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<td>31 Aug 1982, GDS, DOD 5200.1-r; APO d/a ltr, 29 Apr 1980</td>
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AGDA (M) (23 Nov 70) FOR OT UT-7031010

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps (u)
Period Ending 31 July 1970 (u)

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Operation in next four quarters of period

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operational: Significant Activities.
   a. (U) Command and Organizations.
      (1) (U) Command.
      (a) On 23 May 1970, COL Milton M. Cook, Jr., (USMC), DCS, departed PCS for CONUS.
      (b) On 5 June 1970, COL Wilmer W. Hixson, (USMC) was assigned to XXIV Corps as DCS.
      (c) On 18 June 1970, LTG Melvin Zais, CG, departed PCS to JCS and LTG James W. Sutherland, Jr., assumed command of XXIV Corps.
      (d) On 1 July 1970, MG George S. Bowman, Jr., (USMC), DOG, departed PCS for CONUS and MG James L. Baldwin (USA) assumed duty as DCG.
   (2) (U) Organisation.
      (a) On 15 June 1970, the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion was released from OPCON and reverted to General Support of XXIV Corps.
      (b) Task Force Clearwater was disestablished on 1 July 1970 and its missions assumed by the Republic of Vietnam Navy.

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AVII-GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Leesville Leasmead, Headquarters, IIIIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) The 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) was attached to Corps
Artillery on 20 May 1970.

(d) Battery G, 29th Artillery (SLT) was attached to the 1st Battal-
ion, 44th Artillery (AW) on 20 May 1970.

(e) Battery G, 65th Artillery (MG) was attached to the 1st Battal-
ion, 44th Artillery (AW) on 20 May 1970.

b. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) General Enemy Situation.

(a) Summary: The most significant development within the reporting
period was the increased infiltration into western Quang Tri Province by
elements of the 9th and 24th Regiments of the 304th Division. In the
western mountains, Military Region Tri Thien Duc forces continued their
defense of cache sites by attacking Fire Support Bases. In southern I
Military Region the enemy attempted to fix allied units by engaging them
in the piedmont thereby allowing the local forces to attack the populace
in the lowlands without interference. This attempt was unsuccessful.

(b) Quang Tri Province.

1. During the reporting period enemy activity in Quang Tri Province
was characterized by harassment of allied installations. The infiltration
and deployment of enemy forces through the western areas of the
province as well as the attempted infiltration of battalion sized enemy
forces into the lowlands was noted.

2. In the eastern Demilitarized Zone area enemy activity consisted
of sporadic attacks-by-fire and numerous mining incidents, probably in-
volved of the 84th Artillery Regiment and the 31st Group.
There was one major ground contact northeast of Con Tien in which allied
forces engaged the 4th Battalion, 270th NVA Regiment.

3. The central Demilitarized Zone area was a major area of enemy
interest during May and June 1970 as the 246th and 27th Regiments with
elements of the 84th and 164th Artillery Regiments conducted operations
in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Fuller. The fire support base re-
cieved mortar fire and ground attacks. The enemy broke heavy contact
and apparently moved some elements out of the area in late June 1970.
In the lowlands the enemy made two attempts to infiltrate Hai Lang Dis-
trict. The first occurred on 27 May 1970 when the 806th Battalion, 7th
Front engaged the Regional Forces/Popular Forces and suffered 81 KIA.
The second occurred on 2 July 1970 when the 806th Battalion, reinforced by the 1st Company of the 528th Regiment and a signal element of the 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment, attempted to penetrate the district. This action cost the enemy 139 KIA and 17 PW. The prisoners stated the mission of their unit was, "to establish the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure and liberate the lowlands."

In western Quang Tri Province most of the enemy activity has been attributed to the 66th Regiment, 304th Division. On 28 May 1970, the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment conducted a ground attack on Fire Support Base Henderson. On 2 June 1970, the 9th Battalion, along with the C-20 Sapper Company, 66th Regiment attacked Fire Support Base Tun Taver. It was after the latter attack that the 66th moved towards the Vietnamese salient where it is now located. Between April 1970 and the time the regiment broke contact it suffered 420 casualties. On 8 July 1970, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged an estimated 200-250 NVA with gunships near Khe Sanh. Ground troops were inserted and contact continued sporadically until 12 July 1970. Total results were 381 NVA KIA and 4 PW. Prisoners identified the unit as the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment and one company of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment. The stated mission of the unit was to stay in the western areas, protect the base areas and conduct large scale attacks if allied troops could be drawn out to their area. If this failed they were to make deep penetrations to conduct large scale attacks to destroy allied battalion sized units. The prisoners also told of seeing elements of the 246th Regiment along the infiltration route. Documents captured in this same area earlier stated that the 5th Battalion, 248 Regiment, 304th Division had infiltrated in mid-May to reinforce the 66th Regiment. To date there has been no contact with this unit.

(c) Thua Thien Province,

During the reporting period the enemy continued his previous low level of activity. During May 1970 enemy units were active in the western areas of the province as the 6th Regiment conducted operations in the Fire Support Base Ripcord area, 803d Regiment in the Fire Support Bases Maureen-Kathryn area and the 29th Regiment in the Fire Support Base Vagbel area. The enemy's intention was to keep allied forces from recovering their caches. During June 1970, the enemy forces in western Thua Thien Province broke contact and then avoided contact with allied units in the area. However, the 4th Regiment launched coordinated attacks on 10 June 1970. Phu Loc District Headquarters, Fire Support Bases Los Banos, Roy, Tomahawk, and Nuoc Ngot Bridge received attacks-by-fire throughout the night with Fire Support Base Tomahawk and the Phu Loc District Headquarters receiving ground attacks as well. Since then the 4th Regiment has been relatively inactive.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT
12 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970. HCS CP 08-65 (82)

2 On 1 July 1970, a mortar attack was made in the Fire Support
Base Ripcord area, utilizing batteries of both the 6th and 8634 Regi-
ments. On 17 July 1970 this area received 120mm mortar fire. This
was the first time in 18 months that the weapon had been used in the prov-
ince. It is unknown which units had the 120mm mortar capability. The
situation reached severe proportions and the 101st Airborne Division
(AMBL) evacuated the base on 22 July 1970. The rest of the enemy units
in the province were relatively quiet, staying in their base areas in
the mountains just east of the A Shau Valley.

(d) Quang Nam Province

1 Contrary to the previous reporting period in which enemy activity
in Quang Nam Province remained generally light, the first 45 days of the
current quarter witnessed a substantial increase in the tempo of Front 4
efforts. This increase was highlighted by stages 2 and 3 of the K-700
Campaign, the first stage of which occurred on 31 April - 1 May 1970.
Also highlighting Front 4 tactics during this period was a sharp increase
in the pressure exerted against the Thuong Duc area in concert with a
similar effort against the Hiep Duc area in northern Quang Tri Province.

2 Intelligence reports indicating a second stage of the campaign's
K-700 Campaign during late April/early May were substantiated on the
night of 7-8 May 1970 when there was a flurry of offensive activity in
the eastern portion of the province. This surge was not as intense as
anticipated and was characterized by series of light attacks-by-fire as
well as several limited ground and mortar attacks. However, preemptive
actions on the part of allied forces within the province stopped the
enemy from achieving any substantial degree of success.

3 In what proved to be a prelude to this highpoint, a battalion
size enemy force launched a heavy ground attack against the Que Son Dis-
trict Headquarters on the morning of 6 May 1970 and at the same time
pinned down elements of the 7th Marines at nearby Landing Zone Ross with
mortar and rocket fire. Friendly forces sustained moderate casualties
and heavy material damage in the attacks while enemy losses were 27 KIA
and 4 WIA. A substantial amount of weapons and ordnance were also cap-
tured. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that all were members
of the 409th Sapper Battalion.

4 Following the 7-8 May highpoint, analysis of increasing intelli-
gence suggested that Front 4 would attempt to launch another highpoint
or about 19 May 1970 to commemorate the birthdays of Buddha and Ho
Chi Minh. A slight increase in enemy offensive efforts was recorded on
the evening of 20-21 May 1970. However, properly forewarned, friendly
forces were successful in limiting the enemy's efforts to such an extent

CONFIDENTIAL
that this surge was preempted.

2 From June 1, 1970 to 200 rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortars were lobbed into the hamlet, lobbing grenades and satchel charges into bunkers where the residents had taken cover and shooting anyone in sight. Seventy-four civilians were killed and 68 wounded. The attack destroyed or damaged 370 homes and structures, including 2 schools and 2 hamlet offices. The hamlet was 85 percent destroyed.

3 Of significance was the increased pressure against the Thuong Duc area during the first half of the period by elements of the 38th and 111th NVA Regiments, supported by the 490th Sapper Battalion and elements of the 57th Rocket Artillery Battalion. This strategy was apparently an attempt to draw allied forces into the Thuong Duc area and tie them down, thereby allowing local force and guerrilla units to attack Free World Military Assistance Forces/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces installations in the eastern lowlands. However, after a month and a half of almost daily mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle attacks on the Special Forces/Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp and District Headquarters, Front 4 apparently ordered the units to withdraw from the immediate area. Activity in the Thuong Duc area slowed substantially during the second week in June 1970 and the situation has remained relatively quiet since that time. The presence of the 31st, 38th and 111th NVA Regiments, the 490th Sapper Battalion and elements of the 57th Rocket Artillery Battalion within a 20 kilometer radius of Thuong Duc presents a potential division wide threat to that area.

4 Concurrent with the termination of the Thuong Duc siege, enemy activity dropped to a low level throughout the province and remained that way for the rest of the reporting period. Scattered, low key attacks-by-fire, mine laying and booby trap incidents, lob bombings, and terrorist activities characterized the enemy's efforts during this time. On 21 June 1970 there was an attack-by-fire against Danang possibly by elements of the 57th Rocket Artillery Battalion. Nine 122mm rockets impacted within Danang killing and wounding several civilians.

5 Towards the end of the reporting period intelligence reports...
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, MS CSFB-65 (R2)

Within the province, the possibility of another highpoint during the period 17-23 July to commemorate the 29 July signing of the NSC General Accords. This surge failed to materialize. Maximum lunar illumination and the apparent unpreparedness of most front line units precluded such an effort.

(a) Quang Tin Province.

As was the case in Quang Nam Province, the majority of activity in Quang Tin Province during the reporting period occurred during the first 45 days, with ground action dropping to a low level during the latter half of the period.

The majority of the enemy efforts during the entire month of May and the first half of the month of June was centered around Hiep Duc as elements of the 1st VC Main Force and 3d (AAM: 31st) NVA Regiments, reinforced by supporting elements of the 2c NVA Division, attacked and occupied the Hiep Duc District Headquarters and surrounding locales. This strategy, apparently timed by MK-5 to coincide with a similar type effort in the Hiep Duc District Headquarters and surrounding locales, this strategy, apparently timed by MK-5 to coincide with a similar type effort at Thuang Duc in Quang Nam Province, proved to be designed to draw the maximum number of US and ARVN Forces away from the lowlands, thereby exposing the population to attacks by main force and local force units in a continuing effort to take the momentum out of the Government of Vietnam pacification programs, disrupt Vietnamese Programs, and gain control of the civilian populace.

Throughout the Hiep Duc siege, the enemy continued to put up substantial resistance to operations conducted by elements of the Americal Division and the 2d ARVN Infantry Division, despite suffering heavy casualties. There were numerous contacts and friendly units occupying Fire Support Bases Siberia and West received rocket and mortar fire on an almost daily basis.

Particularly noteworthy in the Hiep Duc action were the statements of two PW and three Ho Chi Minh from the 30th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division. Interrogation of these individuals revealed that the Hiep Duc action was part of a three-phase campaign (2,180) designed to destroy the Government of Vietnam pacification programs. Their testimony also substantiated the strategy of drawing allied forces out of the eastern lowlands.

After sustaining about 1,000 casualties as well as the loss of 4 Fw, 3 Ho Chi Minh and a substantial number of weapons, enemy forces withdrew from the immediate area during the second week of June, but remained within easy striking distance. Following this withdrawal, the Hiep Duc area was quiet throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

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Elsewhere in Quang Tin Province, the early part of the reporting period witnessed a concerted effort possibly by elements of the 56th Rocket Artillery Battalion against the Chu Lai Combat Base. The complex received a combined total of 81 rounds of 122mm rocket fire on the mornings of 4 and 5 May 1970, with an unconfirmed number of rockets impacting in the ocean. The two attacks-by-fire resulted in moderate casualties and material damage. After the attack on 4 May, a reaction force entered the area of the suspected launch site and captured 43x122mm rockets which were rigged for launching.

While not as intense as that experienced in Quang Nam Province, there was a surge of a limited nature in Quang Tin Province during the second week of May 1970 which was consistent with stage two of the A-700 Campaign. In addition to the attacks-by-fire against Chu Lai, most activity was an estimated 300 rounds of assorted 122mm rocket, 60, and 81mm mortar fire directed against Tam Ky City on 7 May 1970. This attack was followed by a combination mortar and sapper attack on 9 May 1970 against the 198th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Fire Support Base Waycasiet.

Subsequent to this highpoint, enemy activity in the eastern portion of Quang Tin Province consisted largely of scattered attacks-by-fire against allied installations and populated areas as well as friendly tactical positions. The Tam Ky/Chu Lai area continued to be a favorite target for these harassing attacks. On 12, 13 and 21 May 1970, mortar attacks were received.

A noteworthy increase in enemy offensive efforts was observed in Quang Tin Province on the morning of 4 June 1970 in conjunction with corresponding increase in the other two provinices comprising southern I Corps. This activity was more intense than in Quang Nam and marked the final phase of the A-700 Campaign, which consisted mainly of attacks-by-fire complemented by a few limited sapper attacks. On 7 June 1970, the 408th Sapper Battalion, identified by one of its commanders, conducted a ground attack against the Thang Binh District Headquarters and nearby Go Thang Out Post. The attack, preceded by 81mm mortar and 37mm recoilless rifle fire, resulted in moderate casualties.

The remainder of the reporting period witnessed a relatively low level of enemy activity in Quang Tin Province. Major enemy tactical units remained out of contact with friendly forces. Local force and sapper units were responsible for what little activity there was in eastern lowlands.

In Quang Ngai Province.
CONFIDENTIAL

12 August 1970


1. Quang Ngai Province was the least active of the three southern provinces of I Military Region. The southerly movement of the 2d and 22d Regiments of the 3d NVA Division to Binh Dinh Province during the previous quarter and the subsequent dismantlement of the latter unit left the 21st Regiment of the 2d NVA Division as the only regimental size unit in Quang Ngai Province.

2. Although intelligence reveals that the 21st Regiment intended to take the offensive, the unit encountered difficulties which precluded the accomplishment of its mission. It planned to conduct an attack against the Nghia Hanh District Headquarters on 17 or 18 May 1970 using the 70th and 40th Battalions in conjunction with the 30th Local Force Battalion and C-75 Local Force Sapper Companies. The Regiment was forced to alter this plan as a result of the capture of the Commanding Officer of the 21st Sapper Battalion. This information was revealed by the Political Officer of the 70th Battalion when he rallied on 13 May 1970. In addition, operations conducted in the Nghia Hanh area during this period by elements of the 2d NVA Division inflicted a large number of casualties on the 21st Regiment. Subsequently the regiment withdrew to the highlands south and west of Nghia Hanh.

3. The initiation of the second phase of the K-T-C Campaign, on 7-8 May 1970, witnessed a moderate increase in the tempo of the enemy's efforts in Quang Ngai Province in conjunction with a corresponding increase in the other two provinces of southern I Military Region. Attacks-by-fire in the eastern lowlands characterized MR-5 efforts in the province. These attacks were directed mainly against friendly fire support bases, including 411, Stinson, and Snoopy as well as Quang Ngai City. This surge was short lived, however, as activity soon returned to the low level experienced previously.

4. Despite this low level of activity, during late May and early June there were two significant attacks in Binh Son District. The first of these attacks occurred on 28 May 1970, when an estimated 70 man enemy force composed of elements of the C-95A and C-95B Sapper Companies, supported by a local village guerrilla unit, attacked Hai Ninh Hamlet, situated 9 kilometers north of Binh Son District Headquarters. An unusual aspect of this attack was the guerrilla unit's use of sampans to cross the Song Tra Bong River. 245 structures were destroyed, 20 civilians and military personnel killed and twenty three others were wounded.

5. Two weeks later an estimated battalion size enemy force attacked the Binh Son District Headquarters. The attacking force fired 80 rounds of mixed mortar, Rocket Propelled Grenades and M-79 prior to launching the attack. Ten civilians and 5 Popular Forces were killed. Thirty-three
Confidential

AVII-GCT

12 August 1970


personnel were wounded, including 11 PW in the District jail.

6. Concurrent with increases in offensive activity in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, enemy forces increased their offensive efforts in Quang Ngai Province on the morning of 4 June 1970. This action appeared to be principally the work of local forces and was confined mainly to a few attacks-by-fire and a few limited ground attacks.

7. The Nghia Hai District Headquarters received a light attack-by-fire, followed by a small ground attack. An PW captured subsequent to this attack indicated that elements of the 21st NVA Regiment were responsible. It is believed that this attack was intended to be of greater size and intensity, but that the presence of friendly forces in the area stopped the enemy from launching an attack of the proportion it had planned.

(2) (C) Intelligence Collection

(a) General: The Collection Division (Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Group Reconnaissance, Group Surveillance and Technical Intelligence) continued to provide timely collateral intelligence information to the AGCS, G2. The division evaluated and distributed five COMUSMACV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) and published three XXIV Corps SICR's during this period.

(b) Interrogation of Prisoners of War.

1. A total of 414 detainees were interrogated in I Military Region. The breakdown by classifications of these detainees are as follows:

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<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>NVA/HC</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>NVA/PW</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>33.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC/HC</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>VC/PW</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>73.3</td>
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</table>

2. XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch interrogated 49 of these detainees. In addition, XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch completed two studies on the tactics of VC units in obtaining shelter provisions, and early warning of Free World Military Assistance Force operations in their areas of operation. This information was obtained from interrogation involving a "round robin" discussion with Hoi Chams at the Chieu Hoi Center in Danang. "Go Teams" were used several times to assist interrogation teams at division level to speed the dissemination of significant information obtained from prisoners.
AVII-GCT
12 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters III Corps
Period Ending 31 July 1970, AGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(c) Ground Reconnaissance.

1. Ground reconnaissance elements in the I Military Region continued
to provide one of the primary sources of intelligence collection as 557
long range reconnaissance patrols were conducted during the quarter.
Patrols reported 457 sightings totaling over 3756 enemy personnel and
participated in 124 contacts. The patrol contacts, plus air and artillery
strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 602
enemy killed in addition to providing intelligence on personnel move-
ments, lines of communication and infiltration routes used by the enemy.
Enemy activity along logistic corridors into and out of base areas con-
tinued at a high level. Enemy forces protecting these corridors were
aggressive and well disciplined when they encountered our reconnaissance
units.

2. This quarter witnessed an increase in the number of patrols deployed in the I Military Region primarily due to better weather conditions allowing the wider use of helicopter insertion techniques. The enemy counter-reconnaissance effort of Landing Zone watches, tracking, and setting of booby traps continued with an increase in incidents of air attack during ground fire around the Landing Zones. This enemy effort was partially circumvented through a variety of insert/extract techniques employed by our reconnaissance elements.

3. Long range reconnaissance training for ARVN personnel in the last quarter produced positive results. Personnel who received training participated in 107 combined US/ARVN long range patrols. A similar reconnaissance training program for the Republic of Korea 51st Engineer Brigade was initiated during this period.

4. Ground Surveillance: The total number of sensors employed throughout I Military Region increased from 1600 to 1725 during the reporting period. The Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART I)
installed at Quang Tri Province became operational during this period.
This facility automatically records all sensor activations, thus allowing the operator to spend all of his time evaluating the recorded sequence, greatly increasing the number of reported targets in that area.

(a) Technical Intelligence: A total of 273 war trophy items were captured by the Technical Intelligence Branch during this period. This total included 111 rifles, 83 pistols and 79 miscellaneous items such as knives and crossbows.

(b) Weather. The southwest monsoon was quite slow in beginning in 1970, and as a result the weather was very extremely favorable. With few exceptions, planned
August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CHDB-65 (R2)

Operations proceeded with little hindrance from the weather. Operations supported through the period were: Raintree Glen, Texas Star, Elk Canyon, Range Hill, Santa Rosa Park, Iron Mountain and Nantucket Beach.


1) Boundary Changes. There were no permanent boundary changes during the reporting period.

2) The following operations terminated during the reporting period:

(a) Barbara Glade.

This operation was designed to conduct overt and covert reconnaissance in the South plain and De Konig River valley, to gather and tactically exploit intelligence and to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes. It involved the Project Delta Force, which was placed under operational control of the 101st Airborne Division (ANB). Phase I of this operation commenced on 15 May 1970 and terminated on 30 May 1970 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11(US)</td>
<td>24(US)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Phase II of this operation commenced on 23 June 1970 and terminated on 30 June 1970 with negative results. The Delta Force was withdrawn from XXIV Corps.

(b) Clinch Valley. This 101st Airborne Division (ANB) operation, involving the 3d Brigade and the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry was designed to provide support for operations conducted by the 3d Regiment, 1st (ANW) Infantry Division, whose mission was to locate and destroy elements of the 9th NVA Regiment. This operation was conducted in the Nha Be plain area, Quang Tri Province, commencing on 9 July 1970 and terminating on 15 July 1970. Two batteries of 155mm howitzers and one battery of 175mm guns supported the operation. Results were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
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</table>

(c) Green River. This 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) operation involved the entire assets of the brigade and was conducted through their assigned Area of Operation. The operation was initiated on 2 January 1970 to counter a high threat period and consisted of search
and clear reconnaissance in force and ambush operations. It intensified preparations for the approaching Tet period by:

1. Increasing intelligence efforts through reconnaissance and surveillance of known and suspected enemy base areas.

2. Strengthening Fire Support Bases and string points to include prepositioning of supplies and equipment.

3. Expanding fire support planning.

4. Increasing security of airfields and key bridges.

5. Planning for rapid repair and/or repair of bridges and by-passes to include identification of counterattack routes by crossing sites, bridges and fording sites. The operation terminated on 31 July 1970 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>VIET</th>
<th>AMRY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph (j) below.

(a) Texas Star. This 101st Airborne Division (AirLand) operation is designed to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches, base camps, and interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Extensive airborne combined operations are to be conducted in the area east of the A Shau Valley and west of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. Reinforcements are provided for the Mai Loc Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp and one airmobile infantry battalion as Corps reserve. Assistance is provided to Government of Vietnam pacification and development plans, programs and civic action. Forces are provided to assist in the defense of Hue and in assisting the Government of Vietnam in assuming full responsibility for combat, pacification and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province. Operations are conducted in close coordination with Territorial Forces to include Regional Forces, Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Forces, National Police Field Forces and Provincial Reconnaissance Units, to deny the enemy access to their sources of supply. The operation commenced on 1 April 1970.

(b) Hamburger Beach. This operational nickname was given to the current search and clear operation conducted jointly by the 108th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division and the 6th Regiment, 2d ARVN Infantry Division in the area between the Batangan Peninsula and Quang Ngai City.
destroy Main Force/Local Force Vietnamese Communist units, and eliminate the Vietnamese Communist infrastructure and political apparatus to re-store Government of Vietnam control. This operation commenced on 20 July 1969.

(c) Frederick Hill. This operation commenced on 18 March 1969, in Quang Tin Province. The operation was initiated by elements of the 196th Brigade, Americal Division to conduct search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Americal Division is the controlling headquarters.

(d) Geneva Park. This operation commenced on 18 March 1969, in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The operation was initiated by elements of the 198th Brigade, Americal Division to conduct search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. Americal Division is the controlling headquarters.

(e) Iron Mountain. This operation commenced on 18 March 1969, in Quang Ngai Province. The operation was initiated by elements of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division to conduct search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. Americal Division is the controlling headquarters.

(f) Wolfe Mountain. This operation commenced on 22 July 1970, in support of the I AFRV Corps/FMWAf, ICTZ, Combined Summer Military Campaign. The operation was initiated by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MUSH) and consists of reconnaissance in force, saturation ambush and continuous reconnaissance operations along the Demilitarized Zone and western border of the Brigade's Area of Operation in northern I Military Region. Combined operations with Government of Vietnam forces to prevent infiltration into the populated lowlands of Quang Tri Province are also conducted. Additionally, a reaction force is provided for relief of Mai Loc Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp and permanent liaison with dedicated communications, has been established at each district/province headquarters in the Brigade Area of Operations.

(g) Pennsylvania Square. This operational nickname was given to the Americal Division's search and clear and reconnaissance in force operations in the coastal plain of northeast Quang Tin Province. It commenced on 29 June 1970 and involves the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Support of the I AFRV Corps/FMWAf, ICTZ, Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan.

(h) Elk Canyon. This Americal Division operation is being conducted to secure Kham Duc Airfield and destroy or neutralize enemy forces, logistic bases; and command and control installations in the vicinity of Kham Duc. The operation commenced on 12 July 1970. The 2d Battalion,
1st Infantry is the participating US unit.

11. Fickense Forest. This is an operation conducted by the III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Division in the Song Thu Bon valley to destroy the enemy, his facilities and interdict his logistical support. It supports the I MEF Corps/FAF, IOTZ, Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan and commenced on 15 July 1970.

(i) Statistical data of current operations:

### FRIENDLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
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### ENEMY

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<td>15 July 1970</td>
<td>15</td>
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(ii) Increment IV Redeployment. Increment IV redeployment began during the reporting period. A total of 1173 personnel spaces were redeployed from units under operational control of XXIV Corps. Of this 1173 total 536 spaces were from elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Force Logistic Command Army spaces redeployed during this period totaled 337 and were from the 245th Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane) and the 134th M.D. Detachment (Veterinary Animal Dispensary).

(iii) Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG 2620,000-65 (MR)

(1) Civilian Personnel Management. The command continues to be
authorized 103 local national direct hire spaces.

(2) Maintenance of Unit Strength. The number of units assigned to
XXIV Corps increased over the reporting period from eight to eleven.
Authorized strength is now 1771 with 1762 assigned.

(3) Medical. On 15 May 1970 the Naval Support Activity Hospital,
Da Nang, ceased operation in accordance with its planned phased-out schedule. Most
of the medical activities formerly performed by the hospital have been assumed by units of the 67th Medical Group and USAFE Medical Command, to include Da Nang ambulance coverage and preventive medicine functions.

(4) Provost Marshal.

(a) XXIV Corps Regulation 190-1, Military Police Areas of Responsibility; and XXIV Corps Regulation 190-6, Personnel Absences, Off Limits and Curfew were published during the reporting period.

(b) On 15 May 1970, a ceremony was held honoring the institution of
combined police patrols on Highway I for the three southern provinces of 1 Military Region. This makes a total of sixteen combined patrols operating on the primary line of communication in 1 Military Region.

(c) Studies were conducted with representatives of USAFE to determine
the feasibility of USAFE's assuming operational responsibility of the III Marine Amphibious Force Correctional Facility. This was done in conjunction with a study to determine the amount of additional Army military police resources required to replace departing Navy and Marine police/security personnel.

e. Logistic.

(1) (G) General. During the reporting period the logistical posture throughout the Corps Area of Operations remained in a high state of readiness and was responsive to all demands.

(2) (G) Operations.

(a) Common Service Support. The following common service support functions were turned over to the US Army from the US Navy during the reporting period:

1. Ferry Ramp (Song Han Pier and Ramps).

2. China Beach In-country Rest and Recuperation Center.
CONFLICTIAL

AVII-GCT 12 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, III Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, AGS GSFOR-65 (E2)

1. Freight Terminal Depot, maintenance operations and transportation
functions (Chu Lai).

2. Bridge Ramp, Tien Sha Ramp and selected lighterage craft.

3. Retail Class I and Serv Mart (Self Service Store).

4. Supply Depot, Transportation Motor Pool and Unaccompanied Bag-
gage Activity.

5. Facilities Engineering Support to include repair and utilities,
fire protection, vehicle maintenance, power generators, industrial fa-
cilities (Chu Lai and Dakang).


8. Area Civilian Personnel Office.


(b) Real Estate. During the reporting period the following bases
were transferred to the Government of Vietnam. The total number of
structures involved was 256 with an acquisition value of $839,460.00:

1. 1st Tank Battalion Cantonment.

2. 1st Aco Plant.

3. 9th Engineer Battalion Cantonment at Chu Lai.

4. Monkey Mountain Receiver Site.

5. Coop Bridge.

6. Hoa Khanh.

7. Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital.


9. (U) Information. None.

10. (U) Command History. None.

16

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (U) Aviation. None.

j. Signal.

(1) (U) XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Communications Center. On 10 May 1970, a permanent TOC Communications Center was activated within the XXIV Corps TOC bunker. The permanent TOC Communications Center replaced the temporary installation of four AN/MSC-29 telegraph terminals which had been providing service to the TOC since the relocation of XXIV Corps from Phu Bai to Da Nang on 9 March 1970. The new communication center facility has the capability of terminating 20 full duplex 60/100 word per minute covered teletype circuits. There are a total of 15 full duplex teletype circuits in operation.

(2) (U) Numerical/Authentication and Operational Codes. On 1 July 1970, the CIRCE Wheel Code used for Numerical/Authentication encryption replaced the KAC-Q code. The CIRCE Wheel Code is much simpler to use than its predecessor and is expected to be used more frequently. At the same time the AKAC 600 series Operation Code became effective and replaced the KAC-P code.

(3) (C) Communications Support for Quang Da Special Tactical Zone.

(a) During the reporting period, Quang Da Special Tactical Zone relocated its headquarters from the city of Da Nang to an area west of Da Nang. This relocation required the rerouting and retermination of Quang Da Special Tactical Zone Advisor voice circuits from Quang Nam Province Senior Advisor Tactical Operations Center and I Corps Tactical Operations Center. Additionally voice and teletype circuits were activated from Quang Da Special Tactical Zone Advisors Tactical Operations Center to XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center switchboard and communications center respectively.

(b) The 37th Signal Battalion installed one AN/MSC-29 teletype terminal and one AN/GRC-142 radio set at Quang Da Special Tactical Zone in support of US Advisors. In addition, the US Advisors entered as a station in the XXIV Corps TAG #2 secure FM net.

(4) (C) AUTOSEVCOM.

(a) On 10 May 1970, a narrow band subscriber terminal was activated at the 2d ARVN Division Advisor Tactical Operations Center in Quang Ngai City. The terminal was hosed off SEORD 27 at Chu Lai. Installation of this terminal had previously been held in abeyance pending resolution of power and air conditioning problems which were resolved on 6 May 1970.
During the reporting period, a wide band subscriber terminal was installed at Company C, 5th Special Forces Group Tactical Operations Center at Camp Khe Sanh. The terminal was handed off 0600Z 17 July at Monkey Mountain.

(5) (U) Chu Lai Dial Telephone Exchange. During the reporting period, the 37th Signal Battalion assumed complete responsibility for the Chu Lai Dial Telephone Exchange and the outside cable plant in the Chu Lai Combat Base area. The dial telephone exchange and cable plant were formerly operated and maintained by the Naval Support Activity Detachment, Chu Lai. Included in the transfer of responsibility was the American Division Tactical switchboard which is located within the Dial Telephone Exchange.

(c) (C) Air-to-Air Support for Operation Elk Canyon. As US and ARVN troops were inserted into the area of operations at Kham Duc, during the initial phase of Operation Elk Canyon, three U-21 aircraft, provided by the 1st Signal Brigade were utilized to provide FM aerial relay from the area of operation to rear area headquarters at Landing Zone Hawk Hill, Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. Each aircraft was equipped with an AN/ARC-149(V) radio console and three HYL-3 generative repeaters which enabled the aircraft to automatically retransmit FM tactical nets simultaneously. Two of these nets operated in the secure mode. A total of 62 hours were flown in support of this operation. At the termination of aerial relay operations, a four channel AN/FRC-163 system had been established between Kham Duc and Landing Zone Hawk Hill. Operators for the HYL-3 were provided by the 270th Signal Company of 37th Signal Battalion.

(7) (U) Systems Reconfigurations. During the reporting period, four Corps Area Communications Systems were activated and five were deactivated.

(a) Activations.
1. 48 channel system, Da Nang AB to Force Logistics Command, Da Nang.
2. 23 channel system, Da Nang AB to XXIV Corps.
3. 48 channel system, Dong Ha West to Quang Tri Army.
4. 48 channel system, Camp Eagle to Camp Evans.

(b) Deactivations.
1. 12 channel system, Da Nang AB to Force Logistics Command, Da Nang.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVIATION

2. 12 channel system, Camp Eagle to Camp Evans.
3. 12 channel system, Dong Ha West to Quang Tri Army.
4. 12 channel system, Camp Evans to Camp Eagle.
5. 12 channel system, Landing Zone Nancy to Quang Tri Army.

8. Circuit Activations/Deactivations/Alterations. During the reporting period a total of 27 circuits were activated, 66 circuits were deactivated and 82 circuits were rerouted or reterminated. The large amount of deactivations was primarily a result of the rationalization of all Defense Communication System sole user circuits on 10 July 1970. All circuits were reviewed within XXIV Corps and its major subordinate commands. Those circuits no longer required were deactivated.

(c) (C) NESTOR Support for Advisor Communications.

(a) During the reporting period sufficient NESTOR assets were made available and distributed to 10 XVII Infantry Division advisors to equip Advisor units down to battalion level. All US Advisor nets in I Military Region now have a secure capability.

(b) During the reporting period, Civil Operations for Rural Development Support Advisors received sufficient NESTOR equipment to establish secure FI communication from each province to all districts within each province.

k. Engineers.

(i) (U) Redeployment. During the reporting period the 7th (less one company reinforced) and 5th Force Engineer Battalions (USMC) as well as the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion (less two companies) stood down in preparation for redeployment and both Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 121 and 7 redeployed. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 62 (less one half its vertical capability) arrived in DaNang. The 18th Engineer Brigade also assigned a well drilling detachment to 45th Engineer Group. The detachment is presently stationed in Chu Lai.

2. (U) Construction projects completed during the reporting period.

(a) The 14th Engineer Battalion completed construction of the DART I site in Quang Tri on 25 June 1970.


The 3rd Naval Construction Regiment completed construction of 9 Force Structure Increase cantonments during this reporting period.

Continuing construction projects:

(a) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 started construction of the 6.8 miles of POL pipe line from Tan My to Hue.

(b) The 27th Engineer Battalion started work on the relocation of 11 existing revetment walls and construction of 8900 linear feet of new revetments for the 15th Aviation Battalion (Alt Sqft Nui) at Phu Bai.

(c) The 3rd Naval Construction Regiment started construction of 1600 linear feet of revetments at Danang Air Base for Marine Aircraft Group 11.

(d) The 27th Engineer Battalion started the upgrading of Phu Bai roads, with paving to be accomplished by Naval Mobile Construction 10 (5.4 miles of roads and 55,000 square yards of hardstand), and continues on this project.

(e) Work continues on the Phu Bai airfield upgrade, with an estimated completion date of 1 August 1970.

(f) Work continued on the upgrade of Fire Support Bases A-4 and C-2, with construction expected to be completed during the next reporting period.

Land Clearing:

(a) On 23 June 1970, the 59th Land Clearing Company completed land clearing operations in the Mdl Loc area. Eight thousand acres of 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) area of operation had been cleared.

(b) On 26 June 1970, the platoon of the 59th Land Clearing Company started clearing in the Tri Thu area and had cleared 2000 acres at the end of this quarter.

(c) During this quarter, the Second Provisional Land Clearing Company, which consisted of elements of the 9th Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) and the 39th Engineer Battalion was deactivated after completing the barrier Island project.
(d) The Third Provisional Land Clearing Company was formed of elements of the 39th Engineer Battalion and the 26th Engineer Battalion. This company is clearing in the Mo Duc area. Approximately 2500 acres have been cleared this quarter.

(e) During early July 1970, the 59th Land Clearing Company moved to the Batangan Peninsula and began land clearing operations. As of the end of this quarter, approximately 3500 acres have been cleared.

(5) (U) Primary LOC construction.

(a) During this quarter, the 7th Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) completed upgrade of RL 540 to MACV standards, less paving, from the Cobb Bridge to Liberty Bridge and to a single lane all weather standard from Liberty Bridge to An Hoa.

(b) As of the end of this quarter, QL-1 will be complete with two exceptions:

1. Approximately 17 kilometers between Tu My and Tam Ky which require some repairs, a second lift of asphalt pavement and reconstruction within the city of Tam Ky.

2. 14 kilometers from Dong Ha to Gio Linh which is planned for post-1970.

(c) Due to the redeployment of USMC engineer units, the 32d Naval Construction Regiment has assumed full responsibility for the completion of QL-1.

(6) (U) Tactical roads.

(a) In the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MME) area the 14th Engineer Battalion started and completed Route 73 and the road from Mai Loc to Fire Support Base Holcomb.

(b) In the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) area of operations, Phase II upgrading of the access road from Landing Zone Nancy to Fire Support Base Barbara and the access road from Landing Zone Sally to Fire Support Bases T-Bone and Geronimo were started by the 14th and 27th Engineer Battalions, respectively, and upgrading continues. Other road upgrading projects started this quarter are the road from QL-1 through Camp Eagle to the Pohl Bridge (27th Engineer Battalion), the road between Fire Support Bases Arrow and Arsenal (27th Engineer Battalion), the Xom Pho road (extension of Street Without Joy), HL 597B to HL 555A (14th Engineer Battalion), and the road from Fire Support Base T-Bone to the Song (27th Engineer Battalion). The latter road was completed this
quarter, HL 547 between Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Vegal was reopened and upgrading is being performed by the 27th Engineer Battalion. HL 547 also opened temporarily between Fire Support Bases Vegal and Blau for an artillery raid on 27-28 June 1970.

(c) In the Ist Marine Division area of operations, Mobile Construction Battalion 62 started upgrading the portion of LTL 4 between HL-1D and HL-540. The 1st Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) opened LTL 4 from Fire Support Base Rawtide to Thong Duc as a pioneer road.

(d) In the Americal Division area of operations, the 39th Engineer Battalion started upgrading of HL 524,523, HL 521 and relieved the 9th Force Engineer Battalion (USMC) on the upgrading of HL 533. The 26th Engineer Battalion initiated a dry weather road program of which 14 kilometers have been completed and 25 kilometers are under construction. HL 529 and HL 533 were opened on several occasions, beyond the present limits of upgrading, for 3 convoys to Tra Bong and 14 convoys to Tien Phuc.

1. Psychological Operations - Civil Affairs.

(a) Military Civic Action. The summary of military Civic Action accomplishments for the reporting period is as follows. A total of 35,237 man days based on a 10 hour day, were expended in support of military Civic Action. Total monetary expenditures were 17,541,928 $VN which includes 15,205,848 $VN from military resources; 1,071,667 $VN from the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Assistance in Kind Fund and 1,264,423 $VN from voluntary contributions. The estimated average percentage of each project that was completed using self help labor was 67% with 27% of the materials furnished by the people. A breakdown of the civic action effort follows:

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<td>Others</td>
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The number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period was 312 schools, 12 orphanages, 219 hospitals dispensaries and 327 other institutions.

(b) Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP): A total of 239, 350
persons were treated by MEDCAP personnel; 1,556 resulted from hostile action. Also, 3,488 persons received dental treatment. A total of 8,548 immunizations were administered: 2,542 plague, 2,326 cholera, 567 smallpox and 3,112 miscellaneous injections. Eight hundred and twenty six Vietnamese Health workers were given training in first aid and nursing techniques in conjunction with MEDCAPs and in provincial hospitals. Three hundred and ninety personnel hygiene-sanitation classes were given with 6,320 persons attending.

(2) (C) Psychological Operations.

(a) The I Corps Combined Psychological Operations Coordinating Center was established on 4 May 1970 as a combined operational element for planning, programming, coordinating and controlling all Psychological Operations activities conducted by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and US/Free World Military Assistance Forces in I Military Region. The Center is jointly staffed by ARVN and US personnel. The director of the Center is an ARVN field grade officer and the greater percentage of the staff is furnished from ARVN Political Warfare assets. The Center is physically located at I ARVN Corps Headquarters. The center has become an effective operating element and will eventually become the controlling agency for Psychological Operations activities within I Military Region after US resources are withdrawn.

(b) On 15 June 1970, the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion was changed from operational control of XXIV Corps to a role of general support of XXIV Corps. Command and control of the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion will be exercised by 4th Psychological Operations Group.

(c) Four Psychological Operations Orders have been promulgated establishing command guidance for three continuing campaigns and one national program. These are:

1. PSYOP-OPORD 1-70 (Rice Denial PSYOP Campaign), dated 12 May 1970.
2. PSYOP-OPORD 2-70 (Chieu Hoi Campaign), dated 29 May 1970.
3. PSYOP-OPORD 3-70 (Support of Pacification and Development), dated 31 May 1970.

One additional order, PSYOP-OPORD 5-70 (Redeployment of Combined Action Platoons), was written establishing psychological operations activities in support of the redeployment or withdrawal of Combined Action Forces assets within the XXIV Corps Area of Operation.
CONFIDENTIAL

AV11-GOT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS GP-03-65 (B)

(d) XXIV Corps letter (AV11-GE) subject: Aerial Psychological Operations Support, dated 2 July 1970, explaining the aerial psychological operations assets of Flight "A", 9th Special Operations Squadron, and leaflet operations was published. This letter was designed to assist in improving psychological operations involving the use of the AS-332 (Super Skymaster) and C-47 (Skytrain) aircraft through an analysis of the aircraft's designed uses, limitations, and command policy concerning their employment. Wide dissemination of Civil Operations for Rural Development Support (COORDS) I Corps Tactical Zone letter, subject: Employment of Armed Propaganda teams, dated 21 June 1970, was made. This letter explained command policy for the use of Armed Propaganda Teams in support of US Forces operations within the XXIV Corps area of operation.

(e) Two incidents received major psychological operations support during the reporting period:

1. The Ba Ho massacre, Thanh My Village, Que Son District, Quang Nam Province, occurred on 11 June 1970. Psychological Operations support of this incident was coordinated by Quang Nam Province using all assets available to achieve maximum exploitation. The Province officials used Vietnamese Informative Service (VIS), 110th Vietnamese Air Force Squadron, the 10th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion and all Province assets in a superior manner gaining local, national and international news media coverage of the atrocity. US/Free World Military Assistance Forces Psychological Operations support stayed in the background in order to allow the Government of Vietnam to gain status in the eyes of the local population.

2. On 1-2 July 1970, Quang Tri Province Territorial Forces defeated the 812th NVA Regiment in Hai Long District. Over 15 hours of aerial broadcast, 25 hours of ground broadcast and 210,000 leaflets were disseminated by US Forces to supplement the local district and province Psychological Operations efforts. Continuing psychological operations activities exploiting the situation are being conducted within the area. The theme for the operation pointed out that Territorial Forces can defend the local population.

(f) During the reporting period 7620 leaflets were requested with 6734 being published and disseminated; 55 191,000 leaflets were produced and disseminated by XXIV Corps subordinate commands and the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion during the three month period.

II. Corps Artillery.

11. (C) Organisation.
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(a') On 1 April 1970, the 2d ARVN Artillery battalion was activated (18 x 105mm) and assigned the mission of Direct Support of the 4th ARVN Regiment, 2d ARVN Infantry Division.

(b) On 15 May 1970, the 48th ARVN Artillery Battalion was activated (18 x 155mm) and assigned the mission of General Support of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division. Upon activation of this unit, C Battery, 44th Artillery (6 x 155mm) was released from the operational control of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and returned to its parent unit, the 44th Artillery Battalion, which is General Support of the Quang Da Special Zone.

(c) On 12 July 1970, the 2d Artillery Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps (18 x 105mm) displaced from the 3d Military Region with the 258th Vietnamese Marine Corps Brigade to the 1st Military Region and Quang Da Special Zone. The mission of the 2d Battalion is Direct Support of the VNMC Brigade and is under the operational control of Quang Da Special Zone.

(d) On 20 May 1970, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) relocated from Dong Ha to Danang, and was attached to XXIV Corps Artillery.

(e) On 20 May 1970, C Battery, 29th Artillery (SLT) and G Battery, 65th Artillery were attached to the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW).

(f) On approximately 16 May 1970, the 30th ARVN Artillery Battalion (18 x 155mm) General Support Reinforcing of the 2d ARVN Division Artillery, was redesignated the 20th Artillery Battalion with no change of mission.

(g) On approximately 16 May 1970, the 34th ARVN Artillery Battalion (18 x 155mm) General Support Reinforcing of the 1st ARVN Division Artillery, was redesignated the 16th ARVN Artillery Battalion with no change of mission.

(h) Personnel Changes. On 30 April 1970, Colonel Edward Greer was appointed as the Deputy Commander, XXV Corps Artillery.

(i) Significant Activities.

(k) Support for Operation Texas Star. Corps Artillery supported operation of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and the 1st ARVN Infantry Division from Gia Le (YD52051), Fire Support Base Birmingham (YD709202), Bantana (YD50053), Vehuel (YD50035), Blaca (YD52035), Vahah (YD52028), Stuc (YD52054), Jack (YD493297), Southwest of Jack (YD481847), (YD476261), (YD469262), and (YD435271); Landing Zone Sally
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XII Corps
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFDR-65 (R2)

(Time, Place, and Results of Operations)

Support bases Barber (YD127127), Daytona (YD141467), and Vandergrift (YD009296).

(b) Support for Operations Green River and Wolf Mountain:
Artillery units supported operations of the 1st Brigade, 25th Division (MEB) and the 1st ARVN Division. Support was provided for Green River (YD210405); Fire Support Bases O-1 (YD1221675), C-2 (YD136649), A-1 (YD18701); and Camp Carroll (YD0063849).

(c) Artillery Raids/Moves for Reinforsing Fires:
Artillery units conducted several heavy artillery raids and moves of short duration in order to provide reinforcing fires in support of maneuver elements. Results of Soviet heavy artillery were able to engage targets in the western portion of the 1st Military Region which could not be fired upon from permanent fire support bases. Artillery raids and moves were conducted from the following locations during the periods indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>INCLUSIVE DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1/2</td>
<td>3 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>3, 4, 5 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/3</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>5, 6 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>7, 8 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/39</td>
<td>1 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>9, 10 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/39</td>
<td>1 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>9, 10 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>1 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>1 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>10 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/39</td>
<td>1 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>1 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>10 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>1 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>11 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>5 1/4 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>14 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>15 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Sally</td>
<td>3 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>16 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>5 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>18 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>5 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>19 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>5 km SW of Jack*</td>
<td>20 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Jack*</td>
<td>21 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1/39</td>
<td>4 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td>Stud*</td>
<td>22 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1/39</td>
<td>3 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Veghel</td>
<td>Blaze</td>
<td>23 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/2/39</td>
<td>1 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>Veghel</td>
<td>Blaze</td>
<td>24 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/2/14</td>
<td>2 x 8&quot;</td>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Daytona*</td>
<td>25 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2/4</td>
<td>2 x 175</td>
<td>Carroll</td>
<td>Vandergrift*</td>
<td>26 May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2/4</td>
<td>2 x 175</td>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Vandergrift*</td>
<td>27 May 1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - A unit or move of short duration in order to provide reinforcing fires in support of maneuver elements.

1 Battle Damage Assessment: Battle Damage Assessment for XII Corps Artillery units during the reporting period was as follows.
CONFIDENTIAL

12 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RC)

TARGET DESCRIPTION       NUMBER
Bunkers Destroyed         361
Bunkers Damaged           336
Structures Destroyed      217
Structures Damaged        79
AA Weapons Destroyed      1
Automatic Weapons Destroyed 2
Automatic Weapons Damaged 1
 Rockets Destroyed         1
 KB Arty (confirmed)      1047
 KB Arty (unconfirmed)     44
 Sampans Destroyed        17
 Sampans Damaged          3
 Vehicles Damaged         1
 Bridges Destroyed         1
 Bridges Damaged           2
Secondary Explosions       117
Trenchline Destroyed, Meters 550

(a) Naval Gunfire.

1 There were 16 Naval Gunfire Support ships utilized in the 1st
Military Region. In addition to regular assets a heavy cruiser, the
USS St. Paul, aided heavy firepower with 9 x 8" guns during two three-
week periods on the gunline. The southeastern Demilitarized Zone was
still the main targeting area with over 70% of the naval gunfire rounds
being fired into the area in support of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division
and the 1ST Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MARCH). The 2d ARVN Infantry
Division, Americal Division, 101st Airborne Division (AMEL), and 1st
Marine Division also received Naval Gunfire support. Due to the pacifi-
cation program in the coastal areas, Naval Gunfire rounds expended
have decreased 20%.

2 In view of the assets available, one ship on the gunline for
daily operations with an additional ship available for ten days each
month, and the lack of targeting areas, ANGLICO consolidated the Quang
Ngai team with the one at Chu Lai. The unit now provides the FMR NGLO
at XXIV Corps and Liaison/Spot teams located at Quang Tri, Dong Ha,

3 During the period 4315 missions were fired for a total expendi-
ture of 20,758 rounds with the following damage assessment:

27

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AVN-RE

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, ROCS CPOR-65 (R2)

TARGET DESCRIPTION

- Bunkers Destroyed
- Structures Destroyed
- Secondary Explosions
- KIA (confirmed)
- KIA (probable)

NUMBER

42
29
15
16
4

(f) Friendly Fire Incidents. The following friendly fire incidents were reported in I Military Region during the period 1 May - 31 July 1970:

1. Number of incidents and accidents.

| Month | Artillery Motor Aerial Field Artillery Naval Gun Fire |
|-------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| May   | 7                                        | 6                               | 4               |
| June  | 3                                        | 3                               | 3               |
| July  | 4                                        | 0                               | 0               |

2. Casualties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>US Kiiled</th>
<th>US Wounded</th>
<th>OTHER Kiiled</th>
<th>OTHER Wounded</th>
<th>TOTAL Kiiled</th>
<th>TOTAL Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) Firing Battery Inspection Team (FBIT). During the reporting period, primary emphasis of the Corps Artillery Firing Battery Inspection Team continued to be placed on technical assistance to ARVN artillery units. With the full concurrence and cooperation of the Commanding Officer, I ARVN Corps Artillery, firing batteries in the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, Quang Da Special Zone, and the 2d ARVN Infantry Division, were evaluated by the team. Detailed technical checks of fire direction procedures, firing battery operations, and maintenance and safety were made in each battery which was visited. On-the-spot critiques were given during and at the end of each visit, and a formal report was forwarded to I ARVN Corps Artillery. Although it was not possible to visit all of the ARVN batteries in I Corps, good coverage of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and the Quang Da Special Zone was obtained.

(h) Regional Forces/Popular Forces.

Corps Artillery participated in one major artillery training program for Vietnamese forces. In cooperation with the Commanding Officer of I ARVN Corps Artillery and the I ARVN Corps Deputy Commander for territorial forces, an extensive program to train territorial force in procedures for requesting and adjusting artillery fire was initiated.
A team of officers from XXIV Corps Artillery and I ARVN Corps Artillery conducted a survey on 16-20 April 1970 to determine the present level of proficiency of Regional Forces/Popular Forces personnel in artillery adjustment procedures and to ascertain the desirability of conducting training in this subject. The team spoke with Government of Vietnam officials and/or US advisors in all five provinces and eleven districts; all agreed upon the necessity for forward observer training for Regional and Popular Force personnel and enthusiastically endorsed a combined program by XXIV Corps Artillery and I ARVN Corps Artillery to conduct such training.

Two separate training programs were undertaken, one for Regional Forces and one for Popular Forces personnel.

The goal for the Regional Force program is to train the following numbers of officers from the various Regional Forces command echelons:

- Sector Headquarters - 1
- Subsector Headquarters - 1
- Battalion Headquarters - 2
- Company-Group Headquarters - 2
- Company - 3

A total of 889 Regional Force officers will be trained in artillery adjustment procedures in I Military Region. The Regional Force training is conducted at the Americal Division as a part of the Regional Forces/Popular Forces Leadership and Orientation Course. The first class started on 10 June 1970.

The Popular Forces training program is being conducted by ARVN artillerymen who will conduct classes at 12 sites in I Military Region at local ARVN batteries. Each class is being conducted over a three day period and stresses basic essentials and actual firing. The Popular Force training program will train a total of 3138 Popular Force leaders in artillery adjustment procedures. The Popular Force training began on 15 June 1970. It is anticipated that the Popular Force training will last for eight weeks.

(1) Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT). Following is a listing, by month, of the number of soundings checked during the quarter with results as indicated. The high unsatisfactory sounding rate at the beginning of the quarter was due primarily to inadequate emplacement of two (2) metro sections.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SOUNDINGS</th>
<th>NUMBER SATISFACTORY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1970</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1970</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1970</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(j) CQM Team.

1. The XXIV Corps Artillery CQM Team formed in 1968 to inspect artillery units was discontinued in June 1970. The mission was taken by the XXIV Corps C., Maintenance Division, on 1 July 1970. Prior to Artillery disbanding the inspection team, the remaining units of Corps Artillery were inspected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>SIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 April 1970</td>
<td>C Battery, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April 1970</td>
<td>C Battery, 29th Artillery</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Corps Artillery CQM Team during the twenty-four months it was active, completed three cycles of inspections. Although unsatisfactory ratings were received by several units during the final cycle, January through April 1970 maintenance and maintenance management standards improved in all battalions. An awareness of the value of good maintenance and maintenance programs was impressed on Commanders and personnel. The value of a CQM effort does not end but must not cease when the formal inspection is completed. The service and assistance of the team as a Command assistance and instructor group must continue and, in fact, be more active than during the actual inspection cycle. Commanders at all levels must make wide use of this resource.

(k) Communications.

1. On 3 June 1970, the XXIV Corps Artillery Command Fire PM secure net was activated at Camp Horn. This net made possible secure voice communications to Corps Artillery units and to other artillery units within the Corps. This net served as a back-up to the AUTOPCOCOM terminal and was the primary and sole means of secure voice to the units which did not have access to the AUTOPCOCOM terminal. This net could not be activated from DaNang previously because of excessive distances involved for man-powered PM equipment, and obstructive terrain features as well as the small amount of secure retransmission equipment available.

2. The obtaining of secure voice automatic digital repeater equipment for retransmission capabilities has given this unit the capability to transmit to all major artillery units within XXIV Corps Artillery in the Military Region. However when attempting to locate this equipment...
the best site to obtain extended range; interference was experienced. This was the result of the same frequencies being used by two or more units within I Military region (I Military Region is divided into three frequency usage areas). These areas are: from the Demilitarized Zone south to Hai Van Pass; from Hai Van Pass south to Hoi An; and from Hoi An south to the southern I Military Region boundary. This breakdown, with its prominent terrain features, allows multiple use of the same frequencies.

b. When retransmission units were located on prominent terrain features, reception of traffic, interference and unintentional jamming by friendly units was frequent. In order to correct this problem, retransmission equipment operated on low power when practicable and directional antennas were used where possible. These measures were satisfactorily employed by this headquarters and subordinate units both north and south of the Hai Van Pass.

2. Due to recent possible enemy attempts at jamming of the Corps Artillery Command Fire FM Net, helicopters were employed using onboard direction finding equipment to search for the transmitting stations and were most successful in locating the interference.

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel

(i) Narcotics suppression.

(a) Observation: Combined narcotics and black market suppression teams are effective in reducing the flow of contraband items.

(b) Evaluation: Emphasis on conduct of these operations on a continual basis.

(d) Recommendation: That turnover of personnel assigned to these teams be kept to a minimum to allow for development of contacts/informers and a harmonious working relationship with Vietnamese officials.

b. Intelligence/Counterintelligence.

(i) Automatic Sensor Readout Recordings.

(a) Observations: The Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART I) facility at Quang Tri became operational during this period. The facility screens out sensor activations caused by RFI, hypersensitivity, etc, based on preset criteria and automatically records all other activations.
This permanent recording of valid sensor activations allows the operator full time for evaluation and provides the supervisor an inspection device in ensuring more attentive operators.

(b) Evaluation: The sensor readouts DART I comprise only 11% of all sensors employed throughout I Military Region. However, since DART became operational, 60% of all targets reported in I Military Region were reported by DART facility.

(c) Recommendation: That all unattended ground sensor monitor sites be equipped with some sort of an automatic recording device as soon as possible (DART, Event Recorder, X-T Platter).

(2) Document Exploitation.

(a) Observation: Enemy documents captured by US Forces are evacuated expeditiously to XXIV Corps and subsequently via a dedicated courier to the Combined Document Exploitation Center in Saigon. Consequently, full and partial readouts of these documents have been available to the capturing unit and all other interested organizations within 36 to 48 hours after evacuation. However, documents captured by ARVN units are sometimes held for exploitation by the capturing unit. Although significant information is usually passed to US Forces in the area via briefings, other interested organizations do not receive the information on a timely basis as desired. XXIV Corps Interrogation Prisoner of War Branch now maintains a portable 3M "107" copier to duplicate documents captured by ARVN units which they do not desire to release for Combined Document Exploitation Center exploitation immediately. A "Go Team" is dispatched with the copier whenever this problem is now encountered.

(b) Evaluation: The use of the copier satisfies Combined Document Exploitation Center requirements for timely evacuation of enemy documents captured by ARVN units while allowing the capturing unit to fully exploit the same documents in the field. This arrangement satisfies all requirements and has strengthened liaison and cooperation between US and ARVN document exploitation personnel.

(c) Recommendation: That US document exploitation personnel experiencing the problem of timely evacuation of ARVN captured documents effect liaison and arrange for reproduction of such documents.

5. (U) Operations.

(1) Reduction of Friendly Fire Accidents.

(a) Observation: The majority of friendly fire accidents and incidents are caused by a lack of experience and failure of personnel to be
properly briefed on locations of friendly troops.

(b) Evaluation: Briefings by responsible personnel, down to the squad leaders level, must be thorough and constantly updated as regards the current situation and status of friendly troops. This is particularly true during the hours of darkness when land navigation and identification of friendly forces is most difficult. Movement around ambush sites and night defensive positions must be kept to an absolute minimum. Personnel departing these areas must insure that other personnel are aware of their departure, direction of departure and return. This requirement is receiving continued daily emphasis.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders concerned, and appropriate service schools, continue to stress the need for thorough and updated briefings on the status of friendly troops.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (C) Training.

(1) Mechanical Ambush Triggering Device Project.

(a) Observation: Recent field experience with mechanical ambushes revealed that the enemy is adapting to the use of mechanical ambush triggering devices by allied forces and has begun to neutralize unmanned ambushes, particularly by severing the trip wire.

(b) Evaluation: Most triggering devices in use that are fabricated in the field are of the single action type. Pulling the trip wire closes a set of contacts which completes an electrical circuit to the Claymore mine. Cutting the trip wire disablesthe circuit. Use of a dual action triggering device of the pull/release type will cause the enemy additional disarming or neutralization problems.

(c) Recommendation: That units make more use of easily fabricated double action triggering devices. A letter explaining fabrication of two field expedient double action triggering devices for mechanical ambushes, made from commonly available materials, was distributed by XXIV Corps.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (U) Communications. None.
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AVII-GST

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Material. None.
2. (U) Other. None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

W. E. SHEDD
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

JOHN D. GARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

2 Incl
as
Incl 1 w/d HQ DA
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 3 July 1970, RCS 2SFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

To: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-IX, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20340

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 3 July 1970 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference items concerning "Intelligence/Counterintelligence," Section 2, page 31, paragraph 2b(1) and "Document Exploitation" Section 2, page 32, paragraph 2b(2) have been extracted and will be considered for possible inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   b. Reference item concerning "Automatic Sensor Readout Recording," page 32, paragraph 2b(1)(c); nonconcur with recommendation. The value of the event recorders is recognized. However, in many locations its use is impractical because of cost, activity in the area, and the temporary or mobile nature of the operation. Recommend that the recommendation be changed as follows: "That all Division and Brigade level unattended ground sensors..." Unit has been so advised.

For the Commander:

[Signature]

Cy expr.

XXIV Corps
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 3 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (c) 

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 SEP 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. CLINE
ZLT, AGC
Asst AG
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AVIII-GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCE DFORD-65 (ES)

TROOP LIST AS OF 31 JULY 1970

XXIV CORPS

Hq, XXIV Corps

24th PI Det

24th Avn Bn (CPCON)

Co C, 5th Special Forces Op (CPCON)

Combined Action Forces (CPCON)

204th MI Det

29th Civil Affairs Co

48th Chemical Det

108th Trans Co (CPCON)

2d Plt, Co B, 504th MP Bn (CPCON)

31st MIS Hist Det

XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY

Hq, XXIV Corps Arty

1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)

Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

Btry G, 65th Arty (.50cal MG)

108th Artillery Grp

Hq, 108th Artillery Grp

8th Bn, 7th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

1st Bn, 39th Arty (155mm) (SP)

1st Bn, 33rd Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

Btry F, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)

235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

III CORP

Hq, Co

1st MP Bn

3d MP Bn

1st Radio Bn

4th Comm Bn

1st Force Recon Co

1ST MDC

Hq, Co

1st MAR Bn

6th MAR Bn

HQ Co

1st Bn

1st Bn

3d Bn

5th MAR Bn

HQ Co

1st Bn

2d Bn

3d Bn

4I Bn

INCLUSIONS: CONFIDENTIAL
AVII-G07
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, KIEF Corps,
Period Ending 31 July 1970, KS OOPU-65 (K)

7th Mar Batt
HQ Co
1st BN
2d BN
3d BN
11th Mar Batt
HQ Btry
1st BN
2d BN
3d BN
4th BN
1st Accoun BN
1st Eng BN
1st Med BN
1st MT BN
1st Bridge Co (-)
7th Eng BN (-)
9th Eng BN

PLG

1st MNY
M2NC-1
MAG 11
MAG 13
MAG 16
MNC-18
MAG-17

101ST ABN DIV (AMBL)
1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

HGC, 1st Bde
1st BN (AMBL), 327th Inf
1st BN (AMBL), 501st Inf
2d BN (AMBL), 502d Inf
42d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

HGC, 2d Bde
3d BN (AMBL), 187th Inf
2d BN (AMBL), 327th Inf
1st BN (AMBL), 502d Inf
47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
34th Pub Info Det (FID Bn)

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

HGC, 3d Bde
2d BN (AMBL), 501st Inf
1st BN (AMBL), 506th Inf
2d BN (AMBL), 506th Inf
50th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
25th Pub Info Det (FID Bn)

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12 August 1970


2 3rd Cav Bn (Assn Maint)
251st Inf Div (Assn Maint)
36th Eng in (AMBL)
501st Sig bn (AMBL)
101st Ft. Co (AMBL)
557th Inf Flt (Obt Tracker)
365th Med Hlth Co
10th Med Flt (US)
20th Cam Htbn (US)
22d Htbn Flt (US)
101st Htbn (US)
Operating Location 6
5th Weather Det (PM) 30th FASC Det

AMERICAN DIV
11th Infantry Division
HQG, 11th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 36th Inf
3d Bn, 2nd Bn
4th Bn, 3rd Bn
6th Bn, 1st Bn
9th Bn, 2nd Bn
17th Bn, 1st Bn (Scout Dog)
34th Bn, 1st Bn
11th Public Information Det
16th Bn, 1st Bn

2nd Infantry Brigade
HQG, 2nd Inf Bde
1st Bn, 1st Inf
2nd Bn, 1st Inf
2nd Bn, 2nd Inf
4th Bn, 1st Inf
2nd Bn, 1st Flt (Scout Dog)
4th Bn, 1st Flt
11th Public Information Det

3rd Infantry Brigade
HQG, 3rd Inf Bde
1st Bn, 3rd Inf
2nd Bn, 3rd Inf
3rd Bn, 3rd Inf
1st Bn, 1st Flt (Scout Dog)
3rd Bn, 1st Flt
11th Public Information Det

4th Infantry Brigade
HQG, 4th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 4th Inf
2nd Bn, 4th Inf
3rd Bn, 4th Inf
1st Bn, 1st Flt (Scout Dog)
2nd Bn, 1st Flt
11th Public Information Det

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-SCI

12 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, BCS CS404-65 (R2)

American Division Artillery

HB Div Art

1st Bn. 14th Arty
1st Bn. 2nd Arty
3d Bn. 10th Arty
5th Bn. 18th Arty
6th Bn., F. A. Artillery

6th Bn., 11th Arty

Metre Section, 2d Bn., 11th Arty

155-gun Artillery Battery (Cal)

3d Plt. 5th Bn., 59th Arty (Searchlight)

90mm FA Artillery

122mm FA Artillery

Artillery Aviation Group

HHC, 14th Inf. Div (Obt)

14th Inf. Div Arty Bn

1st Avn. Co

133d Avn. Co (Asst Spt Hal)

170th Avn. Co (Asst Spt Hal)

178th Avn. Co (Asst Spt Hal)

316th Med. Det

362nd Med. Det

123d Avn. Bn (Obt) (Inf Div)

Trp B, 1st Sikhs, 1st Cav

Co K, 723d Maint Bn

Trp F, 82nd Cav

335th Trans Co

American Division Support Command

HHC and Bn

23d Armd. Co

23d Med. Bn

23d S.S. Bn

723d Maint. Co (Obt)

634 Inf. Plt. (Obt)

Co C (Inf); ... 55th Inf

American Works Command (AUD)

Ch. of Staff, Command (PAVD)

Headquarters American Division

HHC, American Division

1st Sqn. 1st Cav (Obt)

26th Engi Bn

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AVII-CLT
12 August 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report -Lessons Learned, Headquarters, III Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CE 080-65 (E2)

523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
146th MP Plt, 504th MP Bn
3d MIL Hist Det
635th MI Co
328th RA Co
OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

Non-Divisional Units
6th CA Plt, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
Det 3, 7th Payop Bn (DS of Div)
USAASG, AGSI, DA

1st BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (GP)
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co P, (Ranger), 75th Inf
Co A, 77th Engr Bn
Co C, 2d Bn, 14th Armor (Attached from 25th Div to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div)
3d Sqdn, 5th Arm Cav (-D Troop) (Attached from 9th Div)
C/3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav
43d Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
75th GS Spt Bn
13th MI Det
86th Cal Det
298th Sig Co
517th MI Det
407th RA Det
77th Unit Tracker Det