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AGDA (M) (22 Oct 70) FOR OT UT 702160 26 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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LOCATION: Cu Chi Base Camp (X7647753); Cu Chi, RVN.

Reported by: Major General Edward Bautz, Jr.

Prepared by: Major Ralph J. Hallaway, 18th Military History Detachment.


1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities.

1a. General: During the previous quarter the 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division successfully forced the enemy to continually postpone his Winter/Spring offensive. Through aggressive pre-emptive operations enemy elements were forced to continue functioning in small units, unable to mount a significant offensive. During this period 25th Infantry Division operations (including 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division) accounted for 3,478 enemy eliminated, including enemy soldiers, killed, captured, and rallying (Ho Chi Minh) to U.S. forces.

The 1st Brigade had preempted all enemy attempts to initiate an offensive in Tay Ninh Province, prevented the enemy from freely using the cave-strewn slopes of Mai Ba Den as a refuge and stop-over point for infiltration groups, and successfully restricted enemy infiltration into Tay Ninh Province from Cambodia. The enemy was forced to resort to attacks by fire as his primary offensive tactic.

The 2nd Brigade continued to disrupt local and main force operations in the Trang Bang-Caidal area, Boi Loi Woods and Ho Bo Woods. As the dry season progressed, some Piow operations in these areas forced the enemy to further disperse to prevent complete annihilation of his offensive capabilities. Effective military and political power of Sub-Region 7 forces was seriously reduced by the small unit tactics of Allied forces in the 2nd Brigade area of operations. An additional ARVN battalion was moved into the 2nd Brigade AO to increase Allied effectiveness in this area.
Preemptive operations cut deeply into the enemy's reserves of rations, munitions and supplies. Without these vital supplies the enemy was unable to coordinate an effective offensive in the 2nd Brigade area of operations. Close coordination between 2nd Brigade maneuver elements and Division intelligence sources caused further breakdown of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in Hau Nghia Province. Rapid reaction to exploitable intelligence continued to force local guerrillas to maintain their ineffective posture.

The combat effectiveness of the 3rd Brigade was significantly strengthened by the move of the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry from the 1st Brigade to the 3rd Brigade AO. With the advent of the dry season, enemy infiltration and offensive activities were on an increase in the 3rd Brigade AO. The move of an additional maneuver Battalion to combat Sub-Region 2 forces has seriously restricted his use of the An Ninh Corridor as an infiltration route, forced main force units into taking sanctuary in Cambodia and remaining there, and disrupted local force activities through increased use of small unit tactics, combat patrols and snipers.

Operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division accounted for 1082 enemy KIA, forced Sub-Region 3 units to operate in dispersed groups to escape Allied detection, disrupted Sub-Region 6 local and main force plans for attacking Saigon and greatly expanded the pacification program in Long An Province. With United States Navy forces, 3-9 Inf Div units seriously disrupted the enemy's ability to operate along canals and rivers within Long An Province, prevented enemy reinforcements of men and supplies to local guerrilla units and reduced the effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure by continuous monitoring of the enemy's routes of movement.

During the present reporting quarter the 25th Infantry Division continued Phase IV of Operation TOAN THAUNG in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces. Planning guidance stressed the promotion of small unit combined operations with emphasis on upgrading RF/PF/PSDF and ARVN forces while stressing night operations. While searching for main force units, Division elements sought every opportunity to annihilate local force units, or infiltration groups through coordination of night patrols, detection devices and responsive firepower. The Tropic Lightning Division stressed small unit operations, pacification, upgrading of ARVN/RF/PF/PSDF forces and security of lines of communications. Contact was exploited to the maximum effort possible. Emphasis was placed on upgrading hamlets and contested villages.

The 1st Brigade operated in Tay Ninh Province with four Battalions and was responsible for security on Highways 22 and 26, for combined operations with South Vietnamese units around Tay Ninh City and for coverage of the area around Nui Ba Den. The 1st Brigade was given the mission of conducting airborne, reconnaissance, denial, and ambush missions throughout the area of operations, and for eagle float operations with the U.S. Navy on the Van Go Dong River; continuing participation in the combined US/RF/PF defense of Tay Ninh City; preparing to insert and extract Ranger teams and
install sensor devices in conjunction with and in support of Division programs, and continuing the pacification effort in conjunction with GVN forces in Phu Khuong, Phuoc Ninh, Hieu Thien and Khiem Hanh Districts.

The 1st Brigade was composed of 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-); 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry; 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry; and 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry. The 1st Brigade was supported by 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery.

The 2nd Brigade operated with two Battalions and one Cavalry Squadron in the central portion of the Division TAOI and conducted security along Highways 6A, 7A, 119 and 26. The Brigade conducted multiple airborne operations, mechanized reconnaissance operations, night combat patrols, and other offensive operations in Khiem Hanh, Trang Bang, Cu Chi, upper Phu Hoa Districts, and the Michelin Plantation area. Tactical emphasis was placed on small unit operations geared to the detection and elimination of Local guerrilla and support forces, and dispersed elements of Sub-Region I forces in the Citadel area and Boi Loi and Ho Bo Woods. The 2nd Brigade continued to support upgrading of GVN forces in Trang Bang and Cu Chi. Pacification and upgrading of contested hamlets and villages received primary emphasis.

The 2nd Brigade's maneuver Battalions were 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; and 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) (until 26 February), all supported by the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery.

The 3rd Brigade's four maneuver Battalions operated in the southern portion of Hau Nghia Province with responsibility for route security along Highways 6A, 7A, 8A, 10 and 1 and the pacification program in the Bao Trai area. The 3rd Brigade was directed to continue ejection and exclusion operations in Duc Hue, Duc Hoa and Cu Chi Districts, Hau Nghia Province and Phu Hoa District, Binh Duong Province. Brigade units in conjunction with ARVN/RF/FF and U.S. Navy forces operated along the Van Go Dang River. 3rd Brigade was tasked with responsibility for defense of Cu Chi Base Camp and designated one battalion as Division Ready Reaction Force. Pacification consolidation operations were conducted in coordination with Hau Nghia Province and Duc Hue and Duc Hoa Districts.

The 3rd Brigade maneuver Battalions were 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry; 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry; and 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry. Support was provided by 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division) operated with four Battalions in Long An Province area with responsibility for the security of Highways 4, 18 and 23 and the local pacification program. The Brigade reacted to exploit current intelligence and conducted multiple airborne, reconnaissance, checkerboard, bushmaster and riverine operations in Long An Province. Continued emphasis was placed on combined operations.
and upgrading ARVN/RP/FF forces. The Brigade sought to locate and destroy local force units and elements of SR-3, SR-6 and 1st NVA Regiment. Special action teams worked with district RP/FF forces. Riverine operations were conducted with U.S. Navy forces on the Van Go Dong and Van Go Tay rivers.

Emphasis was placed on upgrading of VC or contested villages.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division's maneuver Battalions were 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry; 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry; and 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. The Brigade was supported by 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery.

There was no significant increase in enemy activity during the first week of the reporting quarter (1-7 February). Main force units continued to avoid contact while attempting to replenish logistical bases during the three-day enemy TAPI ceasefire which began on 6 February. Sub-regional forces throughout the Division TAOI continued to be primarily concerned with the transportation of food and supplies for possible post-TAPI activities. (See 372d Radio Research Company, 303d Radio Research Battalion Historical Report for this period.)

Three shelling incidents were reported in the 1st Brigade area of operations during the first week of February. A night defensive position of Company B and one platoon, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry with Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, located 3 kilometers northeast of Trai Nhi (XT442771), received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, all landing inside the wire. One U.S. soldier was wounded. No U.S. casualties were sustained in either of the other attacks by fire. Activity within the 1st Brigade AO remained at a low level during this period. In three separate contacts during the week, 1st Brigade forces accounted for ten enemy killed. The largest action occurred 4 kilometers west-northwest of the Ben Oui Rubber Plantation (XT404463) on 2 February. Snipers from Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry engaged six enemy with organic weapons, Night Hawk helicopter and three artillery batteries (122 rounds) at 1900 hours, resulting in six enemy killed. There were no U.S. casualties from enemy return fire of small arms, automatic weapons, M79 grenade launchers and hand grenades. Firing ceased at 1915 hours.

No shelling incidents were reported in the 2nd Brigade area of operations during 1-7 February. Rear service and supply groups were quite active during the week as 2nd Brigade elements killed 26 enemy and captured 17 prisoners-of-war in 17 separate contacts. Between 1525 hours and 1730 hours on 1 February, Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, operating 5 kilometers northwest of Ben Suc (XT5235) in the lower Boi Loi Woods, captured 17 prisoners-of-war and evacuated four AK47 rifles. All of the PWs were members of the C160 (Rice Procurement) Company of the 83 Rear Service Group. During interrogation it was learned that the strength of the company was 30 men and that the company was located in the contact area. The PWs were easily induced to surrender and at least one of them was carrying
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a Chieu Ho leaflet. This is additional evidence that the low morale encountered in SR-1 combat units has spread to the logistical support units as well. Of the 17 PWs, six were classified as VC-PW, nine as NVA-PW, and two of the PWs rallied and were classified as returnees.

Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry located a cache in a hole five kilometers northwest of Dan Tieng (XT455505) at 1345 hours on 1 February. Evacuated were two MG0 machine guns, two .30 caliber machine guns, one HMG rifle and 1000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. Two RPG rounds were destroyed.

A combat patrol from Company G, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry killed seven enemy in a contact which began at 0055 hours on 5 February 6 kilometers north of Trung Lap (XT573279) in the Ho Bo Woods. The contact started when the combat patrol received hand grenades from an estimated 10-15 enemy. The enemy were killed by small arms, automatic weapons, and helicopter gunships. U.S. forces had one soldier wounded by hand grenade fragments. Two AK-47 rifles, one RGO pistol, 3 pound of documents and 50 flashlight batteries were evacuated. The following day (6 February) at 0015 hours, a security patrol from C/1-5 Inf (M) engaged 10-20 enemy moving east towards the Ho Bo Woods in the Citadel area 2 kilometers southwest (XT558-265) of the previous morning's contact. Organic weapons, one light fire team and an AC-119 "Shadow" fires were employed during the contact, killing ten enemy soldiers. The enemy force returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons wounding four U.S. soldiers, two of whom died of wounds. Two AK-47 rifles were evacuated and numerous blood trails were located at the contact site. The enemy broke contact at 0210 hours. At 0800 hours, a wounded prisoner-of-war was captured at the contact site. The PW identified his unit as the 2 Company, Thanh Vien Battalion, SL-1, a rice transportation unit. The Than Vien Battalion is unidentified and is most likely a code name for a rear service element of SL-1.

Activity was at a low level in the 3rd Brigade area of operations as U.S. forces killed seven enemy soldiers and captured four prisoners-of-war in seven separate contacts. One enemy attack by fire was reported during the first week of February. Beginning at 1614 hours on 4 February, Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry received four rounds of 60mm mortar fire 75 meters from their position located in the Plain of Reeds 2 kilometers from the Cambodian Border (XT2711175). There were no U.S. casualties.

Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry began an operation on 2 February in the Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT6720) northeast of Cu Chi to root enemy forces in this area. Elements of the Cu Chi District Force and 268 VC/NVA Regiment are known to use this area as a base of operations. As of 7 February, B/2-14 Inf had killed four enemy in this operation which is still continuing.

Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry located a cache in the brush 6 kilometers north of Hiep Hoc at 1310 hours on 3 February. Evacuated were
four 30 pound Chicom claymore mines, 85 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 108 rifle grenades, 45 pounds of C-4 explosive, 20 feet of detonating cord, 120 60mm mortar fuses, three homemade grenades, one 81mm mortar round, 750 rounds of AK ammunition and seven pounds of documents.

Elements of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to apply pressure to active enemy resupply and support elements within their area of operations as 59 enemy were killed and two prisoners-of-war captured in 28 separate contacts.

Company B, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kilometers south of Ben Luc (XS624716) at 0930 hours on 1 February. One enemy was killed by organic weapons fire, one prisoner-of-war was captured and one Hoi Chanh was received. All three of the enemy were identified as members of the VCI. Two M16 rifles and one 9mm Browning pistol were evacuated. Six kilometers southeast of this contact (XS626894) at 1200 hours, B/6-31 Inf and helicopter gunships of the 118th Assault Helicopter Company engaged four enemy soldiers, killing all four. Two M7 carbines and two Thompson submachine guns were evacuated.

Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy while conducting a night patrol 4.5 kilometers northeast of Binh Phuoc (XS330990) at 1955 hours on 1 February. Seven enemy soldiers were killed by organic weapons fire, TAC air strikes and "Fire Dragon" (ARVN AC-119). One U.S. soldier was wounded by enemy small arms fire. Two AK47 rifles were evacuated.

At 1200 hours on 3 February, Company A, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry located a cache 9 kilometers northeast of Thuy Dong (XS356640), and evacuated 18 107mm rockets with fuses.

On 3 February, elements of 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry accounted for ten enemy killed in three separate contacts 6.5 kilometers northwest of Tan Tra. At 1210 hours, Company D received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy (XS626681), wounding one U.S. soldier. Returning fire with organic weapons and helicopter gunships of the 118th AHC, five of the enemy were killed. Captured documents identified the 625th Company of the K7 Sapper Battalion, 11 NVA Regiment. Three and one-half hours later (1540 hours), gunships of the 118th AHC and the G-CC ship, 2-60 Inf engaged two enemy 200 meters southeast of the earlier contact (XS631660), killing both of the enemy soldiers. At 1720 hours, Company A with gunships of the 118th AHC and Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged three enemy soldiers 200 meters north of the earliest contact (XS626684) and killed all three of the enemy soldiers. Two AK47 rifles were evacuated.

A prisoner-of-war captured by Company B, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry on 5 February, 5 kilometers west of Can Gion (XS732734), identified his unit as the C3 Company, Dong Phu Battalion. The PW stated that the battalion's strength was too low to carry out any offensive operations and
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that its present mission was to guard My Loc (V) (XT7972) cadre. The PW also revealed that families of NVA ralliers were being punished because of their relatives rallying to the GVN. For this reason, the men of the Dong Phu Battalion are afraid to rally even though they want to. The morale in the battalion is very low and the soldiers do not want to fight any longer, however, they will not rally for fear of reprisals against their families in North Vietnam.

Enemy initiated activity throughout the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI decreased slightly during the second week of February (8-14 February), but continued at a moderate level. Main force units continued to avoid contact while experiencing a lack of logistical support. It also became apparent as a result of information received from a prisoner-of-war and document readouts that enemy units have undergone a period of reorganization throughout the sub-regions. Areas of main enemy initiated activity were southwest of the Straight Edge Woods and in the vicinity of Thy Binh. Mining activity continued at a moderate level with the main areas of mining activity located in the Sugar Mill and east of Binh Panoc. In addition, emphasis was placed on the political indoctrination of enemy troops in an attempt to limit the effects of the Chieu Hoi program, while attempting to increase military proselytism of GVN troops.

One shelling incident was reported in the 25th Infantry Division TAOI during the second week of February. A 1st Brigade element, Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, located at Patولا Whills, 9 kilometers southwest of the Renegade Woods (XT2934306), observed seven rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire impact outside the wire at 1105 hours on 11 February.

In five separate contacts, 1st Brigade elements killed 22 enemy and captured three prisoners-of-war. A contact involving Companies A and B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry and elements of 2nd Battalion, 31st Armor, 3.5 kilometers east of Trai Bi (XT1556686) on 8 February, resulted in 15 enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war. Beginning at 0620 hours the U.S. forces engaged an unknown number of enemy moving northwest with six light fire teams, six TAC air strikes and two artillery batteries (267 rounds). The enemy force returned fire with RPGs but there were no U.S. casualties. Evacuated were five AK47 rifles, one M16 rifle, one .45 caliber pistol, one RPG launcher, 15 rounds of RPG ammunition, five ChiCom hand grenades and 4 pounds of documents. Both PW interrogation and document readout identified the enemy contacted as elements of the 82 Rear Service Group. At 1015 hours the following day (9 February), 1/4-9 Inf captured one additional PW, 300 meters north of the previous day's contact.

Activity in the 2nd Brigade area of operations, while decreasing during the week, continued at a moderate level with most of the activity being limited to logistical resupply by rear service units. In nine separate contacts, 18 enemy were killed by 2nd Brigade forces. On 9 February at 1845 hours, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry engaged seven enemy with organic
weapons and a light fire team, 8 kilometers west of Ben Suc (XT495364).
Two of the enemy were killed and 4 pounds of documents were evacuated. At 0715 hours the following morning (10 February), C/3-4 Cav located one enemy KIA in a sweep of the contact area. At 1615 hours, C/3-4 Cav located one grave with one enemy body, credited to the previous day's action, bringing the total number of enemy killed to four. In five other actions in the Boi Loi Woods between 10-13 February, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry elements killed eight additional enemy and located seven enemy killed by artillery fire.

On 10 February at 1120 hours, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry on a reconnaissance mission in the Citadel 5 kilometers northwest of Trung Lap (XT554244), located in a hole and evacuated 4500 pounds of rice in 100 pound bags with various markings. At 1300 hours, D/2-12 Inf located an additional 3000 pounds of rice in another hole. This cache was also contained in 100 pound bags with various markings and was located 200 meters north of the previous find (XT544246).

Activity within the 3rd Brigade area of operations was at a low level during the 2nd week of February. Ten enemy were killed and one prisoner-of-war was captured in five separate contacts. Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry accounted for six enemy killed between 9-12 February in its operations in the Filhol Rubber Plantation. On 9 February a combat patrol from B/2-14 Inf killed two enemy soldiers, one of whom was identified as Vu Minh Liam, Assistant Political Officer of the Quiet Thang Regiment. According to captured documents, the Quiet Thang Regiment has been reorganized to include the 1 and 2 Quiet Thang Battalions and the Gia Dinh 4 Sapper Battalion.

Company C, 2nd Battalion, (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry located a cache at 1100 hours on 13 February in a bunker 8 kilometers southwest of Trung Bang (XT435196). Evacuated were 35 RPG rounds, 35 new RPG boosters, three AP mines, 59 B-40 rockets, 75 B-40 boosters, three Chicom claymore mines, 2000 feet of detonating cord, two AK magazines, 500 pounds of small arms ammunition, two wire cutters, one RPG launcher and 1/2 pounds of documents. Five homemade hand grenades with tripwire attached were destroyed. At 1445 hours, C/2-22 Inf (M) destroyed 357 homemade grenades in a cache located 100 meters southwest of the earlier discovery.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division accounted for 36 enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war in 15 separate contacts during the second week of February. The largest contact developed on 8 February at 2045 hours when Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 7 kilometers east of Binh Phuoc (XS684546). Five enemy were killed by fire from organic weapons and artillery. No U.S. casualties resulted from enemy small arms fire. Five additional enemy dead were located the following morning on a sweep of the contact area by A/2-47 Inf (K).

A combat patrol from Company B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, located 4 kilometers northwest of Can Doc (XT386414), engaged an unknown number of enemy at 2010 hours on 9 February with organic weapons, light fire team and
artillery, killing four of the enemy. On 13 February at 2015 hours, 2 kilometers southwest of the 9 February contact, snipers of D/5-60 Inf with U.S. Navy river patrol boats engaged four enemy soldiers with organic weapons, killing all four of the enemy. One AK47 rifle was evacuated.

A number of notable civilian and military personnel visited Cu Chi Base Camp during the week of 8-14 February. General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, visited the 25th Infantry Division on 10-11 February to inspect U.S. Army facilities and troop units. On 11-12 February, the Reverend Dr. John R. McLaughlin, Secretary, Methodist Commission on Chaplains visited Cu Chi Base Camp and three fire support base to confer with U.S. Military Chaplains endorsed by the United Methodist Church. Major General Walter J. Woolwine, Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, USARV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 13 February to obtain an update on logistical support to the 25th Infantry Division. On 15 February, Major General Karl W. Gustafson, the Provost Marshal General, visited Cu Chi Base Camp to observe and discuss military police operations of the 25th Infantry Division.

Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division TAOI generally remained at a moderate level during the third week of February (15-21 February). Main force units continued to avoid contact while preparing for a possible high-point in March. (See 372d Radio Research Company, 303d Radio Research Battalion Historical Report for this period.) Mining activity increased during the week with the main areas of activity being north of the Sugar Mill (XT4505) and in the Boi Loi Woods (XT2837).

Seven shelling incidents occurred during the week, six of which were in the 1st Brigade area of operations. Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1651) received attacks by fire on 17 February (eight rounds of 120mm mortar fire - no U.S. casualties) and 19 February (10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire - one U.S. wounded). On three different occasions, night defensive positions of Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 1.5 kilometers north of the Cambodian border and west of the Straight Edge Woods, received attacks by fire. Six rounds of M79 fire and 62 rounds of 82mm mortar fire were directed against A/4-9 Inf by unknown enemy forces. No casualties were sustained in any of these attacks by fire.

In five separate contacts, 1st Brigade forces accounted for ten enemy killed and the capture of two prisoners-of-war. At 1350 hours on 15 February, a 1st Brigade Command and Control ship with elements of 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 8 kilometers southwest of Tay Ninh City (XT095386), engaged 15 enemy with two artillery batteries (134 rounds) and two light fire teams resulting in three enemy killed and the capture of two female prisoners-of-war. Two M16 rifles were evacuated. At 1935 hours, A/4-9 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, and light fire team approximately 170 meters southwest of the earlier contact (XT096384). One enemy soldier was killed. Captured documents identified the Minh Dien (V) unit. No U.S. casualties were sustained in either contact.
Team 13, Company F (Rangers), 75th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 9.5 kilometers north of Dau Tieng (XT468567) at 0050 hours on 19 February. Artillery fire resulted in five enemy killed.

One shelling incident was reported in the 2nd Brigade area of operations. At 0115 hours on 21 February, a night defensive position of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry on Nui Ong 12 kilometers north-northeast of Dau Tieng (XT522588), received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. No U.S. casualties were sustained.

The level of enemy activity in the 2nd Brigade area of operations remained at a low level during the week with the lower Boi Loi Woods as the center of enemy activity. Rear Service operations along the Saigon River remained the primary activity of Sub-Region 1 units as was evidenced by several minor contacts on both sides of the river. Reports continued to indicate that the sub-regional forces are still suffering critical food shortages. There has also been indication that SR-1 forces intend to shift operations to the eastern Citadel, Hoc Mon (D), and the outskirts of Saigon, renewing their efforts in the area northwest of Saigon, although SR-1 forces have remained relatively dormant during the Winter/Spring Campaign. The tactics to be employed are sapper and special actions which will be conducted in coordination with penetration agents.

In five separate contacts, 2nd Brigade forces accounted for 18 enemy killed. At 1645 hours on 18 February, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 6 kilometers southeast of Ben Sue (XT632313) in the Ho Bo Woods, engaged an estimated ten enemy with organic weapons and light fire team, resulting in four enemy killed. One female Hoi Chanh was received. Two AK/47 rifles, two K54 pistols and five pounds of documents were evacuated. Enemy small arms fire killed one U.S. soldier and wounded another. Contact was lost at 1845 hours. At 2050 hours, C/2-12 Inf engaged two enemy approximately 360 meters southeast of the earlier contact (XT634310). Both enemy soldiers were killed. Two AK/47 rifles, one ChiCom claymore mine, 50 pounds of rice and 1 pound of documents were evacuated.

At 0935 hours on 21 February, helicopter gunships of the 187th Assault Helicopter Company with elements of 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 5 kilometers northwest of Ben Sue (XT525351) in the Boi Loi Woods, engaged six enemy in blue uniforms. Organic weapons fire resulted in all six enemy being killed. A/2-12 Inf swept the contact area and located five pounds of documents and ten pounds of medical supplies.

Enemy activity in the 3rd Brigade area of operations increased in the northern and eastern sections of the AO. Sub-regional forces continued to conduct reconnaissance and make preparations for future offensive operations in northern Duc Hoa (D) and northern Long An (F). There were several indications during the week that two or three main force units of Sub-Region 2 are planning to launch offensive operations in the northern portion of the sub-region.
In five separate contacts, 3rd Brigade forces killed 14 enemy and captured one prisoner-of-war. On 18 February at 1105 hours the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry with the 15 and 55 Popular Force Companies engaged an unknown number of enemy 7 kilometers southwest of Trang Bang (XT472123) with organic weapons. Six enemy were killed and five AK-47 rifles, 100 rounds of small arms ammunition and six AK magazines were evacuated. Three U.S. soldiers were wounded by enemy return fire with small arms and hand grenades.

At 1500 hours on 15 February, Company A, 168th Engineer Battalion with elements of 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, located ten enemy killed by artillery, 8.5 kilometers northeast of Go Dau Ha (XT474263).

Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 5 kilometers southeast of Trang Bang (XT512416) on 17 February, captured a doctor from the K2 Dispensary in Ba Thu, Cambodia. The physician stated that his mission was to go to My Tan Village (XT5110) and Duc Lep Village (XT5506) and establish dispensaries between these points. He further stated that he had heard that Group 5 (the 267 Battalion) and Group 10 (the 269 Battalion) would move into northern Duc Hoa (D) in four or five weeks to conduct offensive operations. This would indicate a possible highpoint which would be conducted in March 1970.

There was a sharp increase in enemy activity in the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division area of operations as U.S. forces accounted for 75 enemy killed and captured three prisoners-of-war in 28 separate contacts.

In a series of contacts on 19 February, 8 kilometers west of Rach Kien (X5620702), elements of the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry killed 12 enemy soldiers. Company B engaged and killed one enemy soldier with automatic weapons fire from gunships of the 118th Assault Helicopter Company at 1320 hours. Two hours later (1515 hours), B/2-60 Inf and gunships of the 118th AHC engaged three additional enemy soldiers, killing all three. Two and one-half pounds of documents and 5 pound of medical supplies were evacuated. One hour later (1615 hours), B/2-60 Inf engaged an estimated enemy squad with organic weapons, one light fire team, one TAC air strike and one artillery battery (337 rounds), resulting in seven enemy killed. Contact was lost at 1655 hours. Three U.S. soldiers were killed by enemy small arms fire. At 1650 hours, 2 kilometers northwest of the earlier contact (X5602-710), gunships of the 118th AHC engaged one enemy soldier with automatic weapons, resulting in one enemy soldier killed.

On 21 February, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, 3 kilometers east of Tan Tru (X700630), engaged five to six enemy with organic weapons, light fire team and artillery beginning at 2005 hours. Five enemy soldiers were killed and one AK-47 rifle was evacuated.
On 20 February at 0015 hours, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 69th Infantry, 4 kilometers northwest of the 19 February contacts of B/2-60 Inf (X5597730), engaged ten enemy with organic weapons, one light fire team and two artillery batteries (181 rounds). Six enemy were killed and one prisoner-of-war captured. Four AK47 rifles, one 60mm mortar tube, three rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, four backpacks, one field radio, three pounds of medical supplies, nine protective masks, 15 SP mines and five pounds of documents were evacuated. Documents captured identified elements of the 1 NVA Regiment, including the 1 and 2 Battalions and the Regimental Signal Company.

Thirty four enemy were killed by elements of 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry in operations between Rach Kien (X37470) and Tan Tru (X56763) during the week (15-21 February). At 2010 hours on 20 February, Company B, 1.5 kilometers northeast of Tan Tru (X5675644), engaged 14 enemy soldiers with organic weapons, a light fire team and artillery resulting in five enemy killed. One AK47 rifle was evacuated. At 2315 hours, B/5-60 Inf, 3 kilometers northeast of Ben Luc (X5877477), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, one light fire team and one artillery battery (178 illumination rounds). Eleven enemy soldiers were killed. Four rounds of RP5 ammunition, 100 rounds of small arms ammunition, 41 pounds of documents, four Chicom hand grenades, one pound of medical supplies and three rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition were evacuated. There were no U.S. casualties in either contact.


Enemy initiated activity remained at a moderate level during the last week of February (22-28 February). Previous intelligence had indicated the initiation of the Spring Campaign on 26 February. (See 372d Radio Research Company, 303d Radio Research Battalion Historical Report for this period.) Enemy offensive activity did increase during the expected period with Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1659), beginning at 0010 hours on 27 February, receiving 25 rounds of 120mm mortar fire. Six U.S. soldiers were killed and six wounded. Heavy damage occurred to one building, moderate damage to three UH-1D helicopters and one AH-1G helicopter, and light damage to two 44-ton trucks, five buildings and two UH-1D helicopters. This was the most destructive enemy attack by fire against a U.S. installation during the current reporting quarter.

During the past several weeks there has been a marked decrease in enemy initiated incidents in Sub-Region 1 as the enemy has diverted his efforts toward harassing allied forces with mines and booby traps. This recent decrease in enemy activity may be due in part to the fact that the enemy is still in the preparation phase for the main part of the Spring Campaign which is supposed to take place in March. This lull also coincides with recent allied AO changes which may have had a bearing on the enemy's
plans for the future. Enemy forces within Sub-Region 2 continued their preparations for future offensive operations in northern Dac Hoa District and Long An Province by conducting limited reconnaissance of targets in these two areas. (For further information, see Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 372d Radio Research Company, 303d Radio Research Battalion, for the corresponding period.)

Enemy offensive activities and the continuation of the Spring Campaign should be characterized by limited attacks by fire against Allied installations and outposts within the Division TAOC, with the added possibility of follow-up sapper attacks. Emphasis by enemy forces will continue to be placed on the limiting of the pacification program, while attempting to maximize economy of forces.

In the 1st Brigade area of operations, five contacts resulted in nine enemy killed. This low level of contact is indicative of enemy refusal to engage 25th Infantry Division forces in open combat. Rear service resupply elements maintained a moderate level of activity. At 1020 hours on 19 February, snipers attached to 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 1,8 kilometers north of Trung Sup (XT170568) engaged 10-15 enemy with organic weapons, light fire team and artillery. Three of the enemy were killed, two AK-47 rifles and 47 pound of documents were evacuated. Seven kilometers southwest (XT115566) on 20 February, Company C, 3-22 Inf engaged one enemy soldier in a tunnel with organic weapons at 1125 hours. The enemy soldier was killed. At 1210 hours, 0-3-22 Inf engaged three enemy soldiers with organic weapons. Contact was lost five minutes later. One enemy dead was found.

At 1215 hours on 28 February, an armored personnel carrier of the Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry (OPCON to 1st Div, 25 Feb 70), detonated one booby trapped (pressure detonating) 750 pound bomb on a road in the Michelin Rubber Plantation (XT577512), 7 kilometers east of Ben Tieng. Seven U.S. soldiers were killed.

The low level of enemy activity in the 2nd Brigade area of operations is evidenced by only five enemy killed in two contacts during the last week of February. On 23 February at 1345 hours, Team 31, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 5 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap (XT538227), engaged three enemy soldiers at 50 meters with organic weapons, light fire team and artillery. All three enemy soldiers were killed.

At 0227 hours on 27 February, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Division Troop element), 8 kilometers south of the Ben Cat Rubber Plantation in the Boi Loi Woods (XT623777), engaged four enemy soldiers with organic weapons and Night Hawk helicopter. Two enemy soldiers were killed and 1 pound of documents were evacuated.

During the latter part of February the 25th Infantry Division began preparations for the deployment of its 2nd Brigade (Task Force Two) in
March to a new area of operations to interdict enemy infiltration routes in eastern Bien Hoa Province, western Phuoc Tuy Province, and areas to be designated by C.G., IFFV. Task Force Two consisted of Headquarters, 2nd Brigade; 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery; Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry; Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion; 2nd Platoon, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry; and an 8" and 155mm howitzer battery from IFFV.

On 26 February 1970, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry became OPCON to 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry was released from OPCON to 2nd Brigade and returned to Divisional control on the same day. This day also saw the new boundary between the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Air Cavalry Division go into effect. This new boundary change meant that the 25th Infantry Division gave up its portion of War Zone C.

Activity decreased in the 3rd Brigade area of operations as six separate contacts resulted in ten enemy killed and four prisoners-of-war. On 22 February at 1950 hours, a combat patrol from Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 5.5 kilometers southeast of Trang Bang (XT522143), engaged five enemy soldiers 100 meters south of their position with organic weapons. One enemy soldier was killed. A sweep of the contact area located one additional enemy KIA.

On 25 February at 1115 hours, 4.5 kilometers east of Trang Bang (XT534-195), elements of the 25th Military Intelligence Company exploiting intelligence information with Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry and helicopter gunships of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, engaged three enemy with organic weapons, killing all three of the enemy. Two AK-47 rifles, one RPG launcher, one RPG round, two Chico's hand grenades and $\frac{1}{2}$ pound of documents were evacuated. Three prisoners-of-war were captured hiding in a tunnel in the contact area. One Hoi Chanh was received. The C3 Company, Trang Bang Local Force Battalion was tentatively identified by captured documents.

On 28 February 1970, the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry came under operational control of 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division from 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

In the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division area of operations, twenty separate contacts resulted in 70 enemy killed. On 25 February at 1225 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 66th Infantry with the 46th ARVW Intelligence Platoon, engaged an unknown number of enemy 4 kilometers northwest of Tan Tru (XT46466). Company B, 2-60 Inf reacted.
Organic weapons, one light fire team, three TAC air strikes and two artillery batteries (462 rounds), accounted for 13 enemy soldiers killed. One L-54 pistol and ½ pound of documents were evacuated. Two US soldiers and four ARVN soldiers were wounded by enemy return fire with small arms and automatic weapons. Approximately 1400 meters southeast of this contact (XS6555), at 1100 hours on 28 February, Companies C and D and Reconnaissance Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, engaged an unknown sized enemy force with organic weapons, one light fire team, two TAC air strikes, one Air Force Forward Air Controller, and two artillery batteries (1225 rounds). Nine enemy soldiers were killed. Five SKS rifles, four Browning Automatic Rifles, two AK-47 rifles, one M-1 Carbine, one light machine gun and one RPG launcher were evacuated. One US soldier was killed and four US soldiers wounded by enemy small arms fire. Documents identified the Guard Unit, Military Staff, SR-3.

Elements of the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry killed 30 enemy soldiers in nine separate contacts between 22 and 27 February. At 0020 hours on 25 February, the Rat Patrol, 2-60 Inf, 5 kilometers southwest of Ben Luc (XS575757) engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons. Contact was lost at 0230 hours. Four enemy dead were located. One US soldier was wounded by enemy small arms fire. At 0800 hours the Rat Patrol located two additional bodies of enemy killed in the contact. One AK-47 rifle was evacuated and one sampam was destroyed.

At 2100 hours on 27 February, Company B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, 3.5 kilometers east of Ben Tru (XS705555), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, light fire team and AC-119 (Shadow) gunship. Contact was lost at 2235 hours. Four US soldiers and two Tiger Scouts were wounded when the enemy returned fire with small arms and RPGs. A sweep of the contact area located seven enemy soldiers killed.

On 23 February at 1840 hours, a combat patrol, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, 7 kilometers east of Binh Phuoc (XS 683545), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, light fire team and artillery. Contact was lost at 1850 hours. At 1300 hours on 24 February A/2-47 Inf (M) located four enemy soldiers killed in the previous evening’s contact.

At 1230 hours on 24 February, Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 5 kilometers northwest of Ben Suc (XT529598) in the Boi Loi Woods, located a cache in a hole. Evacuated were two M-16 rifles, six AK-47 rifles, one RPG launcher, one 60mm mortar tube, two base plates for 60mm mortars, two 20 pound AT mines, 1200 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, 50 rifle grenades, 70 AT hand grenades and 21,450 rounds of small arms ammunition. One US hand grenade, 97 RPG rounds, 21 RPG boosters, 11 Chico bangalore torpedoes, eight rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 13 cases of 82mm mortar fuses and 31 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition were destroyed.
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During the final week of February, a number of notable military personalities visited the 25th Infantry Division. On 26 February, Rear Admiral Frank B. Voris, Surgeon, Pacific Command, visited medical facilities of the 25th Infantry Division and 12th Evacuation Hospital. On 26 February, Colonel Samuel C. Cockerham, Commanding Officer, 34th General Support Group, made a liaison visit to the 25th Infantry Division to discuss aircraft maintenance and supply. On 27 February, Major General Chin Yung-Fa, ROC, Deputy Director, G3, Army General Headquarters, discussed tactical and technical employment of anti-infiltration warfare in the 25th Infantry Division TAOI. On 27 February, Major General Sheldon E. Lollis, Commanding General, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, visited the 25th Infantry Division automotive support facilities. On 27-28 February, Wing Commander D.E. Jamieson, RNZAF, Administrative Planning Staff-Ministry of Defense visited the 25th Infantry Division for orientation of Division air activities.

The 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, killed 489 and captured 36 of the enemy during the month of February, accounted for 186 individual weapons, 12 crew-served weapons and 4.49 tons of rice (captured or destroyed). Division soldiers destroyed 230 mines and boobytraps while detonating 96, resulting in 11 U.S. soldiers killed and 101 wounded.

During the month, Civic Action/PSYOPS activities declined slightly due to a lull in operations during the Tet holidays and a major unit relocation to a new area expanding the TAOI. Quick reaction type operations decreased in number primarily due to the low intensity of contacts with the enemy and limited exploitable new intelligence.

A total of 52,740 patients were treated during the month on ICAPS, NITECAPS, and MEDCAPS. Over 900 small gifts were prepared for distribution by the Cu to patients at the provincial hospitals during the Tet season. An Innocent Civilian Center (ICC) was opened at Cu Chi Base Camp as was directed by the CG. It provides facilities to house innocent civilians who have been detained by Division units and later declared innocent by the IPW interrogation team. The area includes sleeping, kitchen, shower and latrine facilities in addition to a comfortable dayroom. It provides accommodations for VN civilians while awaiting transportation to their homes which is provided by the detaining unit.

Approximately 15 million leaflets were disseminated and 1,235 hours of broadcasts were made during the month. Two hundred and eighty-seven Hoi Chanh rallied to all forces in the TAOI. The Kit Carson Scout authorization for the Division was increased to 400. At the close of the month there were 396 assigned.
 Implementation of HES-70 resulted in numerous changes of hamlet status as of 31 Jan 70. There was an overall regression of 31 hamlets in Hau Nghia Province from B & C level to D level and an upgrading of 79 hamlets in Long An Province to B level with overall upgrades of 34 from C, 27 from D, 11 from E, and 7 from VC categories.

The 31 Jan 70 HES-70 results were:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
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<td>91</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
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<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>119</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
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</table>

Population living in A, B, and C hamlets was 99.9 percent in Tay Ninh Province, 72.4 percent in Hau Nghia Province, and 87.3 percent in Long An Province.

Enemy initiated activity and mining incidents decreased throughout the Division's TAOD during the first week of March (1-7 March). Previous intelligence had indicated the possibility of an increased activity period during this week, however the anticipated increase failed to materialize. (For further information see Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 372nd Radio Research Company, 303rd Radio Research Battalion, for corresponding period.)

Six enemy were killed in four separate contacts in the 1st Brigade area of operations during the period 1-7 March. Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry killed two enemy soldiers while operating in the Trapezoid against SE-1 Forces (XT6336) during 1-4 March. On 5 March at 1830 hours Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 5 kilometers northwest of Ben Suc (XT524349) engaged three enemy soldiers with artillery, killing two of the enemy.

At 1115 hours on 2 March, the Scout Platoon, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, located a cache 3.5 kilometers northwest of the Ben Chai Rubber Plantation (1409469). Evacuated were two M-16 rifles, three SKS rifles, nine M-16 magazines and five pounds of documents. The captured documents identified local force elements of Tay Ninh Province. No tactical information was obtained.
On 2 March 1970, Task Force Two (2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division) became OCON to II FFV (See Annex A, Task Organization). With the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division to the United States, the AO of the 25th Infantry Division became extended. To facilitate command/control of this AO, II FFV took operational control of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

Contact decreased in the 3rd Brigade area of operations as six contacts resulted in 14 enemy killed. The most significant contact occurred on 6 March at 2137 hours 12 kilometers northwest of Hieu Hoa (XT33180), 2 kilometers southeast of the Cambodian border. Company D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry engaged an unknown sized enemy force with artillery. Six enemy soldiers were killed.

Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, at 1238 hours on 3 March, 3.5 kilometers east of Trung Lap (XT524212), located ten enemy soldiers killed by 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, initiated by duffel bag activations on 19 and 20 February 1970.

At 1200 hours on 5 March, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry with elements of Company E, 65th Engineer Battalion (OCON to 4-46 ARVNs), 5 kilometers northwest of Bao Trai (XT518097), located an enemy munitions cache. Destroyed were 27 homemade booby traps, one booby trapped round of 105mm ammunition, four booby trapped RPG rounds and two twenty-five pound ChiCom claymore mines. Two AK47 rifles were evacuated. Three dead enemy soldiers were located by GVN troops. At 1356 hours, elements of 4-46 ARVNs with A/2-22 Inf (M) and E/65th Engr Bn, located one enemy dead approximately 1700 meters northeast of the earlier find (XT519099). GVN troops evacuated two 41 carbines, 1 pound of documents, one typewriter, two headsets, and one SKS rifle from a second cache. One SKS rifle and one AK47 rifle were evacuated by U.S. troops. At 1445 hours, A/2-22 Inf (M) engaged two enemy soldiers with organic weapons and hand grenades, killing both enemy soldiers. One AK47 rifle was evacuated. Contact was in the vicinity of the second cache (XT519099).

Activity within the area of operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued at a moderate level as main force units in Sub Region 3 persisted in their efforts to disrupt the Pacification Program. In eighteen separate contacts, 3-9 Inf Div forces killed 54 enemy soldiers and captured one prisoner-of-war.

On 5 March, information gained from a prisoner-of-war captured by GVN forces in the vicinity of Tan Tru (D) reveals the conditions of local forces in the 3-9 Inf Div TAOI. The PW protested that 3L-3 Headquarters apparently had no real concept of existing conditions within the District. The PW maintained that unless adequate replacements were received, it would be impossible to continue effective operations against the GVN Pacification Program. Previous intelligence has indicated that communist VC capabilities in the District have deteriorated as a result of pacification and Allied operations.
Elements of 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry killed 21 enemy soldiers in four contacts east of Tan Tru during the period 1-7 March. The most significant contact began at 1940 hours on 1 March as Company D, 2-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 4 kilometers east of Tan Tru (X571638). Thirteen enemy soldiers were killed by fire from small arms, automatic weapons and artillery illumination, 7 kilometers southwest of Ben Luc (X574-771). Both company soldiers were killed, one AK47 rifle was destroyed. At 2240 hours, 2 kilometers northeast of the earlier contact (X576748), Company A engaged 10-12 enemy soldiers with organic weapons, one light fire team, one AC-119 "Shadow" and artillery illumination (275 rounds). Six enemy soldiers were killed. Evacuated were three AK47 rifles. One U.S. soldier was wounded by enemy small arms fire.

Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry killed five enemy soldiers in five separate contacts between 1910 hours and 2255 hours on 4 March 1970, 5 kilometers southwest of Binh Phuoc (X565522). At 1630 hours on 7 March, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2-47 Inf (H) located 11 enemy killed in graves vicinity X5655519. The enemy KIA were credited to an A/2-47 Inf (H) contact at 1930 hours on 4 March vicinity X564520.

During the period 1-7 March 1970, a number of notable civilian and military personalities visited Cu Chi Base Camp. On 1 March, Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, visited the 25th Infantry Division for an update briefing. Colonel Howard G. Allbee, Chief, USARV AGI Team, conferred with Commanders and Staff of the 25th Infantry Division on problem areas within their units on 1 through 7 March. On 2 March, Major General Edward Bautz, Jr., ACoS, Operations, J-3, USMACV, received an orientation briefing on 25th Infantry Division activities. Major General Wellborn G. Delvin, Chief of Staff (Designate), MACV, received an orientation visit on the 25th Infantry Division on 3-4 March. On 6 March, Mr. Clyde D. Hardin, Deputy for Southeast Asia Matters, Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research and Development, received an update on 25th Infantry Division research and development activities. Brigadier General Lawrence V. Greene, ACoS, J-1, USARV, received an orientation visit to the 25th Infantry Division on 6-7 March. On 7-9 March, the OPD Orientation Team (LTC Aubrey G. Morris, LTC William L. Wubbena, and LTC Clinton A. Freeman) gave a Junior Officer Career Opportunities Orientation at Cu Chi Base Camp.

On 3 March 1970, the 25th Infantry Division was presented with the Civic Actions Medal, 1st Class, for outstanding contributions to the Civic Action Program.

Enemy initiated activity during the second week of March in the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations increased but still remained at a low level. Enemy offensive activities were characterized generally by limited attacks by fire against ARVN, RF, and PF outposts. Areas of primary enemy activity were in the Trang Bung-Citadel area, vicinity of Dac Hue and along the Van Co Dong river in Long An Province.
Two shelling incidents were reported this week, both occurring in the 1st Brigade area of operations. Five U.S. soldiers were wounded in an attack by fire on Toy Minh Base Camp (XT165515) on 12 March. At 0140 hours the base received 30 rounds of 120mm mortar fire from vicinity XT164568 (determined by radar pickup = Q4). Thirteen of the rounds landed inside the base camp. Two LCHs received moderate damage, two LCHs received light damage, one UH1H was a combat loss, and heavy damage was sustained by one bunker. At 0245 hours, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry was inserted in the area of suspected enemy activity (XT164568) with no results. At 0350 hours, a combat patrol from B/3-22 Inf, located 2 kilometers northeast of the area of suspected enemy activity (XT180578) engaged 3-4 enemy 100-meter mortars from their location with organic weapons and helicopter gunships. At 0355 hours contact was lost. One 120mm mortar was captured.

In five separate contacts 1st Brigade forces killed seven enemy soldiers and captured three prisoners-of-war. The most significant contact began at 0430 hours on 13 March when a combat patrol from Company A, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, located 3 kilometers southwest of Muoi Ba Den (XT258542), engaged an estimated two enemy squads. Contact was lost at 0510 hours. Three enemy soldiers were killed by organic weapons and artillery fire. Enemy small arms fire was completely ineffective. One wounded prisoner-of-war was captured on a sweep of the contact area. Eight ChiCom hand grenades, one AK47 rifle and miscellaneous web gear were evacuated. At 0555 hours, the combat patrol engaged and killed one enemy soldier with small arms and automatic weapons fire. One AK47 rifle was evacuated along with miscellaneous pieces of web gear.

A large enemy food cache was uncovered by Company A, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry on 11 March. At 0830 hours on a reconnaissance mission 6.5 kilometers southeast of Trai Bi (XT775650), A/3-22 Inf located an enemy bunker complex consisting of 18 bunkers, all of which were destroyed. Evacuated were eight tons of unpolished rice, five pounds of salt, cooking utensils, six NVA poncho liners, one entrenching tool, and one flashlight battery.

Enemy activity increased slightly in the 3rd Brigade area of operations as U.S. forces killed 29 enemy soldiers in seven separate contacts. The most significant contact developed at 1000 hours on 12 March, 2.5 kilometers east of the Cambodian border (XT326186) when Company D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted a sweep of the area where artillery and a Night Hawk had previously delivered a large volume of fire due to significant radar sightings. D/2-27 Inf received small arms and mortar fire from an estimated 30 enemy and returned fire with organic weapons, six light fire teams, and two artillery batteries (110 rounds), killing 13 enemy soldiers. Contact was lost at 1100 hours. One AK47 rifle and five pounds of documents were evacuated. Seven rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition were destroyed. The captured documents tentatively identified the 2 Company, 267 Battalion. At 1300 hours, B/2-27 Inf located two complete 60mm mortars and seven rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition 500 meters north of the B/2-27 Inf contact. All were destroyed by artillery.
A combat patrol from Company A, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 7 kilometers southwest of Tra Cu (XS414933), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, and artillery at 0025 hours on 11 March. Four enemy soldiers were killed. Contact was lost at 0100 hours. Four K54 pistols, 150 vials of penicillin, and ⅔ pound of documents were evacuated. The documents identified the 2642 Battalion which normally operates in Duc Hoa District. The documents included notes by a member of the 6 Local Force Battalion, detailing the unit's mission assigned by SR-2 Headquarters for an upcoming "D-Day". According to the documents, battlefield preparations were to be completed by 20 March, while "D-Day" was to be scheduled for 25 March. The battalion's primary targets will be Pacification teams, RF/PF elements, and allied troops stationed in Binh Chanh District, while all the units plan to coordinate with guerrilla forces to assassinate GVN officials and intelligence personnel.

Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry uncovered a cache 4 kilometers northwest of Hiep Hoa (XT412097) at 1300 hours on 11 March. Destroyed were 90 ChiCom hand grenades.

Enemy activity continued at a moderate level in the area of operations of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division during the second week of March. In 16 separate contacts, 3-9 Inf Div forces killed 53 enemy soldiers and captured four prisoners-of-war. At 1040 hours on 14 March, Companies B and D, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry with elements of Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and the 118th Assault Helicopter Company, engaged an unknown sized enemy force 4 kilometers northwest of Tan Tru (XS6966). Organic weapons, helicopter gunships, and three artillery batteries (534 rounds) accounted for 11 enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, one protective mask, two pounds of medical supplies and ⅔ pound of documents were evacuated. At 1515 hours, B/5-60 Inf captured one prisoner-of-war in the area of contact. The PV identified himself as the NCOIO of the Signal Section of the 211 Sapper Battalion. The battalion is currently believed to be coordinating with the 3 Artillery Battalion and the 2 Battalion, 1 NVA Regiment against the 2-60 Infantry Base Camp in Tan Tru (D). The captured documents also identified the 211 Sapper Battalion. At 1650 hours, B/5-60 Inf destroyed 11 bunkers in a bunker complex 1 kilometer northwest of the contact site (XS681663).

Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, 5 kilometers south of Ben Luc (XS618718) engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, one light fire team and two artillery batteries (310 rounds) at 1350 hours on 10 March. Eight enemy soldiers were killed. One AK47 rifle was evacuated. While sweeping the area of contact, ground troops detonated one booby-trapped (tripwired) ChiCom hand grenade. One U.S. soldier was wounded. At 1515 hours, B/2-47 Inf (M) located six enemy dead 700 meters south of the earlier contact (XS618711). Three AK47 rifles were evacuated. Captured documents identified the C30 Company, D8 Training Battalion, 1 NVA Regiment. To date the training unit of the 1 NVA Regiment has been identified exclusively in the vicinity of Ben Luc, indicating that the battalion has been infiltrating personnel along the Bo Bo Canal, a traditional route into the northern sub-region.
At 2045 hours on 12 March, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry with Vietnamese Navy elements, 9 kilometers northwest of Tan An (10°48'7"N, 109°45'18") engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and U.S. Navy helicopter gunships. One U.S. soldier was wounded by enemy small arms fire. Four of the enemy were killed. On 13 March at 2130 hours, Rcn/2-60 Inf with U.S. Navy elements engaged and killed one enemy soldier 2.6 kilometers northeast of the previous evening's contact.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations remained at a low level during the third week of March (15-21 March), as enemy units continued to avoid contact while confining their activities to reconnaissance of future targets and replenishment of logistical bases. Mining activity increased within the AO with the primary area of activity located north of the Sugar Hill (XT4505). Areas of significant enemy activity were around Tay Ninh, the lower Bøi Løi Woods and Trang Bang area.

Three shelling incidents were reported during this period, all within the 1st Brigade area of operations. One U.S. soldier was wounded when Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry received 10 mortar rounds at 0855 hours on 19 March. The company was located 4.5 kilometers northeast of Trang Sup (XT305553) at the time of the attack by fire. Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT655515) received attacks by fire on 19 March (2330 hours) and 21 March (0518). There were no U.S. casualties or equipment losses or damages.

Enemy activity within the 1st Brigade area of operations continued at a low level during the third week of March. In five separate contacts, 1st Brigade forces killed 57 enemy soldiers and captured one prisoner-of-war.

The 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry accounted for 56 enemy dead in a two-day operation on Nui Ba Den and just northeast of the mountain. At 1022 hours on 15 March, C/4-23 Inf (M), approximately 600 meters northeast of the mountain (XT306010), received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy. One U.S. soldier was wounded. U.S. forces returned fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery with unknown results. Contact was lost at 1337 hours. A/4-23 Inf (M) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1100 hours 2.8 kilometers northeast of C/4-23 Inf (M) contact (XT282612). Ten U.S. soldiers were wounded. U.S. forces returned fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery, CS drops and TAC air strikes resulting in 31 enemy killed. Contact was lost at 1730 hours. At 1900 hours, A/4-23 Inf (M) received small arms fire resulting in one U.S. soldier killed. Contact was lost at 1905 hours.

At 1010 hours on 16 March, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and A/4-23 Inf (M) were inserted in reaction to an intelligence target on the "Saddle" area of Nui Ba Den (XT285600). An LH received small arms ground fire. No enemy contact was made.
fire resulting in moderate damage to the LOH but no casualties. The fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery. (For further information see Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 372d Radio Research Company, 303d Radio Research Battalion, for the corresponding period.) Later at 1338 hours, A/D/4-23 Inf (N) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy vicinity XT280600. U.S. forces returned fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, and TAC air strikes with unknown results. An AHIC Cobra gunship supporting the 4-23 Inf (N) contact received heavy small arms fire at 1400 hours and crashed. A/I-23 Inf (N) swept the contact area at 1430 hours and located ten enemy killed vicinity XT285605. At 1527 hours, C/4-23 Inf (N) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy vicinity XT281615. Two U.S. soldiers were killed and six wounded. U.S. forces returned fire with organic weapons, light fire team, TAC air strikes, and artillery resulting in 15 enemy KIA. Contact was lost at 1845 hours.

Company C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, 9.5 kilometers northeast of Dau Tieng (XT524564), located five enemy dead at 1650 hours on 19 March. The bodies were 3-5 days old. The enemy had been killed by artillery initiated by duffel bag activations.

Operations by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry during this period resulted in seven enemy killed and the capture of three prisoners-of-war in two separate contacts. On 18 March at 1500 hours, a light scout team from Troop D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav received heavy small arms fire from an estimated 20 enemy, 1 kilometer east of the Cambodian border (XT346139) near the Tay Minh and Hau Nghia Province borders. The team LOH took one hit, sustaining minor damage. Returning fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and supporting artillery accounted for six enemy KIA. Companies A and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry swept the contact area with no further results.

Enemy activity within the 3rd Brigade area of operations continued at a low level, as main force units continued to reconnoiter future targets. In ten separate contacts, 3rd Brigade forces killed 22 enemy soldiers and captured two prisoners-of-war.

A combat patrol from Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 8 kilometers southwest of Go Day Ha (XT375171) on 17 March at 2125 hours. They returned fire with organic weapons, a light fire team, and a flare ship, resulting in six enemy killed. One U.S. soldier was killed and five were wounded during the contact. Two AK47 rifles and two RPG launchers were evacuated. At 2005 hours on 19 March, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, reacting to duffel bag activations, engaged ten enemy soldiers with organic weapons, a light fire team and a flare ship 3 kilometers southeast of B/2-14 Inf's contact on 17 March. Five of the enemy soldiers were killed. There was no return fire from the enemy element.
Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry killed seven enemy soldiers in four separate contacts on a rubber tree plantation 3 kilometers southeast of Cu Chi (XT655122). The contacts began at 0920 hours on 16 March and continued sporadically through 2150 hours on 17 March. One AK47 rifle, 21 pounds of commo wire, one headset and miscellaneous medical supplies were evacuated to Cu Chi Base during the operations. Captured documents identified elements of the Quyet Thang Regiment and BR-1 Headquarters sections.

Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry with elements of the 25th Military Intelligence Company uncovered a small enemy weapons cache at 1223 hours on 15 March. The cache was located 5 kilometers north of Trung Lep (XT587266) in the Ho Bo Woods. Evacuated were three M16 rifles, one AK47 rifle, one SKS rifle, one Carbine, four M16 magazines, four 122mm rockets and 700 pounds of polished rice.

Activity within the area of operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained moderate during the week as main force and local force units continued their reconnaissance and re-supply efforts for future planned activities intended to disrupt the GVN Pacification Program in Long An Province. In 26 separate contacts, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division elements killed 75 enemy soldiers and captured six prisoners-of-war.

In a series of contacts 4 kilometers southeast of Ben Luc (XS6473) on 20 March, elements of 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry killed ten enemy soldiers, captured five prisoners-of-war, and received one Ho Chi. At 0940 hours, helicopter gunships of Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry with A/2-60 Inf (XS640733), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons resulting in four enemy KIA. At 1200 hours, A/2-60 Inf (XS640729), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons resulting in two enemy KIA. Three prisoners-of-war were captured and one rallier received. One of the PWs identified his unit as the 1 Company, 1 Battalion, 1 NVA Regiment. The PW also stated that the mission of the company was to serve as a commo liaison unit between Ba Thu (XT0604) and Long Dinh Village (XS6573). One-half pound of medical supplies, five AK47 rifles and one K54 pistol were evacuated from the contact area. At 1305 hours, D/2-60 Inf (XS640738), captured two male prisoners-of-war, and evacuated four pounds of documents to Tan Tru. At 1800 hours, A/2-60 Inf (XS643729) engaged four enemy soldiers with organic weapons fire, killing all four enemy.

Operations north and northeast of Tan Tru (XS6764) between 16 and 20 March by elements of 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry accounted for 22 enemy killed in five separate contacts.

At 2155 hours on 21 March, Team 21, Company B (Rangers), 75th Infantry, 3 kilometers northwest of Ben Luc (XS598782), engaged 5-6 enemy soldiers.
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with organic weapons, U.S. Navy light fire team, and artillery. Five of the enemy were killed. No U.S. casualties resulted from enemy small arms fire. At 0130 hours, Team 11, Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry was inserted in this area (XS598782) and received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Returning fire with organic weapons, flareship, U.S. Navy light fire team and artillery, U.S. forces killed two enemy soldiers, bringing the total number of enemy killed during the contact to seven.

During the period 17-27 March, Colonel Walworth F. Williams, Commanding Officer (Designate), 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an initial orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division’s area of operations remained at a low level during the fourth week of March (22-31 March) as the predicted highpoint for enemy main force units failed to materialize. This postponement may have been due to the current politico-military situation within Cambodia. Enemy main force units continued to avoid contact while confining their activities to reconnaissance of future targets and replenishment of logistical bases. There was a decrease in mining activity within the AO during this period. (For further information, see Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 372d Radio Research Company, 303d Radio Research Battalion, for the corresponding period.) Areas of significant enemy activity occurred within the 3rd Brigade of the 9th Division’s AO, specifically around Tan Tru (XS6763) and Rach Kien (XS7470).

Four shelling incidents were reported within the Division’s TAOI, all occurring during the last three days of March. Two of these attacks were within the 1st Brigade’s AO, the most significant being against Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT165515) in the early morning of 31 March. At 0123 hours, Tay Ninh Base Camp received small arms and RPG fire, 16 rounds of 60mm mortar, two rounds of 107mm mortar and an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown number of enemies, resulting in seven U.S. wounded. This enemy force was engaged with helicopter gunships, an Air Force forward air controller, a Night Hawk, and artillery, resulting in five enemy killed. On a sweep of the area by Company G, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and Company A, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, two prisoners-of-war were captured. The two PWs identified the 8 Sapper Battalion, 16 Armor Office, COSVN which had last been identified on 7 March by documents taken from an enemy body southwest of Tham Rot (XT719531). Three AK47 rifles, 80 ChiCom hand grenades, 23 RPG rounds, two bangalore torpedoes, one ChiCom pistol, two rifle grenade launchers, five AK47 magazines, and two pair of wire cutters were evacuated.

Enemy activity within the 1st Brigade’s AO continued at a low level during the fourth week of March. In four separate contacts, 1st Brigade forces killed ten enemy soldiers and captured two prisoners-of-war.

The most significant contact occurred at 1600 hours on 28 March 8.5 kilometers north of Dau Tieng (XT491473) in the Razorbacks. The 1st
Brigade Wnl.-Cav with the Remteassance Platoon and CopezW C, 51st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, engaged 8-10 enemy in bunkers with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, tactical air strikes and artillery. Seven enemy soldiers were killed. Return fire by the enemy resulted in one U.S. killed, three U.S. wounded and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. Three AK47 rifles, ten pounds of documents, and ten pounds of clothing were evacuated.

Operations by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry during this period resulted in 12 enemy killed and the capture of two prisoners-of-war. On 22 March at 1800 hours, an LOH from Troop D, 3-4 Cav on visual reconnaissance over the Fil Hol Rubber Plantation (XT693206) received small arms fire. The gunship returned fire with organic weapons, killing four of the enemy.

On 26 March at 0720 hours, a light scout team from Troop D, 3-4 Cav engaged several enemy with organic weapons and artillery resulting in two enemy soldiers killed. A sweep of the area by Troop C, 3-4 Cav and Company D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry resulted in the capture of two prisoners-of-war and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles, ten pounds of documents, one S.O.I. and code book, and ten pounds of medical supplies. One of the prisoners captured identified the B1 Staff Section, 268 Regiment. He also stated that the entire 268 Regiment was located in the Boi Loi Woods (XT48-38) with an approximate strength of 300 men in January.

On 29 March at 1730 hours, a light scout team of Troop D, 3-4 Cav engaged five enemy soldiers about 2 kilometers north of the Straight Ridge Woods (XT69385) with organic weapons and artillery. Four enemy soldiers were killed.

The only significant enemy caches found during this period were by Troop A, 3-4 Cav on 23 and 24 March approximately 10 kilometers north of the Ban Cui Rubber Plantation (XY236380, XY323360, XY333554). A medical cache containing 700 pounds of penicillin pills, five pounds of unidentified red powder, ten pounds of sulphate, seven pounds of unidentified pink pills, one gallon can of ether, one .50 caliber can of ether vials, two .50 caliber cans of syringes and surgical thread, two .50 caliber cans of powdered penicillin in bottles, one .50 caliber can of unidentified yellow powder, four quart bottles of ether, one five gallon can of chloroform, nine bottles of malaria pills, five pounds of unidentified yellow pills, two 500al bags of glucose, three pounds of unidentified orange pills, nine pounds of unidentified orange powder, 18 pounds of unidentified white pills, two bags of surgical thread, and two AK47 rifles was located at 1245 hours on 23 March. At 1100 hours on 24 March, 4,720 pounds of rice were evacuated. At 1515 hours on 24 March, 50 pounds of medical supplies were evacuated.

Enemy activity within the 3rd Brigade area of operations remained at a low level as main force units continued to avoid contact while attempting to replenish logistical and personnel losses. In 19 separate contacts, 3rd Brigade forces killed 46 enemy soldiers and captured two prisoners-of-war.
On 31 March at 2050 hours, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons 8.5 kilometers northwest of Hiep Hoa (XT373110) in the Plain of Reeds. Six enemy were killed and three AK-47 rifles and three RPG rounds were evacuated. The enemy returned fire with organic weapons, wounding two U.S. soldiers.

On 22 March at 2130 hours, a combat patrol of Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, a Night Hawk, helicopter funships and artillery, 4 kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (XT599161). Nine enemy were killed and ½ pound of documents was evacuated with no U.S. casualties.

A prisoner-of-war was captured by Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry 9 kilometers southwest of Go Dau Ha (XT25115). The PW was an NCO for the Commander of the 269 Battalion. He revealed that the main mission of the 269 Battalion is to combat the success of the Rural Development Cadre in Loc Giang and Duc Hoa (D). He also stated that the 269 Battalion plans on attacking three allied posts in the vicinity of Loc Giang (XT431), An Hiep (XT461), and Rach Cong (XT411).

In an action by snipers of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry on 27 March at 1930 hours 10 kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng (XT47370) in the Boi Loi Woods, five enemy soldiers were killed. Two AK-47 rifles, 24 pounds of documents, 1 pound of medical supplies, and ten pounds of clothing were evacuated.

A Hai Chanh received by Company D, 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry at 1350 hours on 27 March 10 kilometers southwest of Hiep Hoa (X526926) identified the 3 Company, 267 Battalion and related that the Company's mission was to support local forces in attacking Revolutionary Development Cadre.

Activity within the area of operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained moderate during the week as main force units continued to work with local forces to disrupt the Pacification Program. In 32 separate contacts, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division forces killed 86 enemy soldiers and captured seven prisoners-of-war.

In two separate contacts on 22 March at 1930 and 2030 hours, elements of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, killed four enemy soldiers 4 kilometers east of Tan Tru (X573625). Three prisoners-of-war were captured by B/2-60 Inf on 23 March at 1651 hours 2 kilometers northeast of Tan Tru (X581651). They identified the 5 Company, K5 Battalion, 1 NVA Regiment which had last been identified by a prisoner-of-war captured on 19 March 10.5 kilometers northwest of Tan Tru (X591696).

In an action on 25 March at 1120 hours, D/2-60 Inf with air cushion vehicles engaged three enemy with organic weapons and helicopter gunships 5 kilometers north of Tan Tru (X570660). Two enemy soldiers were killed, one prisoner-of-war was captured, and two AK-47 rifles were evacuated. One
U.S. soldier was wounded by enemy small arms fire. The PW identified his unit as C4 (107mm Rocket Company), 3 Artillery Battalion which previous intelligence had indicated was targeted against the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry's Base Camp at Tan Tru (X8665623).

On 27 March at 0125 hours, a combat patrol of Company D, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry with helicopter gunships of the 190th Assault Helicopter Company, reacting to duffel bag activations, engaged an unknown number of enemy 8 kilometers north of Thu Thua (X506800) with organic weapons, one light fire team, and one artillery battery (150 rounds illumination), resulting in 13 enemy soldiers killed. Three SKS rifles, four AK47 rifles, one RPG launcher with 13 RPG rounds, one ChiCom .30 caliber machine gun, 33 rounds of 82mm mortar, 7,750 rounds of small arms ammunition, three anti-tank mines, 751 pounds of explosives, seven ChiCom hand grenades, one protective mask, 30 rounds of rice, 30 blasting caps, five pounds of clothing, two pounds of medical supplies, one round of 57mm ammunition, and five pounds of documents were evacuated. The enemy returned fire with organic weapons slightly damaging one helicopter. There were no U.S. casualties. The captured documents identified the K8 Training Battalion which trains newly infiltrated replacements in sapper tactics.

Elements of Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry had three significant contacts during this reporting period. On 25 March at 1540 hours, Team 21 engaged an estimated platoon of enemy soldiers 6 kilometers north of Tan Hiep (X529588) and killed five of the enemy. Evacuated were one ChiCom hand grenade and ½ pound of documents. On 31 March at 0830 hours, Team 17 with elements of Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged an unknown number of enemy 3.5 kilometers southwest of Rach Kien (X5715670) with organic weapons and helicopter gunships resulting in six enemy killed. One R54 pistol, one ChiCom hand grenade and ½ pound of documents were evacuated. There were no U.S. casualties. Team 24 with elements of B/3-17 Air Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1720 hours on 31 March 6.5 kilometers south of Ben Luc (X622699) with organic weapons and artillery, resulting in seven enemy killed.

On 23 March at 2020 hours, Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanised), 47th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kilometers southeast of Binh Phuoc (X639306) with organic weapons and artillery. Five enemy soldiers were killed. One AK47 rifle and two pounds of documents were evacuated.

On 25 March, Major General Edward Beutz, Jr., Commanding General (Designate), 25th Infantry Division, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

The 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division forces killed 553 and captured 32 of the enemy during the month of March, accounted for 227 individual weapons, 21 crew-served weapons, and 11.03 tons of rice (captured or destroyed). Division soldiers destroyed 210 mines and boobytraps while detonating 72, resulting in eight U.S. soldiers killed and 106 wounded.
In March, 53,276 patients were treated on MEDCAPS and dental civic action programs. A class for 16 RF/PF medics was started by the 12th Evacuation Hospital at Ou Chi Base Camp. The 3-4 Cav conducted MEDCAPS combined with Vietnamese medics, enhancing the rapport of the GVN and providing a method of training GVN personnel.

Approximately 17 million leaflets were disseminated throughout the TAOI during the month and 1500 broadcast were made by ground and air resources. A total of 242 Hoi Chanh rallied during the month. A program to induce wounded VC to rally was initiated by the 3rd Brigade along the Van Co Dong River between FSB Hampton (XT417228) and FSB Mountch (XT437070). The program includes dropping a signaling device (carissa panel 10" x 14") with instructions on use, rally instructions and Chieu Hoi leaflets along with four ounces of rice.

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES-70) ratings as of 28 February 1970 were:

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<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
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<td>120</td>
<td>66</td>
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The percentage of population in A, B, and C category hamlets as of 28 February 1970 was 98.7 percent in Tay Minh, 70.4 percent in Hau Nghia, and 87.0 percent in Long An.

Enemy initiated activity increased significantly during the week (1-7 April) within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations, as enemy forces conducted attacks by fire and limited sapper attacks against allied installations within the 1st and 3rd Brigade AOs. The increased period of enemy activity during the week produced the highest output of enemy initiated activity since October 1969. Primary areas of enemy activity were in the Renegade Woods (XT2930), Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1651), Duc Hue (XT1408), Dau Tieng (XT4947), and west of Go Dau Ha (XT3925). Mining activity also increased during the week.

Ten shelling incidents were reported within the 1st Brigade AO during the week. Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT91473) received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 0710 hours on 1 April, resulting in light damage to four AH-1G (Cobra) helicopters. The fire was returned with artillery, mortars, a Shadow, and a light fire team with unknown results. On 7 April, Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1651) received eight rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire at 0655 hours, four rounds of HS at 0245 hours, and five rounds of 122mm rocket fire at 0630 hours resulting in six U.S. wounded, heavy damage to one truck, and light damage to two trucks and one building. Artillery returned fire to XT75525 and XT67456 with unknown results. At first light, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry swept the area of the suspected enemy locations and evacuated one protective mask, one RPG round and one ChiCom hand grenade. Tay Ninh Base Camp received three 122mm.
rockets at 0710 hours on 3 April resulting in one U.S. killed, 11 U.S. wounded, heavy damage to one building and light damage to another building. On 7 April at 1000 hours Company C, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry near the Straight Edge Woods (XT178297) received eight rounds of 82mm. A UH-1H helicopter in the vicinity received organic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy. Two U.S. soldiers were killed, five U.S. wounded and there was heavy damage to the UH-1H helicopter.

In two separate contacts, 1st Brigade forces killed eight enemy soldiers. On 1 April at 2015 hours, Company G, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry engaged five to six enemy soldiers 1 kilometer north of Phu Khuong (XT376000) with organic weapons and artillery, killing two enemy soldiers and evacuating one AK-47 rifle. On 5 April at 1225 hours, A/4-23 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy at the southeastern base of Mui Ba Den Mountain (XT90370) with organic weapons, an Air Force Forward Air Controller, air strikes, a light fire team, and artillery resulting in six enemy killed and the evacuation of one RPG launcher and one AK-47 rifle. Enemy organic weapons fire killed two and wounded 11 U.S. soldiers.

Operations by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry during this period resulted in 11 enemy killed. On 5 April at 1820 hours, a light scout team, while on visual reconnaissance over the Boi Loi Woods (XT904335), engaged three enemy soldiers with organic weapons resulting in three enemy soldiers killed. At 1015 hours on 7 April, a light fire team from D/3-4 Cav with elements from 116th Assault Helicopter Company and 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 9 kilometers east of Trung Lap (XT690218), resulting in four enemy killed. Four AK-47 rifles, one RPG launcher, one pound of medical supplies and one pound of documents were evacuated. Enemy small arms fire caused moderate damage to one LCH.

Within the 3rd Brigade's AO, nine shellfire incidents were reported during the week. The most significant one occurred at 0245 hours on 1 April, when Company R, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, at Patrol Base Blue (XT258291) received four 107mm rockets, 30 RPG rounds, and 30 rounds HE resulting in two U.S. wounded. Fire was returned with artillery, a light fire team, and a Night Hawk until 0315 hours when contact was lost.

The most significant contact within the 3rd Brigade's AO began at 0840 hours on 2 April when Teams 38 and 39, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry were inserted into the Renegade Woods (XT25930) reacting to intelligence information. The contact lasted until 6 April, ultimately involving Companies A, B, and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, and Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, supported by artillery, tactical air strikes, Air Force Forward Air Controllers, helicopter gunships, flame bath, Shadow, Night Hawk, and flare ships. The total results for the operation were 101 enemy killed (BC), one prisoner-of-war captured, and two Ho Chi Minh received. U.S. casualties were 11 killed, one died of wounds, and 34 wounded. For further information, see Inclosure 6 and 372nd Radio Research Company Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1970.
In other actions by 3rd Brigade forces, seven enemy soldiers were killed, one prisoner-of-war captured and three Hoi Chanh received. At 2155 hours on 4 April, a night defensive position of Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry in the Michelin Rubber Plantation (XT589501) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned with mortars resulting in four enemy killed.

At 1900 hours on 5 April, Company A, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry engaged two enemy soldiers 8 kilometers east of Trung Lap (XT672222), with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed, one enemy wounded and two Hoi Chanh received. On 6 April, a Hoi Chanh rallied to A/6-31 Inf near the 5 April contact site (XT671225). He identified himself as a platoon leader in the 2 Company, 1 Battalion, Quyet Thang Regiment. He stated that the 1 Battalion was now located in Phu Hoa Tay (CNA) which is the normal area of operation of the Quyet Thang Regiment. The 1 Battalion was last identified by a Hoi Chanh who rallied vicinity XT626222 on 23 March.

Enemy initiated activity within the area of operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained at a low level as main force units attempted to avoid contact. In 14 separate contacts, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division forces killed 23 enemy soldiers and captured one prisoner-of-war.

At 1330 hours on 1 April, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS578753) with organic weapons and a light fire team, resulting in three enemy killed. Documents captured northwest of Ben Luc (XS588790) by B/2-60 Inf at 1200 hours on 3 April identified the Postal and Transportation Section of SR-2, Ben Bau (D) element. No tactical information was obtained.

At 0440 hours on 1 April, Company C, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy 4 kilometers north of Tan Tru (XS658697) with organic weapons and artillery killing two enemy soldiers. One AK47 rifle was evacuated. At 2120 hours on 6 April, B/5-60 Inf with river patrol boats (PBRs), engaged three enemy soldiers 5 kilometers northeast of Tan Tru (XS705668) killing two enemy soldiers.

On 4 April at 1100 hours, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry engaged three enemy soldiers 4 kilometers northeast of Binh Phuoc (XS638568) with organic weapons and a light fire team, resulting in three enemy killed.

In an action by Teams 14 and 21, Company K (Ranger), 75th Infantry, 5 kilometers north of Thu Thua (XS530770) on 7 April at 1950 hours, six enemy soldiers were engaged with organic weapons, a light fire team, and artillery. Three enemy were killed and three AK47 rifles were evacuated.

On 2 April, the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.
the 25th Infantry Division. Also, Colonel Thomas J. Hanifen became Chief of Staff of the 25th Infantry Division.

Major General Alberto Pico, Adjutant General and Lieutenant Governor of Puerto Rico visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 2 April for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

Major General James W. Sutherland, Jr., U.S. Army, DCG, II Field Force, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 4 April for an orientation of 25th Infantry Division activities. On 6 April, Major General Sutherland visited Tan An for an orientation on the activities of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

Brigadier General Stewart L. McKenny, Deputy STANO, ACSI, DA visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 5 April to obtain information on surveillance, target acquisition and night observation sensor devices which are currently employed against NVA/VC forces. Colonel William E. Burr, Chief, MACV J3-06 visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities on 5 April.

On 7 April, the Citizen's Committee For Peace With Freedom In Vietnam visited Cu Chi Base Camp to obtain information on the current situation in the Republic of Vietnam, Vietnamization, and the Pacification Program. The party consisted of Dr. Edmund A. Gullion, Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; Mr. Charles Tyroler, President, Quadri-Science, Inc.; Mr. David Bradshaw, Attorney; and Mr. Peter White, Director, World Affairs Council, Atlanta. They were escorted by Brigadier General Greene and Mr. Richard J. Harrington, U.S. Embassy.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations decreased but remained at a low level during the second week in April (8-14 April). Primary offensive activity for main force units continued to be the conduct of limited attacks by fire against allied installations. Areas of primary enemy activity were in the Renegade Woods (XT-2931), west of Nui Be Dan Mountain (XT2858), Dau Tieng (XT4947), and in the Boi Loi Woods (XT4397).

Activity within the 1st Brigade's AO remained at a low level this week with only scattered engagements reported in which 12 enemy soldiers were killed. However, two significant shellings occurred in the 1st Brigade during the week. Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT291473) received 22 rounds of 120mm mortar fire from northwest of the camp at 0100 hours on 9 April, resulting in one U.S. wounded and heavy damage to a petroleum oil lubricants bladder. Fire was returned by 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars with unknown results. At 0030 hours on 11 April, Tay Minh Base Camp (XT1651) received 15 rounds of 120mm mortar fire from the northwest (XT18559), resulting in one U.S. soldier wounded and minor damage to the perimeter's defensive wire. Fire was returned with Night Hawk and artillery with unknown results.
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On 12 April at 1405 hours, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered an enemy bunker complex 5.5 kilometers east of Ben Son in the Trapesoid (XT628355). Ten bunkers, 800 pounds of rice, seven small arms magazines, and 150 pounds of small arms ammunition were destroyed. One and a half pounds of documents were evacuated. An ammunition cache was located by C/2-12 Inf on 14 April at 1230 hours 7 kilometers east of Ben Suc (XT647338). Eighty RPG rounds, five rounds of 82mm mortar, 57 hand grenades, 1100 small arms rounds, 53 RPG boosters, and two anti-personnel mines were destroyed. One unknown type rifle, one light machine gun, and one 82mm mortar sight were evacuated.

Company C, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry received eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire 4 kilometers southeast of the Straight Edge Woods (XT880293) at 1000 hours. A UH-1H helicopter, called in for a MEDEVAC, received heavy enemy .51 caliber machine gun, small arms, and RPG fire and was downed in the vicinity of XT792392 with heavy damage. Five U.S. soldiers were wounded and two killed. An hour and a half later (1130 hours), C/3-22 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 30 meters from the shelling incident (XT782897). Fire was returned with organic weapons, a light fire team, air strikes, and artillery with unknown results. Three U.S. soldiers were killed and two were wounded in the engagement. A sweep of the previous day's contact area by B/3-22 Inf located six enemy dead. Two anti-tank mines, six RPG rounds, two RPG boosters, 14 rifle grenades, eight ChiCom hand grenades, 30 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, 300 rounds of SKS ammunition and 25 ½ pound sticks of TNT were destroyed. Evacuated to Tay Ninh were 300 pounds of clothing, one medical bag, and 32 pounds of documents.

A night defensive position of A/3-22 Inf in the Straight Edge Woods engaged ten enemy soldiers with organic weapons, a Night Hawk, and artillery at 2050 hours on 9 April. Six enemy soldiers were killed while four AK47 rifles and one backpack were evacuated. There were no U.S. casualties.

Team 11, Company F (Rangers), 75th Infantry, reacting to duffel bag activations, engaged 12 enemy soldiers 6 kilometers southwest of Phu Khiong (XT844555) with organic weapons resulting in seven enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol and three pounds of documents were evacuated.

Operations by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry during the second week of April resulted in seven enemy killed in three separate contacts. The most significant contact occurred at 1700 hours on 11 April in the Boi Loi Woods (XT 475405) when an LCH from Troop D, 3rd Sqd, 4th Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers with organic weapons and a light scout team. The enemy returned with small arms fire, hitting the LCH and forcing it to land with light damage. One platoon from B/3-4 Cav reacted to the contact and located six enemy bodies. One AK47 rifle, two K54 pistols, and three pounds of documents were evacuated.
A cache was located in a tunnel in the Boi Loi Woods (XT502332) by C/3-4 Cav on 9 April at 1740 hours. Fifteen blasting caps, five pounds of medical supplies, miscellaneous booby trap manufacturing material and one pound of documents were evacuated. The tunnel, two 105mm rounds, two CBU bombs, and one shape charge were destroyed. The captured documents identified the C23 Medical Company, 268 Regiment.

Enemy activity within the 3rd Brigade's AO remained at a low level during the week as main force units avoided contact. 3rd Brigade forces killed 12 enemy soldiers and captured one prisoner-of-war in four separate contacts.

On 11 April at 1315 hours, 3rd Brigade Mini-Cav with the 25th Military Intelligence Company and elements of 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, exploiting Hoi Chanh information, destroyed 20 rounds of 60mm mortar and 12 RPG rounds, 6 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap in the Ho Bo Woods (XT657245). Three RPD light machine guns, one AK-47 rifle, and one RPG optical sight were evacuated.

On 12 April at 0005 hours, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry engaged an estimated enemy platoon 3.5 kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (XT597143) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in six enemy soldiers killed. Enemy small arms fire wounded six U.S. soldiers and caused light damage to two APCs. Contact was lost at 0110 hours.

Company C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry located an ammunition cache in the Renegade Woods (XT286323) on 8 April at 1245 hours. One claymore mine, nine RPG rounds, one RPG booster, two ChiCom hand grenades, and 800 rounds of small arms ammunition were evacuated to Go Dau Ha. Two hundred pounds of rice were destroyed also.

A combat patrol from Company D, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry engaged four enemy soldiers on 10 April at 0140 hours in the Plain of Reeds (XS341905) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in one enemy killed and one backpack evacuated. Enemy returned fire with small arms until 0150 hours when contact was lost. At 1800 hours on 11 April, a combat patrol from D/6-31 Inf engaged four enemy soldiers 7 kilometers southwest of the previous day's contact (XS31844) with organic weapons and a light fire team. Four enemy were killed and two RPG launchers, one RPG booster and ½ pound of documents were evacuated to Cu Chi. There was no enemy return fire and no U.S. casualties.

Enemy activity within the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division's AO remained at a low level during the second week of April as main force units continued to coordinate with local units in an attempt to disrupt the Pacification Program. 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Forces killed 25 enemy soldiers in eight separate contacts this week.

At 2230 hours on 11 April, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry
engaged four enemy 8 kilometers southeast of Tan Tru (XS710564) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in three enemy killed. On the following day at 1310 hours, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry with a combat patrol from D/2-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers with organic weapons 300 meters north of the A/2-60 Inf contact. Four enemy soldiers were killed while one K-54 pistol and one pound of documents were evacuated to Tan Tru.

On 11 April at 1225 hours, Company A, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry located and destroyed two 30 pound anti-tank mines and two ChiCom hand grenades 5.5 kilometers south of Binh Phouc (XS633503). Four hundred rounds of small arms ammunition were evacuated to Rach Kien. At 1550 hours, A/5-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy at the same spot with organic weapons, a light scout team, and one light fire team resulting in two enemy killed. The enemy force returned fire with organic weapons and RPG fire, killing one U.S. soldier. Nineteen bunkers, nine booby trapped hand grenades, and two 82mm mortar rounds were destroyed. One RPG launcher and one pound of documents were evacuated. A sweep of the 11 April contact area by A/5-60 Inf on 12 April at 1105 hours located one medical aid bag, one flashlight, two NVA protective masks, 700 small arms rounds, two NVA protective masks, two AK-47 magazines, two transistor radios, 200 pounds of rice, and one field stove which were evacuated to Rach Kien (XS739-696).

In an action on 13 April at 2059 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry engaged two enemy soldiers 7 kilometers south of Tan An (XS49669) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in one enemy killed. Eight B-40 rounds, 40 pounds of C-4, one U.S. claymore mine and 1000 small arms rounds were evacuated.

Company E (Rangers), 75th Infantry had two significant contacts this week. On 12 April at 0450 hours, Team 14 engaged two enemy soldiers 6 kilometers west of Tan An (XS490669) with organic weapons, resulting in two enemy killed. Two K-54 pistols, miscellaneous web gear, and 3 pound of documents were evacuated. Team 11, engaged six enemy soldiers in a sampan 5 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS577753) with organic weapons on 13 April at 1825 hours. Four enemy soldiers were killed and one RPG launcher and one AK-47 rifle were evacuated.

The 1st Air Cavalry Division relinquished operational control of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry on 12 April and the 1-5 Inf (M) returned to the 1st Brigade.

Lieutenant General Walter T. Kerwin, DCSPER, DA visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 9 April to discuss Officer retention/enlisted extensions, drug abuse, confinement facilities, DA support of Awards Program, uniform for RVN returnees and strength accounting procedures.
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Infantry Division Headquarters, Cu Chi Base Camp for an intelligence briefing and a discussion of operations against enemy units in SR-1.

Colonel Arthur W. Hackwood, Colonel, U.S. Army Staff, Pacific, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 April for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division’s TA0I remained at a low level during the third week in April (17-21 April). Enemy activity continued to consist of limited attacks by fire against allied installations and reconnaissance of friendly targets for an expected offensive to be initiated in late May or early June. Also, enemy mine activity stayed at the same level as in the second week of April. Primary areas of enemy activity were in the vicinity of Tay Ninh (XT601) and east of the Angal’s Wing.

Enemy activity remained at a low level in the 1st Brigade’s AO during the week as main force units continued to avoid contact while attempting to replenish logistical and personnel losses. In two separate contacts, 1st Brigade forces killed ten enemy soldiers. Three significant shelling incidents occurred in the 1st Brigade AO during the week. Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT691473) received 10 rounds of 120mm mortar fire on 20 April resulting in six U.S. wounded. Fire was returned with artillery and mortars to XT691473 with unknown results. At 0420 hours on 21 April, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry at 55th Washington (XT756568) received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from XT695673 resulting in two U.S. wounded. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results. On 21 April at 0600 hours, Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT651) received seven 122mm rockets from the northeast resulting in two U.S. wounded, heavy damage to one UH-1H helicopter and light damage to another UH-1H helicopter.

The most significant contact in the 1st Brigade AO occurred on 17 April at 1520 hours when Company C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 6 kilometers northeast of Ben Su (XT567387) with organic weapons and a flame thrower resulting in four enemy soldiers killed and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles and one RPG launcher. The enemy force returned fire with organic weapons and hand grenades until 1750 hours when contact was lost. At 1830 hours, C/2-12 Inf received automatic weapons fire from the south resulting in one U.S. soldier killed and four wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in five enemy soldiers killed and the evacuation of three AK47 rifles. Contact was lost at 1900 hours.

Operations by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry during the third week of April resulted in five enemy killed in three separate contacts. The most significant contact occurred at 0705 hours on 15 April when D/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy 2 kilometers south of Ben Su (XT568512) with organic weapons and a light fire team resulting in three enemy soldiers killed.

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Enemy activity within the 3rd Brigade's AO remained at a low level during the week as main force units avoided contact. In three separate contacts, 3rd Brigade forces killed 20 enemy soldiers.

The most significant contact occurred on 19 April at 1030 hours when a UH-1C helicopter from the 116 Assault Helicopter Company received small arms ground fire from an estimated 20 enemy soldiers 6 kilometers southeast of Trang Bang (XT545167). Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in six enemy killed. Company A and the Scout Platoon, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry moved into the contact area about 1135 hours where they engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, light fire team, and artillery resulting in seven enemy killed. Evacuated from the contact area were three AK47 rifles, one .45 caliber pistol, four AK47 magazines and 1/2 pound of documents. Five hand grenades, one booby trapped 81mm mortar round, five bunkers, ten fighting positions, two trenches, one U.S. ammunition pouch, and one first aid pouch were destroyed.

Team 32, Company F (Rangers), 75th Infantry engaged five enemy soldiers 7 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap in the Ho Bo Woods (XT656242) resulting in five enemy killed. Enemy small arms fire wounded one U.S. soldier. Three AK47 rifles, one backpack and 1/8 pound of documents were evacuated. The captured documents identified the Rear Service Section, Quyet Thang Regiment.

Two Hoi Chanh were received by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry at 0640 hours on 19 April 7.5 kilometers south of Go Dau Ha. One stated that he was a member of the Dung Binh Local Force unit whose mission was to provide security for civilian laborers carrying ammunition and small arms from Dia Gia, Cambodia (XT280150) to Ba Thu (XT250030). Both men were subordinate to a rear service element, probably the 100 Rear Service Group.

Enemy activity in the area of operations of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained at a low level during the week, as main force units coordinated with local forces to harass the GVN Pacification Program. In 14 separate contacts, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division forces killed 33 enemy soldiers and captured three prisoners-of-war.

Tan An Airstrip (XS556264) received five rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 0025 hours on 16 April, resulting in seven U.S. soldiers wounded, light damage to three buildings and one 5-ton truck. Fire was returned with artillery with unknown results.

The most significant contact occurred 6 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS565757) at 1225 hours on 19 April when Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry with an aero rifle platoon, reacting to an Intelligence target, received small arms ground fire from an unknown number of enemy. Companies A and D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry were inserted at 1305 hours and they engaged the same enemy force with organic weapons, a light fire team, and artillery resulting in 14 enemy killed. Enemy small arms fire killed one
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U.S. soldier and wounded three U.S. soldiers and one Kit Carson Scout. Three AK47 rifles, two transistor radios, two ponchos and 1 pound of documents were evacuated. They destroyed 25 bunkers, 50 pounds of rice, 20 ChiCom hand grenades, one stove, and one pound of medical supplies. Also, two destroyed sampans were located.

At 2234 hours on 15 April, Company A, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry engaged two enemy soldiers 6.5 kilometers north of Tan Tru (XS653697) with organic weapons and artillery resulting in two enemy killed. Two AK47 rifles, two backpacks, two ChiCom hand grenades, and one pound of documents were evacuated.

Company B (Rangers), 75th Infantry had two significant contacts this week. On 21 April at 1930 hours, Team 11 engaged an unknown number of enemy 4.5 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS567760) with organic weapons, a Navy light fire team, and a Night Hawk resulting in three enemy killed. Team 17 on PBRs engaged five to ten enemy at 1955 hours on 21 April 2 kilometers north-west of Team 11's contact (XS572778) with organic weapons resulting in three enemy solders killed.

On 17 April, the 3rd Brigade released operational control of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry which returned to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. On 18 April, the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry left the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and was placed under the administrative and logistical control of the 2nd Brigade and deployed in Nhon Trach District.

Mr. Wilson Bryant, GS12, USARV Ammunition Surveillance Inspector, visited Cu Chi Base Camp and subordinate units throughout the 25th Infantry Division's AO from 15-21 April to observe and discuss 25th Infantry Division ammunition storage and dispersal procedures.

Major General Donald H. Cowles, ACofS, J3, USMACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 19 and 20 April for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities. On 20 April, Lieutenant General John B. LeVelle, USAF, Director, Defense Communications Planning Group, DA, Colonel L. V. Hoyt, DCPG LNO, Saigon, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert G. Perlman, USAF, Ex Asst, DCPG, and Major W. T. Chawtek, USMC, DOPG LNO, Saigon, visited Cu Chi Base Camp to obtain an update on current Duffel Bag/Bass operations.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division's TA0I remained at a low level during the fourth week of April (22-30 April). Offensive activity generated by enemy forces continued to consist of limited attacks by fire against Allied fire support bases and patrol bases while conducting reconnaissance of future targets. Mining activity increased during the week with the primary area being in the Citadel (XT5428). Primary areas of enemy activity were in the vicinity of Tay Ninh (XT1650) and Dau Tieng (XT4947).
Activity within the 1st Brigade's AO remained at a low level this week as main force units avoided contact while attempting to replenish logistical and personnel losses. In six separate contacts, 1st Brigade forces killed eight enemy soldiers. Five shelling incidents were reported during the week but only one was significant. On 26 April at 2255 hours, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry at Fire Support Base Pine Ridge in the Razorbacks (TX522580) received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 10-15 RPG rounds from an unknown number of enemy. Immediately following this barrage, 10-15 enemy sappers breached the wire from the east and proceeded to detonate about 25 satchel charges and 30 hand grenades in hooches and bunkers throughout the FSB. The enemy force withdrew the same way they came in and were engaged with organic weapons, artillery, a light fire team, Shadow, and a flare ship until 2350 hours when contact was lost. Four U.S. soldiers were killed and 13 wounded in the attack while the enemy lost one KIA. Destroyed were two line bunkers, one radio shack, one medic shack, one command post bunker, two artillery hooches, five sleeping hooches, and one generator shop with four generators. An artillery fire direction center (FDC) was lightly damaged. One AK47 rifle and 10-15 satchel charges were evacuated.

The two most significant contacts in the 1st Brigade AO occurred in the Straight Edge Woods. On 23 April at 1900 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 9th Infantry engaged two enemy soldiers at XT77337 moving to the southwest with organic weapons and a light fire team resulting in two enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, one 7.5 pound mine, 150 rounds of small arms ammunition, one set of NVA web gear, one shovel, and 3 pounds of documents were evacuated. The captured documents identified the 9th Battalion which normally operates in the contact area. At 0405 hours on 25 April, B/1-5 Inf (M) 2 kilometers north of the B/1-5 Inf (M) contact (TX183374), received small arms and RPG fire from six to ten enemy soldiers. The U.S. force returned fire with organic weapons, a light fire team, TAC air strikes, and artillery resulting in two enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, two RPG launchers, three RPG rounds, and two NVA helmets were evacuated. Two U.S. soldiers were wounded.

Operations by 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry during the fourth week of April resulted in four enemy killed in two separate contacts. The most significant contact occurred at 0710 hours on 25 April when a Light Scout Team from Troop B, 3-4 Cav engaged three enemy soldiers in bunkers 4 kilometers southwest of Ben Sue in the Ho Bo Woods (TX554238) with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed. An Acre Rifle Platoon was inserted in the contact area and located one destroyed RPG launcher and one destroyed R54 pistol. Evacuated were on AK47 rifle, ten pounds of clothing and two pounds of documents. The captured documents consisted of a series of letters which identified the Rear Service and Political Staffs of SR-1.

Three enemy arms caches were located by B/3-4 Cav in a three day sweep of an area 11 kilometers northwest of Dau Tieng in the Crescent. On 22 April at 1516 hours, B/3-4 Cav located six bunkers at XT426556 which
contained one light machine gun, four AK47 rifles, one M16 rifle, one ChiCom hand grenade and one 60mm mortar round. The cache was approximately two to three months old and in poor condition. The weapons were evacuated to FSB Wood. On 23 April at 0900 hours, B/3-4 Cav located a cache 80 meters south of the previous day’s cache at XT404548. Destroyed were 412 ChiCom hand grenades, 130 rifle grenades, 63 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 30 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 146 rounds of RPG ammunition, 63 RPG boosters, 23 rounds of 82mm mortar, two rounds of 60mm mortar, 18 more rounds of 82mm mortar with fuses, seven ChiCom claymore mines, 30 claymore detonators, 36 pressure type detonators, and 3,100 rounds of small arms ammunition. On the following day, 24 April, B/3-4 Cav located another cache (in poor condition) at 1125 hours in the same place as the 23 April cache (XT424548). Destroyed were two bunkers, one 40 pound shape charge, one RPG round, one 57mm recoilless rifle round, 20 rounds of 81mm mortar and 10 ChiCom hand grenades. Evacuated were 1,030 rounds of small arms ammunition.

Enemy activity within the 3rd Brigade AO continued at a low level during the week. In nine separate contacts, 3rd Brigade forces killed 21 enemy soldiers.

In a series of three contacts, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry killed six enemy soldiers in an area approximately 6 kilometers west of Duc Hoa. On 21 April at 2101 hours, snipers from B/2-27 Inf engaged five to six enemy at XS523993 with organic weapons and artillery resulting in two enemy killed. At 2030 hours on 23 April, snipers from C/2-27 Inf engaged three enemy soldiers 260 meters southeast of the 21 April contact (XS542978) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed and the capture of 30 pounds of rice. Snipers from R/2-27 Inf engaged two enemy soldiers on 24 April at 0316 hours 80 meters southeast of the 21 April contact site (XS532996) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed.

Two Hoi Chanh were received by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry 10 kilometers north of Duc Hue near the Angel’s Wing (XT346174). One Hoi Chanh identified himself as a civilian laborer with Group 10 which is a transportation group located in Bien Gia, Cambodia. Group 10 is probably the 82 Rear Service Group which used to operate in War Zone C. The shift to the 9 VC/NVA Division south probably accounts for the 82 Rear Service Group operating in the Angel’s Wing. The other Hoi Chanh was a female medic with the Information Platoon, 2642 Battalion in Ba Thu, Cambodia. The mission of the Information Platoon is to supply liaison personnel to deliver messages and letters between units in SR-2. She also stated that the morale of the 2642 Battalion is low and that there are many VC who want to Chieu Hoi but will do so only when the opportunity presents itself.

Enemy activity within the area of operations of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained at a low level during the week as main force units continued to operate in a fragmented configuration while reinforcing local forces in their efforts to disrupt the GVN Pacification Program in Long An Province. In nine separate contacts, 17 enemy soldiers were killed and three prisoners-of-war captured.
In a contact with five enemy soldiers on 24 April at 0330 hours, in the Plain of Reeds (XS359900), one enemy soldier was killed by a combat patrol from Company C, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. Evacuated were one AK47 rifle, one backpack, one NVA pistol belt, one ChiCom field radio, one NVA gas mask and two pounds of documents. The captured documents identified the K4 Battalion, 1 NVA Regiment which was last identified by two prisoner-of-war captured on 20 March vicinity XS603738 by Company D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry. On 25 April at 0630 hours, 4/6-31 Inf engaged two to three enemy 7 kilometers west of Binh Phuoc (XS545547) with organic weapons, a light fire team and artillery resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle. Enemy small arms fire wounded one Kit Carson Scout.

Company C, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry engaged 10-15 enemy 5 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS573579) on 24 April at 1930 hours with organic weapons, a light fire team, and a U.S. Navy light fire team resulting in seven enemy killed. There were no U.S. casualties. One K54 pistol, one ChiCom hand grenade, and two pounds of documents were evacuated. The documents identified an unknown sapper battalion of SR-2.

On 22 April at 2100 hours, Team 21, Company E (Rangers), 75th Infantry engaged ten enemy soldiers 3 kilometers northwest of Ben Luc (XS599781) with organic weapons, a U.S. Navy light fire team, and a light fire team resulting in three enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, one M16 rifle and one CKC rifle were evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no U.S. casualties. Team 17, Company E (Rangers), 75th Infantry with the U.S. Navy engaged 10-15 enemy soldiers 4.5 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS580730) on 30 April at 1935 hours with organic weapons and a light fire team resulting in six enemy killed. There were no U.S. casualties.

Lieutenant General Michael S. Davison, Commanding General, II Field Force, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 29 April for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities. On 29 and 30 April, The Reverend Dr. Carl McIntire (GS-17E), The Reverend Dr. James Shaw (GS-17E), Dr. Israel Guerres, and Evangelist Bob Wells visited Cu Chi Base Camp and surrounding fire support bases to obtain knowledge of the general situation within the Republic of Vietnam and to talk with troops in the field.

The 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division forces killed 372 and captured 11 of the enemy during the month of April, accounted for 121 individual weapons, 20 crew-served weapons, and 2.2 tons of rice (captured or destroyed). Division soldiers destroyed 116 mines and boobytraps while detonating 85, resulting in one U.S. soldier killed and 140 wounded.

During the quarter from February 1970 to 30 April 1970 the 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division successfully forced the enemy to continually postpone his Winter/Spring offensive. Through
aggressive preemptive operations, enemy elements were forced to continue in small units unable to mount a significant offensive. During this period 25th Infantry Division operations (to include 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division) accounted for 1,565 enemy eliminated, including enemy soldiers killed, captured, and rallying (Boi Chanh) to U.S. Forces.

Enemy maneuver elements continued to rely on sapper tactics and shellings and attacks by fire to inflict heavy losses of men and equipment within the Division's TAOI. Though the enemy had planned to use these tactics to regain the momentum he had lost since Tet 1968, 25th Infantry Division operations continued to disrupt all enemy plans. Wherever the enemy attempted to operate he was under constant pressure from snipers, combat patrols, small unit operations and electronic surveillance. Furthermore, great strides have been made in the pacification program. The enemy has found himself more alienated from the people than at any other period during the war. Also, the tenacity and professionalism of the South Vietnamese soldiers and their ability to successfully conduct their own operations has greatly improved through combined operations with U.S. forces.

With the increased Vietnamization of the war, 25th Infantry Division forces were able to maintain a posture of "protective reaction" as the mode of operations within the Division's TAOI. Protective reaction refers to the type of combat operations used by Allied commanders against Communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam to provide for the security of his unit, his tactical area of operations and the Vietnamese people. This is accomplished primarily by small unit reconnaissance patrols to locate the enemy, disrupt his movements and find his caches of arms, ammunition and rations. Large scale unit operations have proved unnecessary and unprofitable as the enemy forces are broken down into smaller and smaller units. Division forces conducted an active or mobile defense of the large inhabited areas to protect the people and Division units and installations.

The effects of these small unit reconnaissance operations has been to preempt the massing of enemy forces, destroy those forces which are contacted and forced the enemy into his Cambodian sanctuaries or deep jungles away from the major population centers in III Corps Tactical Zone. The results of these operations have been to inflict serious personnel losses on the enemy and to disrupt his supply activities. They have disorganized the enemy's usual attack planning, imposed heavy personal losses on the enemy while reducing friendly casualties, and deprived the enemy of the arms and supplies needed to sustain his attacks. The enemy units are not only being cut down to size, but are also losing their experienced leaders.

The 1st Brigade's area of operations became extended to include the area around Dau Tieng (X1947) with the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division to the United States in March 1970. The combat effectiveness of the 1st Brigade was significantly strengthened by the move of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry from
the 2nd Brigade to the 1st Brigade AO. The 1st Brigade has preempted all enemy attempts to initiate an offensive in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces, prevented the enemy from freely using the cave-strewn slopes of Nui Ba Den as a refuge and stop-over point for infiltration groups, and successfully restricted enemy infiltration into Tay Ninh Province from Cambodia. The enemy was forced to resort to attacks by fire as his primary offensive tactic.

Task Force Two (2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division) became OPCON to II FFV on 2 March, 1970. The combat effectiveness of the 2nd Brigade was strengthened by the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry.

The 3rd Brigade continued to prevent the enemy from using the An Minh Corridor as an infiltration route, forced main force units taking sanctuary in Cambodia to remain there and disrupted local force activities through increased use of small unit tactics, combat patrols and snipers. The 3rd Brigade was also tasked with the responsibility for the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp. The most significant contact of the reporting quarter occurred in the first week of April in the Renegade Woods involving elements of two battalions of the 3rd Brigade. Enemy losses in the contact were 101 killed, one captured and two Hoi Chanh received. (See Inclosure 6)

Operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division accounted for 711 enemy KIA, forced Sub-Region 3 units to operate in dispersed groups to escape Allied detection, disrupted Sub-Region 6 local and main force plans for attacks on Saigon and greatly expanded the pacification program in Long An Province. With United States Naval forces, 3-9 Inf Div units seriously disrupted the enemy's ability to operate along canals and rivers within Long An Province, prevented enemy reinforcements of men and supplies to local guerrillas and reduced the effectiveness of the Viet Cong infrastructure by continuous monitoring of the enemy's routes of movement.

B. (C) Personnel:

(1) During the months of February through April 1970, the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 18,331 of 17,978 authorized or 101.8%. Enlisted personnel strength averaged for this period 16,678 authorized or 101%, while officer personnel strength for the period averaged 1,674 of 1,300 authorized or 105.7%. Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry, Signal Corps and Engineer captains, aviators overall, and noncommissioned officers in the grades E6 through E8 in the 11B, 11C, 12B, 13E, 17E, 34G, 63G, and 76P MOS series.

(2) During the period 1 February 1970 through 30 April 1970, the Division had 113 KIA's (8 officers and 105 EM), and 1,112 WIA's (64 officers and 1,048 EM), excluding OPCON units. There were 28 nonbattle deaths, 103 nonbattle injuries and 0 missing in action. Officer gains for the period 43
numbered 394 while administrative officer losses were 302. EM gains were 4,401 while administrative EM losses totaled 3,944.

(3) Principal Command and Staff: The identification of the principal Command and staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General</td>
<td>Major General Harris W. Hollis</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 1 Apr 70)</td>
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<td>Major General Edward Butz, Jr.</td>
<td>(2 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Division Commander - A</td>
<td>Brigadier General Thomas J. Camp, Jr.</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 7 Apr 70)</td>
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<td>Brigadier General Michael J. L. Greene</td>
<td>(8 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Division Commander - B</td>
<td>Brigadier General Michael J. L. Greene</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 7 Apr 70)</td>
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<td>Colonel John R. Thurman III</td>
<td>(8 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Colonel James M. Connell</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 1 Apr 70)</td>
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<td>Colonel Thomas J. Hanifen</td>
<td>(2 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
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<td>ACoS, G1</td>
<td>LTC Thomas E. Hiley</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACoS, G2</td>
<td>LTC Paul A. Brinkman</td>
<td>(11 Feb 70 - 2 Apr 70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACoS, G3</td>
<td>LTC Toshio Aoyagi</td>
<td>(3 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoS, G4</td>
<td>LTC Robert A. Kurek</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 24 Mar 70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC James E. Coggins</td>
<td>(25 Mar 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoS, G5</td>
<td>LTC Burton J. Walrath</td>
<td>(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ACofS, G5

LTC John R. Randolph
(1 Feb 70 - 16 Mar 70)

LTC Davant T. Williams
(17 Mar 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade

Colonel Paul J. Mueller, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade

Colonel Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade

Colonel Olin E. Smith
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, DIVARTY

Colonel Dan D. Stedham
(1 Feb 70 - 8 Feb 70)

Commanding Officer, DISCOM

Colonel Harry A. Puzzett
(9 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 725th Maint Bn

Colonel Robert B. Hammerquist
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn

LTC Wallace H. Dawson
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th Med Bn

LTC Delmas V. Lippard
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 125th Sig Bn

LTC James E. Dill
(1 Feb 70 - 7 Feb 70)

Commanding Officer, 65th Engr Bn

LTC Bruce F. LaFollette
(8 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 25th Avn Bn

LTC William R. Rogers
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 4th Bn, 9th Inf

Colonel James L. Trayers, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Robert R. Gosney
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Forest S. Rittgers
(1 Feb 70 - 11 Apr 70)

LTC Robert W. Welsh
(12 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)
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Commanding Officer, 2d Bn, 14th Inf

LTC Donald O. Crutchley
(1 Feb 70 - 15 Feb 70)

LTC Charles W. Norton
(16 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC James E. Coggins
(1 Feb 70 - 19 Mar 70)

MAJ Frederick J. Stanley
(20 Mar 70 - 21 Apr 70)

LTC Edward M. Bradford
(22 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Thomas K. Whitesel
(1 Feb 70 - 5 Mar 70)

LTC Marvin M. Rosenstein
(6 Mar 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC George A. Custer
(1 Feb 70 - 27 Apr 70)

LTC Albert P. Hodges
(28 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Ted G. Westerman
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Sheppard H. Phillips
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC John R. Parker
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Warren A. Jones
(1 Feb 70 - 23 Mar 70)

LTC John E. Hazelwood
(24 Mar 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC William Greenberg
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

LTC Corwin A. Mitchell
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)
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Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 8th Arty
LTC Richard A. Manion
(7 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 7th Bn, 11th Arty
LTC Robert E. Robinson
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty
LTC Calvin H. Hunter, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 23 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty
LTC William D. Taylor
(24 Apr 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Commanding Officer, 7th Bn, 11th Arty
LTC Charles S. Stodter, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Adjutant General
LTC William J. Winter, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Division Chaplain
LTC Gene M. Little
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Finance Officer
LTC James A. Enloe
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Information Officer
MAJ Warren J. Field
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Inspector General
LTC Bruce F. Williams
(1 Feb 70 - 7 Mar 70)

LTC John M. Walton
(8 Mar 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Staff Judge Advocate
LTC Fred Bright, Jr.
(1 Feb 70 - 6 Feb 70)

MAJ Burnett H. Radosch
(7 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Provost Marshal
LTC William Gregerson
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Division Surgeon
LTC Bruce LaFollette
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

MAJ James D. Knipp
(1 Feb 70 - 30 Apr 70)

Division Chemical Officer
C. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Summary of Enemy Activity.

(a) Enemy activity fell short of its expected level of intensity during the month of February, especially for the Tet period. The enemy highpoint for the month occurred on 27 February when Tay Ninh Base Camp received 25 rounds of 120mm mortar fire. Principal areas of enemy activity were Tay Ninh, Ben Soi, east of Angel's Wing, and along the Van Co Dong River in Long An Province.

(b) During March, enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division TAOI continued at a low level. Enemy units avoided contact while replenishing logistical bases and conducting reconnaissance of future targets. Intelligence reports indicated that a higher level of activity was planned for the period 1-10 April. The primary areas of enemy activity during March continued to be Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, the area east of the Angel's Wing, the Trang Bang-Citadel area and the Van Co Dong River in Long An Province.

(c) A sharp increase in enemy initiated activity occurred within the TAOI during the period 1-6 April. Activity then returned to the lower levels experienced earlier in the reporting period until the morning of 27 April when FSB Pine Ridge was attacked by sappers using satchel charges. Movement was moderate throughout the TAOI during April as the enemy conducted reconnaissance of future targets and limited harassment with attacks by fire while avoiding significant ground action. These indicators point to an increase in enemy activity during May. The 9 VC/NVA Division has apparently completed its shift form central to western War Zone C and is preparing defensive positions, resupplying bases, receiving replacements, and conducting minor actions against fire support bases. Areas of primary enemy activity were in the vicinity of Tay Ninh, Straight Edge Woods, Renegade Woods, FSB Pine Ridge, Duc Hue, and the Ben Luc area in SR-3.

(2) Operational report for Source/Liaison Target Exploitation Operations.

(a) During the quarter Source/Liaison target exploitation operations have accounted for five enemy KIA; nine prisoners, of which two were Viet Cong Infrastructure; one Hoi Chanh; and seven detainees. In addition, 14 small arms, four 122mm rockets, 64 pounds of documents, 74 booby traps ranging from home made devices to 155mm rounds, seven pounds
of medical supplies, and 7,000 pounds of rice were evacuated or destroyed.

(b) During this period, one member of the Viet Cong Infrastructure was neutralized: Pham Van Dong, Cu Chi District Farmers' Association Chief.

(3) The Interrogation Prisoner of War Section, 25th Military Intelligence Company, processed 173 detainees during the quarter. This included 61 VCI/VC/NDP PWs, one VCI PW, 53 returnees, six VCS CDs, 11 Civil Defendants and 55 innocent civilians. Classifications for three deceased personnel were not determined.

(a) For the quarter, the IPW Section developed two targets for field units. One exploitation was successful and resulted in twenty 60mm mortar rds, twelve B-40 rds, three RPD machine guns, one AK-47 and one optical sighting device for the RPG-7 captured.

(b) The significant decrease in the number of detainees and exploitable targets during the past quarter reflects the general decline in activity during the period. However, an increasing number of returnees processed during the latter part of April may be attributed to extensive ARVN operations along the Vietnam-Cambodian Border. During the last four weeks of the quarter, IPW personnel were used extensively in the questioning of detainees captured by ARVN Forces.

(4) During the quarter, the G2 Air Section tested a new procedure for flying Red Haze target areas. Instead of covering a 10km x 10km box at an altitude of 2500', as had been past practice, target areas were flown in strips at an altitude of 1000 feet. A comparison of the results obtained is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Target</th>
<th>Daily Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block Targets</td>
<td>49.8 emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strip Targets</td>
<td>35.8 emissions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the strip target technique indicated the following reasons for fewer emissions:

(a) At an altitude of 1000', a 500 meter wide surface area is covered. At 2500', approximately 1250 meters are covered.

(b) At the lower altitude, the data link signal is frequently broken by terrain features which results in interruptions in the film.

(c) Block targeting accomplishes an imagery overlap as the aircraft flies parallel paths 1000 meters apart, making photo/terrain association much easier.

(5) Sensor devices continue to be successfully employed in the 25th Infantry Division TAOI in both a target acquisition and intelli-
gence role. They are located to monitor base areas, routes of infiltration, areas of mining and booby trap incidents, enemy supply routes, and waterways.

(a) At the end of the reporting period a total of 91 strings of 391 active sensors were employed throughout the Division TAQI.

(b) During the reporting period, 1438 enemy targets were acquired through Duffel Bag operations, 899 of which were engaged with a total of 21,409 rounds of artillery. Duffel Bag operations have been credited with the elimination of 136 enemy plus numerous amounts of enemy weapons and equipment either captured or destroyed. Significant Duffel Bag activities for the period were as follows:

(1) On 20 Feb, Co B, 5-60 Inf, reacting to Duffel Bag activations vic XS6169 engaged and killed eleven enemy. Four rounds of RPG ammo, 100 rounds of small arms ammo, 3.5 lbs of documents, four hand grenades, one pound of medical supplies, and three rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition were captured.

(2) On 2 Mar, Co B, 2-22 Inf, located ten enemy killed by artillery fire vic XT624212. The artillery had been fired on Duffel Bag activations.

(3) On 12 Mar, Co D, 2-27 Inf engaged and killed 12 enemy vic XT3218. One AK-47 rifle and five pounds of documents were evacuated. Seven rounds of 60mm mortar ammo were destroyed. Operations in the vicinity of sensor fields east of the Angel’s Wing were based primarily on heavy activation in that area.

(4) On 17 Mar, Co B, 2-14 Inf combat patrol reacted to Duffel Bag activations vic XT3717 and killed six enemy. Two AK47 rifles and two RPG launchers were evacuated.

(5) On 192005 Mar, a combat patrol from Co C, 2-14 Inf reacted to Duffel Bag activations vic XT3814, killed five enemy, and destroyed one sampan.

(6) On 27 Mar, Co D, 5-60 Inf combat patrol with 190 Assault Helicopter Co reacted to Duffel Bag activations vic XS5080, engaged an unknown number of enemy, and killed 13. Three SKS rifles, four AK-47 rifles, one RPG launcher, light machine gun rounds of RPG ammo, 33 rounds of mortar ammo, 7750 rds small arms ammo, three AT mines, 75 lbs of explosives, seven hand grenades, one protective mask, 30 lbs of rice, 30 blasting caps, two pounds of clothing, two pounds of medical supplies, one round of 77mm recoilless rifle ammunition and five pounds of documents were evacuated.

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(7) On 13 April, Team 11, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf reacted to sensor activations vic XT3855, engaged 12 enemy, and killed seven. The team evacuated one AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol, and three pounds of documents.

(8) On 2 April, Teams 12 and 13, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf reacted to Duffel Bag activations in a sensor field west of the Crescent, engaged 10-15 enemy and killed 10.

c) During the reporting period, the test and evaluation of the Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS) was completed (evaluation is contained in a separate document). The LORAN Sub-System of BASS is expected to arrive on 1 Jul 70 for test and evaluation.

d) Continuous emphasis during the quarter was placed on employment of combat patrols in support of and in reaction to Duffel Bag activations. A total of 147 patrols were employed with results as indicated in paragraph a above.

e) In conjunction with an AO change and the assignment of an AO to the 49th ARVN Regt in the Citadel, fifty-three sensors were transferred to the 25th ARVN Division. ARVN Forces increased their activity during the period and have taken a more active role in sensor operations. The major obstacle at this time appears to be a lack of U.S. advisors in the planning, employment and management of the program.

(f) On 18 March, DART I Operations terminated in III Corps Tactical Zone. Sensors formerly monitored by DART in support of 25th Infantry Division sensor operations were taken over by ground monitoring stations and the BASS System at Cu Chi.

D. Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, the G3 Sections continued to develop plans and execute operations to preempt VC/NVA operations and to destroy VC/NVA forces.

(2) Doctrine, Organization and Training were coordinated by G3 DOT. All schools operated during the previous quarter remained in operation. A training regulation (350-4), Training Assistance to Government of Vietnam Units, was published to aid U.S. units in GVY training. A mobile training team was organized and sent to the 18th ARVN Division to instruct on ambush techniques. The ten man team trained 12 companies of the 78th ARVN Division from 20 March until 10 April 70. A second mobile training team was formed to instruct Division soldiers on mechanical ambush techniques; it will train units at the fire support bases throughout the Division. G3 BESC continued to coordinate the evaluation of Army research and development projects within the Division. Twenty-eight projects were in various stages of evaluation during the period. Significant among these were the XM91 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon, the AH/TPS-57 Foliage Penetration

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The Automatic Data Processing section has continued with the development of computer programs to provide evaluation of statistical data for use by commanders and their staffs. A major project for this section was the rewriting and updating of the Duffel Bag Program for compatibility with the II FFV computer system. In the Current Statistics section a summary was prepared for Major General Hollis as part of the Debriefing Report covering his time as Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division. Also, the Reports and Evaluation Branch revised the maneuver-unit computer program, and revised the reporting system for combat activities. Provisional units organized during this period included the Cu Chi Utilities Command, Cu Chi Airfield Support Command, and the Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng base camp commands.

(3) The G3 Plans Section coordinated all friendly operations conducted in the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest. The section coordinated areas of operations with the 5th ARVN Division, 25th ARVN Division, CHQ and adjacent U.S. Divisions. It also coordinated combined operations; provided planning guidance and mission assignments to maneuver units of the Division and the OPGON 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; published a new Tactical SOP; and coordinated and published AO floating boundaries with the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and the 5th ARVN Division.

(4) The G3 Air Section coordinated the Division's tactical air support and B-52 strikes. The USAF TACP assigned to support the Division was responsible for controlling tactical air strikes, visual reconnaissance in the development of B-52 targets and B-52 bomb damage assessment. There were 1,551 tactical air sorties flown in support of the Division. The air strikes were in support of troops in contact, landing zone preparations, prestrikes, intelligence, and interdiction strikes. Bomb damage assessment was:

- Killed by air (body count) 60
- Killed by air (possible) 31
- Bunkers destroyed 1654
- Secondary explosions 133
- Secondary fires 102

During this period there were two B-52 strikes in support of Division operations. Bomb damage assessment was:

- Bunkers destroyed 69
- Secondary explosions 2

(5) The Division Chemical Section and the 9th Chemical Detachment continued to support Division operations by employment of persistent and non-persistent riot control agents and by the conduct of airborne personnel detector and defoliation missions. During the reporting period,
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48 E-158 CS cannister clusters were dropped in flushing operations and in support of troops in contact. A total of 95,200 pounds of micro-pulverized CS powder was dropped from CH-47 aircraft to restrict known or suspected enemy infiltration routes, assembly areas, and base camps. A total of 7,825 gallons of diesel fuel and 6,023 gallons of defoliant were sprayed around base camp, fire support base perimeters and on approved defoliation projects in the Division TAOI. During the reporting period a total of 317 airborne personnel missions were flown. Tests and evaluations were conducted by the Division Chemical Section and the 9th Chemical Detachment in usage of the Retro-Reflector system. The system has proven successful in that areas sprayed could be readily identified during the hours of darkness by personnel in aircraft. A new design was developed for the external mounting of E-158 cannister clusters on UH-1 aircraft. This external mounting system does not require either aircraft commander or pilot to wear a protective mask while carrying this CS munition. Evaluation of the XM191 Flame Weapon System continued with a greater demand for munitions from personnel in units using the weapon. Testing and evaluation of the Sampan Marking System continued with emphasis on a new dye which lasts 48 hours instead of indefinitely as was tested before.

Army Aviation:

(a) During the reporting period the Army Aviation element was responsible for aviation support for the Division and was under the direct staff supervision of the MOFO, G3. During this period, Army combat aviation support was provided to the 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division by organic and non-organic aviation units. Organic units which provided support included the 25th Aviation Battalion, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, and DIVARTY aviation sections, and Company E, 725th Maintenance Battalion. Non-organic air support was furnished to the 25th Infantry Division by units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group. Assault helicopter companies and CH-47 aircraft were provided primarily by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion whose units include the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, 187th Assault Helicopter Company, and the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company. Reconnaissance and surveillance was provided from the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (Mohawk) and the 74th and 187th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies (Bird Dog). Primary aero-medical evacuation was provided to the Division by the 159th Medical Company. Additional non-organic air support was provided the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division from the 240th Assault Helicopter Company, the 222nd Combat Aviation Battalion, and the 118th Assault Helicopter Company, and the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(b) During the quarter the 25th Aviation Battalion continued to support the Division in the conduct of Operation Tong Toan Phase IV. Support hours fell within the established flying hour program for each type, model and series of aircraft.

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(c) There has been no change in daily aircraft requirements during this reporting period. The battalion continues to support the 25th Infantry Division in a general support role.

(d) Statistical Summary of Combat Performance Data: (1 February to 30 April 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flight Hours</td>
<td>3333</td>
<td>4326</td>
<td>4366</td>
<td>12025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>6687</td>
<td>7961</td>
<td>7194</td>
<td>21822</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passengers Carried</td>
<td>9260</td>
<td>12127</td>
<td>10425</td>
<td>31912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Carried (Tons)</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Eliminated (BC)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Eliminated (Foss)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Structures (Dest)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Structures (Dam)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Sampans (Dest)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Sampans (Dam)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) There was no significant change in the operational concept of the Division's air assets during the reporting quarter.

(f) Statistical Summary for Troop D, 3rd Sqdn., 4th Cav.: (1 February to 30 April 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flight Hours</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2814</td>
<td>2353</td>
<td>7147</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
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<td>5581</td>
<td>4770</td>
<td>14326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers Carried</td>
<td>7388</td>
<td>6506</td>
<td>3390</td>
<td>17274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Carried (Tons)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Eliminated (BC)</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy Eliminated (Foss)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Structures (Dest)</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(g) During the reporting quarter the Battalion experienced five major accidents. The causes are as follows: Four UH-1Hs due to failure of the tail rotor drive system; engine failure at night; pilot losing visual reference in dust at night; a wire strike; one UH-1G due to failure of the cyclic servos. Troop D, 3-4 Cav (OPCON) experienced two major accidents as
follows: one AH-1G due to loss of directional control in a revetment and
one LCH due to a tree strike on a visual reconnaissance mission.

(7) Engineer Operations:

(a) The Division Engineer Section, under the general staff super-
vision of the ACoS, G-3, continued to coordinate combat, operational and
MFR engineer support to the 25th Infantry Division. Major William W. Yaun,
Assistant Division Engineer, operates the Assistant Division Engineer (ADE)
Office. During the period 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70, the 65th Engineer Battalion,
25th Infantry Division, provided combat support to the Division. Traditional
direct support relationships continued: Company A (DS) 1st Brigade, Company
C (DS) 2nd Brigade, Company D (DS) 3rd Brigade and the 65th Engineer Bat-
talion (Infantry Division) (-) (GS) 25th Infantry Division. Due to the de-
parture of 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Company C assumed responsi-
bility for the Dau Tieng area on 2 February 1970. With the establishment
of AO Chop, Company C moved with the 2nd Brigade assuming responsibil-
ity for AO Chop on 2 March 1970. Also on 2 March, Company A expanded its area
of responsibility to include the Dau Tieng area. In addition to the normal
combat support, the 65th Engineer Battalion continued land clearing opera-
tions with the use of assigned dozers and anchor chains. Approximately
6,500 acres of hedgerows and light jungle were cleared during this period.

(b) As the result of enemy activity, two tactical bridges were
destroyed during this reporting period. The Go Dau Ha Bridge at XT383250
was blown on 13 February 70. In order to maintain the flow of traffic which
is crucial for the resupply of tactical units west of this bridge and to con-
tinue construction of Route 251, a pacification road, 5-float reinforced
rafts were expediously placed by Company E, 65th Engineer Battalion to be
used in ferrying operations. Another raft was assembled as a standby.
Responsible to restore the destroyed bridge was assigned to the 30th
ARVN Engineer Group. The second bridge destroyed by enemy activity was the
Philcag Bridge south of Tay Ninh at XT201481. This 175’ long bridge was
temporarily replaced by a class 60 M4T6 float bridge. A 1308 Double
Bally Bridge, Class 50, was subsequently installed by Company A, 65th Engr
Bn. Additional bridging operations during this reporting period include
the installation of two M4T6 Dry Spans. These were 1 each 30’ Dry Span at
XT447067 and 1 each 45’ Dry Span at XT231009. Rafting operations included
1 each 9-Float Raft at Duc Hao (XT575393), a 7-Float Raft at XT55395 and
the above mentioned rafting operations at Go Dau Ha. In addition, 10 bays
of M4T6 Floating Bridge were furnished for bridging operations at Ben Soi.
In support of Rome Plow operations, and 8-Float, 120’ Floating Bridge was
emplaced at XT195348. This bridge was installed to accommodate the movement
of Rome Flows into the Straight Edge Woods area. The 65th Engineer Battalion
participation in the II Field Force secondary road program consisted of res-
ponsibility for 59.9 kilometers of road. To date, 98% of the roads have
been completed.
The 588th Engineer Battalion (Combat) with the 362nd Engineer Company (Light Equipment) attached, formerly located at Tay Ninh, completed their move to Cu Chi on 2 Apr 70. The 588th Engineer Battalion and 362nd Engineer Company have continued to provide operational support, MER support, LOC repair and work on the II Field Force secondary road program. Some significant projects of the 588th Engineer Battalion included completion of the Ap Phe Ninh Barge site upgrade, Duster positions at Cu Chi, moving perimeter lighting at Dau Tieng and MER Projects at Tay Ninh. In the II Field Force secondary road program, the 588th Engineer Battalion has been assigned responsibility for 48.5 kms of road and to date has completed approximately 63%. In conjunction with the secondary road program, Company C, 588th Engineer Battalion, raised the classification of the bridge at Ben Cau from 16 to 45 by converting a double single Bailey bridge to a double double.

The 168th Engineer Battalion, with the 595th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) attached, provided three companies for the current II Field Force secondary road program for Feb and Mar 70. Companies A and D of the 168th Engineer Battalion and the 595th Engineer Company (Light Equipment), operating from Cu Chi, were assigned the responsibility for opening approximately 40.0 kms of road in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia provinces. All work on these roads was completed prior to the deactivation of the 168th Engineer Battalion on 30 Mar 70, and the departure of the 595th Light Equipment Company for Lai Khe on 1 Apr 70.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, continued to be supported by the 571st Engineer Company (Combat), in direct support, and the 93rd Engineer Battalion (Construction), a subordinate unit of the 20th Engineer Brigade, providing Engineer Operational Support. In the II Field Force secondary road program, the 571st Engineer Company had completed 85% of their assigned roads. The 93rd Engineer Battalion has committed one company to the II Field Force Secondary Road Program in Long An Province. The 93rd Engineers have been assigned responsibility for 71.6 kms of road and to date have completed 57% of their assigned roads.

During this reporting period, a total of 300 mines and 492 booby traps were found or detonated within the 25th Infantry Division's AO. Of these, 47 mines and 37 booby traps were found by the 65th Engineer Battalion. In comparison with the previous quarter, Division mining incidents increased 10% while booby traps decreased 20%.

Fire support bases throughout the Division area received continuous engineer effort. Sixteen (16) FSBs/PBs were upgraded, five were constructed and three were closed. A great variety of tasks were performed: berms, fields-of-fire, interior and access roads, bunkers, TOC and FDC construction, drainage and trash sumps, POL points, heliports and refuel points, hardstands, dust abatement, artillery parapets, culverts, drainage, water wells and observation towers were among the most common.
type projects. Wet season preparation was emphasized. Technical advice was commonly provided.

1. At FSB Buell a rifle range was constructed by pushing up 20 meters of 6' berm. Areas between the FSB berm and first wire were cleared for fields of fire and interior areas were leveled for four new bunkers. The most extensive work during this quarter was the closure of the FSB Annex or "Bubble". Work consisted of leveling ten bunkers and 3000 square meters of annex berm, pushing up a new berm to restore the original Buell perimeter and opening three swags, filling them with debris and closing them. Work was initiated to upgrade the interior roads in preparation for the wet season.

2. At FSB Chamberlain, the access road which caused considerable consternation during the last rainy season was improved using 124 loads of laterite. The roadway was widened and another lift of laterite was used to cap the wearing surface. The helipad was also penepriemad.

3. At FSB Devin 35 loads of trash were hauled and interior ditches cleaned out. Fifty feet of 24" culvert and 120' of 48" culvert were placed in the interior of the FSB. A drainage ditch was dug 850 meters long and 10' wide with a slope of 4' outward from the perimeter. A well 35' deep and 12' in diameter was dug and a 60" culvert 40' long was installed and backfilled with 15 loads of laterite and 10 loads of rock. Sixty-two loads of laterite were placed, graded and compacted on the interior roads. Seventy loads of fill were used to rebuild low portions of the berm. Six 20' diameter 155mm artillery gun pads were built using 224 loads of laterite and 10 loads of rock. Each gun pad had a berm five feet high and four feet wide constructed from 192 loads of laterite. Two 12" culverts 20' and 40' and two 18" culverts 30' and 35' long were placed at the entrance and exits to the gun pads. Berm positions and frames and six bunkers were constructed.

4. At FSB Gettysburg a 30' timber observation tower was flown in after being constructed at Cu Chi Base Camp.

5. At FSB Hampton a dozer was employed to reduce the size of the base by 50% and push up a new berm. Work was begun to revamp the existing drainage system which was found non-functional. The dust problem was countered at Hampton by penepriemading the 3000 square meter helipad.

6. At FSB Houston 377 loads of laterite were used to build pads for the self-propelled guns and APCs. The 5000 square meter helipad at Houston was also treated with penepriem. Five hundred meters of drainage ditch was cleaned. Three hundred and ten loads of laterite and 65 loads of fill were used to upgrade roads and interior facilities. Two hundred loads of laterite were used to upgrade the berm. Two 18" culverts and two 24" culverts were placed for interior drainage.
Construction was supervised for a TOC bunker, FDC bunker, four CP bunkers, aid station, S-4 bunker, 4.2" mortar bunker, mess hall bunker, and a S-1 bunker for the 4-9 Inf. Two mess halls, a mess hall sump and five sleeping bunkers were constructed for 1-8 Arty. A Chinook pad 150 X 50 meters was constructed using 8470 gallons of peneprime and 1200 gallons of diesel.

PB Lee was closed. Closure consisted of opening three sumps, leveling the perimeter, filling the sumps with leveled debris and closing them.

At FSB Patton two 12" culverts 30' long were replaced in the interior roads and backfilled with four loads of laterite.

At FSB Rawlins drainage ditches (700 X 5 X 1½ meters) were reshaped. Approximately 50 loads of laterite were placed in low areas. A dust problem on the access road was solved. 5000 gallons of diesel. An 8'X16'X8' water tower was constructed at the waterpoint. Interior road network was graded.

At FSB Tennessee 60 loads of fill were placed in spots on the berm and inside the perimeter. A 70 X 60 meter Chinook pad was constructed from 2 bundles of PSP. Five garbage sumps 20'X10'X4' were dug and 4 were covered over after being filled with trash. The interior and access roads were graded and an area 400 X 30 meters was leveled outside the perimeter.

At FSB Washington 550 loads of fill were hauled in for sandbags, low spots and berm shaping; 100 loads of laterite were hauled in to build the interior road and 35 loads of laterite were hauled in to build up mortar positions. Fourteen (14) holes were punched in the berm (20 feet wide) for new fighting positions and 2 holes 20 feet wide for new bunkers, fields of fire were cleared between the first wire and the bermline, 3 drainage culverts were placed in the interior roads and a 75 meter ditch 1½ feet deep was cut along the road. Considerable technical and material assistance was provided during the upgrading of this FSB.

At FSB Wood 12 loads of rock and 55 loads of laterite were brought in to complete a 12 feet diameter, 30 foot deep well. Eighty-six loads of laterite were brought in for general upgrading of the FSB berm and interior roads. A 24'X24' landing mat was constructed using MSA1 matting. Approximately 2000 board feet of lumber were used in the construction of bunkers or upgrading of existing facilities. Sixty barrels of peneprime and two loads of rock were stockpiled. Half of the halipad was resurfaced with peneprime. Five-hundred and twenty loads of laterite were utilized for upgrading interior facilities and the bermline. Ninety-eight loads of laterite were mixed with 216 bags of lime and spread in company areas. The berm height was raised from two feet to six feet on 50% of the bermline. An area 700 X 600 meters has been cleared for fields of fire. One-hundred and ten feet of 18 inch culvert was constructed and
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placed. One thousand eight hundred sandbags have been filled and stock-
piled for future use on bunkers in the FSB. Five hundred and fifty square
meters have been backbladed and seven loads of dunnage have been hauled
cour of the FSB. On 25 March two classes on "mechanical ambush and mine
sweeping were taught to Troop C, 3-4 Cav. On 26 March 3-4 Cav began
utilizing their personnel to conduct sweeps while Company B continued to
provide demolitions specialists for ...s in 3-4 Cav operations. Two engineer
personnel bunkers, one generator bunker and two demolition bunkers were
constructed. A four foot berm was constructed for an ARVN compound at
Go Trach (XT531381) which was 31 X 30 X 30 meters (triangular).

(h) Cu Chi Base Camp:

1. A 24' X 20' addition was built on the existing 3rd Brigade
TOC to house operations for Base Camp Defense. Extensive renovation were
also made to the interior of the 3rd Brigade TOC. A sheet metal roof was
installed over the Brigade Commander's trailer and two new revetments were
built for the 3rd Brigade Aviation element pad. The latter project re-
quired 30 loads of laterite which were hauled from Tan Hiea Pit.

2. Five 36" culverts 30' long were built and emplaced in the
berm to provide improved drainage between bunkers 60 and 61. Five 36"
culverts 30' long were built and stockpiled in the S4 yard for future
use in the drainage system. Ammo box blast walls were erected behind
all the lateral fighting positions in the G Sector of the bunkerline.

3. A rifle range was constructed for the Tropic Lightning Acad-
emy on the C Sector of the bunkerline. The range was approximately 60
meters in length with a berm elevation of seven feet. Ninety-eight man-
hours, one D-7 dozer, one scoop loader, one grader and two five-ton dump
trucks were utilized. Seven lateral fighting positions were constructed
for the G Sector of the Cu Chi Base Camp bunkerline. The project required
approximately 150 man-hours and the use of a scoop loader. Ammo boxes
and 60" culvert were utilized.

4. During the quarter there were no unusual recovery operations.
The wrecker was used primarily for convoy duty during this quarter. En-
gineer equipment being utilized on the bunkerline and land clearing oper-
ations received maintenance priority from Battalion maintenance section.

5. An AN Net, using the AN/RC-106, was installed and operated
to facilitate communicating with Companies A and C. Initiation was prompted
by the movement of Company C to AO Chop. A crypto facility was built within
the existing Battalion TOC to prevent improved security and control of
classified material.

6. During February, the Battalion built a prototype bunker on
the base camp perimeter to determine the construction time and to train
personnel to supervise construction of identical bunkers on other portions

60

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of the bunkerline. Three more bunkers were constructed by this same crew
to increase their familiarity with necessary procedures. To date, 21
bunkers have been completed and seven are in various stages of completion.
Each bunker utilizes 10,000 square feet of lumber, 600 linear feet of
wire rope, 450 pounds of nails, 25 ammo boxes, 14 sheets of metal roofing,
three rolls of tar paper, 36 cubic feet of finished concrete and other
hardware associated with finishing doors and the interior of each bunker.

7 A new command bunker was constructed for the G Sector of the
bunkerline. The overall dimensions of the bunker were 15' X 20' X 13'1.
Approximately 22,000 feet of ditching have been dug to facilitate drain-
age of the bunkerline and 250,000 square feet of area has been sloped.
Two hundred feet of 30' ditching has been cleared. Thirty feet of 36" culvert has been constructed and placed.

(i) Dau Tieng Base Camp:

1 At Dau Tieng a Civilian Personnel Control Gate, 8'X8', with
two pedestrian lanes was constructed. Two mine booms were repaired with
two each 6"X12"X16' timbers. Two gates, 8'X13', were constructed for
entrances on the new bermline. A generator shed, mess hall and two KP
shacks were demolished. Portions of the berms were rebuilt with 675 loads
of laterite while 125 loads of fill were used to close a garbage sump for
1st Aviation Battalion. Interior roads were graded and 800 gallons of
peneprene were spread on the perimeter road adjacent to the 2nd Brigade
heliport.

2 In constructing the 2nd Brigade helipad, 22 loads of over-
burden and 710 feet of triple concertina wire and double apron fence
were removed. Six hundred and sixty-five loads of laterite were placed
over a graded area 320' X 390'. A 24" culvert 24 feet long was installed
at the 150 meter long entrance road. Nine 24' X 24' helipads were con-
structed from M81 matting and filled with laterite. A total of 8250
gallons of peneprene were applied.

3 The 2nd Brigade TOC was left 70% complete due to sudden change
in the Brigade's AO. Three-hundred and eighty-two linear feet of forming
materials were placed and 90' of forms for footers. Three-hundred and twenty
feet of reinforcing forms were placed and 70 steel plates were installed.
Twenty-one cubic yards of concrete were poured for 7 footers and 21 cubic
yards were used for a concrete floor of 48'X32'. Three inch by eight inch
roofing was emplaced while the blast walls were left 35% complete.

4 During March and April considerable engineer effort was pro-
vided Dau Tieng Base Camp. The project included work to reduce the peri-
meter of Dau Tieng Base Camp, construction of a new berm and leveling of
the area between the two berms for fields of fire. As part of the new
berm construction, 2000 meters of new berm was pushed up, four new culverts
were placed in the new berm, seven bunkers and two observation towers were
The old berm removal consisted of leveling 3500 meters of the old berm, eight firing positions and 14 bunkers. To improve observation and fields of fire, 7500 cubic yards of ridge line and an old ASP were leveled. Additional work at Dau Tieng consisted of providing 600 loads of fill for low areas in the base camp, for sandbags, for the 2-12 Inf and 1-5 Inf (M) requests, and for shaping the new and old berms. Additionally, 80 loads of laterite were provided for access roads leading into the base camp.

(j) Route Construction and Maintenance:

1. Road construction and maintenance received significant engineer effort. Priority of lines of communication effort went toward wet season preparation of roads and roads that supported the pacification program.

2. TL 4: Route maintenance was accomplished by placing and grading 215 loads of laterite from XT256606 to XT238588.

3. Route 7A South was upgraded from XT508512 to XT563167 using 365 loads of laterite and 14 pallets of lime. Work was accomplished with a grader, a sheepsfoot roller and a water tanker. Between TL 10 and the Sugarmill, 1118 loads of laterite were spread to raise the level of the road. Approximately two kilometers of road were raised and shaped.

4. TL 14: Route maintenance was accomplished by placing and grading 44 loads of laterite near Dau Tieng Base Camp.

5. Route 6A received 174 loads of laterite for upgrading from XT452125 to XT450125 (250 meters) and from XT441124 to XT440124 (100 meters). A culvert was extended at XT441124 and three culverts were installed at XT417124.

6. TL 13: Route maintenance was accomplished by placing and grading 200 loads of laterite in holes between FSB Washington and old FSB Crook. This maintenance was a combat essential mission facilitating the passage of 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and supporting artillery units.

7. QL 22: Route maintenance was accomplished by placing and grading 60 loads of laterite southeast of FSB Washington.

8. 239: Route maintenance was accomplished by placing and grading 485 loads of laterite between FSB Hunter and Dau Tieng. Culverts at XT415443 were repaired and additional culverts added. Extensive channel shaping and cleaning was accomplished in conjunction with culvert work. The culverts were upgraded upon request of Tay Ninh Province Chief.
The Cu Chi By-pass Road, which Company D started and later turned over to Company B, took 168 loads of laterite. The market place pad, near Cu Chi main gate, required 92 loads of laterite. An additional 35 loads of laterite were delivered to 8th Aerial Port for the construction of three helipads. The Cu Chi By-pass was upgraded for a distance of one kilometer from XT627141 to XT635138 using 136 loads of laterite. A hill was leveled at XT627157 and 80' of 18'' culvert was placed and backfilled while 200 feet of ditch was cleared.

Upgrading of the unnumbered route south of Trang Bang was completed on 23 March. One thousand seven hundred and thirty-six loads of laterite were dumped and spread between XT530513 and XT487179. This entire three kilometers was composed of 1736 loads of laterite each mixed with four bags of lime and surface graded.

A road was constructed from XT533333 to XT362349. This project was undertaken upon request of the Tay Ninh Province Chief. Construction required 2140 loads of laterite. Three culverts were installed at a stream crossing.

To eliminate potential mining incidents and to improve fields of fire, a dozer was used to level approximately 2800 cubic meters of obstructions along laterite road.

Technical assistance was given to the engineers of the 25th ARVN Division in preparing routes 8A and 244 south of Duc Hoa.

Bridging:

Seven bridging and two rafting missions were accomplished. Missions included reestablishment of bridges destroyed by enemy sappers, installation of bridges to support tactical scheme of maneuvers and bridges which supported the pacification program.

At XT05595 a seven-float M426 bridge with approaches was installed. Installation occurred on 11 April and was completed approximately eight hours after arrival at the site. On 12 April 1-5 Inf (M) passed over the bridge. Lancer Rifles "minicav" was used to insert an engineer recon party at an earlier date. Recon recorded approaches, bank and river characteristics. This recon facilitated successful mission accomplishment.

At XT201531 engineer recon was performed to determine feasibility of an M426 float bridge. First Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry inserted the engineer recon party. The bridge was necessary to pass the 501st Engineer Company, with 1-5 Inf (M) as security, who were engaged in land clearing operations in the Renegade and Straight Edge Woods. On 19 April two OH-47 and nine CH-54 sorties were used to deliver personnel and eight pre-assembled M426 pontoons with partial decking in place.
At XT202479 an existing bridge was destroyed by enemy sappers using explosives. Approaches were constructed the morning of 17 April. Bridging arrived at 1330 hours. By 2130 hours a seven-float M4T6 bridge was opened to traffic. Continuing the mission, a 130 foot double-double Bailey Bridge was installed over the top of the destroyed bridge. The bridge was emplaced in such a manner that its effective span 120 feet. It was placed one foot above the destroyed bridge to facilitate repair of the destroyed bridge.

At XT231309 trees and an old existing bridge were removed so the crossing site could accept an air delivered 45 foot M4T6 dry span. Project was completed on 9 April. Mission was accomplished in 44 hours after arrival of personnel on site.

During the period 13 February through 18 March 1970 Echo Company built and maintained three 5-float reinforced M4T6 rafts at Go Dau Ha to pass military traffic across the Van Go Dong River after Communist forces destroyed the existing bridge. In the course of this operation Echo Company's rafts carried 3354 vehicles across the river including numerous dump trucks of the 588th Engineer Battalion involved in the construction of the II Field Forces Secondary Road Network west of the river. On 18 March, Echo Company turned the raft operation over to the 79th Engineer Company (BF) of the 79th Engineer Group.

A 30 foot M4T6 dry span was emplaced at XT447067. This bridge replaced an earlier structure which was in need of renovation.

Echo Company supplied technical assistance and a platoon of men to support the engineers of the 25th ARVN Division in building a 9-float M4T6 bridge at XT575937. This bridge permitted continued and uninterrupted operations along Route 224 from Duc Hoa to Ben Luc while a more permanent bridge was being constructed. Echo Company rendered further assistance by constructing a five-float reinforced M4T6 raft to float a crane to midstream to drive piles for the permanent bridge that was to follow.

1. Land Clearing:

1) Division land clearing continued to be a valuable, viable means of denying the enemy his traditional sanctuaries and of destroying enemy boobytraps while minimizing friendly losses. A total of 7425 acres of land were cleared.

2) Two small land clearing projects were accomplished using company level resources. Operation "Big Look" entailed removal of brush from 58 acres northwest of FSB Washington. Clearing was accomplished to increase range of radar and resulted in a 1.0 to 1.5 increase in radar range. A second land clearing of 22 acres of brush, vicinity XT1749, was accomplished upon request from Tay Ninh Province Chief. It denied a traditional mortar site.
(m) Water Production: The production of potable water for the Division is among the most significant operations performed by the 65th Engineer Battalion. Water production was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>GALLONS PRODUCED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSB Washington</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Rawline</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Wood III</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>341,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB Kion</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>132,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB Jackson</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>57,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB Chamberlain</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
<td>105,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB Colorado</td>
<td>Mar - Apr</td>
<td>204,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB North Dakota</td>
<td>Mar - Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cu Chi Base Camp</td>
<td>Feb - Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>3,062,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(n) Other:

1. Construction of the Coordinated Fire Support Control Center (CFSCC) at Bao Trai, XT526044, is a continuation from the last quarter. Since the last report 19,500 board feet of lumber has been used along with 53 loads of fill, 603 ammo boxes, 750 feet of electrical cable, 16 light fixtures, four light switches, 22 electrical outlets, 200 pieces of roofing tin and 260 linear feet of wire screen. The bunker was completed on 3 February 1970. Three antenna poles, one 70 feet high and two 80 feet high, were set next to the bunker. A covered generator shed 15'X15' was constructed next to the bunker. The shed required 55 cubic feet of finished concrete, 5500 board feet of lumber, 225 ammo boxes and 10 sheets of tin.

2. The Innocent Civilian Center was also a carry-over from the previous quarter. The project was completed during this period.

(d) Artillery Operations:

(a) The Fire Support Element worked under the general staff supervision of the AGofS, G3. The Division Artillery Command supervised the FSE as Division Fire Support Coordinator. The FSE continued to coordinate the fire support for the maneuver elements of the Division and supervised the artillery warning control centers. Each maneuver brigade
was provided direct support by a light artillery battalion. Although there
were attachments and detachments, normally support was provided as fol-
1st Brigade 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
2nd Brigade 1st Battalion, 6th Artillery
3rd Brigade 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

The 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (155/8") provided general support for
the Division.

(b) 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery:

1 Battalion Headquarters remained at Tay Ninh Base Camp during
the reporting period. At the start of the reporting period the batteries
were deployed as follows: Battery A at Tay Ninh Base Camp; Battery B
at FSB Buell; and Battery C at FSB Rawlins. In addition to providing
direct support to the 1st Brigade, the Battalion also provided support to
the ARVN operating in the Tay Ninh Area and the US Navy patrolling the
Van Co Dong River.

2 Expenditures for the period were: 7-11 Arty 83,995 rounds;
other units firing in support of the 1st Brigade 33,771 rounds; total
expenditure 117,776 rounds.

3 In the change of the Brigade boundary on 26 February Fire
Support Bases Pine Ridge, Kien and Tennessee came under the control of
the 1st Brigade. This necessitated moving several artillery units.
A/7-11 Arty split and sent three tubes each to FSBs Kien and Pine Ridge,
and 2-77 Arty was positioned at FSB Tennessee to provide reinforcing
fires.

4 During this quarter the Battalion continued using barge ar-
tillery on several occasions: 11 February, 10 March, and 20 April.
C/7-11 Arty continued as the riverine battery. Again the concept of
reaching inaccessible areas with light artillery has proven a great
success within the AO.

5 Experience in fixed wing mobility was gained by B/7-11 Arty
on 20 February when they were flown by C-130 to Thien Ngen and again
when they returned on 25 February.

6 The Combined Fire Support Coordination Center established on
24 October 1969 remained in operation. During this quarter 6321 requests
for clearances were submitted by US elements of which 5224 were cleared.
Vietnamese elements requested 4907 of which 4077 were cleared.

(c) 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery:

1 The 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery has continued to provide
fires in support of numerous US Navy and ARVN operations as well as
in its direct support of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia, Binh Duong and Tay Ninh Provinces.

2 The Battalion extended its direct support capabilities on 19 February when the 3rd Brigade was expanded. The 3rd Brigade's acquisition of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry as an OPCON unit from the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, from the period 1 March to 18 April brought Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery under the Battalion's control for clearance of fires and tactical fire control. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery became GSR to the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery on 1 March with a mission of direct support to the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

3 During the quarter, elements of the Battalion made a total of 22 tactical moves in support of 3rd Brigade combat operations. Nine of the moves were made by air, using CH-47 aircraft. Additionally, a Battalion advance CP and TOC was displaced from Cu Chi to FSB Jackson during the period 13-17 April for the purpose of improving command and control in the western sector of the TAOI.

4 In the area of target acquisition, the Battalion gained the AN/MPQ-4A counter-mortar radars of the 258th and 264th Field Artillery which became OPCON to the Battalion on 28 March to supplement the program established previously.

5 The Battalion took over the responsibility for Cu Chi Base Camp Artillery Defense on 19 February as part of the 3rd Brigade's mission of Cu Chi Base Camp defense. The Combined Fire Support Coordination Center for Hau Nghia Province also became functional during the quarter, initiating operations on 18 March.

6 Total expenditures for the Battalion for the quarter were: 63,033 HE; 1,509 ICM; 4,595 Illumination; 1,381 WP; 20 CS; and 6 BH rounds.

(a) 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery:

1 Battery A was stabilized at FSB Hampton from 1 February to 25 April. The Battery's mission for this reporting period was GSR fires for 2-77 Arty. Two howitzer sections remained under operational control of Battery D. On 13 April Battery A (-) moved to FSB Jarrett, previously known as FSB Harris, with no change in mission. On 18 April, Battery A returned to FSB Houston to prepare for permanent movement to FSB Jarrett. On 25 April FSB Houston was officially closed out with the move of Battery A to FSB Jarrett.

2 On 1 February Battery B moved from FSB Patton II to FSB Devin. The mission at FSB Devin was GSR fires to 2-77 Arty. Two howitzer sections were moved to FSB Pershing on 28 March. The same two sections moved from Pershing to Dau Tieng Base Camp on 4 April. While at Dau Tieng their mission was GSR fires to 7-11 Arty.
Battery C was located at FSB Rawlins during the reporting period. The primary mission at FSB Rawlins was GSR fires to 7-11 Arty. From 5 February to 11 February two howitzer sections moved to No Cong with no change in mission. On 18 February two sections returned to FSB Rawlins from Dau Tieng, but were moved there again for the period 2 to 12 March. On 8 April the Battery moved to FSB Mitchell with no change in mission, returning to FSB Rawlins on 11 April. Two howitzer sections assumed the role of GSR to 2-77 Arty at FSB Jackson during the period 12 April to 18 April. These two sections returned to FSB Rawlins on 18 April. Two sections were dispatched to the vicinity of FSB Grant on 23 April with no change in mission. These two howitzer sections returned to FSB Rawlins on 28 April. Two howitzer sections moved to FSB Washington on the same day with no change in mission and returned to FSB Rawlins on 30 April.

Battery D continued its mission of General Support for the 25th Infantry Division from a primary base at FSB Hampton. Two howitzer sections were displaced to Tay Ninh Base Camp from 3 March to 24 March in the role of GSR fire to 7-11 Arty. These two sections returned to FSB Hampton on 24 March.

(a) The Division Signal Office continued coordination and staff supervision over all communication within the Division.

(b) During the month of February, a secure Nestor test was conducted by two Battalions of the Division. The test was made to determine if the small size infantry units could effectively utilize Nestor secure gear on operations. Results were encouraging except that the weight of the man pack configuration was too much for one man.

(c) The 2nd Brigade communications was put in at Dau Tieng. A 120 foot tower was erected to provide VHF and FM communication with Cu Chi. The communication set up was only two weeks as 2nd Brigade moved to Bearcat where once again communication was provided. VHF, FM and RATT communications was provided at FSB Colorado, the 2nd Brigade Headquarters. At Bearcat, the 2nd Brigade rear, a VHF link with Hurricane (II Field Force) and Lightning (25th Infantry Division) was set up to link the Brigade with higher headquarters.

(d) The communication bunker for Go Dau Ha MACV Compound was completed, however, the 160 foot tower originally planned was not put in. There is a 70 foot pole at Go Dau Ha to fulfill the requirement of mounting the antennas needed.

(e) With 2/34 Armor OPGON to II FFV, new resupply problems were encountered with SOI/SSI material. The normal implementation time of 48 hours was found to be too short for units of their mobility. Other units
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e.g. 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 4th Bn, 9th Inf indicated that 48 hours was too short notice to notify all of their personnel. The Division Signal Officer modified his procedures to give between 60 and 72 hours notice on major SOI/SSI changes.

(f) As the 2nd Brigade became established in AO Chop, the Mobile MARS station was sent out to serve the 2nd Brigade and OPCOM Battalions. It visited the FSBs to preclude personnel having to go to one main location.

(g) Nestor secure voice equipment was at its highest usage level in the Division. All Brigades were secure, and Battalions had secure operations in all semi-fixed positions. All Division nets were secure, including C&C ships, which allowed the Command Group to attain fast secure transmissions from any place in the AO.

(h) The 3rd Brigade set up a forward TOC at Go Dau Ha which was supported with an AN/GRC-163 four channel FM radio set. This provided the support needed for a mobile headquarters and allowed them to maintain communications with rear elements at any position in the AO.

(i) During the months of February, March and April three members of the Division Signal Office conducted the communications, electronics and cryptographic portions of the Division Pre-AGI.

(j) During the last two months of the quarter, the Division encountered approximately 14 SOI compromises. Two new SSI items were issued to preclude the recurrence of this problem. WO1 Duncan from CLSS and CPT Klockow, Division Radio Officer, gave classes in SOI and crypto security to the Brigades and DIVARTY Signal Officers and crypto clerks.

E. (C) Logistics:

(1) The 25th Infantry Division Support Command continued to provide Division-level combat support to all Divisional and several non-Divisional units in the area of operations. Because of the reduction of troop strength in Vietnam as part of the Vietnamization program, many changes were made in the disposition of troop units within the Division's expanding Tactical Area of Interest (TAO). This necessitated adjustments in DISCOM's support operations and the location of supporting units and facilities. To support an increase of Division units in the Michelin Plantation Area, forward supply and maintenance elements were established at Dau Tieng Base Camp. By direction, CL I, III, IIIa, and VI (to include sundry packs) support was provided to all U.S. units located in the Dau Tieng area. The Saigon Support Command continued to throughput CL V and, occasionally, CL IIIa. In addition, the Saigon Support Command transported two CL I reefers to Cu Chi Base Camp for further movement to Dau Tieng by Division 5-ton tractors.

(2) During April the Division was tasked to temporarily backup CL III, IIIa, V and medical evacuation support to ARVN forces operating in
the western portion of the Division's TAOI. Two aircraft refuel points and one dustoff control point were established.

(3) As part of a reduction in support provided to the Division by the Saigon Support Command, operation of the Cu Chi Base Camp ASP was assumed by DISCOM effective 15 March. All artillery units operating in the Cu Chi area were required to transport all CLV (artillery) requirements directly from the Long Binh ASP. Other types of ammunition (small arms, grenades, etc.) were transported from the Long Binh ASP to the Cu Chi Base Camp ASP on Division vehicles for issue to using units. To provide the Division a capability to offset the loss of support from the Saigon Support Command, Headquarters, USARV authorized the Division to draw six 5 ton tractors, five 12 ton S&P trailers, three 5,000 gallon tankers and three fork lifts.

(4) During this period, salvage operations were improved and expanded. Procedures were revised and a directive on property turn-in procedures was prepared as a Division Regulation.

(5) Following are significant projects accomplished by the office of the Installation Coordinator, Cu Chi Base Camp:

(a) A new on-post sanitary fill was established and operated by the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E). Previously, the sanitary fill was located off-post and caused numerous problems.

(b) A conservation program was initiated to conserve electric power.

(6) Because of increased requirements, the number of CH-47 aircraft available for Division support was sharply reduced. To offset this air transport loss, an increased use of road transportation was required of all units. During the quarter, a 98.5% utilization of CH-47 aircraft assets allocated to the Division was achieved.

(7) The 341st Aviation Detachment (Divisional), 165th Aviation Group, USARV, was detached from the 25th S&T Battalion and attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Band, 25th Infantry Division Support Command by General Order 3585, 25th Infantry Division.

(8) 25th Medical Battalion:

(a) The 25th Medical Battalion supported both Division and non-Divisional units with Medical service and supplies.

1 Medical Totals:

Patients Seen:

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a. Disease - 3,094
b. Non-battle Injuries - 641
c. IRHA - 123 (NOTE: Seriously wounded patients were dusted off directly to the 12th Evacuation or 45th Surgical Hospitals.)

2. Supply and Services:
   a. Line items issued - 1,989
   b. MEDCAP line items issued - 152
   c. Bulk pharmacy items issued - 3

(b) The 40th Medical Detachment (KJ), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided dental treatment for the Division.

1. Total treatments - 8,973
2. Civic actions - 875

(c) The 159th Medical Detachment (HA), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided evacuation to Divisional and non-Divisional units.

1. Total Patients - 1,097
2. Total Missions - 538
3. Flying Time - 445 hours
4. Aircraft Availability - 74%
5. Aircraft Flyable - 66 2/3%

(9) 25th Supply and Transport Battalion:

(a) During the month of March, due to the tactical situation, the perimeter of the Dau Tieng Base Camp was drawn in. This necessitated the relocation of the entire Class I operation.

(b) On 12 February 1970 at 2100 hours, Company A was notified of a requirement to set up a temporary four point JP-4 refuel operation at Thien Ngon.

F. (C) Communications:

(1) During the reporting period, the 125th Signal Battalion continued to provide the 25th Infantry Division with VHF multichannel radio communication, FM clear and secure radio, radio teletype, communications center and message service, photographic support and tactical telephone communications.

(2) Significant events:
   (a) During the reporting period, the Battalion has continued to provide personnel at the fire support bases with MARS support, using the
multichannel VHF systems, and a portable MARS facility.

(b) A complete signal center platoon was deployed to Bearcat in support of the 2nd Brigade during the month of March.

(c) During the reporting period the Division Photo Lab processed 613 work orders, producing 15,975 prints and 116 slides.

(d) The Division MARS Station processed the following traffic between 1 February and 30 April 1970:

1. Total number of requests - 10,173
2. Total number of requests passed - 8,669
3. Total number of calls completed - 6,090

(e) The multichannel systems were changed as follows:

1. On 2 February an area signal center was installed at Dau Tieng to support the 2nd Brigade. Multichannel systems were installed from this signal center to Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, and Fire Support Base Wood. The Dau Tieng radio relay system between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh was relocated to that signal center.

2. On 10 February 1970 FSB Kien was opened and a 12 channel system was established between Dau Tieng and FSB Kien.

3. The system to FSB Pershing was discontinued on 10 February 1970 and the personnel and equipment returned to Cu Chi.

4. On 13 February 1970 the system between the 1st Infantry Division, located at Lai Xhe, and Cu Chi was discontinued.

5. The system to FSB Hunter was discontinued on 14 February 1970 and the personnel and equipment returned to Company B at Tay Ninh.

6. An AN/NRC-4 was installed at Go Dau Ha on 20 February 1970 for relay between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh. The system is used for the training of enlisted men in the MCS 31M.

7. The system to FSB Washington was discontinued and the personnel and equipment returned to Company B at Tay Ninh. The systems to Bao Trai and FSB Dixon were discontinued and the personnel and equipment returned to Cu Chi. On 21 February the FSB Wood III System was reterminated at Cu Chi.

8. On 23 February 1970 the system between FSB Kien and Dau Tieng was reterminated at Tay Ninh due to relocation of 2nd Brigade personnel.

9. On 24 February 1970 the system between Dau Tieng and Cu Chi was discontinued due to relocation of personnel of the 2nd Brigade. This service was reestablished using a relay at Long Binh via 53rd Signal Battalion systems.

10. The 56th Signal Company joined with the 125th Signal Battalion to establish a system between Ben Luc and FSB Chamberlain from 25 February 1970 to 26 April 1970.

11. On 25 February communications for AO CHOP were installed, with multichannel systems installed from Bearcat to FSB Colorado, FSB Le Loi, and Nui Dat.

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On 2 March the system to FSB Buell was discontinued and the personnel and equipment returned to Tay Ninh.

During the period 4 April to 22 April a four channel system using AN/GRC-163 was installed between Cu Chi and Go Dau Ha in support of the 3rd Brigade forward.

G. (C) Material:

(1) The 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts and supply to the 25th Infantry Division. A new low in equipment backlog of 112 pieces was reached on 23 February 1970. Aircraft availability during this period averaged 87.2%.

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<td>138</td>
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<td>1001</td>
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<tr>
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(2) Significant relocation of Divisional units within the TAOI necessitated the use of heavy contact teams in widely scattered locations. The 725th Maintenance Battalion supported Divisional maneuver Battalions (1 Armor, 3 Mech Inf) and supporting units from as many as six separate locations simultaneously. The addition of another Mechanized Infantry Battalion and supporting units for maintenance required personnel and equipment not available from Maintenance Battalion resources. An augmentation of 22 personnel, a 5 ton wrecker and selected special tools was requested.

(3) Significant MOS and skill shortages continued to plague the Battalion. In addition, the majority of automotive repairmen authorized possessed organizational repair MOS 63B and 63C. An MTOE change was submitted to re-designate 75% of these MOSs to 63H to reflect the direct support maintenance work performed. Shortages of MOS 67W20, rotary wing technical inspector, have necessitated "on the job" training of personnel to fill existing vacancies.

(4) To provide effective repair parts supply support to the Division's widely scattered units, a 100% location survey and inventory was
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conducted. In addition, $61,523 in excesses were identified and retro-
graded in a continuing effort to purge the system. County stores were est-
ablished in each company technical supply, including aircraft, to provide
low cost, fast moving repair parts with a minimum of administrative work-
load.

H. (C) Revolutionary Development/Pacification:

(1) Within the Division TAOI, the Village Self-Development pro-
gram is continuing to gain momentum. Nearly all of the villages with
selected officials made use of their self-development funds and the objective
of the program, namely involving the people in the villages in their own
improvement, is being attained.

(2) The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES-70) ratings as of 31 March
show the following changes in HES Security/Development Ratings during March
1970:

<table>
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<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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(3) Actual HES Security/Development Ratings as of 31 March 1970
w ere:

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<th></th>
<th>A</th>
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<td>132</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>696</td>
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### Percent of population in AB and ABC status and changes from February:

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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>AB</th>
<th>ABC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tay Ninh Province</td>
<td>93.4% (+19.1)</td>
<td>98.6% (-0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hau Nghia Province</td>
<td>40.0% (+8.5)</td>
<td>76.6% (+5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long An Province</td>
<td>74.3% (+9.4)</td>
<td>91.9% (+4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tri Tam District</td>
<td>69.9% (+29.5)</td>
<td>70.0% (-0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Tuy Province*</td>
<td>67.6% (-2.3)</td>
<td>89.5% (-2.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Long Le, Duc Thanh Districts only)*

### Civic Action:

1. MEDCAPS, ICAPS and NITECAPS have continued during the reporting period with 178,234 patients being treated in 4,866 operations. This represents an 82.8% increase over the previous quarter in which there were 2,893 operations treating 97,480 patients. GVN participation in this area continues to be encouraged.

2. During this reporting period, the 65th Engineer Battalion repaired a total of 71 kilometers of secondary roads as its primary contribution to the civic action program. These roads are useful to both civilian and military traffic.

### Psychological Operations (PSYOPS):

1. PSYOP activities were in support of operations conducted in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Long An Provinces.

2. A total of over 48.5 million leaflets were disseminated in the Division TAOL. This is a decrease of approximately 6 million leaflets from the last reporting period.

3. During the reporting period, 4,087 hours of air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted. This was a slight decrease from the previous period.

4. During the period, 25 AN/PIQ5 hand held loudspeakers were distributed to maneuver Battalions within the Division. Five AN/U11-6 (500 watt) loudspeaker sets were distributed to the maneuver Brigades.

5. During the reporting period, a total of 760 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOL, which is a decrease of 420 from the previous reporting period.
2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. (U) Personnel. None.

   b. (C) Intelligence:

      (1) Source/Liaison Target Exploitation Operations.

         (a) Observation: Complete cooperation between 25th MIC personnel and the ground units who support them in exploiting intelligence targets is essential to a successful operation. In a recent operation targeted against village-level cadre, the ground Commander agreed to provide aerial surveillance while 25th MIC personnel, and indigenous source, and ground troops swept the targeted area. The targeted individuals avoided detection, however, and escaped from the advancing troops. An after-action critique revealed that the promised air cover had been diverted prior to the operation. Effective coordination would have permitted a change in plans, the method of the attack and perhaps a successful mission.

         (b) Evaluation: Recently, an intelligence target was hit by artillery fire and tactical air strikes prior to the positioning of the ground troops and 25th MIC personnel who were to sweep the target area. The preparatory fires warned the targeted individuals and obliterated essential landmarks.

         (c) Recommendation: Coordination should be established between 25th MIC personnel and supporting forces on operations designed to exploit intelligence targets.

      (2) Obtaining information about the enemy from civilians.

         (a) Observation: The civilian populace of Vietnam normally has current information of enemy movement and operations.

         (b) Evaluation: Intelligence from these civilians is normally reliable. However, it is difficult to get the average Vietnamese to communicate with U.S. personnel on these matters.

         (c) Recommendation: Kit Carson scouts can be very effective in obtaining current intelligence from the civilian populace. When units are operating in areas of civilian occupation, their Kit Carsons can easily slip in among the populace, undetected, and return with valuable information that will enhance the success of current operations. Leaflets can also be distributed with a map of the area and a message asking the civilians to pin-point enemy locations and turn the map in to any GI or Allied installation.
c. (C) Operations.

(1) Employment of Light Scout or Hunter-Killer Teams.

(a) Observation: The employment of one LOH and one Cobra as a team during late evening and early morning hours has proven successful in locating small enemy groups when VC/NVA tactics are primarily to avoid contact with US/GVN forces.

(b) Evaluation: The Cobra/LOH team has been effective when conducting scouting missions to locate small groups of VC/NVA forces. These small groups are dispersed to avoid contact with friendly forces. They live underground in tunnels and bunkers during daylight hours but come out in the late evening to carry out routine duties. They remain above ground cooking, resupplying and preparing positions until early morning. The LST has proven effective in locating and engaging these small groups during last light and first light.

(c) Recommendation: Continued use should be made of LSTs during early morning and late evening hours.

(2) Night Airborne Personnel Detector Operations.

(a) Observation: The recent innovation of night "Sniff" operations has presented several problems unique to this operation. The primary problem is the determination of what constitutes adequate ambient light to facilitate night low level operations with a reasonable degree of safety for the aircraft and crew involved.

(b) Evaluation: Under optimum moon light conditions the lowest one may safely descend to conduct low level operations is 50-100 feet AGL, depending upon the height of the local vegetation. Given the appropriate meteorological conditions the airborne personnel detector (Sniff Machine) can be effective only up to 100 feet above ground level, ie, a lapse condition or one in which the thermal convection of local air currents is present. This is normally a daytime or early evening condition. The neutral condition which exists during the hours of darkness is characterized by a lack of convective air currents upward due to a lack of sunlight and heat; hence, in order to be effective the operating envelope for the machine is significantly reduced, essentially to below 50 feet AGL. In a situation in which an aviator must operate at a flight level below 100 feet AGL and his visual acuity is reduced by darkness, an already hazardous condition is greatly magnified by two resultant phenomena. Horizon is lost as is the necessary visual contrast by which one may detect and avoid obstacles in the path of flight; thus, the time in which an obstacle may be visually acquired and avoided is greatly reduced, and the hazard of collision is greatly enhanced. In addition, the survivability of an in-flight emergency, given the altitude, airspeed and visual conditions described, would be doubtful at best.
(c) Recommendations: The Night Sniff operations should, if continued, be conducted shortly prior to EST and between BMNT and dawn. The atmospheric conditions during these periods would be one of lapse and inversion respectively, and would be more conducive to effective operation of the sniff machine. The visual conditions during these periods would be subdued, but should still be adequate for positive terrain and obstacle avoidance during low level operations. Resources should be made available to immediately react to Alpha and Bravo readings. The Night Hawk cover aircraft currently in use has no capability for detailed reconnaissance/search operations in areas where positive readings are received. Opportunity for a thorough daylight reconnaissance should be given to the crew in the operational area to be covered.

(3) Difficulties encountered with crew procedures of downed aircraft.

(a) Observation: No aircrew member is without thoughts and plans of what he will do in the event of a forced landing. Each aviator is thoroughly versed in the procedures required to successfully accomplish a landing in an emergency situation. However, during descent there is seldom time to brief the crew on a plan of action to be taken upon touchdown in a hostile environment.

(b) Evaluation: The best defense against post-landing loss of life and property is the crew's ability to make an organized evacuation, thus eliminating the inherent confusion. Experience has shown that most all crew members have a normal tendency to carry only what they are wearing when evacuating the aircraft. With this in mind and a little prior planning, the crew should be able to evacuate the aircraft with the basic survival equipment, i.e., individual weapon, pen gun, flares, emergency radio, and first aid kit.

(c) Recommendation: Satisfactory results are best accomplished by a pre-flight briefing by the AC or covered in the unit SOP. At a minimum, it should cover the releasing (or jettisoning, as appropriate) of cargo and/or external stores during descent, immediate security of weapons, survival gear and emergency radio upon touchdown, establishment of an immediate hasty defense posture, instructions and aid to passengers or crew, and preparations for the recovery of the aircraft, crew and equipment.

(4) Riverine Platoon operations.

(a) Observation: The best method of conducting Riverine operations must be determined.

(b) Evaluation: The best method of patrolling and selecting ambush sites can be best determined by personnel actually engaged in Riverine operations. A minimum of two boats should be employed so as to provide mutual support. At times the controlling Headquarters has required the exact positioning of ambush sites. This is not desirable since conditions at actual sites must govern final ambush selection.
(c) **Recommendation:** A minimum of two boats should be employed together. Final site determination should be made by the aquabush patrol leader.

(5) **Detonation of dud rounds by tracked vehicles,**

(a) **Observation:** At least one APC has run over and detonated a dud artillery round.

(b) **Evaluation:** Often dud artillery rounds are observed but not destroyed. This situation has resulted in casualties and material damage.

(c) **Recommendation:** Unless a unit is in contact, it should be SOP to stop and destroy all dud rounds.

(6) **Security of land clearing,**

(a) **Observation:** Security provided Engineer land clearing teams has been marginal to inadequate in many instances.

(b) **Evaluation:** Dozer operators cannot provide security for themselves and perform their land clearing mission. In most cases, security is poor because maneuver units have not been made fully aware of the requirement.

(c) **Recommendation:** When units are tasked to provide security for land clearing operations, close coordination should be effected among the Engineer Staff representative, the maneuver unit S-3, and land clearing team OIC to task and explain security requirements.

(7) **Construction of Fire Support Bases,**

(a) **Observation:** The increased mobility of general support units and the commensurate assignment to areas of troop activities, especially as complete firing batteries, has seemingly placed a strain on operational support in the area of engineering and construction.

(b) **Evaluation:** To move a battery-size unit from one firing position to another with the requirement of taking down all overhead cover and bunkers requires a minimum of ten days. The lack of close coordination with construction engineers, and the lack of a definite plan for construction creates uncontrollable results (i.e., moving material three and four times, equipment destroyed by the construction unit, loss of equipment through lack of control or theft, and the tearing down and re-construction of bunkers or buildings before the right location is attained).

(c) **Recommendation:** A standard blueprint for the construction of fire support bases should be established and all changes and coordination be done prior to actual start of construction.
(8) Use of a bulldozer for airmobile operations.

(a) Observation: Artillery batteries on airmobile operations require an airmobile bulldozer in order to achieve minimum protection standards the first night in a new position.

(b) Evaluation: With the personnel normally available to a battery, it is extremely difficult to complete adequate fortifications by the first night after airmobile insertion into a new position. In an area where digging below one foot will usually produce water, fortifications must be constructed above ground. Unless all personnel and material reach the position by 0900-1000 hours, it is impossible to fill a sufficient number of sandbags to build protective facilities for men and ammunition. A D-4 bulldozer, airlifted into the position early in the move can push up a berm, bank dirt on structural frames and provide a convenient fill for sandbags. One OH-54 sortie will transport the bulldozer, which can accomplish in one day what would be impossible to do manually. Seven to eight sorties with filled sandbags would be required to transport the number of sandbags necessary for minimum protection without the use of the bulldozer.

(c) Recommendation: That units involved in airmobile operations consider transporting a D-4 dozer to the new battery position for the first day of operation, even at the expense of other items.

(9) Minimum Quadrant Elevation chart.

(a) Observation: Both the Fire Direction Center and the firing battery need a quick reference chart to determine minimum QE for an individual weapon.

(b) Evaluation: A minimum QE chart has been constructed from Target Plotting Grid, DA Form 6-53, covered with contact acetate. This chart is constructed for each gun and placed where it can be easily seen. The FDC will be able to see at a glance which guns will be able to fire on a mission where minimum QE may be a factor. The graduation on the chart grid is the same as the deflection, if the gun is laid on 3200, it can be divided into sectors having different minimum QEs according to the deflection. The exact deflections dividing the sectors and the minimum QE are written on the chart in grease pencil, so, if the need arises, the chart can be changed or revised.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider this method of a quick reference, Minimum QE chart.

(10) A stable gun pad for the M102 howitzer.

(a) Observation: The M102 howitzer requires a stable firing platform to insure consistently accurate fires.
(b) Evaluation: A stable gun pad for the M102 howitzer can be constructed using one sheet of PSP cut in half, a short length of chain, 3\(\frac{1}{2}\) inch angle iron, and cement. The pad can also be moved to a new location. The first step is to construct, with the angle iron, an eight-sided enclosure that the M102 firing platform will fit snugly into. Then 14 inch legs are welded to each of the eight corners. Place the framework into a hole either at the firing site or work site. Place the M1151 wheel, with the chain welded to it, on the ground in the center of the framework, keeping the chain vertical by a cross bar through the kinks and resting on the upper framework. Pour a layer of cement that comes up to the top of the wheel. Place a piece of the PSP length-wise across the wheel with the chain passing through it. Cover the PSP with cement and then put the second piece crosswise over the first sheet. Continue pouring the cement until the level inside the framework is high enough so the firing platform sits flush with the top of the framework. After the cement has hardened for 24 hours, scoop our a hole in the center that the chain will fit into. Let it harden for 10 days. To insure the platform remaining in place, three latches are built into the framework. They consist of a bolted piece of metal that will swing out over the top of the platform and can be tightened into place. The chain is used to move the platform from one location to another.

(c) Recommendation: That M102 firing units consider this gun pad in conjunction with their own operational requirements.

(11) Clearance of an area around an ambush patrol.

(a) Observation: Normally, it is not necessary to clear specific defensive targets around an ambush patrol.

(b) Evaluation: The clearing of several defensive targets around each ambush patrol in the TAOI is excessively time consuming. After considering the nature and function of defensive targets, it was determined that by clearing the grid of the ambush patrol itself, the circle of 1000 meters radius would obviate the need for further clearance. Since defensive targets usually are plotted within 1000 meters of the ambush patrol and fire is adjusted in toward the ambush site, the 1000 meter circle appeared to be sufficient. In practice this proved to be the case. Illumination cannister malfunction grids which fall beyond the cleared area may be cleared on an as-needed basis in two to three minutes. This technique has reduced the volume of clearances by 20-25 percent and upgraded the entire clearance process.

(c) Recommendation: That units exercising a clearance of fires responsibility consider this technique as the standard procedure around ambush sites or other small installations.

(12) Identifying positions in triple canopy jungle.
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(a) Observation: It is very difficult for aircraft to identify friendly positions in triple canopy jungle.

(b) Evaluation: Some method is needed to quickly identify ground units, and to keep their positions marked.

(c) Recommendation: When operating in triple canopy jungle, ground units should carry extra 40mm smoke. The 40mm smoke can be fired into the top of the jungle for quick identification, and normal smoke grenades can be used to keep friendly units' locations marked for aircraft.

(13) Conducting bomb damage assessments.

(a) Observation: It is very difficult for the ground Commander to determine his exact location when conducting a BDA, due to the drastic changes in the terrain and vegetation.

(b) Evaluation: The ground Commander should be notified of his current location whenever he becomes disoriented.

(c) Recommendation: A Light Observation Helicopter or Command and Control Helicopter should be provided for units conducting BDAs so that the location of the ground unit will be known at all times.

(14) Use of radar in conjunction with night operations.

(a) Observation: Friendly units on night operations often set up in areas not covered by sensing devices such as radar and duffel bags.

(b) Evaluation: Advance warning of enemy movements in the area of friendly units at night is important for security as well as eliminating the enemy.

(c) Recommendation: When friendly units are operating in areas not sufficiently covered by early warning devices, they should carry a radar set with them. A PPS-4 is recommended for this as it is easier to carry and gives sufficient advance warning. It also serves to plot the unit's position correctly, eliminating any chance of any patrol becoming disoriented.

(15) Night insertions.

(a) Observation: Friendly installations are constantly subject to indirect fire attacks, and are especially vulnerable at night.

(b) Evaluation: Enemy launch sites are seldom within small arms range of friendly night positions, therefore troops must be inserted close to the enemy's position in order to fix and destroy him. Such operations, of course, must be meticulously planned and rehearsed.

(c) Recommendation: Once the enemy's location has been confirmed, friendly elements can be inserted by air, and eliminate the enemy threat.
(16) Mobile ambushes.

(a) Observation: The enemy often observes friendly elements moving into night locations.

(b) Evaluation: Since the enemy knows the location of friendly ambushes, he will avoid these areas during his movement at night.

(c) Recommendation: If no movement is observed, friendly elements should change their night locations from time to time in an attempt to intercept the enemy's movement. Great care in exact reporting and coordination with other friendly units, however, is required.

(17) Use of vehicles on ambushes.

(a) Observation: Heavy firepower and shock action are very effective in contacts with enemy units.

(b) Evaluation: The more organic firepower and heavy equipment a unit can bring to bear on the enemy, the more successful the operation will be.

(c) Recommendation: Special units, such as Recon Platoons, should make maximum use of their gun jeeps and other vehicles, as this gives them more firepower, and a quick reaction capability that the regular foot Soldier does not have. This can be most effective at night when reacting to other friendly contacts or springing ambushes of their own.

(18) Small ambush patrolling techniques.

(a) Observation: Small ambush patrols (eight to ten men) can be more effectively employed when they are extended to cover more locations.

(b) Evaluation: Small ambush patrols inserted by drop-off from a mounted reconnaissance unit and ordered to execute night movement to occupy two or three ambush positions increases the effectiveness of the patrols and extends night influence and interdiction of enemy movement over a larger area. Enemy peak movement times can be targeted without having to constantly insert and extract patrols during daylight hours. Patrols can continue to operate in an area for three days continuously prior to extraction.

(c) Recommendation: Change the routine pattern of inserting ambushes at night into one position and then have them return to the base the following morning. Insert ambushes early in the day and have them remain for more than one day, moving at night and conducting reconnaissance for new night positions during the day.

(19) Roving ambush patrols.

(a) Observation: With roving ambush patrols, the claymore is not the primary kill weapon.
(b) Evaluation: Roving ambush patrols must select and utilize weapons differently than those patrols which occupy only one position. With moving patrols, the primary kill weapon will not be the claymore. Positions must be set up so that M-60 machine guns and M-16 riflemen can engage and kill with a limited number of claymores.

(c) Recommendation: There cannot be an over-dependence on the claymore in roving patrols occupying several positions during the night. The importance of proper use of machine guns, small arms and hand grenades must be reemphasized.

(20) Defense of Fire Support Bases and night defensive positions.

(a) Observation: Good defensive planning can minimize the enemy threat to defensive positions.

(b) Evaluation: The relocation of base areas can be directly related to the enemy threat if the threat can be properly evaluated. Against main force NVA regiment elements, company base areas should be relocated daily. Fire Support Bases should be relocated every three to five days.

(c) Recommendation: Continuous movement is the best passive defense against attack by either mortar, ground, stand-off rocket attack or a combination of all three. The best active defense against attack is a well planned and executed defense plan to include saturation trip flares, mechanical ambushes, night vision devices, M-79 fires from the perimeter, illumination plan, direct fire artillery, and extensive reconnaissance by fire. All weapons must be planned and coordinated.

(21) Ammunition placement at forward areas.

(a) Observation: The enemy is particularly adept at targeted ammunition storage areas either by indirect attack or by sapper utilization.

(b) Evaluation: All artillery ammunition must be buried in bunkered positions with overhead cover and distributed or separated around the area to avoid heavy damage if the storage area is hit.

(c) Recommendation: All ammunition for artillery and mortars should be buried and divided into storage areas around the fire base.

d. (C) Organization.

(1) MOS redesignation.

(a) Observation: The majority of the automotive repairmen authorized in the Division maintenance battalion possess organizational repair MOS 63B and 63C.
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(b) Evaluation: Organizational repairmen possessing the MOS 63B and 63C do not have the technical skills necessary to perform the direct support maintenance required by the mission of their battalion.

(c) Recommendation: That the TOE of the infantry division maintenance battalion be reviewed in order to insure that the skill level of the repairmen authorized is sufficient to perform the battalion's direct support mission.

(2) TOE review.

(a) Observation: When operating in an extended TAOI, the heavy duty transport equipment authorized for the Division supply and transport battalion is inadequate to move supplies.

(b) Evaluation: Heavy duty transport equipment authorized for the infantry division supply and transport battalion under the ROAD concept is inadequate when operating in an extended TAOI as was done by the Division during this reporting period. When the Division was required to assume responsibility for hauling much of its own supplies from Long Binh Depot to FSB and to fire support bases, additional vehicles were required.

(c) Recommendation: That the TOE of the infantry division supply and transport battalion be reviewed in light of experience gained in Vietnam.

(3) Organization of a Riverine platoon.

(a) Observation: A type of organization has evolved from Riverine operations.

(b) Evaluation: Resulting organization has proven effective.

(c) Recommendation: That the following organization be adopted as standard.

1. Platoon Headquarters.
   a. Platoon Leader 1LT
   b. Platoon Sergeant SSG
   c. 3-ton Driver E-4
   d. 2½-ton Driver E-4

2. Boat Team A.
   a. 1 E-6, SSG, Team Leader
   b. 7 E-4, SP4

3. Boat Team B.
   a. 1 E-5, SGT, Team Leader
   b. 7 E-4, SP4

4. Maintenance Section.
   a. 1 E-5, SGT, Motor Sergeant
   b. 3 E-4, SP4, Mechanics
5. **Boat Equipment.**
   a. 1 M-60 with 1200 rounds of ammunition
   b. 2500 rounds of M-16 ammunition
   c. 12 concussion grenades
   d. 32 signal flares
   e. 3 fragmentation grenades
   f. 1 AN/PRC-25 radio with extra batteries
   g. 1 anchor
   h. 1 boat hook
   i. 2 12-gallon gas tanks with four 5-gallon cans of gas
   j. 1 small tool kit for minor repairs
   k. 2 paddles
   l. 1 Starlight scope for every two boats

   (a) **Organizational requirements for split battery operation.**

   (b) **Observation:** Split battery operations in support of ground elements cause increased strain on the firing battery's organic communications and fire control equipment. With the current policies of radio communication for split battery elements, for organic battery convoys, and sound artillery safety procedures, the radio and fire direction equipment organic to the battery is tasked very heavily, a situation which, in some instances, necessitates the borrowing of equipment from other units.

   (b) **Evaluation:** The necessity of maintaining two separate FDCs, a minimum of two resupply convoys per day, and the safety requirement for two aiming circles in every firing unit location is beyond the firing unit's equipment capability. Each firing battery is authorized three AN/VRC-46 radios, one AN/VRC-47, and two aiming circles.

   (c) **Recommendation:** An additional AN/VRC-46 radio, an IRC-77 and an additional aiming circle should be authorized for issue to each firing battery.

   (c) **Training.**

   (a) **Observation:** During the quarter there has been more than one instance of broken gear sticks on Westinghouse graders.

   (b) **Evaluation:** Breakage apparently has resulted from operators attempting to speed shift the grader while enroute to or from job sites. This attempt to speed shift has resulted in improper use of the clutch.

   (c) **Recommendation:** Operators should be warned against careless use of the equipment they operate and supervisors should insure that all equipment is used properly.
(2) Junior NCO and Small Unit Leaders' School.

(a) Observation: All small unit leaders should be proficient in certain areas that are vital to all combat operations such as map reading, air assets and adjustment of indirect fire.

(b) Evaluation: Many small unit leaders are of the SP4 and PFC rank and are not proficient in these areas, and need guidance and training in leadership.

(c) Recommendation: Classes should be established within each battalion in order to train and refresh all small unit leaders in these areas and this will enhance the battalion in becoming more flexible, and will enable it to operate effectively all the way down to the squad level.

(3) Training in special weapons.

(a) Observation: There are several weapons used by Allied forces in Vietnam such as the .50 caliber machine gun, the 90mm recoilless rifle, and the M-79 grenade launcher in which little or no prior training is given to the average Soldier.

(b) Evaluation: Since these weapons are often used effectively against hostile forces, all personnel should be familiar with their operation and performance.

(c) Recommendation: All units should periodically refresh their troops in the use of effective weapons that are not used in everyday operations, but prove very effective in special situations.

f. (C) Logistics.

(1) Engineer material support.

(a) Observation: The available bunker construction material must be considered when moving large numbers of personnel and equipment into a new location.

(b) Evaluation: During the recent deployment of a brigade headquarters to a new field location, the planning for engineer construction material was inadequate. The total requirement for lumber and sandbags was compiled and a large request for material was submitted. This resulted in personnel and equipment being in an unimproved area for several days because materials were not available. When shipments were made it was found that lumber did not arrive at the time it was needed. Such simple errors in planning resulted in strings arriving before the risers.

(c) Recommendation: That bunker material be stored in a standard package in depots. All required materials for a bunker X feet by Y feet could then be issued in a packet. Larger bunkers could be constructed by ordering the required number of packets.

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(2) Logistics support of a Riverine platoon.

(a) Observation: When compared with traditional concepts of direct support, logistic support is difficult to be defined.

(b) Evaluation: Some items are best supplied by the supporting unit and some by the supported unit.

(c) Recommendation: Food, water, gasoline and other items of common supply and expendables should be provided by supported units. Special purpose items such as paddles, anchors, boat hooks and outboard motor parts should be supplied by engineer units.

(3) Bolts for culvert construction.

(a) Observation: Because of multiple handling during transportation, corrugated metal culvert is usually bent to some degree, yet still remains serviceable.

(b) Evaluation: When culvert becomes bent, the bolts provided with the culvert are too short to assemble the culvert without undue difficulty.

(c) Recommendation: The manufacturers providing culvert to Army field forces should provide bolts two inches longer than normal.

(4) Ammunition handling in battery moves.

(a) Observation: The displacement of firing batteries, or howitzer sections, requires the additional resupply of ammunition to the new location. This resupply takes place during the initial phases of occupation and is usually off-loaded by hand, causing delays in construction, and decreasing man-hours available for constructing overhead cover for the ammunition.

(b) Evaluation: The occupation of a new firing position must be accomplished with the least amount of delay under very strenuous conditions. The availability of a wrecker to off-load ammunition during this initial phase would greatly increase the speed with which the ammunition could be placed on the ground, and the appropriate overhead cover could be constructed with fewer man-hours consumed.

(c) Recommendation: That the firing element's higher Headquarters be cognizant of this fact, and be prepared to dispatch a wrecker to support the off-loading of ammunition.

(g) Communications.

(1) The LOH Command Console.
(a) Observation: A need for additional communications capability was recognized when Commanders utilized the OH-6A LOH for command and control. A console was built, tested and worked well in a battalion aircraft. Complete diagrams, schematics, pictures and charts of this prototype console were sent to the Avionics Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey for evaluation and possible introduction into the Army inventory. The laboratory constructed another prototype console which was brought to Viet Nam, tested and evaluated in a battalion LOH. The console was then taken to the USS Corpus Christi Bay for limited production of 40 prototypes. Sixteen of these consoles were issued to the 25th Infantry Division after completion. They have been in use for seven months.

(b) Evaluation: The console's major components are three each AN/PRC-27/77, three each C-1611/AIC, and one each TSEC/KY-38. The total weight of the prototype console was about 88 pounds. The total weight of the production console is 75 pounds. Due to the nearly equal weight of the useful load of the aircraft and the normal load carried, the weight of the console often required that less fuel be carried or one less passenger. Often the Commanders would ride in the front seat and would have no one in the rear to change console frequencies. These two disadvantages coupled with the fact that preventive maintenance and operator maintenance were not performed, led to the gradual removal of all consoles due to their lack of dependability and undesirable design.

(c) Recommendation: That one additional ARC-114 be installed in the LOH pedestal for use by the Commander. The weight of this additional radio, plus the weight of a desired (and provided for) KY-38, would be eight pounds and 25 pounds respectively, for a total of 33 pounds. This would not require degrading the current capability of the aircraft to carry four personnel and a full fuel load. The need of the console in a LOH should be carefully weighed against the capability of the LOH to carry a Command party that would need more than one radio as noted above. If the need is valid, and mission requirements would not cause derating of the LOH's load carrying capability, a console design similar to the ASC-15 utilizing SLAE (Small Lightweight Avionics Equipment), i.e., ARC-114, 115, 116 in place of the heavier ARC-series equipment is recommended.

(2) Field expedient antennas.

(a) Observation: Operations are frequently conducted in areas where communications to the NCS or relay station are poor.

(b) Evaluation: When operating in areas where communications are poor, units should be prepared to make use of field expedient antennas.

(c) Recommendation: When units are on the move, they can take a short break and put the radio in a tall tree to transmit and receive messages. When units set up in a relatively stationary position, they can make use of an RC-292 antenna. However, if an RC-292 is not available, a $\frac{1}{2}$ Rhombic antenna can be constructed with relatively primitive equipment.
(3) Signal support for brigades.

(a) Observation: Deploying a full forward area signal center platoon in support of a brigade in the field increases communications capabilities and reduces reaction time during ensuing changes.

(b) Evaluation: During previous signal support communications, personnel and equipment were committed piecemeal only in enough quantity to satisfy immediate requirements. During two recent moves of a brigade field location, the Signal Battalion committed equipment in support of the first move in a piecemeal fashion. The support for the second move was provided by a complete forward area signal center platoon. By having all the equipment available in the brigade area, the time required to complete the later additions to the mission was greatly reduced. The use of the full platoon capabilities prevented overloading by any one means of communication.

(c) Recommendation: That a complete forward area signal center platoon be deployed with a Brigade Headquarters.

h. (C) Material.

(1) Repair of mine detectors.

(a) Observation: Numerous broken, short and long handles on mine detectors results in long periods of deadline.

(b) Evaluation: Current practice calls for replacement of broken mine detector handles. However, they can be glued quite effectively using epoxy glue.

(c) Recommendation: Rather than turning in mine detectors with broken handles to a maintenance activity, broken handles should be repaired at company level using epoxy glue. Better yet, protect them so they do not get broken in storage or in transit while not in use.

(2) Tearing off of dump truck bumpers.

(a) Observation: When a five ton dump truck becomes badly stuck, pulling on the lifting shackles tears off shackles and bumpers.

(b) Evaluation: When a dump truck becomes stuck, the load should be dumped if possible. Pulling on frame beams while the truck attempts to drive out under its own power has proven best.

(c) Recommendation: When recovering badly stuck five ton dump trucks, fasten drag chain around two frame beams.

(3) Loading and transporting Riverine platoon boats.

(a) Observation: Boats used by Riverine Platoons weigh 1800 pounds. Problems have been encountered in loading and transporting boats.
(b) Evaluation: Loading boats requires a lifting device. When boats are transported on five ton bridge trucks, a rough ride results.

(c) Recommendation: A winch powered A-frame mounted on the front of a cargo truck has been found satisfactory for loading boats. Constructing a cradle using sandbags and/or tires has prevented boat damage.

(4) Overheating of D-7 dozers.

(a) Observation: During land clearing operations, it was noted that the D-7 dozers being utilized were overheating excessively.

(b) Evaluation: Attempts were made to clean out the dozers by use of a water truck in the field. Although this helped, it did not relieve the problem. The next step was to remove the radiators while the dozers were in for maintenance stand down and to clean the dozers with the radiators removed. This procedure was time consuming but the results justified the extra time and effort.

(c) Recommendation: Radiators should be removed during stand down so dozers can be thoroughly cleaned.

(5) Recoil oil level in M102 howitzer.

(a) Observation: In this area of Vietnam, a single adjustment of the recoil oil level of the M102 howitzer is adequate for virtually all situations.

(b) Evaluation: Continual adjustment of the level of recoil oil in the M102 howitzers was resulting in broken filter plugs. Moreover, draining of recoil oil as the weapon heated during firing frequently came at a time when the full attention of the crew should have been directed to firing. It was believed that a nearly universal recoil oil level existed for the temperatures encountered in this area. Through trial and error: this level was determined to be the lowest level which would hold the tube in battery during the coolest part of the night. Since the adjustment was made to that level there has been no requirement to drain or add recoil oil to the howitzers of the battery which adopted the procedure.

(c) Recommendation: That this procedure be evaluated for standardization in uniformly warm climates, such as that found in the lowlands of South Vietnam.

1. (c) Other.

(1) Quick reaction psychological operations.

(a) Observation: Psychological operations often assist in producing Hoi Chanh and intelligence that reduce Allied casualties and equipment damage.

(b) Evaluation: Psychological operations should be conducted against current enemy locations, but it is often difficult to obtain a means to deliver the propaganda.
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(c) Recommendation: Command and Control helicopters are often in the area of enemy elements, and can make leaflet drops on the spot provided they are prepared ahead of time. In all heliborne operations, the C&C ship should carry Chieu Hoi and surrender leaflets, and a loudspeaker and interpreter if available.

(2) Culvert utility.

(a) Observation: Heavy vehicular traffic on interior and access roads to fire support bases causes the collapse of large diameter culverts, because they cannot be properly covered.

(b) Evaluation: Crushed culverts restrict runoff and compound drainage problems encountered during the wet season.

(c) Recommendation: That two culverts with a smaller diameter, but comparable capacity, be employed side by side to replace the larger diameter culvert.

(3) Aviation safety.

(a) Observation: Dust suppression of helicopter landing zones continues to be a critical problem during dry season operations in RVN.

(b) Evaluation: In spite of seven years of experience factor with dry season helicopter operations in RVN, we continue to lose Army aircraft and personnel in accidents caused by dust hazard in landing zones. Dust hazard is a fact of life in tactical landing zones, and little can be physically done to prepare the surface itself to accept helicopter operations under these conditions; however, when similar conditions persist year in and year out in rear area fire support base and base camp landing areas, it becomes evident that we are failing to use our experience and institutional memory to its fullest advantage. The dry season is an inevitable, recurring phenomenon in Southeast Asia, and preparation for the conditions that occur during this period must be forecast and made prior to its advent. Preparation of helicopter landing areas must be made during the latter stages of the wet season. Peneprine and other soil binding materials should be applied while the surface is still damp for maximum effectiveness and economy. All that should be necessary during the dry season are light touch up applications of soil binder to maintain a satisfactory surface.

(c) Recommendation: Preparation for dust suppression of helicopter landing areas should be made prior to the dry season in order to preclude the development of a dust hazard condition.

(4) Civic action.

(a) Observation: When an American unit with an aggressive, generous S5 is in an area, ARVN personnel, and civilians both, will attempt to obtain resources, aid or help from the Americans, either in addition to or before
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trying their own channels. Many times giving the requested support produces more immediate results and more impressive statistics for the US unit, and it is therefore tempting to acquiesce in granting it.

(b) Evaluation: Such assistance is in the long run detrimental to the US disengagement effort and continues ARVN dependence on unofficial sources. Moreover, this hinders the MACV efforts to get ARVN elements to use their own channels and to coordinate among themselves. US presence in civic action projects further impedes the projection of the GVN image throughout the countryside by presenting a US image for the people to contrast with the GVN image. The GVN is, after all, what the people will have to live with once US combat forces have left a particular area and, ultimately, RVN.

(c) Recommendation: Unit 35s should work to shift more of the civic action effort to ARVN, so that the GVN image or presence is projected. In approaching this, close coordination with local MACV resources and channels is imperative. Lower quantitative levels of achievement must be expected and accepted when such an approach is taken.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

T. J. HANIFEN
Geval, GS
Chief of Staff

Inclosures
1. Troop List
2. Task Organization
3. Enemy Main Force Unit Identification
4. Commander's Combat Notes
   (General Policies and Areas of Interest)
5. Commander's Combat Notes
   (Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff)
6. Combat After Action Interview Report
   (Renegade Woods)

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AVFBC-RE (30 Apr 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CEFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEN, APO San Francisco 96266 10 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVGCCDST, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from the 25th Infantry Division, and concurs except as indicated in paragraph 2, below.

2. (C) Comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning "Night Airborne Personnel Detector Operations", page 77, paragraph 2c(2): concur. The unit's comments on night sniffer missions do not mention the problem of navigation. The difficulties associated with obtaining an accurate location for the helicopter at night results from the lack of identifiable terrain features. This degrades the intelligence value of the night missions and limits the type of combat response that can be directed at the targets that the mission develops.
   b. Reference item concerning "Use of a Bulldozer for Airmobile Operations", page 80, paragraph 2c(8): concur, however the D-4 bulldozer is not found in US tactical units in III Corps Tactical Zone. Reference should read D-5 bulldozer or Case 450, both of which are airmobile. Airmobile earth moving equipment is always a critical item for two reasons: 1) lack of prompt procurement action to replace combat losses and uneconomically repairable items, and 2) low end item density results in almost non-existent ELL and ASL levels; therefore, heavy demands are placed on the "Red Ball" system. This system bypasses the demand data base and does not get repair parts into the pipeline. Recent experiences with frequent artillery unit moves could justify an airmobile bulldozer as an augmentation to each artillery battalion.
   c. Reference item concerning "A Stable Gun Pad for the M102 Howitzer", page 80, paragraph 2c(1). If a requirement exists for a transportable platform for the M102 howitzer, recommend that requests be forwarded to an engineer agency for technical assistance.
   d. Reference item concerning "Use of Radar in Conjunction with Night Operations", page 82, paragraph 2c(14). Non-availability of unattended ground sensors is cited as a motivation for employing a PPS-4 radar. Lightweight patrol seismic intrusion detectors (PSID) are also available in great numbers, adequate for the support of patrols on night operations.

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AVFBC-RB (30 Apr 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

a. Reference item concerning "Ammunition Placement at Forward Areas", page 84, paragraph 2c(2); concur, however since ammunition cannot be stored underground during the rainy season adequate above ground protection must also be provided.

f. Reference items concerning "MOS Redesignation", page 84, paragraph 2d(1); "TOE Review", page 85, paragraph 2d(2); Organization of a Riverine Platoon", page 85, paragraph 2d(3); and "Organizational Requirements for Split Battery Operation", page 86, paragraph 2d(4); reporting unit has been advised to submit requests for TOE changes in accordance with AR 31-49. To satisfy the requirement discussed in paragraph 2d(4)(b) of the report, two additional aiming circles would be needed rather than the one.

g. Reference item concerning "Engineer Material Support", page 87, paragraph 2f(1). Currently, there are 3 standard fire base kits, similar to the one recommended, available for use in RVN. By letter, file AVCA-ICC-SR-GF, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 1 June 1970, subject: Fire Base Kits, the tactical units have been requested to forecast and report the 1st and 2d Qtrs FY 71 requirements for Fire Base Kits.

h. Reference item concerning "The ICH Command Console", page 88, paragraph 2g(1); concur. The lack of command and control communications is a recognized shortcoming of both the OH-6 and OH-58 aircraft. The reporting unit's comments have been forwarded to USARV-CE.

i. Reference item concerning "Overheating of D-7 Dozers", page 91, paragraph 2h(4); concur. The procedure described is standard operating procedures for land clearing companies under the control of this headquarters.

j. Reference item concerning "Recoil Oil Level in M102 Howitzer", page 91, paragraph 2h(5); concur. Additionally, the procedure for determining the appropriate recoil oil level in the M102 howitzer should be considered by the USA Weapons Command for evaluation and publication.

k. Reference item concerning "Culvert Utility", page 92, paragraph 2I(2); concur. Proper analysis and design of culvert requirements will result in the proper size and configuration to obtain the desired results.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. BARTEL, JR.
CP, ACC
Asst AG
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I. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Night Airborne Personnel Detector Operations," page 77, paragraph 2c(2), and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement: Concur with recommendation; the unit is conducting its night airborne personnel detector missions during the time-frame cited in the recommendation. To conduct these missions with no ambient light would be extremely hazardous. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Difficulties Encountered with Crew Procedures of Downed Aircraft," page 78, paragraph 2c(3): concur. Maximum emphasis should be placed on the crew's wearing the equipment that will aid or enhance survival. In this regard USARV has made distribution of the new SNU-21/F survival vests. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Construction of Fire Support Bases," page 79, paragraph 2c(7): concur. This Headquarters is developing designs for a standard fire support base package. Complete standardization is not feasible as each situation has its own special requirements. Part of the problem is to properly set the limits of standardization. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Use of Bulldozer for Airmobile Operation," page 80, paragraph 2c(8) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c: concur with recommendation on page 80, paragraph 8(c). Nonconcur with 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2(b) where it recommends that an artillery battalion be augmented with an airmobile dozer. Tasks requiring engineer equipment are part of the function of Combat Support Engineer Units. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Identifying Positions in Triple Canopy Jungle," page 81, paragraph c(12): concur. 40mm Smoke ammunition is not presently a theater stockage item. Subject item is in theater under the ENSURE program for evaluation and rates for stockage have not yet been determined. Safety factors resulting from use of this item as recommended in paragraph c(12)(c) are also subject to evaluation. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.
f. Reference item concerning "Breaking of Gear Sticks on Graders," page 86, paragraph 2e(1): concur. Supervisors should, as a matter of course, insure that all equipment under their control is operated properly and that operators are warned against careless operation of their equipment. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

g. Reference item concerning "Engineer Material Support," page 87, paragraph 2f(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph g: concur. This Headquarters is developing standard designs for bunkers and revetments, some of which could be used as a basis for such kits. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

h. Reference item concerning "Bolts for Culvert Construction," page 88, paragraph 2f(3): concur with requirement; nonomncur with action recommended. Ordering new culvert bolts is extremely difficult to justify because of the current cost reduction program within DOD. If this order was approved, the lead time required to satisfy these requirements would be unsatisfactory. Recommend that non-galvanized large size bolts, available within the Army supply system, be requisitioned separately by specific FSN. These will not last as long as galvanized culvert bolts, but can accomplish the job satisfactorily and are available in-country. Unit has been so advised.

i. Reference item concerning "The LOH Command Console," page 89, paragraph 2g(1): concur. The AN/ARC-114 will not become available to USARV until 1973. At that time USARV Aviation will request requirements. The AN/ARC-114's in CONUS are committed to production aircraft and for maintenance float. Unit has been so advised.

j. Reference item concerning "Repair of Mine Detectors," page 90, paragraph 2h(2): concur. The recommended use of epoxy glue to mend broken, short and long handles on mine detectors is excellent for a short lived field expedient. It should not be used as a permanent procedure. Broken handles should be replaced as soon as possible through normal maintenance channels. Unit has been so advised.

k. Reference item concerning "Recoil Oil Level in M102 Howitzer," page 91, paragraph 2h(5): concur. Recoil oil reserve level need not be adjusted unless the indicator rod protrudes more than five-thirty-seconds on an inch from the regulator housing (paragraph 67c, page 66.1, O3, TM 9-1015-234-12). Procedure for determining the appropriate recoil oil level should be evaluated by USA Weapons Command. Action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.
AVHGC-DST (Undated) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSMFOR-65 (R2)

1. Reference item concerning "Quick Reaction Psychological Operations," page 91, paragraph 21(1): concur with the recommendation that leaflets be carried aboard C&C ships, in small quantities, if prior coordination is effected with G5 authorities. However, to carry a loudspeaker and an interpreter in a C&C ship on all heliborne operations appears excessive. A suitable loudspeaker is the 1000W kit containing speakers, amplifiers, and cables which, when installed, take up an entire side of a UH-1 cabin. An interpreter is required only for broadcasts. The flexibility of the C&C ship would be greatly reduced. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

m. Reference item concerning "Culvert Utility," page 92, paragraph 21(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph K: concur. The two culverts would be structurally stronger and more resistant to crushing. Also they would probably drain more water because of the fact that water would have to back up to a certain height before the full capacity of a large diameter culvert could be realized. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

n. Reference item concerning "Intelligence," page 49, paragraph 2c(4); page 76, paragraph 2b(1); and page 76, paragraph 2b(2); concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

o. Reference item concerning "Signal Operations," page 68, paragraph 2d(9). Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

p. Reference item concerning "Operations," page 77, paragraph 2c(1); page 77, paragraph 2c(2); page 82, paragraph 2c(14); page 83, paragraph 2c(17); page 83, paragraph 2c(18); page 84, paragraph 2c(19); page 84, paragraph 2d(1): concur. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

q. Reference item concerning "General Policies and Areas of Interest," Inclosure 4, pages 1-3. Letter has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn: [Signature]
II FFORCERV
25th Inf Div

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (undtd) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comment.

2. Reference paragraph 2h(5), page 91: Recoil oil level in M102 Howitzer. Proposal for procedure to determine appropriate level of the M102 Howitzer will be forwarded to USAECOM for their evaluation.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

CPT, AG
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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TROOP LIST
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

AS OF 30 APRIL 1970

I. ORGANIC

a. Command & Control Elements
   HHC, 25th Inf Div
   HHC, 1st Brigade
   HHC, 2nd Brigade (OPCOM IIFFV)
   HHC, 3rd Brigade

b. Combat Elements
   3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Troops B & C OPCOM 1 ACD)

c. Combat Support Elements
   HHS, 25th Inf Div Arty
   1st Bn, 8th Arty (OPCOM IIFFV)
   7th Bn, 11th Arty
   3rd Bn, 13th Arty
   2nd Bn, 77th Arty
   25th MP Company
   25th Aviation Battalion
   65th Engineer Battalion
   125th Signal Battalion

d. Combat Service Support Elements
   HHC & Band, 25th Div Spt Gd
   25th Admin Company
   25th Med Battalion
   25th Sft Battalion
   725th Maintenance Battalion

II. ASSIGNED

a. Command & Control Elements - None

b. Combat Elements
   1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf
   4th Bn, 9th Inf (OPCOM IIFFV)
   2nd Bn, 12th Inf
   2nd Bn, 14th Inf
   2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf
   3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
   4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf
   1st Bn, 27th Inf (OPCOM IIFFV)
   2nd Bn, 27th Inf
   2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-) (OPCOM 1 ACD)
      Co C attached to 1/5th Inf Div (Mech)
   Co F (Mech), 75th Inf

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II. **ASSIGNED** (Cont)

c. Combat Support Elements
   - 9th Chemical Det
   - 38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   - 44th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   - 46th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
   - 66th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
   - 265th FA Arty Det (Radar)

d. Combat Service Support Elements
   - 15th Public Information Det
   - 18th Military History Det
   - 20th Public Information Det
   - 25th Military Intelligence Company

III. **ATTACHED**

a. Command & Control Elements - None

b. Combat Elements - None

c. Combat Support Elements
   - Btry E, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty
   - Btry I, 29th Arty (1 Plt)
   - 4th MED Det
   - 159th Medical Det, Helicopter Ambulance
   - 255th FA Det (Radar-CM)
   - 341st Avn Det
   - 362nd Avn Det

d. Combat Service Support Elements
   - 5th Weather Sqdn Det (USAF)
   - 3 AA Plt, 2nd Civil Affairs Company
   - 20th Preventive Med Det
   - 40th MED Det
   - 390th Quartermaster Det (Petroleum)
   - USA Special Security Det
   - 372nd Radio Research Company

IV. **OPERATIONAL CONTROL**

3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (-)
   2nd Bn (Mech), 47th Inf OPCON 1 ACD
## DIRECT SUPPORT

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>53rd Signal Det</td>
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<td>61st Trans Det</td>
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<td>2142nd Assault Helicopter Co</td>
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<td>277th Bn Resupply Service</td>
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<td>283rd Sig Det</td>
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<td>325th Weather Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>501st Land Clearing Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>578th Sig Co Support</td>
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## GENERAL SUPPORT

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<td>Hq &amp; A Btry, 6th Bn, 15th Arty</td>
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<td>20th IC Co Aircraft</td>
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<td>45th Surg MA (MUST)</td>
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<td>269th Avn Bn Assault Helicopter</td>
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<td>515th Engr Flt Asphalt Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co G, 586th Engr Bn Combat</td>
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Changes in Task Organization

**Effective 1 Feb 70**

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<td>C/65 Engr (DS)</td>
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<td>3/P/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)</td>
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**Div Troops**

| 7/P/75 Inf (RGR)(-* | IFFY ARTY (GSR) |
| F/75 Inf (RGR)(- | 7-9 Arty (105)(- | 3-4 Cav |
| 25 Avn Bn (GS) | 1-27 Arty (155)(- | 2-12 Inf |
| D/3-4 Cav | A/B/3-42 Arty (155) | 3-60 Inf |
| 65 Engr Bn (GS)(- | | 2-47 Inf (M) |
| 125 Sig Bn (GS) | | 2-60 Inf |

**Effective 26 Feb 70**

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<td>4-23 Inf (M)</td>
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<td>2-34 Arm (-)</td>
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<td>2-77 Arty (105)(DS)</td>
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<td>7-11 Arty (105)(DS)</td>
<td>A/B/5-42 Arty (155)</td>
<td>D/65 Engr (DS)</td>
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<td>A/65 Engr (DS)</td>
<td>B/2-32 Arty (8&quot;) (-)(GS)</td>
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<td>C/2-32 Arty (8&quot;) (GS)</td>
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**Div Troops**

| 7/P/75 Inf (RGR)(- | IFFY ARTY (GSR) |
| F/75 Inf (RGR)(- | 7-9 Arty (105)(- | 3-4 Cav |
| 25 Avn Bn (GS) | 1-27 Arty (155)(- | 2-12 Inf |
| D/3-4 Cav | A/B/3-42 Arty (155) | 3-60 Inf |
| 65 Engr Bn (GS)(- | | 2-47 Inf (M) |
| 125 Sig Bn (GS) | | 2-60 Inf |
| 3-4 Cav (-) | | 3/P/75 Inf (RGR)(DS) |

* Co B returned from 1st Inf Div 15 Feb 70.

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### Effective 28 Feb '70

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<td>1/7/75 Inf (RGR) (DS)</td>
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**Dty Troops**

| F/75 Inf (RGR) (-) | 25 Avn Bn (GS) | 2-27 Inf |
| D/3-4 Cav | 125 Sig Bn (GS) | 2-14 Inf |
| | 65 Engr Bn (-) (GS) | 2-22 Inf (M) |
| | 3-4 Cav (-) | 2-77 Arty (105) (DS) |

### Effective 2 Mar '70

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<td>B/2-32 Arty (8&quot;) (-) (GS)</td>
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**Dty Troops**

| F/75 Inf (RGR) | 25 Avn Bn (GS) | 2-27 Inf |
| D/3-4 Cav | 125 Sig Bn (GS) | 2-14 Inf |
| | 65 Engr Bn (-) | 2-22 Inf (M) |
| | 3-4 Cav (-) | 2-77 Arty (105) (DS) |

**LFFY Arty (GR)**

| 1-27 Arty (155) | A/8/5-42 Arty (155) | 3/F/75 Inf (RGR) (DS) |
| 2/F/75 Inf (RGR) (DS) | B/2-32 Arty (8") (-) (GS) | |
| | C/65 Engr (DS) | |

**Dty Arty**

| 3-13 Arty (155/8") | B/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS) | 2-77 Arty (105) (DS) |
| 2/F/75 Inf (RGR) (DS) | | D/65 Engr (DS) |
| | | 3/F/75 Inf (RGR) (DS) |

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## CONFIDENTIAL

**Effective 13 Mar 70**

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**Div Troops**

- F/75 Inf (RGR)(-)
- 25 Avn Bn (DS)
- D/3-4 Cav
- 125 Sig Bn
- 65 Engr Bn (-)(GS)
- 3-4 Cav (-)

**IIFFV Arty (GS)**

- A/8-1-27 Arty (155)
- A/C/2-32 Arty (155)
- A/7-9 Arty (105)
- C/5-2 Arty (-)(AW)(SP)
- B/3-17 Air Cav

**Div Arty**

- 3-13 Arty (155/8")
- B/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)
- 571 Engr (DS)

**Effective 3 Apr 70**

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**Div Troops**

- F/75 Inf (RGR)(-)
- 25 Avn Bn (GS)
- D/3-4 Cav
- 125 Sig Bn (GS)
- 65 Engr Bn (-)(GS)
- 3-4 Cav (-)

**IIFFV Arty (GS)**

- A/B(-)/5-42 Arty (155)
- A/C/2-32 Arty (-)(8") (GS)
- C/5-2 Arty (-)(AW)(SP)
- B/3-17 Air Cav

**Div Arty**

- 3-13 Arty (155/8")
- B/5-2 Arty (AW)(SF)(GS)
- 571 Engr (DS)

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### Effective 6 Apr 70

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<td>A/3-4 Cav</td>
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### Div Troops

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<td>D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4-23 Inf (M)</td>
<td>4-9 Inf</td>
<td>6-31 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12 Inf</td>
<td>A/3-4 Cav</td>
<td>2-14 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-11 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
<td>2-32 Arty (M) (OPCOM IFFY)</td>
<td>2-22 Inf (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/65 Engr Bn (DS)</td>
<td>1-8 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
<td>2-77 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/7/75 Inf (RGR) (DS)</td>
<td>0/65 Engr (DS)</td>
<td>D/65 Engr (DS)</td>
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### Div Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7/75 Inf (RGR) (-)</th>
<th>IFFY ARTY (GS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Arm Bn</td>
<td>A/G/1-27 Arty (155)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D/3-4 Cav</td>
<td>A/B(-)/5-42 Arty (155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125 Sig Bn (GS)</td>
<td>A(-)/G/2-32 Arty (8&quot;) (GS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 Engr Bn (-) (GS)</td>
<td>5-60 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-4 Cav (-)</td>
<td>2-47 Inf</td>
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### TIPvY ARTY (GS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3-13 Arty (155/8&quot;)</th>
<th>3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/5-2 Arty (AW) (SP) (GS)</td>
<td>B/3-17 Air Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-4 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
<td>571 Engr (DS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effective 19 Apr 70

1st Bde
3-22 Inf
1-5 Inf (M)
4-23 Inf (M)
2-12 Inf
7-11 Arty (105)(DS)
A/65 Engr (DS)
1/F/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)

2nd Bde (OPCON IFFY)
1-27 Inf
4-9 Inf
2-47 Inf (M)
B/2-4 Arty (105)(DS)
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)
C/65 Engr (DS)
2/F/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)

3rd Bde
2-27 Inf
2-14 Inf
2-22 Inf (M)
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)
D/65 Engr (DS)
3/F/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Troops
F/75 Inf (RGR)(-)
25 Avn Bn
125 Sig Bn (GS)
65 Engr Bn (-)(GS)
3-4 Cav (-)
B/2-4 Arty (105)(DS)
2-34 Arm (-)(OPCON IFFY)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

Effective 28 Apr 70

1st Bde
3-22 Inf
1-5 Inf (M)
4-23 Inf (M)
2-12 Inf
2-47 Inf (M)
B/2-4 Arty (105)(DS)
2-34 Arm (-)
7-11 Arty (105)(DS)
A/65 Engr (DS)
1/F/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)
D/3-4 Cav (DS)

2nd Bde (OPCON IFFY)
1-27 Inf
4-9 Inf
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)
C/65 Engr (DS)
2/F/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)

3rd Bde
2-27 Inf
2-14 Inf
2-22 Inf (M)
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)
D/65 Engr (DS)
3/F/75 Inf (RGR)(DS)

IFFY Arty (GSR)
A/6/1-27 Arty (155)
B(-)/C/5-42 Arty (155)
A(-)/C/2-32 Arty (8") (DS)

Div Arty
3-13 Arty (155/8")
B/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

Div Troops
F/75 Inf (RGR)(-)
25 Avn Bn
125 Sig Bn (GS)
65 Engr Bn (-)(GS)
3-4 Cav (-)(OPCON 1 ACD)
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Effective 29 Apr 70

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<th>3rd Bde</th>
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<td>2-14 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-23 Inf (M)</td>
<td>1-8 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
<td>2-22 Inf (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12 Inf</td>
<td>C/65 Engr (DS)</td>
<td>2-77 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-11 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
<td>2/F/75 Inf (RGR) (DS)</td>
<td>D/65 Engr (DS)</td>
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<td>IFFV Arty (GSR)</td>
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<td>1/F/75 Inf (RGR) (DS)</td>
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<td>D/3-4 Cav (DS)</td>
<td>B(-)/C/5-42 Arty (155)</td>
<td>6-31 Inf</td>
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<td>A(-)/C/2-32 Arty (8&quot;/175)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A/7-8 Arty (-) (8&quot;)</td>
<td>5-60 Inf</td>
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<td>Div Troops</td>
<td>Div Arty</td>
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<tr>
<td>F/75 Inf (RGR) (-)</td>
<td>3-13 Arty (155/8&quot;)</td>
<td>B/3-17 Air Cav</td>
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<td>125 Sig Bn (GS)</td>
<td>2-4 Arty (105) (DS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 Engr Bn (-) (DS)</td>
<td>571 Engr (DS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 Cav (-) (OPCON 1 ACD)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-34 Arm (-) (OPCON 1 ACD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-47 Inf (M) (OPCON 1 ACD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Enemy Main Force Unit Identifications  
23 April 1970

### COSVN NON DIVISIONAL UNITS

- **16 Armor Office**: XT574931  
- **69 Artillery Command**: XT165515

### COSVN DIVISIONAL UNITS

- **9 Division**: XT579723  
  - **271 Regiment**: XT275225  
  - **272 Regiment**: XT017669  
  - **95C Regiment**: XT0179
- **7 Division**: XT791828  
  - **209 Regiment**: XT444760  
  - **165 Regiment**: XT492862

### TAY NINH PROVINCE

- **D1 Battalion**: XT275361  
- **D14 Battalion**: XT296485

### SUB-REGION 1

- **268 Regiment**: XT478359  
  - **K1 Battalion**: XT500316  
  - **K2 Battalion**: XT467370  
  - **K3 Battalion**: XT577183  
- **101 Regiment**: XT413838  
  - **K1 Battalion**: XT463819  
  - **K2 Battalion**: XT538430  
  - **K3 Battalion**: XT504900  
- **Qayet Thang Regiment**: XT411166  
  - **1 Qayet Thang Battalion**: XT600241  
  - **2 Qayet Thang Battalion**: XT783049  
  - **3 Qayet Thang Battalion**: XT746168  
- **Bach Dang Battalion**: XT626222  
- **8 Artillery Battalion**: XT603145  
- **9 Artillery Battalion**: XT634361  
- **10 Artillery Battalion**: XT592855  
- **128 Artillery Battalion**: XT3517

### SUB-REGION 2

- **267 Battalion**: XT507704  
- **269 Battalion**: Hieu Thien (D)  
- **2642 Battalion**: XT510075

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Region 2</th>
<th>Sub-Region 3</th>
<th>Sub-Region 6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D12 Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>1 NVA Regiment</td>
<td>M10 Battalion</td>
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<td>D16 Battalion</td>
<td>K4 Battalion</td>
<td>XS857947</td>
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<td>308 Battalion</td>
<td>K5 Battalion</td>
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<td>6 LF Battalion</td>
<td>K6 Battalion</td>
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<td>K7 Sapper Battalion</td>
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<td>K8 Training Battalion</td>
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<td>XS697663</td>
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</tbody>
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SUBJECT: General Policies and Areas of Interest

SKE DISTRIBUTION:

1. The following are policies and areas of interest which I consider of particular importance. They are not all-inclusive but should serve as a guide.

2. Soldiers are our most precious resource. They also require the most attention. Their safety and welfare is most important. Be tolerant and understanding, yet firm and fair with them. Special emphasis should be placed on:
   a. Insuring that all understand the enlisted promotion system.
   b. Insuring that there is in fact equal opportunity for all.
   c. Treating each man as an individual and according him the respect and dignity he deserves.
   d. Keeping Soldiers busy doing constructive things and explaining WHY.

3. Training must be constant to insure that each individual maintains a fine honing in the Fundamentals and in the Rules of Engagement. This makes him more effective and increases his probability of personal safety. The institutional memory of organizations in Vietnam is very short.

4. Without good intelligence, operations are not productive and merely expend time, resources and energy. Learn to use and integrate the modern and sophisticated pieces of equipment but, in so doing, do not overlook the basics of old-fashioned combat intelligence. Seek to develop rapport with Vietnamese, military and civilian. The latter, particularly, are a most effective source of intelligence information at the small unit level.

5. Seek to develop the enemy's total system in your area — his logistics flow, bases, LOC, infrastructure, commo-liaison, caches, hospitals, personnel replacement system, communications system — his interference with the population. Then work on all elements of his system.

Incl 4
AV0C00

SUBJECT: General Policies and Areas of Interest

2 April 1970

6. Avoidance of non-combatant casualties and incidents is essential. Attempt to view both friendly and enemy actions as the villager sees them. If he suffers losses to his family and his property the impact on him, personally, is the same, whether due to our action or the enemy's. This is not limited to combat action but extends to every facet of our association with the population.

7. Economy of Force is an accepted principle of war. Use it not only in tactics but in all areas. Looked at another way, it is simply "Good Management" to avoid waste. In this regard, eliminate excess equipment; usually, it drains off resources and creates imbalances in our structure that decrease efficiency and effectiveness.

8. Elimination of the enemy is an essential step. POW and Hoi Changs are more valuable than dead enemy soldiers. KIA statistics are important but are not an end in themselves.

9. Take every opportunity to work with the RVNAF so as to increase their effectiveness. Teach them how to do things rather than doing it for them. In this geographical area, the point has been reached where we should gradually reduce our combined operations with the objective of eventually turning over complete and independent control to the RVNAF.

10. Watch FES ratings carefully. They highlight areas needing concentration of effort. When there is regression, react promptly.

11. Insure we are fighting under a "One War Concept". Integration and orientation of all resources, programs and operations to the achievement of a common objective is complex but essential. In pacification, particularly, insure that your programs support the District or Province Chief's plan.

12. US Forces are not "operations security" conscious, particularly in use of voice communication. Reduce the amount of chatter and use the secure means which have been provided.

13. Perfection in a tactic or technique is laudatory, but don't become so enamoured of it that you fail to change when change is needed. The enemy adjusts rapidly.

14. Learn the established system for getting things done and use it. By-passing and shortcuts may achieve quicker results initially but usually undermine the system, and the end result is less responsibility to one's needs.

15. In briefings and reports, be precise and factual. Opinions may be helpful but label them opinions. Historical data provide a good basis for projections, but I am more interested in knowing what is being done at the moment and what is planned for the future. Content, simplicity
AVDCOG

SUBJECT: General Policies and Areas of Interest

and knowledge of the subject are more helpful than elaborate training aids and wordy, formal presentations.

16. When you reach the point where you can feel complacent about the effectiveness of your unit, your own ability to do your job, or the enemy situation, ask for a transfer.

s/Edward Bautz, Jr.
t/EDWARD BAUTZ, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
B

A TRUE COPY

Ralph J. Ballway
MAJ, INF
Division Historian
SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. I have designated my Assistant Division Commanders as follows:

2. I have assigned duties and responsibilities to the Assistant Division Commanders primarily on a geographical area basis, but the duties of each include specific functional areas as well. In addition to performing in their specific areas of interest, I expect each Assistant Division Commander to maintain a "feel" for this Division as a whole and to be prepared to supervise such functions of special interest to me as I may direct.

3. Specific areas of responsibility for the Assistant Division Commanders:
   a. ADC-Alpha:
      (1) 1st Brigade; 2nd Brigade; Division Support Command; 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry; 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; 65th Engineer Battalion; 125th Signal Battalion; and, Company F (Rangers), 75th Infantry.
      (2) Direct and personal liaison with:
         (a) CG, 1st ARVN Airborne Division (as necessary).
         (b) Tay Ninh Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor.
      (3) Supervision of ARVN pacification program support in the areas of the 1st Brigade and 2nd Brigade. This will include all plans, programs and activities incident to:
         (a) Developing effective DIOCC and PIOCC capabilities.
         (b) Developing and sustaining increasingly effective Territorial Forces (RF, PF, PSDF) and National Police Field Force (NPPF) and Special Police.
AVDCGG
7 April 1970

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff

(4) Training (to include schools and the reception — orientation of newly arrived Soldiers).

(5) Supervision of road and waterway lines of communication throughout the division area (to include security of bridges, convoys, and waterborne military logistics traffic).

(6) Division-wide base development and Tay Ninh base defense.

(7) Liaison with Free World Military Assistance Forces.

b. ADC-Bravo:

(1) 3rd Brigade; 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; Division Artillery; 25th Aviation Battalion; Company E (Rangers), 75th Infantry; and non-organic units supporting (or operating in the area of) the 25th Infantry Division.

(2) Direct and personal liaison with:

(a) Commanding General, 25th ARVN Division.

(b) Hau Nghia Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor.

(c) Long An Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor.

(3) Supervision of RVN pacification program support in the areas of the 3rd Brigade and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. This will include all plans, programs and activities incident to:

(a) Developing effective DIOCC and FIOCC capabilities.

(b) Developing and sustaining increasingly effective Territorial Forces (RF, PF, PSDF) and National Police Field Force (NPPF) and Special Police.

(4) Cu Chi base defense.

(5) Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) Program.

4. The Chief of Staff directs and supervises operations of the 25th Infantry Division's General and Special Staffs. Guidance and directions normally come directly from the Commanding General to the Chief of Staff. While the Assistant Division Commanders have an overwatch responsibility in the fields of maintenance and operational readiness as it applies to the specific units which they supervise for the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff (assisted by the ACofS, G-4 and the CO, Division Support
AVDCGG

7 April 1970

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Assistant Division Commanders and the Chief of Staff

Commander is primarily responsible to the Commanding General for the logistic readiness of this Division.

s/Edward Bautz, Jr.
t/EDWARD BAUTZ, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
ADC-Alpha
ADC-Bravo
CorS
CO, 1st Bde
CO, 2nd Bde
CO, 3rd Bde
CO, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div
CO, DIVARTY
CO, DISCOM
CO, 25th Avn Bn
CO, 65th Engr Bn
CO, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav
CO, 125th Sign Bn
CO, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor
CO, Replacement Detachment
CO, Co E (Rangers), 75th Inf
CO, Co F (Rangers), 75th Inf
General and Special Staff
Division Historian
SA, 25th ARVN Inf Div
SA, 1st ARVN Abn Div
PSA, Hau Nghia Province
PSA, Long An Province
PSA, Tay Ninh Province
PSA, Binh Duong Province
SA, 5th ARVN Inf Div

A TRUE COPY:

Ralph J. Ballway
MAJ, INF
Division Historian
SUBJECT: Small Unit Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96225

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Unnamed; Ground Reconnaissance.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 02 April - 06 April 1970.
3. (U) LOCATION: Renegade Woods (X2930); Sheet Number 6231 III N, Map Series L8020, 1:25,000; Hieu Thiem District, Tay Ninh Province.
4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED: See Inclosure 1.
6. (U) INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.
7. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:
   a. Teams 38 and 39, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry.
   c. Companies A, B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry.

[Incl 6]
S. [U] SUPPORTING FORCES: (See Inclosure 2)

a. Artillery.

(1) Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm howitzer).
(2) Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (8" howitzer).
(3) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, IFFV (155mm howitzer).
(4) Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery, IFFV (8" howitzer).

b. Army Aviation.

(1) Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur).
(2) Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion (Little Bear).
(4) 116th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion (Hornet).
(5) 187th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion (Crusaders).
(6) 118th Assault Helicopter Company, 145th Aviation Battalion (Thunderbird).
(7) 159th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) (Dustoff) - MEDEVAC.
(8) 3rd Brigade Aviation Element (Snoopy).

c. United States Air Force. (See Inclosure 3)

(1) Air Force Forward Air Controllers (FAC), 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (OV-10).
(2) 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100; A-37).
(3) 31st Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100).
(4) 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100).
(5) 8th Attack Squadron (A-37).
(6) 3rd Direct Air Support Center (AC-119 Shadow).

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9. (U) BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The primary mission of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is to destroy VC/NVA forces and their bases of operation; assist the Republic of Vietnam in rural development, pacification and civic action programs; assist in training and provide support to RVNAF; and be prepared to reinforce US and ARVN forces within the TAOI as directed. This Brigade is continuing Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang.

10. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. **Enemy:** Intelligence indicated that enemy main force units might be moving into the Renegade Woods to establish a base area from which to conduct offensive operations. On 30 March elements of the 271 Regiment and elements of the 272 Regiment conducted an attack on Fire Support Base Jay (XT0375) of the 1st Cavalry Division (AirMobile), but were repulsed with a loss of 70 KIA (BC). After the attack, these units were reported moving to base areas to refit. Subsequent moves of these regiments was not indicated, however, a move to the south along the border was suspected and watched for. The first indication of a sizable enemy force in the Renegade Woods came when Teams 38 and 39, Co F (Sapper), 75th Inf made contact on 2 April 1970. Interrogation of prisoners-of-war and Hoi Chanh, plus readouts from captured documents, later identified the 271 Regiment, 9 VC/NVA Division as the enemy force contacted during this operation.

Interrogation of Nguyen Huong Mai, a prisoner-of-war captured on 3 April in the vicinity of XT264274 revealed that the 2 and 3 Battalions of the 271 Regiment were moving into newly established positions in the Renegade Woods to prepare for future operations. He further stated that the battalions were 80% NVA and that his battalion (2 Battalion) had a strength of 200-300 men. Documents captured on 3 April in the vicinity of XT292312 identified the Executive Officer, G13 Company, 3 Battalion, 271 Regiment, and the same battalion was identified by further documents found the next day at XT289312.

The ground units involved in the action found numerous indications that the enemy was highly trained and well-equipped. They identified NVA equipment in large quantities, and believed the enemy to be highly aggressive NVA regulars.

For additional information, see Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 372nd Radio Research Company, 303rd Radio Research Battalion, dated 1 April 1970.

b. **Terrain:** The Renegade Woods is a flat area with thick double canopy jungle heavily undergrown with vines. The few open areas consist
of elephant grass bisected by hedgerows and have isolated clumps of brush and a few dead trees, but are basically without cover or concealment. An exception was the landing zone of the Ranger team which had two bomb craters that provided the only cover. The hedgerow and jungle areas had been heavily bunkered and provided excellent defensive positions which were very difficult to locate. (See Overlay 1.)

c. Weather: Weather remained variable during the contact period and caused some difficulties during the early morning hours and again in the late afternoon when rain storms forced air assets to operate at low level. These periods, notably the mornings of 2, 3, and 4 April and the afternoon of 4 April, were the only exceptions to generally excellent visibility during the contact period. High temperatures in the 90s were typically seasonal for this area of Vietnam and caused only minor difficulties as most of the troops were acclimated. Heavy residual ground moisture on the morning of 2 April caused an unusually high number of weapons malfunctions among the Ranger team. It also served to lessen casualties among the elements engaged that day by absorbing much of the ricochet.

11. (C) MISSION: Initially, the teams from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry were inserted into the contact area to exploit intelligence information. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was preparing to begin normal operations in the same general area, was committed as a reaction force when the Rangers developed the large contact. Two companies from the 2nd Battalion (Mechanised), 22nd Infantry, were committed to the action as it expanded. The mission of the reacting forces was to conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area, and to extract the bodies of the two Rangers who had been killed.

12. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION:

At 0700 hours on 2 April the Commanding Officer, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, CPT Paul Schierhols, was alerted by 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, to provide an element to exploit intelligence information in the Renegade Woods (XT3032). From 0700 to 0800 hours a Light Scout Team (LST) from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, flew a visual reconnaissance of the area and noted no activity in the proposed landing zone (LZ), but saw signs of recent activity in a large clearing approximately 1000 meters to the west and 500 meters to the south. The AH-1G Cobra (Centaur 47) and OH-6A Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) (Centaur 13) saw a camouflaged structure just west of this clearing and made rocket and grenade passes at it, uncovering eight to ten buildings. They then returned to Cu Chi to refuel.

The 13-man Ranger element, composed of teams 38 and 39 (see Inclosure 4), boarded two UH-1H helicopters provided by D/3-4 Cav at 0800 hours and
Overlay 1

- Jungle
- Swamp
- Trails

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proceeded to the Renegade Woods, escorted by the LST. (See Inclosure 5).
Upon arriving in the area they still found no signs of enemy activity near the proposed LZ, but discovered additional footprints in the other clearing (XT291316) along with a litter bag lying in the open near a wall. At this time WO1 Kenneth Strand, Aircraft Commander in the Cobra, advised 1LT Philip Norton, the Ranger Team Leader who was riding in the lead UH-1H (Centaur 23) to supervise the insertion, of these findings. 1LT Norton decided to insert the team at the new location, which was accomplished at 0835 hours (see Overlay 2). Following standard operating procedures for Ranger insertions there was no preparation of the landing zone.

The Rangers deployed from the helicopters, immediately found signs of recent activity, and began moving west towards where the structures had been uncovered. At approximately 0840 hours a light machine gun (LMG) opened fire on the lead men, 1LT Norton, SGT Fred Stuckey and SP4 Donald Purdy, at a range of ten to 15 meters (see Overlay 3). In this initial burst of fire SGT Stuckey was wounded, 1LT Norton's AM/PRC-25 radio was rendered inoperable when the cord to its microphone was severed, and SP4 Purdy's extractor mechanism on his M-16 was shattered. SGT Stuckey and SP4 Purdy destroyed the LMG with hand grenades, killing its crew, but the team began taking fire from all directions. Since a LMG is usually found with at least a reinforced platoon, too large a force for the team to fight, it was decided that they should withdraw to the east and attempt to maneuver around the enemy. SFC Alvin Floyd, the Assistant Team Leader, contacted the Cobra with the remaining radio and requested that suppressive fire be placed on the western treeline, and that a reaction force be sent into the area.

The team split into its two elements, Team 39 under 1LT Norton moving eastward while Team 38 under SFC Floyd provided covering fire (see Overlay 4). The initial firefight lasted three to five minutes and died down to isolated sniping by the time Team 39 reached the eastern end of the clearing (100 meters away) and began deploying into the woods. During this withdrawal the Cobra made minigun and rocket passes on the western treeline to provide cover. At this time its 40mm automatic grenade launcher jammed after firing only one of the 250 rounds it carried. The LOH also made firing passes with its M-60 machine guns. The two UH-1H helicopters (Centaur 23 and 24) were dispatched to Cu Chi to bring out a reaction force. Centaur 23 had intended to land to MEDEVAC SGT Stuckey, but WO1 Strand refused it permission because no assistance had been requested and ground fire was too intense.

As Team 39 entered the eastern treeline they began to receive a heavy volume of fire from small arms and two or possibly three LMGs. Team 38 had just reached the vicinity of a large bomb crater, approximately 15 feet deep and 30 feet wide, when a combination of small arms
A - Lister Bag
B - 8-10 Structures
// - Underbrush

Overlay 2

Not drawn to scale

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OVERLAY 3

A - 1LT NORTON, SGT STUCKEY
B - TEAM 3B
C - TEAM 39
!! - UNDERBRUSH

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE
A - M79
B - CASUALTIES
// - UNDERBRUSH

OVERLAY 4

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

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fire and a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fired from the north killed SFC Floyd and SGT Michael Thomas and wounded SP4 Donald Tinney. SFC Floyd's radio was destroyed by the explosion, leaving the team without radio contact. Suppressive fire was placed by the Rangers in all directions to enable all of them to withdraw to the crater which provided the only cover in the area. At this time SFC Colin Hall silenced the western LGM and killed its crew with hand grenades and M-16 fire, and SGT Charles Avery silenced the RPG-7 and M-79 firing from the northern LGM site.

Once inside the lip of the crater LT Norton dragged SP4 Tinney to safety and obtained the microphone from SFC Floyd's radio, enabling him to regain communications. He repeated his request for a reaction force and gunship support, and additionally requested MEDEVAC for the three men struck by the RPG. The Cobra expended the rest of its rockets and minigun ammunition (4000 rounds) in laying suppressive fire. The LCH made passes with its M-60s expending 600 rounds. It also began jettisoning extra ammunition in preparation for an attempt to accomplish the MEDEVAC by leaving one of its gunners on the ground to make space for the wounded. The UH-1H helicopters heard the call and returned on station, having gotten as far towards Cu Chi as the French Factory (XT3532).

The Rangers inside the crater were taking small arms fire from all directions and hand grenade fire from a finger of the woods to the southwest. However, their suppressive fire succeeded in silencing the crew-served weapons. A NVA soldier emerged from the southern treeline to throw a hand grenade, but was wounded and then killed by two hand grenades thrown by SGT Stuckey. FPC Raymond Allison expended the 700 rounds of M-60 ammunition he carried and a 50-round belt he removed from SGT Thomas' body, and was reduced to using his .45 caliber pistol. FPC Steven Peres expended all his M-79 ammunition and FPC Kenneth Langlais fired 860 rounds before his M-60 malfunctioned. By about 0920 hours the team had expended most of their ammunition and were having many weapons failures. The LST had expended their ammunition and were making dry gun runs in an attempt to suppress the enemy fire.

At 0922 hours Centaur 23's Commander, WO1 James Jenailli, and its Pilot, CPT Philip Tocco, landed after a low-level approach to pick up the wounded. (See Overlay 5.) The helicopter received four hits from ground fire during the extraction (see Diagram 7), and was later examined by experts from Bell Aircraft who expressed amazement that it was still able to fly. The ship landed ten to 15 feet from the lip of the crater, and LT Norton gave his men the order to board, since they were in an untenable position. SP5 Charles Lowe, the Crew Chief, maintained fire

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\text{\textbf{Overlay 5}}
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\text{\textbf{X - Location of Bodies}}
\]

\[
\text{\textbf{\textbackslash\textbackslash - Underbrush}}
\]

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\text{\textbf{NOT DRAWN TO SCALE}}
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Diagram 1 - Hits on Ranger Extraction Helicopter (Centaur 23)
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with his M-60 on the treeline ten meters away while the doorgunner, PFC Richard Adams, a former member of Team 38, jumped off the ship to assist in getting SP4 Tinney aboard. After spending 30 seconds on the ground the overloaded UH-1H lifted off with maximum torque and severe vertical vibration and cleared the treeline with 11 Rangers and its crew of four aboard. One of its M-60 machine guns jammed as it was lifting off, but the Rangers continued firing their individual weapons. The two dead men were left on the ground along with some of the destroyed or damaged weapons and equipment. All the helicopters were running low on fuel and departed for Cu Chi, arriving there about 1000 hours. Centaur 23 had to stop near Trang Bang (XT4919) to administer initial first aid to SP4 Tinney and to redistribute the passengers, some of whom were literally hanging on, before landing at the 12th Evacuation Hospital.

At 0900 hours ILT David Parsons, a Forward Air Controller (FAC), arrived on station over the contact area in an OV-10 and expended 1500 rounds of minigun ammunition straffing after the extraction. He received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the ground. Also at 0900 hours, Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were alerted that they were to be inserted into the area as the reaction force. Company B had conducted Ambush Patrols (APs) in an area nine kilometers south of the contact area and were alerted to move to a pick-up point for airlift. Company C had been serving as a blocking force for an ARVN contact four kilometers to the southwest. Additionally, Company A which had just come into Cu Chi on standdown was placed on alert. The Battalion had been preparing to conduct operations in the same general area on that day. At 0925 hours LTC George Custer III, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, flying in a Command and Control helicopter from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, took off to supervise the action, and he remained on station for the majority of the five-day encounter.

Company C, utilizing three UH-1H ships, began helilifting to a LZ located in the vicinity of XT298313 (see Overlay 6). Artillery fire from Fire Support Bases (FSBs) Hull and Hampton provided a blocking fire into which the enemy was to be driven. By 1100 hours the 1st and 3rd Platoons, Company C, had assembled and began moving west towards the area of the Ranger contact, while part of the 2nd Platoon moved along a parallel course 300 meters north. At 1140 hours both elements became engaged. The heavier contact involved the southern group, which had been moving forward in a two-column formation through a series of open areas bordered by hedgerows (XT297313). The lead platoon, the 1st, was immediately pinned down by a LMG firing from the right front. The initial burst of fire killed the point man of the right column and wounded the other point man. The Platoon Leader, ILT Ronnie Clark, was also wounded in the stomach by this burst which initiated a 20-minute firefight. At 1217 hours urgent MEDEVAC was requested by the Company Commander.
OVERLAY 6
ACTION ON 2 APRIL
A - RANGER CONTACT
B - DOWNED UH-1C
C - ROUTE OF C/2-27
D - ROUTE OF B/2-27

COMPANY A

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When this action began, 2/C/2-27 Inf began receiving small arms fire from the west (to their front), but most fell short. The Platoon Leader, 2LT Monte Hack, requested gunship cover to enable him to pull back and link up with the rest of the Company. He withdrew, but was unable to rejoin the Company until about 1400 hours when Company B was lifted into the action. At that time his wounded man and five heat casualties were evacuated. The 3rd Platoon which had been on the right flank of the 1st pulled back and maneuvered in again on its left. 2LT Ronald Kolb, with 3/C/2-27 Inf was killed during this maneuver, and SSG Malvyn Kalili, Platoon Sergeant of the 1st Platoon, was killed when he went to aid the wounded point man. The intense enemy fire was very accurate and well-directed. The men of Company C were effectively pinned down and had difficulty locating the source of the enemy fire. They remained pinned down by the sniper fire following the firefight for over six hours and had extreme difficulty extracting their casualties. The dead point man was left overnight because it was impossible to reach his body.

At 1145 hours a Light Fire Team (LFT) composed of two UH-1C gunships from the 118th Assault Helicopter Company were orbiting the contact area trying to locate ground fire with other aviation elements and CPT William Wilson, a FAC. One of the gunships was shot down by small arms fire, but the pilot was able to set it down in a clearing about 800 meters west of the contact site (XT287314), and the crew safely evaded one hedgerow westward where the other gunship rescued them. The UH-1C's left side rocket pod was on fire and the rockets "cooked off" after the crew had left. The FAC and other gunships expended in support of the rescue.

At 1200 hours CPT Wendell Brown (FAC) was on station over the contact area and inquired if the ground commander wanted tactical air strikes in addition to the LFT from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion, then on station. He requested two immediate air strikes in addition to the one already scheduled. These he directed on target at 1315, 1330, and 1345 hours in an area west of the contact (see Overlay 7 and Inclosure 3). At 1337, 1357 and 1421 hours resupply ships from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, brought in extra ammunition and evacuated seven wounded men and five heat casualties to Tay Ninh.

Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, which had been waiting at its pick-up zone since 0900 hours was finally airlifted into a LZ (XT993-315) to assist Company C. The seven UH-1H helicopters took the Commanding Officer, CPT Charles Creswell, and his command element with the 1st and part of the 2nd Platoons on the first lift. After an hour-long flight, it inserted at 1423 hours. The second lift brought in the remainder of the company and ISG Domingo Rodriguez-Colon at 1820 hours. The element from the initial lift formed on line with 2/B/2-27 Inf on the right and moved forward 300 meters until they reached Company C (see Overlay 6).
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At approximately 1445 hours they began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire, and assaulted forward, bypassing the strongpoint which was keeping Company C pinned down. The 1st Platoon worked through the open area to its front by fire and maneuver, but was forced to halt when the 2nd Platoon became pinned down temporarily, causing its fire to impact close to the front of the 1st Platoon's positions. While they were halted, the enemy attempted to maneuver around their right flank. Two men who emerged from the hedgerow were killed by the fire of 1/B/2-27 Inf, one of whom appeared to be either a junior officer or NCO who was attempting to lead his men. Other enemy soldiers were chased out of the hedgerow and two more were killed by gunship fire when they attempted to flee west. This firefight cost the 1st Platoon one machine gunner wounded.

The 2nd Platoon was finally able to move up on line, but highly accurate sniper fire immediately pinned them down, killing SP4 John Lyons, the ATG (radecman), and 2LT Orvil Kitchen, the Forward Observer (FO) from Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, in rapid succession. The bypassed "hot corner", where the initial LMG fire had come from, had been quiet for some time, so SGT Stephen Adams, a squad leader from the 1st Platoon, Company B, and SP4 Richard Nest, a medic from HHC attached to his platoon, attempted to retrieve the body of the dead point man. The LMG opened fire on them and kept them pinned down until SP4 Armando Noriega, a machine gunner from 1/B/2-27 Inf fired to his rear with his M-60 and an M-16 which he took from his assistant gunner and silenced it. This action also enabled the forward elements to commence a fighting withdrawal as they began to run out of ammunition. They were forced to leave two bodies at the limit of the farthest advance, as well as the dead point man, and abandon some equipment. MEDEVAC of casualties took place at 1533, 1545 and 1631 hours as the wounded and the bodies of the KIAs were brought back to the LZ.

At 1525 hours Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was alerted to move to a pick-up zone at Cu Chi and began lifting on two UH-1H helicopters at 1600 hours. By 1815 hours the last of the company had inserted into a LZ approximately one kilometer southwest of Companies B and C. The withdrawal of these two Companies to a night defensive position (NDF) in the vicinity of their LZ was covered by artillery fire from FSB Hull and FSB Hampton, and air strikes placed on enemy positions 400-600 meters west by ILT Hamby Fagg at 1700 hours and again at 1805 hours. This second strike which was made by four F-100s struck positions marked by a Cobra in the area of the camouflaged structures. During this last strike ILT Fagg expended 1000 rounds covering Company B's right flank with a Cobra. They spotted a group of enemy maneuvering to attack, and broke it up after the ground troops had marked their positions with smoke.

At 1820 hours the second lift of Company B arrived at the LZ and was directed by MAJ Howard McAllister, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, S-3 who had assumed command on the ground, to begin securing a NDF for the
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engaged troops to withdraw to. LTC Custer reported that the contact was broken off at 1840 hours, and a four-ship resupply mission brought ammunition, food and water into the CP. Reinforcements were brought in for Company C from the Battalion rear, and LIE Cy Weisner, Company C Executive Officer (EC), replaced the wounded LIE Clark in command of 1/C/2-27 Inf. Helicopter gunships and flareships remained on station during the night but there was no contact. CPT John MacLeod directed the final air-strike of the day at 1900 hours and made rocket and machine gun runs when the fighters received ground fire.

The mission of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was to conduct a ground reconnaissance on 3 April of the previous day's contact area, and to retrieve the five bodies left overnight. The task force was composed of Companies A, B, C, and Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, which was made OPCOM. Plans called for B/C/2-27 Inf to sweep west from their position through the area of their firefight to the site of the Ranger contact. There they would link up with Company A and B/2-22 Inf (M) moving up from the south (see Overlay 8).

At 0745 hours a LSF from D/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy in the vicinity of XT292320. They received ineffective small arms fire from the enemy and killed all three. CPT Bobby Hawkins, FAC, arrived on station at 0945 hours as the ground troops began moving forward, and shut off artillery fire to clear the air for friendly aircraft. At 1000 hours he sent the day's first air strike (see Overlay 9) into the area, resulting in two enemy KIA (BC). His rocket and machine gun passes which were required to suppress ground fire directed at the aircraft resulted in another possible enemy KIA. Companies B and C had meanwhile moved up to the contact area and paused while the air strikes were brought in, and then moved forward to evacuate the three bodies left in the area the previous afternoon. They paused again at 1100 hours to let additional air assets be brought in.

CPT MacLeod brought in an air strike at 1100 hours on positions marked with smoke by a LSF from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and in response to ground requests for additional napalm had two more air strikes brought into the area by 1300 hours. At 1100 hours a LSF from D/3-4 Cav engaged two enemy near an oxcart in the vicinity of XT275308, killing both. The NVA were attempting to fire an RPG at the LOH when they were killed by rockets and minigun fire from the Cobra. A .51 caliber machine gun mount, six RPG rounds and ½ pound of documents were evacuated to Cu Chi from this encounter. CPT MacLeod engaged two enemy in a bunker (XT283718) at 1146 hours, killing both of them. The weather had cleared by this time, enabling the follow-up missions to avoid the necessity of making low-level approaches which had plagued pilots earlier in the day. The first element of fighters at 1300 hours produced multiple secondary explosions.

During their pause to allow the air assets to be brought in, Companies B and C policed the contact area and gathered up abandoned equipment for
evacuation. They also ate a hot meal at noon which was brought forward from the LZ by their respective security elements. Company C utilized its 1st Platoon for this task, with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons remaining on line. Company B kept three Platoons as a striking force and had its Weapons Platoon (without heavy weapons) acting as a rear security element. The equipment was evacuated between 1400 and 1430 hours, with the two companies (minus security elements) sweeping forward to the area of the Ranger contact where they linked up with A/2-27 Inf and B/2-22 Inf (M) which had swept up from the south across their front. Two armored personnel carriers (APCs) broke down during the sweep and 2/B/2-27 Inf provided security for them until they were repaired.

At approximately 1400 hours, CPT Brown and 1LT Parsons received permission to engage a bunker complex (XT290314) which 1LT Parsons had seen one NVA run into earlier. After having B/2-27 Inf mark its positions with smoke, CPT Brown made an initial rocket pass which flushed four or five enemy into the open. The two FACs made ten passes apiece on the target, chasing several more enemy into the open, and receiving fire from small arms, LMGs, and RPGs. Initially, the enemy ran towards Company B, which engaged them with organic weapons at 1415 hours. Six enemy were killed by the ground troops before they fled. Several weapons were found in the bunkers, indicating that the enemy was attempting to strike Company B on the northern flank.

After the bodies of the two dead Rangers were recovered by Company A, the ground troops swept west to the demand UN-10. They provided security while it was disarmed and recovered by a CH-47. Recovery took place at 1815 hours with 1LT Parsons flying cover. At this time all four companies returned to the clearing where the Ranger contact had occurred and established a NDP with APCs positioned around the perimeter.

During the afternoon's sweep of the area, there were several isolated contacts. Company A engaged three enemy in a bunker (XT292312) located by a LST from D/3-4 Cav. Using small arms fire at 1517 hours, they killed three enemy without taking any casualties. A ChiCom claymore mine and documents identifying the 10, Co 3 Company, 3 Battalion, 271 Regiment, were evacuated and three RPG rounds destroyed. At 1528 hours Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, engaged four enemy (XT294313) with organic weapons, killing all four. The enemy small arms fire produced negative casualties, and a cache containing 49 RPG rounds, 70 82mm mortar rounds, and 100 60mm mortar rounds was uncovered and evacuated. At 1529 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav located eight enemy killed by artillery at XT289316. The force sweeping from the south engaged another group of four enemy at 1535 hours at XT293314. Company A killed three of the enemy and captured one GNC rifle without receiving any return fire. Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, captured the fourth, who was taken to Tay Ninh for interrogation.
Two pounds of documents, two RPG launchers, five AK-47 rifles, two SKS rifles, three ChiCom claymores, 19 ChiCom hand grenades, one ChiCom field radio with S.O.I., 1500 rounds of small arms ammunition, 400 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition, one loaded RPG magazine, 23 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, four pounds of medical supplies, a bag of miscellaneous machine gun parts, 20 pounds of polished rice, two NVA backpacks, four NVA canteens, five NVA ponchos, three NVA shovels, two flashlights, and six pounds of clothing and miscellaneous web gear were gathered during the sweep of the battlefield and evacuated to Cu Chi. One enemy body was also discovered at XT291315.

After spending an uneventful night, all companies moved out from the NDP to continue their ground reconnaissance of the immediate area on the morning of 4 April. Company C prepared to move to Cu Chi Base Camp to conduct a 24-hour maintenance standdown, and Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry moved from Patrol Base (PB) Blue (XT258290) to replace them. At 0830 hours A/2-27 Inf located one enemy KIA in blue shorts and a blue shirt which was credited to their contact at 1517 hours the previous day. At the same time B/2-27 Inf located another body at XT289314 which was credited to artillery fired at 1548 hours on 3 April.

At 0915 hours one field telephone switchboard with batteries, two terminal boxes, one 82mm mortar sight, five pounds of documents, and one unknown type of booster which had been found during the morning by the two companies were evacuated to Cu Chi. Another cache (XT287317) containing 43 rounds of 82mm, 30 rounds of 60mm and three rounds of 75mm ammunition plus an 82mm mortar sight and one ton of unbagged rice was discovered by the two companies at 1136 hours and destroyed. At noon the companies returned to their NDP for a hot meal brought in by helicopter.

The two air strikes of the day were flown at 1100 hours and 1300 hours before weather conditions became too poor (see Overlay 10). CPT Brown directed the first on targets marked by helicopters from D/3-4 Cav. CPT MacLeod directed the second, which produced one large secondary explosion and several smaller ones. He had the F-100s make strafing runs with their 20mm cannon, but they were unable to cause any more explosions. An artillery spotter in a LOH made a visual reconnaissance of the area and saw numerous boxes scattered on the ground, leading to the assumption that a supply bunker had been destroyed.

In the afternoon sweep (see Overlay 11) Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved northwest to establish a line, and then began sweeping southwest towards two large clearings. Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry provided security for them and then continued towards PB Blue for the night. During the sweep B/2-27 Inf located several bodies and miscellaneous equipment. At 1220 hours they located ten KIA (KC) at XT287317, of which six were credited to their small arms fire, two to the artillery, and two to air strikes. At 1230 hours two bodies were located (XT279313) which had been killed by D/3-4.
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Cay, and one RPG-2 launcher was evacuated. Fifteen minutes later at XT289315 one pound of documents, 660 small arms rounds, nine 82mm mortar rounds, and one RPG round were evacuated to Cu Chi. A/2/2-27 Inf halted at 1600 hours in the large clearings to eat their evening meal which was brought in on resupply helicopters. At this time the evening rainstorm set in.

During this meal, A/B/2-27 Inf used binoculars to select sites for platoon-sized ambush patrols which would be set out that night in the clearings. At 1930 hours the patrols moved out. Company B selected locations for its platoons along the northwest edge of their clearing (see Overlay 12). The 1st Platoon set up an L-shaped ambush at the clearing entrance (XT275301), the 2nd Platoon chose an area to their northeast (XT273314), and the 3rd Platoon with the command element remained between them (XT277312). By 2000 hours, the 1st and 2nd Platoons had become established in their locations, but the 3rd still had not found a suitable site.

Just after dark (approximately 2010 hours), 1/B/2-27 Inf saw an unidentified element moving towards their positions from the southwest. The Platoon Leader, 2LT Dennis Heitner, wanted clearance before engaging the estimated 20 men because there were indications that they might be allied troops. Before he could contact the Company Commander, his men informed him that the force was composed of 200-250 heavily equipped NVA. 2LT Heitner ordered his men to lay down and let the enemy pass. The column, which had no forward or flank security and was observing lax route discipline, passed in such close proximity to the platoon's position that they walked over the wires strung out to the platoon's claymore mines. The enemy force paused for approximately 45 seconds near the platoon's position to allow stragglers to close up, and the AP saw that they were heavily laden with LMGs, mortars, and large quantities of ammunition being transported on stretchers. As the two-man rear security element of the 300 meter long column came abreast of his position (about 2035 hours), 2LT Heitner told his men to get on the other side of their berm and open fire on the enemy who were disappearing into a large wooded area to the east. He initiated fire with his M-60 machine guns and M-79s, followed by a general engagement with small arms. The enemy replied with small arms and RPG fire.

The other two platoons, concentrated at the 3rd Platoon location, set up a cross fire. Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, was recalled to the scene, and helicopter gunships, flareships and artillery were brought in. A/2-27 Inf never saw the enemy, most of whom had evaded into the woods when the contact was initiated. B/2-27 Inf gathered at the 3rd Platoon site and were joined there by A/2-22 Inf (H). The mechanized company had taken sniper fire which wounded two men in its effort to join B/2-27 Inf, but had seen few enemy. Resupply was brought
OVERLAY 12
NIGHT ACTION 4 APRIL

A - A/2-27 AO
1 - 1B/2-27 AP
2 - 2B/2-27 AP
3 - 3B/2-27 AP
→ ROUTE OF NVA
→ ROUTE OF A/2-22(M)

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It was the opinion of the officers of Company B that the element they engaged was returning to its base camp and was completely unaware of the presence of any allied units in the area. It is possible that this unit was part of the force which attacked FSB Jay (XT0375) on 30 March.

On 5 April, Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, and Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were ordered to continue their ground reconnaissance of the contact area, concentrating on the vicinity of the previous night's encounter. Company A, 2-27 Inf, would go to Cu Chi Base Camp for a 24-hour maintenance standdown and be relieved in place at noon by Company C.

At 0925 hours a LST from D/3-4 Cav located two enemy KIA (XT292299) which were credited to A/2-22 Inf (M) from the previous evening's action. At 0940 hours B/2-27 Inf located one enemy KIA from the night before and received one Hoi Chanh, badly burned by napalm (XT275307). They also captured two AK-47 rifles and one pistol belt. Four bodies of enemy soldiers killed by air strikes were located between 1100 and 1200 hours. Company B discovered two at XT281305, and Company A found one at XT280304 and another at XT282306.

Two air strikes were delivered at split locations (see Overlay 13) during the morning. CPT Hawkins directed one at 1100 hours which destroyed a large supply bunker and produced a large secondary explosion. 1LT Parsons directed the second at 1200 hours.

After the noon meal, the ground forces continued to move west towards their eventual NDP (XT270320). At 1500 hours LTC Custer's Command and Control ship engaged and killed one enemy with three flame baths at XT96301. There was no return fire. One half-hour later A/2-22 Inf (M) located five enemy KIA from their engagement on 4 April (XT276303). They also captured ten rucksacks and destroyed 35 RPG boosters. At 1545 hours, a UH-1H from the 25th Aviation Battalion flying over XT289301 at an altitude of 500 feet and a speed of 50 knots received small arms fire from an unknown location. No damage occurred and there was no return fire. The final action of the day occurred when Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery engaged a suspected enemy location (XT296308), killing two at 1745 hours.

Plans for the final day of the action, 6 April, called for Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, to return to Cu Chi for a 24-hour maintenance standdown. The remaining companies (C/2-27 Inf and A/B/2-22 Inf (M)) were to make a sweep through the area and move west to NDPs.

At 0730 hours A/B/2-22 Inf (M) received one Hoi Chanh in their NDP (XT295283). He was evacuated to Cu Chi for interrogation. Exploiting information obtained from him, Company B evacuated one RPD light machine gun.
gun at 1500 hours (XT301286). The only other incident during the day occurred at 1341 hours when Company B detonated a tripwired hand grenade and had two men wounded (XT282302). Three air strikes were flown (see Overlay 14) at 0900, 0930 and 1300 hours, the last of which produced a large secondary explosion.

13. (C) RESULTS: (See Inclosures 6 and 7)
This action was a successful ground reconnaissance operation carried out by 3rd Brigade elements. Enemy personnel losses during the five-day operation were 101 KIA (BC), one prisoner-of-war captured, and two Hoi Chanhs received by US forces. Large amounts of enemy equipment were also captured or destroyed. US forces suffered 11 men killed and 35 wounded, of whom 18 were treated and returned to duty immediately, but one of whom subsequently died of wounds. (See Inclosure 8)

The 271 VC/NVA Regiment was hurt by this operation which inflicted heavy personnel and material losses and destroyed the base area of the 2 and 3 Battalions. This operation has impaired the enemy's offensive capability in the Hieu Thien District of Tay Ninh Province.

14. (C) ANALYSIS:
This operation succeeded because the morale, initiative, esprit-de-corps and fighting qualities of the individual soldier proved equal to the test, and because of outstanding support from air assets and artillery. The enemy force was aggressive, well-equipped, highly trained, and well-entrenched. The massive, concentrated firepower which was utilized by the ground troops enabled them to batter the enemy while minimizing casualties.

The initial contacts of both the Rangers and Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, resulted in heavy expenditures of ammunition, particularly M-60 and M-79 rounds. The enemy apparently was inadequately supplied with mortars and M-79s, since he made little use of them, especially in the Ranger contact when they would have been decisive. Both the Ranger team and B/C/2-27 Inf experienced sniper fire which was highly effective, and had enemy ground elements trying to maneuver around their flanks. Air assets proved invaluable in providing flank security. The team from Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry, felt that their early insertion caught the enemy by surprise, since the extensive positions around the clearing were only partly manned. By contrast B/C/2-27 Inf found the positions they assaulted prepared and fully manned.

The Forward Air Controllers encountered unusual problems with air congestion during the operation. There were numerous helicopters over-
flying the contact area, and an ARVN contact four kilometers southwest which was also utilizing air support required coordination. Eighteen tactical air strikes were flown in the area, despite heavy cloud cover which often provided the supporting fighters with special problems involved in low altitude bombing.

13 Incl
1. Persons Interviewed
2. Supporting Fires
3. USAF Air Strikes
4. Composition of Ranger Team
5. Helicopter Crews During Ranger Contact
6. Enemy Personnel-Losses
7. Enemy Equipment-Losses
8. US Casualties
9. Table of Ground Unit Strengths
10. USAF PAC Missions-Flown
11. Awards for Valor
12. List of Photographs

Incls 4 thru 12 w/d HQ DA
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OVERLAY 14 AIRSTRIKES 6 APRIL

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>SSAN</th>
<th>Job Title and Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allmon, Raymond L.</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>512509989</td>
<td>Machine gunner, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, H. Noel</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>331408190</td>
<td>53 Air, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avery, Charles P.</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>147447643</td>
<td>Rifleman, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baglay, Michael R.</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>535480476</td>
<td>Gunner, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown, Wendell L.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>937589568</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creswell, Charles E.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>314427609</td>
<td>CO, B/2-27 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dobry, Steven L.</td>
<td>SP5</td>
<td>442309974</td>
<td>Crew Chief, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fagg, Hanby D.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>442469797</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmer, Robert E.</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>534542581</td>
<td>XO, 2-27 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guth, Richard P.</td>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>266661405</td>
<td>Sniper, Co F(Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hack, Monte L.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>404547317</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hall, Colin K.</td>
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<td>525824050</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawkins, Bobby W.</td>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>066361559</td>
<td>Pilot, 1/B/2-27 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hettner, Dennis E.</td>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>576381161</td>
<td>1SG C/2-27 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higa, Sengoro</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>562748683</td>
<td>Rifleman, 1/C/2-27 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotchkiss, Bruce D.</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>526900256</td>
<td>Pilot, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson, Roger</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>259823153</td>
<td>A/C, D/3-4 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kempson, Marcus A.</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>374301545</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kordus, Louis C.</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>326462633</td>
<td>Machinegunner, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langland, Kenneth J.</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>229682521</td>
<td>Pilot, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lastwasser, Dan A. III</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>717340187</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MacLeod, John D.</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>516312557</td>
<td>AdaO, 25th Inf Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCurdy, John D.</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>484540262</td>
<td>Tm Ldr, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norton, Philip J.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>448448418</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Neill, John H.</td>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>349368232</td>
<td>Pilot, 3/C/2-27 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parsons, David S.</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>551781868</td>
<td>Grenadier, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perez, Steven (MM)</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>388466526</td>
<td>FAC, 19th TASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterson, Steven J.</td>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>005544618</td>
<td>Pilot, 2/B/2-27 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purdy, Donald E.</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>411789282</td>
<td>Rifleman, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure 1 to Incl 6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Number</th>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Position Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rodriguez-Colon, Domingo</td>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>5816886918</td>
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<td>Rifleman, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seay, Samuel P.</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>260744262</td>
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<td>Co, Co F (Rgr) 75th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schierholz, Paul C.</td>
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<td>541486386</td>
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<td>A/C, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strand, Kenneth L.</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>516600662</td>
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<td>Rifleman, Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf</td>
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<td>Stuckey, Fred B.</td>
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<td>75th Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tocco, Philip A.</td>
<td>ODT</td>
<td>374460466</td>
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<td>Pilot, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonelli, James D. R.</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>219524888</td>
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<td>A/C, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walgren, William E.</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>523461450</td>
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<td>S3, 25th Avn Bn</td>
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<td>Weisner, Cy F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Williams, Adrian K.</td>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>468824585</td>
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<td>Pilot, D/3-4 Cav</td>
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## ConfidentiaL

Supporting Fires

### Artillery Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Firing Location</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3t/B/2-77</td>
<td>105mm howitzer</td>
<td>XT243293</td>
<td>1 WP; 27 Illumination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/3-13</td>
<td>8&quot; howitzer</td>
<td>FSB Hampton (XT417238)</td>
<td>204 HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/1-27</td>
<td>155mm howitzer</td>
<td>FSB Hull (XT263380)</td>
<td>430 HE; 1 WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2t/C/2-32</td>
<td>8&quot; howitzer</td>
<td>FSB Hull (XT263380)</td>
<td>78 HE</td>
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</table>

**Total Rounds:** 741

### Aviation Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Support</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 25th Avn Bn</td>
<td>2 Night Hawk/day; 17 flamethrows; Command and Control helicopters; Resupply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B, 25th Avn Bn</td>
<td>9 LFT/day; 2 Flareships/day; Resupply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/3-4 Cav</td>
<td>3 LST/day; Lift for Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116th ABC</td>
<td>Lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187th ABC</td>
<td>Lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118th ABC</td>
<td>1 LFT (2 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>3 AC-119 (Shadow)</td>
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</table>

Inclosure 2 to Incl 6

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**Tactical Air Strikes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strike Number</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Unit (Base)</th>
<th>Ordnance Exploded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2/1315</td>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>8th Attack Sqdn (Phan Rang)</td>
<td>4500 lbd napalm; 4500 lbd HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/1330</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>4750 lbd napalm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2/1345</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>35th TAC F.W. (Phan Rang)</td>
<td>4500 lbd HE (High Drag); 4750 lbd napalm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2/1700</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>31st TAC F.W. (Tuy Hoa)</td>
<td>8500 lbd HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2/1810-1815</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>8500 lbd HE; 8500 lbd HE (.025 sec delay)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2/1900</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>35th TAC F.W. (Phan Rang)</td>
<td>4500 lbd HE (High Drag); 4500 lbd napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3/1030</td>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>8500 lbd HE</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3/1100</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>35th TAC F.W. (Phan Rang)</td>
<td>4500 lbd HE; 4500 lbd napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3/1300</td>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>4500 lbd HE; 4500 lbd napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3/1300</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>8500 lbd napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4/1000</td>
<td>A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>4500 lbd HE; 4500 lbd napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4/1300</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>4500 lbd HE (High Drag); 4500 lbd napalm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See maps for location of numbered strikes.

Enclosure 3 to Incl 6

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strike Number</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Unit (Base)</th>
<th>Ordnance Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>5/1000</td>
<td>2 A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>M: 4,500 1lb HE (1 Dud) S: 4,500 1lb napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>5/1200</td>
<td>2 A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>M: 4,500 1lb HE; S: 2,500 1lb napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>5/1630</td>
<td>2 A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>4,500 1lb HE; 4,500 1lb napalm</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>6/0900</td>
<td>2 F-100</td>
<td>35th TAC F.W. (Phan Rang)</td>
<td>4,500 1lb HE (Daisy Cutter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>6/0930</td>
<td>2 F-100</td>
<td>31st TAC F.W. (Tan Son Nhut)</td>
<td>3,500 1lb HE (Daisy Cutter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>6/1300</td>
<td>2 A-37</td>
<td>3rd TAC F.W. (Bien Hoa)</td>
<td>4,500 1lb HE; 4,500 1lb napalm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 25th Infantry Division

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CG, 25th Infantry Division