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AGDA (H) (30 Oct 70) FOR OT UT 702040 12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. MISSION: During the reporting period the 1st Cav Div (AM) continued operations throughout the TACO to interdict enemy infiltration routes through Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa Provinces in order to deny enemy access to the population centers, and to neutralize enemy forces operating throughout the area. Division elements continued to support the SVN Pacification Program and conducted Dong Tien operations with RVNAF forces operating within the Division TACO.

b. GENERALS:

(1) The 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970 period saw a continuation of the roles, missions, and functions of the last reporting period, but in an area of operations (AO) that significantly increased in size due to the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. During the reporting period the enemy generally avoided contact except for four periods of increased activity, most of which took place in War Zone C. Those periods of increased activity, their highlights, and friendly and enemy casualties are summarized below. Additional details of these operations can be found in paragraphs 1 e, d, c, and f.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM), Period Ending 30 April 1970, H&F C2FOR-65 (R2)

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<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>HIGHLIGHTS</th>
<th>SW KIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>VIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-4 Feb</td>
<td>Attack on FSB EYNA</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>4-19 Mar</td>
<td>Attack on A/2-8 Cav in their NDP</td>
<td>779</td>
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<td>146</td>
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<td>29 Mar-1 Apr</td>
<td>Attack on FSB JAY</td>
<td>313</td>
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<td>10-16 Apr</td>
<td>Attack on FSB TILLINGWORTH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1634</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>313</td>
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(2) Operations in the Bu Gia Map Area (Northeastern Phat Loang Province).

(a) Operations in the Bu Gia Map area during the period 26 Jan-13 Apr 70 were intended to destroy cache sites and interdict enemy supply movements along the Jolley Road. Elements of the 5th VC Div were known to be in the target area, and visual reconnaissance and aerial photography showed evidence of truck and cart activity on major trails originating along the Cambodian border. The operation was initiated by blocking the major trail systems along the line formed by FSB Elaine (YU595180) and FSB Blackhawk (YU243194) thus causing congestion further to the north. B-52 strikes, day and night air strikes and massed artillery were utilized extensively as three ARVN airborne and two US airmobile battalions moved steadily northward, thoroughly searching the area for enemy units and material. Light fire support bases were moved frequently, thus limiting the enemy's opportunity for reconnaissance. The employment of Ranger Teams developed hard information on enemy troop movement, trail networks, and bunker complexes. They produced timely intelligence and restricted enemy movement. The 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division was not identified in the Bu Gia Map area; however, elements of the 174th Regiment were first identified on 6 Mar 70 by documents found on a KIA at YU404264.

(b) From the beginning of the operation, Allied forces uncovered large amounts of ammunition and foodstuffs probably destined for movement down the Jolley Road to enemy units operating in eastern III CTZ, HR-6, and HR-7. The largest weapons and ammunition cache was discovered on 5 Mar at YU444324 by B/1-8th Cav. The cache included 50 SKS rifles, 10 Soviet M1944 and 26 Chicom type 53 rifles, one H-1 rifle, 83,500 small arms rounds, 798 B-40 rockets, 400 B-40 charges, 1,265 x 82mm mortar rounds, and other military equipment. Numerous other caches were also discovered. The total inventory of captured arms and munitions is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons</td>
<td>177</td>
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<td>Crew-served weapons</td>
<td>17</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM), Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<table>
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<th>ITEM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
<td>433,421 rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large caliber ammunition</td>
<td>2,650 rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>86 cases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenades and mines</td>
<td>433</td>
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</table>

(c) The largest rice cache found was on 19 Feb at YU353221 and YU354228 by 3rd and 4th Companies, 8th ARVN ABN. The cache discovered by the 3rd Co contained in excess of 22 tons of rice. Approximately 750 meters NNE of that cache, the 4th Co discovered in excess of eight tons of rice. During the entire operation, more than 151 tons of rice and three tons of barley were discovered by Allied forces.

(d) In addition to uncovering enemy war materiel, the 1st Air Cav and ARVN ABN Divisions were involved in numerous firefights in which elements of the 174th Regiment, several rear service groups and other COSVN elements were identified. There were 495 enemy KIA. Friendly casualties included 34 US and 23 ARVN KIA. The majority of the contacts were with small squad or platoon size infantry units possibly conducting countersweep operations. The heaviest contact in the Bu Gia Map area took place on 28 Mar at YU276444. A/1-12th Cav, while on a ground BDA of an Arc Light, moved into an enemy base camp and received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy company, probably elements of the 174th Regiment, 5th VC Division. The results of this contact were 44 NVA KIA, 5 US KIA and 10 US WIA. Between 26 Jan and 13 Apr several heavy attacks by fire were directed against the fire support bases throughout the Bu Gia Map area. The two FSBs experiencing the most intense standoff attacks were Le Loi (YU253294) and Snuffy (YU336362); receiving 40 to 45 82mm mortar rounds on 19 Mar and 70 rounds on 23 Mar.

(a) Beginning on 13 Feb, 18 Arc Light missions were flown in support of this operation, resulting in heavy destruction of enemy base areas and bunker complexes. Two were especially significant.

(f) On 2 Mar an Arc Light was targeted against a large base camp of the 174th Regiment at YU320311. Visual reconnaissance had reported numerous bunkers and military structures in the area, all showing signs of heavy recent use. The Airborne surveillance readings confirmed enemy presence. A BDA of the Arc Light found 195 bunkers and structures destroyed along with 62 spider holes uncovered. The 4th Co, 6 ARVN ABN Bn conducted the ground BDA and reported that most of the bunkers had heavy blood stains in them.

(g) A 19 Mar target was a large base camp believed to contain elements of HQ, MR-10, including approximately 200 NVA. Intelligence sources indicated that this was also a possible way and training station for infiltration groups moving from Cambodia through Bu Gia Map to the south. VR reported that the area contained a large bunker complex and showed very heavy recent use. While on a VR, C/1-9 helicopters received ground-to-air fire on several occasions. BDA of this Arc Light revealed 60 bunkers destroyed, 100 bunkers uncovered and damaged, 30 fighting positions destroyed, 50 fighting positions uncovered and damaged, 14 military structures and 25 meters of trenchline destroyed.

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(h) Unlike previous operations in Bu Gia Map, this one was not intended as a raid. It was a phased, step by step progression emphasizing massive firepower and airmobility. As allied operations moved northward minimal opposition was encountered until mid-March when elements of the 174th Regiment, 5th VC Division were committed in counter-sweep operations.

(i) The discovery of large caches has hampered the enemy drastically in his efforts to conduct essential resupply activity. The enemy has been left with the choice of extending his logistical routes east of the II - III CTZ boundary, attempting to rehabilitate the disrupted Adams Road or Serges Jungle Highway, or finally starting again from scratch along the Jolley Road Cache Complex.

3. Rice Interdiction Operations.

(a) Northern Phuoc Long Province (P): With the development of the Jolley Road in eastern Phuoc Long (P) and with the cessation of the heavy supply traffic which had formerly moved down the Serges and Adam's Trail complexes in western and central Phuoc Long (P), it became apparent that an east/west trail network had been formed in northern Phuoc Long (P) to connect the trans-shipment points in Base Areas 350 and 351 to the Jolley Road. To develop intelligence concerning this trail, increased visual and electronic surveillance was utilized in the northern Phuoc Long (P) area along an axis extending from Base Area 351 east to the northern extension of the Jolley Road (vic YU4325). This increased surveillance in the area produced the initial trace of gradual deployment of Allied ground forces to the northeast. Heavy surveillance monitoring in the area was continued. As more information was acquired ground forces deployed into the suspected trail areas and FSB's were relocated to the northeast to aid in the interdiction and provide fire support for the infantry unit. Visual and ground reconnaissance during the month of February revealed an extensive network of cache sites, with the focal point being centered around the operational areas of FSB Margaret (YU2724) and FSB Lolita (YU3727). Fourteen of these caches contained over 2,000 lbs of rice each; the largest contained 45,600 lbs (YU353221). From 2 Feb to 5 Mar over 90 tons of rice were discovered, with the ARVN ABN Div accounting for over 73 tons of the total. This rice probably was destined for enemy units operating in MR-7 and SR-5 but because of the heavy Allied interdiction along the Jolley Road since 15 Dec 69, the rear service elements were unable to move the rice from its northern cache sites. Reports are still being received indicating a food shortage in units to the south of the FIRST TEAM's AO. Using the CICV estimate of enemy individual rice consumption (1.7 lbs per/man per/day), the 90 tons of captured rice represent the equivalent of almost a months supply to enemy elements in MR-7 and five month's supply to the enemy units in SR-5.

(b) Northern Tay Ninh (P): On 28 February while on a last light reconnaissance, A/1-9 Cav observed 6 huts at XT185995, and engaged the area with organic weapons, artillery, and an airstrike. Seven additional huts were discovered and rice was seen scattered throughout the area. On the following day (1 March) C/2-8 Cav air assaulted into the area and during the day 61,000 lbs of rice was evacuated. C Company continued the rice evacuation
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operation for the past 5 days with the final totals being 253,020 lbs evacuated and 14,000 lbs destroyed in place (133.5 tons). Since COSVN Headquarters elements and the 9th VC Division have ready access to rice supplies within Cambodia, this cache probably was destined to be moved south into SL-1 by the 82d Rear Service Group. The 133.5 tons represents a rice supply of over 2 months for all units operating in SL-1.

(4) Automatic Ambush Operations:

(a) During the past quarter the enemy has relentlessly attempted to move supplies, equipment, and personnel to bases areas within the FIRST TEAM's TACI, and to areas further south and east. Because of the rough terrain, thick jungle, and need to move rapidly, enemy units rely upon the extensive trail networks for movement, rather than attempting to 'break brush'. One of the most successful methods used to interdict this movement is the Automatic Ambush.

(b) Evolving from the combination of a U.S. command detonated claymore mine ambush and an enemy trip wire booby trap, the automatic ambush is essentially an unmanned ambush which is triggered by the enemy himself. It consists of a string of claymore mines rigged for simultaneous detonation when a trigger device is activated by pressure against a trip wire.

(c) The original intent of the automatic ambush had it being used as an economy of force measure to maximize area coverage, thereby increasing interdiction capabilities along the enemy's infiltration and logistics routes. However, it soon became apparent that there were other outstanding characteristics and capabilities inherent in its design.

1. The absence of personnel in the immediate area eliminates any possible compromise of the ambush due to a breach of light or noise discipline.

2. The effects of any enemy counter-ambush fires are negated since, again, troops are not located in the ambush position.

3. By its automatic nature you are assured of instant response when the enemy is in the killing zone.

(d) When employed in conjunction with a standard ambush, the automatic ambush, if positioned properly, may catch any enemy attempting to escape from the effects of a manned ambush. In addition to supplementing manned ambushes, automatic ambushes are very effective when employed as a stay-behind measure to eliminate enemy clonal trails U.S. units, and as an additional early warning/protective measure for a night defensive position or fire support base.

(e) Just recently it has been discovered, through captured enemy documents, that automatic ambushes have had a definite psychological effect upon the enemy. After repeated encounters with ambushes that he cannot retaliate against, he has gone from the state of being wary to one of being actually afraid to move.
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(c) The effectiveness of the 'instant killers' can be illustrated by the results obtained. During the three-month period, February through April 1970, we have killed 254 enemy, captured 7 enemy, wounded countless others, and recovered 127 enemy weapons. One interesting point to note is that during this period not one Skytrooper became a casualty as a result of enemy counter-ambush actions.

(g) The automatic ambush is considered such an effective combat power, that it has been included in replacement training at the FIRST TEAM Academy. There has also been established a training team that travels from unit to unit, conducting refresher training on automatic ambushes.

o. lst Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: 1st Brigade conducted operations in western War Zone "C" to interdict enemy lines of communication and supply and to destroy enemy forces, installations, and equipment.

(2) Execution:

(a) The lst Brigade continued operations into February with the 2-5 Cav, 2-7 Cav, 2-8 Cav and 1-11 ACR, elements of which were securing the 501st Land Clearing Company in Romeo Plow operations. The 3d ARVN Abn continued operations in their assigned AO with the 2nd, 5th and 7th ARVN Bns. Intelligence indicated the enemy forces to be in the northeastern portion of the brigade's AO. In light of this intelligence, two extended artillery support operations, one northeast of FSB CARLYN and one in the BC TUC area, were conducted with the BC TUC operation finding the enemy in a retraining and rest posture.

(b) During March the lst Bde' (with the 2-8 Cav, 2-7 Cav and 1-11 ACR) and the 3rd ARVN Abn Bde (with the 5th, 9th, and 11th ARVN Abn Bns) continued offensive operations to interdict enemy resupply routes and lines of communication. During March there was a marked rise in enemy activity. Based on intelligence, operations were centered in northern and western War Zone "C". The operation in the north resulted in capturing over 135 tons of rice with no US casualties. During the latter half of the month NVA activities increased toward US held FSB's.

(c) During April the lst Brigade (with 2-7 Cav, 5-7 Cav, and 1-11 ACR) and the 3rd ARVN Abn Bde (with the 5th, 9th, and 11th Abn Bns) continued offensive operations to interdict enemy resupply and lines of communication. During April there was an increase in enemy activities, with attacks of FSB's ILLUMINATON, ATKINSON, and KRAMER. Based on intelligence, operations were conducted in the northern and western portions of the lst Brigade AO. The 3rd ARVN ABN Bde conducted operations in the northern part of the AO. In addition to offensive operations, 0/1-11 ACR provided security for the 984th Land Clearing Company in Romeo Plow operations.

(3) Discussion and Analysis of Significant Events:

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(a) 030120 Feb XT040833: A Co 2-7 Rec 2A & AW fire from an est plat size en force SW of the NDF. Eng w/orx and Arty. HTY contact broke at 0230 however continued to rec sporadic Sa fire until 0530. Initial contact resulted in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA and 1 NVA KIA. At 0430 obsr en force moving N in the open. Eng w/orx and Arty resulting in 7 NVA KIA. At 0545 Arty obsr en plat size en force 200 meters NW of the NDF. Eng w/orx resulting in 5 NVA KIA. At 0755 medevac for WIA complete. At 0830 a sweep around the NDF revealed 2 additional NVA KIA & 2 AK-47; misc equip and assorted documents identifying the 61 Military Staff Section, 950 NVA Regt. Totals for contacts: 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 15 NVA KIA.

(b) 031228 Feb XT406854: C Co 2-7 Rec 2A & AW fire from an est 2 or 3 indiv from the NE. Eng w/orx. Contact broke immediately w/neg fduy casualty. Arty who was called to support the initial contact obsr 12 indiv evading to the NE. Obsr & Arty resulting in 7 A KIA. At 1245 C Co obsr 5 VVA evading to the NE, Eng w/orx resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. At 1255 obsr & Arty resulting in 2 NVA KIA & 2 AK-47 capt. At approx 1250 the 20 plat in ambush position obsr & eng w/orx 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. Totals for the contacts: Neg fduy; 19 NVA KIA.

(c) 040427 Feb PFB TINA: Rec an unk number of 107mm rockets, D-40 & Sa fire from the S & SW of PFB. Also rec a ground probe from an est 2 plat size en force also from the S. Eng w/orx, Arty, Arta. Contact broke at 0525 resulting in 5 US slightly wounded and neg damage to PFB. A first light sweep around the PFB revealed 5 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47 captured. At 1100 D&B Companies while continuing to sweep rec 60mm mortar fire from an est Co en force to their E. Eng w/orx, Arty, Arta. Contact broke at 1215 resulting in 4 US KIA, 4 US WIA, 39 NVA KIA, 33 60mm Mortar capt/det, 25 AK-47 capt/det, 1 x 30 cal & 1 M60 MG db. Captured documents identified the 21 Recon Co 950 NVA Regt. Totals: 4 US KIA, 9 US WIA, 44 NVA KIA.

(d) 071550 Feb XT092868: A 1-A & D 240 Rec Sa, AW and RPG fire from an USEFP to their E and SE; Eng w/orx, Arty, and Arta. Contact broke at 1750 resulting in 9 US WIA, 14 NVA KIA, 1 Rome Plow moderately damaged, 3 AK-47, 1 D-40 and misc equip captured.

(e) 141445 Feb XT 251704: C Co 2-7, C Tpr 1-11 ACR & 1 Plat 2-7 Rec Sa, AW, and RPG fire from and USEFP to their N. Eng w/orx, Arty, and Arta. Contact broke at 1515 w/neg fduy casualty. Initial search of contact area revealed 2 NVA KIA. At 1555 while continuing to search the contact area, rec 10 xds 60mm mortar fire from W and NW. Eng w/orx Arty, and Arta. Contact broke at 1840 have resulting in 8 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 30 US WIA and 3 NVA KIA. Also destroyed 1 M-48 Tank, 1 M-113 AFV, and moderately damaged 1 M-48 Tank. Medevac completed for WIA 1930. The following day 151330 obsr and eng 1 NVA on a trail resulted in 1 NVA KIA. At 151800 a further search of the contact area revealed 1 NVA KIA. Also recovered 2 US WIA and classified as KIA. A complete sweep of the contact area was made on 16 Apr and revealed an additional 11 NVA KIA: Misc equip and amm and documents were captured which identified the est 1st bn, 272 NVA Regt. Total cases for the contact were: 10 US KIA, 30 US WIA and 46 NVA KIA.

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(f) 011036 Mar XTI05995: C Co 2/8 In response to a 1-9 sighting of rice cache on lat on evening 28 Feb, C Co inserted to conduct a search of the area. Discovered a total of 9 frame hooches of which contained numerous 220 lb bags of rice. Evacuation of rice began immediately and was completed on 4 March. 173 tons of rice were extracted or destroyed from the cache.

(g) 040610 Mar XTI78996: A Co 2-8 Reo 90 xds of mixed 60mm mortar and B-40 fire from SE of their NDP. Also reo SA fire and grenades from the N by an est Co size en force. Eng w/org, Arty, and ARA. Contact broke at 0620 resulting in neg fully causal. 29 NVA KIA and 12 AK-47 and rice equip & ammo captured. At 0705 obs an Automatic Ambush activate 200 meters NE of NDP. A sweep of the area revealed 3 NVA KIA. At 1300 reo hvy SA and AW fire from an est plat size en force in bunk from the NW. Eng w/org, Arty and ARA. Contact broke at 1330 resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 5 NVA KIA. Medevac complete at 1520. Total causal: 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 17 NVA KIA.

(h) 070630 Mar XTI78998: C Co 2-8 Reo 30 xds 82mm mortar fire from NW. Also reo SA & B-40 fire from the N and W. Eng w/org, Arty, ARA and an A/S. Contact broke at 0659 resulting in 6 US WIA. Sweep of contact area revealed 13 NVA KIA, 2 MG, 5 AK-47 and 2 B-40 RL capt/dest. Medevac was completed at 0950. At 1715 heard movement in a bunk complex to their SW. Eng w/org and reo SA fire in return. Further eng w/Arty and ARA. Contact broke at 1810 resulting in 4 US WIA and 1 NVA KIA. Medevac complete at 1755. Total causal: 10 US WIA and 14 NVA KIA.

(i) 081625 Mar XTI74982: C Co 2-8 Reo hvy SA, AW, B-40 and 20 xds of 60mm mortar fire from an est Co size en force to the SSW and E. Eng w/org, Arty, ARA and A/S. Contact broke at 1650 resulting in 1 US KIA, 26 US WIA and 29 NVA KIA. Medevac completed at 1625. Co extracted to FSB CAROL. During the extraction by A/229 one A/C lifting out of the NZ reo hvy AW and .50 cal GA taking numerous hits, A/C crashed resulting in 2 US WIA. The A/C was destroyed. At 2005 A Co 2-20 covering C Co's extraction reo light .51 cal fire. Eng w/org resulting in 10 US KIA KIA and 1 .51 cal. Total causal this contact: 3 US KIA, 28 US WIA, 37 NVA KIA.

(j) 090405 Mar XTI22692: Rec approx 175 xds of 62mm mortar and possibly 107mm rocket fire from the NW. Three reo impacted inside the perimeter resulting in 5 US WIA, all other reo impacted 400 meters N of FSB. Eng w/Arty & ARA. Medevac complete at 0910. At 1005 local patrol 700 meters N of FSB heard voices and eng w/org receiving SA fire in return. Contact broke immediately w/neg fully casual. At 1115 local patrol found 1 NVA KIA 400 meters NW of FSB. At 1445 FSB again reo 25-30 xds of unk type incoming. All reo impacted 406-500 meters E of FSB. Total causal: 5 US WIA, 1 NVA KIA.

(k) 090405 Mar XTI22693: A Co 2-20 Rec light .51 cal GA fire 'taking per hits. Eng w/org resulting in 10 NVA KIA and 1 .51 cal MD dest.

(l) 120605 Mar XTI73884: D Co 2-8 Rec approx 125 xds of 60mm mortar fire from the NW. Reo impacted 200 meters SW of NDP. Also reo a ground
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probe from an 82 mm mortar on a patrol of 30 NVA resulting in 1 US KIA.

(n) 131701 Mar XT189769: A Co 2-8 Eng 3 NVA w/roc resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1741 rec S/A and B-40 fire from an USEP from S of their NDP. Eng w/roc, Arty, ARV and A/S. Contact broke at 1920 resulting in 1 US KIA. At 0600 the following morning rec S/A and B-40 fire from the S of NDP. Eng w/roc, Arty and ARA. Contact broke at 0617 resulting in 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA. A search of the contact area revealed 12 NVA KIA, 4 AK-47, and 1 .45 cal pistol captured. Medevac complete for WIA's at 1320. Total casualties: 2 US KIA, 6 US WIA and 12 NVA KIA.

(o) 181110 MOW XT049333: D Co 2-8 rec S/A and B-40 fire from an 82 mm mortar on a patrol of 30 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 0600 the following morning rec S/A and 2-40 fire from the S of NDP. Eng w/roc, Arty, ARA and A/S. Contact broke at 0617 resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1741 rec S/A and D-40 fire from an USEP from N of their position. Eng w/roc, Arty, Arv and A/S. Contact broke at 1125 resulting in 14 US WIA. The following day at 1516 hrs a search of the contact area, revealed 2 graves containing 19 NVA KIA in the contact the previous day. Total casualties: 14 US WIA and 19 NVA KIA.

(p) 261145 Mar XT077829: A Co 2-8 & A Troop 1-11 ACR C Co while on grd rec S/A fire and grenades from an 82 mm mortar on a patrol of 30 NVA resulting in 1 US KIA. At 1215 and reestablished 1221 rec S/A, AW, and B-40 fire from all sides of C Co perimeter. Eng w/roc, Arty, ARA and A/S. Contact broke at 1400 to 1445 when C Co was reinforced by A Co 2-8 and A Troop 1-11. ACR's began receiving intense B-40 & AW fire from N. Continued to enc w/roc, Arty and ARA, fully units broke contact at 1900 due to night fall. Total casualties for the day were 3 US KIA, 22 US WIA, and 18 NVA KIA. One M51 sheridan tank and one M113 ACAV were destroyed in the action. Documents subsequently captured identified the 272 Rgt as the unit eng. Additionally 14 NVA's and 2 Ho Chi Minhs taken on 31 Mar identified the 1st BN, 272 Rgt as having been involved in this contact.

(q) 300415 (approx) Mar JAY: Obs a trip flare ignat 60 meters S of FSB. Eng 2/40 & direct fire Arty. 0420 rec on undetermined number of mixed 107mm, 20mm, 122mm xts, 120mm, 82mm mortar 75mm R & B-40 fire from the W and SW of FSB. Also rec a grd attack from the S and SW by an USEP which breached the perimeter. The enemy used a direct hit and cover was also lost when incoming dest the antennas. All supporting A/C rec 51 cal 6/A fire from the SE, S, SW and NW. At 0520 the ground attack, direct & indirect fire on the FSB ceased, however sporadic SA fire continued until 0652. By 0630 the FSB was secured completely and cleaning up and search operations began. The attack of FSB JAY resulted in 13 US KIA, 53 US WIA, 74 NVA KIA and 3 POW's. POW's initially identified elements of the 271 NVA Rgt. However documents subsequently captured on 11 Apr 70 (news letter published by 9th VC Div) indicates 30 BN, 95C NVA Rgt was responsible for the attack.

(q) 51245 Mar XT027867: D 1-11 rec an USEP in a large bkr complex and rec S/A, AW, & 75mm R fire from the W of their location. Eng w/Arty, ARA. D Troop was reinforced by D Co 1-11 at approx 1400. Both units continued to receive fire from the enemy as they swept thru the bkr complex.

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Contact broke at 1530 resulting in 4 US WIA, 30 NV. KIA, 16 NVA captured
and 2 Hi-Choas plus 1 60mm mortar, 1 M-60, 1 9mm pistol and 4 AK-47 captured.
POW's identified 1st BN, 272 NV. Regt.

(x) 010218 Apr FSB TILLINGSWORTH: Rec an unkn number of mixed
122mm, 107mm Rockets, 120mm, 82mm, 60mm mortars, 75mm ER and D-40 rds
from the S and SW. Their indirect fire was followed by a ground attack from an est
2 reinforced NVA Companies from the SW. The en was eng w/org, Arty, ARA,
Nighthawk and L/S. Fighting was fierce particularly on the SW portion of the
FSB where friendly forces engaged the enemy in hand to hand fighting in order to
repel the attack. The 9th Ammo caught on fire and a tremendous explosion oc-
curred destroying one 8" gun and damaging radio antennas, rendering a temporary
loss of com. At 0330 the FSB was still receiving mortar and rocket fire
although the ground attack had been broken. All incoming ceased at 0430 and
search operations began. The attack on the FSB resulted in 24 US KIA, 54
US WIA, and 65 NVA KIA. Also numerous wps and equipment were captured.

(y) 100250 Apr W9996660: 0/1-5 Mech Obex 2 indiv 150 meters
NW of NDB. Eng w/org and Arty. At 0515 over 26-30 indiv 100 meters SE of
NDB. Eng w/org, Arty and Nighthawk. Contact broke at 0611 resulting in 2
US KIA, 5 US WIA. Medevac complete 0630. A search around the NDB revealed
12 NVA KIA.

(z) 10525 Apr W978746: B Co 2-7 Obex an est Squad size en
force in the open. Eng w/org, Arty and ARA. Contact broke at 1605 resulting
in neg fdy case and 11 NVA KIA.

(u) 11025 Apr X017667: A-6 Troops 1-5 Mech Heard movement
on a NE trail. Eng the area and reco Sa, AN, .51 cal and RPG fire from an USRF
from the NE. Eng further w/org, Arty, ARA; LRF and an A/S. Contact broke at
1320 hrs w/4 US WIA, 2 M134g161 dest, and 1 .51 cal NE capt. At 1335 hrs C
Troop reinforced and the two units searched the contact area revealing 15 NVA
KIA and 5 indiv wps & 2 crew served wps capt. At 1610 again reco Sa, AN and
RPG fire from the NE; Eng w/org, Arty and ARA. Contact broke at 1640 resulting
in 7 US KIA and 9 US WIA. A searoh of the contact area revealed 11 NVA
KIA, 2 indiv wps and 1 crew served wp, plus misc eqip capt. Total case
this contact 2 US KIA, 3 US WIA, and 26 NVA KIA.

(v) 151520 Apr X022669: B Troop 1-11 ACM: Leading veh reco
1 rd RPG fire from the E. Eng w/org and reco neg return fire. Contact broke
immediately and reestablished at 1700 engaging an est sqd size en force
w/org, Arty & a LRF. Contact broke at 1730 resulting in 4 US WIA 10 NVA KIA
and 1 NVA Pt. A Troop, in a search of the contact area the following day
found an additional 10 NVA KIA bringing the total en case to 20 NVA KIA
and 1 NVA Pt.

(w) 150231 Apr FSB KIAMEH: Rec approx 20 rds mixed Rockets,
mortars and RPG fire from the S and SW of FSB. Numerous rounds impacted inside
the FSB resulting in 3 US WIA, 1 M-60 tank med damaged and 1 M-48 tank dest.
The enemy was engaged with org wps artillery, armed O-119 aircraft and Nighthawk.
A first light sweep around the FSB revealed 20 NVA KIA, 11 indiv wps, 5
crew served wps and misc eqip and ammo capt.

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(x) 152143 Apr FSB ATKINSON: Heard movement W of FSB and Scout Dog alerted. Eng w/20mm and received ad est 50 rds of mixed 240mm, 107mm rockets, 62mm, 60mm mortar, 57mm RR and B-40 fire. Also rec'd ground attack from the W and a suppress attack from the SE. Eng w/20mm, Arty, AAA, Nighthawk, Shadow and A/S. At 2217 hrs the indirect fire ceased however the FSB rec sporadic SA fire until 0230. At 2245 a flare ship red by .51 cal on ground and was forced to crash. Later the FSB rec sporadic fire until 0230. At 2245 a flare ship red by .51 cal on ground and was forced to crash. Later the FSB rec sporadic fire until 0230. At 2245 a flare ship red by .51 cal on ground and was forced to crash.

2d Brigade Operations:

(1) Mission: During this period the 2d Brigade, the 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade, and the 2d ARVN Airborne Brigade working in close coordination and cooperation, conducted ground and air reconnaissance in their assigned area of operations. All three brigades were targeted on locating and eliminating the 174th Regiment, 275th NVA Regiment, the K-17 and the E-29 Local Force units, interdicting and neutralizing enemy lines of communication, denying the enemy use of known and suspected base areas and cache sites, supporting the GVN pacification programs, emphasizing Dong Tien in support of the Vietnameseization effort, and intensified psychological operations in support of Chieu Hoi programs.

(2) Execution:

(a) During February the 2d Brigade conducted four major operations against VC/NVA units in the Song Be area with emphasis on pacification, while concurrently interdicting rear service group movement along the Jolley Trail in eastern and south-central Phuoc Long Province. The 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade targeted its forces against the 174th Regiment and rear service group elements operating to the north and northeast of Song Be. In support of these operations, the Brigades established ten mobile fire support bases.

The first operation was targeted against VC/NVA forces operating in Phuoc Binh district. The 2-12 Cavalry, working closely with provincial RF/PPF forces, conducted extensive combined operations to deny enemy elements access to the populated areas around Song Be. Tactical operations were characterized by small unit reconnaissance and ambush activities. During the month, 2-12 Cavalry units participated in combined operations and training sessions with 36 RF/PPF units located throughout the district.

In support of these operations, 64 air moves were conducted by rotary wing aircraft. A significant small unit action, illustrative of the tactics utilized by the 2-12 Cavalry, occurred on 26 February when an eight man ambush/sniper team engaged an enemy force resulting in 10 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47s and 3 X54 pistols captured. A total of 6 NVA were killed by an automatic ambush, 2 by sniper and 2 by other small arms.

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2. The second operation was targeted against enemy rear service group activities in Duo Phong District. The 1-12 Cavalry conducted extensive interdiction operations along the Jolley Trail, and established two mobile fire support bases in order to support the eastward movement of its maneuver elements. FSB BLANCHARD was established on 9 February and was closed on 15 February when intelligence information revealed that rear service groups were moving supplies along the JI – III CTZ boundary. FSB BLAINE was opened on 15 February to counter the enemy’s attempt to bypass allied forces. Field Force artillery moved five 155mm howitzers (EF) and two 8” howitzers (EF) to FSB BLAINE to extend the range of allied fire support. Operations were conducted north of FSB BLAINE, and coordination was affected with II CTZ to extend the Cav AO into Quang Duc Province. Indicative of 1-12 Cavalry operations during the month was the utilization of platoon size forces to interdict the trails and maximum employment of the automatic ambush.

3. The third operation was targeted against enemy rear service group activities in Don Luan District. As a result of the large logistical complex uncovered by the 3rd Mobile Strike Force, the Commanding Generals of II FF and III CTZ directed that a thorough search of the 81st Rear Service Group base area be conducted. The 1st Airborne Battalion was airlifted to south central Phuoc Long Province to work the southern extremities of the Jolley Trail leading southwest toward Nong Rang. In support of this operation, FSB JAN was opened on 8 Feb. Ground reconnaissance and interdiction operations around FSB JAN proved unproductive and on 12 February, the 1st Airborne Battalion displaced to FSB VAN. Ground operations around FSB VAN also proved unproductive and battalion elements were airlifted to FSB TIM on 15 February to continue operations in their original AO.

4. The fourth operation was targeted against the 174th Regiment and rear service group elements operating north and northeast of Song Be. The tactical plan called for the progressive movement of 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade forces to the north, supported by artillery fires from mutually supporting fire support bases. During the month of February, six mobile fire support bases were established to support the scheme of maneuver. The 6th Airborne Battalion, operating out of FSB JUDIE, displaced north on 17 February and established FSB MARGARET. Concurrent with this move, the 1st Airborne Battalion assumed responsibility for FSB JUDIE, which remained open to provide supporting artillery fires for units operating in the Song Be area. The 6th Airborne Battalion, operating out of FSB JOAN, established FSB DJANGO on 14 February. FSB JOAN remained open temporarily to support FSB DJANGO with artillery fires. FSBs DJANGO and JOAN were closed on 25 and 25 February respectively and the 6th Airborne Battalion displaced to establish FSB LOLITA. As the move north gained momentum and enemy activity increased, FSBs CANDY, LOAN and AUDIE were established on 25, 26 and 27 February respectively. In order to provide the long range fires required to neutralize enemy forces and disrupt supply lines in the Bu Dinh area, two 175mm guns (EF) and two 8” howitzers (EF) were displaced from FSB BUTTONS and moved forward to FSB CANDY. Route security along Highway 309 was provided by the 1st Company, 1st Airborne Battalion, the 334 RP Company, and the 35 and 34 PF Platoons. The 2-12 Cavalry provide one rifle company to secure FSB CANDY. The 1st Airborne Battalion moved to establish FSB LOAN, leaving one rifle company to secure FSB JUDIE.

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The 3rd Brigade, 1st ACR, released OPCON of the 1-8 Cavalry which established FSB AUDIE on 27 February, and began reconnaissance and interdiction operations north and southwest of the fire support base.

(b) During March the 2nd Brigade conducted three major operations targeting its forces against VC/NVA units in the Song Be area. The 15th ACR continued their route security mission for convoys and provided security for land clearing operations along highway QL 14 and Route 311. The 2nd Brigade and 1st ABN Brigade continued reconnaissance and interdiction operations in northern Phuoc Long Province. In support of these operations, the Brigades established six fire support bases.

1 The first operations were targeted against VC/NVA forces operating in the Song Be area. The 2-12 Cavalry, working closely with Provincial RF/PF Forces, conducted extensive combined operations to deny enemy elements access to the populated areas around Song Be. Tactical operations were characterized by small unit reconnaissance and ambush activities. During the month, 2-12 Cavalry units participated in combined operations and training sessions with 33 RF/PF units located throughout the district. In support of these operations 94 air moves were conducted by rotary wing aircraft. On 24 March the 2-12 Cavalry, reacting to intelligence, displaced from FSB BUTTOI to reopen FSB TIM. After locating a large ammunition cache, the battalion moved to FSB JUDIE on 30 March to conduct interdiction operations along the Adams Trail complex.

2 The second operation concentrated on land clearing and convoy security operations along the major LOCs in Phuoc Long Province. The 501st Land Clearing Company initiated Plow operations on 25 March by cutting both sides of QL 14 from Duc Phong to the II Corps Boundary. By 31 March, 1,629 acres of land had been cleared. In addition, the 62nd Brush Clearing Detachment, an experimental cutting unit, commenced operations on 20 March to remove secondary growth along QL 14 in the vicinity of Buvar, by the end of the month 243 acres of land had been cleared of secondary growth. Security for these engineer units was provided by the 15th ACR and the 3-8th AINN Infantry Battalion. To facilitate security requirements for both the land clearing units and for convoys, the 15th ACR and the 3-8th AINN Infantry were placed in direct support of the 2nd Brigade on 25 March. During the month there were a total of 39 convoys in the 2nd Brigade area of operations. There were no ambushes and only 4 mining incidents along QL 14 and Route 311 during the month.

3 The third operation was targeted against the 174th Regiment and rear service group elements operating north and northeast of Song Be. During the month four fire support bases and one fixed wing airstrip were established to support the scheme of maneuver. The 6th Airborne Battalion, operating out of FSB MARGUDET, displaced forward on 8 March and established FSB HUNG VUONG. On 11 March the 1-12 Cavalry closed FSB EL LINH and moved north to establish FSB JEWEL. To provide additional heavy artillery support to the 1st Airborne Battalion and the 1-12 Cavalry, whose units were continuing operations further north, two 175mm and three 8" guns from the 6-27 Artillery moved along Highway 509 from FSB CANDY to FSB HUNG VUONG. FSB CANDY was
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closed on 15 March. On 22 March the 1st Cavalry closed FSB JEWEL and opened FSB SNUFF on the south end of the Bu Gia Map airstrip. Concurrently, the 8th Engineer Battalion began work to upgrade the airstrip, and by 26 March CL30 fixed wing aircraft were providing essential materials to support allied units operating in the Bu Gia Map area. On 25 March the 1-8 Cavalry, after operating in Base Area 373 for almost a month, closed FSB AUDI and reopened FSB CANDY. Concurrent with the 1-8 Cavalry move, the 6th Airborne Battalion conducted a retrograde from FSB HUNG VUONG to FSB BUTTONS in preparation for a fixed wing move to Dong Tan on 26 March. The 1st Airborne Battalion displaced their command post from FSB LOAN to FSB HUNG VUONG and assumed responsibility for FSB HUNG VUONG. FSB LOAN was closed on 25 March. The 3rd Airborne Battalion departed Saigon by fixed wing and arrived at FSB BUTTONS on 28 March. The battalion conducted a direct exchange with the 8th Airborne Battalion at FSB LOLITA and began reconnaissance and interdiction operations in their assigned area of operation.

(o) During April the 2nd Brigade conducted three major operations targeting its forces against VC/NVA units in the Bu Gia Map and Song Be area. The 175th ARMN ACR continued their road security mission for convoys along Highway QL14 and Route 311. The 2nd Brigade and the 2nd ARMN BN Brigade continued reconnaissance and interdiction operations in northern Phuoc Long Province. In support of these operations the Brigade established three fire support bases.

1. The first operation was targeted against the 174th NVA Regiment and K29 local force units operating in the Bu Gia Map area. During the period 1-9 April the 1-12 Cav conducted extensive reconnaissance and interdiction operations to deny the enemy access to, and use of the Jolley Trail - Adams Road complex. There were no major enemy contacts. There were three large munitions caches found and forty-one Montagnards returned to authorities at Song Be. One Chieu Hoi from this group led elements of the 1-12 Cav to the capture of fourteen individual weapons. The 1-12 Cav then redeployed from Bu Gia Map, closing FSB SNUFF on 10 April, and assumed the mission of pacification of Song Be and defense of FSB BUTTONS. During the remainder of the month the 1-12 Cav emphasized denial of access routes into population centers in and around Song Be. The battalion in close coordination with 26 RP/FP units conducted 42 combined operations and training programs.

2. The second operation was initiated when the 2nd ARVN BN arrived at BUTTONS on the first and second of April and conducted a direct exchange with the 1st ARVN BN who returned to Saigon. Effective 02001 the 2nd ARVN BN assumed responsibility for the Airborne AO. With the imminent of the rainy season the 175mm guns and 8" howitzers were retrograded from FSB HUNG VUONG to FSB BUTTONS on 3 April. On 10 April the 6th ARVN BN arrived at Quan Loi, returning from a stand down in Dong Tan, and on the 11th deployed to FSB DIEN HUNG and commenced operations. On the 13th the 2nd ARVN BN deployed from FSB HUNG VUONG and redeployed to FSB DIEN HANG and assumed control of the western Phuoc Long AO. The 3rd ARVN BN began their retrograde of FSB NUYEN TAI and redeployment to Dong Da. To provide long range fire support the 8" howitzers were road marched from FSB BUTTONS to FSB DONG DA on the 16th of April, in an effort to reduce enemy activity in...
in the southeastern section of Binh Long Province, the 6th ARVN ABN established a mobile FSB named GIA LONG. In an attempt to interdict the enemy’s LOCs near the Cambodian border in northern Binh Long Province the 2nd ARVN ABN Bn established a second mobile FSB HONG HA on 24 April 1970.

The third operation was initiated when the 2-12 Cav was given a change of mission from the pacification of the Song Be area and was moved into FSB JOAN to interdict enemy LOCs on 10 April. As a measure to increase the interdiction of the Adams Trail the 1-8 Cav was displaced from FSB CANDY to FSB MARGARIT on 5 April. On 7 April in an attempt to realign forces, and based on the impending move of the ARVN ABN Bde into the 3rd Brigades A0, the 1-8 Cav assumed responsibility for FSB JUDIE. Based on current intelligence and the enemy activity along the Jolley Trail in eastern Phuoc Long Province, the decision was made to redeploy both the 1-8 Cav and the 2-12 Cav. On 18 April the 1-8 Cav reopened FSB NGUTX to start extensive ground reconnaissance operations to the north and west. On 19 April the 1-8 Cav assaulted C Co to establish FSB MARISA. Both the 1-8 Cav and the 2-12 Cav were targeted against the 174th NVA Regiment and rear service elements operating in and around the Jolley Trail Complex.

(3) Significant Contacts:

(a) On 10 February at 1845 hrs, via YU535207, B/1-12 and B/1-12, via YU563180, had automatic ambushes go off resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47s and documents captured.

(b) On 11 February at 1450 hrs, via YU535207, B/1-12, while on ground recon made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The results of the contact were 4 NVA KIA, 1 SKS, 1 AK-47, and documents captured.

(c) On 12 February at 1845 hrs, via YU597150, B/1-12 had an automatic ambush activate, resulting in 3 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47s and documents captured.

(d) On 17 February at 1130 hrs, via YU232292, 2nd Brigade Scouts, composed of a LCH and a Cobra from D/229, in response to Ranger Team 45 sightings, engaged an unknown number of individuals resulting in 15 NVA KIA. At 1408 hrs, via YU198262, D/229 engaged 10 to 15 individuals resulting in 10 NVA KIA. At 1415 hrs, in the same area, D/229 engaged 3 individuals resulting in 3 NVA KIA. At 1430 hrs, in the same area, the Brigade Scouts spotted and engaged 6 individuals resulting in 6 more NVA KIA. Finally, at 1730 hrs, via YU281280, the Brigade Scouts engaged numerous individuals resulting in 6 NVA KIA and 5 NVA KBARA. Total kills for this action were 45.

(e) On 18 February at 1425 hrs, via YU518228, A/1-12, while moving to secure a downed log bird, made contact with an unknown size enemy force and engaged them with organic and artillery. The results of this action were 9 NVA KIA and 5 NVA KBARA. (Total 14 NVA killed).

(f) On 26 February at 0700 hrs, via YU216058, an automatic ambush established by E/2-12 Sniper Team was activated; the enemy was engaged with hand grenades and small arms. The results of the action were 10 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47s, 3 SKS pistols, and documents captured.
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(g) On 3 March at 1100 and 1230 hrs, via YU295306 and 297306, respectively, C/1-9 and the Brigade Scouts with D/227 in support of the 62 Company, engaged an unknown size enemy force with organics, resulting in 3 NVA KIA by C/1-9, 5 NVA KIA by D/227, and 1 NVA KIA by the Brigade Scouts, for a total of 9 NVA KIA.

(h) On 13 March at 1215 hrs, via YU288395, C/1-9 received ground to air fire. They engaged the enemy with organics, artillery and air strikes. The results of the action were 4 NVA KIA and 8 NVA KIA totaling 12 enemy killed.

(i) On 13 March at 1040 hrs, via YU294427, C/1-9 LOH received ground to air fire. They spotted and engaged 5 individuals with organics. They also adjusted artillery on the location and marked the area for an air strike. The results of this action were 5 NVA KIA, 3 NVA KIA and 2 NVA KIA for a total of 10 NVA KIA.

(j) On 15 March at 0955 hrs, via YU438248, A/1-8 made contact with twenty individuals resulting in 4 NVA KIA. At 1637 hrs contact was reestablished resulting in another NVA KIA. Again at 1730 hrs they reestablished contact with another 20 individuals resulting in 4 NVA KIA. A total of 9 NVA were killed in this action.

(k) On 15 March at 1440 hrs, via YU290412, C/1-9, while making a BDA of Air Light, received ground to air fire. They engaged the area with organics and called in artillery and air strikes resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 3 NVA KIA and 2 NVA KIA/S. A total of 13 NVA were killed in this action.

(l) On 18 March at 1430 hrs, via YU433246, A/1-8 made contact with an estimated twenty individuals. They engaged with organics and artillery. The results of this action were 3 NVA KIA and 2 NVA KIA for a total of 5 enemy killed.

(m) On 22 March at 1020 hrs, via YU420251, A/1-8 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. They engaged with organics, artillery and called in Tac Air and ARI. The results of the contact were 10 NVA KIA, 5 NVA KIA/S and 2 NVA KIA. A total of 17 NVA were killed in this action.

(n) On 26 March at 1300 hrs, via YU273439, B/1-12 engaged one individual resulting in 1 NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1620 hrs they engaged an unknown size enemy force with an automatic ambush and organics resulting in another 4 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 3 AK-47s and a 9mm pistol. A total of 5 enemy were killed and 5 individual weapons were captured, as well as a PW, who later died. The PW stated his unit was the 5th VC Division.

(o) On 27 March at 1500 hrs, via YU284433, A and B/1-12 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. They engaged with organics, artillery and ARI resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 7 NVA KIA. A total of 8 enemy were killed.

(p) On 28 March at 1502 hrs, via YU267444, A/1-12 made contact

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with an unknown size enemy force. They returned fire with organic, artillery, ARA, and an air strike. Results of the encounter were 7 NVA KLA, 6 NVA KBAR, 5 NVA KEA/S, and 3 NVA KBARL. A total of 23 enemy were killed in this action and 1 ton of rice was destroyed.

(q) On 28 March at 1629 hrs, via YU28743; D/3-12 made contact with a squad size enemy unit. Contact broke at 1640 hrs. At 1930 hrs, contact was reestablished. Bravo Company engaged with organic and automatic ambush, resulting in 6 NVA KLA.

(r) On 6 April at 0150 hrs, the 3rd Troop of the 15th ACR and the 11 Company of the 3-8 ARVN Inf at FSB Mary received a ground attack. Nighthawk and ARA were called on station. The results of the action were 15 NVA KLA, 3 NVA KBH, 1 NVA FW, 7 AK-47s, 2 B-40 rocket launchers, 5 B-40 rockets, 1 Chicom claymore, and 5 AK-47 Magazines captured. (Total of 18 NVA killed).

(s) On 22 April at 1130 hrs, via YU42418; D/2-12 made contact with an unknown size enemy force in a large bunker complex and engaged with organic, artillery, ARA, and an airstrike. The results of the action were 9 NVA KLA and 21 B-40 rockets, 23 bicycles, 2 tons of rice, 50 rounds of .51 cal ammo, 4000 rounds of AK-47 ammo, 5 rounds of 75mm R/L ammo, 4 rifle grenades, documents, and miscellaneous personal equipment captured. The bunker complex consisted of approximately 200 bunkers.

(t) On 27 April at 1030 hrs, via YU32292, D/3-8 made contact with an unknown size enemy force in bunkers and engaged with organic, artillery, ARA, airstrike, and artillery. The results of the action were 7 NVA KLA, 6 NVA KEA/S, and 6 NVA KBARL. (Total of 21 NVA killed).

(u) On 27 April at 0920 hrs, via YU36620, A/2-12 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Contact continued throughout the day and during this time A/2-12 engaged the enemy force, which was estimated to be a company sized element, with organic, artillery, ARA, and artillery. On 27 April while sweeping through this area A/2-12 found 13 NVA KLA, 5 NVA KEA/S, 3 NVA KBAR, and 3 NVA KEARL. (Total of 24 NVA killed).

(v) On 30 April at 0820 hrs, via YU35279, C/1-8 made contact with an estimated platoon sized enemy force. They engaged the enemy with organic, artillery, ARA, and air strike. The results of the action were 14 NVA KLA, 4 NVA KEA/S, and 6 NVA KBAR (total of 24 NVA killed).

3d Brigade Operations

(1) Mission During the period 1 February - 12 April 1970 the primary efforts of the Brigade continued to be directed toward interdiction of the Sergus Jungle Highway and neutralization of the VC infrastructure and local force units. The Brigade continued overall responsibility for the 9th ARVN Regiment, for RVNAF/GVN forces and installations in Binh Long Province and for Bo Mai District of Phang Long Province. During the period 10 - 15 April 1970, tactical responsibility for the Kentucky Racer was passed to the 1st
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ARVN Airborne Brigade and the 3d Brigade relocated to eastern War Zone "C". The newly assigned mission of the Brigade encompassed interdiction of the Saigon River Corridor and the Mustang Trail, targeting specifically against the 101st and 165th Regiments and the 50th and 82nd Bear Service Groups. The brigade continued to support pacification programs in Binh Long Province, emphasizing "Dong Thi" operations in support of GVN pacification and Chieu Ho Programs.

(2) Execution: Tactical operations during this period emphasized combined coordinated operations with ARVNAP targeted against interdiction of main force infiltration, upgrading RP/FF units in Binh Long Province and neutralization of the VC infrastructure and local force units. Elements of the 1-5 Cav, 2-5 Cav, 1-7 Cav, 1-6 Cav, and 11th ACR concluded operations along the Sages Jungle Highway, after successfully sealing this main route of enemy infiltration and logistical flow. As the threat from main force elements diminished, emphasis was directed toward Vietisation and the neutralization of enemy base areas and cache complexes. During the quarterly reporting period the 3d Brigade was generally targeted against the D 188 and 3 368 Local Force Battalions, the 95G, 101st and 165th NVA Regiments and the 50th and 82nd Bear Service Groups. During the closing weeks of the quarter the efforts of the Brigade were redirected to eastern War Zone "C" where infiltration along the Saigon River Corridor and Mustang Trail had recently been left unimpeded.

(3) General: NVA/VU offensive high points occurred in early February, early March and late April. Heaviest activity was noted in the Bo Duo District area and in eastern War Zone "C" where only main force company or larger size contact occurred. While standoff attacks were numerous they were not of the intensity characteristic of determined attacks in the western War Zone "C" area, but rather appeared as a harassing action. Ground to air firing incidents, similar to ground contacts, were predominant in the Bo Duo District area and in eastern War Zone "C". The majority of the contacts were small contacts involving enemy forces of generally less than squad size where the enemy did not demonstrate a desire to initiate or maintain contact with friendly forces. The area of operations remained essentially unchanged during the initial 20 days of the quarter. It encompassed the northeastern portion of Binh Long Province and the northeastern portion of Phuoc Long Province. On 19 Feb., with the assumption of GPOCM of TF Master, the area of operations was expanded to encompass all of Binh Long Province north of Ganh Thanh. In mid-April with the turnover of the area of operations to the 3d ARVN ARN Bde, a new 3d Bde area of operations was established in eastern War Zone "C" astride the Saigon River corridor and the Mustang Trail.

(4) Significant Activities:

(a) The first five days of February were characterised by an extremely high incidence rate of ground-to-air firings and stand-off attacks in the Bo Duo District. During this period, there were twelve (12) standoff attacks directed primarily against the CP, 3-9 ARVN Bn and Bo Duo District endquaters. Resulting friendly losses were 6 VN civilians WIA and 250 x .50mm HE rounds destroyed. Ground to air firing incidents numbered ten (10)
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resulting in no friendly losses and 35 NVA killed. Ground contacts totaled five (5), the enemy force varying in size from one squad to an estimated company. Resulting friendly losses totaled 3 CIDG WIA with enemy losses reported as 25 killed.

(b) The period 6-13 February was one of negligible enemy activity. Three ground contacts with 3-5 individuals each, two automatic ambush detonations and two unsuccessful ground to air firing incidents summarize the enemy activity. Losses included 5 US WIA and 11 NVA killed.

(c) On 140530 February, an automatic ambush detonated vicinity D/1-7 Cav NDF at YU10531 resulting in 5 VC KIA and 1 VC PW. Numerous documents also were captured. A second automatic ambush detonated at 150645 February in the same general vicinity, resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(d) On 19 February, 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of 3-11 ACR (-) and 2-5 Cav forming TP Master. This force expanded Brigade operations to the north and west of Loc Ninh, resulting in several significant contacts with NVA main force elements.

(e) The evening of 26 February was attended by a marked increase in enemy activity throughout the area of operations. During the period 262000-272000 February, there were eight (8) stand-off attacks of varying degrees of intensity, primarily directed against RP/PP outposts and GVN hamlets. There were also 3 mining incidents. Results of this increased activity included 11 RP/PP/KIA/VC WIA, 1 HD KIA, 2 US WIA and 9 enemy killed.

(f) A/2-5 Cav, on 28 February, at 0900 hrs, while on ground reconnaissance, made contact with USARV, APA and artillery supported. The contact resulted in 9 NVA KIA and no friendly casualties.

(g) B/1-9 aerial rifle platoon was air-assaulted 281645 February into the area of a ground to air firing incident. The ARF engaged an estimated NVA platoon. The B/1-9 Cav ARF received fire from three sides, quick reaction forces (G16/1-5 Cav) reinforced. Between 1045 and 1930 hrs there were four separate contacts. The QRF and ARF were extracted at 1930 hrs. Contact was supported by ARF and artillery and resulted in 6 NVA KIA.

(h) NVA/VC highpoints activities continued through the night of 2 March 1970. There were eight (8) stand-off attacks in the first two days of March directed primarily against GVN hamlets. Two of these incidents were followed up by platoon size penetrations of the respective villages. There were also three ground to air firings and four ground contacts, three of which were light, fleeting contacts.

(i) At 1150 hours on 2 March, L Troop, 3-11 ACR (TP Master) received small arms fire from an estimated 10-20 NVA via their NDF. L Troop pursued the withdrawing enemy southeast into a bunker complex where they received small arms and B40 rocket fire. Contact broke at 1230 hrs with the enemy evading south. APA, artillery, and B/1-9 Cav supported the contact which resulted in 30 NVA killed.
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(i) At 1915 hours on 9 March, an automatic ambush was detonated at XU682085 in the vicinity of L/3-11 ACR's (TF Master) night defensive position. The area was engaged with indirect fire. A first light sweep revealed heavy blood trails which were followed by a dismounted platoon. At approximately 1030 hours, vicinity XU675075, subsequent to finding 1 NVA KIA, the platoon made heavy contact with an estimated NVA battalion in bunkers. The enemy force was later identified as a battalion of the 209th NVA Regiment. 1 Troop (-) reinforced and was supported by ARI, artillery and 4 airstrikes. A sweep of the contact area revealed 53 NVA killed and resulted in the capture of an additional 5 NVA plus weapons and equipment. Friendly losses resulting were 4 US KIA and 25 US WIA.

(k) On 12 March, at 0950 hours, vicinity YU013022, the 2nd platoon, C/1-7 Cav made contact with an estimated NVA squad while checking out the area of an automatic ambush detonation. Artillery and ARI supported. Contact broke at 1140 hours, C(-)/1-7 Cav reinforced and reestablished contact at 1330 hours. Sporadic contact continued throughout the afternoon with artillery, ARI, and TAC air supporting. Contact broke at 1730 hours. Results of the contact were 6 NVA KIA, 3 US WIA and 1 US KIA.

(l) On 24/03/13 March an automatic ambush detonated at XU975109, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. 4th platoon, B/1-7 Cav swept the contact area with negative further results. At 1355 hours, 2nd platoon observed and engaged 4 NVA in the same general area. The enemy returned fire and evaded. At 1430 hours, the 2nd platoon again made contact, engaging with organics, ARI and artillery. The enemy evaded. While continuing to sweep the contact area the following day, B/1-7 Cav uncovered a bunker complex revealing 20 NVA killed.

(m) From 31/03 to 01/04 April, Quan Loi Base Camp received an estimated 25 x 82mm mortar rounds, 4 unknown type rounds and 5 x 75mm rounds impacting within the defensive perimeter. There were no friendly casualties, however, equipment damaged included 1 UH-1H CBL, 5 UH-1H, 5 OH-6A, 2 AH-1G, 10 x 2 1/2 ton and 2 x 3 1/2 ton trucks damaged.

(n) On 14 April, the 54 Brigade realigned its area of operations to eastern War Zone "C".

(o) During the afternoon of 16 April, between 1400 and 1620 hours, a combined US/RF force made contact with an USSF vicinity XU756070. Initial contacts resulted in 2 RF WIA and 1 RF KIA. 4th platoon, C/1-5 Cav (-) reinforced the 215th RF Company and contact was reestablished. Enemy forces engaged small arms, B-40 rockets and 82mm mortar fire. Friendly forces returned fire with organics, ARI and artillery. B/1-9 Cav scout team was on station. Contact broke immediately with the enemy force evading. Casualties included 2 US WIA and 5 RF WIA. There were no confirmed enemy losses.

(p) The 2nd platoon, C/1-7 Cav had an automatic ambush detonate vicinity XT577743 at 2207 hours on 16 April. The ambush site was engaged with organics, artillery and 81mm mortar fire. A sweep of the ambush site revealed 8 NVA KIA.

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(q) B/227 AVN Night Hawk on 200015 April sighted and engaged 20-30 NVA along the bank of the Saigon River vicinity XT518667. The engagement resulted in 10 NVA killed.

(r) On 260930 April, C/1-7 Cav while on ground reconnaissance vicinity XT605733 made contact with an estimated NVA company in bunkers. Contact continued sporadically until 1300 hours with C/1-7 Cav being supported with artillery, ARA and TAC air. Results of the contact were 4 NVA KIA, 2 US KIA, and 15 US WIA.

(s) At 1530 hours on 29 April, while establishing an automatic ambush vicinity XT630742, 1st platoon, I/1-7 Cav observed and engaged 1 NVA. The enemy evaded, was pursued and contact was reestablished at 1600 hours with an UH-60 in bunkers. Enemy fire was returned with organics, LAM, and artillery. B/1-9 Cav was on station. A US-1H flying medevac was hit by ground to air fire and made a controlled emergency landing. The B/1-9 Cav ABP secured the downed aircraft. At 1805 hrs while sweeping the contact area, contact was reestablished. Contact broke at 1810 hours. At 1900 hours an UH-60 Cav was engaged outside the NDP. Contact was supported by ARA and artillery. Contact broke at 1910 hours. Total results of the contacts were 5 NVA KIA, 2 US KIA and 4 US WIA.

f. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry continued reconnaissance operations throughout the 1st Air Cavalry Division's AO. Alpha Troop remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade while the Squadron (-) remained in general support of the Division (-) with priority of effort shifting as necessary to accommodate enemy activity.

(2) During the first portion of the current reporting period emphasis was placed on interdicting and developing the Jolley Trail and supporting the Division's northerly movement throughout the AO. During March the 1st Brigade AO was extended west to the Cambodian border in the Dog's Head area. Alpha Troop placed priority of effort to that area, identifying and eliminating the NVA/WU main crossing points from Cambodia to South Vietnam in the Dog's Head. The 3rd Brigade took an AO extension westward to the XT 36 N/S grid line. B Troop placed priority of effort on this area during the reporting period. C Troop continued to support 2nd Brigade and monitor the Jolley Trail network.

(3) The Squadron distributed its assets in this fashion from March to the end of the reporting period. The only exception was that D Troop was tasked to supply one Pink Team per day to the 2nd AVN ADN Brigade in the C Troop AO from the middle of April to the present. This measure was adopted in order to assist C Troop in covering their AO which, due to its size, is difficult to cover adequately with the assets of a single troop. D Troop also supported the 11th ACR with visual reconnaissance.

(4) The quarter ended with the squadron in this configuration. Priority of effort was still with A Troop in the Dog's Head, and the enemy has displayed an increased aggressiveness in attacking aircraft in all portions of the Division's AO. Alpha Troop contacts during the reporting period were...
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primarily with the 9th VC Division. Troops B and C had contact mainly with the 7th NVA and 5th VC Divisions. Specific results of the contacts were:

(a) Enemy: 83 KIA, 52 KIA, 5 IV
(b) US: 8 KIA, 55 WIA

(5) Significant Contacts:

(a) Operations conducted by Troops A and B, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRONS on 1 Feb 1970 resulted in 50 NVA KIA, KIA, and KIA, and 1 truck destroyed. While conducting aerial reconnaissance, at 0950H, WU41797, an OH6A from Trp A received heavy automatic weapons fire and sustained several hits. The aircraft, immediately locating the enemy firing positions, engaged them with organic weapons, resulting in 11 NVA killed. At 0820H, WU95324, an OH6A from Trp B received 50 cal MG fire and engaged the area with organic weapons, resulting in 4 NVA killed. While conducting aerial reconnaissance, at 0935H, YU109324, Trp B aircraft received automatic weapons fire from several individuals. The enemy soldiers were engaged with organic weapons, resulting in 4 NVA killed. An OH6A from Trp B, at 1125H, WU108326, spotted and engaged one enemy soldier and killed him. Aircraft from Trp B, at 1150H, YU922240, while conducting aerial reconnaissance, spotted an enemy truck. The vehicle, 3/4 to 1 ton in size, was engaged with an air strike and resulted in 1 truck destroyed. At 1400H, in the vicinity of the destroyed enemy truck, an OH6A from Trp B received 30 cal MG fire. The suspected enemy firing position was engaged with organic weapons, supported by ARA and air strikes, resulting in 8 NVA killed. An OH6A from Trp B, at 1345H, XU917244, received automatic weapons fire and engaged the area with organic weapons, supported by an air strike, resulting in 2 NVA killed. While conducting a BDA of air strikes, at 1425H, YU912554, aircraft from Trp B spotted 6 NVA KIA. Continuing the mission, the OH6A spotted and engaged 4 enemy soldiers and killed them. At 1502H, in the vicinity of the air strikes, the OH6A spotted several enemy soldiers and engaged them with organics, supported by air strikes, resulting in an additional 5 NVA killed in the area. An OH6A from Trp B, at 1700H, YU905235, while conducting an assessment of ARA firings, spotted 2 NVA KIA. Continuing the assessment of ARA firings mission, at 1705H, XU917235, the OH6A spotted an additional 3 NVA KIA.

(b) Operations conducted by Trp B, 1-9 Cav on 3 Feb 1970 resulted in 33 NVA KIA and KIA. While conducting aerial reconnaissance, at 1505H, YU151288, an OH6A spotted several individuals and engaged them with organics, resulting in 4 NVA killed. At 1440H, in the area of the earlier sightings, aircraft from Trp B over several more enemy soldiers and engaged them, resulting in an additional 6 NVA killed. An OH6A, at 1500H, YU145280, received automatic weapons fire and engaged the area with organics, supported by an air strike, resulting in 4 NVA killed. At 1540H, YU140276, an OH6A received automatic weapons fire and engaged with organics, air strikes supporting, resulting in 1 NVA killed. While conducting a BDA of air strikes at 1555H, YU146281, an OH6A and an Air Force FAC spotted 6 NVA killed. Continuing the BDA mission, the OH6A, at 1605H, YU146279, spotted an additional NVA killed. At 1700H, YU146281, the OH6A and Air Force FAC spotted 5 more enemy killed. The OH6A spotted one individual in the area and engaged him, resulting in

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1 NVA killed. An OH-6A, at 1800H, YU146281, observed several bunkers that showed signs of recent use. The area was engaged with organic weapons and resulted in 3 NVA killed. At 1850H, YU145279, while conducting a BDA of air strikes, an OH-6A spotted 2 NVA killed.

(c) Operations conducted by Troop B, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON on 11 Feb 1970 resulted in 9 NVA killed. While conducting aerial reconnaissance, at 1440H, UX59103, an OH-6A from Troop B observed a recently used trail leading into an area with several bamboo structures. Continuing the reconnaissance of the area, the aircraft spotted several enemy soldiers on the trail and engaged them with organic weapons. The action resulted in 9 NVA killed.

(d) On 18 February 1970, at 1200H, YU169981, A Troop Blues made contact with a small size force and captured four (4) prisoners, two (2) AK-47s and one SGS. At 1630H, at UX177869, Apache 14 sighted 4 individuals walking south on a north-south trail. He engaged with organic weapons resulting in 4 KIA. At 1655H, UX623973, Apache 14 sighted 3 more individuals on a trail, engaged with organic weapons resulting in 2 KIA; one individual evaded into the bamboo. At 1700H, the Blues located 2,800 pounds of rice.

(e) On 24 February 1970, at 1200H, YU169981, A Troop Blues made contact with a small size force and captured four (4) prisoners, two (2) AK-47s and one SGS. At 1630H, at UX177869, Apache 14 sighted 4 individuals walking south on a north-south trail. He engaged with organic weapons resulting in 4 KIA. At 1655H, UX623973, Apache 14 sighted 3 more individuals on a trail, engaged with organic weapons resulting in 2 KIA; one individual evaded into the bamboo. At 1700H, the Blues located 2,800 pounds of rice.

(f) On 1 March 1970, at 1600H, UX183993, A Troop Pink Team spotted approximately twelve structures. Structures appeared to be loaded with rice. Aircraft engaged the structures with organic and uncovered the rice. A line unit was put into this area to extract the rice. After four days approximately 120 tons of rice had been extracted and 14 tons destroyed in place.

(g) Early evening operations conducted by Trp B, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON on 10 March 1970 accounted for 26 enemy soldiers eliminated. While conducting aerial reconnaissance at 1825H, UX302215, aircraft from Trp B spotted a large enemy force moving in a southerly direction and engaged them with organic weapons, receiving automatic weapons fire in return. The action, supported by artillery, continued until accurate and intense fires had killed 26 NVA, forcing the remainder of the enemy to hastily retreat from the area.

(h) On 14 March 1970, at 1920H, XT191711, an A Troop AH-1G spotted six individuals in a bomb crater and engaged with 20cm resulting in 6 NVA KIA and 1 8-40 rocket launcher destroyed. While conducting aerial reconnaissance of an area that had reported earlier ground to air firings, aircraft from Troop C, at 1705H, UX594427, spotted 10 individuals moving across an open area. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery and air strikes, resulting in 10 NVA killed.

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1. Operations conducted by 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON on 15 March 1970 accounted for 15 NVA soldiers killed. While conducting a FIB of an Aro Light Strike at 1500H, YU30409, aircraft Type U spotted 2 NVA EB Aro Light. Continuing the mission, the aircraft received .51 cal MG fire and engaged the area with organic weapons, resulting in 1 enemy eliminated. At 1530H, YU39042, continuing to check the area of earlier ARO fire, the aircraft again received .51 cal MG fire. The enemy firing position was engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery, and resulted in another 5 NVA killed in the area.

2. On 17 March 1970, at 1150 hours, at X7166975, an A Troop AH-10 received heavy .51 cal fire with negative injuries; aircraft received one (1) hit. Area was engaged with organic, ARO, and air strikes, resulting in nine (9) NVA KIA by A Troop, four (4) NVA EA by ARO, and two (2) NVA EA by Blues. The Blues also captured six (6) AK-47 rifles and destroyed seven (7) AK-47s, one (1) RPG launcher and twelve (12) RPG rounds. Documents were also captured and turned over to the 1st Brigade.

3. On 1 April 1970, several different actions were reported. In the vicinity of grid square XT1598, approximately 25 individuals were sighted and engaged resulting in 15 NVA KIA. In other actions throughout the day 5 NVA KIA were reported.

4. While conducting aerial reconnaissance on 19 March 1970 at 1430H, at YU34837, an OH-6A from Troop C, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON received .51 cal fire and engaged the area with organic weapons, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 1630H, continuing the reconnaissance mission, aircraft from Troop C spotted several more of the enemy and again engaged them with organic weapons, supported by an air strike, resulting in an additional 9 NVA killed, bringing the total to 13 enemy soldiers killed in the area.

5. While conducting aerial reconnaissance at 0745L on 12 April 1970 at X7457890, aircraft from Troop B, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON received .30 cal MG and automatic weapons fire. The suspected enemy firing positions were engaged with organic weapons, supported by artillery, ARO, and air strikes resulting in 12 enemy killed.

6. While on a visual reconnaissance, a light fire team received small arms, automatic weapons, and .51 cal MG fire from a known size enemy force. The area was engaged with organic weapons, ARO, and air strike, and a light fire team from 3d Brigade Scouts. As a result of the combined fire there were 8 NVA killed, 15 by B Troop, 4 by air, 6 by ARO, and 3 by 3d Brigade Scouts. In addition 1 crew-served weapon was destroyed and 3 secondary explosions were observed.

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(p) At 1705H on 18 April 1970, at XT597732, while occupying a
FZ in preparation for an extraction, the rifle platoon and aircraft from
Troop B, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON received heavy automatic weapons fire from
an unknown size enemy force. The enemy fire was immediately returned with
organic weapons from the ground troops and aircraft. The contact, supported
by Btry D and C, 2-20 Arty, was broken when the enemy retreated, resulting in '18
enemy soldiers killed. The Rifle Platoon was extracted at 1745H. At 1830H,
Troop B aircraft returned to the area, spotted 3 NVA soldiers and engaged
them with organic, resulting in an additional 3 enemy killed; bringing the
total to 21 enemy soldiers killed. There were no friendly casualties.

(q) While conducting aerial reconnaissances at 1720H on 22 April
1970 at YT52242, and OH-6A from Troop C, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON spotted
several individuals and engaged them with organic weapons, resulting in 6 NVA
killed. Continuing the mission in the area, the aircraft received automatic
weapons fire and sustained an unknown number of hits. The suspected enemy
firing positions were engaged with organic, supported by artillery and ARA,
resulting in an additional 6 enemy soldiers killed, bringing the total to 12
NVA killed in the area. There were no friendly casualties.

(r) A Troop on 27 April 1970, at 0923 hours at grid coordinates
XT292975; 4 individuals were sighted and engaged resulting in 4 NVA KIA. At
1240 hours at grid coordinates XT169953, an A Troop OH-6A received heavy 30
cal. and B-40 fire from 8-10 individuals. The area was engaged resulting in
6 NVA KIA. At 1805 hours at grid coordinates XT113935, an A Troop OH-6A
sighted 18 individuals wearing dark green uniforms and helmets with undetermined
weaponry. The enemy was engaged with organic and an airstrike resulting in
11 NVA KIA and 4 KIA/B. Throughout the day 11 more NVA KIA were reported with
9 NVA KIA. Total enemy casualties were 45 NVA killed.

(s) During the conduct of aerial reconnaissances'operations on
29 April 1970, an OH-6A from Troop C, 1-9 AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON, at 1435H, YU
42242, spotted a bunker complex and several trails that indicated recent
heavy use by the enemy. Continuing to check the area, the aircraft received
automatic weapons fire from several individuals and engaged them with organic,
resulting in 4 NVA killed. Returning to the area at 1620H, aircraft from
Troop C again received automatic weapons fire and engaged the suspected enemy
firing positions with organic weapons, supported by an air strike, resulting
in an additional 7 enemy soldiers killed, bringing the total to 11 NVA killed in
the area.

2. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) Operations

(1) Mission: The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery and supporting fire
units provide fire support to 1st Cavalry Division (AM) maneuver forces within
the division's assigned TIC and take necessary action to enhance GVN pacification
efforts, and to improve the effectiveness of all RVNAF elements.

(2) Special Mission: The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) con-
tinues to act as the maneuver headquarters for AO Chief and control the
defenses of the 1st Cavalry Division base camp at Phuoc Vinh, RVN.
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(3) Intelligence:

(a) Survey: The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Survey Section continued to provide fourth-order survey data to artillery battalions within the Division AOR. Control was brought into 15 new fire support bases and into one reopened base. The Division Artillery Survey Section calibrated the weapons of 14 US firing batteries and one ARVN battery. They participated in the "Dong Tan" Program by presenting a one-week training session in the operation and administration of a Survey Information Center (SIC) for two 5th ARVN Division Survey Personnel. The Survey Section also continued to provide "on call" crater analysis teams for immediate response to all stand-off attacks on Camp Gorad.

(b) Radars:

1. The Division Artillery and each of the three DS artillery battalions operated an AN/MPQ-4A counter-mortar radar during the period. In addition, 2d Field Force Artillery had one Q-4 radar detachment operating within the AOR that occupied positions at FSB's CAROLYN, SCHUYT, SONG BENG, and QUAN LOI. The radars continued to provide support in their primary mission of counter-mortar and counter-rocket location. They also continued to conduct radar registrations for all firing units located within their area.

2. Division Artillery had an AN/TPS-25 ground surveillance radar detachment assigned. The TPS-25 continued to provide coverage for the Camp Gorad area. One hundred and sixty-one hostile targets were acquired and engaged during the reporting period. In addition to providing a rapid and accurate target detection means, the TPS-25 was also used as a reliable method of verifying intelligence information produced by other target acquisition sources.

3. Division Artillery continued to have responsibility for the control and management of the Division's AN/TPS-4 & 5 ground surveillance radar sets. High priority continues to be placed on continuous radar coverage. This resulted in the Division Artillery continuing its program of "Radar Express" missions in which non-operational radars are replaced at the fire base by operational sets, insuring maximum continuous operation.

(4) Operations:

(a) Concept of Operations: Artillery Support for maneuver battalion operations consisted of Direct Support, General Support, and General Support Reinforcing (Modified) plus additional support, as required from the 22nd Artillery Group and heavy artillery support from II Field Force Artillery. Direct Support artillery was provided by the artillery battery habitually associated with the maneuver battalion. Assigned medium artillery was employed in the General Support Reinforcing role to be responsive to the calls for additional fires by the Direct Support battalions. Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) is assigned a General Support Reinforcing (Modified) role to permit the Direct Support Battalion to commit up to two sections under specific circumstances. Heavy artillery support is provided by the 6th Battalion, 27th
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Artillery and 2nd Battalion 32nd Artillery. ADA automatic weapons are also employed for fire support base/base camp defense, convoy security, and support of Special Forces/CIDG and ARVN elements.

(b) Execution:

1. Organization for Combat:
   - 2nd Bn; 19th Arty: DS 1st Bde; 1st Cavalry Division
   - 1st Bn; 77th Arty: DS 2nd Bde; 1st Cavalry Division
   - 1st Bn; 21st Arty: DS 3rd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division
   - 1st Bn; 30th Arty: GSR, 1st Cavalry Division
   - 2nd Bn, 20th Arty: GSR (Mod), 1st Cavalry Division

2. Areas of Operation: The three brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment operate in the following areas: The 1st Brigade AO is generally in Western War Zone C (Dog's Head Area). The 2nd Brigade operates north from Song Be to Cambodia to south of Dong Xoai and east to the boundary with II Corps Tactical Zone. The 3rd Brigade operates out of Quan Loi in Binh Long Province and western Phuoc Long Province. Division Artillery continues operations in AO centered around Phuoc Vinh, extending to the north of QL 13 from Chi Linh to Dong Xoai and south to the Song Be River.

(c) Operational Summary:

1. The month of February was characterized by a general decrease in enemy activity throughout the Division AO despite the enemy offensive expected in conjunction with the Tet holiday period. An operation to interdict the Jolley Road logistical network in the 2nd Brigade AO included the use of all calibers of artillery weapons. Light and medium artillery was moved rapidly from one light fire base to another, north to Bu Gia Map, 175mm and 8-inch artillery was moved forward from PAD BUTTONS by cutting trails for these self-propelled weapons. The massing of all available artillery fires, in conjunction with TAC-Air and B-52 strikes, was one of the keys to the success of the operation. Powerful TOT's were fired, employing up to 36 artillery pieces on several targets.

2. The Bu Gia Map operation continued into March. Contact picked up during this reporting period and by the end of March the 1-77th Artillery was averaging 61 rounds fired per tube per day supporting the 2nd Brigade and the ARVN Airborne. Significant artillery action developed in the Dog's Head, northwest of Tay Ninh. The enemy proved to have a great capability for massing indirect fires. This was demonstrated in attacks against PAD JAY on 29 March, PAD ILLINGSWORTH on 1 April and PAD TURNER on 16 April. (Artillery support provided during the attack on PAD JAY is described in detail in Tab 9). Thorough prior planning for the employment of all fire support assets proved invaluable in the successful defense of these fire support bases. The planning and execution of defensive fire plans, as described and demonstrated in previous Fire Support Coordination Seminars, is valid and necessary.
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<td>2nd Bn, 20th Arty</td>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>24,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Artillery Movements 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feb 70</th>
<th>Mar 70</th>
<th>Apr 70</th>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn; 19th Arty</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn; 21st Arty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn; 77th Arty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn; 30th Arty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) 2nd Bn, 20th Artillery (ABA) Employment Statistics for the Period 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970:

- Total Hours Flown: 9112.15
- Sections - Fire Missions: 1133
- Sections - CAP's: 826
- Sorties - Mortar Patrol: 335
- Sorties - Hunter/Killer: 265
- Sorties - Nighthawk: 125

(8) Tube Artillery and ABA Kills for the Period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FEBRUARY</th>
<th>MARCH</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tube</td>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Dts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Dts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Dts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Aircraft Utilization by A Battery, 32nd Artillery (ABA):

(a) During the reporting period the unit flew a total of 0034 hours. A breakdown by type mission follows:

| aircraft utilization by B battery, 32nd artillery (ABA) |
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Administration (including Radar Missions) 7532
Logistics 1161
Artillery Adjustment 318
Command and Control 665
Visual Recon 1849
Maintenance 1010
Training 236

12,853*

*Note: Some missions were dual purpose (i.e., training and logistics) and full time was credited to each. Therefore total is greater than total hours flown during the reporting period.

(b) During the reporting period, the unit flew a total of 15,483 sorties averaging 31 minutes per sortie.

(c) Summary of A/C maintenance for the reporting period:

OR: 90%
MR: 80%

11th Aviation Group (Combat) Operations:

(1) During the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970 the 11th Combat Aviation Group has provided extensive general and direct support throughout the northern portion of the III Corps Tactical Zone. Helicopters were provided in support of the First, Second, and Third Brigades. Support was also provided to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st ARVN Airborne Brigade and 9th ARVN Regiment. Aerial surveillance, target acquisition, courier service, and VIP flights were other missions flown.

(2) Support of various units listed involved participation in the following operations:

(a) Operation Kentucky Coupée which was initiated the latter part of July 1969 and is still in progress.

(b) Toan Thang III which commenced operations on 17 February 1969 and is also still in progress.

(c) In conjunction with the above operations the 11th Combat Aviation Group assisted in the opening, closing, or relocation of 50 Fire Support Bases.

(3) Laser Target Designation System. An evaluation is presently underway to determine the usefulness of the Laser Target Designation System (LTDS) which is Enroute 170. LTDS uses a laser beam to designate a target, landing - drop zone, etc. The beam may be used from an aircraft, ground vehicle or from a stationary point. This equipment, at present, is installed on a Nighthawk, three Cobras, two CAC ships and there are two hand held seekers. This equipment is undergoing a 90 day ACTIV evaluation which should terminate 25 May 1970.

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(4) During the last quarter the following support has been provided UNN Forces in conjunction with Dong Tien operations:

- CH-47: 1990.7 hours
- AB-12: 771.6 hours
- UH-1H: 5579.1 hours

(5) Tactical Units of the 11th CAG are deployed as follows:

- Phuoc Vinh: 11th Combat Avn Cp, 11th GS Company, 227th A&H (-), 228th A&H (-)
- Tay Ninh: 229th A&H (+)
- Da Nang: Co D, Co B, 229th A&H
- Bear Cat: Co A, Co B, 228th A&H
- Lai Khe: Co A, Co D, 227th A&H

i. 8th Engineer Battalion Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the majority of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in operation Toan Thang III. The battalion, being involved in operations for 89 days during the period, constructed or reopened sixty-seven (67) fire support bases (FSB's) for the division, upgraded nine (9) other FSB's which were controlled by the division and dismantled sixty-three (63) FSB's which were no longer required for tactical operations. Non-divisional engineer effort in the division area of operations was mainly directed toward upgrading roads and airfields at Thien Ngon, and Toan Shan, along with the facilities at Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi, An Loc, and Song Be. This effort by non-divisional engineer units was coordinated by the 8th Engineer Battalion and has been significant in enabling the 8th Engineer Battalion to devote the majority of its time to direct combat support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(2) Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period. The equipment platoons were involved in several construction and maintenance projects in the division area of operations. During the months of February, March, and April HHC was involved extensively in the construction and upgrading of all weather airstrips in the 1st Team Area of Operations. At FSB Elaine, a C-7A type I airfield was constructed. HHC then moved to Thien Ngon to upgrade the airstrip there to a C-130 type II. While a maintenance crew continued to work on the airstrip at Thien Ngon the rest of the company went to Bu Gia Map for the construction of a Type I C-130 airfield. While constructing these airfields HHC also provided the line companies with equipment support for the construction and upgrade of FSB's in the 1st Teams Area of Operations and at the same time maintained and upgraded vital road networks and drainage systems throughout AO Chief. A total of 1085 CH-54 and CH-47 sorties along with 86 fixed wing sorties were required to move airborne engineer equipment and material throughout the division area of operation in support of wide spread construction efforts. At Camp Gorvad, engineer equipment and personnel maintained existing road and drainage system.

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The divisional water points, operated by HHC personnel, produced 2,542,689 gallons of potable water.

(3) Company A remained in direct support of the 1st Brigade with its base camp at Tay Ninh. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to support the infantry. A major portion of Company's effort during this reporting period was directed toward the minesweep teams provided to the infantry. As a result of these minesweep and mine clearing operations, 62 M-14, 70 M-16, 1-34 1b mines, and 6-23 1b mines were found. A Company also constructed 21 PEB's and aided HHC in the upgrading of the Thien Ngon airstrip.

(4) Company B remained in direct support of the 2nd Brigade with its base camp at Song Be. Company B during this period was involved in the construction and improvement of U.S. PEB's Elaine, Candy, Audie, Jewel, Snuffy, Marisa, Nguyen Toc (Lolita), Margaret, Hoa Vuong (Song), and Le Loi (Loa). In addition to these operations it was involved in the build-up of PEB Button to include the construction of HHC around the MAP; a radar tower, the NLS station, a civilian air terminal, and technical assistance on numerous other engineering tasks. Direct combat support also included daily minesweep and demolition support to infantry units in the field.

(5) Company C remained in direct support of the 3rd Brigade with its base camp at Quan Loi. Minesweep and demolition support were provided to the infantry on an as required basis. The construction, rehabilitation, and closing of fire support bases in the 3rd Brigade Area of Operation was the Company's main concern during this period. New fire support bases were constructed at King, Dragoon, Phi Na (Arm), Frances, and Jamie. Other construction in support of the Brigade was furnished on an as required basis and included upgrading the Quan Loi Greenline, a bunker for 15th Medical Battalion, and the upgrade of QL-15.

J. 13th Signal Battalion Operations

(1) During this period, the 13th Signal Battalion continued to provide communications in support of Operation Kentucky Cougar and the 1st Cavalry Division's mission of interdicting enemy infiltration routes through Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long and Dien Bien Province and the neutralization of enemy forces operating within the area. Significant signal highlights include:

(a) The 13th Signal Battalion on 1 Feb in reaction to the approach of Tet, established a secure relay on Nui Ba Den for the 1st Brigade. In addition, two non-secure relays, which could go secure if necessary, were established on Nui Ba Den and Nui Ba Ra. These relays could be activated in the event of increased traffic loads on the Division primary nets of be used to contact maneuver battalions experiencing communications difficulties.

(b) The 11th Aviation Group needed to pass POL information to Duong Thong on 4 February, but had no means to do so. To assist the 11th Aviation Group, the 13th Signal Battalion's command net on Nui Ba Ra started relaying the information. This alleviated the establishment of another relay on Nui Ba Ra.

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(c) The Phuoc Vinh MARS station had been experiencing transmission and reception interference with the electromagnetic radiation around the AB-216 located in the signal complex. To overcome the problem, the station was moved to an area near the 13th Signal Battalion Headquarters on 6 Feb 70. In this new location, the number of MARS calls and the quality of voice phone patches have greatly increased.

(d) On 9 Feb 70, the 13th Signal Battalion took over operations of the 1-9th Cav's secure relay on Nui Ba Den. This alleviated the problem of living space on this major relay point and enhanced the operation of the 1-9th Cav's relay capabilities.

(e) To provide units standing down at the Bien Hoa VIP Center with a MARS capability, a new MARS station was opened and started passing phone patches to the States on 10 Feb 70. This station passes over 200 calls a week and has received many favorable comments from the Commanding General and his staff.

(f) On 13 February 1970, the new 13th Signal Battalion Complex at Phuoc Vinh was officially dedicated by BG R.M. Shoemaker, assistant division commander - B. This bunker complex provides greater physical protection for the vital communications supporting the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters.

(g) To increase radio operator proficiency and knowledge of enemy initiated jamming, the 101st Radio Research Unit conducted classes on 15 Feb 70, for the 13th Signal Battalion's Radio Platoon. Radio operators were trained for a week on enemy imitative communication deception.

(h) On 4 March radio equipment and personnel were airlifted to Nui Chau Chan (Hill 837) to test reliability of communications between Phuoc Vinh and Binh Tuy Province. Radio frequencies, equipment and several areas were tested for a four day period. The results of these tests proved that excellent communications could be established between Phuoc Vinh and Binh Tuy Provinces by using Nui Chau Chan mountain as a major relay.

(i) On 6 March at 0001 hours, the entire 1st Cavalry Division's SOI was changed. This was the first time in over four years that units throughout the Division changed call-signs and frequencies. As a result of MTO training on the new SOI, no major communications problems or security violations occurred. It is recommended that staff officers and communications personnel continue to be trained on call-signs and frequencies prior to implementation of future SOI items.

(j) To provide a MARS capability below Brigade level, a radio relay terminal, AN/GRC-163 was airlifted to FSB Granite on 11 March. A four channel communications system was established between FSB Granite and the 3rd Brigade Headquarters at Quan Loi. Over this system, troops at FSB Granite were able to place MARS' phone calls to the United States through Quan Loi MARS station. In the future, this radio equipment will be moved to other FSB's throughout the 1st Cavalry Division and function as a mobile MARS station for the troops in the field.
The withdrawal of the 1st Infantry Division and the reduction of area communications systems into Lai Khe seriously limited lines of communications between the 1st Cavalry Division at Phuoc Vinh and the 5th ARVN Division at Lai Khe. In addition, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division's 227th Aviation Battalion located at Lai Khe had difficulty communicating with its parent unit, the 11th Aviation Group located at Phuoc Vinh. To alleviate these communications difficulties, a four channel voice system was established between Phuoc Vinh and Lai Khe on 17 March by equipment and personnel from the 13th Signal Battalion. Channelization for this system included: one hotline from the 1st Cavalry Division TOC to the 5th ARVN TOC, one common user trunk from the Skyking switchboard to the Lai Khe switchboard, two telephone lines from the 227th at Lai Khe to the 11th Aviation Group at Phuoc Vinh.

The mobile MARS radio terminal equipment located at FSB Granite was airlifted to FSB Compton on 25 March. A four channel system was established between FSB Compton and Quan Loi. Over this system, troops located at FSB Compton were able to make phone patches to the United States and Hawaii through the Quan Loi MARS station.

During the month of March, the 1st Cavalry Division's five MARS stations completed a record Division high of 3560 MARS calls for the Skytroopers. The previous Division record was 2436 calls, which occurred in February 1970. The breakdown of MARS calls per station was as follows: Bien Hoa 1089, Phuoc Vinh 1002, Quan Loi 598, FSB Buttons 552, and Tay Ninh 317.

Following a heavy enemy indirect fire attack and ground probe, the 13th Signal Battalion airlifted FM radio equipment and antennas to help reestablish communications at FSB Illingsworth on 1 April.

The four channel VHF system between Quan Loi and FSB Compton was terminated and the equipment and personnel were airlifted back to Phuoc Vinh on 11 April.

During this reporting period, the 13th Signal Battalion also provided:

- FM radio terminations in all Division and field force nets (for the Division Headquarters) and Support Command Headquarters.
- AM high frequency SSB terminations in all Division nets for Division Headquarters and the Support Command Headquarters.
- Four channel VHF systems to the 1st and 3rd Brigade Headquarters and a twelve channel VHF system to the 2nd Brigade Headquarters.
- Switchboard and wire installation service for the Division Headquarters and Support Command.
- Message Center and courier service for the Division Headquarters and Support Command.
- Direct support crypto maintenance support for the Division.
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k. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the reporting period. The regiment conducted operations in northern and western Binh Long Province, along the Saigon River, and in eastern War Zone C. The regiment continued to provide security for convoys and for Rome Plow land clearing operations in the Division's AO. At the close of the reporting period, the 11th ACR was operating with all three of its organic squadrons. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment prepares and submits a separate CRCL.

1. Division Cumulative Results: Results of operations from 1 February 1970 through 30 April are as follows:

   (1) Enemy: 3047 KIA, 42 Pk, 42 Roc Chanh, 114 crew-served weapons captured, 763 individual weapons captured, 617 large caliber rounds captured, 652,248 small caliber rounds captured, and 262 tons of rice captured.

   (2) US: 172 KIA, 1250 WIA (of which 640 required medical evacuation), 9 OH-6A destroyed, 5 OH-1H destroyed, 1 M110 (8" SP) destroyed, and 1 5-ton truck destroyed.
Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Stabilizing the Number of Personnel in the Unit to Maintain Efficiency.

(a) OBSERVATION: In company Tech Supply, requisitions and issuing of parts were delayed in many instances because the military personnel working in Tech Supply were committed on guard duty or training as their company schedule prescribed it.

(b) EVALUATION: With an insufficient number of personnel in Tech Supply to replace those that were committed to other duties, the unit was hindered in performing its mission of supplying the 1st Cavalry Division with aircraft parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In order to increase effectiveness of Tech Supply personnel, it was recommended to staff the Issuing Section, and Packing & Crating Section with civilian, as they lend an amount of stability that is needed to accomplish the mission supplying aircraft parts to 1st Cavalry Division (A&M). A realignment of civilian personnel within the 15th Trans Bn (A&F M&S) enabled Alpha Company to gain six additional civilian workers without loss of effectiveness in aircraft maintenance.

(2) Infusion Policies.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the redeployment of different units throughout the Republic, there is becoming an abundance of Scout Dog Platoons. There still remains an abundant amount of replacements arriving monthly from Ft. Benning, Ga.

(b) EVALUATION: At the close of the conflict here in Vietnam, the Scout Dog Program will be one of the first to suffer, i.e. the training of handlers and dogs will come to a standstill as was exemplified at the close of World War II.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that as units are being redeployed from Vietnam, Scout Dog Platoons also be redeployed, instead of deactivated. Plans should be drawn up to include one Scout Dog Platoon with every Infantry Brigade, or as a minimum, one per division. If Scout Dog Platoons were attached to units throughout the world, there would not be the absence of dog teams that there was at the end of World War II and the Korean Conflict.

(3) Enlisted Records.

(a) OBSERVATION: DD Forms 268 (Suspension of Favorable
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Personnel Actions) were not being prepared accurately. Timely initiation, proper control, and terminating actions were nonexistent prior to 18 Jan 70.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found that unit clerks within the large FIRST TEAM AO had insufficient data to properly prepare the DD Forms 268. The forms were received late, improperly prepared, or not received at all. Increased contact with the units failed to improve the situation. With the concurrence of the commanders the Adjutant General Section assumed the responsibility for preparing all 268's on enlisted personnel. Enlisted Records Branch receives a written or telephonic request from a unit requesting an individual be flagged; this system has proven very effective and insures timely and accurate initiation, control, transfer, or termination of the DD Forms 268 on enlisted personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The present system be continued and adapted in other units where problems are being experienced.

(4) Timely Strength Information.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Morning Report preparation was being accomplished the day following the closeout date of the morning report. This caused the strength figures to be delayed 24 to 36 hours.

(b) EVALUATION: It was determined that a more timely strength accountability system was required. The Morning Report Unit started operating from 1800 hours to 0800 hours daily. This new operation resulted in the receipt of strength figures from 6 to 8 hours following closeout of the morning report day.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: Regarding more accurate strength accountability the new working hours have proven highly successful. In a combat zone timely strength figures are of the utmost importance. This system provides the needed information in the shortest possible time.

(5) Officers Records.

(a) OBSERVATION: There continues to be an unreasonable number of Officer Efficiency Reports past both 1st Cav and DA suspense.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem of overdue OERs has been recurring in this division for many months. This office had undertaken a program of calling senior commanders to provide lists of overdue OERs as well as listings of those OERs that could go overdue in the next week so that special emphasis could be placed on getting the OERs in on time. This program met with fair success and is being continued. Numerous command letters have been prepared, the latest dated 16 March 1970, stressing the need for prompt submission of the OERs and the adverse
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Effect that a late submission can have on the career officer. The latest innovation established in the use of a courier system 3 times weekly to go to the Brigade HQs, 11th Group, and DIVARTY to pick up and distribute OERs. While the program is still in its infancy, favorable results have been noted. All of the major commands have expressed an interest in this system. Additionally, an officer takes the place of the courier on Saturdays and makes the circuit in order to provide general AG assistance to the major commands.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all commanders continue to stress to their officers the need for prompt submission of OERs. Continued emphasis should be placed on the courier system and every effort made to use it.

(6) Reenlistment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Doubts have been expressed concerning the quality of first term enlists/reenlistees in the Division.

(b) EVALUATION: A detailed survey of such personnel was conducted, covering the month of October 1969, when the Division achieved the highest number of such reenlistments in our history. One hundred ten of these personnel are still in the Division of a total of 147 reenlisted in October. Statistical data relating to the 110 personnel follows:

1. Average time in the field at time of reenlistment. 3.7 months
2. Number promoted since reenlistment 73
3. Average scores on Army Classification Battery 113
4. Average years education 11.5 years
5. Number of short term AWOLs since reenlistment 8
6. Number dropped from rolls 1

The survey failed to reveal that a single one of the reenlistees from October was disposed of under AR 635-212. Additionally, a survey of a major subordinate command of the Division (a recipient of many reenlistees) reveals that of the last 36 AR 635-212 cases in that command only four involved personnel who had reenlisted since arriving in the Division. The above evaluation indicates that the enlisted personnel who are attracted to reenlist while in the Division are, as a group, of a higher quality than the Army average and the overall Division average in every category measured.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that commanders and Command Sergeants Major be made aware of the quality of Troopers being retained and the success of the program to retain only the best and that every effort be exerted to support the reenlistment program.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Timely Reaction to the Usually Reliable Source (URS).

(a) OBSERVATION: The timely deployment of ground forces in response to usually reliable source information has resulted in establishing contact with enemy forces and has produced significant tactical successes.

(b) EVALUATION: The nature of URS information precludes determining the exact location of the enemy force. It does, however, provide valid information reflecting a general area of likely enemy presence. Therefore, this data must be complemented with other pertinent intelligence to arrive at probable enemy locations. Upon receipt of the URS, recent enemy activity in close proximity to the report is quickly but thoroughly analyzed with emphasis directed toward location of known base areas, bunker complexes, and recent trail activity. A map and visual reconnaissance of the suspected enemy location is immediately conducted by Hunter-Killer Teams. Particular attention is directed to available water sources in the area, as the enemy frequently established bases within easy access of a water source. Triple canopy jungle which protrudes above the surrounding vegetation may offer additional clues to the enemy location. Triple canopy jungle serves to obscure low vegetation which allows more freedom of movement and provides a concealed and relatively comfortable area for use as a base camp. A low level visual reconnaissance allows the sense of smell to be applied. In an area recently used by the enemy, an odor discernible to westerners often provides the air. Following the visual reconnaissance, most likely areas of enemy activity are selected and ground troops are air assaulted into the suspected enemy locations. The key to a successful exploitation of URS activity is the rapid analysis of intelligence, reconnaissance for likely locations, and timely follow-up by ground forces, where feasible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units establish SCG reaction to URS activity, to include commitment of ground forces. Upon receipt of a URS, units should complement this information with a rapid but thorough analysis of all available pertinent intelligence to identify probable locations for selections of the most likely target area, and deploy ground forces when the situation permits. If ground forces are not available, response with TAC AIR, artillery, and ARA is appropriate.

(2) Chemical Essential Elements of Information (EEI).

(a) OBSERVATION: In many cases the effects of CS and herb-

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(1) EVALUATION: Chemical EEl regarding CS, defoliation, and herbicide operations have provided valuable feed-back. On 16 February 1970, Hoang Van Mao, an NVA captured by A/1-5 Cav stated that his group was forced to detour around a CS area. POWs and Hoi Chan's have stated on numerous occasions that their garden plots were destroyed by defoliation operations. Important information was gained for future targets by interrogation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Interrogators continue to implement the chemical EEl and provide rapid feed-back to chemical personnel.

(3) Location of Suspect Enemy Firing Positions.

(a) OBSERVATION: During stand off attacks, a rapid means of locating suspect enemy firing positions is needed.

(b) EVALUATION: An expedient device consisting of a transparent disc with various enemy weapon range circles and azimuth rays plotted provides this rapid means. By going out the back azimuth of the incoming to the estimated range of the suspect type weapon, rapid grids for shifts from quick fire targets become available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other artillery units consider this technique to rapidly acquire suspect enemy firing locations.

(4) Crater Analysis.

(a) OBSERVATION: Angle of fall computations vary considerably in range when compared to the radar acquired grids computed for the 120mm mortar.

(b) EVALUATION: The range computed from angle of fall tables for the 120mm is consistently greater than that resulting from radar acquired grids for the same projectile.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the angle of fall tables for the 120mm mortar be evaluated and, if a variation exists when compared to data from the M64A1 radar, that a correction factor be computed and disseminated to all units employing these tables.

c. Operations,

(1) Dust Problems during Attacks on Fire Support Base.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the attack on Fire Support Base
ILLINGSWORTH on 1 April 1970 an excessive amount of dust, caused by the intense volume of large calibre rockets and mortar fire restricted observation to the point that defenders manning the berm could not see each other or the advancing enemy. Furthermore, the dust condition was of such a magnitude that normal breathing was extremely difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: The problem of dust being thrown up by incoming rounds on fire support bases in dry weather obscures vision to a significant degree and makes the defense of the fire support base more difficult. Night vision devices are rendered unusable during these conditions and adjustment of supporting fires becomes very difficult. The restriction on observation and normal breathing has a substantial psychological effect on the defending soldiers, causing confusion and disorganization. This in no way implies that the non on Fire Support Base ILLINGSWORTH during the attack did not perform in a magnificent manner.

(o) RECOMMENDATION: Employment of defensive fires based on sectors and primary direction using the old stake and marker method. Additionally, newly assigned personnel should be instructed in techniques of fighting during periods of reduced visibility and prepared for the effects of the dust.

(2) ARC LIGHT Aborts.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 1 April 1970 an ARC LIGHT was aborted because of friendly troops being within minimum safe distance.

(b) EVALUATION: The planned movement of friendly troops to a safe distance was conducted with a tight time schedule. The flight leader was unable to contact the aerial rocket artillery section that was tasked to support the troop lift. As a result a total of 47 minutes of lift ship fuel was expended while these two flight leaders attempted to establish radio communication causing an unplanned refuel stop. The time lost caused enough delay in extracting friendly troops to abort the ARC LIGHT.

(o) RECOMMENDATION: Extraction wherever possible, be made the day prior to delivery of an ARC LIGHT. Greater emphasis and indoctrination should also be given to the utilization of all modes of aviation communications, i.e., FM, UHF, VHF, and Guard.

(3) Use of Abatis System to Impede Movement.

(c) OBSERVATION: During the past 3 months, 3rd Brigade units operating on the Senges Jungle Highway have utilized an abatis system designed to impede movement along established trails and along the Song Be River.

(b) EVALUATION: This technique consists of cutting and felling trees across major land routes and water crossings. As friendly
units return to the area of concern, the abatis are checked for signs of disturbance. If the abatis has been disturbed, it is generally an indication of renewed movement along that particular route. Experience has proven that if the enemy intends major movement, he will remove the trees rather than construct a new section of trail or detour around the obstruction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units engaged in interdiction operations along major trail networks and waterways employ abatis at key locations to interdict main force movement and provide indicators of recent enemy movement.

(4) Combined Operations with Armored Cavalry Units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recently conducted combined operations with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment have reaffirmed the tactical advantages of the armored infantry combined force. The airmobile battalion and the armored cavalry squadron form a powerful, mutually complementary force. Certain unique planning considerations must be taken into account, however, in operations involving mounted/dismounted forces.

(b) EVALUATION: The cross attachment of armor and infantry provides the infantry with the advantage of responsive reinforcement. Reinforcement planning, however, must consider the terrain limitations imposed by natural and manmade obstacles. Additionally, the extensive use of the ACLV mounted 50 calibre machine gun by the armored cavalry requires detailed fire coordination during link-up operations. The use of smoke is essential. Similarly, when conducting a sweep of a contact area, in densely vegetated terrain, the armored cavalry and the infantry should advance on the same axis, providing mutual security and ease of fire control. Other methods of operation risk misidentification of the infantry in heavily vegetated or close terrain and may result in friendly forces being exposed to friendly fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When the terrain and tactical situation permit, joint operations with armored cavalry units should be encouraged, with consideration in planning directed towards increased fire coordination requirements.

(5) Field Expedient Method of Making a Highly Directional Strobe Light.

(a) OBSERVATION: The flash of a strobe light can reveal friendly locations to nearby enemy ground elements. By placing the strobe light inside an open-ended 81mm mortar canister, smoke grenade canister, or other expedient shielding device, the illumination beam is uni-directional. The light can be seen only by individuals toward whom the canister is pointed, thus providing an excellent ground-to-air signal device which will not compromise friendly positions.
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(b) EVALUATION: This technique has been used with excellent results to direct Shadow, Nightsting, and INFANT. However, care must be taken to accurately track the orbiting aircraft to insure the light remains visible, as the uni-directional shielding will mask the light if the target is not properly tracked.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a standard uni-directional shielding device be incorporated in the current strobe light system as a detachable component.

(6) Use of the Air Force OV-10 as a Cover Aircraft for the OH-6A in the Hunter-Killer Team Role.

(c) OBSERVATION: The standard Hunter-Killer Team, the OH-6A (LOH) and AH-1G (Cobra), an extremely valuable visual reconnaissance asset, assists ground forces in reestablishing contact and identifying enemy locations for artillery and airstrikes. The Table of Organization and Equipment of the Brigade Aviation Platoon provides for eight OH-6A (LOH) scout aircraft but no AH-1G (Cobra) aircraft. As a result, brigades must depend upon Divisional aircraft support for necessary Cobra coverage for scout aircraft. Some difficulty has been experienced in this regard, owing to non-availability of cover aircraft, resulting in less than maximum utilization of organic scout assets. In conjunction with the 3rd Brigade ALQ, a mutually satisfactory expedient technique has been developed utilizing the USAF OV-10 aircraft for cover.

(b) EVALUATION: Those FAC aircraft (OV-10) fly continuous visual reconnaissance of the brigade area of operations as normal procedure. Organic scout aircraft fly low level reconnaissance while the OV-10 aircraft provides cover. Although not as heavily armed as the AH-1G, the OV-10 is equipped with adequate armament to provide the necessary firepower for this mission. Further, when suitable targets are identified for airstrikes, request for and delivery of ordnance by USAF high performance aircraft is expedited. By combining the organic reconnaissance assets of the brigade with those of the USAF in a mutually supporting team, the brigade has increased its visual reconnaissance capability significantly, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of both FAC and scout operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the USAF OV-10 be utilized as an interim cover aircraft for the OH-6A during scouting missions when the AH-1G (Cobra) helicopter is not available.

(7) Smoke Grenade.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units in contact must frequently provide continuous smoke over extended periods while marking their locations for supporting ARA, airstrikes, and command and control helicopters. Re-supply of smoke during a contact is not always feasible or possible, imposing a requirement for ground units to carry excessive mounts of smoke.
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smoke.

(b) EVALUATION: The smoke grenade currently in use does not provide adequate smoke for prolonged marking missions. Neither is the selection of colors adequate, for the following reasons:

1. Red generally indicates enemy locations or danger.

2. White is currently used by the USAF FAC's to mark enemy locations or danger.

3. Green and purple are not clearly visible from the air in jungle terrain. Yellow is the only currently available color which is easily identifiable. However, the limited dispensing capability of the grenade requires that excessive amounts be used if marking is required for a prolonged period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a hand fired smoke/dye round be developed that would penetrate jungle canopy, explode, and emit smoke that would, in turn, dye foliage. The dye marking should not be permanent, but should have a planned persistency of 4-8 hours. Brighter colors, to include international orange, should be included in the smoke inventory.

(6) Complacency among aircrews.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period there were a number of lulls in enemy activity throughout the Division's AO. This reduction in activity was observed to cause a complacent attitude, particularly among scout aircrews.

(b) EVALUATION: Crews with this attitude, especially relatively inexperienced crews, of which there are a great number currently, tend to take unnecessary chances and underrated enemy capabilities. As a result, a number of personnel on these crews have been wounded and aircraft damaged when the enemy decided to respond.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During periods of reduced enemy activity, pilots and crews be forcefully reminded to maintain an alert and aggressive disposition to resist complacency toward the enemy. Pilot and crew training be intensified with emphasis placed on proper visual reconnaissance procedures.

(9) Coordination Between Gunships and Ground Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting there have been several cases of confusion arising from insufficient coordination of fires between aircrews and ground commanders.

(b) EVALUATION: Insufficient coordination has resulted in
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ground troops firing in the direction of LOH's using reconnaissance by fire techniques assuming the LOH fire to be of hostile origin. By the same token, LOH's have returned the fire of friendly elements. The possibility of casualties from such cases of shooting first and asking questions later are obvious. Scout aircraft, like ground troops, respond immediately and directionally to the sound of fire.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: Ground troops should be trained to keep scout aircraft constantly informed of their location and intentions, particularly in regard to use of reconnaissance by fire. Every means of coordination and notification should be employed between ground commanders and aircrews, to include smoke marking of perimeters. Coordination must be complete, continuous and reciprocal.

(i) Employment of Scout Dog Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the biggest problems that a Scout Dog Platoon faces is that of proper utilization. Time after time a team is sent to a unit that either did not request him or has no use for the team once he gets there. There have also been instances when a team was requested simply to have another rifle, or a body guard for the unit commander.

(b) EVALUATION: The improper utilization of a Scout Dog Team does not only hurt the team, but all of the units he supports. When "X" number teams are out in the field being improperly utilized, the units that want and could use the team effectively are being denied the opportunity to do so.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all commanding "Small Unit Commanders" be fully indoctrinated as to the proper utilization of Scout Dogs. It is also recommended that the small unit commander in the field be the one to request a Scout Dog Team instead of the Battalion or Brigade taking it upon themselves to request teams for units that do not want them, or could not properly employ them due to terrain and other factors even if they did want them.

(ii) Fabrication of a Herbicide Spray Rig to Facilitate Fast Coverage of Hostile Terrain.

(a) OBSERVATION: Gravity flow spray rigs necessitate extended low level, reduced speed flight over hostile terrain. A minimum of 20 minutes is required to dispense 110 gallons of herbicide over 39 acres flying at less than 40 knots.

(b) EVALUATION: A spray rig utilizing the bilge pump from an M13 APC to pump the herbicide out of the spray tank into the spray bar, can effectively dispense 110 gallons in about five minutes. This rig is shown in Figure 1. The pump is electrically operated and the spray
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The mission can be flown with less time on station and at a faster air speed, thus decreasing risk of ground to air fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This type spray rig should be employed over heavy risk areas.

Figure 1: Bilge Pump Spray Rig Schematic:

1. 190 gallon fiber glass tank
2. M13 APC Bilge Pump
3. Main tank valve
4. Spray bar control valve
5. Quick disconnect coupling
6. 1" Sprag bar
7. Power cord to 28 volt helicopter auxiliary outlet
8. Spray tank mount
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(12) Fire Base Markers.

(a) OBSERVATION: All gun sections should be aware of the direction to all fire bases within range of their howitzers.

(b) EVALUATION: As an added safety measure to alert gun crews of the direction to nearby fire bases, a marker can be placed along the parapet physically denoting these directions. An added feature is to paint charges capable of reaching the base on the marker.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a device of this nature be employed by all artillery units whenever in range of other fire bases.

(13) Supplementary Positions for Direct Fire.

(a) OBSERVATION: At many fire bases, the direct fire capability of the 105mm howitzer is reduced by obstructions, high masks and the location of parapets.

(b) EVALUATION: Early consideration of supplementary positions will allow for maximum utilization of the direct fire capability. Speed of occupation can be enhanced by emplacing an extra base plate in this supplementary position.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units consider this tactic to increase their own direct fire capability.

(14) Air Warning Data.

(a) OBSERVATION: Valuable time may be lost from errors in changing deflection in miles to azimuth in degrees for air advisories.

(b) EVALUATION: By inscribing azimuth in degrees on the periphery of the check chart, an immediate air advisory is available for the adjacent AWCC and each battery is provided with a double check.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be adopted for use in other direct support technical fire direction centers.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training.

(1) Refresher Training for Squad Leaders in Adjusting Artillery and Aerial Rocket Artillery Fire.

(a) OBSERVATION: Squad leaders should possess the ability to accurately and safely adjust indirect-fire and aerial rocket artillery in order to effectively conduct squad level independent operations.
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(b) EVALUATION: Given sufficient training and practice, the average squad leader is capable of adjusting indirect fire and ARA in close support of his unit. One method used to insure squad leaders maintain proficiency in PO procedures is to assign squad leaders to train with the company forward observer each evening while in night defensive position (NDF). The company forward observer requires the squad leader to adjust the defensive fires surrounding the company NDF. The squad leader senses each round and makes the necessary corrections. The forward observer then requests the missions by radio, insuring that only safe corrections are actually requested.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units consider the above technique in training junior leaders in the methods of adjusting indirect fires.

(2) More Suitable Trainings for Handlers and Scout Dogs.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Some training received by handlers in CONUS schools is not relevant to the actual situation in RVN and the handler has to be retrained and sometimes cured of bad habits. Presently there is not enough night training being conducted and handlers are arriving in RVN almost totally ignorant of the concept of night utilization of their dogs. Not enough live fire training is being conducted to prepare handlers for the reaction of dogs to live fire and artificial illumination. Since the dogs used in CONUS are eventually sent to RVN this would enable them to adjust early and enable the instructors to weed out the ones who could not adjust. The present method of procuring handlers is inadequate. The present system acquires non-volunteers from among drop-outs of other service schools. This results many times in individuals who are far from being highly motivated. It also has the added disadvantage of training a man from twelve to sixteen weeks and only have him serve six to eight months in his MOS.

(b) EVALUATIONS: Training is not being conducted on a parallel with what the handler will be confronted with once he reaches RVN. Many times handlers have been taught exactly opposite from what they should be i.e. that there are very few booby traps. Even though this may be true in some areas, training should be conducted that will prepare the handler regardless of the AO he is finally assigned to. Many times because of short tours, full use is not being made of individuals in respect to the amount of training they have received.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: A closer coordination should be maintained between CONUS training centers and platoons within RVN in order to conduct a more realistic training program. More time should be spent in night training and live fire exercise. A program should be instituted to gain personnel who will have an adequate amount of time remaining in the service upon completion of their training. Thought should be given to introducing more highly motivated and career oriented NCO’s and junior officers into the program to provide a source of
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trained personnel for use in future platoons and as instructors. Presently the junior officers and NCO's have a very high turnover and there are only a few career oriented senior NCO's who remain with a scout dog unit for any length of time. One answer to this might be to set up a career program for NCO's similar to that of Drill Instructors and opportunities for advancement and stabilized tours.
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1. Logistics.

(1) Ammunition Storage on Fire Bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the attack on fire support base ILLINGWORTH on 1 April 1970 the 8" howitzer ammunition dump exploded killing and wounding a number of individuals and destroying two M548 full-tracked ammunition carriers and one 8" self-propelled howitzer.

(b) EVALUATION: The ammunition was stored in a centralised ammunition dump above ground level. Additionally, the projectiles, canisters and powder bags were stored together. There was also an excessive amount of ammunition on hand because of the intensive enemy activity in the area and the fact that for a period of three days only one of the two 8" howitzers was operable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All ammunition stored on fire support bases be stored underground with at least three layers of sandbags as overhead cover. Ammunition be stored in several small ammunition dumps rather than one large dump. Powder bags and projectiles be stored separately, or as a minimum, in separate compartments within the storage dump.

(2) Combined Operations to Upgrade Regional Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combined Operations with Regional Forces revealed that some units are improperly supported by the RF logistical system.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience in conducting combined operations with regional forces (RF) units has been that the RF units properly supplied by their own logistics system, will function in a more professional manner than those units which depart for the operation improperly supplied and then rely on US logistical assistance. The RF unit properly equipped displays confidence and aggressiveness in accomplishment of assigned missions. The improperly supplied units are more interested in US supplies than in accomplishment of assigned missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During coordination phase of a combined UE/RF operation, emphasis must be placed on the RF unit commander to ensure his logistical system issues the initial supply and continues the resupply functions until the termination of the operation.

(3) Conservation of sling, nylon, air delivery and sling, cargo, air delivery, nylon.

(a) OBSERVATION: ARVN units are not issued the sling, cargo, air delivery and other air items.

(b) EVALUATION: The "Red Hats" of Aerial Equipment Support
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(AES) Company, located in the Song Be and Tay Ninh areas, support the ARVN Airborne Division to a great extent. The ARVN units have no slings or nets and when aerial delivery equipment is issued to ARVN units, this equipment, in most cases, is not retrograded back to the point of issue. It would assist the AES Company if the ARVN's were included as using units for slings, nets, and other air items. If such were the case, the AES Company would include the ARVN's for periodic inspections, to include marking of their equipment.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That ARVN units be authorized a basic issue of slings, nets and other air items.

(4) NORS Procedures for Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: During this quarter the 1st Cav Div attained the highest MR/OR rates while flying the highest number of hours in its history. All levels of maintenance have been able to support these standards. A key to maintaining and attaining these standards is intensive management of the NORS (not operationally ready for reasons of supply) rate.

(b) EVALUATION: During this period of time intensive management was applied to insure that every effort possible was applied to insure that aircraft were not held down for lack of parts. Measures were established to provide complete lateral search within the division as well as outside the division. A system was set up to provide rapid reporting of aircraft that were NORS for parts. This identified the specific parts problem which in turn permitted effective search for the parts required. Additionally, a policy was established which required that once a NORS part arrived at the AMIC depot it was moved without delay to the aircraft down for parts. Organic transportation to include C-47 aircraft, if necessary, was utilized to insure that NORS parts were not delayed for transportation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That NORS management become a major item of command interest at all levels. Ingenuity and use of organic resources can greatly reduce the number of aircraft that are NORS which in turn will improve availability.

g. Communications.

(1) Volume Control for AN/ARC-77/KY-38 Configuration.

(a) OBSERVATION: When using the AN/ARC-77/KY-38 combination for fixed station secure radio communications, the audio output level may be insufficient to be heard over normal background noise.

(b) EVALUATION: Incoming calls over the secure radio system described above are often not heard because the volume obtainable through
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The normal speaker system is relatively low. Neither is it practical to monitor the equipment for prolonged periods by holding the handset to the ear.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: By using the AN/GRA-39 radio control unit, it is possible to provide sufficient amplification of the output signal to eliminate this problem. The local unit of the GRA-39 is connected to the audio jack of the KY-38 and then connected to the remote unit. The remote's amplifier and speaker will provide adequate volume.

(2) Communications problems on FM-secure mode.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period there have been several cases of lost communications or interference noted in the Air Cav Squadron, particularly while operating in the FM secure mode. Following these breaks, it was extremely difficult to reestablish secure communications.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been determined that these cases of lost communications arise from two principal causes. The first is improper heat dissipation in the KY-36 secure voice communications unit, which causes an electrical malfunction in the unit itself. The second primary cause is another station transmitting non-secure on the same frequency as the secure stations, which produces interference in the secure mode.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that if adequate ventilation does not exist to dissipate heat generated by the KY-36, a fan be positioned to provide direct cooling of the unit. This should prevent malfunctions due to overheating. If interference is present, recommend disconnecting the KY-36 and establishing non-secure communications. This serves two functions. First, disconnecting the KY-36 will aid in isolating a possible cause for the loss of communications (i.e., the radio set itself). Second, in the non-secure mode it will be possible to monitor and perhaps identify any station which may be operating on the same frequency.

(3) Forward Observer Communications.

(a) OBSERVATION: The increased frequency of platoon operations has complicated the communications requirements of the forward observer party.

(b) EVALUATION: By authorizing an additional PRC-77 to each observer party, the recon sergeant can maintain artillery communications without disrupting the company command net for artillery transmissions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each FO section be authorized two PRC-77 radios.
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(4) Location of RO-292's on PB1's.

(a) OBSERVATION: RO-292 antennas located in close proximity to one another are vulnerable to destruction by one enemy round.

(b) EVALUATION: By locating the infantry TOC and artillery FDO at least 50 meters apart, this vulnerability is greatly negated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units occupying PB1's, especially hasty PB1's, locate TOC, FDO and respective RO-292's at least 50 meters apart.

h. Material.

(1) AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Operators unauthorized adjustments on AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets cause much unnecessary down time.

(b) EVALUATION: After many inspection visits that included interviews with radar operators, it was found that radar operators were in fact causing the radar sets to be deadlined by making unauthorized adjustments. Some method of sealing the radar set to discourage the opening of the transmitters to make these adjustments, was needed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a 1/32" hole be drilled through the external center guide pin to enable a lead-wire device to be used in sealing the radar set. This will enable the maintenance personnel to determine if unauthorized persons were tampering with the sets.

(2) Loudspeaker Sets.

(a) OBSERVATION: UH-5 Psychological Warfare Loudspeaker Sets were being deadlined for an extended period of time due to the non-availability of speaker horns in the supply system.

(b) EVALUATION: The Psychological Warfare Program of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was seriously impaired and a field expedient method of manufacturing the speaker was needed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That these speaker horns be manufactured from used number ten (10) cans, readily available from the unit mess hall.

(3) Seat Failure on the Jungle Penetrator.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 10 March 1970, a member of H Co. (Ranger), 75th Infantry (Airborne) was killed in a fall when the seat of a Jungle Penetrator on which he was being extricated broke. The in-
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Individual was carrying his own pack and that of a wounded team member at the time.

(b) EVALUATION: The seat of the Jungle Penetrator is rated to hold 300 to 350 pounds. The individual's weight, plus that of his pack and the additional pack he was carrying was in excess of the weight practical for the seat. In addition, the individual was not hooked onto the penetrator itself in any way.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That all Jungle Penetrators be equipped with rings at the top of the penetrator and under the seats so that personnel riding them may connect themselves to the penetrator by rope or snaplinks, and stow any extra equipment under the penetrator by the same means. Further recommend that an additional brace be installed as a seat support to increase the load-carrying capacity of the individual seats. All Jungle Penetrators currently in use in the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry have been equipped with this modification.

PSYOPS in Support of a Unit in Contact.

(a) OBSERVATION: PSYOPS support to units in contact requires extensive coordination and preplanning by the brigade staff.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience during recent attacks on fire support bases JAY and ILLINGSWORTH has emphasized the fact that PSYOPS considerations should be included in base defense planning to assure optimum coverage. It is virtually impossible to deliver aerial broadcasts directly over the contact area, however, PSYOPS aircraft can and should cover routes of egress from the area and likely aid station and resupply sites. This coverage must include coordination with the artillery, aviation and ground units involved in the contact, and should compliment the overall scheme of maneuver rather than being simply "tacked on" to the operation as an afterthought.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should be prepared to request and employ PSYOPS assets from brigade and higher headquarters. Procedures for obtaining this support should be developed and coordinated by brigade with battalions in advance so that valuable time and effort is not wasted on routine matters during the contact.

(2) Joint US/ARVN Civil Affairs Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The majority of joint US/ARVN civil affairs operations result in the US personnel conducting the operation, with the RVNAF representatives assuming a passive role.

(b) EVALUATION: With increased emphasis on the Vietnam-
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In order to protect the war, the US civil affairs representatives must coordinate closely with the local GVN representatives in directing and conducting civic action programs. By inviting local Vietnamese officials and professionals to accompany MEDCAP/ICAP operations, the attention of the group is directed to the Vietnamese. US sponsorship should then typically involve only civil affairs representatives, radio operators to maintain contact with the US fire support base, and transportation for the team. Herefore the participation of GVN/RVNAF personnel invariably resulted in increased village participation and has brought GVN representatives into closer communications with the civilian population.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That US civil affairs representatives direct their efforts toward assisting the RVIN civil affairs personnel. The actual direction and execution of civic action operations must be affected by the RVIN, with emphasis placed upon bringing the GVN into hamlets and homes.

(3) Immediate Response to Exploitable Situations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The NVA soldier is the least susceptible to the general appeals of tactical PSYOPS and the Chieu Hoi program.

(b) EVALUATION: Most NVA soldiers rally or surrender immediately after a contact because of the circumstances of the situation and the breakdown of cohesive leadership. During and immediately after a contact, the NVA soldier is highly susceptible to tactical PSYOPS directed specifically against him, his unit and his particular situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Tactical PSYOPS be employed immediately over a contact area using live broadcasts or special tapes exploiting the particular situation on the ground to reduce the fighting effectiveness of the enemy in contact.

(4) Use of Live Broadcasts and Specific Appeals.

(a) OBSERVATION: One of the recent ralliers from Phu Van stated he rallied because he heard his name called on an aerial broadcast by a friend who previously rallied. The friend stated that life under the GVN was more preferable than life in Phu Van.

(b) EVALUATION: Personal appeals or exploitation of a particular situation by specific broadcasts provide a psychological impact and lend credibility of the appeal to those on the ground. The individuals on the ground develop an awareness of the gravity of the situation and the "live" appeals provide an alternative to the situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Live broadcasts and specific appeals be used more frequently to provide an awareness of the situation and a viable alternative.

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(5) Community Relations Councils’ Benefits.

(a) OBSERVATION: Community Relations Councils are a contributing factor in maintaining good relations between US Forces and the Vietnamese.

(b) EVALUATION: The hamlet of Phuoc Vinh was placed off limits to US personnel for a period of 4 months as a result of an increase in incidents between the townspeople and US troops. Prior to the town going back on limits, a Community Relations Council meeting was held with Vietnamese and US personnel discussing past problems and future problems that might arise. Solutions to hypothetical problems were mutually agreed on.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Community Relations Councils continue to be used to further the understanding between US Forces and the Vietnamese people.
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FOR THE COMMANDER:

KENNETH R. SWIM
CFT, AGC

TAB A: Task Organization
TAB B: Friendly Order of Battle
TAB C: Enemy Order of Battle
TAB D: Weather and Terrain
TAB E: Aerial Surveillance
TAB F: Intelligence Activities
TAB G: Training Combat Development
TAB H: Key Personnel Reoster
TAB I: Oil Activities
TAB J: VIP Visits
TAB K: Information Activities
TAB L: Provost Marshal Activities
TAB M: Surgeon Activities
TAB N: Logistics Operations
TAB O: Fire Bases-Opened/Closed
TAB P: Civil Affairs
TAB Q: Psychological Operations
TAB R: Chemical Activities
TAB S: Attack on FSB JAY
TAB T: FIRST TEAM Area Operations

Tabs H, I, J, K & O W/DA

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AVPSC-RZ (15 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 6 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 for Headquarters,
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and concurs, except as otherwise indicated
below.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

   a. Reference item concerning "Infusion Policies", page 35, paragraph
    2a(2); nonconcur. Current health regulations preclude redeployment of
    scout dogs from Vietnam. As US Forces redeploy from Vietnam the input
    of scout dogs should be proportionally reduced based on current TOEs
    and NTCZs. Reporting unit has been advised of the current policy on
    redeployment of scout dogs.

   b. Reference item concerning "Timely Reaction to the Usually Reliable
    Source (URS)", page 38, paragraph 2b(1); concur. Establishing standard
    operating procedures at brigade and lower echelons for timely operational
    reactions to intelligence reports from usually reliable sources should
    improve the exploitability of this information. Reporting and operational
    responses to this type information at brigade, division and II Field Force
    levels are being adequately handled by "Yellow Jacket" procedures.

   c. Reference item concerning "Chemical Essential Elements of Infor-
    mation (KEI)", page 38, paragraph 2b(2); concur.

      (1) The reference to Chemical KEI is actually a chemical operations
      questionnaire used by IPW teams to obtain information about the effective-
      ness of herbicides and agent 03. The use of PW interrogation and captured
      documents to evaluate the effect of friendly chemical operations is the
      most practical way to obtain this type of information. All II Field Force
      Vietnam assigned, attached, or OPCON units will be provided a chemical
      operations questionnaire and asked to use it when appropriate.

      (2) Requirements for information on special areas of interest by
      higher commands can be adequately met by levying a SGRP on the appropriate
      command through II FFORCEN G2 Collection channels.
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AV/PBC-RE (15 May 70) lst Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

d. Reference item concerning "ARC Light Aborts", page 40, paragraph 2c(2): concur. Additionally, OPCON units are being encouraged to request a divert of the ARC Light Strike to an alternate target whenever clearance of the area for the intended strike is doubtful within four hours of TOT.

e. Reference item concerning "Fabrication of a Herbicide Spray Rig to Facilitate Fast Coverage of Hostile Terrain", page 44, paragraph 2c(11): nonconcur for the following reasons:

(1) The AGAVENCO helicopter-mounted spray system is considered more effective than the system recommended by the reporting unit for applying herbicides to large targets because the AGAVENCO system:

(a) Operates over a range of speeds from 50 to 90 knots. Operation at the 90 knot speed decreases exposure time significantly in comparison to maximum operating speed of about 65 knots for the field expedient system.

(b) Controls the application rate and atomization of the herbicide more closely by means of a variety of nozzle orifice tips furnished with each AGAVENCO sprayer.

(c) Permits a faster flow rate than the proposed field expedient (175 gallons per minute for AGAVENCO compared to 110 gallons in about 5 minutes for the field expedient).

(2) This headquarters is not aware of a gravity-flow spray rig which is satisfactory for applying herbicides over hostile terrain; therefore a comparison of the recommended field expedient spray system with an unknown "gravity-flow spray rig" cannot be made. Comparison with the AGAVENCO system (which has been issued to major units of this command) would be far more meaningful.

(3) The field expedient system described by the reporting unit is considered more effective than the AGAVENCO for applying herbicides to small, short targets. The recommendation made by the reporting unit would be considered valid if it were changed to read "This type spray rig should be used to apply herbicides to small or short targets in hostile areas".


(1) Facts reported by the battalion and battery commander of the artillery unit involved do not agree with the evaluation in the report. On the night of the attack at FSB Illingworth, the 8 inch ammunition was
stored in two recently completed ammunition bunkers. These bunkers, one at each howitzer, were above ground and were both overheaded with three layers of sandbags. The projectiles and powder were separated in each bunker by a blast wall. According to daily situation reports, both howitzers were operational from the day of occupation of position until the night of the attack (11 days).

(2) Underground bunkers would have greatly reduced the damage which resulted from this incident. Headquarters, II Field Force Artillery, immediately implemented a policy of underground ammunition storage at all fire support bases. However, a modified policy will be necessary during the rainy season.

g. Reference item concerning "Combined Operations to Upgrade Regional Forces", page 49, paragraph 2f(2): concur.

(1) The increased duration and scope of Regional Force operations has placed additional demands on an already struggling RF logistical system. For the most part, mission essential combat items are available in supply channels. The system simply does not get these items to the units in a dependable and timely manner.

(2) Traditional RF operations have been limited in scope and duration, hence requiring little attention to logistical support during operations. As a result, operational planning was habitually accomplished without consideration from the logistics staff.

(3) This operational deficiency has been identified by province advisors, and has been brought to the attention of the Vietnamese. Recent messages to the field from the Commanding General, III Corps Tactical Zone, have encouraged longer duration and combined RF operations, and have pointed out the need for logistical planning for these operations.

(4) Additionally this subject has been the topic of discussion at a recent GORDS III CTZ, RF/PF Advisors Conference. The need to encourage counterparts from the Supply, Maintenance and Direct Support Logistical Command and the tactical commanders of the sector to closely coordinate their functions was stressed.

(5) The Vietnamese logistics system can support this type of operation and will improve in its ability with increased command and advisory emphasis at each level.

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AVFG-RE (15 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM), for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS GSPR-65 (R2)(U)

(1) This problem has been identified by both ARVN and US Advisors at all levels as a problem common to all ARVN divisions. The Central Logistics Command, ARVN, published a letter to each of the logistical agencies with information copies to Corps Commanders recommending that all TOEs within their purview be evaluated and the air delivery items that are required be requested on a TA or TOE basis. US Advisors are monitoring development of this recommendation.

(2) Currently, requests for TA or TOE authorizations are being drafted within the ARVN divisions. The normal development of these requests for additions to TA or TOEs, the related programming, and the subsequent issue of equipment takes from six to nine months.

1. Reference item concerning "Seat Failure on the Jungle Penetrator", page 52, paragraph 2h(3):

(1) Nonconcur in part, in that the Jungle Penetrator has a rated capacity of 300 to 350 pounds. If the equipment is overloaded, it becomes a safety hazard. Strengthening would increase the capacity; however, it is possible that loads greater than that for which it is designed could cause overloading of matched components of associated equipment. These include the cable, hoist, and the helicopter airframe.

(2) Concur in the recommendation made concerning the addition of rings to which the individual can secure himself. The proper procedure to be followed is the submission of an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) under the provisions of paragraph 5-7.4, TM 38-750. In the case of aeronautical equipment, an emergency or urgent EIR may be submitted to US Army Aviation Systems Command on any condition involving safety of flight or hazard to personal safety.

(3) The reporting unit has been advised of these comments concerning their recommendations, as well as the appropriate action to be taken.

4. Reference items concerning "Joint US/ARVN Civil Affairs Operations", page 53, paragraph 21(2), and "Community Relations Councils' Benefits", page 55, paragraph 21(5): concur. Actions recommended are requirements stated in II FFORGEV Regulation 515-2, 2 May 70, subject: Military Civic Action, and II FFORGEV Regulation 360-3, 20 February 70, subject: Community Relations Program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CF:
CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)

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AVHGC-DBT (15 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters,
1st Cavalry Division (AM) and concurs with comments of indorsing head-
quarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Operations", page 26, paragraph g(3)(b).
      Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next
      issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action recommended by
      USARPAC or DA.

   b. Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 38, paragraph b(1).
      Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV
      Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action recommended by USARPAC or DA.

   c. Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 38, paragraph b(2).
      Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV
      Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   d. Reference item concerning "Location of Suspect Enemy Firing
      Positions", page 39, paragraph 2b(3): concur. The use of such an
      expedient to locate suspect enemy firing sites is particularly effective
      when used in conjunction with intelligence maps of probable firing sites
      and with available countermortar radar assets. No action by USARPAC or
      DA is recommended.

   e. Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 39, paragraph b(4):
      concur. If the 1st Cav Div has conclusive, substantiating evidence that
      there is a great variance in the angle of fall computations in range
      (when computed from angle of fall tables) and from data acquired
      from the MPQ4A Radar, this evidence should be reported to the US Director,
      Combined Material Exploitation Center, APO 96307 for review. Only after
      a review of the evidence presented should an evaluation be conducted.
      CMEC can verify the manner in which the angle of fall tables were prepared.
      No action recommended by USARPAC or DA at the present time. Unit so advised.

   f. Reference item concerning "Operations", page 42, paragraph c(6):
      concur. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next
      issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

   g. Reference item concerning "Complacency Among Aircrews", page 43,
      paragraph 2c(8): concur. A complacent attitude toward the enemy
      generally results in unnecessary losses. This is a matter which should

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AVNCG-DST (15 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

receive continual command emphasis. No action by USARPAC or DA is
recommended.

h. Reference item concerning "War Dogs", page 44, paragraph c(10): concur, except in part of paragraph c about career program for NCO's similar to that of Drill Instructors. Experience has shown that regular infantry platoon sergeants perform as well with war dog platoons as do NCO's with special war dog training. This is basically an administrative and leadership position. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

i. Reference item concerning "Supplementary Positions for Direct Fire", page 46, paragraph 2c(13): concur, except for the use of term "base plate". Since the 105mm DS artillery battalions of the 1st Air Cav Div (AM) have the M102, howitzer, the proper term to be used is "firing platform". No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

j. Reference item concerning "Air Warning Data", page 46, paragraph 2c(14): concur. Methods for determining firing azimuth for air advisors are many and must be determined in view of the current situation and requirements. After the FDC commands "BATTERY ADJUST", an azimuth in mils is announced to minimize the possible loss of time caused by shifting of trails. This announced azimuth (in mils) may be readily converted to degrees for air advisories. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

k. Reference item concerning "NORs procedures for Aircraft", page 50, paragraph 2f(4): concur. All levels of command must take an interest in NORs management. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

l. Reference item concerning "Volume Control for AN/PRC-77/KY-38 Configuration", page 51, paragraph 2g(1)(c): nonconcur. The KY-38 was designed for operation with a handset in manpack or tactical vehicle configuration. USAECON is aware that the handset is not adequate for all situations and has adopted the amplifier AM-4979 ( ) GR for use with the vehicle mounted KY-38. 300 each AM 4979 ( ) GR Amplifiers will be sent to RVN for use in conjunction with the 300 vehicle kits already in country. A possible tempest hazard exists when the AN/GRA-39 is used. USARV mag 011221Z Jun 70 states: Secure voice equipment should not be remoted except during periods of operational necessity. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

m. Reference item concerning "Communications Problems on FM Secure Mode", page 51, paragraph 2g(2)(c): concur. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

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AVGHC-DST (15 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 1st Cavalry Division (AM),
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

n. Reference item concerning "AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets", page 52,
paragraph h(1): nonconcur. If a hole is drilled, rust will tend to
accumulate in the area of the exposed metal. Correct primer paint is
not always readily available to adequately seal exposed metal. Also
recommend that a label such as a DA Calibration label be used to seal
the door after the set is repaired. No action by USARPAC or DA is
recommended.

o. Reference item concerning "Jungle Penetrator", page 52, paragraph
2h(3) and paragraph 2i, 1st Indorsement: concur. The unit is submitting
an EIR. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

p. Reference item concerning "PSYOPS in Support of a Unit in Contact",
page 53, paragraph 2i(1): concur. The recommendation is in keeping
with planning techniques and procedures contained in US Army Field
Application and coordination of this recommendation would be handled by
local commanders. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

q. Reference item concerning "Joint US/ARVN Civil Affairs Operations",
page 53, paragraph 2i(2): concur. Policies and guidance for conduct
of civic action operations is contained in the Combined Campaign Plan
1970, AB 145, and USARV Regulation 515-1. Closer coordination and
supervision is required by G5 staffs and subordinate civil affairs
personnel. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
II PPORCEV
1st Cav Div (AM)
GPOP-DT (15 May 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM)
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
L.N. Ozaki
CPT, AGO
Asst AG
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB A: Task Organization

Task Organization: 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

a. Division Troops

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>HHC, 1st Cav Div (AM)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-9 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Inf Regt, 75th Inf (Airborne)</td>
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<tr>
<td>62nd Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)</td>
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<tr>
<td>98th Trans Det (Base Maint) (DS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>151st Trans Det (Base Maint) (DS)</td>
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<td>545th Trans Det (Base Maint) (DS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Sensor Plt (Prov)</td>
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<td>8th Eng Bn</td>
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<td>41st FI Team</td>
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<td>42nd FI Team</td>
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<td>Radio Relay Co (Prov)</td>
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<td>HHC, 1st Cav Div Rear (Prov)</td>
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<td>FISTS TEAM Academy (Prov)</td>
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<td>Personnel Services Co (Prov)</td>
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<td>15th Admin Co</td>
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<td>25th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)</td>
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<td>34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)</td>
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<td>37th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)</td>
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<td>Operational Location #2, 5th Weather Squadron (USAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>322nd Avn Spt Det</td>
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<td>366th Avn Spt Det</td>
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b. 1st Bde

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<tr>
<td>5-7 Cav</td>
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<td>6-11 ACR (OFCON)</td>
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c. 2nd Bde

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<td>3-4 Cav (-) (OFCON)</td>
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d. 3rd Bde

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

1-7 Cav
2-7 Cav
2-5 Cav
2-34 Arm (-) (GFCOM)
2-47 Inf (Mach) (GFCOM)

e. Division Artillery

111th DIV ARTY
2-6 Cav
2-19 Arty
2-20 Arty
80th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
171st Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
329th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
1-21 Arty
1-77 Arty
Btry B (Avm), 82nd Arty
564th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
1-30 Arty
273rd Fd Det (MRCmd)
TF North 5-2 Arty (AW)

f. 11th ACR (GFCOM)

111th ACR
1-11 ACR
2-11 ACR
3-11 ACR

g. 11th Avn Gp (Cmbt)

111th Avn Gp
Air Traffic Control Plt (Prov)
273 Assault Spt Hol Co (Hvy Hol) (GFCOM)
111th Avn Co (GS)
150th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
227th Avn Bn (Aalt Hol)
166th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
390th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
394th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
400th Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)

226th Avn Bn (Aalt Spt Hol)
51st Trans Det (Aft Med Cgo Hol Maint) (DS)
165th Trans Det (Aft Med Cgo Hol Maint) (DS)
255th Trans Det (Aft Med Cgo Hol Maint) (DS)

229th Avn Bn (Aalt Hol)
391st Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
392nd Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
393rd Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)
571st Trans Det (Aft Maint) (DS)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

h. Division Spt Cmd
   HHC & Band
   15th Med Bn
   15th S&S Bn
   15th Trans Bn
   27th Maint Bn

i. Supporting Artillery
   2-12 Arty (155)
   B/1-27 Arty (155)
   6-27 Arty (8"/175)
   A/2-32 Arty (8"/175)
   B/2-32 Arty (8"")

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<th>COORD</th>
<th>CONTROL HQ</th>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

TAB C: Enemy Order of Battle

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PROBABLE LOCATION AS OF 30 APR 70</th>
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<td>1. 9th VC Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. 271 Regiment</td>
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<td>b. 272 Regiment</td>
<td>XT 0489</td>
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<td>c. 950 Regiment</td>
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<td>2. 5th VC Division</td>
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<td>a. 275th Regiment</td>
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<td>b. 174th Regiment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 7th NVA Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 209th Regiment</td>
<td>XT 4981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 165th Regiment</td>
<td>XT 5197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 141st Regiment</td>
<td>XU 5234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 101st Regiment</td>
<td>(poss) XT 5383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 69th Arty Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 208th Arty Regiment</td>
<td>XT 3595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 96th Arty Regiment</td>
<td>XT 6085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Dong Nai Regiment</td>
<td>XT 7644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. D368 LF BN</td>
<td>XU 8204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. D168 LF BN</td>
<td>YU 0734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

TAB D: Weather and Terrain

1. Terrain: The terrain in the 1st ACD AO is generally flat. Tay Ninh Province is marked with rice paddies and marsh lands in some parts, but is forested in the north and east. Binh Long Province is flat and covered with dense forest which are mixed with rubber plantations in the south. Phuoc Long Province consist of a plain rising to the west and a mountain range dominating the northeast. The province is on the whole heavily vegetated, primarily with multi-canopied forest, three rivers - the Vam Go Dong, the Saigon, the Song Be and the Dong Nai - flow through the divisions AO. These rivers present an obstacle to ground movement because of their depth and steep banks. Three mountains are prominent in the area: Nui Ben, Nui Be Dm and the Razorback.

2. Weather:

a. February's weather was characterized by an unusually weak northeast monsoon and by a frequently developing southerly wind flow. These conditions caused dense fog and low clouds during the morning hours more often than normal, particularly in the northern and northwestern regions of the 1st ACD AO. A persistent problem for flying units was a layer of haze mixed with smoke found during daylight hours between 1000 and 6000 feet.

b. March's weather differed from expected climate patterns in the case of rainfall and temperature. Rainfall set new records at Phuoc Vinh with 4.48 inches, whereas the average rainfall is 1.0 inch. The average maximum temperature for the month was 98 degrees F, whereas the climate average is 95 degrees F. These unusual conditions were caused by a trough (similar to low pressure troughs of mid-latitudes) which passed over III CTZ at high altitudes.

c. April's weather followed climate patterns except during the first week, when an unusual amount of rain fell and when winds blew from the south and southwest, rather than from the northeast. Although the month had more days with rain than normal, total amount of rainfall was not much above average. In fact, climate norms except as mentioned above were not exceeded.

d. Maximum Temperatures:
   Feb - 97°F
   Mar - 101°F
   Apr - 103°F

e. Minimum Temperature:
   Feb - 62°F
   Mar - 69°F
   Apr - 71°F

f. Relative Humidity:
   Feb - 90% morning
   and - 50% afternoon
   Mar - 90% morning
   and - 50% afternoon
   Apr - 90% morning
   and - 50% afternoon

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

TAB D1 Weather and Terrain (cont)

g. Rainfall: Feb - 6.69 inches
   Max = 4.48 inches
   Apr = 6.12 inches (All totals are for the Phuoc Vinh area)

h. Maximum Density Altitude: Feb = 3105 feet
   Max = 3325 feet
   Apr = 3485 feet

i. Minimum Density Altitude: Feb = 503 feet
   Max = 1158 feet
   Apr = 1232 feet

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB E: Surveillance Information

1. Aerial Surveillance:

   a. Mission statistics for the period 1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION TYPE</th>
<th>SCHR/CMP</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>324/306</td>
<td>3888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>345/320</td>
<td>1261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (Mohawk)</td>
<td>98/92</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (Air Force)</td>
<td>218/211</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The weather during the three month reporting period was good to excellent. Although the number of days with rainfall and the amount of rainfall during April exceeded the climatological averages, the weather was not a factor affecting aerial surveillance missions during the reporting period. The only limiting factor was early morning ground haze which necessitated a short delay in the TOT on aerial photo missions.

(1) IR: During the quarter 94.5% of the missions were completed. Eighteen missions were cancelled, 11 because of sensor malfunction, and 7 because of A/C problems.

(2) SLAR: During the quarter, 92.7% of the SLAR missions were completed. Twenty-five missions were cancelled, 7 because of sensor malfunction and 18 because of A/C problems.

(3) PHOTO (Mohawk): During the quarter, 93.8% of the Mohawk missions were completed. Six missions were not completed, 3 because of weather and 3 because of camera malfunction.

(4) PHOTO (Air Force): During the quarter, 96.7% of US Air Force photo missions were completed. Seven missions were not completed, 3 because of weather and 4 because of A/C problems.

2. Ground Sensor Surveillance: Mission statistics for the period 1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70:

   a. Mission Sched/Comp: 15/15 (8 air/7 ground)
   b. New Sensors Implanted: 310
   c. Average Number Implanted per Mission: 21
   d. Air Implanted: 261 (26%)
   e. Land Implanted: 50 (26%)
   f. Maximum Sensor Density: 569
   g. Number of Targets Detected: 610

3. SLAR Test Report

   a. General: On 14 April 1970 a controlled SLAR test was conducted along a jungle trail approximately 4 kilometers NW of Nha Trang. This was

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the second SLAR test to be conducted by G2 Air, 1st Cav Div with the cooperation and support of II FFV and 73d SAC.

b. Background: The first SLAR test was conducted on 23 January 1970 on an open road SW of Phuoc Vinh. The results of this test indicated that SLAR would detect moving vehicles of varying sizes in open terrain. Bicycles were detected on 50% of the SLAR runs, motorbikes and lumbrettes on 75% of the runs, and moving jeeps on 100% of the runs. In addition, concentrations of troops moving at a speed of greater than 3 kilometers per hour were detected by SLAR.

c. Test Objectives and Conditions: The test conducted on 14 April was to determine what size objectives could be detected by SLAR on a jungle trail typical in SVN. The test was conducted between 1000-1200 hours in clear weather with unrestricted visibility. The test site consisted of a one-way narrow road approximately 600 meters long. Vegetation consisted of large trees, thick shrubbery and 12 feet high elephant grass on both sides of the road. There was no overhead canopy; however, line of sight conditions between targets and sensor did not exist when the flight line was parallel to the route of travel.

d. Test Vehicles: The following vehicles were utilized for the test:

1. 2x½ ton jeeps
2. 2 motorbikes
3. 2 NVA bicycles w/water cans attached
4. A concentration of 5 troops w/wpas and equipment

e. Aircraft: A standard OV-1D Mohawk was used for the SLAR test. The data link capability was utilized and was continuous after the start of the test. Imagery from the aircraft was excellent; imagery from the data link station was only fair. A 25 kilometer setting was used by the aircraft. The aircraft flew at an altitude of 7500 feet.

f. Conduct of Test: The test site was divided into three sections. Each section of the test site was occupied by the bicycles, motorbikes, and ground troops, respectively. During the actual test the vehicles and troops moved along the 200m of their respective trail areas, turned around, and moved back 200m. This procedure was continued until the test was completed. Simultaneously, the 2 jeeps traveled the entire length of the trail, each jeep starting at opposite ends of the trail and passing each other in the middle of the test site. The initial passes by the aircraft were made perpendicular to the test site, at distances of nine and seven kilometers. The second set of passes was made parallel to the test site at ranges of 6, 8, 10 and 15 kilometers. Movement along the trail by the test vehicles and troops was continuous during the actual test.

g. Results and Conclusions:
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB E: Surveillance Information (Cont)

(1) More movers were detected on flight lines flown perpendicular to the direction of movement than on the flight lines flown parallel to the direction of movement of the targets. An average of two movers were detected on a parallel flight line as opposed to an average of three to four movers on a perpendicular flight line.

(2) The test indicated that movers the size of a jeep or larger could be detected on a parallel flight line. However, on a perpendicular flight line movers the size of a motorbike could be detected.

(3) Since the test site did not have overhead canopy a flight line perpendicular to the route of travel created line of sight conditions. The test did not prove that targets smaller than a jeep will be detected when the targets are screened by vegetation.

(4) More movers were detected on a horizontal flight line flown seven kilometers from the target than on flight lines flown closer to or farther than 7 kilometers from the test site.

(5) A third test will be conducted under conditions approximating jungle canopy. The results of all tests will be evaluated to determine the reliability of SLAR in the Division's AO.
### Background Investigations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>on hand at beginning of reporting period</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>received during reporting period</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed during reporting period</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on hand at end of reporting period</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processed past suspense date</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leads completed</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Security Services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Announced security inspections</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtesy inspections and checks</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unannounced security checks</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unannounced sanitary fill checks</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fingerprintings</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech Services (looks, combination changes, etc)</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG inspections</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Liaison Contacts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local GVN Officials</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Officials</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Intelligence Units</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Blacklist Personalities Screened:

- 62

### Intelligence Files Checked:

- 211

### Interrogations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Brightlight Reports:

- 0

### Collections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Spot Reports</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Translations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>秘Txn</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPS</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB F: Intelligence Activities (Cont)

9. Personnel Security Actions:

a. Number of Validations: 2124
   (1) Top Secret 207
   (2) Secret 1917
b. Interim Clearances Granted: 179
   (1) Interim Top Secret 160
   (2) Interim Secret 19
c. Cryptographic Access Granted: 0
d. Requests for INSER Checks Submitted: 250
e. Local Files Checks Completed: 5136
f. Requests for HI submitted: 6
g. Requests for NAC submitted: 48

10. Detainees:

a. FW:
   (1) NVA: 39
   (2) VC: 1
b. Returnees:
   (1) NVA: 45
   (2) VC: 8

11. Documents: 423 (827 inches)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

1. DIVISION TRAINING:

a. The FIRST TEAM Academy at Bien Hoa conducted individual replacement training for all incoming replacement personnel during the reporting period. A total of 508 officers and 2,610 enlisted men received the four day course of instruction.

b. The Combat Leaders Course (CLC) graduated 214 personnel during the quarter. The 10-day course of instruction provides training for selected personnel (E-3 thru E-5) who have demonstrated leadership potential in the field and are programmed to become team leaders and squad leaders. The subjects stressed are small unit tactics, air assault techniques, map reading, communications procedures, first aid, and leadership.

c. The Kit Carson Scout training program graduated 86 personnel during the reporting period. The objective of the program is to provide maneuver units within the Division with well-trained American soldiers who perform as scouts with American units during operations. Training includes basic airborne tactics and techniques, care and operation of US equipment, English language, and the mission of the Kit Carson Scout.

d. The Division Sniper School graduated 44 personnel during the quarter. The program is designed to train selected personnel in advanced marksmanship and sniper techniques. Course of instruction also includes communications procedures, map reading, adjustment of indirect fire and night firing techniques. Upon graduation, the trained snipers are returned to their units to be employed as a battalion asset. On 17 March 1970, a nine-man Sniper Instructor Team was assigned to the FIRST TEAM. The team had just completed formal training at the Sniper Instructor School of the Army Marksmanship Training Unit, Fort Benning, Georgia.

2. NON-DIVISIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS:

a. The Division made extensive use of the US Army school system during the reporting period. The following figures indicate the utilization rate for the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>FM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Aviation Refresher Training School</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB-13 Transition</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB-LC IP/SIP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H Transition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A Transition</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-6A IP/SIP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Bde</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV Rendezvous School</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. There were 6 aviators within the Division who attended the Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST) course in the Philippines during the reporting period. JEST was discontinued on 1 March 1970.

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3. **US/RVN Training:**

   a. In keeping with the spirit of Vietnamization, the FIRST TEAM has participated in an on-the-job training program with the graduates of the 5th ARVN Division's Platoon Leader Refresher Course, Company Command Refresher Course, and NCO Academy. The graduating ARVN Officers and NCO's are attached to 1st Cav Div units in OJT positions commensurate with their rank and MOS for a period of one week.

   b. During the last quarter 40 ARVN Officers and 45 ARVN NCO's participated in the program. The program proved to be a big success. Ideas on concepts and techniques were freely exchanged, resulting in a greater respect for and appreciation of the RVNAF soldier's ability.

4. **Combat Developments:**

   a. On 14 February 1970, the Division completed a five week combat evaluation of the Improved Position Locator (IPL). When properly calibrated and used, the instrument provides an individual with his location in eight-digit UTM grid coordinates under most conditions of terrain and weather. Users were very impressed with the accuracy of the machine. Recommendations included reducing the weight and bulk of the device and human engineering improvements on the antenna system. Once these improvements are made, the IPL should again undergo an extensive evaluation program to determine if additional improvements are needed and to establish a basis of issue.

   b. The 90 day combat evaluation of the Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker (INFANT) (ENSU=100) ended on 28 February 1970. To evaluate the system's capabilities over widely varying types of terrain, the INFANT aircraft were O0PCON to the 1st Inf Div for 6 days, the 25th Inf Div for 15 days, and the 1st Avn Bde for 10 days during the evaluation period. One of the three aircraft was lost in action on 2 Jan and was not replaced until 23 Jan 70. The final evaluation report is being written by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) and has not been published as of this date. INFANT results, and a comparison with the standard Nighthawk system are shown below. Results are only for those days in which the INFANT aircraft flew in support of the IACP (59 days). Nighthawk results are for seven systems for the period 1 Dec 69 - 28 Feb 70.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NIGHTHAWK</th>
<th>INFANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of engagements</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time flown (hrs)</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy KPH</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPH per engagement</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying hrs per KPH</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search aircraft cost</td>
<td>$283,000</td>
<td>$665,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above data is only a small portion of that needed to make an adequate evaluation of the INFANT. Accordingly, no conclusions will be drawn except for.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TM 6: Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

to say that the system is effective and significantly reduces the enemy's freedom to move at night.

c. On 30 March 1970, the Division completed a 60 day combat evaluation
of the Modified M102 Howitzer Fire Control Material. The evaluation covered
the M134 telescope mount, carrying case and storage bracket. The greatest advantage of the modifications is the ease and speed by which the fire control
hardware may be de-mounted and re-mounted. The carrying case proved to be
ideal for protecting the M133 telescope during air and land movement operations.
It was recommended that the modifications be applied to all M102 fire control
systems.

d. On 30 April 1970 the Division completed a 5 month combat evaluation
of the XM 191 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon (MFPW) (ENSU265). The
weapon is extremely accurate, easy to operate, and very reliable. It is ef-
ficient against bunkers and targets where combustion is the main result desired.
The weight, bulk, smoke blast, and lack of fields of fire are the main dis-
advantage of the XM 191 when used in jungle terrain. Most units prefer to
leave the weapon at a fire support base and call for it to be delivered by
helicopter when needed by troops in the field. It is also effectively
employed as an integral part of a base defense weapons system. Minor improve-
ments recommended included relocating the carrying strap and replacing it
with a stronger one, and attaching the rubber gaskets at each end of the
XM 191 more securely.

e. As of 30 April 1970, the following equipment was under evaluation:

(1) Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) for UH-1 Series Helicopter (ENSU29):
One unit has been in use and under an informal evaluation since Nov 1969.
The additional units were received and installed on 16 April 1970. The unit
has been used mainly by maintenance personnel in ground checking the console
radios and for supplying internal aircraft lighting during periods of night
aircraft maintenance. Due to the reduced range of the aircraft's radios
while it is on the ground, the APU had not been extensively used for its
originally intended purpose.

(2) Non-Directional Ground Fire Detectors (ENSU314): Seven systems
were installed in AH-1 helicopters and have been under evaluation since 7 Feb
1970. The detectors work well, but due to a reduction in ground-to-air firing
incidents, sufficient data is not currently available to judge the worth and
future potential of the detectors.

(3) Laser Target Designation System (LTD) (ENSU170): The equip-
ment arrived in country in early February and data collection began on 20 Feb
1970. Most users are impressed with the equipment's capabilities and have been
experimenting with new potential uses. A Nighthawk configuration has proven
to be successful. Its advantage over existing Nighthawk systems is the
ability to covertly designate a target to permit rapid and accurate engage-
ment by the "chase bird" (usually on AH-1).

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TMD G: Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

(4) XM-433 Rocket Fuse and Remote Set Subsystem (EASURE 107): The Division received one retrofitted XR-16G and 750 rocket fuzes on 5 March. Pilots have been impressed with the new capability that the system provides. On maximum delay, the rocket is capable of penetrating 8 feet of earth and/or logs prior to detonation. In the 1st Cav Div (IM) 10, the fuse has been used primarily to achieve an air burst under the jungle canopy.

(5) Tunnel Detection Device: The ULDAK developed and shipped seven detectors to RVN for evaluation. The data collection period started on 1 April 70. No results are currently available, however the device does not appear to be sufficiently ruggedized and is too heavy and cumbersome to employ in the jungle terrain.

(6) Canopy Marking Round (EASURE 3): The device is a smoke grenade fired from an M-79. The Division received 660 rounds for evaluation. Results to date are very encouraging.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB II: Provost Marshal Activities

1. During the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of seven hundred and twenty-nine offenses.

a. Offense Statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense/Activity</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against persons/property</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous offenses</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military offenses</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offenses</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>729</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Breakdown of offense statistics:

1. Crimes against persons/property 210: aggravated assault 17, assault 10, larceny over $50 145, larceny under $50 34, fraud 1, unlawful entry 2, communicating threat 1.


3. Military offenses 118: AWOL 9, pass violations 1, off limits 46, unlawful discharge of firearm 3, disrespect to NCO 1, curfew violation 3, uniform violation 6, failure to obey a direct order 2, disrespect to an officer 1, self-inflicted gunshot wound 1, other 2.

4. Traffic offenses 295: speeding 94, fail to stop 60, unsecure vehicle 21, parking in prohibited area 7, wrong way 32, overloaded vehicle 18, no operator’s permit 27, reckless driving 1, excessive speed for road conditions 7, failure to maintain control 9, failure to yield 3, fleeing the scene 3, inattentive driving 6, drunken driving 2, improper backing 5.

c. Comments on offender statistics:

1. The over-all offense rate decreased 3% from the preceding reporting period.

2. In respect to the four major reportable categories, crimes against persons/property decreased 17%; miscellaneous offenses decreased by 6%; military offenses decreased by 12%; however, traffic offenses increased by 19% over the previous period.

3. Significant changes with regard to particular offenses reported during the previous period are as follows: assaults decreased from 31 to 10; larcenies over $50 decreased from 183 to 145; AWOLs apprehended within the IACD Area of Operations decreased from 41 to 9%; speeding violations decreased from 126 to 94; whereas "failure to stop" violations increased from 39 to 60 and "wrong way" violations increased from 0 to 32.

*The significant decrease in the number of AWOLs apprehended must be considered in light of 31 IACD AWOLs apprehended in the Saigon, Cho Lon, Bien Hoa Area.

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2. During the period the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of two hundred thirty-eight detainees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detainees Statistics</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>238</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB M: Surgeon Activities

1. Disease and Injury Statistical Data:
   a. Non-battle Injuries 407
   b. Disease 1087
      (1) Malaria 185
         (a) Vivax 76
         (b) Falciparum 99
         (c) Unknown 9
      (2) FTO 380
      (3) Psychiatric Cases 247
      (4) Others 11
   c. Remaining in hospital 146
      (In country)

2. Discussion of Disease
   a. There were 185 cases of malaria in this division from 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70, 76 of which were attributed to Plasmodium vivax, and were caused, in most cases, by failure to take the weekly Chloroquine-Primaquine Prophylaxis.

   (1) The malaria incidence is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 2d Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 3d Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Art.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avn Gp</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Cnd</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Div</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545 MP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) The continued decrease in the number of malaria cases was expected on a seasonal basis since this reporting period was in the dry season for the Corps.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

TAB: Surgeon Activities (Cont)

b. Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

- Immersion Foot: 0
- Heat Exhaustion: 3
- Poisoning: 0
- Animal Bites: 36
- Hepatitis: 14
- Dengue Fever: 0
- Infectious Meningitis: 0
- Scrub Typhus: 1

3. WIA: From 1 Feb through 30 Apr 70, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 820 U.S. Army personnel who were WIA. Of these, 469 were admitted and 351 were CRO.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations

1. During the reporting period 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970, the Division Support Command (DISCOM) continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in all operations. Combat service support provided and/or coordinated by DISCOM included supplies, maintenance, medical services, transportation, evacuation of captured enemy material and salvage, bath, laundry, graves registration and explosive ordnance disposal for the 1st Cav Div (AM) organic and attached elements. Support rendered remained basically unchanged in mission requirements as compared to previous periods.

a. The First Forward Service Support Element (FSSE) provided logistical combat support to Division maneuver battalions assigned to the 1st Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) from its base camp in Tay Ninh. Classes I, II, IV (Installation Equipment), VIII, and IX as well as direct maintenance support, medical service and air transportation support were provided by DISCOM elements at this location.

(1) On March 18, 1970, construction of a POL refuel point began at Thien Ngon. Consisting of eight (8) refuel pads with a storage capacity of approximately 30,000 gallons of JP4, the point was operational on 27 March 1970. Refueling of the point is accomplished by bladder bird. On 19 March, a forward supply point was established at Thien Ngon. Classes III and V supplies are flown into Thien Ngon from Bien Hoa daily. Minor problems were experienced initially, but were later alleviated.

(2) The PML point at Barbara remains in operation with eight (8) refuel pads and a storage capacity of approximately 30,000 gallons of JP4. On 17 April at approximately 0300 hours, a fire was reported at the PML point at Barbara. An M-79 fired from inside the berm was reported as the cause of the fire. 4,500 gallons of JP5 (blivits) and seven (7) empty blivits and minor POL equipment were destroyed.

(3) Intermittently during the report period, elements of the 11th ACR were resupplied from the Dominator Helipad without incident.

(4) Major ground movement during the report period included the construction of three (3) ARVN and thirteen (13) semi-permanent US fire bases, the moving of one battalion rear trains from Tay Ninh Base camp and the receiving of another.

(5) During the report period, a total of 16,225 tons and 17,844 passengers were flown out of the Tay Ninh helipad by CH47 helicopters with an additional total of 4,342 tons and 14,765 passengers flown into the helipad. CH54 helicopters carried 4,258 tons out and 32 tons into the helipad. The movement team located at Tay Ninh Airfield reported 745 tons and 8,642 passengers flown in and 978 tons and 8,674 passengers flown out of the airfield.

b. The 2nd FSSE supported the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cav Div (AM) and attached units based at and operating from Fire Support Base Buttons for the entire period. Classes I, II, III, IV and V as well as medical service, maintenance support and air transportation support were provided by DISCOM elements at this location.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TB N: Logistics Operations (Cont)

(1) The Movement Control Section continued to provide rotary wing airlift control at Dusty Pad. A daily average of 230 tons of supplies were moved to support forward fire bases. Continued rotary wing support was provided for the 1st, and later the 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigades. Rotary wing airlift control was provided at Due Phong during the period of 12 April 1970 to 28 April 1970. An average 10 to 14 sorties of Class V supplies and water were flown daily to forward fire bases.

(2) A fixed wing resupply point for Class V resupply was established 22 March 1970 at LZ Snuffy, Bu Gia Map, to support 1/77 Artillery at LZ Snuffy and B Btry 1/50 Artillery at LZ Hung Young. LZ Snuffy was closed 10 April 1970 after a fixed wing movement of the 1/12 Cav and A Btry 1/77 Arty to Fire Support Base Buttons.

(3) Resupply convoys were received on 14 April 1970 and 18 April 1970. The convoy operation furnished all classes of supply during a period when fixed wing capabilities were restricted by limited airfield use.

(4) The 3rd FSSM supported the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cav Div (AM) and attached units from its base camp in Quan Loi. Classes I, II, III, IV (Installation Equipment), VIII, IX as well as medical service, and air transportation support were provided.

(1) A central helicopter rearm facility was established for all helicopter rearm operations conducted in Quan Loi.

(2) Fixed wing aerial resupply was coordinated for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment units operating in the vicinity of Tonle Chan and Thien Khoi.

2. During the reported period, the 27th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply for all ground equipment (less medical and cryptographic) of the First Team. This "Anywhere-Anytime" support was evident in the fact that the following percentage of equipment was operational at the end of the quarter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>% OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>99.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>95.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. During the quarter there were 31 technical assistance visits conducted by units of the Battalion

b. The Battalion's AIM Team visited a total of 14 units during the reported period.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations (Cont)

c. The disposition of elements of the Battalion as of 25 April 1970 was as follows:

- Headquarters and Company A: Bien Hoa
- Main Support Detachment: Phuoc Vinh
- B Detachment: Quan Loi
- C Detachment: FSB Buttons
- D Detachment: Tay Ninh

d. The consolidated Battalion production for the period shows the following completed jobs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQ&amp;COA</th>
<th>MSD</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>2749</td>
<td>1392</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>6399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>2624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament (Artillery)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament (Small Arms)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament (Instruments)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>5299</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>2058</td>
<td>12749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: "Other" categories of completed work order requests shown above include machine shop work, canoe repair, glass cutting, office machine repair, welding and fuel and electrical component repair.

e. Summary of supply data for the quarter reveals the following:

1. Total ASL requests received: 34,976
2. Total fringe requests received: 5,541
3. Demand Accommodations: 85.2%
4. Demand Satisfaction: 86.6%
5. Average ASL lines stocked: 6,306
6. Average zero balance lines: 3,495
7. Average fringe lines on hand: 0
8. Units supported by ASL: 110
9. Lines inventoried during the period: 3,622

f. Receipt of repair parts at the supply base at Bien Hoa for the quarter was as follows:

- Red Ball receipts: 53,200 lbs
- Parcel Post: 20,160 lbs
- Normal Stockage: 324,279 lbs

3. The 15th Supply and Service Battalion continued to provide combat service support to the 1st Cavalry Division (AC) during this reporting period. The battalion operated from a base area in Bien Hoa and forward locations in Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi and Song Ba. Major operational achievements were:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

a. The 1st Forward Supply Platoon at Tay Ninh moved to the area formerly occupied by the Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam. As a result of careful planning and coordination with the 1st FSSE and Headquarters, 1st Brigade, all supplies were moved and new shipments received without any deterioration in service to customer units.

b. Supply company planned and installed helicopter refueling points at Duc Phong and Thien Ngon. Currently, these points are manned by personnel from the 1st and 2nd Forward Supply Platoons, located at Tay Ninh and Song Be, respectively.

c. During the first quarter, Supply Company began work on a new helicopter refueling point at Phuoc Vinh. Upon completion of the fourteen point facility, the JP4 capacity at Phuoc Vinh will be increased by sixty thousand gallons.

d. Forklifts and operators have been provided by Supply Company to support the reopening of Fire Support Bases Carolyn, Jroke and Snuffy. In addition, forklifts are operated at Thien Ngon and Duc Phong in support of operations at those locations.

e. Supply Company assumed operational control from the 1st Infantry Division of the Class I Yard at Lai Kho which supports approximately three thousand troops.

f. The battalion successfully completed the Division Annual General Inspection and a Command Maintenance Management Inspection administered by the Division CMNI Team.

g. The class activity report for the period of 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970 is as follows:

| (1) Class I Issues | | |
|------------------|------------------|
| Class            |                |
| I Issues         |                |
| Rations          |                |
| (a) Bien Hoa     | 2972.0 Tons    |
| (b) Phuoc Vinh   | 2561.5 Tons    |
| (c) Quan Loi     | 4483.4 Tons    |
| (d) Tay Ninh     | 1604.3 Tons    |
| (e) Lai Kho      | 375.1 Tons     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) Class II &amp; IV Issues</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4389.4 Tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) Class III Issues</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c) JX-4</td>
<td>43656.3 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) NV-2</td>
<td>306.2 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) MGS-3</td>
<td>5125.1 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) DF-2</td>
<td>12064.2 Tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4. During the reported period, the 15th Transportation Battalion continued to provide backup direct support maintenance for all division aircraft and supply of all aircraft parts, avionics and ammunition.

a. Maintenance Operations:

(1) Production Control:
   (a) Aircraft work orders received: 1154
   (b) Aircraft released: 471

(2) Productive manhours: 81405

(3) 1st Cavalry Division Availability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Recoveries: 0

(5) EIRs Submitted: 11

(6) Technical Assistance: 16
   Visits to Units

b. Unit Locations:

(1) HHC - Phu Loi
(2) CoA - Phu Loi
(3) CoS - Phu Loi

c. Tech Supply

(1) Lines on ASL: 25994
(2) Zero Balance: 7779
(3) Percent Zero Balance: 29.28%
(4) Total Requests Received: 45038
(5) Demand Satisfaction: 55.65%
(6) Demand Accommodation: 77.25%
(7) ASL Requests Received: 34775
(8) ASL Requests Filled: 19364
(9) Tonnage of Parts Issued to Supported Units: 581

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5. During the reporting period, 1 February through 30 April 1970, the 15th Medical Battalion continued to provide complete division level and limited unit level medical support to the First Team. The 15th Medical Battalion was deployed as follows:

   Hq & Spt Co  Camp Gruval
   A Co       Troy Vinh Base Camp
   B Co       FSB Buttons
   C Co       Quan Loi Base Camp

   a. The Battalion Headquarters provided administrative and logistical support to elements of the 15th Medical Battalion, as well as medical evacuation, psychiatric, veterinary, optometry and medical supply services for all units of the First Team.

   b. Headquarters and Support Company provided medical support to the division base camp at Phuoc Vinh, Division Rear at Bien Hoa and back up support to the latter companies of the 15th Medical Battalion. The Air Ambulance Platoon provided aeromedical evacuation for the First Cavalry Division as well as non-Cavalry units working within the Divisions area of operations.

      (1) During this reporting period the Air Ambulance Platoon has flown 2,315 missions, totaling 3,946 hours flying time and evacuated 5,720 patients. Nine ships have been damaged by hostile fire, two of which were total combat loss.

      (2) Headquarters and Support Company opened a new dental clinic on 23 March 1970. The new facility is air conditioned and has four dental operators, a prosthetic area, and an X-Ray room.

   c. Company A continues to provide medical support to the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

   d. Company B provided medical support to the 2nd Brigade and all OPCON units. Company B has made continuous improvements in the unit area and treatment facilities throughout this reporting period.

   e. Company C provided medical support to the 3rd Brigade and all OPCON units, with the exception of the 11th ACR which has its own medical support. Aeromedical evacuation support was provided to 11th ACR by the Air Ambulance Platoon.

   f. The strong personal relationships established with the medical battalion and the ARVN Airborne Division have proved to be invaluable in the accomplishment of our medical mission. The co-location of the medical company supporting the 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigade and Company B, 15th Medical Battalion has proven highly successful. The rapport established between the two battalions is excellent.

   g. The MUCAP and DEENTCAP program has been an area of emphasis throughout the quarter. The companies of the 15th Medical Battalion have participated

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB N: Logistics Operations (Cont)

in 163 MEDCAPS with a total of 7,463 patients and 18 DENTCAPS with a total of 180 patients.

6. During the period 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970 the First Team Band performed throughout the AO raising the morale and spirits of many First Team Troopers.

Engagements Played:

a. Music for the troops (troops returning to FSB)
b. Music for the General (General's Mess - Phuoc Vinh)
c. Unit Citation Ceremony -------2
d. Awards Ceremony----------------16
e. Change of Command Ceremony---24
f. Honor Guard for LT General Ewell
g. Reveille & Retreat Ceremony at Bien Hoa - Daily

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB P: Civil Affairs

1. (C) Population and Resources Control

   a. Refugees

      (1) Water was transported daily to the refugees at the Montagnard Mission in Song Be.

      (2) Food was provided to refugee centers throughout the AO. This included parts of a 125 ton rice cache uncovered the 1st of March 1970.

   b. Security Control: During the reporting period the Division provided supplies for the upgrading of PSDF defenses throughout the AO.

2. (U) Civic Action

   a. Through the Division Community Distribution Program 1,544,200 VN$ of supplies were contributed by the division to villages and hamlets throughout the AO.

   b. Financial support amounting to 121,800 VN$ was provided in the repair or construction of 21 schools, 15 hospital/ dispensaries, 12 orphanages/day care centers and numerous other self-help projects.

   c. The Division conducted 756 MEDCAPS treating 29,916 patients during the reporting period.

   d. A PSDF conference and Boy Scout Conference was conducted during the reporting period with the division providing tents for shelter as well as transportation for the Boy Scouts to their conference.

   e. The Division extracted a total of 227 tons of rice during the reporting period. The majority of this was distributed to Province Officials as they saw fit.

   f. 350 School Kits, 10 Health Education Kits, 200 lbs soap were distributed to various hamlets, in addition to 1700 board feet of lumber, 5740 lbs excess food, and 107 gals of paint and peneprime type commodities.

   g. A total of 22,106 man-days (1 man-day equals 10 hrs) were devoted to civic action during the reporting period.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAQ: Psychological Operations

1. (c) General

   a. As the quarter commenced, the First Team was actively engaged in intensified campaigns directed against the 95C and 272d Regiments of the 9th VC Division, the 165th and 209th Regiments of the 7th NVA Division, Montagnards and Vietnamese living under VC control in Phuoc Long Province and VC guerrillas in A0 Chai. General campaigns directed against major enemy and local force units continued.

   b. Initiated during the first few weeks of the quarter, an intensified campaign was directed towards the Montagnards of Phuoc Long Province. The objective was to induce them to rally to GVN controlled areas, thus curtailing the support forces of the VC/NVA. The prime target areas centered around Bu Gia Map and Duc Phong. Special tapes made in the Montagnard dialects indigenous to the area (Stieng and M'Nong) were broadcasted and pictorial leaflets were dropped since the Montagnards have no written language. 937,000 leaflets were dropped and 8 hours, 28 minutes of broadcast time were used in support of the campaign. To date 177 Montagnards (58 Hoi Chanh, 119 refugees from VC control) have rallied to Allied or ARVN bases.

   c. Renewed PSYOP in the Phu Van - Nhon Ly area resulted in a Hoi Chanh during the first week of the quarter. Interrogation and exploitation of the Hoi Chanh resulted in information pin-pointing the villages of Nhon Ly and Phu Van which were relocated in the jungle by the VC. Special tapes and leaflets targeting specifically the villagers and rally maps of the area were used to induce them to rally. 1,537,000 leaflets and 11 hours, 57 minutes of broadcast time were used in support of the effort. The entire village of Nhon Ly and all the residents of Phu Van hamlet 3 rallied. 38 were classified Hoi Chanh and 34 were classified refugees from VC control.

   d. On 15 March, an extensive PSYOP campaign was initiated against the M168 Local Force Battalion and its 74 hospital unit. Psychological vulnerabilities were extracted from documents found by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. A total of 1,900,000 specifically designed leaflets and 1 hour, 15 minutes of special tape broadcast were used in the campaign. Although the campaign produced no ralliers, it established the basic tenets to be used in campaigns directed specifically against current, known vulnerabilities of enemy units.

   e. II Field Force, Vietnam campaign "Family Troe" was supported by the First Team. 380,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the objective to cause distrust and dissension among the headquarters elements of the enemy units.

2. (c) Support

   a. The 6th PSYOP Battalion, located at Dien Hoa, continued to provide Q-93

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

general support to the First Team operations by printing a total of 11,800,000 special request leaflets.

b. During the reporting period the 9th Special Operations Squadron dropped 25,923,000 preplan and 9,048,000 quick reaction leaflets and broadcast 44 hours of preplan tapes and 48 hours quick reaction tapes in support of the First Team PSYOP program.

c. LACD Brigades and Division Artillery BN teams operating from UH1H, OH6A helicopters and UC6 "Beaver" aircraft broadcast 612 hours and dropped 53,931,000 leaflets. LACD operations included pre-planned, and daily planned target areas, special campaigns as well as quick reaction PSYOP exploitation of contacts. Brigade and Battalion command and control aircraft were used to drop leaflets and to augment regular PSYOP missions. Nightsquawk (night loudspeaker broadcasts) missions continued to provide PSYOP loudspeaker exploitation during the hours of darkness. All Brigades of the First Team supported the ARVN IJN.

d. The quarter closed with DIVARTY, in coordination with District and Province chiefs, actively engaged in a PSYOP campaign directed against VC guerrillas in '40 Chief. The campaign will culminate with a "rally day" on 30 April 1970.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB R: Chemical Activities

1. Operations: During the reporting period 1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70, Division Chemical, the 184th Chemical Platoon (IS) and the 26th Chemical Detachment provided chemical support for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 1st ARVN Airborne Division. Chemical activity generally stayed at the same level as the last reporting period.

   a. A new addition to the Division Chemical "Field Expedient" Arsenal is the persistent CS "Mini - BURD" (Bunker Utilization Restriction Bomb). The Mini - BURD is constructed from free drop water containers (FSN 1670-832-5917) and has already been sent to the field for testing. Evaluations already received indicated that the principle advantages are its lighter weight and ease of carrying and packing due to its variable shape. The 26th Chemical Detachment now has the facilities to supply field commanders with either the "BURD" or the new "Mini - BURD".

   b. The Division Chemical Section and the 26th Chemical Detachment have constructed a Direct Support M17 Protective Mask Repair Facility. This facility is able to direct exchange unserviceable masks and eliminate the time delay in the unit securing a serviceable mask. This facility is capable of inspecting and repairing the M17 series protective mask, the M28 series protective mask, the M24 series protective mask, the M442 protective mask, the M11 decontaminating apparatus, and the M15 Breathing Apparatus.

   c. Division Chemical Personnel have fabricated a new helicopter defoliation spray system that facilitates fast coverage of hostile terrain. The old system was a gravity flow rig which required a minimum of twenty minutes to discharge 110 gallons of herbicide. The new spray system is constructed from a 190 gallon fiberglass tank utilizing a bilge pump from a M113 APC to pump the herbicide out of the spray tank into the spray boom. The new tank is emptied in approximately five minutes thus reducing the time on station and reducing the risk of ground to air fire. The pump is electrically operated and the spray can be controlled by an on and off switch.

2. Operational Totals: Totals for the reporting period includes most but not all of the wide variety of Chemical support given the First Team.

   CS Drum Drops
   87 missions for 2,595 drums (207,600 lbs)

   Shiffer Missions
   1,051

   Fourmazse Installed
   350 55 gallon drums
E-158 CS Carnister Clusters Dropped
102 CS Carnisters dropped (includes only those dropped by chemical personnel)

Denser Use Restriction Bomb (DURB)
2,625 DURBs and 505 Mini-DURBs manufactured

Napalm dropped from CH 47
729 55 gallon drums

Hugh Flares
133 installed

Defoliation Operations
103 Missions using 2,155 gallons of agent orange

M17 Mask Renovation
1,007
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970

TAB S: Attack of FSB Jay

I. General. At 0415 hours 29 March 1970, FSB Jay (X039750) was attacked by elements of the 271 NVA Regiment, supported by a heavy indirect fire attack. After a fierce fight, during which some 10-12 enemy penetrated the position, direct fire artillery repulsed the assault. Enemy losses were 74 KIA, 3 POW and miscellaneous weapons and equipment captured. US losses were 13 KIA, 53 WIA and 2x105 howitzers damaged.

2. Background.

a. FSB Jay had been occupied by the 9th Battalion, 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade from 7-14 March 1970. Scattered, sharp contacts occurred throughout this period, and an NVA POW, captured 10 kilometers southwest of Jay, stated that his unit's mission was to attack any enemy in the area. FSB Jay was vacated until 18 March, when the 2d Battalion 7th Cavalry, B/2-19th Arty and B/2-12th Arty occupied the position.

b. The following artillery units were involved in the action at Jay:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organic</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HA/6, 2-19th Arty</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Base Camp (X077520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-19th Arty</td>
<td>FSB Jay (X039750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opoon</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/1-77th Arty</td>
<td>FSB Illingsworth (X033788)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arty</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1-30th Arty (-) (3x155)</td>
<td>FSB Illingsworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-12th Arty</td>
<td>FSB Jay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-32nd Arty (-) (2x9&quot;)</td>
<td>FSB Illingsworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-32nd Arty (2x75)</td>
<td>FSB St. Barbara (X076678)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/2-32nd Arty (-) (2x9&quot;)</td>
<td>Camp Hazard (X076840)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Arty, 1-11 ACR</td>
<td>Camp Hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-20 Arty (ARA)</td>
<td>Tay Ninh Base Camp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Only three rifle companies (A, B, and C) of 2-7 Cav were moved to Jay from FSB Joe. Company D was Opoon to the 11th ACR in eastern War Zone O. Company C became Opoon to 2-8 Cav, 6-10 kilometers northwest of Jay. Company D and reconnaissance elements of Company E were located 6 kilometers southwest of Jay. The FSB was secured by Company A, Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company E (-).

d. Artillery on the FSB consisted of B/2-19th Arty (6x105) and B/2-12th Arty (6x155). The 105's were located on the southern sides, and the 155's were on the north.

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ATTACK OF FSB JAY (Cont)

3. Attack

a. During the initial occupation on 18 March, light, sporadic small arms fire was received from the western treeline. Artillery, 120mm mortars, and small arms silenced the fire. Several small contacts with groups of 1-3 NVA occurred prior to the attack and Company B killed 2 of a group of 13 NVA some 6 kilometers southwest of Jay. Patrols found several trails, fighting positions, and bunker complexes showing negative to moderate recent use. One new bunker complex was found by Company A (XTO10727). On 20 March an automatic ambush detonated just outside the base, and on 22 and 23 March the PPS-5 radar picked up two to three individuals in the tree line. Artillery was placed on the ambush and sightings with negative results; there were no radar pickups or other warning on the night of the attack.

b. Attack

At 290415 a trip flare ignited in the treeline to the south of the FSB. This was immediately followed by intense fire from 107, 122 and 240mm rockets, 82 and 120mm mortars, RPG's, and 75mm recoilless rifles. This attack lasted some 15 minutes. The initial rounds knocked out the antennas on the infantry TOC, 105 battery FOC and critically wounded the FSB Commander ( aún, 2-7 Cav). A platoon-sized enemy force, having blown a gap through the single row of barbed wire, moved in over the south and southwest portion of the base, firing RPG's directly into the FSB. Meeting little resistance on the base, they headed for the 105 howitzers. Both the 105 and 155 batteries had begun firing directed fire into the treeline when the attack began and now the NVA were not by M-16 fire from the D/2-19 Arty gun positions. A small reaction force, led by the battery commander, quickly eliminated 5 NVA near the #4 gun, captured 1 (WIA) and drove the remainder out of the position. The enemy established a base of fire near the trash dump, and this area, as well as a .51 cal position nearby, were taken under short range direct fire by #1, 2 and 6 guns. A fire which broke out in the infantry ammunition dump was quickly controlled by D/2-19th Arty personnel. However, debris from the explosions put #5 gun temporarily out of action. All other howitzers continued to fire directly at enemy positions at maximum rate. When guns #4 and #5 were covered by NEC fire, the surviving crew members and ammunition were quickly placed in the remaining four sections. Led by the D/2-19th Battery Commander and First Sergeant, the defenders regained the base and built up a volume of small arms fire.

b. Initial notification to 2-19th Bn FOC came from FSB Illingsworth where the 2-6th Cav artillery FMO observed and reported the firing. The Bn FOC immediately activated the preset fire plan, using all artillery units in the area. The 2-19th Arty 1-64 radar at Thai Nguyen was oriented on FSB Jay and located one enemy mortar which was immediately attacked by indirect artillery fire. Communications with Jay were finally obtained by the 2-7th Cav Artillery FMO, using a spare FDC-25 radio, through the Phu Ba Dan relay. At his direction, fire was shifted from the eastern target groups and concentrated to the south, west and southeast.

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TB 8: Attack of FSB Jay (Cont)

1. The 105 artillery FDO had received a direct hit, seriously wounding
the FDO, but the surviving personnel continued to perform their mission.
Defensive fires were quickly reinforced by 7.5mm sections, tactical air, a
Spooky gunship and flareships. The 1st Brigade TOO had lost all communi-
cations with Jay, and the request for tactical air and Spooky support were
initiated by the 3-19th Arty FDO to the TOO. As the attack slackened about
0600, medevac and resupply ships began to fly in on a pre-planned corridor.
Intense .50 cal AA fire along the corridor forced a change in routes and
the AA sites were heavily engaged with 155, 8" and 105mm fire.

2. As the enemy withdrew, fires were shifted in pursuit to the west
and continued at a high rate. An enemy bunker complex to the southwest
was pounded by medium and heavy artillery on a phased plan to support a
CS drop in the area.

3. Total expenditures during the action were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>2279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adi</td>
<td>7 Sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Air</td>
<td>3 Airstrikes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. US losses were:

- 15 KIA (B/2-19th Arty; 4; 2-7th Cav; 7; B/2-12th Arty, 4)
- 53 WIA (B/2-19th Arty; 22; 2-7th Cav, 22; B/2-12th Arty, 8)
- 2x105 howitzers destroyed.

5. Thirty-five of the 74 NVA KIA were credited to artillery fire.


a. Pursuit artillery fire continued through the day on enemy withdrawal
routes. FSB Jay displaced later that day (29 March) to FSB Humpa (X031718)
and continued its support mission without interruption.

b. The prompt response of all fire support elements, both at and in
support of FSB Jay, was extremely effective in repulsing the enemy attack.
The devastating effectiveness of direct artillery fire in the initial
moments of the action on the enemy assault and support elements in the
treelines can be credited with the failure of the enemy to mount a major
ground assault and the very survival of the base.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1970
TAB T: First Team Area of Operations
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.**

CC, 1st Cavalry Division