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<td>TO:</td>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
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<td>AGO DA ltr, 9 May 1975; AGO DA ltr, 9 May 1975</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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AVCA CRB-GO-0


THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA CO-O, APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96552

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. ACoS, Personnel and Administration
      (1) Personnel Management:
         (a) The command strength continues to decrease as the effects of the drawdown become more evident. Efforts are geared toward replacing key personnel losses. The statistics clearly show the trend:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>AUTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>427</td>
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<td>WO</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>8049</td>
<td>8029</td>
<td>7731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9619</td>
<td>8527</td>
<td>8282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8195</td>
<td>7422</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The transition from 1st Logistical Command to USARV on both officer and enlisted personnel replacements was made and a personal visit to USARV proved to be the key to the smoothness of the transition. The personnel at USARV have been very receptive.

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AVCA CRB-60-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Car Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65(R2)(U)

reporting period are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Security and Intelligence

(a) Clearance Actions

1. During the reporting period, a total of 528 requests for personnel security actions were received, and a total of 442 clearances were granted or validated. As of 30 April 1970, 106 clearance actions were pending.

2. USARV Message, DTG 171043Z Jan 70, pertaining to paragraph 20a, USARV Reg 604-5, amended the paragraph to read: "It is imperative that commanders/supervisors at all echelons immediately suspend access to classified information of any individual upon discovery of significant derogatory information within the criteria of paragraph 17a, AR 604-5." The above change specifically applies to the possession or use of Marijuana even when the individual concerned claims possession or use as a first offense. Suspension of access will remain in effect pending inquiry/investigation per paragraph 20d, USARV Reg 604-5. Whether the illegal use or possession of a narcotic was an isolated first time offense will be a factor for consideration by the clearance granting authority as to whether the clearance will be revoked or the access to classified information restored.

(b) Document Security: Scheduled 10% inventories of SECRET documents were conducted on 12 January 1970, 10 February 1970, 10 March 1970, and 14 April 1970, respectively. Additionally, a 100% inventory of all SECRET documents was conducted on 1 April 1970.

(c) War Trophy Registration: A total of 139 war trophies were screened for intelligence value in accordance with USARV Reg 643-20, during the reporting period.

(d) Ground Defense: Improvements have been made in the perimeter lighting system to include the field expedient employment of fluorescent lighting, borrowed U.S. Air Force mobile lighting units and a jeep mounted searchlight. Additional wire and lighting have been installed. Perimeter security has been upgraded through the use of broken glass interspersed within the wire to delay barefooted sappers. Noise making devices have been installed in the security

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AVCA CP-80-60

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(1) Chaplain's Visits to LSA's: A coordinated program was instituted by the 56th General Support Group to have chaplains visit LSA's on a weekly basis, rotating the chaplains to each LSA.

(2) Casualties: See Inclosure 1.


(9) Promotions: See Inclosure 3.


(11) Visitors: See Inclosure 5.

b. ACC'S, SP&O

(1) Plan for the Realignment of Logistical Support in II Corps Tactical Zone - South. During the report period this headquarters undertook a major study and planning effort to assess the total capability of the command now, and in the 30 September 1970 time frame for the purpose of evaluating how the command would look in terms of its own composition and force structure and that of the units supported. The substance of this OPLAN (CRBSUPCOM OPLAN 111-70) was presented by the CC at the 1st Logistical Command's Commanders' Conference during April. The following conclusions were formulated from the study:

(a) The strength supported in the time frame of the study will not be reduced significantly from the strength supported on 15 April 1970.

(b) Of significance to this command will be the increased support directed for Qui Nhon Support Command. To date, Class III (Package), Class V and Class VII supply support has begun between Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. Tonnage requirements are noted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Tonnage/ Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class III (Package)</td>
<td>950 tons/ month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>7500 tons/ month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII (Major Wheeled/Tracked Vehicles)</td>
<td>3000 tons/ month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Internal realignment within the support command will involve principally the Logistical Support Activities (LSA's) located at Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, Dalat, Phan Rang, Nha Trang and Bien Hoa. Through centralization, termination, assumption by the customer, satelliting of personnel and function on the customer and ARVNization, this command hopes to achieve economy in the retail customer support activities.

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INCL
(2) **Operation OTTER**

(a) In February 1970, dedicated OTTERs and other aircraft were used on a scheduled basis twice a week for the delivery of priority maintenance repair parts and assemblies to the outlying Logistical Support Activities in support of Support Command maintenance detachments. Flights emanated from Cam Ranh Bay to Ban Me Thuot, Dak Lab, Bao Loc and Phan Thiet. Return flights bring back repairables and requisitions for fill. Since the start of this program the following tonnages have been delivered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>POUNDS SHIPPED</th>
<th>POUNDS RETRO-GRADED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>19,504</td>
<td>5,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>32,762</td>
<td>5,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>6,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Advantages and benefits realized from the OTTER thus far include:

1. Reduction of reorder ship time from 15-20 days to 7-10 days.
2. Reduction of retrograde for repair time for mission essential communications/electronic equipment from 15-21 days to 4-7 days.
3. Deadlined equipment awaiting parts time has been reduced from 15-26 days to 7-10 days.
4. In a significant number of instances, Class IX items have been made available within 12-24 hours to remove combat vehicles and artillery pieces from deadline.

(c) Coordination to obtain the OTTER and other types of dedicated aircraft for the air delivery of Class IX essential repair parts is conducted through the Transportation Division, G-4, I Field Force - Vietnam, Nha Trang.

(3) **Training**

(a) At the present time 5 Koreans (2 Officers and 3 EW) are receiving LARC-V OJT with the 97th Transportation Company. This is a six week program with completion scheduled for 16 May 1970. Upon completion of training these personnel will return to Korea to act as instructors for the operation and maintenance of LARC-V's.

(b) The SKILLS I program is designed to provide for the orientation and indoctrination of newly assigned personnel and additional emphasis on formal and informal logistical training. The number of personnel trained during the
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The reporting period are listed below:

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<th></th>
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<th>APRIL</th>
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<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>HACIE</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>15</td>
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(a) Security and Intelligence

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wire surrounding critical facilities. Additionally, emphasis is being placed on the acquisition of personnel sensors, radar, and seismic intrusion detection devices. All subordinate units have been provided information on construction of the "HUSCH" flare as a means of improving perimeter illuminations.

(e) For additional information refer to Inclosure 6 (After-Action Report - Enemy Attack 31 March - 1 April 1970).

(f) Intelligences As of 10 April 1970, the following enemy units were confirmed within a 30 km radius of Cam Ranh Bay. Composition of the listed units is characterized by the presence of recon, sappers, artillery, engineer, and propaganda/civil affairs/proselytizing elements.

2. Our Secret Zone

HQ, 407th VC Sapper Bn
10/95th VC Artillery Bn
HQ, 145th VC MP Bn
HQ, 610th VC LF Bn
K-93 Swimmer/Sapper Platoon
K-91 Sapper Platoon
99th Recon Platoon
7-106 Recon Platoon
241 Recon Platoon

Dong Bo Secret Base

2-2 LF Co
K-94 VC Engr Co
K-98 Sapper Co
C-4 LF Co
5C3 LF Platoon
50° VC LF Co
K-92 VC Sapper Co

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Indirect fire attacks and sapper activity have been the predominant enemy tactic during the second quarter of 1970. The ordnance used by the enemy has consisted of C-4 satchel charges, B-40 rockets, 82mm mortars, and 107mm and 140mm rockets. The majority of the attacks are launched between 2300 and 0400 hours. The enemy favors periods of decreased lunar illumination. Because most indirect-fire attacks are launched from the same general area, commonly referred to as the "Rocket Belt", the local Vietnamese military officials are of the opinion that the attacks are conducted by small VC/NVA cells which infiltrate the launch area as part of the local population engage in woodcutting, etc., and remain in the area overnight taking refuge in caves, areas of heavy foliage, or other places of concealment. During the night they set up the mortars and rockets, launch the attack, and then exfiltrate the launch area by mixing with the local population moving to and from the villages along Highway 1. The VC/NVA in the Cam Ranh area retain the capability to launch effective rocket/mortar attacks and sapper probes against the installations in the DS/CTCC/CRB complex.

(g) Chronological listing of attacks against Cam Ranh Area: See Inclosure

(c) ACofS Supply

(1) Representatives of the ACofS Supply made liaison visits to the following areas and customers in these areas on the dates indicated below:

(a) 1 February - Ban Me Thuot
(b) 5 February - Phan Rang
(c) 18 February - Phan Rang Air Base
(d) 19-23 February - Bao Loc
(e) 27 February - Phan Thiet
(f) 10 March - Ban Me Thuot
(g) 13 March - Nha Trang
(h) 16 March - Dalat
(i) 18 March - Bao Loc
(j) 20 March - Nha Trang

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65(R2)(U)

(k) 20 March - Dalat
(l) 22-23 March - Phan Rang
(m) 23 March - Cam Ranh Bay
(n) 24 March - Nha Trang
(o) 2-3 April - Phan Thiet
(p) 6 April - Ban Me Thuot
(q) 7 April - Nha Trang
(r) 9 April - Bao Loc
(s) 14 April - Dalat
(t) 21 April - Phan Rang
(u) 22 April - Nha Trang

(2) Liaison visits were made to 1st Logistical Command (LC) and other Headquarters on the following dates for the purpose indicated:

(a) 26 February - 1st LC Menu Board
(b) 20 March - MACV SAPOV Petroleum Conference
(c) 20 March - Qui Nhon Support Command Liaison
(d) 23 March - 1st LC Resources Review Board
(e) 24 March - USAICCV Liaison
(f) 14 April - Qui Nhon Support Command Liaison
(g) 18 April - 1st LC Special Courier
(h) 21 April - 1st LC Petroleum Liaison
(i) 22 April - 1st LC DSU Procurement
(j) 23 April - USAICCV Liaison
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1) 27 April - MACV Quartermaster School Observation

3) Special assistance visits were made to the following locations on the dates indicated:

(a) 24 February - Song Kao

(b) 16 April - Nha Trang Self Service Supply Center

4) A feasibility study was made on a proposal submitted by the Meadow Cold Dairies. The proposal was for delivery of dairy products to each individual mess hall located in Cam Ranh Bay and Dong Ba Thin, and line haul of refrigerated dairy products to LSA's at Phan Rang and Nha Trang. After careful consideration by this command, the proposal was forwarded to 1st Logistical Command with recommendations that the proposal be implemented.

5) The US Air Force located at Phan Rang requested that they be designated a direct Depot customer for Class I supplies. A plan was initiated to provide the Phan Rang Air Force support from Depot; however, the Air Force Base Commander did not feel that they could effectively assume the missions of the commissary and troop issue supply of Air Force mess halls. Therefore, the Phan Rang Air Force decided to continue to draw rations from the Phan Rang Logistical Support Activity.

6) Through a Memorandum of Understanding between COMUSMACV and COMROKFV, a maximum number of MCI and A rations meals was established for issue to Republic of Korea Forces - Vietnam. The ratio for II CTZ South has been 43.5 A ration - 57% MCI rations. After 1 May 1970, the new ratio will be 65% A ration - 35% MCI ration. This action was taken by MACV to reduce the cost of supporting ROKFV since the MCI ration is more costly than the A ration.

7) A test on tailgate distribution of subsistence items to unit messes was completed during the period. It was found that the command does not have the necessary assets of personnel and vehicles to implement the system at this time. When a sufficient number of vehicles and personnel are received, tailgate distribution will be implemented. In the interim, this command is consolidating several messes and the ration requests for battalion sized organizations to assist in lowering the work load of Class I ration breakdown point at Cam Ranh Bay.

8) To meet anticipated demands for diesel fuel at the Phan Thiet LSA in support of engineer roadwork, one 3,000 barrel tank was converted from JP-4 to diesel fuel. In addition to accommodating future requirements for diesel fuel, the utilization of the converted tank will increase the efficiency of the discharging operations of Y-tanker vessels.
AVCA CRB-GO-0

SUBJECT: Operational report - lessons learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65 (H) (U)

(9) After coordination with the 5th Area Logistical Command Advisory Team II, an OJT program for ARVN petroleum logisical personnel was initiated at Nha Trang by the 18th Terminal Operating Platoon. This program will qualify ARVN personnel in POL terminal operations. Training will include all phases of terminal operations including receipt, storage, and issue of bulk and packaged petroleum products. The program which began 1 March 1970 will continue until 30 personnel have successfully completed the training.

(10) Operational control of the MT/S T-2 shuttle tanker Suamico was transferred from Qui Nhon Support Command to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command on 14 February 1970. Acquisition of this tanker will increase to three tankers the Cam Ranh Bay shuttle fleet which has been distributing petroleum fuel throughout II Corps Tactical Zone for the past six (6) months.

(11) On 11 March 1970, Maj Montaigne from USARV G-4 and Maj Shirley from the ICCV visited Cam Ranh Bay for the purpose of determining the status of the Popular Forces Dependent Housing Program and of assisting in any problem areas. It was determined that 1/0 kits had been assembled and were available for shipment for the FY 70 program. A problem is that the kits are not being called forward by the MACV Area Advisor on a timely basis. Material for the FY 71 units should begin arriving in April and continue through July. Once the material arrives, it will be separated from normal stocks and assembled into kits. Cam Ranh Bay Depot expects to receive about 22% (or 13,200) of the total programmed 60,000 short tons.

(12) The USASUPCOM-CRB Self Service Supply Centers continued to exceed the 1st Logistical Command goal of 90% demand satisfaction. During April the Nha Trang store received 1,899 requests and filled 1,856 for a 97.7% demand satisfaction. The Cam Ranh Bay store received 3,876 requests and filled 3,718 for a 95.9% demand satisfaction. Combined statistics for both stores show a demand satisfaction of 96.5% for the month of April 1970. Zero balances decreased from a 9% average for the month of March to a combined figure of 7.8% during the month of April.

(13) The Cam Ranh Bay Class II, IV, and VII Supply Point surpassed the 1st Logistical Command goal of 70% for demand satisfaction for the third consecutive month by reaching a percentage of 75.7% during the month of April. This was an improvement of 5% over the previous month. Demand accommodation showed a 5% increase over the month of March by reaching 77.1% during the month of April.

(14) On 24 March 1970 representatives of the Plans and Operations Division and the 54th General Support Group presented a briefing on the
AFAF CEC-60-0


The contractor operated Cam Ranh Bay Class II, IV, and VII Supply Point to the 1st Logistical Command Resources Review Board. The board approved the continued operation of this DSU by a contractor during FY 71 based on Vinning performance to date. Personnel staffing of 2 American, 7 Third Country and 75 Local National personnel was approved by the board.

On 22 April 1970 a representative of the Plans and Operations Division assisted personnel of the 1st Logistical Command ACofS, Services in reviewing the Cam Ranh Bay Class II, IV, and VII DSU procurement package so that it was in format prescribed by USARV Regulation 715-1 and in agreement with the final recommendations approved by the 1st Logistical Command Resources Review Board prior to transmittal of the package to USARV.

The ACofS, Supply participated in the Logistical Conference hosted by USARV-LOG on 28 April 1970 for representatives of major supported organizations. Handouts pertaining to the following subjects were provided to the attendees: FSEKA requisitions, MACV Advisory Team requisitions, Special Services requisitions, reasons for nonresponse of supply system, criteria for average rejection of requisitions at depot and USAICCV, rejection of requisitions for quantities exceeding requisitioning objectives, temporary loan of equipment, turn-in of unneeded equipment, unauthorized Red Ball items, Tropical Electrolyte, reasons for zero balances, reduction of high priority requisitions, follow-up and requisitioning procedures, Customer Status Listing, Customer Assistance Channels, Central Issue Facility and Direct Exchange Points, Self Service Supply Center Pre-Packs, Dog Food, Long Range Patrol Rations and Indigenous Patrol Rations. Detailed discussions were presented on the following subjects: Future Self Service Supply Center operations, Command Controlled items, Return of 500 gallon collapsible drums, Issue of Meal Combat Individual, and Issue of Sundries Packs.

During the period 2,422 lines of excess with a value of $1,043,828.55 were reported under Project Thru-Put. Redistribution of 1,001 lines with a value of $891,928.70 was made during the period.

4. ACofS, Transportation:

(1) Project SLAM: Cam Ranh Bay Support Command was tasked to provide Class V support to Qui Nhon. Previous Class V shipments from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon had been made by LST's on a break-bulk basis and by air, both in coordination with TM-72. Under the Project SLAM concept maximum use is made of containerized vans for limited Class V requirements. Initially dedicated RO/RO trailers from 2nd Logistical Command are being used to provide throughputs support to the maximum extent possible. Effective 1 April 1970, Project SLAM RO/RO trailers were being utilized from Cam Ranh Bay on a throughputs basis to selected end stations in II Corps North. Cam Ranh Bay
Support Command completed six Project CLAM RC/RO shipments to Qui Nhon during the month of April with 1,182,9 S/T of Ammo, with an estimate of 85% throughput.

(2) TMP Contract: A PR&C has been drawn up to place the operation of the Transportation Motor Pool (TMP) under a contract operator. With a shortage of personnel and an increasing area and number of vehicles it was apparent that the TMP could most efficiently and economically be operated by a contractor.

(3) Records set by 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A):

(a) 25 Feb 1970 - 24 hour discharge by deep draft vessels - 14,700 S/T
(b) 2 Apr 1970 - 24 hour deep draft onload - 3,678 S/T

e. ACESS, Services:

(1) Engineering:

(a) During this period the 497th Engr Co (PC) continued their work on the deep draft port area bulkheads. They have completed the area between piers 2 and 4 and started between piers 1 and 2. An additional platoon that had been located at Qui Nhon moved to Cam Ranh Bay and started work on the bulkhead south of pier 1. The 497th Engr Co (PC) also continued their operational support mission of repairing the POL storage tanks. Repair consists of pouring a concrete slab in the bottom of the unserviceable tanks and coating the slab with an epoxy compound. Six tanks were repaired using this method; however, when tested they still leaked. USAECV (P) is studying a modification in the repair procedure to correct this situation.

(b) Contractor construction support felt the effect of the USARV construction austerity program, with all projects being either cancelled, put on hold or reduced in scope. During this period the Ammo Storage Area "C" and repair of Bayshore Drive projects were completed or are nearing completion after a redesign to lower the cost. Work was started on the port hardstand areas with the areas between piers 2 and 4 being completed.

(c) The lack of funds and engineer labor has resulted in the cancellation of projects that are considered essential for either operational or security reasons. The most outstanding example is security lighting for the large POL and Ammo storage areas. Because of the threat of hostile actions, temporary lighting was erected on a self-help basis.

(d) The repair of the 631 barge pier at the South Beach shallow draft facilities was started during this period. Materials were furnished by
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April, OCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

the Army with the labor and equipment being furnished by AB&T under NCTS contract.

2. Graves Registration: The remains of 151 US Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) personnel were processed through USASUPCOM-CRB collecting points during the reporting period.

3. Laundry: Contract laundry costs were $51,796.85 below the imposed ceiling of $318,779.40 for the reporting period. A surplus of $23,694.01 exists for the two contracts. This is expected to increase during the Fiscal Year. Field laundry production was 2,049,275 pounds for the reporting period. This includes 219,738 pounds processed at the Nha Trang Air Force laundry that is operated by the Army. Production at the Air Force laundry began on 6 April 1970. During the reporting period two Eidel laundry machines were turned in resulting in an on hand total of 16.

4. Food Service: During the reporting period a total of 738,649 pounds of bread was produced and distributed by the Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay field bakeries.

5. Property Disposal:

(a) A staging area of approximately ten acres was set up for Schiavone Chase Corporation to assist them in removing scrap. The new area gives them the capability to load their ships on a 24-hour basis.

(b) During the reporting period the PDO processed 3,086.7 short tons of scrap and $4,555,337 worth of items. Approximately $1,349,714 of usable property was returned to various units within this command's area of operation to satisfy their requirements.

f. Cam Ranh Special Troops:

1. The Commander of Cam Ranh Special Troops for the period 1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70 was LTC Robert L. Moore. During the reporting period the command was engaged in training, troop movement, and combat support for 89 days.

2. Special Order 68, dated 9 Mar 70, Headquarters, USASUPCOM-CRB gave the CO, Cam Ranh Special Troops the additional duty as Headquarters Commandant. Additional responsibilities included the addition of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, USASUPCOM-CRB for administration, military justice, and logistics.

3. On 5 Mar 70, the 22d Finance Detachment located in Nha Trang was moved to another location. The 22d Finance Detachment maintained the office in Nha Trang and assumed all the functions of the 22d Finance Detachment.
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A total of 9 officers and 65 enlisted men were transferred to the 92d Finance Detachment. A majority of the personnel remained at Kha Trang to operate the facilities located there.

(c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

1. Personnel:

(i) Driving Safety:

(a) Observation: The command has intensified the program to appren- tend personnel operating motor vehicles at an excessive rate of speed. A letter was published requiring all officers and noncommissioned officers to report all violations of speed limits in the Cam Ranh Bay area. The command safety office makes weekly traffic safety checks to observe and report spe- ders. These reports are referred to the Military Police. Commanders are notified and a reply is required on disciplinary action taken. Remedial drivers school is held on Sunday evenings for all personnel of this command that receive a ticket for speeding or racing violations.

(b) Evaluation: Speeding violations can be reduced by unannounced traffic surveys and the concerted effort of all supervisors and commanders to discourage speeding by remedial training, revoking operator's licenses and imposing appropriate disciplinary action.

(ii) Water Safety:

(a) Observation: A drive on water safety was initiated prior to swimming areas opening for the season. The following actions were taken: Letters were published emphasizing safety in water sports and recreation at beaches; major subordinate commanders were required to submit copies of their water safety SOP's to this headquarters for review; special SOP's on beach safety were prepared by those commands controlling beaches; a special SOP was written for the Tiger Lake recreation area; life guards received refresher training; a project of regular safety inspections of all water recreation areas was initiated; regular patrols of MP's of the recreation areas are conducted to reinforce the life guards constabulary duties.

(b) Evaluation: The intensified water safety program will minimize accidents at beaches. Tight supervision with emphasis on educating personnel relative to good water safety practices and hazards that are present at beaches have been effected. Only one recordable injury has been reported since 1 Jan 70. This accident was caused by "horseplay".

(iii) Automated Listing of Local National Employees:

(a) Observation: The authorization for local national employees has de- creased from 2,637 to 2,431 by a series of reductions made by higher
headquarters to reduce manpower ceilings and the redeployment of units. An automated listing of local national employees is now being prepared on a monthly basis to assist staff officers and commanders in responding to the turbulent personnel requirements.

(5) Evaluation: The automated listing of local national employees provides commanders with a monthly document to update personnel changes, realign assignments to meet reductions/additions, and to control the authorized positions and the assigned personnel. The listing provides the Personnel Management Division, Civilian Personnel Office and the 92d Finance Office with a managerial tool to control and coordinate all personnel actions pertaining to local national employees.

(4) Military Operations Office

(a) Observation: Civil/Military planning in Cam Ranh City was completely realigned to increase Vietnamese participation and greater coordination among the US services and agencies. A list of projects for the past year has been developed, specified responsibilities are indicated, and priorities are established for the projects. Current projects emphasize community developments such as children's day care centers, education facilities, public health and road improvements.

(b) Evaluation: The yearly list of projects enables all of the civil affairs personnel to improve coordination and control of the projects of highest priority as determined by GVN officials. The increase in GVN participation will result in their officials assuming more responsibilities in improving their communities.

(5) Nonappropriated Funds Division:

(a) Observation: There has been a sharp upsurge in the number of investigations requested by the Exchange system, particularly those pertaining to inventory variances. During this reporting period there has been no request during January, one request for February, and 14 requests during March. The one inventory variance reported in February was a matter of accounting errors and no true variance existed. Of the 14 inventory variances reported in March, six of the variances have been the result of accounting errors and/or shortages in one accounting period resulting in a compensating overage for the following period. Four of the investigations are still in suspense and the remaining five were all inconclusive due to the lack of records. Not one of the original reported inventory variances has been validated to date, resulting in a waste of critical man-hours and government funds.
b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations: None

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Phase down of Ban Me Thuot LSA

(a) Observation: A proposal was made by the Commander of the 54th General Support Group to phase down Class I support at the Ban Me Thuot LSA in an effort to save personnel, refrigeration assets and vehicles. The rations would be broken down at Cam Ranh Bay and shipped on a daily basis to each mess hall receiving support in the BFT area.

(b) Evaluation: Great difficulty has been experienced in the shipment of rations to outlying LSA's such as Ban Me Thuot. It was felt that transportation was not dependable enough to rely on it for the issue of rations on a daily basis without back-up reserves. At present, the LSA maintains a stockage level, and if rations fail to arrive, subsistence items are issued from balances on hand, eliminating any requirement for units to consume their basic load of Meals, Combat, Individual.

(c) Recommendation: That Ban Me Thuot LSA continue to issue Class I utilizing stockages of refrigerated and dry rations stored at the LSA.

(2) Shipment of MCI Rations to Ninh Hoa ROKFV

(a) Observation: During the period, ROKFV personnel presented a listing of MCI rations that were allegedly short from original quantities booked for shipment to Ninh Hoa.
CONFLICT:

AVCA CRB-60-0
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(b) Evaluation: After correlating Transportation Control Movement Documents (TCMD) from the Depot and the transportation battalion, very little shortages had actually occurred. It was apparent that ROKFV personnel had altered their copies of the TCMD's after the battalion drivers had delivered the rations.

(c) Recommendation: An officer or noncommissioned officer accompany each shipment of VCI's to ROKFV units. The responsible officer or noncommissioned officer can resolve any shortages which may occur.

(2) POL Quality Surveillance/Technical Assistance

(a) Observation: It was observed by this Headquarters that POL products at certain LSA's were not being tested on a timely basis. As a result some of the products had been contaminated.

(b) Evaluation: Great difficulty had been experienced in providing transportation for personnel to visit the LSA's to conduct quality surveillance operations to insure timely testing of POL products.

(c) Recommendation: In order to provide quality surveillance and technical assistance to LSA's, rapid transportation should be made available to obtain samples of products for testing and to furnish technical assistance to the LSA's.

g. Communications. None

h. Material. None

i. Maintenance:

(1) Operation: Marine Overhaul Program.

(a) Observation: Parts were ordered for the entire in-country Marine Overhaul Program for RHN on 15 March 1970. Requisitions were hand-carried to the ICCV for transmittal to COMUS. The ICCV will issue to the contractor certificates of nonavailability for parts required for first quarter FY-71 not received by 15 May 1970. These parts will then be procured by the contractor. The time limits for required overhaul of certain water craft has been extended by 12 to 36 months. As a result, the number of craft scheduled for overhaul in FY-71 decreased slightly from the original program.

(b) Evaluation: A total of 305 personnel (US, TCN and LM) are included in the FY-71 contract. This increase of personnel is necessitated by the increased in-country overhaul objectives.

(2) Operation: Office Machine PR&C
AVCA CRB-GO-0


(a) Observation: The office machine PR&C for CRB Support Command was approved by 1st Logistical Command, USEARV and USAPAV. This $40,000 contract will result in a savings to the US Government due to more machines being repaired in-country and fewer being washed out. The existing military repair capability will be employed as contact teams to perform preventive maintenance and limited repair in the CRB and outlying areas such as the LSA's and artillery batteries.

(b) Evaluation: Five personnel are required to adequately support the office machines.

(c) Operation: General Support Overhaul Program

(a) Observation: Repair parts of the entire FY-71 1st quarter CRB General Support Overhaul Program were ordered during the month of February 1976. These requisitions were hand-carried to the ICCV for transmittal to CONUS. Lead time for repair parts is four to six months. Certificates of non-availability will be provided by the ICCV for repair parts that cannot be acquired through the supply system. The GS Overhaul Program in HVN is to be expanded in FY-71 to a two ten-hour shift. This is necessary because of the decrease in CONUS inputs of major subassemblies to HVN. Majority of new employees will be LN's.

(b) Evaluation: 1052 personnel, US, TCN and LN are included in the GS Overhaul Contract for FY-71. This is an increase of approximately 50% over FY-70 necessitated by the two shifts required for rebuilding the increased density of items to be repaired in-country. The GS Overhaul Program will result in a substantial increase over FY-70 thus offering better service to supported units by decreasing equipment down time.

(c) Operation: Repair of POL Tanks

(a) Observation: In the past year there has been a sharp increase in the number of POL tanks becoming unserviceable. There have been 13 at Cam Ranh Bay, 3 at Nha Trang, 3 at Phan Thiet, and 1 at Phan Rang.

(b) Evaluation: The bolted steel tanks were put into use without being painted or coated with a preservation sealer. In addition, they have been in continuous use with insufficient maintenance. This has resulted in the buildup of residue, chemical actions and bacteria. Because of the need to utilize all the tanks at all times and because of a shortage of personnel, the POL units have been unable to provide all required periodic maintenance services. The cause of the leaks has not been confirmed; however, posed
theories include bacteriological action, chemical action, deterioration of the bottom plates, and cracks being opened between the bottom plates because of fluctuating gyrostatic pressures. Since the 262d CM Bn is not capable of repairing these tanks and PASE is prohibited by their contract, the only source for repair has been engineer troop support. Obtaining this source of labor is difficult because of the high priority of their commitments. At best the support can be obtained only on an emergency basis and after the tank is out of service.

(c) Conclusion: That the mission of repairing POL tanks be given to a contractor. Since the number of POL tanks in-country is quite large, the contractor would have sufficient work to warrant obtaining specialized equipment and repairmen. Besides being able to react to newly unserviceable tanks, the contractor would be able to initiate a periodic maintenance program. It is highly probable that by taking a tank out of service and making minor repairs on a periodic basis, the problem of leaking tanks could be greatly reduced. The contractor would also be able to renovate the tanks scheduled for turnover to ARVN units. In their present condition, the serviceable life of many tanks is limited.

(5) Logistics: Logistics for support of the operations above will be provided by the US Government except in instances where military supply channels cannot furnish repair parts required. In such case, the contractor will be authorized to go to their COMUS procurement office for local purchases.

(6) Recommendations: That contract maintenance be used when possible at the GS level. History has shown that down time and nonavailability of equipment is greatly reduced in contrast to out-of-country maintenance and in most cases at a lower cost.

j. Transportation

(1) Personnel: None

(2) Operations: SLAM Shipment of RO/RO Trailers

(a) Observation: During the first SLAM shipment of RO/RO trailers, it was discovered that the stress and action of the sea and vessel against a fully loaded trailer tended to loosen the bandings, and in some cases, damage the landing gear. Also the landing gear was being damaged while loading the trailers onto the LST with E-52's.

(b) Evaluation: Damage to the trailers' landing legs was sustained during loading, due to the configuration of the LST ramp. A wooden bridge
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AVCA CRR-30-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSPOR-65

was constructed on the LST ramp and RO/RO loading was continued and accomplished without incident. SLAM 3, 4 and 5 shipments were not loaded to full capacity, and Class V cargo pallets were loaded on the trailer from rear to front to take excess weight off the landing gear. Qui Nhon Support Command has further provided a banding team to tighten and replace bands upon receipt. Decreased cargo capacity per trailer further allowed utilization of a forklift fitted with a fifth wheel to load the vessel more rapidly and preclude additional damage to the trailer landing gear.

(c) Recommendations: Future SLAM shipments will utilize the knowledge gained from these initial shipments.

(3) Operation: RO/RO Class V.

(a) Observation: RO/RO Class V Support to Qui Nhon (Project SLAM) was initiated.

(b) Evaluation: Before this system can work successfully on a pull-up requisition basis both the shipper and consignee must be in agreement of size of load and roundcounts per item load. Also a thorough understanding of milstamp procedures is mandatory.

(4) Operation: Closing of Dalat ASP

(a) Observation: Supply procedures prior to closing of Dalat ASP

(b) Evaluation: Liaison visits to customer units must be made prior to closing an ASP in an effort to encourage draws in order to deplete stocks as much as possible thus reducing retrograde of excesses. Also, customers must be aware of the impending closure and must be briefed thoroughly on throughput procedures and requisitioning.

k. Ammunition

(1) Observation: Arvinization of Ban Me Thuot Class V Support to US units and retrograde of excess Class V stocks from the BMT LSA.

(2) Evaluation: No significant change in resupply techniques has been required by the new concept of Class V Support, however, asset accountability changed considerably since the ARVN's own all ammunition placed in their ASP but are not customers of the US. This problem was resolved by posting issues to US customers after-the-fact at the CCRD depot.

(3) Observation: Ammunition malfunction investigation conducted on in-bore premature of ROK 105mm Howitzer at Kinh Hoa.
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AVCA ORB-CO-C

(4) Evaluation: All personnel must be interviewed to gain an objective account of what happened and an effort to obtain all fragments, unexploded rounds and gun-tube data is paramount to a successful complete investigation.

Incl as

Incl 2 thru 5 w/d HQ DA

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AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) lst Ind


Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Nonappropriate Funds Division," page 15, paragraph 34(5)(a): nonconcur. Investigations of exchange inventory variances are required IAW AR 60-20. The unit has been notified that paragraph 5c(14), USARV Reg 60-5 assigns the responsibility for initiation or appropriate investigative action to the installation coordinator or, when mutually agreed to by the area exchange commander, to another commander. This does not preclude having a disinterested, accountant investigate a variance prior to investigation by a disinterested officer, provided it is accomplished in a timely manner. Investigations of inventory variances are cyclic due to the four month country-wide inventory procedures of the exchange. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Shipment of MCI Rations to Ninh Hoa ROKPV," page 16, paragraph f(3): nonconcur. An officer or noncommissioned officer should not have to accompany a shipment of MCI's. A letter will be forwarded to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command requesting copies of all available documentation if this problem arises again. This Headquarters will then apprise COMUS MACV of the problems being encountered and request corrective action. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "POL Quality Surveillance/Technical Assistance," page 17, paragraph f(3): concur. Samples of POL products should be taken frequently and submitted to the supporting POL Lab (524th QM Co laboratory Section, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312). USARV Reg 701-11, Quality Surveillance of petroleum, and USARV Reg 701-12, Inspecting and Servicing Filter/Separators on Aircraft Refuelers, give sample submission schedules for different products and situations. Samples should be sent by the first available transportation to the supporting laboratory. Quality Surveillance visits and inspections should not depend on sample collecting, nor should sampling depend on quality surveillance visits. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.
AVHGC-DST (15 May 70) 1st Ind

RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

d. Reference item concerning "Office Machine PR&C," page 17, paragraph e(1): nonconcur. The FY 71 Office Machine procurement request FOR CRB is for $70,488 and has been approved by the 1st Log Cmd and USARV. The contract is still under negotiation by US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam. The evaluation is not supported by the observation. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn: USASUPCOM - CRB
GPOD-DT (15 May 70) 2d Ind (U)

Cam Ranh Bay, for Period Ending 30 April 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

SLT, Asst 40
## UNIT PERSONNEL TESTING

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Inclosure 1

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1. (U) Purpose and Scope: To review the events and results prior to and during the period 31 March - 1 April 1970 concerning the standoff and sapper attack on the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

2. (C) Weather and Terrain.

   a. Weather: Partly cloudy to overcast with occasional showers throughout the period 30 March to 2 April. There was decreasing lunar illumination throughout the period with the moon entering its final phase on 30 March.

   b. Terrain: The terrain immediately west of the tank farm about 100 meters is punctuated by a high sandy ridge. Further west toward the bay, a flat, marshy area characterized by 3-4 foot reeds extends the remaining 300 meters to Cam Ranh Bay interrupted only by a hard surfaced road which connects the Army and Air Force Sectors of the peninsula. The area due north of the tank farm is characterized by heavily vegetated hills and ridges, which extend for some three kilometers before the Air Force physical plant begins. To the east, the same general type of terrain exists except that it is less densely vegetated. To the south, the vegetation is replaced by gently sloping sandhills extending some 1,500 meters before reaching the Depot physical plant. This terrain affords excellent cover and concealment for the small sapper band, which is intent on entering the area.

3. (C) Chronology:

   a. Background.

   (1) Prior to the 31 March - 1 April 1970 attack, Headquarters, IFFV alerted the entire II Corps area to the possibility of increased enemy activity throughout the Corps for the period 31 March to 4 April 1970.

   (2) At 02125H March 70, Sector II, consisting of the Army element on the Cam Ranh Peninsula, conducted a Practice Yellow Alert. The deployment times were well within the USARV acceptable reaction time limits. The reaction and performance of the 1st Logistical Command and nonlogistical forces participating in the practice alert was satisfactory.

   (3) On 31 March, the Commanding General, USASUPCOM-CRB, acting upon the advisement of IFFV provided information called an emergency meeting
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SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Enemy Attack 31 March - 1 April 1970

of the Installation Commanders for the purpose of informing them of the necessity for increased vigilance.

(4) At the time of the attack, the entire Cam Ranh Peninsula was on Grey Alert status.

b. The chronology of the attack follows:

312310H March. Tank Farm #2 experienced four explosions in rapid succession. The explosions were caused by chemical delay-fused satchel charges placed by a suspected 3 to 5 enemy personnel, who previously infiltrated the tank farm area. The Peninsula was immediately placed on Yellow Alert. Support Command reaction units were dispatched immediately to the Tank Farm Area to reinforce the static guard posts and conduct a comprehensive sweep of the remaining Tank Farm #2 area. These sweeps led to the discovery and disarming of rigged satchel charges on three additional tanks (Tanks #31, 32 and 33) and the discovery of bare footprints leading west from the tank farm towards Cam Ranh Bay. The footprints were followed by Support Command and Military Police personnel from the tank farm area to the general area between Pier 5 and the RMK area with negative results.

312340 March. The Rappahannock left Pier 5 and was moved by the harbor pilot to Anchorage #29, Cam Ranh Bay. At the same time, the tanker, Nash Bulk, discharging at the T-5 jetty was ordered to the outer harbor. The Nash Bulk had trouble recovering an anchor and actually left the Jetty on 010125H April.

312345H March. The SeaLift was ordered to get ready to move from its berth at Pier 2 to the outer harbor. The actual move occurred at approximately 010100H April.

Concurrent with the search in the POL Tank Farm area, 191st Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) and 262nd Quartermaster Battalion (POL) personnel conducted a thorough search of all ammunition storage areas and the remaining tank farms with no additional enemy ordnance found. In addition, Military Police patrols were dispatched to patrol the road network in the vicinity of the ammo and POL storage areas, and the suspected egress routes of the sappers from the Tank Farm #2. The areas in the general ammo storage and tank farm areas were illuminated by a mobile ground xenon searchlight furnished by IFFV and a "Firefly" UH-1 helicopter from the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion at Dong Ba Thin.
SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Enemy Attack 31 March - 1 April 1970

Concurrent with the above actions to remove the ammo bearing vessel from Pier 5 and other general cargo ships from the remaining piers, Harbor Defense elements increased their patrolling of the harbor area and conducted hull and pier checks for explosive devices through the port area.

Within the affected tank farm area D7E dozers organic to the Support Command were rushed to the burning area to reinforce existing berms and prevent the spread of released product from the exploded bulk storage tanks. As a preventive measure, water tankers were ordered into the Tank Farm #2 area to cool down bulk storage tanks located adjacent to the burning tanks. This action is credited with "saving" several of the unexploded tanks in the area.

Foam trucks from PA&E - Post Engineer were used, but with only limited success.

010000H April. The US Army Depot - Cam Ranh Disposal Yard, vicinity coordinates CP 048318, was entered by an estimated 3 to 5 personnel employing satchel charges. The explosions destroyed 26 tons of dry batteries and 2 pallets of oxygen bottles. All items destroyed were unserviceable property.

010100H April. The South Beach area of the Support Command complex came under an indirect rocket fire attack consisting of from 10 to 15 107mm rockets. The principal impact area was in the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity - Vietnam areas, vicinity of coordinates CP 064135 and CP 056135, respectively. Rounds from this attack caused a power outage in the South Beach area that lasted approximately 3 hours. Additional results are contained in paragraph 5. Rounds are believed to have been fired from the Cam Tho Peninsula located south of the Cam Ranh Peninsula. Ships at anchor in the outer harbor were immediately ordered into the South China Sea. Harbor Defense watercraft engaged and exchanged fire for a short time with enemy positions on the Cam Tho Peninsula. Subsequent sweeps of the attack launch area to be conducted by the ROKA. A sweep conducted on 3 April produced negative results.

010400H April. The Cam Ranh Peninsula received another indirect fire attack consisting of 15 to 17 rounds of 107mm rockets. These rounds landed in and around the US Army Depot - Cam Ranh area and in the Pier 5 - Tank Farm #2 areas. Four rounds impacted in the Engineer Construction Materials Yard (ECMY) Annex and 12 rounds impacted in the
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SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Enemy Attack 31 March - 1 April 1970

US Army Depot - Cam Ranh Bay area. The launch area was verified to be in
the vicinity of coordinates BP 985214. The launch area was observed by
C Battery, 6th Battalion, 32d Artilley (8"/175mm, SP), located at Fire
Base FREEDOM (adjacent to the 30th ROKA Military Compound) and was engaged
by 40mm Dusters. A subsequent ROKA ground sweep operation revealed that
the launch area was hit by a majority of the 500 rounds of 40mm duster
fired in response to the attack. Thirteen launchers and aiming stakes for
107mm rockets were found. The sweep did not reveal any tangible evidence
of enemy casualties.

4. (C) Attacks on Logistical Support Activities (LSA) During the Night
of 31 March - 1 April 1970.

a. LSA Dalat. The LSA area and the adjacent Cam Ly Airfield received
an estimated 30 rounds of suspected 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The time
duration of the attack was from approximately 010155H until 010235H April.
Results are noted in paragraph 5.

b. LSA Ban Me Thuot. Although several sectors in Ban Me Thuot re-
ceived mortar and rocket fires, the LSA escaped unscathed.

c. LSA Bao Loc. Although the Bao Loc area did receive attacks by
small arms and indirect fire weapons the LSA escaped unscathed.

d. LSA Phan Thiet. Indirect fire was directed toward the BDL LTJ
John U.D. Page but without results. No rounds landed inside the LSA
perimeter.

e. LSA Phan Rang. Although enemy fires were received in the beach
area and at the main base complex, the LSA sustained negative damage. A
direct hit on barracks located at the Phan Rang Beach, "D" Company, 51st
Infantry area (Bldg 5014), resulted in an estimated $1000.00 damage.

f. LSA Nha Trang. Indirect fire was received in several areas of
Camp McDermott. One round hit direct on a barracks occupied by the 459th
Signal Battalion resulting in 4-6 US WIA. Other rounds fell in the LSA
Class II and IV Storage Yard and near the dispensary with negligible
results.

5. (C) Results.

a. General. Following are the physical materiel and property losses
incurred during the 31 March - 1 April 1970 enemy attack on the Cam Ranh
Peninsula. Loss impacts are cited where known.

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b. Physical Material and Property Losses.

(1) Cam Ranh Bay.

(a) Tank Farm #2 (262nd QM Battalion)

- one (1) 3,000 barrel tank for Diesel storage (tank #25)
- one (1) 10,000 barrel tank for Diesel storage (tank #43)
- two (2) 10,000 barrel tanks for MOGAS storage (tanks #29 & 30)

Product losses: 530,300 gal Diesel fuel and 19,370 gal MOGAS.

Impact:

1. Loss of the diesel tanks and fuel will have no adverse affect on the unit's ability to perform its mission. The stockage objective for diesel fuel was reduced from 116,085 barrels or 39 days of supply to 100,000 barrels or 34 days. The safety level for diesel fuel is 23,809 barrels or 8 days of supply.

2. The stockage objective for MOGAS is 60,719 barrels or 36 days of supply. The loss of fuel reduced the days of supply to approximately 32.5 days. The safety level is 12,857 barrels or 8 days of supply.

3. Of the thirty-three thousand barrel loss of storage capacity, only 13,000 barrel capacity was in service. The other 20,000 barrels storage capacity was unserviceable and under repair.

4. The thirty-three thousand barrel loss of storage capacity represents an overall loss of 5.72% of the total CRB bulk fuel capacity.

(b) Maintenance Facilities (69th Maintenance Battalion)

1. Building (Warehouse 92): Numerous holes in end and top of building; light fixtures and wiring damaged.

2. Building (Warehouse 95): Numerous shrapnel holes in front and top of building.

3. Van trailer (M-146): Numerous shrapnel holes in rear and top of van.

4. 1.5KW Generator: Shrapnel hole in gas tank and frame of generator.
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5. 3 KW Generator: Broken pulley.
6. Maintenance tent: Damage beyond repair (canvas only).
8. 3/4 Ton Truck: Windshield broken; hole in radiator; holes in two tires; regulator cable damaged by shrapnel.
10. 5 ton wrecker (M543): Hole in main hydraulic tank; holes in both doors.

Impact: Loss of the above and damage sustained will have no adverse affect on this unit's capability of performing its mission.

(c) 124th Transportation Command (TML A) Area.

1. One of the incoming rounds fired into the 10th Transportation Battalion area passed through a troop barracks without exploding; sleeping troops were spared. A total of approximately 15 rounds fell into the 10th Battalion area with only minor damage incurred.

2. As a result of the 010400H April rocket attack, two USATSA (RO/RO) trailers sustained light shrapnel damage.

3. No ships received weapons damage.

(d) US Army Depot - Cam Ranh.

1. BY Yard. PSP matting holed; shrapnel damage to crates in immediate area and maintenance tent in Consolidated Motor Pool.


3. RO/RO Yard. PSP matting holed; shrapnel damage to 2 vans and 3 trailers.

4. PX Depot. Shrapnel damage to crates in immediate area and to 3 refrigeration units.

5. Delta Yard. PSP matting holed; shrapnel damage to crates in immediate area and to Warehouse 70.

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6. Warehouse 57. Roof severely damaged, shrapnel damage to crates stored inside.

7. Engineer Yard. Shrapnel damage to crates in immediate area.

8. Class I Area. 52 pallets of food stuff damaged. Approximately 2300 lbs of canned food (fruits and vegetables) have been condemned.

(e) US Marine Maintenance Activity - Vietnam (MMAY).

1. 5 Ton Tractor M52A2, Multifuel: Eight flat tires; left and right windshields; radiator and holes in cab, fender and hood.

2. 3/4 Ton Contract Truck: Right window, right and left windshield; headlights; radiator; and holes in cab and body.

3. 5 Ton Wrecker M543A2, Multifuel: Left window; left door; radiator and windshield.

4. 2½ Ton Van: Left window; right windshield; cab top; headlights; and holes in cab and body.

5. 1/4 Ton Truck ML51A1: Windshield; radiator; headlights; and holes in body.

6. 2½ Ton Van: Right door glass.

7. 2½ Ton Van: Left windshield; right door glass; right front tire; and holes in body.

8. 6,000 lb RT Forklift: Hole in hydraulic line.

9. 12 Ton Van: Three broken windows and holes in body.

(f) Job Order Vehicles:

1. 2½ Ton Cargo M35A2: Windshield glass; 2 flat fires and radiator.

2. 2½ Ton Cargo M35A2: Five flat fires; radiator; fuel tank; rear door and glass; and holes in cargo bed and body.

(g) Equipment Awaiting Retrograde:

1. Two tail pipes for 2½ ton trucks (lower).
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2. Two Tail pipes for 2½ ton trucks (top).
3. Three 5 ton radiators.
4. 2½ ton truck fenders.

Impact:
1. All damaged vehicles, generators and retrograde were located in 557th Light Maintenance Detachment area.

2. The motor pool office and motor pool maintenance tent received very minor damage from shrapnel and do not require repair.

3. All vehicles and generators can be repaired at the LSA Dalat.

4. Equipment awaiting retrograde is not repairable.

5. Personnel Losses. Two (2) personnel received wounds from enemy action. Both personnel were wounded only slightly.

6. (C) Post Attack Actions.

a. The Support Command has remained in a continuous Yellow Alert condition, Options I, II, and III, during the hours of darkness since the attack.

b. Improvements have been made in the perimeter lighting to include the field expedient employment of fluorescent lighting, borrowed U.S. Air Force mobile lighting units and a jeep mounted searchlight. Additional lighting has been requested.

c. Perimeter wiring has been upgraded through the use of broken glass interspersed within the wire to delay barefooted sappers.

d. Nine separate sweeps have been conducted throughout the heavily vegetated areas within Sector #2, including the exterior perimeters of the POL tank farms and ammo storage areas.

e. A ROKA sweep was conducted in the Tiger Mountain area (vicinity coordinate CP 0914) on 3 April 1970.

f. Noisemaking devices are being installed in the security wire surrounding critical facilities. Additionally, experimental action is being conducted with seismic intrusion detectors.
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g. The number of conventional guard personnel has been increased throughout and listening posts have been established.

h. Continuous checking and supervision of the POL and ammo areas are being accomplished during hours of darkness.

i. Local Vietnamese and ROKA tactical forces have been informed of the necessity for increased surveillance of the rocket and mortar launch sites.

7. (C) Conclusion.

a. Through continuous and deliberate planning and execution of practice alerts the troops reacted flawlessly and through the following enumerated actions minimized further losses in the POL area:

   (1) Rapid deployment of dozers and water trucks into the tank farm area to contain the fire and prevent further losses.

   (2) Courageous and observant reaction of personnel in detecting and removing explosive devices from three large POL tanks during the initial phases of the attack.

b. Rapid and coordinated action to clear the piers and inner harbor of deep draft vessels to preclude their loss/damage by possible action.

c. Maintenance of rigid fire discipline, despite numerous patrols (foot, mechanized, roving, etc.) and reports of sapper sightings during the full duration of the attack resulted in small arms fire being held to a minimum and targets engaged only when it was certain that friendly forces were not involved.

d. Despite the standoff attack from Cam Tho Peninsula, which resulted in darkness for the entire South Beach Section of the Cam Ranh Peninsula, deployed units and reaction squads continued to examine the harbor and adjacent beaches for sappers and enemy ordnance.

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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF ATTACKS AGAINST CAM HANH AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT INVOLVED</th>
<th>NATURE OF ATTACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 70</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>25-30 rounds of 82mm mortar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 70</td>
<td>CRAB</td>
<td>1x107mm rocket, 2 vehicles moderate damage, 1 u-trailer moderate damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar 70</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>2 sappers, 22x82mm mortars; power plants heavy damage, 2 helos heavy damage, helo moderate damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar 70</td>
<td>CRAB</td>
<td>3x140mm and 1x107mm rocket; no damage or casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mar 70</td>
<td>CRAB</td>
<td>3x107mm rockets; no damage or casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mar 70</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>3x107mm rockets; no damage or casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 70</td>
<td>Sector II, CRB</td>
<td>5 enemy sappers destroyed 3 POL tanks in Tank Farm #2 containing 1,400 bbls of fuel. No casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 70 (010010H)</td>
<td>Sector II, CRB</td>
<td>15x107mm rockets impacted in South Beach area. 1 building moderate damage, 6 personnel lightly wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 70</td>
<td>Sector II, CRB</td>
<td>17x107mm rockets; 2 warehouses moderate damage, 32P's moderate damage, warehouse van yard and PX storage yard moderate damage. No casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr 70</td>
<td>CTOC</td>
<td>17x60mm mortar rounds; 3 KIA, 4 WIA (All ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr 70</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>30x107mm, 10x82mm; 4 US WIA, 2 CH-53 helos heavy damage, 1 mess hall destroyed, 3 trucks heavy damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr 70</td>
<td>CRAB</td>
<td>3x107mm, 1 helo rocket. No damage or casualties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Report Title:**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.**

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