero-Scouts, Cobra gunships, Artillery, and Tactical air strikes, resulting in 39 enemy killed. On 31 July Troop B supported the 47th ARVN Regiment to the South of PLEIKU. Flying was greatly restricted during the month of July because of monsoon weather. Low ceilings and low visibility caused delays in take off and a greatly reduced capability to operate in the Area of Operations. During this reporting period Troop B reported numerous bunker and structure complexes located and destroyed. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted seven times during the reporting period to develop the situation or to secure downed aircraft. Troop B reported 15 enemy killed and eight enemy probably killed between 1st and 31st of July.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVAPCE-OC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65, (R2) (U).

(c) Troop C during this reporting period supported TASK FORCE PURSUIT Southwest of AN KHE, the 4th Infantry Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA and in the vicinity of AN KHE, the 22nd ARVN Division in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA, and in the BEN HET, DAK SEANG area. Troop C also supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the LZ English area. Beginning 1 May through 3 May, the troop supported TASK FORCE PURSUIT to the Southwest of AN KHE with no significant activities. On 4 May, the troop supported the 22nd ARVN Division in the Rocket Ridge area to the Southwest of DAK TO with little activity. Beginning 5 May through 7 May the troop operated in RATANKIRI Province, CAMBODIA in support of the 22nd ARVN Division's Operation BINH TAY II with the mission of assisting Free World Forces in their assault on NVA base areas within CAMBODIA. Numerous large bunker complexes were located in Base Area 701. Intense ground to air fire was received throughout the Area of Operations resulting in one LOH being downed by enemy fire. Several sets of tracks made by heavy tracked vehicles were spotted by the troop. Indications were that the vehicles had moved to the South, however, no tracked vehicles were sighted. Troop C supported the 4th Infantry Division in Base Area 702 in Eastern CAMBODIA from 8 May through 12 May. On 9 May the troop located two M-3 scout cars and a dump truck that had been destroyed by an air strike. Numerous large bunker complexes were located and destroyed by the employment of gunships, Artillery, and Tactical air strikes. Ground to air fire in the area was intense throughout the operation. Beginning 13 May through 25 May, the troop supported the 22nd ARVN Division to the West of DUC CO in CAMBODIA. The troop continued to locate bunker complexes and caches of enemy supplies. Ground to air fire continued to be intense. Troop C supported the 22nd ARVN Division in the BEN HET and DAK TO area from 29 May to 31 May. On 31 May one of the troops aircraft received what was believed to be 37mm anti-aircraft fire. The Cobra gunships were employed against the suspected enemy location and observed several secondary explosions. When a tactical air strike was employed on the suspected enemy location four more secondary explosions were observed. Beginning 1 June through 3 June, Troop C worked for the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to the South of Fire Support Base BLACK HAWK. The troop was credited with one enemy KIA on 2 May. Troop C supported the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the vicinity of LZ English from 5 June through 23 June. Activities throughout the area were characterized by moderate enemy contact. Ground to air fire was sporadically intense. Numerous caves and bunkers were destroyed by the troop utilizing combined arms firepower. The troop was credited with 24 enemy KIA during this period. Troop C supported the 4th Infantry Division to the North of AN KHE from 24 June through 28 June and was credited with one enemy KIA. Troop C returned to the LZ ENGLISH area to work in direct support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade from 29 June through 31 July. Operations were limited primarily to the detection and destruction of bunker and structure complexes. The entire Area of Operations had numerous indications of large enemy troop movements but enemy contact was light and characterized

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVEACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

by the engagement of small groups of enemy soldiers. During this reporting period the troop was credited with 49 enemy KIA'S and 1 detainee. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was inserted 14 times to develop the situation and secure downed aircraft.

(d) Troop D, during this reporting period, operated in support of the 4th Infantry Division at PLEI DJERENG, II Military Region to the West of PLEIKU TAOR, and was on standby as a ready reaction force for the Squadron. At the beginning of the period, Troop D conducted a search and destroy operation to the West of PLEIKU. On 6 May, two platoons of D Troop conducted a road march to PLEI DJERENG to assist the 4th Infantry Division in the security of PLEI DJERENG Airfield. This operation lasted until 16 May at which time D Troop returned to Camp HOLLOWAY. Troop D conducted unit training on individual and crew served weapons while providing convoy escorts to DUC CO, Fire Support Base OASIS, and Fire Support Base BLACKHAWK. One platoon from D Troop provided convoy escort and perimeter security for A Troop's move to BAN ME THOAT. On 5 July, while D Troop was conducting a search and destroy operation to the West of PLEIKU, they sustained 1 U.S. KIA and 2 US WIA from an enemy command detonated mine. A continued sweep of the area produced no more significant activity. At the end of the reporting period, D Troop was continuing to provide convoy escorts and a ready reaction force for the Squadron.

(e) (U) Organization: No change since last ORLL.

(f) (U) Trainings:

(1) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School Program: The maintenance program of the Squadron was greatly enhanced as a result of refresher training provided by these courses. (See Inclosure 5).

(2) Aviation Training: (See Inclosure 5).

(3) Special Training: Both A Troop and B Troop Aero-Rifle Platoon personnel conducted classes at KOYTUM for the training of ARVN Scout personnel from the 22d ARVN Division as Aero-Rifle Platoons. This training included an orientation on Air Cavalry Operations with special emphasis on rappelling training.

(4) The Squadron engaged in training a total of 92 days during the Quarter. (See Inclosure 5).

(g) (C) Logistics:

(1) Supplies:

(a) Class I - A Troop, B Troop, and D Troop drew rations from the 88th S & S Battalion, PLEIKU, RVN. C Troop drew rations from

CONFIDENTIAL

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AFR-03-C C

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

the 4th Infantry Division at AN KHE, RVN. D Troop operates a consolidated field ration mess for D Troop and Headquarters and Headquarters Troop.

(b) Class II - Supplies were requisitioned from the 83th S & S Battalion.

(c) Class III - Package POL products were requisitioned through the 83rd S & S Battalion and issued by S-4 to the troops. Dies I and JP-8 were requisitioned through 573rd S & S CO, FLEIKU, RVN. Forward refueling sites were established on a mission basis at DUC CO, BLACKHAWK, PHU NHON and OASIS.

(d) Class IV - Construction material was acquired through local contractor by Troop Commanders.

(e) Class V - Ammunition was requisitioned from Ammunition Supply points FLEIKU, 4th Infantry Division (AN KHE) and OUI NHON. Effective 25 June 70 ammunition drawn in the FLEIKU area came under the control of the ARVN ASP, FLEIKU. Ammunition was positioned forward at LZ TWO BITES, LZ ENGLISH, KONTUM, PHU NHON, DUC CO, OASIS, BLACKHAWK, and APMAGEDDCH in support of operations. A Troop and B Troop operated a rearming point at CAMP HOLLOWAY.

(f) Class VII - Major items, loss aircraft and armament, were requisitioned from the 88th S & S Battalion.

(g) Class VIII - Medical material was requested thru the 71st Evacuation Hospital, FLEIKU, RVN.

(2) Requisitions submitted during 1 May thru 31 Aug 1970:

Non-expendable - 199

Completed - 28

Cancelled - 87

Turn-In - 146

(3) A reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions is made with the 83th S & S Battalion each quarter.

(4) Reports of Surveys Submitted - 8

(5) Combat losses Submitted - 31

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVRACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(h) (u) **Communications: Signal and Message Center Operations**

(1) **General:** Having completed the construction of the new Communications Center at Camp Holloway early in the quarter; operations during this quarter have been relatively stabilized. On 3 May 1970 a land line was installed, and the 7/17th Air Cavalry Squadron Communications Center resumed responsibility for transmission and reception of electrical messages from and to 17th Aviation Group (Combat). The 43rd Signal Battalion maintained responsibility for traffic on the World Wide Net.

(2) On 5 May 1970, the AN/GRC-106 and two operators returned from their forward position at Tan Canh. During the period 19 May 1970 through 4 June 1970, A Troop maintained a forward AN/GRC-2 at Ban Me Thuot, to provide radio teletype communications with their operations. The Squadron Communications Platoon operated the AN/GRC-142 in Ban Me Thuot during this time, maintaining radio teletype communications with the Squadron Headquarters as a back-up system. On 25 June 1970 three men with an AN/GRC-106 mounted on a 1/2 ton truck were dispatched to DAC CO from the Squadron Communications Platoon to assist in setting up and operating a navigational beacon for A Troop and to report on its operations. They returned to Camp HOLLOWAY on 28 June 70.

(3) **Operational Statistics:** (See Inclosure 6).

(i) (U) **Materials**

(1) Aircraft maintenance support is provided to the Squadron by the 604th Direct Support unit as indicated below:

<u>Unit/Location</u>	<u>DSU/Location</u>
HHT, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU
A Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU
B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU
C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE	604th DSU, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU

(2) Vehicle maintenance support is provided by direct support units as indicated below:

<u>Unit/Location</u>	<u>DSU/Location</u>
HHT, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU
A Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU
B Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU
C Troop, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE	5th Maint Bn, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE
D Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU	62d Maint Bn, Camp WILSON, PLEIKU

(3) When A Troop was located at BAN ME THUOT, a portion of the units maintenance element was located with the troop to perform unscheduled

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVSACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

maintenance and light combat damage repairs. All heavy maintenance was accomplished at Camp HOLLOWAY.

(4) Statistics on aircraft strength and availability are included in Inclosure 7.

J. (U) Civil Affairs

(1) General: Major areas of S-5 activity during the last quarter were education, sanitation, recreation, sponsoring of social events, and sponsoring the Catholic Orphanage of TU TAM.

(2) Operation and Training Activities:

(a) PLEI POO NGO (AR830366): During the 2nd Quarter, the Civil Affairs team gave instruction in the building of bunkers and other fortifications and the setting up of their perimeter.

(b) LA SON (AR817376): During the past Quarter, the Civil Affairs team helped to repair one mile of road that runs through the village.

(c) TU TAM Orphanage: The S-5 team in conjunction with D Troop is helping to support the orphanage of TU TAM.

1. Supplying edible garbage for the live stock.

2. Presenting additional clothing, food, and toys for the children.

3. Organizing a picnic for the children at BIEN HOA LAKE.

(3) Logistics: The Civil Affairs Team received support from LE TRONG District, The Squadron Chaplain, D Troop, PLEIKU Air Base S-5, personal resources of team members, PLEIKU Hospital, and the 71st Medical Evacuation Hospital.

(4) Civil Affairs Projects:

(a) Sanitation:

1. The S-5 team supplied soap for the Montagnard villagers.

2. A general clean-up project was conducted in PLEI POO NGO.

(b) Recreation: The S-5 team conducted ten hours of organ-

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AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

ized sports for the children of both villages.

(c) Social Events: One picnic to BIEN HOA LAKE was sponsored for the children in the orphanage of TU TAM.

(d) Psychological Operations: During the past Quarter, many reports of NVA troops and areas of concentration were received by the S-5 team from the Montagnards. One NVA mine was found that was intended for use against the S-5 team but was noticed by some Vietnamese civilians and reported to the S-5 team. The villagers in both PLET POC NGO and LA SON are most cooperative.

(e) Transportation: The S-5 team provided transportation for the people of both villages to medical facilities, market, and school.

(f) Miscellaneous: The team distributed 10,000 lbs. of food.

k. (U) Accident Prevention:

(1) The accident rate per 100,000 flying hours was 35.00 for this Quarter. The previous reporting period was 32.00.

(2) Accident rate statistics and accident summaries are attached as inclosure 8.

1. (U) Religious Functions:

(1) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the Quarter, conducted a total of 11 Sunday and 17 weekday Protestant services, with a total attendance of 1289.

(2) Catholic Mass was conducted 13 times with a total attendance of 756.

(3) Religious services were conducted at Camp HOLLONAY, AN KHE, PHU HIEP, and AN SON.

(4) The 7/17th Cav Chaplain, during the Quarter, made 846 visits to troop areas and made contact with 1,332 individuals. The Chaplain visited 25 men in hospitals.

(5) The 7/17th Cav is supporting the T TAM Catholic Orphanage. Support is also being given to missionaries in the HEIKU area by way of designated offerings and supplies.

(6) The 7/17th is also giving assistance to the Christian and Missionary Alliance Leprosarium.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(7) Because of reduced number of chaplains in-country, the 7/17th Chaplain was assigned TDY to the 268th Aviation Battalion during the last three weeks of June. In the absence of a chaplain for the 52nd Aviation Battalion the 7/17th Chaplain is also acting as Post Chaplain for Camp Holloway.

m. (U) Medical Section:

(1) The medical section of this squadron consists of a flight surgeon, a section sergeant, and fifteen medics. There are two medics with each aero-rifle platoon, one with each of the three platoons in D Troop, and one with the S-5 Team. With the exception of C Troop, all personnel receive their primary medical support from the Camp HOLLOWAY Dispensary. The dispensary is jointly run by the Flight Surgeons and medics of the 52nd Avn Bn (Cbt), and the 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav. C Troop receives its primary medical support from the 4th Aviation Dispensary of the 4th Infantry Division at Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE.

(2) At Camp HOLLOWAY, the dispensary receives laboratory and X-ray support from the 71st Evacuation Hospital. Medical supplies are obtained from the 2/32nd Medical Depot in QUI HNON, and thru the 52nd Aviation Bn (Cbt)

(3) Medical Statistics:

	<u>Previous QTR</u>	<u>REPT QTR</u>
Patient Visits	863	1519
Immunizations	900	894
Venereal Disease	54	58
Malaria	3	5
Diarrhea	12	7
Hepatitis	0	0

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

- a. (U) PERSONNEL: None
- b. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None
- c. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Stereotyping of Air Cavalry Tactics.

(a) Observation: Air Cavalry tactics can become stereotyped which leads to unfavorable situations.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(b) Evaluation: It is easy for an air cavalry unit to become stereotyped in its missions. When working the same areas of operation this can lead to a dangerous situation. The enemy can recognize units, and it is not too difficult for the enemy to set up anti-aircraft weapons against the unit that does not vary its tactics.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that air cavalry units employ a variety of techniques to keep the enemy off balance. The unit that employs a variety of tactics will lose fewer aircraft and be much more successful in the accomplishment of its mission.

(d) Command Action: Each troop is to conduct an informal meeting whenever it is felt necessary to discuss a change in tactics. This type of meeting has led to a variety of tactics which have helped to break the stereotyping of air cavalry tactics and has kept the enemy off balance.

(2) Use of Scouts in the Air Cavalry Mission.

(a) Observation: Light observation helicopters (LOH) are in grave danger when hovering or spending extended periods of time over any one area while conducting visual reconnaissance.

(b) Evaluation: Each troop in the squadron has suffered casualties and aircraft damage in the past as a result of LOH's hovering too long in one area.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that all scout pilots be continually briefed on the hazards of hovering or staying in one place too long while conducting visual reconnaissance.

(d) Command Action: The squadron has made continuous efforts to eliminate this problem through briefings and on the spot corrections.

(3) Use of Tactical Air Support.

(a) Observation: The squadron has been able to achieve excellent results in the destruction of enemy forces and equipment through the proper utilization of tactical air support.

(b) Evaluation: In the past, troops in the squadron have lost many opportunities to bring the full brunt of tactical air support against the enemy due to lengthy briefings conducted over the radio with forward air controllers just arriving on station. Tactical air support was not responsive to the squadron's needs due to a lack of knowledge concerning the squadron's area of operations. This continuously caused a delay in air support responsiveness.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that each air cavalry troop effect coordination with their supported units to obtain a forward air controller to support the troops in their areas of operation. The FAC has available pre-planned air strikes which can be diverted to meet the needs of the air cavalry troop.

(d) Command Action: Coordination has been made with units providing FAC's in the squadron's areas of operations and provisions have been made for forward air controllers to receive a daily briefing of planned air cavalry operations. At these briefings the exchange of radio frequencies are made and the FAC receives all intelligence reports concerning possible lucrative targets in the areas of operation.

(4) Improved Effectiveness of Marking Targets in Densely Wooded Areas.

(a) Observation: Gunships often have trouble determining where to shoot in relation to a mark as well as determining angle of attack.

(b) Evaluation: The point detonating fuze of the 2.75" FFAR severely limits its effectiveness in dense terrain because of height of foliage around the target. The smoke from the white phosphorous or smoke grenade often drifts long distances prior to coming through the upper canopy. This causes the gunships difficulty in determining where to shoot in relation to the mark and what angle of attack would be most effective as far as reaching the ground.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that the scout elements give an approximate tree height as well as density of trees.

(d) Command Action: The aero-scouts and aero-weapons platoon crews have been briefed on this procedure. This procedure has improved the rocket accuracy and damage to enemy positions.

(5) Vehicular Movement Through Restricted Terrain.

(a) Observation: Recently, platoons moving through terrain severely restricted by vegetation have been ambushed by enemy elements up to 50 meters off the road or trail. These ambushes have been well concealed and camouflaged, and detection has been impossible beyond five meters.

(b) Evaluation: When movement is limited to one road or trail, and visibility is restricted by close vegetation, the organic infantry squad of the cavalry platoon is insufficient to provide adequate flank security for the point element. The infantry squad cannot screen more than 12 to 15 meters from the flanks of the column.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65, (R2) (U).

(c) Recommendation: That sufficient infantry be made available to the lead platoon in column to sweep both flanks for a distance of at least 30 meters. This can easily be accomplished by attaching the infantry squad from the next platoon to the lead platoon. This gives flank protection not only to the lead platoon but to the whole column. Column speed is not restricted, because column movement is restricted to the speed of the point mine sweep team.

(d) Command Action: Personnel of this unit are to be trained in this method of movement.

(6) Standardized Training for Similar Sections in Each Platoon

(a) Observation: During operations, elements of one platoon attached to another platoon for tactical reasons have been unable to work effectively together.

(b) Evaluation: Training conducted by each platoon, while resulting in some improvement in troop morale and esprit, results in a loss of flexibility for the troop as a whole. Individuals usually become proficient in only the favorite tactical maneuver of their squad or platoon leader.

(c) Recommendations: That training of the individual and of squads and sections be conducted on a troop rather than a platoon basis. Classes in tactics, battle drill, and general subjects should be given by the same instructor to all personnel and their platoon leaders who desire more intensive training may conduct individual training and methods of employment.

(d) Command Action: Training in the troop is being conducted on a standardized basis.

d. (U) ORGANIZATION: None

e. (U) TRAINING: None

f. (U) LOGISTICS: The Establishment of Forward Class III and Class V Points.

(1) Observation: This squadron has been required to support ARVN operations at great distances from the Camp HOLLOWAY area. Most of these operations have been on a single troop support basis and required the establishment of at least two separate forward staging areas. The distance from the area of operations to the base camp (Camp HOLLOWAY) was the determining factor in selection of the forward staging areas and the means by which the Class III and Class V were transported to the staging area. If roads were available and secured to a staging area, truck convoys were used to transport materiel and equipment. If roads

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBACB-GC

10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

are inaccessible or not secured, then the use of CH-47 aircraft was required to transport the Class III and V to the staging area.

(2) Evaluation: Initially, good weather conditions were favorable for the use of CH-47's and good roads were available for truck convoys. With the onset of the monsoon season limitations were placed on the use of CH-47's due to low ceilings, and road conditions slowed down travel time of convoys. Daily mission changes and weather conditions caused delays in getting the required Class III and V forward.

(3) Recommendations: That a limited operational load of Class V be prepositioned at selected fire bases and special forces camps within the current areas of operations. This would allow limited rearming capabilities until the normal operational load reached the forward staging point. JP-4 would be transported forward in a 5000 gallon tanker and 500 gallon collapsible drums would be ready in the base camp waiting to be slung or trucked out to the forward staging area.

(4) Command Action: Limited operational loads have been moved forward to fire support bases for operations conducted from QL 19 to the Cambodian border. One organic 5000 gallon tanker with a 100 gpm pump for backup is sent forward on a daily basis and ready for use upon arrival at the forward staging area.

- g. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: None
- h. (U) MATERIEL: None
- i. (U) MEDICAL: None
- j. (U) SAFETY: None

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10 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending July 31, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2) (U).

Rudolph B DeFrance
RUDOLPH B DeFRANCE
LTC, AR
Commanding

Inclosure 1: Organizational Structure.
~~Inclosure 2: Major Command and Staff.~~
~~Inclosure 3: Unit Strength and Miscellaneous Data.~~
Inclosure 4: Operational Statistics.
~~Inclosure 5: Training.~~
~~Inclosure 6: Signal and Message Center Statistics.~~
Inclosure 7: Aircraft Strength and Availability.
Inclosure 8: Quarterly Accident Summary.
Incl 2, 3, 5, and 6 wd, HQ DA

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INFO COPIES:

CG, Headquarters II Military Region
CG, 4th Inf Div, ATTN: AVDDH-GC, APO 96262
1 Each Organic Troop

AVB:CB-SC (10 Aug 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron,
17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, ACS CSFOR-65 (R2)
(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 17TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96240 23 August 1970

TO: Department of the Army (ACSPOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20315
Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

(U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached report, considers it
adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


BILLY W. COUGHLAN
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant

CP:
CO, 7/17th ACS

AVFA-GC-HIST (10 Aug 70) 2d Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Squadron,
17th Cavalry, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.F. 96350 , 2 SEP 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and forwarding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT R. OLIN
CPT, AGC
Ass't AG

CF:

- 1 - CO, 17TH AVN GP (C), (LESS ORLL)
- 1 - CO, 7TH SQDN, 17TH CAV, (LESS ORLL)

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
AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Period Ending 31 July, RCS CS FOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 21 000000

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
I FFORCEV
7th Squadron, 17th Cav

GPOP-DI (10 Aug 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 7th Squadron,
17th Cavalry, for Period Ending 31 July 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 SEP 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH OF SUBORDINATE UNITS AS OF 31 JULY 1970 (c)

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Camp HOLLOWAY, PLEIKU, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T, and is equipped with 5 UH-1H Helicopters.
2. Troop A, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LOH, and 8 UH-1H Helicopters. The 568th TC Detachment and the 258th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.
3. Troop B, Camp HOLLOWAY, is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-96T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LOH, and 8 UH-1H Helicopters. The 569th TC Detachment and the 411th Signal Detachment provide direct maintenance and avionics support.
4. Troop C, Camp RADCLIFF, AN KHE, Republic of Vietnam is organized in accordance with MTOE 17-98T and is equipped with 9 AH-1G, 10 LOH, and 8 UH-1H Helicopters. The 412th TC Detachment and the 238th Signal Detachment provide direct support maintenance and avionics support to the troop.
5. Troop D, Camp HOLLOWAY, is a standard wheel vehicle mounted ground cavalry troop organized in accordance with MTOE 17-99T.
6. See Page 2 & 3 of this inclosure for organizational charts.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS FOR 7TH SQUADRON, 17TH CAVALRY


NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Signal Detachment
per Air Cavalry Troop


TOE 17-95T

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

One (1) Transportation
Det. per Air Cavalry
Troop



**HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP
TOE 17-93T**



Inclosure 1

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
AIR CAVALRY TROOP

NORMAL ATTACHMENTS

TOE 17-90T


One (1) Signal Detachment
per Air Cavalry Troop

One (1) Transportation
Detachment per Troop



CAVALRY TROOP

TOE 17-99T



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OPERATIONAL STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD

1. (C) Results:

UNIT	SORTIES		TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO (TONS)	KIA'S		STRUCTURES DESTROYED
	COMBAT	OTHER			CONF	UNCONF	
HQ TRP	808	411	2137	16	---	---	---
TRP A	8339	990	4913	0	64	---	62
TRP B	2996	344	3268	1	45	8	393
TRP C	7288	312	7175	0	49	---	209
TRP D	---	---	---	---	0	---	44
TOTAL	19,431	2057	17,093	17	158	8	703

DETAINÉES: 6

Enemy Material Captured:

- 1 - SKS Rifle
- 1 - AK-47 Rifle
- 1 - Chi Com Model 56 MG
- 1 - B-40 Rocket Launcher
- 1 - M-16 Magazine
- 4 - Rucksacks
- 10 - lbs of Medical Supplies
- 3 - Sand Bags Full of Rice
- 1 - Rucksack Full of Documents
- 1 - Canteen
- 1 - Pohcho

Enemy Material Destroyed:

- 20 - 20 Gallon Drums of Fuel
- 8 - Rucksacks
- 3,000 + Lb of rice
- 3 - Bridges
- 7 - Bicycles
- 8 - 2½ Ton trucks
- 24 - Boxes of Ammunition
- 1 - Ox Cart

2. (C) GROUND TO AIR FIRE FOR THE PERIOD

a. 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1970:

TROOP	OH-6A		AH-1G		UH-1H	
	A/C RECV G/A FIRE	A/C HIT	A/C RECV G/A FIRE	A/C HIT	A/C RECV G/A FIRE	A/C HIT
HQ TROOP	---	---	---	---	2	2
A TROOP	45	15	9	2	0	0
B TROOP	42	14	3	0	2	1
C TROOP	31	11	5	1	6	5
TOTAL	118	40	17	3	10	8

~~Inclosure 4~~

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b. MAY 1970:

HQ TROOP	---	---	---	---	0	0
A TROOP	16	8	3	2	0	0
B TROOP	27	7	2	0	0	0
C TROOP	<u>17</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	60	19	8	3	1	1

c. JUNE 1970:

HQ TROOP	---	---	---	---	0	0
A TROOP	15	2	2	0	0	0
B TROOP	9	3	0	0	1	1
C TROOP	<u>8</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	32	11	2	0	4	3

d. JULY 1970:

HQ TROOP	---	---	---	---	2	2
A TROOP	11	5	4	0	0	0
B TROOP	6	4	1	0	1	0
C TROOP	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	26	10	7	0	5	4

3. (C) Aircraft Lost and Damaged:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT TYPE</u>	<u>LOST</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
HBT	UH-1H	0	4
TROOP A	OH-6A	4 (Note 1)	10
	UH-1H	1 (Note 2)	2
	AH-1G	1 (Note 3)	2
TROOP B	OH-6A	10 (Note 4)	3
	UH-1H	1 (Note 5)	3
	AH-1G	0	2
TROOP C	OH-6A	4 (Note 6)	10
	UH-1H	3 (Note 7)	2
	AH-1G	1 (Note 8)	1

NOTE 1. Two Combat Loss, one Extensive Maintenance, one Combat Damage

NOTE 2. One Crash

NOTE 3. One Crash

NOTE 4. Six Combat Loss, three Extensive Maintenance, one Combat Damage

~~Enclosure 1~~

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NOTE 5. One Extensive Maintenance

NOTE 6. Two Combat Loss, two Extensive Maintenance

NOTE 7. Two Crash, one Combat Loss

NOTE 8. One Combat Damage

4. (C) Flying Hour Statistics for the Period: (Based on DA Form 1352)

a. The average flying hours by type aircraft, by troop:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OH-6A</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>
HQ TROOP	---	---	158
TROOP A	162	182	154
TROOP B	138	163	118
TROOP C	154	164	158

b. The average flying hours by type aircraft:

<u>OH-6A</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>
151	168	146

c. The cumulative flying hours by troop and by type aircraft:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OH-6A</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HQ TROOP	---	---	791	791
TROOP A	1617	1637	1233	4487
TROOP B	1380	1303	945	3628
TROOP C	1538	1476	1265	4279
TOTAL	4535	4416	4234	13185

5. Units supported and maintenance stand downs by number of days:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>4th Inf Div</u>	<u>173d Abn Bde</u>	<u>22d Div (ARVN)</u>	<u>23d Div (ARVN)</u>	<u>Special Forces</u>	<u>TF Pursuit</u>	<u>II MR</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Maint Down</u>
Troop A	7	---	22	16	11	2	20	---	14
Troop B	58	---	13	---	---	---	9	1	11
Troop C	13	45	17	---	---	3	---	---	14
Troop D	11	---	---	---	---	---	13	60	8

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AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

1. (C) Aircraft Strength as of 31 July 70

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OH-6A</u> <u>AUTH/ASG</u>	<u>AH-1G</u> <u>AUTH/ASG</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>AUTH/ASG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>AUTH/ASG</u>
HQ TROOP	-----	-----	7 / 5	7 / 5
A TROOP	10 / 8	9 / 9	8 / 8	27 / 25
B TROOP	10 / 10	9 / 8	8 / 8	27 / 26
C TROOP	<u>10 / 10</u>	<u>9 / 9</u>	<u>8 / 8</u>	<u>27 / 27</u>
TOTAL	30 / 28	27 / 26	31 / 29	88 / 83

2. (U) Average Aircraft Availability by Troop and by Type Aircraft 1 May - 31 July

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OH-6A</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>
HQ TROOP	-----	-----	85% OR 14% NORM 1% NORS
A TROOP	78% OR 10% NORM 12% NORS	79% OR 10% NORM 11% NORS	82% OR 9% NORM 9% NORS
B TROOP	85% OR 10% NORM 5% NORS	70% OR 22% NORM 8% NORS	89% OR 8% NORM 3% NORS
C TROOP	69% OR 21% NORM 7% NORS	74% OR 24% NORM 2% NORS	77% OR 22% NORM 1% NORS

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SAFETY STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD (Based on OPREP-5 Flying Hours)

1. (U) 1 May 70 - 31 July 70.

<u>TROOP</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>RATE</u>
HHT	781	0	0
A Troop	4978	3	60.0
B Troop	3556	0	0
C Troop	4234	2	47.2
7/17th	13519	5	35.0

2. May 1970:

HHT	239	0	0
A Troop	1871	2	112.8
B Troop	1300	0	0
C Troop	1516	1	80.0
7/17th	1516	3	75.0

3. June 1970:

HHT	274	0	0
A Troop	1877	1	72.5
B Troop	1104	0	0
C Troop	1334	1	81.5
7/17th	4589	2	50.0

4. July 1970:

HHT	248	0	0
A Troop	1230	0	0
B Troop	1152	0	0
C Troop	1384	0	0
7/17th	4014	0	0

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(U) ACCIDENT SUMMARIES BY MONTH

1. May: Three accidents:

a. On 3 May 70, Troop C, AH-1G Sn 68-15179, Pilot CPT Vester. The aircraft had an engine failure. An autorotation was performed resulting in a hard landing with major damage to the aircraft. Both the pilot and the co-pilot suffered back injuries and abrasions. Engine analysis to determine the cause of the engine failure is not yet complete.

b. On 10 May 70, Troop A, AH-1G Sn 68-15008, Pilot CW2 Stephanski. On takeoff from the Christmas Tree Heliport there was a tail rotor failure and then separation of the 90 degree gear box. Because of the resulting loss of anti-torque control and the forward shift of the center of gravity the aircraft crashed. The cause of the tail rotor failure and subsequent separation of the 90 degree gear box has not been determined. Complete analysis of the tail rotor assembly is still in progress. Both pilot and co-pilot were seriously injured and evacuated to COMUS.

c. On 23 May 70, Troop A, UH-1H Sn 69-15115, pilot CPT Blake. In an effort to avoid wires across the take off path collective pitch was reduced rapidly. The aircraft rolled on its side after impact with the ground resulting in damage to the main rotor blades and separation of the tailboom aft of the synchronized elevator. The Crewchief was fatally injured in the crash but the other crew members suffered only minor injuries.

2. June: Two accidents:

a. On 23 June 70, Troop C, UH-1H Sn 67-17346, Pilot WO1 Yetmar. The aircraft had an engine failure in cruise flight. A downwind autorotative landing was performed resulting in a hard landing and major damage. Although there was a full crew and five passengers aboard, no one was injured. The cause of the engine failure is unknown pending completion of teardown analysis of the engine.

b. On 24 June 70, Troop A, OH-6A Sn 69-15981, Pilot WO1 Dalby. The aircraft had an engine failure. An autorotative landing was performed into a rice paddy, with no injuries. Originally classified as an incident, subsequent inspection revealed that depot level resources would be needed to repair structural damage. Investigation of the accident showed that the main fuel line had been disconnected and not reconnected prior to flight. The aircraft was able to start and fly using overflow fuel. The engine failed due to fuel starvation. An E I R has been submitted for a modification of the fuel inlet valve to prevent an engine start if the fuel line is disconnected.

3. July: No accidents.

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
<small>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and this information must be entered when the original report is received)</small>		
1 ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)	26. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C.	CONFIDENTIAL	
	28. GROUP	
	4	
2. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry.		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970.		
3. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
10 August 1970	34	
2a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	703099	
b. PROJECT NO.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned to this report)	
N/A		
c.		
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		