**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**CLASSIFICATION CHANGES**

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**LIMITATION CHANGES**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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**AUTHORITY**

AGO D/A ltr, 25 Jun 1975; AGO D/A ltr, 25 Jun 1975

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SUBJECT: Conceptual Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th
Military Police Group (U)

Operational report for the period ending 30 April 1970.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a
result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90
days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current
operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP
APU San Francisco 96240

AUGSF 18 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.


c. Personnel, Morale and Discipline:

(1) Decorations:

(a) Soldiers Medal

(b) Bronze Star (Valor)

(c) Bronze Star (Service)

(d) Air Medal

(e) Army Commendation Medal (Valor)

(f) Army Commendation Medal (Service)

(g) Purple Heart

(h) Good Conduct Medal

(i) Brigade Certificate of Achievement

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702/67

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AVBOPF

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS USPOM-65(M2) (U)

(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures:

(a) Assignments:

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<td>ELLIOTT, H. N.</td>
<td>COL</td>
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<td>February</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALEXANDER, John</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Det 00</td>
<td>February</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPPENSON, Roger</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Asst 5-3</td>
<td>March</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASILE, Leonard</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>PSNCO</td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMELL, Jerry</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>TCNCO</td>
<td>April</td>
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<tr>
<td>COOPER, Alan</td>
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<td>April</td>
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(b) Departures:

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<td>TROOST, Howard</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Asst 5-3</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEPHERD, Steven</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Reenlistment NOO</td>
<td>April</td>
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<td>HUTCHINSON, Edward</td>
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<td>PSNCO</td>
<td>April</td>
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(3) Casualties:

(a) Battle Losses

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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Wounded</td>
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(b) Non-Battle Losses

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<tr>
<td>2 Injured</td>
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(b) Reenlistments:

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<td>200</td>
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INCL 2

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CRDOC-65(R2) (U)

(5) Civilian Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Six Civilisation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Augmentation TDA P5-WFEAA-99</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>152</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January 1969</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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(6) R&R

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>99.5</td>
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(7) Strengths:

(a) As of 1 February 1970

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<tr>
<td>WO</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>2083</td>
<td>1853</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>1944</td>
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(b) As of 30 April 1970

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<tr>
<td>WO</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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(8) Extensions of Overseas Tour:

(a) Total Extensions

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>March</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
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INCL 3
Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65(RZ) (U)

(b) Under FL 89-735 (6 mo)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
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(9) Discipline, Law and Order:
(a) General Courts 0
(b) Special Courts 11
(c) Summary Courts 9
(d) Article 15 UCMJ 111

(10) Congressional Inquiries: 16

(11) Publications:
(a) 16th MP Group Regulation 28-1, Soldier of the Quarter, 13 March 1970.
(b) 16th MP Group Regulation 335-3, Reports End of Tour, 12 April 1970.
(c) 16th MP Group Regulation 381-5, Intelligence Spot Reporting (ISR), 21 March 1970.
(d) 16th MP Group Regulation 551-5, ARVN Interpreter Program, 5 February 1970.
(e) 16th MP Group Regulation 600-205, Proficiency Pay for Enlisted Personnel, 5 February 1970.
(f) 16th MP Group Regulation 735-26, Accounting of Class V Items, 28 February 1970.

(1) On 31 March 1970, elements of the 16th Military Police Group began escorting convoys employed in the relocation of the 626th Engineer Battalion from Kontum to Di Linh. Coordination was made between the 93d Military Police Battalion and the 97th Military Police Battalion to provide escorts over the 650 kilometer convoy route. This convoy commitment is expected to continue into the month of May.
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AVGCP

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military
Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

(2) The recently activated 595th Military Police Company (SD) at Da
Nang currently has 24 dogs, four of which are TDY to the Navy for special
training. Kennel facilities in Da Nang are shared with a USAF sentry dog
unit. During the next quarter, ten portable kennels will be sent to the
595th Military Police Company (SD) to begin sentry dog operations at Phu
Bai.

d. Training: On 18 April 1970 a generator operator's course of
instruction was given to 26 enlisted men from throughout the 16th Military
Police Group. The course was held in Cam Ranh Bay with instructors pro-
vided by the 69th Maintenance Battalion, 54th General Support Group, Cam
Ranh Support Command. Instruction was given on the 1.5 kw, 3 kw and 10
kw generators.

f. Intelligence:

(1) Intelligence summaries continued to be received from USARV, XXIV
Corps, IFFV, 5th Special Forces Group and 18th Military Police Brigade.

(2) No administrative or security violations occurred during the re-
porting period.

(3) 281 Intelligence Spot Reports were processed.

(4) 521 security actions were processed.

(5) Intelligence is collected from the following sources:

(a) Intelligence Spot Reports from subordinate units.

(b) Intelligence Summaries from higher headquarters.

(c) Local MI units.

(d) Vietnamese police agencies.

g. Force Development:

(1) On 20 February 1970 Co B, 504th Military Police Battalion (A)
was reassigned back to the 504th Military Police Battalion (A) from the
93d Military Police Battalion. This involved a change of colors only.
Personnel were not relocated. Co B headquarters is located in Da Nang.
Co B colors were replaced in the 93d Military Police Battalion by the
colors of the 560th Military Police Company. Company headquarters is
located in An Khe.

(2) On 20 February 1970 the colors of the 146th Military Police Plato-
on were sent from the 504th Military Police Battalion (A) to the 89th
Military Police Group.
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AVBGF 14 Mar 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(N2) (U)

(3) Effective 26 April 1970 Company D, 51st Infantry, Company C, 54th Infantry and Company D, 56th Infantry were reassigned from the 16th Military Police Group to the 1st Logistical Command.

(4) On 17 March 1970, Team O, 2d Battalion, 981st Military Police Company (SD) was established with kennel facilities at Nha Trang Airbases. Team O has 13 dogs and shares kennel facilities with an ARVN sentry dog unit.

h. Communications:

(1) The 16th Military Police Group obtained all secure voice equipment for 12-series radios and currently is at authorized strength.

(2) Messages passed over the RTT net increased over 30 percent in the period from 1 February to 31 March 1970.

(3) 16th Military Police Group has been issued on 180 day loan 1 each AN/GRC-142 radio teletypewriter set and an additional 12 each radio sets AN/PRC-74B. The radio teletypewriter set AN/GRC-142 will be employed by B Company, 504th Military Police Battalion (A), and 595th Military Police Company (SD). The 12 each radio sets AN/PRC-74B will be distributed throughout the group area in outlying areas where telephone communications is at times difficult or impossible. These radios will operate on battalion nets.

i. Logistics: One XM706 Armored Car became a combat loss during the reporting period. The assignment of the 560th MP Company increased group authorization to 32 XM706's. Additional XM706's were issued which brought the group total to 36. Of this total 1 XM706 are on Hand Receipt from 89th MP Group.

j. Other: None.

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Air Support:

(a) OBSERVATION: Despite repeated efforts by this headquarters, Brigade, and USARV, and the expressed personal concern of CINCPAC, this command remains without reliable air support.

(b) EVALUATION: 16th Military Police Group, with three battalions and more than 2000 officers and men, is responsible for area military
police support in I and II Corps Tactical Zones, an area representing more than 2/3 the land mass of South Vietnam. With the assumption of wider responsibilities, especially in I Corps Tactical Zone, the compelling necessity for the Group Commander and his staff to visit subordinate units in order to effectively command, control and supervise operations is becoming more, rather than less, urgent. During the past year, two requests for dedicated air support for this headquarters have been categorically refused by I Field Force, Vietnam. The last request, acted on in April, was inspired by a message from CINCUSARPAC, who expressed his personal concern at the lack of dedicated air support during a recent visit. In rejecting the last request, IFFV recommended that a MTOE change be submitted for organic aircraft to Group Headquarters, a suggestion which is doubly impractical because of the delay inherent in such an action and the existing moratorium on MTOE amendments. This headquarters desperately needs reliable air support now, not at some time in the distant and unspecified future. A number of examples - these are only a few examples - of the frustration, waste of time and man-hours, and inability to make plans which have resulted from the lack of reliable air support may reinforce the recommendation which follows:

1. To travel to I Corps Tactical Zone, "normal" arrangements require travel aboard Air Force C-123 or C-130 scheduled flights. Except in rare cases, when an IFFV or USARV U-21 might be already scheduled, this procedure applies to all members of this command, including the Group Commander. Problems:

   a. Bookings must be made 3-5 days in advance. Once an aircraft is fully booked, the prospective passenger's rank, position or the urgency of his mission is immaterial. He does not get on. This inflexibility has caused more than its share of problems.

   b. All USAF flights require passengers to "show" approximately two hours in advance of the announced departure time. Since the aircraft has been known to leave an hour early or an hour late with equanimity, this requirement cannot be waived. As a result, the Group Commander and his staff have spent - collectively - hundreds of hours waiting benches in air terminals, a rather unique pastime for key personnel.

   c. The requirement to change planes because of a lack of direct flights (e.g., to Phu Bai, where a battalion headquarters is located) has further compounded the problems. On one occasion, a key staff officer's outgoing flight was late, resulting in his missing a connecting flight. He spent the night at Phu Cat Air Base and was successful in getting to Phu Bai the following day (traveling standby). After a two day visit, he caught a flight to Da Nang, waited three hours and flew to Cam Ranh Bay, arriving too late for a trip to Nha Trang. In six days, this officer
spent more than three traveling. Dedicated aircraft would have eliminated all but four hours of this needless waste of time. As further evidence, in the last nine months, the Group Commander (usually accompanied by his Command Sergeant Major) has been "stranded" overnight or longer because of cancelled or rescheduled flights at least five times.

Within II Corps, where support from IFFV in the form of helicopters and U-21s is feasible, the problems are not as aggravated. However, the same inability to plan ahead because of a lack of assurance of air support exists. In one week, the Group Commander was refused four times (on four consecutive days) when he was attempting to secure an aircraft to make a swing through one battalion area. Air support for battalion commanders is nearly nonexistent.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That immediate action be taken to provide two rotary wing aircraft to this command on a dedicated basis.

(2) Sentry Dog TOE's:

(a) OBSERVATION: Sentry Dog Companies, organized under TOE 19-500E, lack many of the elements necessary to insure optimum efficiency of operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Sentry dog companies in a counterinsurgency environment are normally fragmented into number of small detachments of platoon and squad size. There are frequently great distances between detachments, and these subordinate units have to operate on a semi-autonomous basis. Company headquarters is responsible for the processing of incoming and outgoing dogs and handlers and the operation of limited training program. As a result, the unit headquarters generally requires a large kennel facility. The sentry dog units are not correctly manned by grade and MOS to face either requirement discussed. Since there is no provision in Company Headquarters for training or kennel support personnel, the platoon supervisory structure offers platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. The latter, in grade E-6, are in MOS 95B4D and are usually Military Police NCO's who have gone to sentry dog supervisor school. They are rarely qualified. Below them, there are the supervisory team E-5 Sergeants, MOS 95B4D, who in this day and age, are usually two year men who have been promoted from dog handler status. Because of the requirement to establish many subordinate detachments, these E-5's frequently are detachment commander's.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That necessary action be taken to amend TOE 19-500G thereby precluding multiple MTOE submissions and to provide the following:

1 Supervisory team NCO's (E-6) and (E-5) in MOS 95B4D to replace the present E-5's and E-4's currently authorized in that MOS.

2 Platoon Sergeants in grade E-7 in MOS 00C4D (Dog Trainer) instead of the present E-6 95B4D.
An additional E-7 in MOS 0082D to function as Training NCO and Kennel Master in Company Headquarters.

d. **Organisation:** None.

e. **Training:** None.

f. **Logistics:** None.

g. **Communications:** Increased use of security equipment and area testing by units of the 16th Military Police Group have shown that signal strength and clarity when using the KY-8 with the VRC-12 series radio is reduced to a great extent. Alignment of the equipment tends to increase the range by about 10 percent.

h. **Material:** None.

i. **Other:** None.

---

**DISTRIBUTION:**

2 - USARPAC (GCPD-DT)
3 - USARV (AVBGC-DST)
4 - 18th MP Bde (AVBCO)
SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period ending 30 April 1970, RCS OSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Basic correspondence has been reviewed and considered adequate as modified below.

2. (U) Reference item concerning air-support, paragraph 2c (1), page 6: Concur. This has been a tremendous problem for the 16th Group. The evaluation contained in the basic correspondence is the result of very extensive research and gives a true picture of the problem. It is imperative for the Group Commander and his staff to be able to be transported to his subordinate units with the capability of arranging itineraries and immediate response to unforeseen problems.

3. (U) Reference item concerning Sentry Dog Companies' TOE, paragraph 2c (2), page 8: Concur.

4. (U) Reference item concerning Sentry Dog TOE's paragraph 2c (2), page 8: Concur.

W. E. HAWKINS
Colonel, MPC
Deputy Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DA, ATTN: AGSFOR
1-OG, USARV, ATTN: AVBGC - DST
1-OG, 16th MP Gp
1-File
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group and concurs with comments of approving headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Air Support", page 6, paragraph 2c(1), and paragraph 2, lst Indorsement. During March 1970, this headquarters received a request from the 18th KP Brigade for dedicated aviation support for the 16th MP Group. The justification for the requested support was the same as is found in this ORLL. Since the aviation assets to support the request are under the operational control of I Field Force and XXIV Corps, USARV dispatched a message on 28 March 1970 to both Commanding General I Field Force and Commanding General XXIV Corps requesting that every effort be made, consistent with overall operational requirements, to provide aviation support to the 16th MP Group in the conduct of its operations within the I and II Corps Tactical Zones. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Sentry Dog TOE's", page 8, paragraph 2c(2), and lst Indorsement, paragraphs 3 and 4: Concur in recommendation 1 but not for the reasons stated. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that his men are qualified to assume greater responsibility prior to promoting them and to take necessary administrative actions if a man does not perform adequately in his grade and MOS. The fact that a man is not qualified after attending a Sentry Dog Supervisor School indicates that either the student is improperly motivated or that the school must be supplemented by OJT. It is not a valid reason for increasing the authorized grade of the space. MP Supervisors in Sentry Dog Companies are equivalent to squad leaders in other MP Companies. They are responsible for a 10-man unit. Squad leaders in all other MP Companies are E6 and their assistants are E5. An important consideration is the fact that authorizing E6 and E5 for these positions would provide a grade progression from grade E3 through E8, an extremely desirable aspect in a company. Previously MP Companies were not authorized E6 squad leaders. This gave an MP only a very slight chance of ever advancing beyond E5 and resulted in many E5's leaving the MP Corps. For this reason it is recommended that the Sentry Dog Company TOE be changed to authorize an E6 for the MP Supervisor position and an E5 as his assistant.
(1) Reference recommendation 2: the platoon sergeant should be authorized E7 for above reasons but the MOS for this position should not be changed. Platoon sergeants in an MP company should have a 95B MOS and the "T" suffix (i.eg). This MOS combines the experience and knowledge of military police work and the knowledge of working with dogs.

(2) Reference recommendation 3: this provides for an E7 with MOS 0004D in company headquarters and is concurred in as it would be the optimum solution. This man could provide the necessary technical experience to guide and teach the rest of the company in technical aspects of a sentry dog company. Action by USARPAC and DA is recommended. CO, 16th MP Brigade has been informed of this action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy furl:
18th MP Bde
16th MP Gp
GPOP-DT (14 May 70) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 16th Military Police Group for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comment: Reference "Sentry Dog TOEs," page 8, paragraph 2c(2): Recommendation for the TOE change should be submitted through channels IAW AR 310-31.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.M. ODARI
CFO, ASC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

13
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 16th Military Police Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CO, 16th Military Police Group

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