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REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (30 Oct 70) FOR OT UT 70B038 10 November 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Verne L. Bowers, Deputy
Chief of Staff (Personnel and Administration), HQ USAFRV, Period
30 March 1969 to 10 September 1970 (U)

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U)
dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Verne L. Bowers, subject as
above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be
interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of
any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a
result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG Verne L. Bowers

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG Verne L. Bowers. The report covers the period 30 March 1969 to 10 September 1970, during which time MG Bowers served as Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel and Administration), Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam.

2. MG Bowers is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

FOR OT UT
708038
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CONFIDENTIAL

10 September 1970

FINAL REPORT

BY

MAJOR GENERAL VERNE L. BOWERS
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY, VIETNAM

30 MARCH 1969 - 10 SEPTEMBER 1970

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# INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## INCLOSURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USARV Organization Chart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USARV Staff Officers Who Contributed to the Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Army Strength History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Enlisted Replacements Received Against USARV Objectives</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. (U) The purpose of this report is to highlight those actions which occurred during my tenure as Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam from March 1969 to September 1970. During this period many problems have been encountered. Most have been solved or reduced but others remain and require continuing attention. In addressing these problems we have learned many lessons and have developed certain recommendations for changes in Army policy and doctrine. It is hoped that some of these may be useful to the Army staff, Army service schools and to CDC for further study and development.

B. (U) Headquarters, USARV, is organized with the traditional general and special staff (See Incl 1). There is one major exception; there are two deputy chiefs of staff who exercise functional supervision over all staff sections. The DCS(P&A) supervises the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1; Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller; Assistant Chief of Staff, Management Information Data Systems; Adjutant General; Chaplain; Civilian Personnel Director; Headquarters Commandant; Information Officer; Inspector General; Post Commander; Provost Marshal; and the Staff Judge Advocate. This report is a compilation of ideas and accomplishments of all these sections and special credit goes to those officers listed at Inclosure 2 who filled these positions during a large part of this period and who made substantive contributions to this report.

C. (C) I assumed this position shortly after the 1969 Post-Tet offensive when the buildup of forces had been completed. Army authorized strength was 363,000 and Vietnam had top priority for personnel and other resources. There were few constraints and no budget limitations. The buildup had been accomplished by crash actions, push packages and other innovative means necessary to reach the directed force levels and to provide a logistical base which would support this force. There was no time to examine management systems and procedures. This is in no sense to be construed as criticism - to the contrary priorities were established and objectives were attained despite almost insurmountable obstacles. It was a herculean task that could have been accomplished in no other way.

D. (C) The buildup having been completed, it became our task to examine the organization, policies and procedures - in other words to tidy up. Following are some of the areas on which we concentrated and which will be discussed in more detail in Section IV.

1. The Budget Program Advisory Committee (PBAC) was a paper
organization which met periodically to listen to presentations by the Comptroller in which he simply reported expenditures and obligations. This was changed to an organization where the members became program directors, each charged with developing and justifying requirements, forecasting their budget position throughout the fiscal year and recommending changes which were reviewed by the full PBAC and presented to the Deputy Commanding General for decision. Work is continuing to extend program and budget control over out-of-country resources and to provide information which will enable the commander to know at all times the status of his fund resources and to have a basis to assign priorities among competing programs.

2. Before the club scandals broke, USARV became aware that there was no organization and little overall direction to an activity with annual sales of over $80,000,000. The Vietnam Open Mess Agency (VOMA) was organized; Central Purchasing Agencies (CPAs) were established; and stringent controls were imposed on selection, records screening and length of tenure of open mess custodians.

3. Because of the rigid DOD strength ceiling, the unpredictable casualty level and a 10,000 mile personnel pipeline USARV had to develop and refine a special strength accounting system which literally counts every man in country, every man arriving and every man departing, on a daily basis.

4. Records and personal effects for medical evacuees were not reaching the serviceman until long after he departed the theater. Much improvement has been made but the operation is not yet completely satisfactory.

5. Reenlistment was largely ignored and USARV was in last place in the USARPAC competition. On 30 June 1969, command support was generated and a new competition was announced which measured accomplishments against a monthly goal of 0.5% of assigned strength. By 31 December 1969, USARV had risen to 2d place in the USARPAC competition and was reenlisting 25.5% of its eligible AUS and 1st term RA personnel.

6. To eliminate overlap and duplication the office of the USARV Surgeon and the Headquarters of the 44th Medical Brigade were combined; the office of the USARV Engineer, Headquarters, US Engineer Command, VN(P) and Headquarters, United States Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam were combined; and Headquarters, USARV and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command were consolidated. These actions resulted in a reduction of 242 military and 118 civilian spaces.
E. (C) As I complete my tour we are in the midst of the fourth redeployment package which will have reduced authorised Army strength by over 74,000. Since March 1969, Vietnam's priority has dropped perceptibly and the "open checkbook" no longer is applicable. There are significant shortfalls in officer and enlisted replacement fill, the FY 71 budget is only about 56% of the FY 70 budget, and controls are being imposed on ammunition expenditures, construction and other resource utilisation. In summary, Vietnam is beginning to share the shortfalls which have been borne by the remainder of the Army for the past five years.
II. CONCLUSIONS

A. (U) Despite the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam and the domestic dissension it has caused, the officers and men of the United States Army have performed magnificently and have carried out their assigned missions in an outstanding manner. The young men who have been involuntarily lifted from an environment of permissiveness and complete disregard for authority have accepted the challenge and have uncomplainingly faced death and severe personal hardship. I have talked to many of these young men in the remotest parts of Vietnam and although most state they would rather not be here, they are proud of their accomplishments and are determined to do the best job possible. Officers and non-commissioned officers who normally are good average performers when assigned in CONUS and other non-active areas, have performed at the outstanding level here in Vietnam.

B. (U) Most indicators reveal that troop morale is above average here. Crime, court-martial and confinement rates are below the Army averages, psychiatric problems are minimal and reenlistment rates are high. Invariably the troops will give the following reasons which contribute to a high state of morale; the one year tour, immediate availability of medical care on the battlefield, the R&R program and good mail service.

C. (U) I believe the most serious problem we face in Vietnam is drugs and I doubt that it is worse here than in the United States. However, the ready availability and low cost combined with a compulsion on the part of many young personnel that they must use drugs to be in with their peer group, make this a challenge that must be given maximum attention. Our educational efforts must be believable and punishment for those who violate the law and regulations must be prompt and adequate to cause soldiers to consciously weigh the advantages and disadvantages of drug usage. Unfortunately the conflicting public statements about the effects of marijuana and the minimal punishment frequently given to violators have not helped to solve this problem.

D. (U) Although several recommendations are made in Section III, the one constraint which has caused the greatest difficulty has been the rigid strength ceiling imposed by DOD. This has required all levels of command to establish elaborate strength reporting systems and controls, it has resulted in the command consistently being below authorized strength as it is impossible to maintain an even strength with a long replacement pipeline and unpredictable casualties and it has imposed personal hardship on many personnel who were diverted at the port, shipped without adequate leave to take care of their families and personal affairs and
those who have had their tours involuntarily curtailed (See IV a lb for
detailed discussion).

E. (U) Headquarters, USARV, has been imbued with the overriding
philosophy that its only purpose is to support the operating troops. It has
attained this objective by much hard work on the part of the staff which
consistently has been the most professional I have known. They have
worked as a team, frequently have had honest disagreements, but have
supported all decisions with complete dedication and have not allowed
professional differences of opinion to degenerate into personal anamities.
Our working relationships with higher and lower headquarters have been
outstanding. In my area of operations the support and rapport between
our personnel and those assigned to OPO, ODCSPER and TAGO have been
tremendous. Without their responsiveness and help we could not have
accomplished our mission.

F. (U) It has been a rare privilege and honor to be the Deputy Chief of
Staff, Personnel and Administration, Headquarters, USARV for the past
18 months. The close association and support from commanders and
staffs alike have not only made this job challenging but it has been fun.
I leave with a sense of accomplishment but a recognition there is still
much to be done.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

The recommendations in this section are made on the basis of conditions and problems encountered in Vietnam. It is recognized fully that factors and considerations not apparent here will make some of them impractical and unworkable. However, they are made with the hope they will identify areas where the Army can continue to improve by examining doctrine, policies and procedures. Detailed discussions of each item which is included in Section IV are identified in parenthesis following each recommendation. Recommendations are:

A. That a two-section Personnel Information Data Reporting System be developed (IV. A. 1. a.).

B. That Department of the Army eliminate the enlisted line item requisitioning system (IV. A. 2. b.).

C. That enlisted personnel not be promoted in an MOS unless they are physically qualified to perform all of the duties required of that MOS (IV. A. 3. a.).

D. That Department of the Army develop a career system which permits enlisted men to move laterally out of combat MOSs which require stringent physical capability as they age, or that an "up or out" policy similar to that used for officers be developed (IV. A. 3. b.).

E. That commanders in active theaters of operation be given more latitude in reassigning Command Sergeants Major (IV. A. 4. a.).

F. That Command Sergeants Major be rotated between command and staff positions (IV. A. 4. b.).

G. That all officers and non-commissioned officers receive some training in casualty identification and reporting procedures (IV. A. 6. a.).

H. That the number of sympathy and condolence letters be reduced (IV. A. 6. b.).

I. That the personnel, finance, and medical records be consolidated in one location (IV. A. 7.).

J. That the Adjutant General's School develop courses which will produce AG officers and non-commissioned officers who have expertise in records management (IV. A. 9.).
K. That DA doctrine prescribe centralized special service organizations in overseas theaters (IV. A. 10. a.).

L. That Department of Defense establish a policy that movies will be shown each day in all short-tour areas (IV. A. 10. b.).

M. That USARV and MACV replacement systems be combined under the management of USARV (IV. A. 12. b.).

N. That priority efforts be made to improve the AOR/ORR reporting system and that more timely assignment instructions be furnished for personnel returning from short-tour and other overseas areas (IV. A. 13.).

O. That the maximum amount of lead time be given in any other redeployment packages and that control of both input and outflow of personnel rest solely with USARV (IV. A. 14.).

P. That an increased number of AGC officers who have had experience operating the enlisted assignment and replacement activities in Vietnam be assigned to OPO (IV. A. 15.).

Q. That a block of instruction on open mess management be included in all service school curriculums (IV. A. 17.).

R. That in future wars, post exchanges stock only essential items and do not sell high dollar value luxury merchandise (IV. A. 18.).

S. That Chaplain positions be removed from group headquarters TOEs and assigned to battalions (IV. B. 1.).

T. That cavalry squadron TOEs be amended to include a Chaplain (IV. B. 2.).

U. That more flexible criteria be adopted for determining the number of Chaplains required in support troop organizations (IV. B. 3.).

V. That contingency plans for future joint operations consider the problem of reimbursable support and prescribe service funding by one agency (IV. C. 4.).

W. That in future wars in underdeveloped areas service regulations mandatorily limit the amount of money the serviceman and other government employees may draw in the overseas area (IV. C. 5.).
X. That a detailed Inspector General be included in all TOE, MTOE and TDA for brigade size or larger units commanded by a general officer (IV. D. 1.).

Y. That requirements for timely completion of DA Form 78 be publicized and made an IG item of interest (IV. D. 2.).

Z. That the need for senior officers to make themselves available to the press be emphasized (IV. E. 2.).

AA. That Department of the Army establish an MOS producing court reporter course and revise the grade structure to provide increased career incentive (IV. F. 2.).

BB. That Department of the Army develop more rugged ADP equipment for use under field conditions (IV. G. 1.).

CC. That Department of the Army develop more in-house ADP spare parts and maintenance capability (IV. G. 2.).

DD. That USARV representatives be present at future GSA ADP maintenance contract negotiations (IV. G. 3.).

EE. That DA, DOD and the Treasury Department get together and assign overseas customs responsibility to one agency (IV. H. 1.).

FF. That AF Manual 125-5 be designated a joint service manual for sentry dogs and that Army units be authorized to requisition this manual (IV. H. 2.).

GG. That Department of the Army expand policies, procedures and doctrine for monitoring PW procedures in stability operations (IV. H. 3.).

HH. That Department of the Army provide standard procedures to obtain health and comfort supplies for PW collecting points (IV. H. 4.).

II. That the Vietnamese local national work force not be reduced proportionate to the US troop withdrawal (IV. I. 2.).

JJ. That a block of instruction on utilization of civilian employees be included in military school curriculums (IV. I. 3. a.).

KK. That civilian personnel reporting requirements from Vietnam be reduced (IV. I. 3. b.).
LL. That Department of the Army establish a centralized Civilian Personnel Recruitment office to recruit personnel for assignment to Vietnam (IV. I. 3. c.).
IV. FUNCTIONAL DISCUSSIONS (U).

A. G-1 and AG.

The relationship between G-1 and AG has been ideal. G-1 has concentrated on policy, planning and overall general staff coordination of the AG's activities. The AG has been the operator, handling all assignments (except colonels and general officers), has directed the operation of the replacement battalions and has operated both the replacement and the special service systems in addition to other normal AG functions. The officer replacement division of AG has been especially effective. Staffed almost entirely by officers of all branches with previous OPD service, they have used a career management approach in officer assignments and reassignments.

1. Strength Control. DOD imposed a rigid strength ceiling which the Army was forbidden to exceed under any circumstances. To operate under this constraint in a wartime environment with no in-country replacement pool and a replacement source which was 10,000 miles distant, required several actions which were expensive and inefficient.

a. USARV had to establish a separate daily telephonic strength reporting system from every Army unit in Vietnam and this report (MACV 5314) became the recognized strength source for all agencies from DOD on down. Despite expensive ADP equipment and thousands of personnel involved in the personnel information data system, it was completely useless for strength management and replacement actions. The inherent time-lag in a system which depends on a morning report transmitted by mail on an irregular schedule can never meet the requirement for timeliness under wartime conditions. Because of the tremendous amount of data which is transmitted through the personnel information data system, I believe we should consider dividing it into two sections. The first simply would report daily strength changes on a real-time basis, using electronic communications or telephone. The second portion, until we can find some better source, could continue to use the morning report and DA Form 1-1 to record and transmit the mass of other personnel data which are required to manage the Army's personnel. This information does not have to be received as quickly as the strength figures and therefore, we can afford the time-lag which will enable purification at each level and which hopefully would improve its accuracy.

b. Because of the long lead-time to procure, train, and furnish replacements to Vietnam and because of irregular transportation schedules,
the command was required to constantly stay one or two percent under the DOD ceiling to insure that this ceiling was never exceeded. USARV requested several times, both through Army and joint channels, that a 1% tolerance be authorized. However, this was disapproved on each occasion. I recognize the political aspects of this war, but I am confident that we spent many millions of dollars and did an extremely poor job of personnel management with its adverse impact on retention of quality personnel in order to live within the strength ceiling. At Inclosure 3 is a chart showing the operating strength related to the DOD ceiling from March 69 to September 70.

2. Replacement Operations.

a. With the constraints mentioned above, the G-1 and AG accomplished an outstanding job in managing the replacements and in supporting the combat, combat support and combat service support commanders. They developed the capability to react immediately to unexpectedly heavy casualties, to shifting workloads and to other changing conditions. Two steps were taken to provide some flexibility in maintaining infantry strength - that which is subject to the greatest casualties in any war.

(1) A 100-man infantry pool was maintained at each of the two replacement battalions and these could be moved to a division or separate brigade on extremely short notice if high casualties were experienced.

(2) We imposed a manning level on some of the combat service support units and authorized each of the divisions and brigades a 3% over-strength in infantrymen. This accomplished two purposes. It gave an internal capability to react to unit casualties and it enabled the commander to maintain a high foxhole strength and still support his base camps for which the TOE provides no authorization.

b. Attached at Inclosure 4 is a chart which depicts enlisted replacement experience during the period March 69 to September 70. In addition to the numerical overfill and underfill shown on the chart, DA fill of specific career groups (first two positions of MOSC) averaged less than 85% in accordance with our requisitions. The number of MOSC and grade substitutions which were made within career groups has not been recorded, but fill against requisition requirements fell substantially below the 85% average mentioned above, even after application of the procedures specified in EPD Operating Instructions 611-4. There is a tremendous amount of effort and resources at all
levels devoted to the line item requisitioning system. These statistics indicate that we should seriously consider eliminating this extremely complex administrative system. I believe that, particularly in wartime, with its turbulence and rapidly changing requirements, some form of inventory and projection by grade and MOS, against which replacements are furnished, would permit the Army to do a more effective job in replacement operations and would eliminate a tremendous amount of paperwork. A system similar to the old 45 Report could serve as a model for refinement. The Army has not demonstrated the capability to manage over a million and a half men as individuals. In addition to the normal requisitions, we have had to submit personnel shortfall compensating requisitions of 25% and OPO has had to issue as high as 100% excess reassignment instructions to meet the replacement objectives in Vietnam.

c. The officer requisition system has been far more efficient than the enlisted system. By daily contact with OPD, the AG was able to exercise very close control over the input of officers with the result that during my tenure, with one exception, our officer posture other than aviators always has been outstanding. The only exception occurred in June 1970, when without coordination with this headquarters, OPD non-validated some 2,000 requisitions apparently based on erroneous strength figures furnished to them by PERSINCOM. As will be discussed under redeployments, it is essential that when strength authorization is changing rapidly under very rigid guidelines, that control of input and out-flow be exercised only at one end. This must be accomplished by the command on which the strength controls are imposed.

3. Physical Profiles.

a. This command experienced difficulty in utilizing excess numbers of senior grade enlisted personnel in the combat MOSs who had physical profiles. In April 1969, 30% of the senior grade enlisted personnel (E7, E8, and E9) who arrived in this command had physical profiles which precluded their assignment to full field duty. Working closely with OPO, this figure was reduced to a manageable 10% in July, but by December 1969, it had climbed back up to 25%. Although some of these personnel can be used in the rear areas and in base camps, percentages this high deprive the line companies and battalions of the NCO leadership which they require. We have reassigned these personnel to security units in combat support and combat service support units, and utilized them in positions calling for other MOS and grade, and recently have taken a hard line in reclassifying these men.
out of a combat MOS. We also have terminated superior performance pay and in some cases have recommended to OPO that the serviceman not be promoted to the next higher grade in his current MOS. It is recommended that more stringent controls be exercised to prohibit promotion of individuals with physical profiles which preclude full performance in the MOS in which they are being considered for promotion.

b. Basic to the problem discussed in paragraph 3 a above is the career pattern and progression for enlisted personnel in Combat MOS. The company commanders and platoon leaders are invariably still in their twenties, the age at which they have maximum physical stamina. The "up or out" officer promotion system results in officers attaining grades which normally keep them out of positions requiring continued "bumping" in the field. The enlisted man with a combat MOS is not assured of this built-in protection. The E7, 11B, 11C or 11E may be in his late 30's or early 40's, yet we expect him to keep up with the 18-27 year old lieutenants, captains and soldiers. He frequently cannot do this in rugged climates and terrain such as Vietnam. The Army must develop a pattern which enables combat arms NCOs to move laterally into other specialties with less demanding physical requirements. It may be necessary to have a modified "up or out" policy for enlisted personnel similar to that now governing officers. Recommend the Army develop some solution to this problem.


a. Centralized control of the assignment of command sergeants major which dictate that reassignments cannot be made except under extreme emergencies, without prior approval of EPD are unworkable in an active theater of operations. A division or separate brigade commander must have the authority to assign his personnel as he deems necessary to accomplish his mission. He can reassign a colonel anywhere he desires, but not a command sergeant major, which is ridiculous to the extreme. Even with the latitude granted to USARV that reassignments can be made on authority of USARV provided EPD is notified within 10 days, does not resolve the problem. The same latitude should be granted for CSMs as for officer personnel and changes in assignment can be reported to DA by reports of change.

b. The prohibition against using command sergeants major in staff sergeants major positions is impractical and is depriving the Army the full utilization of the capability of these soldiers. Cross assignment between staff and command positions has been determined
essential to the Army and to the individual for commissioned officers, and the same principle applies to non-commissioned officers. It is recommended that the rigid prohibition against assigning CSMs into staff positions be relaxed. This would enable top NCOs to bring their intimate knowledge of the soldier in the field to the staff where it can be utilized in developing improved policies and procedures.

5. Experienced Aviators. The policy had been established that 25% of the aviators in USARV should be second tour personnel. This apparently was an arbitrary figure which had been arrived at without a realistic analysis of the position demanding this experience. When Brigadier General George Putnam assumed command of the 1st Aviation Brigade he made a line by line analysis of aviation positions identifying those which required an experienced aviator. This resulted in a determination that only 19% must be experienced personnel if assigned to the proper positions. This demonstrates an often learned lesson that the personnel policies must be based on careful analysis with consideration of all of the environmental conditions before their adoption.

6. Casualty Reporting.

a. Considering the uncontrolled large press corps in the theater, the AG has done an outstanding job in operating the casualty reporting system in Vietnam. However, it is apparent that the AG corps must increase its expertise in this function so that all career AG officers have the basic knowledge necessary to operate the system. The AG school should increase the scope and depth of the casualty block of instruction. Other service schools and NCO academies must have a block of instruction which emphasizes the importance of proper identification procedures and reporting. Frequently, unnecessary delay in positive identification was caused by the untimely removal of dog tags, identification cards, miss-laying of records and other needless and careless actions.

b. I believe we have overdone the sympathy, condolence and pastoral letters. Under current regulations, the next of kin now receive a minimum of six such letters and frequently more if intermediate commanders decide to enter into this chain. There is the condolence letter from the President, Secretary of the Army, or Chief of Staff; the documentary with condolence from TAG as prescribed by AR 600-10; a letter of condolence from COMUSMACV; a letter of condolence from the division commander; a letter of sympathy from
the immediate commander as prescribed by AR 600-10; and a pastoral letter of condolence from the Chaplain. This requires many manhours because each of these must be carefully written and related to the others so that there are no contradictions or misstatements of facts. I do not believe we can afford this many individual letters particularly if we become involved in a conflict which results in mass casualties. Recommend the number of condolence and sympathy letters be reduced.

7. Personal Property and Records of Medical Evacuees. In December 1968 PACOM and CONUS hospitals were experiencing an average of 37 days delay between the time the patient arrived and receipt of his medical records. Beginning in February 1969 a number of procedures were changed including the use of electrical message reassignment orders. Shipments of items direct from the losing to the gaining unit and the use of ADP equipment for control and monitoring these actions now have resulted in an average time of five days between the evacuation of the patient out of Vietnam and the shipment of his records and his personal effects. Quality and completeness of shipments also have improved, i.e., fewer lost items, fewer improperly posted and closed records and fewer missent shipments. One of the causes of this delay as well as some other problems, is the separation of the personnel, finance, and medical records. While it normally is not difficult to get the personnel and finance records together, the medical records have been decentralized to such a low level that often they are difficult to locate and combine with the other records. The AG has been working with the Surgeon to maintain these records at a higher level. Normally medical treatment which can be given at a lower level does not require a previous medical history and can be recorded on a temporary form and forwarded to the central point of inclusion in the individual’s medical record. It is recommended that DA re-examine the current policy of records separation with a view toward consolidating them at the PSD or PSC level.

8. Reenlistment. Prior to June 1969 reenlistment had been given little attention in Vietnam. Most commanders considered that trying to reenlist a soldier other than a career soldier in a combat theater was counter-productive. We developed a new incentive program based on 0.5% of the monthly strength as a goal for first term and AUS enlistees. This new incentive program which gained the support and confidence of the troop commanders, together with the strong support of General Mildren, regenerated the reenlistment effort. In
the last half of CY 1969 USARV enlisted 1898 AUS personnel, 4309 first term RA personnel, and 4334 career soldiers and rose from last place to second place in USARPAC competition. In the first half of FY 1969 only 7% of the eligible first term RA and AUS personnel were retained. In the first half of FY 1970, 25.5% were retained. Careful analysis of the first six months of this program revealed that over 81% of the enlistees had at least three ACB test scores above 100 and 49% had at least three scores above 110. Although there were a large number of personnel enlisted out of infantry MOS, over 60% were enlisted into other MOSs which were on the Army shortage list. However, because of the critical shortage of infantrymen which began to develop in June 1970, on 1 July, USARV temporarily suspended any enlistment options which removed a serviceman from MOS series 11, 12, and 13 during his Vietnam tour. As expected, this has had an adverse impact on enlistment accomplishments although those commanders who are continuing to devote attention to the program are still enlisting a significant number of soldiers under other options.

9. Records Management. As might be expected under a wartime operation and with a one year tour for most personnel, records management was essentially nonexistent and was the subject of criticism by the Peers Committee. With the assistance of the DA records management expert, Mr. Olin McCool, we have secured a qualified civilian records management employee. We also have required the command historian to use his historical detachments to provide records management guidance to our units in the field. It is apparent that we must have within the Adjutant General's Corps, both commissioned and non-commissioned officers who are given records management training and who maintain these skills. As has been demonstrated in Vietnam, we cannot count on civilian employees to meet our requirements in combat areas.

10. Special Services.

a. In early 1969 Special Services was operating on an almost completely decentralized basis and special service supply had just been transferred to the 1st Logistical Command and integrated with the overall supply system. Because of the relatively small amounts of supplies included in this program, it became lost in the morass of high volume items being handled by the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam. Most special service supplies are non-standard items with no stock numbers for use by the ICCV, no procedures existed in the depots to handle large purchases with non-appropriated funds, and
special service items have a priority of 12. Additionally, special service morale and athletic programs and equipment were being handled haphazardly, at best. In February 1970, the USARV Special Service Agency was activated and placed under the operational control of the AG. This agency has succeeded in getting the special service supplies integrated into the ICCV, RO's established and the supplies are beginning to flow into the country again. Additionally, organized special service and morale programs are beginning to develop and the command is in a much better position to provide healthful activities for all personnel as the level of operations decreases. Recommend that DA doctrine prescribe a Centralized Special Service organization in overseas theaters.

b. Movies were being shown only five nights a week when I arrived in March 1969. Discussions with many commanders and troops convinced me that this is one of the most important morale activities in Vietnam and that movies should be shown every night. The Army Air Force Motion Picture Service representative agreed although it did complicate scheduling and resulted in more repeats. However, after one year's experience commanders are unanimous in their support of the expanded movie program. Recommend DOD establish the policy that movies will be shown on a 7-day schedule in short tour areas.

11. Mail. The out of country mail service has been outstanding. Ordinary mail time between CONUS and soldiers in the most remote locations is six to ten days. This has been possible primarily because of the advent of the helicopter and the recognition by the chopper pilots of the importance of mail to troop morale. Everything that moves picks up this personal mail and gets it to its destination as quickly as possible. On the other hand, in-country mail service of official mail has been unsatisfactory. It frequently takes 10-15 days or longer for mail to move from one military location to another in the Republic of Vietnam. This has been caused by the relatively low priority given by the Air Force to this type of mail and the lack of regularly scheduled mail pouches between locations. Some improvements have been made recently by expansion of the pouch system and establishing of a courier system to certain major locations. However, much work remains to be done in this area and General McCaffrey, the new Deputy Commanding General, has directed that whatever action necessary be taken to eliminate these excessive delays.

12. The One Year Tour and The Six Month Command Policy.

a. Despite the turbulence caused by the one year tour, it
CONFIDENTIAL

unquestionably is one of the most important factors in the high morale and motivation of troops fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam. The climate and terrain in Vietnam are debilitating and most individuals' efficiency declines after the first year. The new ideas and energy provided by the continual influx of new personnel more than compensate for the lack of continuity caused by the rapid turnover. Additionally, there have been very few cases of battle fatigue in this war. I believe this results primarily from the fact that a serviceman knows there is a definite date when he will leave Vietnam and that he will not be involuntarily extended.

b. It has been the policy that normally battalion and lower unit command tours will be six months and then the officer will serve in some other capacity for the remainder of his tour. For the reasons expressed above, this also has been successful. However, with the increased emphasis being given to the MACV advisor effort, USARV is now being levied for large numbers of officers and NCOs who have had six months with a US unit. Because of requisitioning lead time this is adversely affecting the requisitioning efforts of both USARV and MACV. Therefore, we have recommended to MACV that a single requisition and replacement system be established under the management of USARV. I am confident that we can do a far better job of personnel management and can better satisfy the requirements of both MACV and USARV with a single manager replacement system.

13. AOR/ORR System - Late Assignment Instructions.

a. Operation of the AOR/ORR systems and timely receipt of assignment instructions for officers and enlisted personnel have demanded much effort and still are not completely successful. The poor level of personnel records maintenance and administration results in inaccurate reports to OPO. Frequent visits to the field have established that the principal causes of inaccurate reporting are:

   (1) Failure to verify rosters prepared by the Data Service Center against DA Forms 20 and 66.

   (2) Units do not maintain adequate suspense files.

   (3) Because of the dispersed location of troops, systematic interviews to obtain necessary information from the individual are not accomplished.
(4) Clerks and Supervisors are unfamiliar with the system.

b. Frequent assistance visits to the field, a general overhaul and tightening of procedures in Headquarters, USARV, and frequent personal visits by me with senior commanders requesting their assistance have resulted in some improvement. However, we still do not have a completely effective system.

c. For those personnel who have been properly reported, OPO has been unable in all cases to furnish timely assignment instructions. Personnel should have at least 60 days advance notice of their next assignment. During the first seven months of CY 1970, only 58% of the officers, 66% of the senior enlisted and 44% of the junior enlisted were in receipt of assignment instructions 60 days prior to DEROS month. Many personnel have been returned to CONUS without an assignment. This not only lowers morale but adversely affects retention of quality officers and enlisted personnel.

d. This is a mutual problem of USARV and DA and one which must continue to receive priority attention to be improved. Because of the untrained personnel and turbulence in subordinate units a suspense system which triggers action at USARV level may offer a fruitful area for potential improvement.


a. Although we have had some problems in implementing the redeployment packages directed by the President, overall these actions have gone very smoothly. Our most difficult operation was Keystone Eagle, the first redeployment package when two events occurred when we were in the midst of the redeployment. Originally, some of the units were to be inactivated in-country. Others were to be returned to CONUS for inactivation and the remainder, comprised primarily of a part of the 9th Infantry Division, was to be sent to Hawaii and remain in the force structure. A large number of internal reassignments within the 9th Division were accomplished to meet the missions of the three segments, i.e., the units to inactivate, the brigade to remain in-country, and the division (-) returning to Hawaii. These reassignments had just been accomplished and some of the advance units already sent to Hawaii when the decision was changed and the division (-) was to be inactivated. This resulted in much hardship to individuals and the transfer out of Vietnam of a number of men who had a considerable amount of time remaining to complete a normal tour. The second event was a decision
approximately 15 days before the deadline for the new ceiling that the reduction must be from the actual strength on the date of the announcement as opposed to the authorized spaces. As the command was over 6,000 understrength on the date of the announcement, this meant that in a period of 15 days over 6,000 extra personnel had to be curtailed and shipped out of Vietnam. Additionally, large numbers of personnel had to be diverted from the ports in Oakland and Fort Lewis and these resources were mostly lost to future Vietnam requirements because they had to be assigned to other destinations from which they subsequently could not be removed. We have used a combination of requisition cancellations, DEROS adjustments, and early return of personnel in deploying units to meet strength objectives for each redeployment package.

b. The two primary lessons learned are: first, that because of political and other considerations, there is normally insufficient lead-time to permit an orderly redistribution of retainable personnel and to reach the new strength objective by requisition cancellation. Second, the number of personnel coming into the country and the number going out must be controlled by Headquarters, USARV. Because of the time it takes to readjust the replacement stream, we have had a very uneven strength situation in Vietnam since redeployments began. Unless the command remains significantly below authorized strength, extraordinary actions are required to keep from exceeding the ceiling. These strength fluctuations are demonstrated by the chart at Inclosure 3.

15. Adjutant General Corps Officers. As I am a member of the Adjutant General's Corps, I have observed with special interest the performance of AGC officers in Vietnam. On the whole, they have done an outstanding job and have enjoyed an excellent reputation among commanders and staff officers of other branches. At every level they have been responsible for assignment and replacement activities. It therefore appears logical that greater numbers of these AGC officers who have gained expertise at all operating levels should be assigned to the Office of Personnel Operations. I believe this not only would offer greater career incentives to AGC officers, but would benefit the Army by providing more experienced operators, particularly to the Enlisted Personnel Directorate.

16. Human Relations. It became apparent that we needed a method to monitor race relations and equal opportunity throughout the command. We established the Ad Hoc Committee consisting of G-1, G-2, PM, IG, SJA, IO, and Chaplain, under the Chairmanship of the DCS(P&A). We utilized this committee as a catalyst for all information pertaining
17. Clubs and Messes. Before the Army's open mess scandal broke into the open, it had been recognized in USARV that there was a high potential for mismanagement and dishonesty in the system. There was no centralized organization and commanders were completely absorbed in their combat and other mission operations. The open mess system, with annual sales of over 80 million dollars, was being managed by inexperienced personnel who were easily duped by the dishonest merchants operating in Vietnam, or by experienced custodians who had succumbed to the offers of bribery which were made by these same unscrupulous distributors. Several actions have been taken which have improved the management and operations of the USARV open mess system. The USAIRR files at Fort Holabird are screened for each individual before he is placed in the club system. No individual may remain in the club system for more than one year in Vietnam without specific approval of HQ, USARV and very few exceptions are granted. A Vietnam Open Mess Agency (VOMA) has been organized under the operational control of the G-1 and has established policies, procedures, manuals and controls which have eliminated many of the opportunities for mis-utilization of open mess funds. Central purchasing agencies have been established through which all non-US government club supplies and equipment and through which all entertainment must be purchased. No direct exchange of money may be made between open mess custodians and entertainers. A number of unscrupulous distributors and organisations doing business with the open mess system have been barred from Vietnam. Although the mess scandal was unfortunate for the Army, at last sufficient attention has been focused that we are beginning to develop personnel with requisite skills and an organisation to manage this multi-million dollar business. It is essential that the commanders' responsibilities and broad guidance in this area be included in the curriculum of service schools and at the Command and General Staff College.
18. **The Vietnam Regional Exchange.** In my position, I have shared on a rotating basis, with the DCG for Materiel of the 7th Air Force, the chairmanship of the VRE Council. Under current policies and guidelines for exchange operations in Vietnam using the PACEX centralized control system and the authority withheld by MACV, the Council's influence is limited. However, it is useful as a vehicle to get the commander's desires before the exchange system and to keep the command apprised of exchange activities. In general, the VRE has supported the soldiers well in Vietnam. Even the most remote locations have beer and soda and periodic deliveries of other exchange supplies. There are two weaknesses in the system. First, the US Government country-to-country agreements have authorized the Free World Military Forces to use the US post exchange system. Second, the exchange attempts to stock high value electronic, photographic, and other items manufactured in the Orient. These two factors have provided a lucrative source of supply for the black market activities in Vietnam. Free World Military Forces, particularly the Koreans and the Thais, abuse the privileges of the exchange and deal regularly in the black market. Many of our soldiers have succumbed to the same temptation. I strongly recommend that in future wars, items in the post exchange be limited to the necessities such as soap, toothpaste, shaving cream, candy, chewing gum, etc. High value local items should be purchased only through mail order with delivery in the United States required.

B. **Chaplain.**

The Chaplain's Corps has performed outstandingly under most difficult conditions. During the past year each Chaplain assigned to Vietnam has conducted an average of 7.7 services each week. This, of course, is in addition to the tremendous amount of traveling and individual counseling which is required to reach the widely dispersed troops. There are two conditions in Vietnam which have made the criteria used for determining the number of Chaplains assigned inadequate. The widely dispersed operations being carried on and the breakdown of most of the major units into small operating elements; and, there is essentially no civilian clergy in Vietnam which can be utilized to augment the military Chaplains. Following are some specific areas which should be studied and changes made:

1. In the Co-Star II and TASTA reorganisation of the Army all Chaplain spaces are located in general support groups, transportation groups and artillery groups. Few, if any, spaces were included at the battalion level except in the case of separate battalions. This method
caused no problem while the authorized strength in Vietnam and the force structure remained as originally configured. However, as the reduction in forces commenced, certain group headquarters were eliminated thus leaving a number of separate battalions without any assigned Chaplains. Recommend that consideration be given to changing the concept of having all Chaplains assigned to the group level, have only one Chaplain assigned there, and have the others assigned to subordinate battalions. The supervision and proper distribution of Chaplains under this concept could still be controlled by the next higher headquarters.

2. Chaplain spaces are not authorized in Cavalry Squadrons which are component to divisions or organized as separate independent organizations. These units have been authorized between 800 and 1200 personnel depending upon their configuration and mission. In Vietnam the cavalry squadron has been used as a separate unit operating for the most part independently. This results in an unsatisfactory religious coverage in some situations but was generally covered by taking an authorized Chaplain from within the division structure to provide continuing coverage for the cavalry. In separate squadrons coverage was provided by taking a Chaplain from one of the combat service support units. It is recommended that a Chaplain be authorized in TOEs of all cavalry squadrons consisting of 700 personnel or more.

3. Chaplains currently are authorized on the basis of troop population. Experience has shown that one Chaplain per 850 combat support troops in Vietnam is inadequate. Recommend a more flexible criteria be developed for authorizing Chaplains in a combat area, considering geographical area to be covered, security, availability of transportation and dispersal of forces.

C. Comptroller.

1. Program Budget Advisory Council. Although a Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) had been established, its primary function was to listen to periodic presentations by the Comptroller indicating the current status of obligations and expenditures against the USARV budget. Since almost unlimited funds were provided to support Vietnam, no particular difficulty resulted from this method of operation except that it served very little useful purpose. We reorganized the PBAC and assigned major programs to each of the principal staff sections. It then became the responsibility of these program directors to develop their requirements, justify them before the PBAC, monitor their pro-
grams, report excesses or shortfalls to the PBAC and be totally responsible for their program. Rather than the Comptroller making the presentations to the PBAC and the Deputy Commanding General, the program director was charged with this responsibility. As a result of this action, staff officers charged with program responsibility became intimately involved in the budgeting for and utilization of resources. Due partially to their efforts, this command was able to return 97 million dollars of OMA funds to USARPAC for use elsewhere in the Army in FY 69. In FY 70, we were able to live within a budget which was 6% lower than FY 69 expenditures. However, much work remains to be done in this area as a system must be developed which gives current visibility to all of our programs in a manner by which the DCG can be constantly kept abreast of where the command is in relation to its resources, when trouble is developing, and what redistribution of funds is required. Initial steps have been taken and this system is now being developed.

2. Elimination of Headquarters.

a. The DCS(P&A) was charged with the overall objective of reducing the number of headquarters in USARV. Action was assigned to the Comptroller. The office of the USARV Engineer, HQ US Engineer Command Vietnam, and the HQ USA Construction Agency Vietnam were combined on 1 February 1970. The office of the USARV Surgeon and HQ, 44th Medical Brigade were combined on 1 March 1970. These consolidations were effected smoothly and resulted in increased efficiency as well as reduced personnel requirements.

b. As a result the DCG decided to consolidate headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and HQ, USARV. This consolidation extended over a period of two months and also was implemented with no adverse impact on the operations of the command.

c. These consolidations resulted in a savings of 242 military and 118 civilian spaces. Paper work was reduced and command control and administration were simplified.

3. Budgeting and Financial Accounting. The Army's earlier decision to keep budgeting and financial accounting out of the combat theater was a sound one. This function was performed by the Central Financial Management Agency in Hawaii. However, as the level of operations has diminished and as greater constraints have been imposed on resource availability it has become essential that USARV become
CONFIDENTIAL

intimately involved in budgeting and programming. Because of the desire to remove American presence from Vietnam and the shortage of skilled labor in this country, the financial accounting should continue to be performed in Hawaii by the Central Financial Management Agency (CFMA).

4. Inter-Service Reimbursement.

a. A simplified procedure should be developed to provide for interservice reimbursement where each service is charged with service support responsibilities. In March 1966, service supply support became an Army mission in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zone. Dollar value of the supply support provided is significant; however, effectiveness of the reimbursement program is almost entirely dependent upon the quality and timeliness of the data flow from supply activities in Vietnam to CFMA. Distances, marginal communications, turnover of supply personnel and combat conditions all combine to make this a very inefficient and inexact operation. As a result of an Army Staff Task Group review of this problem, the military services reached an agreement for departmental level of reimbursement for bulk POL use based upon the MACV Bulk Fuels Report. The military services agreed to reimburse Army for ammunition issues based on verified monthly extracts of the Worldwide Ammunition Report. Agreement was also reached that the Army would be reimbursed for bulk subsistence issues based upon data reported on the Subsistence Supply and Services Summary. These actions have significantly reduced the flow of reimbursable issue documentation.

b. However, the efforts to simplify reimbursement procedures have not been completely successful. Unpaid delinquent bills for bulk subsistence issued to the Navy, MSTS, and certain contractors remain a problem. Several other areas continue to cause difficulty in the matter of interservice reimbursement. It is recommended that contingency plans for future joint operations consider the problem of reimbursable support and prescribe common service funding for one agency. Regulations, manuals, forms and training for service schools should be revised to include provisions for reimbursable support.

5. Money Manipulation. We have faced a continual problem of money manipulation and this should be expected when there is such a difference between the official rate of the local currency and the unofficial rate. Although the 10% savings program, Defense Savings Bonds, military banking facilities that pay interest on checking accounts and use of allotments have been emphasized, millions of dollars have flowed into unauthorized channels because of the improper manipulation of money. A number of actions have been taken including limitation of the amount of money soldiers may have at any one time without a commander's certificate, establishment of special money order procedures which require the money orders to be mailed in the presence of the money order.
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clerk and use of a special money order form negotiable only in the US. However, these have merely touched the surface. Drastic action is required to eliminate this undesirable situation. The serviceman or US civilian in Vietnam has very little genuine use for actual cash. Therefore, in future operations similar to Vietnam, consideration should be given to requiring servicemen and civilian employees to establish allotments or other means for disposition within the US of all of their salary and emoluments with the exception of a very small amount necessary to purchase personal items, hair cuts, and food and drink in the open messes. Similar restrictions should be imposed on contractor employees and other government workers. This recommendation is related to the elimination of luxury items in the post exchanges.

D. Inspector General.

1. New Concept. For the first time in an active theater of operations full fledged Annual General Inspections have been conducted by the Inspectors General. Although initially looked upon with great reservation by the combat commanders, because of the attitude of being helpful rather than of criticism, commanders now welcome these inspections and have found them extremely useful in identifying administrative and maintenance areas that are inclined to be neglected when engaged in sustained combat operations. All of the Inspectors General during my tenure have been imbued with the philosophy of helpfulness and as a result, the program has been very successful. In view of this extension of the IG program all TOEs, MTOEs or TDAs for brigade size or larger units commanded by a general officer should include a detailed Inspector General.

2. Missing DA Forms 78. One area identified by the IG which demands attention throughout the world is the large number of WO1, 2d Lts and 1st Lts nearing eligibility for promotion who arrive in the command without a DA Form 78 (Recommendation for Promotion of Officers) or with one which is not properly prepared. These forms must be prepared two months prior to the date of promotion eligibility and may be prepared as much as four months prior to the eligibility date when the officer is being reassigned. If these forms are not received or are improperly prepared, promotion of the officer is delayed and has an adverse impact on the retention of highly qualified individuals in the Army. It is recommended that these requirements be widely publicized by DA and added to the IG areas of major interest.

E. Information Officer.

1. Shortage of Experienced Information Officers. During my tenure as the DCS(P&A) the Army has experienced a series of events which
have resulted in unfavorable publicity. Included in this has been the Green Beret Case, My Lai incident, and the club and mess scandal. However, this appears to be symptomatic of the general public dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam and reflects conditions in the United States where adverse publicity against the "establishment" is sought. There have been incidents when reporters have interviewed individuals, have visited particular installations or sites in the hope of finding something adverse. When this has failed to materialize and there have been some favorable activities and positive responses on the part of officers and men, the story is not written. Vietnam is flooded with correspondents to the extent that they frequently have compromised military operations. Under these conditions qualified information officers are an absolute must. Unfortunately, the Army has been unable to produce sufficient trained officers to staff all of the requirements in Vietnam. Most of the information officers below MACV and USARV level have had little practical experience in dealing with the press or the public and as a result frequently inadvertently do not present the best picture for the Army. Although there is a program to offer advance training to senior officers in the information field an officer who becomes a specialist in this area hurts his chances for promotion, particularly beyond the grade of lieutenant colonel. The recent selection of BG Sidle, first for promotion to BG and then for promotion to MG may help to overcome some of the reluctance to enter the information field.

2. Availability of Senior Officers to the Press. Because of the unfavorable press most officers are reluctant to talk to members of the press. As a result, we must share part of the blame for not getting the Army's story to the public. Recognizing that it is a calculated risk, responsible Army personnel should meet with the press from time to time and above all should be immediately responsive to press inquiries. Factual information should be furnished and if there is some reason the information cannot be released, the press members should be told why and no effort should be made to mislead them. This will only result in an unfavorable story and additional criticism of the military.

F. Staff Judge Advocate.

1. Reduction of Pretrial Confinement. The recent change to the Uniform Code of Military Justice has imposed a tremendous additional workload on the Judge Advocate General's Corps. Although additional JA officers have been provided, to date there have been insufficient
numbers, particularly military judges, to insure that court martial cases are processed rapidly and efficiently. As a result, USARV has experienced great difficulty in keeping pretrial confinement to reasonable lengths of time. We have developed a procedure whereby the Provost Marshal furnishes a bi-weekly report which lists the individuals in pretrial confinement and the date they were placed in this status. The SJA reviews this list and any individuals who have been in pretrial confinement four weeks or longer, become the subject of special investigations by him. If he cannot secure satisfactory resolution of the difficulty, it is brought to the P&A and if necessary, ultimately to the DCG. This procedure has resulted in significant reduction in the number of individuals who are in pretrial confinement in the Long Binh Stockade. Recently, additional military judges have been assigned to Vietnam and this should enable us to continue the favorable trend of reducing the pretrial confinement.

2. Shortage of Court Reporters. There has been a continual shortage of qualified court reporters in Vietnam. With the implementation of the new Military Justice Act in August 1969, in addition to general court martial cases, the Army is required to detail a court reporter to those special courts martial cases in which a bad conduct discharge could be adjudged. Court reporting is a critical skill which has been overcome in CONUS and other overseas commands by the use of civilian court reporters. The available pool of military court reporters worldwide is very small. USARV has 41 military court reporter spaces, but these never have been totally filled. The SJA of this headquarters conducted three courses - in March 69, February 70, and July 70. This in-country training is undesirable but was the only answer to meet a critical situation. It is recommended that DA provide a court reporter MOS producing course in the Judge Advocate General's School and revise the grade structure for enlisted court reporters to afford increased career incentives.

G. Management Information Data Systems.

1. Need for More Rugged ADP Equipment. USARV has a large number of ADP configurations involving both logistical and personnel systems. Despite the normal downtime and the non-availability of trained personnel, the large installations which are located in dust-proof, air conditioned buildings mechanically have performed adequately. However, those which are taken into the field, such as the UNIVAC 1005 in the PSD and the flexi-writer have demonstrated beyond question this equipment is not designed or rugged enough to operate under
field conditions. The flexi-writers' downtime caused by dirt getting into the mechanism has adversely affected their utility. I reiterate a recommendation I made to the DA on 23 May 1969 that CDC and the Computer Systems Command should be developing more rugged equipment which can continue to perform when it is removed from its dust-proof, air conditioned environment.

2. **Shortage of ADP Personnel.** Although not a new problem the number of military personnel who are trained in both ADP operator and maintenance is completely inadequate for the amount of equipment which the Army has today. As a result, much of our programming has been accomplished by contract and most of the maintenance has been performed here by contract or direct hire civilians. This again may be adequate in a stable environment, but in Vietnam it has been unacceptable. The contractors are expensive, particularly when maintenance has to be provided on a 24-hour basis. More importantly, the civilian contractor personnel will not respond to requirements in the outlying areas because of fear for their personal security. We have partially solved this problem by establishing centralised maintenance contact teams under USARV control. Availability of qualified military technicians in sufficient numbers has prevented this solution from being completely satisfactory. Recommend that the organisations for ADP maintenance in the Army be reviewed with the objective of providing higher level maintenance and spare parts supply in the DSUs/ GSUs, and depots; also, that future ADP programs developed for the Army be accompanied by a personnel and maintenance program which will insure complete capability to keep the system operational.

3. **GSA Schedules.** The GSA schedules for rental and maintenance of ADP equipment are not appropriate in a combat area such as Vietnam. These schedules are negotiated at GSA level and at the USARV level only an ordering officer tightly bound by the provisions of the schedules is authorised. Representation by using agencies at contract negotiations is not actively sought nor are such agencies encouraged to submit requests for contract consideration. Basic schedules are devoted primarily to stateside operations with overseas or combat area difference handled by addendum or special paragraph. This frequently results in wasteful, inefficient, and non-standard contracts which, in many instances, are neither applicable nor responsive to the needs of the user. Some examples follow:

   a. UNIVAC charges a basic maintenance fee for each piece of equipment plus a basic monthly salary fee for each maintenance man.

29
The latter cost amounts to over $35,000 a year for an individual who is nothing more than an electronics repairman.

b. IBM contracts provide extra use charges (added rental costs for machines under prime maintenance used more than 176 hours a month, which is a stateside work month). Exorbitant hourly rates are established for backup maintenance of leased equipment. No agreement for backup maintenance of the government owned equipment exists at other than prime maintenance sites.

c. Datagraphix specifies a normal work day from 0800 to 1700 hours and charges $25 an hour for maintenance performed outside these hours. These examples indicate the high desirability of having local representation for contract negotiation and services to be performed in Vietnam. During a recent visit to USARV, BG Fair agreed with this proposal.

H. Provost Marshal.

1. Customs Control Procedures. The introduction of narcotics, firearms, and explosives into CONUS has been a serious matter. Intense interest in this subject was developed when the redeployments commenced and it was apparent that many units would deploy directly into CONUS without benefit of any formal customs inspections at any point. Responsibility for Customs Clearance is divided between the Army and the Air Force. The Air Force is responsible for personnel and personal baggage and the Army is responsible for inspections at Army operated household goods and hold baggage facilities. When units began to redeploy, the Air Force disclaimed responsibility on the basis that these were unit moves with personnel not being shipped out through normal exit procedures. Transportation personnel disclaimed responsibility since neither household goods nor hold baggage per se were involved. In order to insure that the job was accomplished, the USARV Provost Marshal assumed responsibility for accomplishing the mission although there are no regulations at this or higher levels tasking him and the Military Police Corps with customs responsibility. The problem was solved by the development of procedural directives and in coordination with customs officials, the training of personnel to outprocess units. Military policemen detailed from units acted as Deputy Customs Inspectors and received cursory training from US customs personnel. However, to become a proficient inspector requires a great deal of experience which cannot be gained as an additional duty. It is recommended that DA, DOD, and the
Treasury Department jointly establish procedures and policies which will assign overseas customs responsibility to the Provost Marshal General or some other agency and provide for the organization of units and training of personnel.

2. Sentry Dog Manual. The frequent personnel rotations in Vietnam cause a requirement for continuous on-site training in sentry dog units. Newly assigned personnel must be supervised and instructed in the various aspects of the sentry dog program. There is a requirement for a field manual which provides detailed guidance in such aspects as the correct maintenance of records, training and utilization of sentry dogs. Currently, the only DA guidance on sentry dogs is contained in AR 190-12. While FM 20-20, Military Dogs Training and Employment, addresses sentry dogs, the manual is too general in application as it relates to all types of military dogs. AF Manual 125-5, USAF Sentry Dog Program, 15 November 1967, provides the information needed by Military Police Corps sentry dog organizations. Recommend that AF Manual 125-5 be designated a joint service manual and that authorization be granted for units in the field to use this manual as a reference.

3. US Forces Prisoners of War. The US forces do not operate any PW camps in Vietnam. PWs captured by the US forces are transferred to the custody of the GVN, designated as the detaining power, and interned in GVN PW camps. However, the US as the capturing power must monitor the treatment of its captured under GVN control to insure they are being treated in accordance with the III Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and also to establish records keeping procedures to maintain accountability of all US captured PWs. Although no agreement was formalized with GVN whereby this treatment could be monitored, this mission is effectively accomplished by MACV advisors, who are Military Police officers, at each of the camps. Furthermore, as a signatory to the III Geneva Convention, the GVN permits free access by the Saigon Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all installations which maintain PWs. Formal inspections of PW camps are made at least semi-annually by the ICRC, accompanied by an officer representative of the MACV PM. Although USARV does not maintain direct liaison with the PW camps, information on US captured PW is readily available through coordination with the MACV PM. No difficulty has been experienced by USARV PM personnel in making periodic informal visits to PW camps. The DA assigned mission which holds USARV responsible for maintaining detailed data on condition, location, and
status of each PW interned in a PW camp is accomplished through information received from camp advisors and ADP rosters received monthly from the MACV PM. To account for all US captures, USARV makes extensive use of automatic data processing. Input is obtained from the USARV developed detainee report form that is prepared at PW collecting points and medical facilities for all detainees captured by US forces or released to US custody. To account for PWs during evacuation from US custody to subsequent internment at a GVN PW camp, the PW division receives a bi-monthly report from all US detainee collection facilities and a monthly report from US advisors of those PW interrogated at RVN intelligence activities. Once the PW is interned at the PW camp, the advisor forwards to the PW division the USARV Form 364 accompanying the PW and a copy of the ARVN PW information form. Recommend DA utilize the experience of RVN to expand present policies and doctrine on PW procedures in stability operations and insure that any future agreements of a similar nature contain provisions for the monitorship required by the Geneva Conventions.

4. Providing Health and Comfort Supplies for US Captures While in US Custody. Health and comfort supplies (soap, toothpaste, toothbrushes, and shaving material) must be provided detainees while in division/separate brigade collecting facilities. The need for these supplies is recognized and authorized by AR 633-50. However, there are no standard prescribed procedures for obtaining the supplies and as a result, each PM operating PW collecting points was left to his own devices to obtain the needed health and comfort items. Among those systems tried and found unacceptable were utilization of funds provided by Civil Affairs Sections to purchase items from the post exchange; provision of supplies by the local Red Cross; and use of sundry packs. After the above methods had been tried and found unsuccessful, a blanket purchasing agreement was established with the Vietnam Regional Exchange for all US PW collecting points. This agreement authorizes a supply officer or NCO appointed by Provost Marshals to purchase designated health and comfort items from the post exchange. This procedure has worked very well and is now in standard use throughout Vietnam. Recommend pertinent DA, PW and supply directives reflect the use of this or a similar method as the standard procedure for obtaining health and comfort supplies for PW collecting points.

I. Civilian Personnel.

1. Management Improvements. Like other operations which were
necessary during the build-up in Vietnam, USARV's civilian workforce and program expanded as requirements were developed. Shortcuts were taken to meet the requirements of the command and particularly in the local national work forces very little control existed over the numbers which could be employed and the records of those actually on the payroll. When Mr. Jim Ballard arrived in the command in May 1969, he initiated a program to bring management into our civilian personnel activities. First, the DAC structure was completely analyzed, requirements reallocated, and appropriate job descriptions written and approved. Control of all records was centralized and a prescribed procedure was developed for all phases of the operation. Having completed this action, the next step was to bring the local national work force into a structured program. This was a monumental task because of the lack of records, lack of authorization, lack of documentation and an extremely turbulent work force. However, much progress has been made including the establishment of structured grades which parallel GS ratings, establishment of hire authorizations by organization and development of personnel files for the majority of local direct hire personnel.

2. **Local National Training.** One of the most important accomplishments of both Mr. Ballard and his predecessor was the establishment and expansion of a training program to upgrade the skills of Vietnamese employees. Since its inception in 1966 over 18,000 Vietnamese have been trained in a wide variety of skills ranging from typing, mechanics, truck driving, keypunch operations, carpentry, to an intern program which has produced six Vietnamese ADP programmers. I consider this one of the most important programs, not only to permit the earlier release of Americans, but a program which will provide skills necessary to the internal economy and for government development in the Republic of Vietnam. I cannot recommend too strongly that we refrain from reducing the local national hire authorization at a rapid pace which parallels the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.

3. **Remaining Problem Areas.** Following are some problem areas which require continued attention:

   a. Because of the increasing use of both US civilian and local nationals throughout the world, it is essential that officers and non-commissioned officers have a basic understanding of the rules under which these employees work. Therefore, it is recommended that the office of Civilian Personnel, DA,DCSPER prepare a block of
b. USARV currently is, and has since the inception of the civilian personnel program in Vietnam, submitted 18 monthly and 26 quarterly statistical and narrative reports on all facets of the US citizen and Vietnamese personnel program. These reports are the same as required from CONUS installations and stable overseas bases. Department of the Navy in Vietnam submits one monthly report to Washington and intermediate headquarters consisting of on-board strength and a narrative statement of program trends. While the DA reporting requirements provide comprehensive data, it is doubtful they merit the approximately 50 man-years used in their preparation. It is recommended that any future civilian personnel program initiated in combat oriented areas of operations be governed by the basic provisions of CPRM-100 with minimal regulatory application for a period of one year. After one year of operation the program should be modified to achieve only minimum essential reporting to higher headquarters necessary to comply with statutes required by the US Civil Service Commission. The full civilian personnel reporting system should be instituted only after the situation has stabilized.

c. The recruiting program for US civilian employees for Vietnam has not been completely successful. Much of the fault rests with USARV because inadequate information was furnished to CONUS regarding authorization, about the nature of the work and the conditions under which the employees would be required to live. On the other hand, it appears that until recently there has been no centrally directed effort by a CONUS agency to recruit sufficient personnel to maintain USARV's authorized staffing. As a result, USARV generally has been under its authorized ceiling and has been unable to maintain a satisfactory posture in a number of areas such as safety, education, recreation, and some logistical fields. It is recommended that if necessary a centralised recruiting team or office be established and staffed by personnel who have just completed a tour in Vietnam. The purpose of this office would be to devote full-time to recruiting on a personalized basis for the vacancies in USARV. I believe that the cost would be more than offset by the increased productivity of a satisfied and compatible work force.
### USARV Staff Officers Who Contributed to Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACofS, G-1</td>
<td>COL Randolph V. Foster</td>
<td>17Jul69 - 12Jul70</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACofS, MIDS</td>
<td>COL Duane L. Emerson</td>
<td>8Jul69 - 3Jul70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
<td>COL John A. O'Brien</td>
<td>30Jun69 - 23Jun70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>COL(CH) James A. Skelton</td>
<td>19Jul69 - 14Jul70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Personnel Director</td>
<td>Mr. James K. Ballard</td>
<td>30Apr69 - 2Aug70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Office</td>
<td>LTC Ross L. Johnson</td>
<td>28Nov68 - 15Jun70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>COL Willard W. Hawke</td>
<td>25Nov68 - 30May70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dep/Provost Marshal</td>
<td>COL Joseph L. Powell</td>
<td>30Jun69 - 22Jun70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>COL Wilton B. Persons</td>
<td>8Jul69 - 1Jul70</td>
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**Report Title:** Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Verne L. Bowers

**Report Date:** 10 September 1970

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**Sponsor's Military Activity:** OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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