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13 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, American Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (0)

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 90374

AVP-EL

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Chu Lai Base (BT 555035), RVN.

Reporting Officer: Major General Albert E. Milloy.

Prepared By: Captain Jonathan W. House, 3d Military History Detachment.


I. Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. "The Americal Division continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) during the reporting period. Enemy contacts were moderate in Operation Frederick Hill and light to moderate throughout the rest of the Americal Division's TAOI. Base denial, pacification and combined operations with the 2d ARVN Division were successfully continued."

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. General Officers.

(1) Major General A. E. Milloy assumed command of the Americal Division on 12 March 70 from Major General L. B. Ramsey.

(2) Brigadier General J. W. Donaldson, ADC (M), departed the command on 15 March 70 and was replaced as ADC (M) by Brigadier General E. L. Powell, Jr., ADC (M).

(3) Brigadier General D. L. Atteberry joined the division on 29 March 70 and assumed the duties of ADC (S).

b. Brigade Commanders.

FOR OOV NT
700010

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DOD DR 5200.10
AVDF-4L

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR -- 65 (R2) (U)

(1) Colonel K. H. Barlow, Jr., assumed command of the 11th Inf Bde on 27 March 1970 from Colonel H. F. T. Hoffman, Jr.

c. Colonels.

(1) Colonel D. M. Duxter, Jr., assumed command of the Division Artillery on 1 March 1970 from Colonel L. B. Hardy.


(3) Colonel A. G. Hume became Chief of Staff on 26 April 1970 replacing Colonel T. H. Tackaberry.

d. Battalion Changes.

(1) 3d Bn, 21st Inf. LTC M. M. Misch assumed command from LTC R. C. Bacon on 15 Feb 70.

(2) 1st Bn, 52d Inf. LTC C. C. Phillips, Jr., assumed command from LTC A. E. Brown, Jr., on 22 Feb 70.

(3) 4th Bn, 21st Inf. LTC R. L. Harper assumed command from LTC G. R. H. Johnson on 16 Mar 70.

(4) 1st Bn, 46th Inf. LTC R. F. Carvell assumed command from LTC P. J. R. Foss on 10 Apr 70.

(5) 3d Bn, 1st Inf. LTC R. A. Culbertson assumed command from LTC L. J. Stottle on 19 Apr 70.

(6) 3d Bn, 18th Arty. LTC J. E. Hayden assumed command from LTC W. F. Sifford on 15 Feb 70.

(7) 6th Bn, 11th Arty. LTC R. H. Kienfelder assumed command from LTC P. R. Gleave on 6 Apr 70.

(8) 723d Maint Bn. LTC J. D. Wilson assumed command from LTC H. J. Flinch on 20 Feb 70.

(9) 26th Engr Bn. LTC H. V. Dutchshyn assumed command from LTC D. R. Swygert on 8 Mar 70.

(10) 23d S & T Bn. LTC J. P. Senna assumed command from LTC F. B. Wall on 27 Apr 70.
9. (U)  **Staff Changes.**

   a. LTC G. R. H. Johnson became ACoFS, G5, on 16 Mar 70 replacing LTC E. L. Harper.

   b. LTC L. J. Stottle became ACoFS, G3, on 19 Apr 70 replacing LTC E. L. Kennedy.
4. **U** **Distinguished Visitors.**

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<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
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<tr>
<td>COL Newman</td>
<td>ACM, G3 USARV</td>
<td>2 Feb</td>
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<td>COL Clark</td>
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<td>LTC Parker</td>
<td>FM, 4th Inf Div</td>
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<td>MG Dolvin</td>
<td>GCS, MACV</td>
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<td>COL Hill</td>
<td>Dep CH Mili Hist, OCMA, DA</td>
<td>10 Feb</td>
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<td>Mr. Albright</td>
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<td>LTC Wagner</td>
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<td>MG Gustafson</td>
<td>Provost Marshall General</td>
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<tr>
<td>LG Forayes</td>
<td>CG, CDC</td>
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<td>COL Broughton</td>
<td>Comd Asst For Proj Appraisal</td>
<td>15 Feb</td>
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<td>COL Koch</td>
<td>LNO, CDC, RVN</td>
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<td>Mr. Hardison</td>
<td>Tech Adv to CDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Harger</td>
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<td>LTC LeVeille</td>
<td>Dir, DCPG</td>
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<td>ENGR Br, Engr Comd, RVN</td>
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<td>MGEN Beal</td>
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<td>MG Baldwin</td>
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<td>COL Love</td>
<td>XXIV Corps Engr</td>
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<td>RADM Voris</td>
<td>CINC PAC Surgeon</td>
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<td>LTG Nickerson</td>
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<td>COL Koch</td>
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**Stars & Stripes**

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<td>Mr. Hardin</td>
<td>Asst for SEA to ASA (M&amp;D)</td>
<td>5-6 Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Samson</td>
<td>Dir Plans and Prog OCM</td>
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<td>Mr. Fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Abrams</td>
<td>CONUSMACV</td>
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**RAVM Adamson**

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<td>COL Maloney</td>
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<td>LTC Lund</td>
<td>USARV, ACTIV</td>
<td>20–21 Mar</td>
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<td>Mr. Kirk</td>
<td>Science Adv to COMUSMACV</td>
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<td>COL Doody</td>
<td>Dep Science Adv</td>
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<td>COL Gibson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Halverson</td>
<td>Minister of 4th Presb Church</td>
<td>27 Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. King</td>
<td>Former Dir &quot;Wings over Jordan&quot;</td>
<td>27 Mar</td>
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<td>LTC Zais</td>
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<td>3–4 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Pico</td>
<td>AG of Puerto Rico</td>
<td>4 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Pietrotoni</td>
<td>Puerto Rico NG</td>
<td>4 Apr</td>
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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CPDR--65 (R2) (U)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>LTG Davison</td>
<td>Incoming CG, II FFV</td>
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<td>LTG McCutchin</td>
<td>CG, III MAF</td>
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<td>MG Bowman</td>
<td>DCG, XXIV Corps</td>
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<td>MG Wright</td>
<td>CG, 101st Abn</td>
<td>9 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Wheeler</td>
<td>CG, 1st Mar Div</td>
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<td>BG McKinney</td>
<td>Deputy for STANO, Office of Gl, DA</td>
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<td>BG Hunter</td>
<td>CO, QM, HQ, Spt Comd</td>
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<td>GEN Walt</td>
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<td>COL Field</td>
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<td>COL Underwood</td>
<td>USAF, Dep Comm Planning Gp</td>
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<td>LTG Lavalle</td>
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<td>COL Holt</td>
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<td>BG Herring</td>
<td>Chief, Planning Div, G3, USAFR</td>
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<td>COL McDaniel</td>
<td>CG, Engr Comd</td>
<td>24 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Dillard</td>
<td>Chief, Research &amp; Development for ACTIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) The Adjutant General.

   a. The Adjutant General's Morning Reports Section is responsible for the daily monitoring of all morning reports submitted by divisional units and compiling of the divisional strength statistics based upon the strength figures indicated on the morning reports. Once the strength aggregates are computed, they are coded and telephonically reported to the USARV Statistical Reports Unit for inclusion in the daily USARV strength report which is used by that headquarters.

   b. All Americal reporting units are required to submit their morning reports so as to arrive at the AG Morning Report Section by 1500 hours of the day following the date of the report. The reports are screened for administrative correctness and all entries affecting the Americal strength are recorded by category on the daily strength accounting report (TAB A). This form was devised in order to consolidate the various personnel transactions which affect the division's strength totals on any given day, and to further corroborate the strength changes, and to insure the accuracy of strength totals reported to USARV.

   c. The Replacement Assignment Branch, USARV projects the division's strength and daily strength changes based upon three input figures: daily DEROS loss quotas, telephonic casualty reports, and the number of replacements assigned the Americal from the USARV Transient Replacement Detachment (22d and 90th Replacement Battalions).

2. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

   a. During the period, Military Justice/Military Affairs continues to constitute the largest activity area. During the quarter Feb-Apr '70, this command tried five general courts-martial, 12 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge was authorized, and received 112 special courts-martial and 0 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 1,135 Article 15, UCMJ proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USAFSAC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions during this quarter include 48 Line of Duty determinations; 46 Article 15, UCMJ appeals for advice; 187 Reports of Survey; 99 Reports of Investigation; 33 elimination proceedings; 14 Congressional inquiries; and, 6 Collateral Investigations forwarded to DA.
Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were 0.12, 0.17, 1.44, and 0.00 respectively.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2,336 cases during the quarter, including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, and general counseling and advice.

Of particular note was the specific Citizenship Program conducted during early February. This section identified, notified, and assisted 31 alien service personnel in applying for American citizenship. During May 1970, 18 of those identified will travel on R&R to Hawaii to be sworn in.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the American Division Combat Center; and to the Military Justice Act of 1968. In addition, unit instruction is provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior NCOs.

d. During the quarter 83 claims were received for payment for loss or damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

3. (U) Inspector General.

a. During the reporting period, the Inspector General conducted twelve Annual General Inspection. Except for one company, all inspected units were rated satisfactory.

b. The Office of the Inspector General processed a total of 492 complaints/requests for assistance. Of these, 92% were resolved by the Office of the Inspector General with the remainder resolved by the seven Acting Inspectors General at major subordinate commands. The 492 complaints/requests for assistance represents an increase of 131 over the previous quarter. The majority of these fell into three categories - dissatisfaction with job, medical, and disciplinary matters.

c. Throughout the quarter, the Inspector General's Office provided logistics and administrative support for LTG Peers' Inquiry Committee. Colonel Whalen, the committee's rear liaison element, visited the Division several times to interview witnesses and obtain documentary evidence.
d. From 9-11 April the Assistant Inspector General made a liaison visit to HQ, USARV. Initial coordination for the FY 71 Annual General Inspection of the Americal Division by Headquarters, USARV, was made. It was determined that the inspection would be reduced in scope due to a reduction of assets of the USARV Inspector General. The inspection is scheduled for the period 6-11 July 1970. Courtesy inspections are being conducted for selected elements of the Division in preparation for the USARV AGI.

4. (U) Information Officer.

a. In February, MG Ramsey, CG, Americal Division, received a request from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to have the Americal Division represented with combat art to be put on display there. In response to this request, the Information Office acquired two combat artists from within the Division. Shortly afterwards, three pieces of combat art representing the Americal Division were sent to the CG&S College. The two combat artists were retained by the Information Office to work on art projects for the Americal magazine, Southern Cross, and the Division history.

b. In March, the press release clearance authority delegated by MACV to III Marine Amphibious Force was not transferred to XXIV Corps which succeeded III MAF as the commanding headquarters of I Corps Tactical Zone. This made it necessary for all news material requiring clearance prior to release or publication, to be sent to the Office of Information, MACV, in Saigon. The former procedure under III MAF resulted in news material being cleared for release in one day. The new clearance procedure takes approximately 3-5 days.

5. (U) Division Surgeon.

a. The following figures represent the malaria statistics for the Americal Division during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NO. CASES</th>
<th>RATE MALARIA</th>
<th>RATE VIVAX*</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>146</td>
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</table>

*Per 1,000 troops per year.

b. Both total malaria and vivax malaria rates have begun to rise with the end of the monsoon season. Antimalaria table discipline is being reemphasized since the mosquito population is increasing and the vivax is still more than one-half of the total malaria rate.
C. Intelligence

a. Quang Tin

(1) The first week in Feb 70, the Vietnamese people celebrated the Tet Holidays (5 - 7 Feb 70) and the enemy’s shortened Tet offensive was scheduled to begin. Documents and POWs gave the time frame of the first 7-10 days as an important indicator of the enemy’s capability to wage a major campaign at this time. The area in northern Thang Binh (D), Quang Tin (P) was particularly active indicating the continued presence of the task force composed of V-10 LF Co, C-9 LF Co, 70th LF En, and possibly elements of the 72d LF Bn and the 74th HVy Wpn Bn operating in the area.

A POW from the V-16 LF Sapper Bn, captured on 1 Feb 70, stated that his battalion was broken down into two separate companies; one operating in northern Thang Binh (D) and the other operating in eastern BL 117. Small sized enemy contacts were prevalent in the first several days of this month as activity was mainly directed at ARVN’s, PF’s, RF’s and CAP Teams in an effort to probe their defenses. On 1 Feb, PF’s from Thang Binh (D) received Sa/AW fire and a ground attack from an UNSF, vic BT2343. Fire was returned, resulting in 20 VC KIA, 2 VC, 2 GEM, 3 DM, and 40 Chicom H/Grenades, CIA. RF #187, vic BT234343, received a similar type of attack from an estimated platoon size force, resulting in 12 VC KIA, 2 GEM, and 2 DM CIA. CAP 1-1-2 and 1-1-3 received an unknown number of 60mm mortar and RPG rounds from an UNSF, vic BT454247 and BT457170. The contact resulted in 8 VC KIA, 5 DM and documents CIA. On 3 Feb, CAP 1-2-3 was attacked twice during the day by a platoon size VC force vic BT443400. The team received a total of 11 60mm mortar and 16 RPG rounds plus Sa/AW fire. Eight VC were killed, 6 DM and documents were captured while suffering light friendly casualties. On 4 Feb, the enemy force operating in Thang Binh (P) combined operations in an effort against RF’s #962 and #173 vic BT457453. The RF’s received a barrage of 200 rounds of 60mm mortar, 42 RPG rounds and Sa/AW fire with a sapper attack from an estimated 2 companies. The enemy effort was rebuffed, resulting in 21 NVA KIA, 3 GEM, 6 DM, 4 RPG rounds, and 52 Chicom H/Grenades CIA. There were 4 incidents of LOC interdiction occurring on 1 - 2 Feb, all concentrated in Tam Ky (D). On 4 Feb, a medic rallied from the GK-36th Medical Bn, 2d NVA Div. He gave the location of his unit vic AT3289 and further stated that the 1st RF Regt, 2d NVA Div was moving to and would operate in the Hiep Duc/Thang Binh District area. On 5 Feb - 7 Feb 70, the Tet Holidays were celebrated but no significant enemy contacts were reported.

(2) The scheduled Tet Offensive failed to materialize during the first week and activity in the second was sporadic. On 6 Feb, 2-5 ARVN engaged an estimated VC platoon vic BT190129 and killed 22 enemy soldiers, capturing 1 GEM, and 6 DM. Several days later on 10 Feb, A/2-1, received 12 82mm mortar rounds, 3 57mm RR rounds, 4 Grenades, and Sa/AW fire from an UNSF vic BT183247. The attack was countered and resulted in 7 NVA KIA, 2 DM and 15 Chicom H/Grenades CIA.
Activity in Thang Binh (D) continued to dominate the month as two MF Bn's crossed the Quang Han/Quang Tin Province borders and were engaged by the 37th and 39th ARVN Bn's with elements of the 1st ARVN Armor Bde vic BT142 just north of LZ Baldy on 15 Feb. The enemy suffered a serious setback when the contact resulted in 155 VC/NVA KIA, 19 enemy, 2 CSW, 35 DM, and 2 radars. CIA, FM's captured identified the T-88 MF Sapper Bn and the V-25 MF Bn as the units in contact. Among the enemy killed were a Bn CO, a Bn XO and a company CO. Another company CO was captured. A particular area of interest in Quang Tin (P) was the Old Hau Duc region located in the south-central portion of the Province which had long been known as the logistical heart of the VC/NVA operation in Southern I Corps. On 18 Feb, elements of the 1-46, 2-1Inf, and 5th ARVN Bn's, combat assaulted into the Old Hau Duc area to interdict this important resupply area. Contact with the enemy was light but findings by friendly forces during the rest of the week indicated that the area had been recently used. On 21 Feb, 3-5 ARVN operating north of Old Hau Duc vic AT939080, found an enemy hospital with 5 large structures and miscellaneous medical supplies. Another PN camp was found by 3-5 ARVN, vic AT935088, complete with barb wire security and 3 ARVN FM's.

In the last week of the month the ARVN's continued to find enemy supplies in the Old Hau Duc area. On 22 Feb, LZ Mary Ann, which had been established to support this operation, received 25 mixed 60/82mm mortar rounds, an unknown number of 57mm BR rounds and SA/AA fire from an UNSSF. The 3-5 ARVN, operating vic AT955073, found a hospital complex containing 2,000 lbs of rice, 200 beds, 150 lbs of medical supplies, and 10 maps. Fifteen structures were destroyed by the ARVN. Again the 3-5 ARVN vic AT970064, engaged an UNSSF and after the contact uncovered 5 DM, 367 RPG rounds, 45 Ch'Com H/Grenades, 17 Ch'Com AT mines, 30 lbs of TNT, and 15 lbs of C-4 explosive, all were destroyed. More enemy munitons were uncovered vic B500940, as B/1-46 Inf found and destroyed 3,030 rounds of SA ammo and 82mm mortar rounds. On 24 Feb, another hospital area was found by 3-5 ARVN vic AT975055, and 2,200 lbs of dry plasma was evacuated. Also on 24 Feb, a FM was captured from the G-31 AA Bn (AKA 14th PN). He located his unit vic BT1131 in support of the 2d and 3d Bn's, 3d NVA Regt, 2d NVA Div, which were operating in western Thang Binh (D). VB sightings in the above area revealed a concentration of enemy activity as many fortifications and foxholes were seen. There were several .50 cal incidents to verify heavy MG positions. On 26 Feb, LZ Mary Ann received 15 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSSF in the 2d attack on the LZ during the week. On 28 Feb, in two separate incidents in the SW portion of PA 117 vic BT 165050 and BT68047, C/1-46 Inf, found and destroyed the following: 200 rounds of SA ammo, 32 82mm mortar rounds, 5 RPGs, 2 bunkers and 3 structures. The totals for the month of Feb 70 were 253 VC/NVA KIA and 119 AEF against US NDF's and installations.

Activity continued into March 70 with no substantial increase until 7 Mar, when several PF and RF outposts were attacked. On 4 Mar, B/3-21 Inf, operating vic BT071213, engaged 15-20 NVA, probably from the 3d NVA Regt HQ's Regt, vic BT 089336 and BT 091338, and killed 7 NVA. F/8 Cav, Nighthawk, adjusted arty on an UNSSF vic BT085335, killing 6 NVA. On 6 Mar, D/3-21 Inf,
During the second week of Mar 70, the 3d NVA Regt HQ's was relocated to vic BT 0026 as of 7 Mar 70. The 72d LF Bn moved into the northern part of Thang Binh (D) to reinforce the 70th LF Bn which had suffered many casualties in the past months. The V-16 LF Sapper Bn moved 22 km NW to vic BT 1525 just south of OP Legionnaire. On 9 Mar, RF #164, engaged an UNSF vic BT 222461. Results were 15 VC KIA, 2 DM and documents CIA. Tam Ky City received a 122mm rocket resulting in minor casualties and damage. On 12 Mar, CIDG Tien Phuoc operating vic BT 108239, found a hospital complex (20th Hospital) and engaged an UNSF. Results of the contact were 21 VC/NVA KIA, 9 VN WIA and 4 DM and miscellaneous medical equipment captured; 20 structures and 330 lbs of rice were destroyed. On 13 Mar, the 21st ARVN Rangers received 30 82mm mortar rounds vic BT 205443.

The third week of Mar 70, the 1-1 Cav on 17 Mar initiated a search-and-clear operation in Thang Binh (D) against elements of the 3d NVA Regt. Several other incidents occurred on 15 Mar. A/3-82 Arty, OP Legionnaire, engaged IOS sightings of 7 NVA resulting in 7 NVA KIA. CAP 1-1-0, vic BT 232272, found 4 NVA KIA credited to A/3-82 Arty. On 16 Mar, B/1-46 Inf, vic BS 185996, engaged 5 VC. Results were 2 VC KIA, 2 DM and 2 packs CIA. Also found and destroyed were 2 structures, 3 bunkers, 2 60mm mortar rounds, 20 lbs of tea, and miscellaneous military equipment. On 17 Mar, the 1-1 Cav moved into the western Thang Binh (D) region on a sweep and clear operation against the defenses of the 3d NVA Regt. Numerous mines and boobytraps were found throughout the area and there was a noticeable increase in AA activity. On 19 Mar, 1-1 Cav vic BT 102323, found a tunnel estimated to be 1/2 mile long and destroyed a 60 lb mine rigged as security. Contact on the 1-1 Cav operation remained light as the 3d NVA Regt evaded any direct confrontation. On 21 Mar, 3-17 Cav and 37 ARVN Rangers vic BT 205476, received 12-15 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSF. Contact resulted in 2 VC KIA and 2 DM.

The last week of Mar 70 witnessed a slight upswing in activity as intelligence pointed to a possible upcoming phase in the Spring/Summer Campaign at the end of the month. On 24 Mar, an enemy food cache was found and destroyed by 1-1-46 Inf. One ton of rock salt, 50 lbs of rice, and 50 lbs of sardines were uncovered. On 25 Mar, contact flared in northern Thang Binh (D) when the 37th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSF vic BT 333483.
resulting in 9 VC KIA, 2 VN detained, and 1 IEC. The 37th ARVN Rangers also operating via BT25454, received 12 82mm mortar rounds and SA fire. On 27 Mar, PF #18 found 15 NVA in graves vic BT249190, all KIA. Also, the 2-5 ARVN, vic BT245184, engaged an UNSEC resulting in 20 VC KIA, 1 IEC, and 20 Chicen H/Grenades CIA. The ARVN moved to vic BT111117 and BT101815, found an ammo cache and evacuated 50 82mm mortar rounds, 5 60mm mortar rounds, 3 122mm rockets, and 1 DE RF #72, engaged a VC company, vic BT247453 resulting in 10 VC KIA, 1 VN detained, 1 IEC, and 1 case of medical supplies CIA. On 30 Mar, LRMP Alabama on a mission vic BT262529, found an enemy base camp guarded by 2 NVA lookouts. The enemy evaded and the team discovered 10 structures, 18 practice rifles, and 5 practice grenades. On 31 Mar, A/2-82 Arty in support of Thang Binh PF's operating via BT244240, was responsible for 9 VC KIA. The totals for the month of Mar 70 were 71 VC/VNA KIA and 22 ARF against US NDB's and installations.

(9) On 1 Apr 70, a number of LZ's, friendly positions and villages were attacked by fire in the most concerted enemy effort since early Jan 70. Numerous reports had stated that the enemy would initiate the first phase of the Spring/Summer Campaign on the 1st of April. Tam Ky City vic BT292425, received 3 122mm rockets with NCD. FSB Hawk Hill received 3 122mm rockets, also with NCD. FSB Fat City received SA fire from an UNSEC. FSB Bayonet was also hit at 15 BPC rounds, 20 60mm mortar rounds, satchel charges, and SA fire were directed at the LZ. The Hamlets of Ky My (BT262625) received a total of 26 82mm mortar rounds, all with NCD. On 2 Apr, the 37th ARVN Rangers vic BT245184, engaged an UNSEC. Results were 11 VC KIA, and 1 IEC. RF #72 at OP 10, vic BT371785, was overrun by an estimated VC Company. The OP was retaken by counterattack and resulted in 5 VC KIA and 1 IEC. On 3 Apr, the 3d NVA Regt, 2d NVA Div was identified in contact with the 2-5 ARVN in 2 separate incidents vic BT326550, which resulted in 13 VC/VNA KIA. A concentrated effort was made by the enemy to interdict two bridges. The two center spans of the Tan Bridge vic BT438046 were destroyed on 1 Apr, and Bridge #24 vic BT391784 was destroyed by an unknown explosion on 3 Apr. Largely as a result of friendly operations and land clearing in northern Thang Binh (D), the 70th LP Br and V/15 LP Co were relocated to vic BT2240 and BT2740 respectively. These moves ended a task force structure that had operated in the area since late Dec 69. Both moves were made on the basis of statements of KIA's and were confirmed by contact during the previous week. A returnee from V/16 LP Sapper Br stated that his unit was still broken down into two separate companies, one of which was operating vic BT2213.

(10) Activity in the second week of Apr 70 was centered in Thang Binh (D). On 5 Apr, Tam Ky received 3 140mm rockets, and on 6 Apr, A/3-82 Arty engaged an unidentified element vic BT265264, resulting in 20 VC KIA. On 7 Apr, 3-5 ARVN found and evacuated 1,100 lbs of rice, 2,500 rounds of SA ammo, 33 AK-47 magazines, and 4 packs vic BT303935. As the 3-5 ARVN moved south vic...
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AVDF-HL

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On 11 Apr, they contacted an unknown size enemy force in 3 separate incidents which resulted in 9 VC KIA, 3 packs and 1 DM captured. On 11 Apr, B-2-1 Inf found and destroyed 10 structures with 10 bunkers vic BT152210, and captured misc military equipment. On 12 Apr, HF #138 engaged an USNEF vic BT215176 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 DM and 660 lbs of rice KIA. Three incidents occurred in the Thang Binh (D), PF 1-165, received an unk amount of SA/RPG fire from an USNEF vic BT215144. Fire was returned and resulted in 5 VC KIA, 1 GS, and 1 DM. The 37th ARVN Ranger killed 4 VC and captured 2 DM vic BT195476. In a contact vic BT171087, the 57th ARVN Rangers killed 4 VC and captured 1 DM. Four incidents of LOC interdiction occurred on 10 Apr along the Tan Phuc Highway indicating the enemy's intention to continue to comply with COSVN Resolution #14 which emphasized such activity. The V/12 LF Co moved from the Pineapple Forest area to vic BT3030, and based on statements made by a returnee, the V/15 LF Co has moved to vic BT2446.

(II) Activity during third week remained unchanged as non-Americal forces were involved in contacts. On 12 Apr, CAP 1-4-2 engaged 5 NVA vic BT154072. While sweeping the area of immediate contact, the team received 30 60mm mortar rounds, 20 RPG rounds, and SA fire from an USNEF. Fire was returned and resulted in 3 NVA killed and 3 DM. On 13 Apr, Tan Phuc CIDC found and destroyed a sapper training school vic BT130297, consisting of 20 shelters, 1 classroom, a rifle range, and misc military equipment. Based upon information given by a returnee, A/3-82 Arty in support of PF #13 engaged 20 VC vic BT199292. Results of the contact were 8 VC killed. On 15 Apr, C/1-46 Inf, operating vic BT195123, found and evacuated the following: 9 AN/PRC 10 radios with hand sets, 5 TA-312 telephones, 1 TA-1 telephone with case, 1 head set, 1 PRC-10 pack, 2 civilian radios and 2 (pork chop) hand sets. FSB Hustler received 4 60mm mortar rounds. On 16 Apr, HF #138 vic BT168319 engaged an estimated 20 VC, resulting vic BT195476. On 17 Apr R/1-45, engaged 12 NVA vic BT171000 resulting in 6 NVA KIA and 4 DM. On 18 Apr, HF #138 found and evacuated 33 81mm mortar rounds and 2,000 rounds of .51 cal ammo vic BT126046.

(II) In mid Apr 70 the 72d LF Bn and the 70th LF Bn which had been operating in Thang Binh (D) task force returned to the vicinity of north-western Tam Ky (D), their old AO's. They had been forced out of Thang Binh by US operations and land clearing operations by the engineers. They had suffered many casualties and quit the area to recuperate. A returnee from the V/16 LF Sapper Bn said that the unit is still operating in BA 117, dispersed in 2 separate companies. Sometimes in the future the unit will be moved to Thang Binh (D) and in conjunction with the 70th LF Bn, 72d LF Bn, and elements of the 74th Heavy Weapons Bn, to conduct attacks in that area. A PW from the 402d LF Sapper Bn said the CP of his unit was located vic BT 2602. The future mission of his unit during the Spring/Summer Campaign is to attack the US
AVDP-HL

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10 May 1970

Navy area vic BT 524118 and friendly CP west of Chu Lai. The unit received 50 NVA replacements in Mar 70. On 21 Apr, 3/17 ARVN Cav, vic BT140050, found and evacuated the following: 100 lbs of TNT, 10 RPG rounds, 75 60mm mortar rounds, and 100 Chinese 82mm grenades.

During the fourth week, the Phuoc Chau Valley was the focal point of activity as ARVN began an operation there on 27 Apr 70. 1-5 ARVN moved into the Phuoc Chau area and made contact with an UNSEF on 2 different occasions, vic AT978093. Results of these 2 contacts were 16 VC KIA, 5 VN detained, 12 IED, and 4 CSW. LRSP Arkansas on a mission vic AT 805307, engaged an UNSEF and killed 5 NVA. On a previous mission on 21 Apr, the team captured documents vic BT 122252 from the 22nd Trans BN, 220th Trans Hpt which operates in that specific area. Also on 21 Apr, the 21st ARVN Rangers contacted 15 VC vic BT 170932, resulting in 5 VC KIA, and 5 VN detained. BF #137, was attacked by an UNSEF vic BT 220174 as they received 15-20 60mm mortar rounds and S/A fire. On 24 Apr, 1-5 ARVN, in 4 contacts vic AT 964086, killed 12 VC/KIA, detained 7 VN, and captured 8 IED and 2 CSW. BF #71 and #227 following up information obtained from a returnee, staged a raid against a meeting of Quang Tin (P) NVA vic BT 270262, resulting in 11 VC KIA. 1-5 ARVN found and evacuated 21 AE, 5 CSW, and 75 Chicen H/Grenades vic AT 960 091. 3-5 ARVN after a brief contact, vic BT 206150, found an enemy cache consisting of the following: 500 rounds of S/A amm, 4 bangalere torpedoes, and 1 AT mine.

The end of April 70 witnessed a major increase in enemy attacks by fire and mortar attacks in the area of FSB Siberia, Hiép Duc (D). On 27 Apr, BF #137, vic BT 216169, received 20-25 unknown type mortar rounds from an UNSEF, resulting in minor friendly casualties. On 29 Apr 70, BF #115, vic BT20217, received 10 60mm mortar rounds resulting in NCD. P/17 Cav operating vic BT230160, found and evacuated 8,000 lbs of rice. In the early morning of 30 Apr and progressing into the day, enemy activity concentrated in the Hiép Duc/Thang Binh District area as FSB Siberia, FSB West, and FSB Center received attacks by fire. An UNSEF conducted 7 separate attacks on FSB Siberia vic AT 901232. The 1st attack started at 0215H with the last attack at 1850H, consisting of a total of 7 RPG rounds, 12 82mm mortar rounds, 6 75mm RGR rounds, unknown number of Chicen H/Grenades, and S/A fire which resulted in minor friendly casualties. FSB West received 6 separate attacks from an UNSEF vic AT 990050. The 1st attack commenced at 0535H with the last attack ending at 2150H. A total of 12 82mm mortar rounds were expended by the enemy with CS agent used in 1 82mm mortar round. FSB Center received 3 attacks from an UNSEF vic BT 052253 at 1445H, 1840H, and 1905H. A total of 27 82mm mortar rounds were used resulting in NCD. Also on 30 Apr, PF #126 and #125, vic AT 911229 and AT 912230 respectively, received a ground attack and engaged an UNSEF vic AT 901232, found 10 NVA KB/SA, AW and arty fire.
Also captured and evacuated were 2 IW, 3 CSW, 80 ChiCom H/Grenades, and 4 satchel charges. R/4-31 Inf, vic AT868233, found 10 NVA killed earlier by air-strikes. There were numerous .31 cal AA incidents vic AT9322 and AT9020 and a total of 13 incidents in the FSB Siberia/Hiep Duc (D) area. A PF outpost was overrun vic AT911245 and the enemy established a .51 cal AA position. The outpost was recaptured later in the day. In the month of April 70, there was a total of 315 VC/NVA KIA and 118 ABF against US NDPIs and installations.

(15) In view of this recent activity, a new offensive seems to have been initiated on 30 Apr 70. Various reports from documents and PW's have stated that the last week of April 70 and the first week of May 1970 will possibly be the beginning of the 2d phase of the 'Z' Campaign. The 1st phase was initiated on 1 Apr 70, and emphasized propaganda and presleying efforts and the strengthening of LF units against the GVN pacification programs especially in Thang Binh (D). The NVA have supported these efforts as elements of the 3d NVA Bct, 2d NVA Div operating in the mountainous area of western Thang Binh (D), continually invaded the lowlands seeking rice resupply and contact with the people. The 1-1 Cav was hampered in its operation as the 3d Bct set up a network of mines and booby-traps and took evasive action retreating into the mountains. A PW from the T-89 M Sapper Bn who was the Asst PO, stated that the policy of the Spring/Summer Operation is large attacks in the vicinity of cities giving the people a chance to conduct uprisings and request for a coalition government. The high point will start in the end of April or the beginning of May. A document captured which originated from the Current Affairs Committee, COSVN, indicates that Campaign 'X' may be a nation-wide all-out effort now advocated in an attempt to destroy the GVN pacification facilities at Hamlet and Village levels, and to utilize the MF units which are now dispersed to various local areas. The enemy is expected to intensify the abduction and assassination of local GVN officials and the removal of RVNAF outposts and refugee centers. A returnee who rallied on 27 Mar 70, predicts that there will be upcoming incidents in the area immediately west of Hiep Duc (D). A Hai Chanh, who defected on 1 Apr 70, said that he saw a conference of province unit cadre who were discussing the plan of launching attacks throughout Quang Tin (P), especially in the pacified area of eastern Thang Binh (D) and Tam Ky (D). Several commemorative dates are centered in May 70 that have significant bearing on the situation: 1 May is the Vietnamese Labor Day (International Labor Day and May Day); the birthday of Carl Marx on 5 May; Constitution Day Celebration (Cambodian) on 5-6 May; the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May; the Organization of Vanguard Youth on 12 May; Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May; and Buddha's birthday on 22 May.

b. Quang Ngai
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10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, ECS CSR-OR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) A relatively low level of activity dominated the first two weeks of February. On 1 Feb, B/1-52 Inf, working with FF’s, vic B5 590817, Dai Loc (V), received 30 60/82mm mortar rounds, 15 RPG rounds, 80 40mm rounds and SA/AM fire from an USNIF. This barrage was followed by a sapper attack and resulted in 12 NVA KIA, 2 NVA CIA, 4 CSVC and 90 Chieu HA/Grenes and miscellaneous military equipment CIA. Information obtained from the FF’s identified the attacking unit as the 95th LF Sapper Co. At the same time as the attack on Dai Loc, A/1-52 Inf, L2 Stinson, received 50 mixed 60/82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified USNIF with MC’s. CAP Team 1-3-4, Sen Tra (2) (H), vic BT 6210/12, received 6 60mm mortar rounds and an unknown number of H/Grenes and satchel charges from an unidentified USNIF. FF Plateen 84, vic BS 685698, received 15 60/82mm mortar rounds from an USNIF, 1-4 ARVN, vic BS 731528, received 15 82mm mortar rounds, AM/SA fire and a sapper attack from an unidentified USNIF. This contact resulted in 12 VC KIA, 2 CSVC, 4 NVA, 3 bangalere torpedoes and 100 Chieu HA/Grenes CIA. 1-4 ARVN, vic BS 603180, engaged an estimated squad of VC resulting in 5 VC KIA. In a later contact, B-4 ARVN, vic BS 694515, also engaged an estimated squad of VC resulting in 7 VC KIA, 1 DM and 10 RPG rounds captured. On 2 Feb, D/1-14th Arty on OP #1 received 10 82mm mortar rounds and SA fire from an USNIF. In a contact on 3 Feb, vic BS 734529, 745557, 745753, 3-4 ARVN engaged an estimated platoon of VC. This contact cost the enemy 9 VC KIA, 6 VC CIA, 3 DM and documents captured. The only significant contact for American Forces on this day occurred when C/4-3 Inf, vic BS 698379, engaged 10 NVA, killing 4. D/1-14th Arty on 4 Feb, vic BS 667468, engaged an IOG sighting, resulting in 6 VC KIA. A/3-1 Inf on 7 Feb, in a sweep operation, vic BS 510715, found a base area consisting of 6 structures. Also, the miscellaneous military equipment was an NVA flag with an unidentified designation embroidered upon it. The only significant AA activity of the week occurred on 2 Feb, vic BS 513713, when a UH-1C received moderate .30 cal fire forcing the aircraft to land.

(2) In light contact with the enemy on 8 Feb, American Forces in the Iro Mauzal, AC accounted for 23 VC/NVA KIA. D/3-1 Inf, vic BS 513752, accounted for 7 VC KIA, A/2-21, vic BS 853342, 5 VC KIA, and 123d Avn Br, vic BS 616477, 5 VC KIA. B/4-21 Inf, vic BS 855310 and BS 849304, found and evacuated 2,500 lbs of rice. A/3-1 Inf, vic BS 515716, found and destroyed 1,000 lbs of rice. On 8 Feb, an F-4 received heavy SA fire causing the aircraft to crash, vic BS 368842; the jet was not recoverable. In a period of four hours on 9 Feb, C/5-46 Inf, vic BS 771383, found and destroyed 20 structures, 20 bunkers, 18 tunnels, 1000 lbs of rice, 2000 lbs of potatoes and 3000 lbs of corn. On 11 Feb, in a series of small contacts in Nghia Hanh (D), vic BS 5565, 123d Avn Br, accounted for a total of 19 VC/NVA KIA. On 12 Feb, D/3-1 Inf, vic BS 551653, found and destroyed 12 structures and 12 bunkers. B/4-3 Inf, vic BS 653224, found and destroyed 2 structures, 12 bangalere torpedoes, 69 RPG rounds, 88 pistol flares and
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AVDP-45

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Letters Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 10 April 1770, BS O54F-05 (KL-10)

10 May 1970

AR-47 ammunition. On 13 Feb, 1-6 ARVN, vic HS 719804, received an unknown number of RPG rounds and 3A/AM fire from an estimated company size force. This contact resulted in 5 VC KIA. On 24 Feb, 1-6 ARVN, vic HS 729814, engaged the enemy; this time, there were 10 VC KIA and 3 DMC.

(4) In scattered contacts on 15 Feb, Americal Forces accounted for 23 VC/NVA KIA. D/1-14 Artillery, vic HS 477771, engaged an IOD sighting of an UNSF, resulting in 11 VC KIA. On 16 Feb, at 0640 H, an unsow (?), vic HS 505915, received several rounds from an estimated 40 VC. The contact resulted in 4 VC KIA and 2 RPG rounds GIA. At 1000 H, 1-6 ARVN, vic HS 535781, engaged an UNSF accounting for 10 VC KIA. On 13 Feb, B/1-32 Artillery engaged an IOD sighting of an UNSF resulting in 13 VC KIA and 3 bunkers destroyed. Later that day, D/6-11 Artillery engaged an IOD sighting of 30 VC resulting in 21 VC KIA. On 20 Feb, in the Geneva Park AO, D/1-14 Artillery, B/1-32 Artillery, D/1-32 Artillery, vic HS 557995 and HS 557991, engaged an IOD sighting of an UNSF resulting in 29 VC KIA. At 2130 H, OP #1, vic HS 517779, received 2 RPG rounds, 12 unknown type mortar rounds and 8A fire from an UNSF. On 21 Feb, B/1-20 Infantry found and evacuated a cache of 30 bicycles buried under the floor of a structure, vic HS 754449.

On 22 Feb, 4-6 ARVN engaged an UNSF, vic HS 664576 resulting in 9 VC KIA. On 23 Feb, F/8 Night Hawk received 8A fire, vic HS 431761 from an UNSF. In the ensuing action, Night Hawk accounted for 17 VC KIA. On 24 Feb, 1-6 ARVN, vic HS 337789, found and destroyed a hospital complex of 19 structures. At the same location, they found 2.5 tons of rice, 100 lbs of salt, 105 pigs, 200 chickens, 100 bottles of penicillin and 100 KG of cotton bandages. On 25 Feb, B/1-52 Infantry, vic HS 327816, received 7 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSF, with NCD. On 27 Feb, 4-6 ARVN, vic HS 323781, found 25 DMC, 4 CSWC, and 1000 rounds of mixed RPG, 82mm mortar and 57mm BR ammunition. Later that same day, 1-6 ARVN, vic HS 328775, received 15 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSF. On 28 Feb, D/1-1 Cavalry, vic HS 437736, engaged 8 NVA resulting in 7 NVA KIA. Later that day B/17 Cavalry, vic HS 502799 and D/4-21 Infantry, vic HS 631327, each received two 105mm rounds used as IED bombs, each with NCD. A UH-1H at 900H received heavy AW cal .50 fire, sustaining 3 hits. The aircraft was forced to land, but was later recovered.

(5) The most significant changes in enemy dispositions during the month were: The 21st NVA Regiment HQ and the 60th Battalion moved out of Base Area 128 to relocate in Northern Binh Thuan (D). The 7th Battalion, 22nd NVA Regiment left the Me Duc/Duc Phe (D) border to relocate along the Song Ve just north of Base Area 123. The 9th Battalion, 22nd NVA Regiment moved east into lower Base Area 124. The 403rd NVA Sapper Battalion (then the 24th NVA Sapper Battalion) moved out of Base Area 124 to just northwest of it. The 120th Light Infantry Battalion moved away from the area just northwest of Base Area 121 to relocate to the bottom of Base Area 120. The 406th Light Infantry Battalion advanced west from the Son Tinh/Mau Bong/ Son Ha border lines approximately 12 kilometers. The 38th Battalion continued...
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10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, HCS OSPOR-65 (B2) (U)

to straddle the coast moving back and forth between LZ Sneepy and LZ Dragoon. 95B LF Sapper Cc moved from southwest of Binh Sen (D) to the upper Sen Tinh (D) area above LZ Clemson. C-212 LF Ce made a noticeable move from six kilometers east of Base Area 128 near the Song Ve to approximately four kilometers northwest of the Binh Dinh (F). C-219 LF Ce moved from eastern Ba To (D) to just north of LZ Drence in Duc Phe (D). 506B LF Sapper Ce proceeded to move from the southeast corner of Base Area 121 to four kilometers southwest of Quang Ngai City. Americal forces accounted for a total of 345 VC/NVA KIA during the month. A total of 154 mortar rounds were fired at Americal installations and NDF's.

(6) The first two weeks of March were characterized by an increase in contacts and attacks by fire in Quang Ngai (P). On 2 Mar, D/4-3 Inf, vic BS 618494 and BS 620501, in two separate attacks by fire received 13 60mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF with NOD. On 4 Mar, D/1-14 Arty, vic BS 470758, engaged an IOS sighting of 46 NVA resulting in 22 NVA KIA. On 5 Mar, 2-4 ARVN accounted for a total of 17 VC KIA in three separate contacts vic BS 774549, BS 773458 and BS 766356. On the same day, Tu Nghia PF's at La Ha Bridge, vic BS 674678, received 20 RPG rounds and SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. This contact resulted in 1 VC KIA and 10 RPG rounds CIA. On 6 Mar, C/4-3 Inf, vic BS 608476, received 7 82mm mortar rounds, 2 RPG rounds, H/Gren and SA fire from an UNSEF. This contact resulted in a VC KIA. On 7 Mar, D/4-3 Inf, vic BS 651733, received 2 140mm rockets on 6 Mar. On 7 Mar, D/1-14 Arty, vic BS 702806, received 5 unknown type mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF resulting in NOD. On 7 Mar, Quang Ngai City received a 140mm rocket from an unidentified UNSEF. On 8 Mar, 4-4 ARVN, while on operations north of Base Area 128, vic BS 408580, found an enemy base camp with 2 structures. The structures were destroyed and 2200 lbs of rice, 1000 rounds of SA ammo and 3 RPG-2 rounds were evacuated. On 8 Mar, OP #1, vic BS 517779, received 4 60mm mortar rounds and SA fire from an unidentified UNSEF. The IOS at OP #1 sighted the suspected mortar position and D/1-14 Arty engaged the area resulting in 11 VC KIA. On 9 Mar, G/4-66 Inf, vic BS 681344, received 12 60mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF. On 10 Mar, H/1-82 Arty, D/6-11 Arty engaged an IOS sighting of an UNSEF vic BS 451762 resulting in 34 VC KIA. D/1-14 Arty later engaged two more IOS sightings, vic BS 471767 and BS 451762, accounting for 12 more KIA. On
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, American Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, CORPS-45 (E) (U)

14 Mar, 3/3-1 Inf, vic BS 415404, found a hospital complex. Ten structures were destroyed and machine guns, rice, and 30 white uniforms were removed. Three aircraft were forced to land during the second week of March. A UH-1H of the 71st Assault Helicopter Co crashed vic BS 468468 and was not recoverable. A UH-1H from the 68th Med, vic BS 625515, was forced to land but later recovered. A UH-1H from the 176th Assault Helicopter Co, vic BS 446595, was forced to land but later recovered.

7) The third week in March witnessed a decrease in contacts while attacks by fire continued at the same level. On 14 Mar, PF #22, vic BS 669976, received 10 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSF. On 15 Mar, Nui But Campound, vic BS 659721, received 4 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSF with NCD. On 16 Mar, Ha Thanh CIDG forces engaged an estimated VC company vic BS 300630 resulting in 1 VC KIA. B/1-52 Inf, on 16 Mar, vic BS 440774, found a bicycle repair shop containing 75 bicycle inner tubes, 20 bicycle tires and 1000 yds of cloth, all of which was evacuated. On 17 Mar, B/1-52 Inf, vic BS 511833, received 7 60mm mortar rounds and SA/AM fire from an unidentified UNSF with NCD. On 18 Mar, PF #933, vic BS 692776, received 40 82mm mortar rounds and SA/AM fire from an estimated 200 VC. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA. That same day, C/5-46 Wtn, vic BS 409906, received 12 81mm rounds, SA/AM fire and M-79 fire from an estimated 10-15 VC. During the week, the combined operations near Base Area 128 resulted in the destruction of the following: a medical aid station vic BS 514388; an enemy way station with 20 structures vic BS 338525; a VC/NVA production camp with 6 houses vic BS 323514; and an enemy base camp with 25 structures vic BS 367417.

8) In the middle of March, the volume of reports concerning a high point of activity between 30 Mar and 1 Apr began to increase. Enemy activity for the last part of March decreased into the expected lull before a high point. On 24 Mar, 3-4 ARVN, vic BS 708471 and BS 703571, engaged an estimated squad size VC force resulting in 10 VC KIA. Several aircraft were forced to land during this period. On 22 Mar, an OH-6A from D/1-1 Hwy, vic BS 479276, received light SA cal.30 fire; the aircraft crashed and was later recovered. On 25 Mar, a UH-1H of the 176th Avn Co, vic BS 519869, received moderate AM cal .30 fire; the aircraft landed, was quickly repaired, and took off again. On 29 Mar, a UH-1H from the 176th Avn Co received light SA cal .30 fire vic BS 518658. The aircraft was forced to land but later recovered.

9) During the month of March, the 3d NVA Div and its support battalions remained in Binh Dinh (P). The 22d Rgt remained in southern Ba Te (D) along the Quang Ngai (P) - Binh Dinh (P) border. The 21st NVA Rgt HQ and the 60th Bn, 21st NVA Rgt operated east of Base Area 128, along the Minh Long/Ba Te (D) border. The 70th Bn, 21st NVA Rgt operated in the Song Va Valley and the 80th Bn, 21st NVA Rgt operated south of Base Area 121 in northern Minh Long (D) and western Nghia Hanh (D). The 407th NVA Sapper on, MR-5 operated west of Base Area 124. The 107th NVA Hwy Wns
En operated in its normal AO throughout the month. The 129th LF Mortaguard BN remained out of contact west of the "Hamanea" area. The 406th LF Sapper BN operated vic BS 3280 in the beginning of the month but moved east to vic BS 4479 due to an ARVN operation west of Base Area 120. The 38th LF BN operated in its normal AO; it is thought that the 38th BN has broken down temporarily into company size units to avoid contact with friendly forces. The 43th LF BN remained west of the Batangan Peninsula during the month. The 81st LF Co was located near the southeast corner of Base Area 121 until the middle of March. At that time, the 81st LF Co moved to a location approximately 3 km east of OP #1. All other LF units remained in their normal AO's.

(10) There was a FIn from the Sapper Section of MR-5 captured near the end of March. His mission was to train village guerrillas in sapper tactics. This is in keeping with the policies put forth in COSTVN Resolution #14, which directed a strengthening of the guerrilla movement. A returnee was rehired on 20 Mar 70, was the PO of the 3d Co, 403d NVA Sapper BN, MR-5. His statements concerning the trading of blankets and uniforms for food are further proof of the achievements of the rice denial program.

(11) During the month of March, Americal Forces accounted for 390 VC/NVA KIA. There were 99 60/82mm mortar rounds directed against Americal installations and NDF's.

(12) The month of April was begun with a marked increase in enemy activity. On the morning of 1 April, the enemy staged a considerable number of attacks throughout Quang Ngai (P). LZ Bence, vic BS 812383, received an unknown number of RPG rounds, ChiCom H/Gren and satchel charges from an UNSEF. FF Platoon #81, vic BS 934, received 5 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF with NCO. FF Platoon #183, vic BS 776415, received 5 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. 2d ARVN Division Headquarters, vic BS 651729, received 10 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. 174th Avn engaged an UNSEF vic BS 690720, resulting in 15 VC KIA and 2 INC. B/1-14 Arty at OPW1, vic BS 517779, received 6-7 unknown size and type mortar rounds and SA fire from an UNSEF. BF Platoon #130, vic BS 645605, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 VC KIA. A/3-1 Inf on LZ All, vic BS 539732, received 11 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. On 2 April, B/5-46 Inf on FSB Gator, vic BS 568961, received 150-200 rounds SA fire and 7-8 RPG rounds from an UNSEF. 1-4 ARVN, vic BS 7676, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 7 VC KIA. 37 RF Group, vic BS 670710, swept an area of previous contact and air strikes. The sweep found 20 VC KIA. On 3 April, 17th RF Group and 1-4 ARVN, vic BS 601706, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 18 VC KIA and on 4 April, 4/4 ARVN, vic BS 750685, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 6 VC KIA.
(13) The week of 5 April commenced with CAP 1-4-4, vic BS 765819, receiving 15 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF with NCD. 4-4 ARVN, vic BS 750687, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 5 IDP. Also 4-4 ARVN in two separate engagements with UNSEF's vic BS 728815 and vic BS 728825 accounted for 16 NVA KIA. On 7 April, Minh Long CIDG, vic BS 591443, found 15 VC KIA dead less than 24 hours which were credited to C/3-18 Arty. On 8 April D/6-11 Arty engaged 3 LOS sightings vic BS 485765, BS 457764 and BS 515721 resulting in a total of 13 VC/NVA KIA. On 9 April, in support of CAP 1-4-6, A/1-82 Arty, vic BS 719779, engaged 45 VC resulting in 12 VC KIA. OP #1, vic BS 517779, on 10 April, received 12 82mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF with no casualties or damage. On 11 April 4-6 ARVN, vic BS 755852, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 7 VC KIA.

(14) The week of 13 April began with C/1-20 Inf, vic BS 748466 and vic BS 750474, finding and evacuating 20,000 lbs of rice. On 15 April, PF Platoon #40, vic BS 657775, received 10-15 60mm mortar rounds from an UNSEF. FSB Snoopy, vic BS 705613, received 11 rounds of 81mm mortar fire with light damage to a 5 ton truck. On 16 April R/6 ARVN, vic BS 366516, engaged 9 VC resulting in 9 VC KIA. On 19 April, R/6th ARVN, vic BS 231695, found and destroyed 117 DVC and found and destroyed one ton (est) of RPG rounds, 50 122mm rocket rounds, 11 82mm mortar rounds, 10 60mm mortar rounds and 30 boxes of TNT. The 174th Avn Bn, vic BS 556635, engaged an estimated NVA Co resulting in 22 NVA KIA on 20 April. On 21 April, R/1-20 Inf and the Ye Duc PRU, vic BS 757554, engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 VC KIA. On 22 April, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS 686667, found and evacuated 9,000 lbs of rice. D/4-3 Inf, vic BS 630428, found and evacuated 20,000 lbs of salt. On 23 April D/3-1 Inf, vic BS 557634, found 10 NVA KIA more than 24 hours, and on 24 April, B/123d Arvn Bn engaged an UNSEF, vic BS 638544, resulting in 9 VC KIA. On 26 April, 4-4 ARVN, vic BS 727827, engaged 5 VC resulting in 5 VC KIA, 2 DVC and 10 Chem Handgrenades CIA and evacuated. The month ended with two mortar incidents. On 29 Apr, C/3-1 Inf on Fire Support Base 411, vic BS 539732 received 3 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF with NCD. On 30 April, C/3-1 Inf on Fire Support Base 411 received 3 82mm mortar rounds from an unidentified UNSEF again with NCD.

(15) Enemy movement was minimal during the month of April. Several units moved closer to Quang Ngai City in the first part of the month placing emphasis on it as an attack target. The local force units such as C-75 LF Co, 605d LF Sapper Co, 506d LF Sapper Co and C-18 LF Co were scheduled to carry the brunt of the attacks. The 107th NVA Hvy Wpn Bn and the 80th Bn, 21st NVA Regt were held in reserve to provide support for the LF units if needed. The attacks were unsuccessful and the NVA units had nothing to exploit. The LF units moved back to their normal AO's possibly
to reorganize. Other changes in disposition were: the 403rd NVA Sapper
Bn moved closer to Duc Phe (D) possibly to assist in gathering rice during
harvest which is a predominant activity during the month of April. The
70th Bn, 21st NVA Regt moved to the east side of the Song Ve and is pro-
sumed to be engaged in resupply activities. The 48th LF Bn moved out of
its normal AO on the southeastern side of the Batangan Peninsula to avoid
contacts with American and ARVN units operating in the area. Later in the
month this unit began returning elements back to its normal AO. The 38th
LF Bn moved westward this month and relocated on the other side of the
Song Ve. After C-75 LF Co reorganized, it again moved and relocated in
close proximity to the 38th Bn. All other units operating in Quang Ngai
(P) remained in their normal AO. Order of Battle dropped the 22nd NVA
Regt from its holdings in April as they are reported to be operating in
Binh Dinh (P). Numerous POW and document reports on the 22nd NVA Regt,
3d NVA Division stated that the 22nd Regt was to be disbanded completly.
A Returnee from the HQ Co of the 22d Regt who rallied on 26 April stated
that his unit was disbanded on 22 Feb 70 and all personnel were assigned
to the battalions. The high ranking officers went to 3d Div HQ. There
are reports that elements of the 22d NVA Regt are still operating in
Quang Ngai (P) and especially in Duc Phe (D) in an attempt to gather
rice. A guerrilla POW from Phe Trung (V), Duc Phe (D) stated he had heard
that the 83d Ce was located four to five hours walk west of his village.
Phe Trung (V) is located vic BS 885305. The 83d Ce has been reported as
an AUA for the 3d Ce, 8th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt. In light of this report it
is considered that the 8th Bn has elements gathering rice in Quang Ngai
(P).

(16) During the month of April, Americal Forces accounted for 364
VC/NVA KIA. There were 80 60/82mm mortar rounds fired at US and ARVN
installations.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities

a. The Americal Division Duffle Bag project continues to grow. Per-
sonal strength as of 1 May 1970 was eight (8) officers and sixty one (61)
enlisted men. Duffle Bag personnel operate the Division sensor detach-
ment, three brigade sensor management teams, eleven ground monitoring
stations and one organic low air monitoring station. A total of 313 radio
linked and 37 line sensors are being monitored in the AO. Commanders at
all echelons are becoming familiar with sensor operations. Preparations
are under way to accept Phase III equipment in the program. Reaction to
sensor activations vary according to the tactical situation. During this
reporting period, small arms, artillery, air strikes, and combat assaults
have been conducted in response to sensor activations.
b. The G2 Air section's reconnaissance missions continue to obtain timely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 362 Infrared (IR) Missions; 308 Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) Missions; 42 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Missions and 244 Photo Missions were completed. In addition, a total of 863 VR Missions were flown. The IR and SLAR missions produced a total of 3698 targets. Of these, 1,566 were engaged by artillery fire with negative damage assessment.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities

a. Counterintelligence Section

(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion, or espionage.

(2) During the reporting period there was one reportable incident of possible espionage. The incident involved 6 Vietnamese persons employed at FSB Brene, 11th Infantry Brigade, who were implicated by a list of known VC agents operating in the Duc Pho (D) area. These personnel were interrogated and then were turned over to the National Police.

(3) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a marked decrease during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period this office conducted 6 investigations, as compared to 12 reported last quarter.

(4) This office provided the following CI services:

- Announced CI Inspections: 29
- Unannounced CI Inspections: 9
- Courtesy CI Inspections: 1
- DA Assists: 36
- Miscellaneous Investigations: 22
- PSI: 19

(5) During the reporting period the CI Section Case Officers conducted 155 Source Meetings and turned in 476 Information Reports. During the previous quarter there were 182 Source Meetings and 499 Information Reports prepared.
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AVP-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCB CSPQR-6 (R2) (U)

Month Information Evaluation

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<th>Rating</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>116</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>304</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) The AGFSS, G2 has directed that a study be made of all District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) within the Americal Tactical area of responsibility through liaison visits and discussions with MACV personnel. The study will include capabilities and limitations of the DIOCC, effective coordination with Americal units, and problem areas which may affect the successful neutralization of VC.

(7) Volunteer Informant Program

(a) The emphasis was correctly placed on information-gathering rather than ordnance collection by MACV Directive 381-2, December 1969.

(b) A letter from Americal Division G2, of 22 April 1970 limited the amount of funds authorized for each brigade and separate unit and refined the program by clarifying many points regarding the fund and awards.

(c) The first month of the fourth quarter FY70 expenditures far exceeded any previous monthly expenditure and nearly exceeded the total third quarter expenditures.

(d) There appears to be little bargaining for lower awards and for additional information. Each VIP officer is being oriented toward improving the intelligence potential inherent with the VIP. This continuous orientation with each contact has begun producing results. One VIP source has provided substantial intelligence information which was not previously reported, but was later confirmed through other sources.

(e) The VIP is extremely difficult to control because of the constant change in VIP officers and personnel and the constant requirement to reorient each newcomer to the program.

b. Interrogation Section
(1) During the reporting period, the IDF Section interrogated and classified 1,363 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification compared to the previous period illustrates that the significant proportional changes in detainee levels are in the categories of VC/PW, Civil Defendants, and Innocent Civilian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Feb – Apr 70</th>
<th>Nov 69 – Jan 70</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA/PW</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>VC/PW</td>
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<td>Innocent Civilian</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Thirty-four (34) man days were spent in support of search operations, screening operations, and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field.

(3) Information from 47 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The breakdown of the classification of detainees providing such valuable information is as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD or IC</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses were made to reports of food and weapons caches, identifications of VCL, base camps, PW camps and rocket firing positions.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section

The Imagery Interpretation Section has organized and is conducting a study designed to locate and identify potential helicopter landing zones in all Brigade areas. Initially, this study will encompass only the eastern half of the TAOR. Similar studies of the western TAOR will be undertaken as operational requirements arise.
d. The Order of Battle section in conjunction with the Imagery Interpretation section initiated a continuing study of the enemy's lines of communication and logistical system. The effort is specifically concentrated on identifying enemy caches, transshipment points, and resupply corridors. A series of LOC map overlays have thus far been completed. Unit studies are presently being compiled on the NVA transportation Regiments that operate in the Americal Division AO.
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AVDF-EL

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR--05 (R2) (U)

D. Operations.

1. (C) Operations Summary:

   a. General: Americal Division Forces continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970 with contact continuing to be moderate in Operation Frederick Hill and light to moderate throughout the remainder of the Americal Division's AO. The main areas of enemy activity were in the Frederick Hill area of operation. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Part., Nantucket Beach, and Iron Mountain were conducted in conjunction and close coordination with the 2nd ARVN Division and continued throughout the period.

   b. Major Engagements: During the three month reporting period, Americal forces were included in only one major engagement with enemy forces. This engagement was airmobile in nature and took place in the Hiep Duc area of operation Frederick Hill on the last day of April. LZ's Siberia and Center were attacked as part of an expected major enemy offensive. There were 39 NVA and 4 VC KIA while US forces suffered 4 KIA, 10 WIA(E) and 1 WIA(M).

   c. Operations by AO:

      (1) Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period, concentrating on combat operations to increase the level of security of pacification operations near the coastal area. Contact remained moderate. The reporting period included a joint operation conducted by 1-46 Infantry and 5th ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of AT9700, AT9705 from 18 Feb to 27 Feb. Contact was light and sporadic during the operation with one significant exception. This was the capture of the enemy's main Quang Tin Province Hospital by 5th ARVN Regiment. Significant contacts were frequent throughout the rest of the Frederick Hill operation. On 1 Feb, C/1-46 engaged 16 NVA, killing 4 and capturing 2 in the vicinity of AT135001. That same day F/17 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force, killing 1 NVA and capturing 4 individual weapons. Friendly losses were 4 WIA(E) and 3 WIA(M). US losses, when A/1-1 Cav detonated an unknown mine, were 2 US KIA and 5 WIA(E). The next day F/17 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force vicinity BT191720, killing 5 NVA at a cost of 2 minor injuries. The 71st AVN continued the action killing 5 more NVA without a loss. An enemy mortar attack against A/2-1 resulted in 10 WIA(E). Action remained sporadic until 10 Feb, when the NVA launched an attack on A/2-1's night defensive position at BT185241 with mortars, recoilless rifles, small arms fire and hand grenades. The enemy lost 7 killed and 2 weapons captured; US losses were 1 killed and 8 WIA(E). On 16 Feb, E/1-1 Cav detonated a 75 pound mine at BT233128, resulting in 5 US WIA(E). R/2-1 Inf, on 18 Feb at BT140230, engaged 15 VC, killing 5. The next day F/8 Cav, vicinity BT121225
suffered 1 US KIA and 9 US WIA(E) from enemy small arms fire. On 20 Feb, F/17 Cav engaged an unknown sized enemy force vicinity BT120323. Casualties were 7 US KIA and 12 WIA(E). Enemy losses were unknown. Later that same evening A/3-21 engaged an unknown sized enemy force at the same location and suffered 5 killed and 10 wounded and evacuated. Enemy losses were again unknown. F/17 Cav later detonated an unknown type of mine and suffered 2 KIA and 5 WIA(E) at BT130320. On the morning of 22 Feb, D/1-46 and A/26 Engr at LZ Mary Ann received mortars, recoilless rifle and automatic weapon fire, killing 1 US and wounding 11 who were evacuated. B/3-21 engaged and killed 5 NVA the same day. On 25 Feb, vicinity BT085324, A/1-1 Cav engaged an enemy force, killing 11 NVA at a cost of 5 US WIA(E). The enemy struck LZ Mary Ann again that evening. D/1-46 and A/26 Engr sustained 1 US KIA and 9 US WIA(E). Contact tapered off until 5 Mar 70. A/3-82 Artv engaged 5 VC at BT156278, killing all. D/4-31 engaged 11 VC vicinity AT92678, killing 9. The Aero Rifle Platoon from F/8 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT084340 and killed 7 NVA at a cost of 2 US killed and 9 wounded and evacuated. F/8 Cav (Night Hawk) continued the action at BT085335, engaging and killing 6 more NVA. C/1-46 closed the day's fighting in an engagement at BT164032 in which they had 2 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). Enemy losses were unknown. Action continued the next day as D/3-21 sought to develop F/8's contact and killed 7 NVA at BT085339 while suffering 1 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). B/3-16 Artv killed 8 NVA at BT176145. On 8 Mar, D/3-21, still seeking the enemy, found 5 additional NVA KIA at BT097510. The next day B/123 Avn engaged and killed 6 NVA at BS822266. A/3-82 Artv added 5 more VC KIA at AT153334 on 11 Mar. On 12 Mar, D/4-31 suffered 1 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M) from a booby trap at AT677182. F/8 Cav killed 4 NVA at AT630240 while suffering 1 KIA and 1 WIA(M). That evening A/3-16 Artv engaged and killed 5 VC as BT94753. Artillery continued to nuisance the enemy on 15 Mar 70 as A/3-82 again engaged and killed 5 NVA. On 19 Mar B/1-1 Cav, working with A/3-21 at BT101313, detonated a 250 pound bomb rigged as a mine. Nine US were killed and 1 was evacuated with wounds. On 27 Mar the enemy struck at two US units with booby traps. A/1-46 had 6 WIA(E) at BT230094 and C/3-21 suffered 2 KIA, 15 WIA(E) and 4 WIA(M) from a 105mm round which was tripped inside their night defensive position. D/4-31 suffered 8 US WIA(E) at AT822894 in a heavy fire fight with the enemy on 24 Mar. Enemy losses were unknown. During the last days of the month, the enemy was generally able to avoid contact although several serious booby trap incidents were reported. On 30 Mar, however, A/4-31 engaged 9-10 VC, killing 7 at AT840245. A/3-82 killed a total of 9 VC in two separate engagements the same day. On 3 Apr F/8 Cav engaged an enemy unit, killing 14 VC at BT276403. Two days later D/2-1 ambush an unknown sized enemy force at BT196272, killing 4 VC. On 6 Apr, A/3-82 Artv fired on a large enemy force in the open at BT200164, killing 20 VC before they could scatter. The next day B/4-31 eliminated a 4 man VC patrol at BS823998. On 9 Apr, C/5-46 at BS283998, killed 7 NVA and captured 3 weapons without loss to themselves. Mine- and booby traps continued to take their toll as D/26 Engr and F/17 Cav lost 1 KIA and 8 WIA(E) in two such incidents in the vicinity of BT216167. On 14 Apr, A/3-82 Artv again surprised an enemy force, killing 8 VC of the 20 engaged at BT184309. The next day, C/2-1 killed 4 VC at BT110310. On 17 Apr R/1-46 killed 4 NVA and captured their weapons in a sharp fire fight at BT171000 while suffering 4 US WIA(E). D/4-31 accounted for 5 VC KIA in 2 actions in the vicinity of AT96287. The next day D/4-31 suffered 5 WIA(E)
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10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RDS CWSO—E5 (IC) (U)

from a booby trapped hand grenade at AT898229. On 19 Apr, 5 more US were wounded and evacuated when a Uh-1H from 71st Avn crashed at BS14896. C/1-46 detonated 2 81mm mortar round booby traps at BT191125. Results were 7 US WIA(E). On 24 Apr B/3-16 arty killed 5 VC at AT965084. Two days later R/2-1 sustained 6 WIA(E) when they detonated an 81mm mortar round booby trap. The enemy raised the level of fighting sharply on the last day of April. At 0215H an unknown size force of NVA attacked LZ Siberia resulting in 3 US KIA and 3 WIA(E). There were 10 NVA KIA. Contact continued throughout the day with no further casualties at Siberia. Sharp fire fights took place throughout the day. D/4-31 killed 4 NVA and 2 VC in four contacts without a friendly loss. R/4-31 suffered 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E) at AT867233. Later they killed 4 NVA 300 meters north of this location. At AT868233 they found 9 NVA KBA. B/4-31 engaged 5 NVA at AT971203, killing 3. C/4-31 killed 4 NVA in two contacts at AT9299227. 1 US suffered minor injuries. At 1445H LZ Center received 20 81mm mortar rounds, resulting in 3 US WIA(E). Total US casualties for the day were 4 US KIA, 10 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy losses were 39 NVA and 4 VC KIA, 2 IWC, 3 CSWC and 3 VN detained. Results for operation Frederick Hill for the reporting period were:

FRND

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69 US KIA</td>
<td>543 VC KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378 US WIA(E)</td>
<td>220 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 US WIA(M)</td>
<td>245 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 US MLA</td>
<td>10 PW/VC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period as the 198th Infantry Brigade and 6th ARVN Regiment concentrated on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City and/or the Chu Lai base complex. Activity was light as American units searched the Rocket Pocket around Chu Lai, targeting against elements of the 78th Rocket Battalion (VCMF). Saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushes, preplanned air strikes, scheduled artillery fires, and sensor devices severely inhibited enemy attempts to attack the populated areas. Action began early on 1 Feb as A/1-52 on LZ Stinson received 40-50 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds in a pre-dawn attack. US losses were 1 KIA, 17 WIA(E), and 10 WIA(M). At the same time, B/1-52 at BS590812 received mortar, RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. They returned fire, killing 6 NVA and capturing 2 NVA, 3 individual weapons and 2 crew served weapons. US losses were 2 KIA, 9 WIA(E) and 11 WIA(M). Thereafter the enemy sought to avoid contact and his frequent moves enabled US Artillery to observe

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and engage him on numerous occasions. On 4 Feb, D/1-6 detonated an unknown type of mine at BT43035 with 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E). D/1-14 Arty engaged and killed 6 VC at BS466766. On 17 Feb, A/1-52 at BS347669 killed 6 VC without loss. On 15 Feb, D/1-14 Arty killed 11 VC at BS477771, and on 17 Feb, they added 5 more at BS641764. The next day B/1-82 Arty engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS44744, killing 13 VC. On 20 Feb, D/1-14 Arty and B and D Batteries of 1 R2 Arty massed their fires to kill 24 VC at BS555745 and BS552791. On 22 Feb, H/17 Cav detonated a 1000 pound bomb rigged as a mine, with 5 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). The next night F/8 Cav (Night Hawk) engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS431761, killing 17 VC. On the last day of the month the Aero Rifle Platoon from D/1-1 Cav killed 9 NVA at BS478773 and detained 9 enemy. March began quietly with the first significant incident reported on 8 Mar when H/17 Cav suffered 6 WIA(E) from a 250 pound bomb rigged as a mine. D/1-14 Arty continued to inflict losses on the enemy as they engaged an enemy mortar position at BS515767 and killed 11 VC. The next significant contact was not until 11 Mar when D/1-14 Arty again engaged the enemy, killing 7 VC at BS466774. On 22 Mar, 5-46 Infantry Battalion replaced 1-6 Infantry Battalion in the Geneva Park operation. The final contact was on 30 Mar, as D/1-1 Cav engaged and killed 5 VC at BS405793. C/1-52 inserted 1 platoon to develop the situation and the infantrymen accounted for 4 more VC before the enemy was able to escape. The enemy began April with predawn attacks on LZ Fat City, LZ Gator and LZ Bayonet. US losses were 2 KIA, 22 WIA(E) and 2 WIA(M). Known enemy losses were 4 killed and 1 captured. Thereafter the enemy was able to avoid serious contact until 10 April when D/1-1 Cav pinned a 10 man VC force and killed 5 of them at BS171871. The enemy's closing effort was to fire 3 rockets of an unknown type into the Chu Lai Base Area on the night of 30 April. No casualties or damages were sustained. The results for Operation Geneva Park for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 US KIA</td>
<td>392 VC KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184 US WIA(E)</td>
<td>51 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 US WIA(N)</td>
<td>213 DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 US MIA</td>
<td>4 PW/VC</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53 INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 CSNC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Operation Nantucket Beach was conducted on the Batang terminals in the 198th Infantry Brigade TAOI by elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment and 5-46 Infantry Battalion from 1 Feb to 22 Mar and 1-6 Infantry Battalion from

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22 Mar to 30 Apr. Constant pacification operations in addition to search and clear operations were conducted throughout the reporting period in support of the SVN Pacification Program. Contact remained light and scattered as numerous casualty producing booby traps and mine incidents were reported. One large scale combined operation was conducted by 1-6 Infantry Battalion, H/17 Cav, and elements of 1-1 Cav working with 4th ARVN and 6th ARVN Regiments. Contact was light and scattered for the American units but the ARVN forces were able to eliminate a large number of enemy and much of his material. On 5 Feb, H/17 Cav and R/5-46, vicinity BS655550, lost 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M) to an unknown type of mine, for the only significant incident of the month. On 2 Mar B/5-46 at BS697816 had 5 men wounded and evacuated in an enemy mortar attack. One man suffered minor injuries. A/1-82 Arty caught an enemy force in the open on 7 Mar, killing 9 VC at BT735775. On 13 Mar A/1-6 operating in the Nantucket Beach AO, detonated 2 booby trapped 105mm rounds at BS753852. Results were 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). The next day C/1-6 was the victim of another 105mm round booby trap at BS758842 as 2 US were killed and 12 US were wounded and evacuated. On 22 Mar, 1-6 Infantry Battalion replaced 5-46 Infantry Battalion in Operation Nantucket Beach. On 24 Mar, H/17 Cav made one of the few significant ground contacts as they engaged 15 VC in the vicinity of BS675946. The enemy lost 3 KIA and 2 CIA before they were able to break contact. On the last day of the month, R/1-6 at BS73853 lost 10 WIA(E) to a booby trap of an unknown type. On 7 Apr, C/1-1 Cav had 5 WIA(E) from a 40 pound mine at BS690926. On 9 Apr, A/1-82 Arty engaged an estimated 45 VC, killing 12 of the enemy. A/1-14 Arty added 4 more VC KIA on 11 Apr when they engaged 20 VC at BS697900. On 12 Apr, D/1-6 had 7 US WIA(E) from an M-16 Anti-Personnel mine. Activity slowed even further after this. On 17 Apr B/1-6 found 5 individual weapons at BS707816. The next significant incident occurred on 26 Apr when A/1-1 Cav detonated a 25 pound nitro-cellulose mine. Results were 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Ten days later R/1-6 suffered 5 WIA(E) from two booby traps at BS702894. Results for the reporting period for Operation Nantucket Beach were:

**FORCED**

| 12 US KIA |
| 167 US WIA(E) |
| 13 US WIA(M) |
| 0 US MIA |

**ENEMY**

| 107 VC KIA |
| 7 NVA KIA |
| 129 DPT |
| 1 PW/VC |
| 1 PW/NVA |
| 7 CH/VC |
| 0 CH/NVA |
| 75 CIV DEP |
| 726 IN CIV |
| 47 MVC |
| 2 CIV/C |

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AVDF-RL

SUBJECT:

Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(4) Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting period, concentrating on security of major lines of communication and supply as well as combat operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations being conducted along the coast. Enemy activity continued to be light throughout the reporting period as the 11th Infantry Brigade continued its operations with the 4th ARVN Regiment. A joint preemptive operation utilizing 3-1 Infantry, and 4-3 Infantry from the 11th Infantry Brigade and the 4th ARVN Regiment was conducted in the vicinity of BS6429, BS4450, BS4940 from 13 Mar to 21 Mar. Light contact was reported. Numerous casualty producing booby trap and mine incidents were reported within the Iron Mountain area of operation. On 2 Feb, C/3-1 engaged 8 VC at BS513752, killing 7 of the enemy. B/4-21 followed by destroying a force of 5 VC in the vicinity of BS63342. B/123 Avn ended the day's fighting by killing 5 NVA and capturing 5 during an engagement in the vicinity of BS616477. On 11 Feb, B/123 Avn engaged and killed 8 NVA at BS557406. Activity was light until 18 Feb when D/6-11 caught a large force of NVA in the open and killed 21 in the vicinity of BS475740. On 21 Feb, D/6-11 again engaged the enemy killing 6 VC of the 14 observed. The enemy successfully avoided significant contact until 1 Mar when Infantrymen from C/3-1 engaged 6-8 NVA at BS460708, killing 5 of the enemy without loss to themselves. The next day D/4-3 engaged an unknown size enemy force and in a fierce fire fight sustained 3 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). The enemy broke contact, taking their casualties with them. On 4 Mar, D/1-14 Arty engaged a force of 46 NVA at BS476758. The enemy scattered, leaving behind 22 dead. On the night of 6 Mar, an unknown size enemy force attacked C/4-3's night defensive position at BS608476 with mortar, RPG and small arms fire. US losses were 1 KIA and 7 WIA(E). A sweep the next morning found 1 VC KIA. On 11 Mar, D/6-3 and 174 Avn engaged a stubborn enemy force of unknown size at BS625313. The enemy finally evaded, leaving 2 NVA KIA behind. US losses were 1 KIA and 6 WIA(E). The next day D/1-14 Arty, D/6-11 Arty and B/1-82 Arty massed their fires on 35 VC in the vicinity of BS451762, killing 34 of the enemy. Later that same day, D/1-14 Arty engaged 2 more groups of enemy personnel, one of 6 VC at BS471767 and the other of 10 at BS451762. Six enemy were killed in each engagement. On 14 Mar, D/1-14 Arty continued to punish the enemy by killing 7 NVA at BS476759. The next day another enemy booby trap took its toll as D/1-20 lost 2 killed and 7 wounded and evacuated to a 155mm round rigged at BS791343. On 25 Mar, D/3-1 had 5 wounded by a booby trapped hand grenade at BS470710. On 30 Mar, B/4-21 detonated 2 booby traps of unknown type, one at BS914195 and the other at BS913202. US losses were 4 WIA(E) in each instance. On 31 Mar, 11th Bde Avn killed 5 VC from a 15 man force engaged at BS706454. D/6-11 Arty killed 5 more VC at BS688769. In the early hours of 1 Apr, the enemy launched fierce and mortar attacks on LZ's Bronco and Snoop. US losses were 1 KIA, 4 WIA(E) and 8 WIA(M). The next day D/4-3 had 7 US killed and 19 wounded and evacuated from the detonation of a large mine at BS812497. On 4 Apr A/1-20 had 5 more WIA(E) from a booby trapped 81mm mortar round at BS743358. C/3-18 Arty, on 7 Apr, killed 15 VC at BS591458. D/6-11 Arty followed with four separate fire missions, killing a total of 13 VC and 4 NVA. P/8 Cav (Night Hawk), on the night of 11 Apr, killed 15 VC in 5 separate incidents.

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In the early hours of 13 April, B/1-1 received 5 Chicom hand grenades from an unknown size enemy force at BS508738. Five US suffered minor injuries while enemy losses were unknown. That evening C/4-21 suffered 4 WIA(E) and 4 WIA(M) when someone detonated a 105mm round booby trapped at BS682028. On 15 Apr, 2 companies from the 11th Bde were operating together when an unknown type of booby trap was detonated causing sympathetic detonation of 81mm ammunition carried by the US troops. Total casualties from C/4-21 and C/4-3 were 14 US KIA, 26 US WIA(E) and 6 US WIA(M). On 20 Apr gunships from 174 Avn engaged an NVA company in the open at BS553635. The enemy left 22 dead on the battlefield. The next morning B/1-20 teamed up with PRU's and HMMWV from Ho Duc to cordon and search an enemy-held village. In the fighting that followed, 15 VC were killed and 10 more were detained at a cost of 1 Kit Carson Scout WIA(E). Six enemy weapons were captured. On 23 Apr, 123d Avn killed 1 NVA and 1 VC in two actions in the vicinity of BS37471. They then engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS638544 and killed 9 more VC. On 26 Apr, the gunship pilots struck again as 11th Bde Avn killed 8 NVA in two contacts in the vicinity of BS482725. Results for Operation Iron Mountain during the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORN</th>
<th>FORN</th>
<th>FORN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51 US KIA</td>
<td>396 VC KIA</td>
<td>283 US WIA(E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253 US WIA(E)</td>
<td>228 NVA KIA</td>
<td>61 US WIA(M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 US WIA(M)</td>
<td>357 DET</td>
<td>0 US KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 US KIA</td>
<td>6 FW/VC</td>
<td>25 NVA KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 CH/VC</td>
<td>2 CH/VC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>204 CIV DEF</td>
<td>198 IN CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>183 TWC</td>
<td>1 CIV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (G) Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effect or were initiated during this reporting period:

(1) OPORD 3-69 (Realignment of Forces) and OPORD 5-69 (Movement of the 196th Infantry Brigade) remained in effect during the reporting period.
OPORD 7-69 (Golden Fleece - Rice Denial) was superseded by OPLAN 7-70 (GOLDEN FLEECE).

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley - Relief/Reinforcement of CIDG Camps), OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation and Evacuation), OPLAN 9-69 (Natural Disaster Relief) OPLAN 11-69, OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsal), OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction), and OPLAN 14-69 remained in effect.
as published contingency plans. OPLAN 1-70 (Security for High-Ranking Officials) was published on 12 Feb 70; OPLAN 3-70 was published on 21 March, and OPLAN 7-70 (GOLDEN FREIGHT) was published on 28 April 1970. OPLAN 183-70 is currently being staffed.

(3) Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to Operations FREDERICK HILL, GENEVA PARK, NORTHERN LEAD, and TAY MOUNTAIN have been published.

b. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Progress (CUPP) continued, and reports were submitted to IV Corps as required.

3. (U) Organization

a. Effective 24 December 1969, the 150th Engr Detachment, previously attached to the 1st Log Command, was reattached to the 1st Log Command.

b. Effective 1 April 1970, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery was relieved from attachment to the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery and attached to the 3d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

4. (U) Training

a. The American Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of 0-3 and assigned or attached to the division. During the reporting period, 11 courses were completed and 1,991 personnel completed training.

b. The American Combat Center completed four Combat Leadership Courses for 199 students and two Support Leadership Courses for 99 students.

c. Two Unit Reconnaissance Courses were completed, graduating 101 personnel.

d. During the reporting period, 270 RF/FP junior officers completed the RF/FP Leadership and Orientation Course.

e. The American Combat Center sponsored a Mine and Booby Trap Mobile Training Team whose mission is to visit all the units of the division on a continuing basis and conduct training on countermining enemy mines and booby traps. Nine courses were conducted during the reporting period.

f. During the period 9 Apr 70 through 28 Apr 70, a Mechanical Ambush Mobile Training Team conducted training throughout the division on the employment of the mechanical ambush.
The first class of the Americal Division Sniper School graduated on 22 Apr 70; 27 students completed the training.

h. The 16th Aviation Group (Combat) conducted a CH-47B Sling Load Operation class on 12 Feb 70, for 40 personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Artillery.

i. The Americal Division Support Command supports a medical training program conducted by the 23d Medical Battalion for medical corpsmen, dental technicians and optometry assistants from the 2d ARVN Division Medical Battalion. During the reporting period 12 personnel completed this training. The 23d Medical Battalion also conducted a ten week on-the-job course in basic practical nursing procedures. Four Vietnamese females from Ky Xuan Island graduated from the course and returned to their island to provide medical aid to the local civilian population. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted Mine Detector Maintenance Training for four personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Maintenance Battalion.

j. The Americal Division Artillery conducted three Field Artillery Radar Operator Training classes for personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Artillery. A total of 19 personnel completed this training.

5. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 February through 30 April 1970, the Americal Division employed 1,858 close air support (CAS) and Combat Sky Spot (CSS) missions using 2,146 aircraft sorties. This was a slight reduction from the 1,962 missions and 2,215 sorties of the previous quarter. This can be directly attributed to the loss of two squadrons of A-4 aircraft when MAG 12 departed Vietnam on 12 February 1970.

(1) CSS missions: Combat Sky Spots totaled 1,264 missions and 943 sorties during the reporting period as compared with 1,214 missions with 880 sorties; the USAF flew 33 missions with 39 sorties; and the USN flew 17 missions with 24 sorties.

(2) CAS missions: A total of 594 CAS missions using 1,203 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Americal during the quarter, which is only a slight decrease from the previous quarter's total of 629 missions and 1,272 sorties. USMC flew 506 missions with 1,024 sorties; the USAF flew 80 missions with 111 sorties; and the USN flew 1 mission with 4 sorties. Additionally, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) flew 7 missions with 14 aircraft sorties in support of the Americal Division.

(3) Ordnance expended: Total ordnance expended by CAS and CSS missions during the reporting period was 5,550 tons of bombs, 302 tons of
CONFIDENTIAL

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, HCS CSFOR--53 (R2) (U)

napalm, and 630 rockets. This represents a 6.4% increase in bomb tonnage, a 1.8% decrease in napalm tonnage, and a 91% decrease in the number of rockets. These figures can largely be attributed to a decrease in enemy activity within the Americal TA01 and air strikes being targeted against hard targets.

b. There were no Arclight strikes in support of the Americal Division during the reporting period.

c. Bomb damage assessment made by Forward Air Controllers during the reporting period: 423 structures destroyed, 286 structures damaged, 544 bunkers destroyed, 108 bunkers damaged, 92 secondary explosions, 306 secondary and sustained fires, 268 fighting positions and spider holes destroyed, 56 tunnels destroyed, 12 AA/AW mortar positions destroyed, 6 caves collapsed, and 48 enemy killed by air strikes (KBAS).

6. (U) Artillery - A separate ORLL for the Americal Division Artillery will be submitted on 10 May 1970.

7. (U) Aviation - A separate ORLL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 10 May 1970.

8. (C) Chemical: During the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 70, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment, and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities.

a. 63,520 pounds of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 52 E158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed in conjunction with APD missions and troops in contact to initiate enemy movement.

c. 20 E8 CS Launchers were employed to flush suspected enemy.

d. 49 APD missions were flown.

e. 17 fields were defoliated by helicopter spray.

f. Approximately 15 acres of enemy hard crops were destroyed by helicopter spray.

g. Approximately 5 acres of enemy rice were destroyed by helicopter spray.

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12,980 gallons of thickened fuel were dropped on suspected enemy positions and minefields.

9. (C) Engineer

a. Activities for the period 1 February to 30 April 1970, consisted of divisional engineer efforts directed to the support of the Americal Division while non-divisional units devoted primary effort to the improvement of QL1 LOC, operational support construction, and the Secondary LOC Program.

b. QL1 continued to receive the priority horizontal effort in the Americal TAOI with two engineer battalions committed primarily to the restoration of QL1. One change in engineer troop disposition occurred during the reporting period. The 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC) was redeployed to Da Nang.

(1) The 26th Engineer Battalion provided tactical bridge support for the restoration and upgrading of QL1 within the TAOI.

(2) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat), augmented by the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) and the 137th Engineer Company (Light Equipment), devoted primary effort toward upgrading and paving QL1 from Mo Duc (BS740525) to FSB Debbie (BS873327), and providing excellent maintenance from I/II Corps border (BS907150) to Binh Son (BS601920).

(3) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 (MCB 7) performed expedient maintenance on QL1 from Binh Son (BS601920) to the Chu Lai Main Gate (BT520044) and as far north as B1145460 after the 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC) redeployed to Da Nang.

(4) The 9th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force (FMF), devoted primary effort toward upgrading and maintenance of QL1 from Chu Lai to BT145460 until 21 March 1970. For the remainder of the period they provided haul support for MCB 7 on QL1 North construction and maintenance from Tam Ky to the end of the paved portion.

(5) Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 301 (CBMU 301) supplied mineral products for engineer construction throughout the TAOI and performed R&A support for Chu Lai Base.

c. Engineer operations in the TAOI consisted generally of the following:

(1) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat):

(a) In addition to the maintenance and upgrading of QL1, the
Battalion was committed to minesweeping from Chu Lai (BT534036) to Duc Pho (BT807378) and provided support for the 11th Infantry Brigade from Duc Pho to I/II Corps border (BS908149). The Battalion completed the restoration of QL1 from Me Duc to Duc Pho on 24 February 1970. The restoration of that portion between Duc Pho and FSB Debbie was completed 15 April 1970.

(b) The Battalion upgraded and paved the access road between QL1 and FSB Liz, approximately 3 km in length.

(c) The Battalion commenced the upgrade of three (3) roads in the FY 70 Secondary LOC Program during the period: QL1 to Ha Thanh, QL1 to FSB 411, and QL1 to Tien Phuoc (LTL 5B, HL 518, and HL 533, respectively).

In addition to these roads the Battalion was jointly tasked to provide material support for the 10th ARVN Group to construct HL 529 (QL1 to Tra Bong).

(d) The Battalion supported the Americal Division with bunker construction at FSB's West, Center, Fat City, Hawk Hill and LZ Dragon.

(e) The Battalion completed construction of fifteen SEA-huts, three mess halls (2000 sq ft area each) and accompanying utilities for 1-1 Cav cantonment area.

(f) The Battalion completed construction of a timber bridge at BS633811 on QL1. Reconstruction two concrete pier bridges on QL1 was started at the Long Go Ha (BS691647) and the Song Ve (BS695636).

(g) During this reporting period the battalion started the rehabilitation of the airfield at Tien Phuoc.

(h) The Battalion acquired a rock crusher during the period and started producing rock from the primary crusher 24 March 1970.

(I) The Battalion also exerted a considerable effort toward culvert construction and repair from Chu Lai to Quang Ngai.

(j) The Battalion contributed a platoon (9 dozers and 17 dozer operators) to the Land Clearing Company (Provisional).

(k) The Battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

1. HHC, A(-), C, D(-) 511th Engineer Company (PB), 137th Engineer Company (LE)(-): Chu Lai

2. B Co: FSB Dottie
2. 2 Platoons A Co: FSB Snoopy
3. 1 platoon each, D Co and 137th Engineer (LE): Tien Phuoc

(b) During the month of February the battalion hauled over 8,750 cy of various mineral products for maintenance and upgrade of QLU and Route 535 from FSB Baldy to FSB Ross (BT025345). Although Route 535 is outside the Americal Division's TAOI, it is important because it leads to the strategic Hiep Duc District.

(c) The Battalion furnished the command element and one platoon (14 dozers and 28 dozer operators) for the Land Clearing Company (Provisional).

(d) The Battalion relocated its Headquarters and the major portion of its assets to Da Nang the first part of March.

(e) The disposition of the battalion at the end of the period was as follows:

1. HBC, Service Company, Company C(-): Da Nang
2. Company B: Hill 10
3. Company D: Hill 63
4. Company A: Hawaii
5. 2 platoons of Company C: 9th Engineer Compound in Chu Lai

(3) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7(MCB 7):

(a) The Battalion constructed 7,102 linear feet of revetment for 91st Medivac Hospital. This project also consisted of drainage structures and sidewalk construction.

(b) The Battalion replaced the matting on the Minh Long runway.

(c) The Battalion installed a pole-mounted lighting system along 25,000 feet of the Chu Lai Base Perimeter.

(d) The Battalion repaired four bridges which were partially destroyed.
by enemy activity during the period. These bridges were the Ba Ban Bridge (BT101511), the Vinh An Bridge (BT379174), the An Tan Bridge (BS497066) and the Hill 10 Bridge (BT208375).

(e) The Battalion drilled five wells during the period. These were located at FSB Hawk Hill (2 ea) (BT231315), FSB Debbie (BS871325), Binh Son (BS601921), and FSB Fat City (BT435079).

(f) In addition, the Battalion provided air-mobile equipment support to the Americal Division.

CBMU-301 provided mineral products for engineer units within the TA0I during the period.

(5) The Land Clearing Company (Provisional) was formed in August 1969 from assets within the ICTZ and placed in support of the Americal Division by the Third Marine Amphibious Force. The company consists of one platoon of Army Bulldozers (9 each D7E) and one platoon of Marine bulldozers (14 each Eimco). During the reporting period the unit was not available to the Americal Division. The 26th Engineer Battalion furnished a CEV to the unit during this period and on 17 March 1970 it hit a mine and was combat lost.

(6) 26th Engineer Battalion: Significant Activities

(a) M0 DUC ROAD: Company C continued work on M0 DUC ROAD and completed the project from BS770535 east to the beach BS790540 on 30 March 1970. Since the previous reporting period 2.5 km of road were constructed and 290 feet of culvert were installed. Casualties since 1 February 1970 were 2 US WIA and 1 US KIA. One five ton dump truck was destroyed and one five ton dump and one D-7E dozer were damaged. All casualties and damages were caused by mines and booby traps.

(b) LZ's/FSB's: Six LZ's/FSB were opened during the period by the Battalion. These were MARY ANN (A962999) on 19 February, TIGER (BS638552) on 11 March, BULLDOG (B368552) on 28 March, HUSTLER (BT294033) on 1 April, PINEAPPLE (BS358961) on 18 April and BOXER (BT119980) on 26 April 1970. Work consisted of clearing helipads, fields of fire, digging emplacements, and clearing mines and booby traps. Most of the clearing was done by using demolitions and the air-mobile Case 450 dozer. There were 15 WIA's from these projects. PINEAPPLE was the most heavily booby trapped and accounted for 6 WIA's. A total of 23 booby traps were found, 4 caused the casualties.

(c) Land Clearing TRA BINH TARGET HAMLET: On 3 March 1970, Company B moved 3 dozers, one with a Rome Plow, to the vicinity of BS599833 to support
the 1-52 Infantry in pacification hamlet fortification of TRA BINH. Approximately 183,000 square meters of land were cleared and 3 mines, 4 booby traps, 60 meters of tunnel, and 14 bunkers were destroyed. One US was WIA when his dozer hit a mine.

(d) Operation Nantucket Beach: Two platoons from Company B were deployed with elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade to provide minesweep and demolition support in the Batangan Peninsula from 10 to 16 March 1970. During the period 17 booby traps, 5 mines, 300 meters of tunnels, and 14 bunkers were destroyed. Casualties on this operation were three infantry KIA, and 18 infantry and 3 engineers WIA. All resulted from a 105mm booby trap.

(e) Land Clearing VAN THIEN TARGET HAMLET: Company B deployed 3 D-7E dozers, one with a Rome Plow, to clear land in the vicinity of PS705805 in support of the 1-6 Infantry pacification hamlet fortification project. During the period 16-23 April 1970, 845,000 square meters were cleared and 1 mine, 6 booby traps, and 170 bunkers were destroyed. There were no casualties.

(f) Road Opening HL 533: During the period 1-30 April, Company D opened HL 533 for 7 convoys to TIEN THUOC (BT114138). Extensive repairs were made to the road on 1 and 2 April. This work consisted of installing 7 new culverts and repairing 3 existing culverts that were washed-out during the post monsoon. There were 8 US WIA, 1 KIA, and 2 ARVN WIA. One 5 ton dump, 1 APC, 1 lowboy and 1 5 ton wrecker were destroyed. 1 Sheridan and one bucket loader were damaged. All of the casualties and damages were caused by mines. Ten other mines were found and destroyed, 7 by mine detectors and 3 by visual detection. Security was provided by elements of the 1-45 Infantry, 5 ARVN Regiment and various RF units.

### INCIDENTS

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### ROADS

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<td>KIA (VN)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WIA (VN)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Mine Incidents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>
E. Logistics.

1. (U) General: The period 1 February 1970 - 31 April 1970, was characterized by improved supply support procedures, realignment and assumption of support functions in preparation for the scheduled withdrawal of the Naval Support Activity Detachment, Chu Lai, and an improved maintenance posture.

2. (U) Services Division: a. Repair and replacement of bunkers on all fire bases and landing zones continues with completion expected within the next 90 days. The erection of SEA HUTS for the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry at Chu Lai and for the 146th Infantry Brigade at LZ Hawk Hill was completed.

b. Inventories of installation property and establishment of real property records were accomplished at LZ Bronco and LZ Hawk Hill by Pacific Architects and Engineers. The inventory of installation property and establishment of real property records at Chu Lai is expected to be completed within the next thirty days.

c. A pumping station and water pipe line were installed to connect an existing but previously unused ground water reservoir to the existing water distribution system for the 91st Evacuation Hospital and the division headquarters area.

3. (U) Supply Division: a. As part of the continuing effort to reduce excess equipment and supplies on hand the 23rd Supply and Transportation Battalion identified and retrograded 344 line items with a total dollar value of $1,022,000.00.

b. Inauguration of over-the-road shipment of supplies by truck convoy from Qui Nhon Depot in March reduced Order Shipping Time and increased supply receipts. Supplies are generally received within seventy-two hours after being released for shipment by the depot.

c. A Central Issue Facility operated jointly by the 23rd ST BN and the 16th Aviation Group (Combat) was established to exercise positive control over Aviation Safety Clothing.

d. Realignment of Support Responsibilities. (1) Common service support provided to the Americal Division by the Naval Support Activity Detachment, Chu Lai (NSAD, CL) will be taken over by agencies indicated below coincident with the withdrawal of NSAD, CL on 30 Jun 70:

...
Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCE 55-70-55 (R2) (U)

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operation of Port Terminal Facility

TASK
- Operation of Port Terminal Facility
- Harbor Security
- Operation of No. 1, 11, III, and IV Issue/Receipt Facilities
- Operation of Rock Quarry, Rock Crusher, Asphalt and Cement Plants
- Installation "Maintenance"
- Water Purification/Distribution
- Electrical Power Production/Distribution
- Operation of Central Dial Tel. Exch

AGENT
- 1st LOG CM (57th Trans En) (TRX)
- USAEC, V (Contractor Operation)
- 1st SIG ELE

(2) As part of the support mission realignments, the 23d S&T Bn assumed operation of a Forward Support Element for Class I, II, III, and IV items at Zaron from the 57th Trans En, 1st Log Command.

4. (U) Maintenance Division: a. As of 20 April the M16 exchange program was approximately 89 per cent complete, with the current on hand figures indicating 5,195 chrome and 77 non-chrome barreled weapons on hand. It is anticipated that the program will be completed by 10 May 70.

b. The Americal Division CIC Team conducted thirteen courtesy and fifteen record inspections during the quarter. Fourteen units received a satisfactory rating on the record inspections. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 652 roadside spot check inspections during the quarter.

c. The M113A1 belly armor modification kit tested during the period was subsequently declared a standard item of issue. Modification kits for all authorized M113A1 vehicles have been requisitioned.

d. During this period continuous operational employment of armored cavalry units, coupled with infrequent operator and organizational maintenance resulted in excessive engine/power-train component failures in M113A1 armored personnel carriers and M551 Sheridans. A regularized maintenance stand-down program developed for all divisional armored cavalry units is expected to decrease the overall down-time of these vehicles.
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CHPOR-65 (R2) (U)

P. Civil Affairs/Civic Action/PSYOP

1. (U) Organization

   a. LTC George R. Hovey Johnson assumed duties as G5, Americal Division, on 16 March 1970, and Major Juris Lapins assumed duties as PSYOP Officer, Assistant G5, Americal Division, on 20 February 1970. The Friendship Councils established by the Americal Division G5, the 196th and 198th Infantry Brigades for the districts they encompass continue to enhance the civil affairs/civic action programs and provide a focal point for discussion of problems involving relations between FWMF, SVN agencies, and the local populace throughout the Americal TAOL.

   b. On 17 March 1970, the Civil Affairs Detachment, 6th AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company, was removed from LZ Bronze and re-integrated into the 6th AA Plt, 29th Civil Affairs Company, which remains in direct support of the Americal Division G5.

2. (C) Operations

   a. On 23 March 1970, civil affairs/civic action responsibility for Ky Lien (V), Ly Tin (D), Quang Tin (P), was transferred from 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, to 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade.

   b. On 18 April 1970, civil affairs/civic action responsibility for Ky Chanh (V), Ly Tin (D), Quang Tin (P), was transferred from the 198th Infantry Brigade to MAG 13.

   c. Rice Denial: The Americal Division continues to support the program to deny vital resources to the enemy. During the reporting period, 114,855 lbs of rice were captured with 107,015 lbs evacuated and turned over to province and district officials and 7,870 lbs destroyed because of the tactical situation or inedible condition.

   d. Refugees: Refugees still represent an acute problem within the Americal TAOL; however, progress is being made in resettling refugees as territorial security improves. During the reporting period, the 4th, 6th and 9th AA Platoons of the 29th Civil Affairs Company, in conjunction with HAGCORDS refugee advisors in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin, continued to work in refugee camps in the TAOL. The refugee population in the Americal TAOL numbers approximately 57,000.
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AVDF-6L

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65, (R2) (U)

a. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) Material: This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to Quang Ngai and Quang Tin during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health supplies</td>
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<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>5 pallets</td>
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3. Civil Affairs Pacification

a. The Americal Division continues to support the GVN Pacification Program throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces.

b. The Americal Division is continuing its increased activity in support of the GVN Pacification and Development Program. The 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, continued the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) in four hamlets. The 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, and the 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry, continued CUPP operations working in and around ten hamlets.

c. Progress in the pacification program in the Americal TAOI during the reporting period:

(1) Security of population* (as of 31 March 1970, A, B, and C status):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Security</th>
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<tr>
<td>Quang Tin</td>
<td>406,254</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Ngai</td>
<td>666,405</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
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</table>

* Population security figures reflected above indicate a decrease of percentage of the population under GVN control. This is primarily due to the introduction of the Revised Hamlet Evaluation System 1970. A downward trend was experienced countrywide when the new system was introduced in January, 1970; however, the percentages are expected to rise as pacification and development continues.

(2) VCI neutralized (as of 31 March 1970):
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDF-HL 10 May 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, AGS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Quang Tin 492
(b) Quang Ngai 296

(c) People's Self Defense Force (as of 30 April 1970):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>ORGANIZED</th>
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<th>ARMED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Quang Tin</td>
<td>77,799</td>
<td>65,616</td>
<td>13,187</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Quang Ngai</td>
<td>98,458</td>
<td>81,410</td>
<td>10,349</td>
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</table>

d. The Americal Division is continuing its support of pacification and development through MEDCAP II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MEDCAPs</th>
<th>PERSONS TREATED</th>
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CONFIDENTIAL

AVDP-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, BCS CSPS-65 (R2) (U)

4. (C) PSYOP Activities (Feb-Apr 70)

a. Leaflets dropped by aircraft, by campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMPAIGN</th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>19,000,000</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>21,902,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>612,000</td>
<td>334,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>245,000</td>
<td>1,235,000</td>
<td>2,330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-NVA</td>
<td>963,000</td>
<td>2,297,000</td>
<td>4,678,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>1,193,000</td>
<td>2,610,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by the 9th Special Operations Squadron, USAF, in support of the Americal Division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>742</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Total newspapers distributed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Aerial loudspeaker targets during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerial tape targets</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial tape time</td>
<td>83:07</td>
<td>99:12</td>
<td>129:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlyword targets</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlyword time</td>
<td>45:20</td>
<td>37:55</td>
<td>32:20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVDP-WL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CP FOR-25 (R2) (U)

Heliborne targets 6 29 57
Heliborne broadcast times 1:30 24:35 31:05

e. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast hours</td>
<td>125:15</td>
<td>199:45</td>
<td>194:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast time</td>
<td>8:45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3:30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Movie missions conducted during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movie missions</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movies shown</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie hours</td>
<td>49:30</td>
<td>44:35</td>
<td>41:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>10,330</td>
<td>8,950</td>
<td>7,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Number of HoI Chanha in the Americal Division TOA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (C) a. Recent significant developments:

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AVDP-HL

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period ending 30 April 1970, #314 (AD) (U)

(1) During the reporting period Americal Division's PSYOP program was reoriented. A shift has taken place from the 63 section primarily issuing guidance and then monitoring brigade PSYOP programs to more actively directing, supervising and most importantly, becoming active as an actual operating entity. To facilitate coordination of this change in mission, 63 is now represented in the UTCG on a 24-hour basis. Also facilitating this has been the receipt of additional broadcasting equipment. The Division received more modern public address systems while retaining the systems already on hand. This has permitted the fabrication of 1000 watt airborne public address systems for each brigade, plus and additional one for the 63 section. In addition, each infantry battalion has been issued a hand-held PA system.

(2) PSYOP planning has been redirected to target against specific units and individuals. This is accomplished by more closely integrating PSYOP planning with the G2 Section, thereby capitalizing on enemy vulnerabilities as they develop. Timely exploitation is accomplished by developing and producing special tapes and leaflets at brigade and division level.

(3) The Division has increased the use of armed propaganda teams (APT) in conjunction with tactical operations. Attempts are made to introduce APT members into the same areas from which they rallied for more effective face-to-face communications with specific individuals of that area.

(4) Increased emphasis is being placed on Ho Chi Minh exploitation. A program is being initiated whereby qualified G2 interrogators will be permanently placed at the Quang Tri and Quang Ngai Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers to interview every raider in the T3K. The interview will not only be from an intelligence point of view, but also will provide PSYOP vulnerability research and analysis, with the objective of making the Division's PSYOP program that much more current and effective.

b. The special TF PSYOP campaign which was initiated in January was continued through the holiday period in February. Objectives of the campaign were to stress family unity, to align the populace with the U.S. and to encourage VC to rally under the Chieu Hoi program.

c. Enemy propaganda: There were relatively few enemy propaganda incidents reported during the past quarter. There were four enemy loudspeaker broadcasts, all of them in Vietnamese and directed primarily toward
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AVDP-HL

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSORF-6-5 (R2) (U)

the military. Of the ten enemy propaganda leaflets reported, two were directed at US military personnel, two were directed at Vietnamese military personnel, and six were directed at the Vietnamese people. A chronological listing of the reported enemy propaganda incidents is listed in paragraph 6.

6. (C) Enemy Propaganda Incidents

a. On 000440H Feb 70 at Giao Thuy #3 (H) (BS628947), CAP 1-3-7 found an enemy propaganda leaflet. The leaflet was written in English. The text was anti-American.

b. On 0 Feb 1970 PPs handed an enemy leaflet to the 10th Bn, 21st Inf, 196th Inf Bde. The leaflet was written in Vietnamese and directed at Vietnamese military personnel. The text was Chieu Hoi to the VC. Location of where the PPs found the leaflet is not known.

c. On 6 Feb 70 the CIDG gave an enemy leaflet to the 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Inf Bde. The leaflet was written in Vietnamese and directed at the population. The text proclaimed a ceasefire for the Lunar New Year.

d. On 211030H Feb 70, Co A, 4th Bn, 21st Inf, 11th Inf Bde, found several leaflets inside a bunker (BS91317). The following is a description of the leaflet texts:

(1) Leaflet number one was written in Vietnamese and directed at ARVN personnel. The leaflet text was anti-CVN.

(2) Leaflet number two was also written in Vietnamese, but was directed at the Vietnamese people. The text of the leaflet was anti-CVN.

(3) The third leaflet was written in English and directed at US troops. The theme was “Why die in Vietnam?”

e. On 011300H Mar 1970 the PPs in the vicinity of BT0730 heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast. The broadcast told the PPs to Chieu Hoi to the VC or NVA.

f. On 102015H March 1970 the RP/PP's of Tu Ky (V) (BS548743) reported hearing an enemy loudspeaker broadcast. The broadcast was in Vietnamese and said that the RP/PP would be killed and the village destroyed.
g. On the morning of 3 April 1970 personnel of the 5th ARVN Regiment found a leaflet at three separate locations (BT239330, BT239334, BT225331). The leaflet was written in Vietnamese and directed toward the people. The text of the leaflet was anti-American and anti-VN.

h. On 0008 on 3 April 1970, Co B, 4th Bn, 19th Inf, 196th Inf Bde, found three types of enemy leaflets in the vicinity of AT938281. All the leaflets were written in Vietnamese and directed at the Vietnamese people. The texts were anti-American.

i. On 36230H April 1970, CAP 1-1-3, with RFs, heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast (BTC47105). The broadcast was in Vietnamese and told the Allied personnel to Chieu Ho or their positions would be overrun.

j. On 100015 April 1970 at BT324168, CAP 1-1-3 and RF/RF with them heard an enemy loudspeaker broadcast. The broadcast was in Vietnamese with an anti-VN theme.
AVMF-42

10 May 1970

SUBJ/REV: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970

II. LESSON LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

A. PERSONNEL

1. (U) SUBJECT: Deliberate NAV Form for Remittance of US Treasury Checks

   a. Observation: Class "A" Agents are turning in NAV Form 6119 to the Finance Office that are difficult to read. Street numbers are illegible and addresses not complete.

   b. Evaluation: A large percentage of US Treasury Checks are returned to the Finance Office each month as undeliverable. This is due to wrong street number, no such person, or no such address.

       2. This is creating a hardship for the men buying these checks, and for the dependents of these men.

   c. Recommendation: That Commanders stress the necessity for these forms to be filled out legibly and information required be complete. The Class "A" Agents should check each form that he accepts, and if not legible or complete, he should have it corrected on the spot. After the form reaches finance it is too difficult to contact each individual for corrections. An individual effort by Class "A" Agents can be a tremendous help in alleviating this problem.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Traffic Safety

   a. Observation: Violations of traffic rules and regulations continue to plague this command, particularly along交代.

   b. Evaluation: USARV Regulation 1-0-5 establishes reasonable speed limits to be in effect throughout Vietnam. These limits are established based upon normal road condition and population density. US military vehicles traveling at excessive speed, particularly through villages, are a constant danger to the Vietnamese people. In addition, great harm is done to the image of the United States and thus greatly hinders our efforts in Vietnam. Many Vietnamese people have said that the American soldier's biggest fault is his careless driving.

   c. Recommendation: That commanders at all levels continue to emphasize safe driving and military police continue to pursue their selective enforcement program in this area.
B. Intelligence.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Division Targeting Committee

a. Observation: In March 1976, a Division Targeting Committee was formed. The committee meets daily to discuss current intelligence and the tactical situation, and makes recommendations for areas of further intelligence acquisition and operational exploitation.

b. Evaluation: The daily meeting of representatives from G4, G3, G2 Air, G3 Air, Div Artillery, Air Force Liaison Officer and Division Aviation has resulted in all of the Division controlled resources being employed in rapid response to the latest intelligence. Also, representatives of G5 and Division Chemical attend on a regular basis to ensure that their operations complement the tactical operations and exploit current intelligence.

c. Recommendation: The Division Targeting Committee has been successful at Division level and targeting committees may be found to be useful at Brigade and Battalion levels.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Division Intelligence Net

a. Observation: A Division Intelligence Radio Net, FM secure, has been installed with the Brigades, Division Cavalry Troops and LRAD Company. The NCS is located in the DTG.

b. Evaluation: This secure means of passing classified information permits a rapid exchange of information that would otherwise have to be sent by secure HT or messenger. This timely exchange of intelligence gives the Division G3 and unit S3's the opportunity to react to intelligence. The Intelligence Net is also used by the G5 and Brigade S5's to pass classified traffic when necessary.

c. Recommendation: The Division Intelligence Net has been useful in passing classified information and may further be made available for G5 operations.

C. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Closing of Temporary Fire Support Bases (TFSB's)

a. Observation: The practice of filling in foxholes on TFSB's is felt to be dangerous and unnecessarily time consuming. On one occasion this year, a unit had filled in all its holes, leaving no cover, and was mortared awaiting extraction with many casualties. On another occasion, a TFSB was being leveled with a bulldozer when weather precluded extraction of the dozer by CH-47. Troops were forced to secure the dozer and were temporarily without cover.
b. **Evaluation**: It is possible to rage bunkers and fortifications on TFSB's and leave the foxholes for protection. Enemy units do not use the hilltops as we do, preferring draws where there is concealment and water, and any boobytrapping of foxholes could be minimized by scheduled fires, LZ preparations, and alertness on the part of the troops.

c. **Recommendation**: That policy be promulgated to preclude filling in of foxholes when closing out TFSB's.

3. (C) **SUBJECT**: ACAV's Carrying Infantry

a. **Observation**: When carrying attached Infantry, mass casualties can occur when a single track hits a mine.

b. **Evaluation**: Armored Cavalry operations in Vietnam often require the attachment of Infantry. When carrying Infantry on ACAV's, the possibility of having a large number of casualties from one mine incident increases.

c. **Recommendation**: No attached Infantry should be carried on the lead vehicle. Additionally, no attempt should be made to maintain the Infantry organization at the expense of dispersing the Infantry throughout the Armored Cavalry formation. The Infantry should be uniformly dispersed among all vehicles except those likely to lead.

4. (C) **SUBJECT**: Scheduled Fires

a. **Observation**: The enemy frequently establishes patterns in their operational procedures which can be exploited to our advantage. This includes the repetitive use of trails, base camps, river crossing sites, and sleeping positions. While it is not possible to place surveillance on all these areas within a unit's area of operations, it is possible to periodically place scheduled fires on these areas to reduce the enemy's capabilities. Due to errors in ground navigation and the existing maps, it is essential that an exact plot be achieved on the desired location.

b. **Evaluation**: The most effective method of obtaining an exact plot for future fire missions is to adjust the artillery on the desired site. To best achieve this without indicating it has happened is to register on the target using white phosphorous rounds with VT fuses. The forward observer can adjust the round relatively accurately utilizing a setting of 50 meters, and not leave any signs on the ground.

c. **Recommendation**: That increased emphasis be placed upon the small leader to identify enemy trails, base camps, crossing sites and sleeping positions. Once identified, artillery should be adjusted when feasible, and the data recorded by the Battalion S2 for future use.
5. (C) SUBJECT: Deception Operations

a. Observation: The 4th Battalion, 1st Infantry has experienced increased success in recent months through the employment of increased deceptive techniques, coupled with greater foot mobility. These techniques include:

(1) Moving into an area, remaining several days and then moving out for a long distance (either by foot or air), rapidly returning to the original area by a new and unexpected route.

(2) Moving slowly through an area, then suddenly moving a long distance in a new and unexpected direction.

(3) Trailing a unit moving through an area by a second unit several hours behind.

(4) Use of the standard stay behind ambushes and stay behind patrols.

b. Evaluation: While both the enemy and friendly units tend to establish patterns in their operations, the objective study of a unit's patterns will offer that unit an opportunity to take advantage of these patterns to lull the enemy into complacency, then a sharp deviation from these patterns will tend to disrupt the enemy's preconceived notions of the friendly unit's methods of operation.

c. Recommendation: That units study their own methods of operation to evaluate methods of varying their techniques and exploit these activities by rapidly modifying operations.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Crop Destruction Techniques

a. Observation: The dropping of 5 gallon plastic collapsible cans filled with herbicide Agent Blue into enemy rice paddies has proven an effective means of destroying rice. The containers are filled with 3 or 4 gallons of agent and can be dropped from a CH-47 at 2500 feet and 70 knots. This altitude and speed provide relative safety from ground fire while allowing enough accuracy for the area coverage desired. Using 5 cans per hectare and arranging the targets in straight line runs, 90% of the targeted rice can be destroyed or damaged. This method utilizes only Division assets and costs only one tenth as much as comparable Traildust Mission flown by C-123 aircraft. The method is limited, however, to smaller targets.

b. Evaluation: Tests have shown that Herbicide Agent Blue can be effectively used to destroy small area rice crops using the method described.

c. Recommendation: That herbicide Agent Blue is 5 gallon collapsible cans be dropped from CH-47 helicopters on small area rice destruction targets.
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7. (C) SUBJECT: The "Pink Team"

a. Observation: The 11th Infantry Brigade has developed a "Pink Team" which provides timely, dynamic reaction to newly acquired intelligence.

b. Evaluation: When fresh intelligence is received at the Brigade Tactical Operations Center, notification is provided to the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), the battalion in whose AO the intelligence is located and the Pink Team. The Pink Team consists of an armed LOH and two armed helicopters which are on a 24 hour alert. Artillery may or may not be fired, depending on the situation, but the Pink Team is always put up. If no artillery is fired, the team proceeds to the location and enters the radio net of the battalion in whose AO the target is located. If there is artillery, it contacts the FSCC on the way to the target and obtains an end of mission. The team then proceeds to the target, contacts the battalion in the AO. At the same time, three utility helicopters are alerted in case the battalion decides to put troops on the ground to exploit the target. The same system is employed whenever a unit comes in contact with the enemy. During combat assaults, a Pink Team performs an aerial zone reconnaissance after the initial insertion and between subsequent lifts.

c. Recommendation: The use of a "Pink Team" can be invaluable in exploiting new intelligence.

8. (C) SUBJECT: Destruction of Expended Grenades

a. Observation: The VC recover expended smoke and CS grenades, remove and rebuild the fuse assembly, and use the rebuilt fuse assembly as detonators for mines and booby traps.

b. Evaluation: Smoke and CS grenade fuse assemblies should be rendered inoperative after use to preclude recovery and later use of the fuse assembly by the VC.

c. Recommendation: That whenever tactically feasible, all smoke and CS fuse assemblies should be rendered inoperative after use. A rigidly enforced program to dismantle all smoke and CS grenade fuse assemblies will seriously impede VC mine and booby trap operations by denial of what has been in the past an easy obtainable component necessary to his operation. Recommended procedure of dismantling the fuse assembly is as follows:

(1) After use of any smoke or CS grenade and after the grenade body has cooled, retrieve the grenade and remove the fuse assembly.

(2) Using the point of an M-14 or M-16 cartridge, push the striker retaining pin out of the fuse assembly. This allows the striker and the striker pin to fall out.

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The fuse assembly is now broken down into four parts:
(a) Fuse assembly
(b) Striker
(c) Striker spring
(d) Striker assembly pin

These four components should now be disposed of by separately throwing the items in a stream, heavy vegetation, or any other area whereby recovery would be extremely difficult.

D. Organization. None.

E. Training. None

F. Logistics.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Ice Container

a. Observation: An excessive amount of ice is being lost in transit between the issue point and release point due to the intense heat in the tropic zone.

b. Evaluation: The quantity of ice lost from issue to release was due to the nonavailability of adequate containers. It was necessary to construct a container made from plywood, styrofoam, and sheet metal. The container holds 2,400 pounds of ice.

c. Recommendation: That a standard ice container that can be housed in a 1½ ton trailer be designed and the TOS of units located in tropical areas be augmented to include this item.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Tower Fan Belts for M551's and M578's

a. Observation: Tower Fan Belts for M551's and M578's are often difficult to obtain but usually one of the other is available. The belts, FSM's 3030-528-6795 (M578) and 3030-519-6423 (M551), are interchangeable. Armored Cavalry units can exchange them between these two vehicles. Old belts and new belts should not be mixed on the four-pulley tower fan, however; the new unstretched belts will break quickly.

b. Evaluation: This method enables Armored Cavalry units to keep vehicles running.

c. Recommendation: This method should be communicated to Armored Cavalry units.
G. Communications.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Teletype Maintenance

   a. Observation: Excessive teletype outage and continual maintenance effort have been experienced in tactical communication center.

   b. Evaluation: Even with air conditioning and sealed facilities, buildup of dirt occurs causing rapid wear of moving parts, necessitating continual machine adjustment and maintenance.

   c. Recommendation: Two innovations have appreciably reduced teletype maintenance:

      (1) A wire screen, dipped in oil, is placed over the exhaust outlet of each tactical air conditioner. This effectively filters most dirt from the air. The screen needs periodic cleaning.

      (2) A teletype cleaning bath has been fabricated from a 55 gallon drum cut in half lengthwise, and placed on a stand. A small electrical pump, such as a bilge-pump from a track vehicle, provides a steady stream of cleaning solvent, FSN 6850-597-9765, or other type. A further refinement includes a 24-ton oil filter in the line which keeps the solvent clean. All teletype machines are periodically cleaned thoroughly in this bath. As a result, machine adjustment and maintenance are reduced considerably.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Remote Communication Capability

   a. Observation: The AN/PRC-77 is often incapable of providing adequate communications support for tactical operations conducted in remote areas of Vietnam.

   b. Evaluation: A need existed for a communication capability when operating in distant areas. The 198th Infantry Brigade constructed a jump TOC utilizing a CONEX container. The jump TOC has two RT-524 radios, four 12V truck batteries connected in series and mounted in two wooden boxes, two KT-6 secure radios, two RC-292 antennas, two whip antennas, and one 1.5 KW generator. Additionally, there are map boards, rations, sandbags, lanterns and other essential items packed in the CONEX. The jump TOC can be airlifted to a remote location and communications can be quickly established.

   c. Recommendation: A jump TOC such as this can be easily constructed and can provide invaluable communications support for operations in remote areas.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Radios for FO's Supporting Armored Cavalry Troops

   CONFIDENTIAL
a. **Observation:** Forward Observers attached to Armored Cavalry troops are equipped with PRC 25/77 radios. The troop commander uses a VRC 12 series radio, with considerably more range than the FO's radio.

b. **Evaluation:** Armored Cavalry troops often work at a considerable distance from fire support bases. The troop commander's VRC 12 series radio is able to maintain contact with these distant bases; however, the forward observer may be out of radio range since he is equipped with a less powerful radio. This has resulted in the FO having to use the troop commander's radio to make a call for fire.

c. **Recommendation:** That Armored Cavalry troop command tracks be equipped with an additional VRC 46 radio for use by the FO. The FO should also keep his PRC 25/77 for use away from the command track.

H. Material. None.

I. Other.

1. **(U) SUBJECT: Combat Photographs**

   a. **Observation:** The number of news photographic releases made by the Division Information Office dropped significantly in February and March.

   b. **Evaluation:** The 523rd Signal Battalion now makes all their shots taken in the field available to the Division Information Office for general release. It was found that many of the photographers of the 523rd Signal and Division Information Office were spending a great deal of time shooting pictures in the Chu Lai area. These were pictures such as award presentations and promotions. None of these shots have any value as Department of the Army record negatives or for general newsworthy releases. Consequently, the photographic assets of the Division Information Office and 523rd Signal are now being used mainly for combat and combat-related assignments. The information officers of the major subordinate commands are now required to send two rolls of unprocessed combat or combat-related film to the Division Information Office weekly.

   c. **Recommendation:** Photographic assets should be used primarily for combat or combat-related photographs.

2. **(U) SUBJECT: Use of Husch Flares for Emergency Lighting**

   a. **Observation:** Husch Flares made with 55 gal drums and 175 mm powder canisters are employed as emergency lighting on defensive perimeters in the 190th Infantry Brigade.
due to heat and forms a thick crust on top, making it difficult to ignite both in the drum and in the canister. To break through the crust and ignite the fuel, a WP grenade can be substituted for the normally used trip flare. The crust is big enough to drive off particles through the crust and clear it up, but small enough to do no damage to the drum or the canister. To prevent evaporation, a small triple valve ear plug can be used to plug the emission hole in the powder canister. The system must be checked and topped off weekly, but requires less attention than other methods tested.

c. **Recommendation:** The 55 gal drum Husch Flare can be effectively used as an emergency lighting system with a WP grenade as the igniter.
1-1st Bn, 523rd Sig Bn
1-3rd Bn, 1st Brigade
1-4th Bn, 21st Inf
1-5th Bn, 20th Inf
1-6th Bn, 21st Inf
1-7th Bn, 21st Inf
1-8th Bn, 6th Inf
1-9th Bn, 46th Inf
1-10th Bn, 46th Inf
1-11th Bn, 2d Bn, 1st Inf
1-12th Bn, 2d Bn, 21st Inf
1-13th Bn, 1st Inf
1-14th Bn, 11th Arty
1-15th Bn, 14th Arty
1-16th Bn, 10th Arty
1-17th Bn, 18th Arty
1-18th Bn, 2d Arty
1-19th Bn, 82d Arty
1-20th Bn, 82d Arty
1-21st Bn, 1st Cav
1-22nd Bn, 1st Cav
1-23rd Bn, 1st Cav
TO: Commanding General, USARW, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The OREL for Americal Division has been reviewed by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (U) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning Scheduled Fires, page 56, para II6b and c; concur, except that word "register" should read "adjust." *

   b. Reference item concerning Ice Containers, page 59, para III1; non-concur. Local fabrication of this item using materials available is considered the most favorable means of storing ice in transit.

   c. Reference item concerning radios for FO's supporting AGAT's, page 60, para IIG3; nonconcur. A more practical solution to the stated problem would be to equip the FO with an AN/GRC-125. The FO would then be able to utilize ranges or manpack the radio when required. An additional advantage would be the elimination of the requirement for a second radio set.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

PAUL W. TRAXLER
CPT AGC
ASS AG

*Corrections made at HQ DA
AV:GC-DST (10 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period
Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPO-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, Americal
Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Division Targeting Committee," page 55,
paragraph 2b(1): Concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the
next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC
or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Division Intelligence Net," page 55,
paragraph 2b(2): Concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next
issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or
DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Closing of Temporary Fire Support Bases,"
page 55, paragraph 23c(1): Nonconcur. Foxholes should be filled when closing
out TFSB's to preclude enemy use for cover and concealment and to prevent
booby trapping. Local policy should dictate the method, timing, and extent
of foxhole destruction to allow adequate troop cover consistent with the
enemy threat until troop departure. Unit has been so advised.

d. Reference item concerning "Scheduled Fires," page 56, paragraph
2c(4): Concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the
next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC
or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "The Pink Team," page 58, paragraph
2c(7): Concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of
the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

f. Reference item concerning "Destruetion of Expended Grenades," page 58,
paragraph 2c(8): Concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for
inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No
action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.
AVHGC-DST (10 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Americal Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

6. Reference item concerning "Tower Fan Belts for M551's and M578's," page 59, paragraph 1f(1), Nonconcur. The federal stock numbers listed are not valid. Fan belts should not be interchanged until such time as the correct federal stock numbers are verified, and the pulley grooves on each vehicle are checked to insure that they are compatible with both sets of belts. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
HQ, Americal Div
HQ, XXIV Corps
CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (10 May 70) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Division, for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 94 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph II Cl, page 55. In the closing of temporary fire support bases, the use of CS to render foxholes unusable should be considered in the event that time or the tactical situation does not permit filling.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

*Corrections to FSN made at HQ DA
AMERICAN DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 30 April 1970)

1. HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN DIVISION

HHC, American Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)
26th Engr Bn
523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
14th MP Flat, 504th MP Bn
3d Mil Hist Det
635th MI Co
328th RR Co
OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

2. AMERICAN DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHD, Div Arty
1st Bn, 14th Arty
1st Bn, 82d Arty
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
3d Bn, 82d Arty
6th Bn, 11th Arty
Metro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty
Btry G, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)
3d Plat, Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)
251st FA Det (Radar)

Inclosure 1
252d FA Det (Radar)
271st FA Det (Radar)

3. **AMERICAN DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND**
   HHC and Band
   23d Admin Co
   23d Med Bn
   23d S&T Bn
   723d Maint Bn (-)
   63d Inf Plt (CTT)
   3e G (Ranger), 75th Inf
   Americal Combat Center (PROV)
   Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. **16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP**
   HHC, 16th CAG (Obt)
   14th Combat Avn Bn
   71st Avn Co
   132d Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal)
   174th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal)
   176th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal)
   178th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hal)
   534th Med Det
   756th Med Det
   14th Security Plt
   123d Avn Bn (Obt) (Inf Div)
   Troop D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
   Co E, 723d Maint Bn
   Troop F, 8th Cav
   335th Trans Co

5. **11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE**
   HHC, 11th Inf Bde

Inclosure 1
6. **196th Infantry Brigade**

HHC, 196th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 46th Inf

2d Bn, 1st Inf

3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th Bn, 31st Inf

Trp F, 17th Cav

48th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

27th Chem Det

10th Public Information Det

7. **198th Infantry Brigade**

HHC, 198th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 6th Inf

1st Bn, 52d Inf

Inclosure 1
5th Bn, 46th Inf
Trp H, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
87th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
  Det 1 (DS of Chu Lai)
  Det 2 (DS of Duc Pho)

Det 3, 7th Payop Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

Inclosure 1
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Americal Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

HQ, OACS FOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

10 May 1970

N/A

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N/A

OACS FOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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