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The information contained in this report is provided to impose appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Donald L. Geer
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS CONUS-65 (R-1)


Commanding General, 1st Logistic Command, ATTN: AVCA WI-GO-H, APO 96226

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: WHGC-VST, APO 96375

Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: WHGC-OCT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

Operations: Significant Activities

1. Colonel Alex T. Longston Jr., commanded during the entire period. The principle staff officers were: LTC Gordon W. Underwood as Executive Officer; LT John S. Laynard as S-1; Captain Timothy J. Rubb replacing Captain Julian E. Barksdale as S-2; Major Douglas C. Binter replacing Captain Robert L. Jones who had replaced Major Thomas G. Stover as S-3; Major John H. Bider as Signal Officer/Assistant S-3; Captain Robert H. Heins as S-4; LTC Joseph A. Davis replacing Captain Herbert M. Hicks as Group Chaplain.

2. The 8th Transportation Group (IT) greatly performed its mission of line haul, local haul, and combat operations during the 60 days of the reporting period.

3. The 8th Transportation Group received visits from the following dignitaries on the dates indicated:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOJ DBR 5200.10
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, OSS CSG-65 R(I)

2 Feb 70 - Col Roscoe C. Cartwright, DCO (Designate), USAAC, GSA
16 Feb 70 - MG Walter J. Woolwine, CG, 1st Logistical Command
13 Mar 70 - Col Carroll E. Adams, CO, 937th Engineer Group
27 Apr 70 - MG Walter J. Woolwine, CG, 1st Logistical Command

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE: (U)

1. During the reporting period, personnel fill varied widely, rendering a report of average fill meaningless. Fill went at a high on 22 Feb 70 when the Group reached 100.3% fill but had fallen to 93% by the end of the reporting period. This represents a drop of 200 enlisted men.

2. There were no special courts-martials during the reporting period, the same as the previous reporting period.

3. Morale continued to be high throughout the 8th Transportation Group.

C. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. During the 29 day period, the 8th Transportation Group traveled 18,582,414 ten miles, traveling 3,229,929 miles, hauling 195,154 tons of cargo, 28,722,000 gallons of petroleum and 9,145 passengers.

2. The command was involved in six (6) major ambushes, seven (7) sniping incidents and two (2) mining incidents during the reporting period. The statistical results of the encounters were:

- KIA (US) - 2
- WIA (US) - 11
- KIA and WIA (Casual) - 1
- PGM's - 0
- Vehicles destroyed or damaged - 6

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RON due to enemy action - 470
Tonnage not moved due to enemy action - 4,285 S/T

3. Periods of concentrated enemy action: 1-25 April 1970, during which we had two major ambushes.

4. The 541st Transportation Company completed the move of one (1) platoon on 14 April 1970 to Qui 'hon for sea movement onto Shigun. The platoon reported to the port at 1300 hours, loaded their vehicles at 1400 hours and departed for their new location at 2300 hours.

5. There continues to be an increased P.L commitment due to the complete closing of the pipeline to Pleiku. The 8th Transportation Group has also received additional tankers to meet this increased commitment, causing our daily tanker commitment to reach 53.9% committed daily on highways QL-1 and QL-19 during the reporting period.

6. Our continued convoys to Chu Lai and Da Nang, introduced on 17 Mar 70, marking the first known instance of interzonal haul in Vietnam, continued to progress with no significant problems in support of the 4th Infantry Division.

7. Eight Group Express: On 19 March 1970, the 8th Transportation Group began a cargo express service. Commanders of units throughout Northern II Corps can expect to receive prompter fill of high priority requisitions. This service will provide rapid handling and delivery of sensitive, high priority cargo to units in the field. Utilizing retrograde vans, the 8th Transportation Group personnel refurbished the express as a shuttle type service operating between Qui 'hon Depot, Pleiku, and An Lien using units. This express system, which moves the cargo by road from the depot directly to the requesting unit reduces delivery time from 5 1/2 days to 1 1/2 days. The system eliminates much time-consuming handling by "middlemen" who previously handled some items as many as seven times.

8. The 4th Infantry Division move was completed from Pleiku to Da Nang on 14 April 1970 with no significant problems encountered.

9. A significant accomplishment was formulated by the Group Commander on or about the 1st of April to off set the thought of the imminent peace rally that was to take place in the major cities in the United States on 15 April 1970. The plan was an award of a one (1) day standdown through the battalion to the company with the best vehicle utilization for that day.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, HGS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

The plan was 100% effective in diverting the young soldier's mind from the peace rally in the United States to a well earned day of rest from the long haul schedule.

10. 15 April 1970 utilization:
   a. Total vehicles committed were 476
      (1) 27th Transportation Battalion 200 90%
      (2) 54th Transportation Battalion 161 96%
      (3) 124th Transportation Battalion 115 89.1%
   b. The 669th Transportation Company was awarded the "Best Company Utilization".

11. The continued conversion of Gun Trucks to Armed Maintenance Vehicles brings our total to eighteen (18).

D. TRAINING: (C)

1. Training was conducted on each of the 39 days of the reporting period in accordance with the motor training schedule and other applicable directives. As in the past, the majority of the training was conducted in the evening after the convoys had returned.

2. On 22 and 23 April 1970 the 8th Transportation Group trained a total of 50 IRVN officers on radio communications as applied to convoy operations.

E. SECURITY and INTELLIGENCE (C)

1. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group exercised command and control for physical security of Compound Complex Charlie (CCC), a six (6) square mile area of the Qui Nhon Defense Installation comprised of seventeen (17) units and facilities. During the quarter, the compound complex witnessed almost a 50% turnover in tenant units: the Property Disposal Company (Prov), 155th, 95th Engineering Battalion from Qui Nhon; Headquarters, 240th Quartermaster Battalion was replaced by Headquarters, 299th Engineer Battalion from Qui Nhon and Headquarters, 937th Engineer Group redeployed from Pleiku to Compound Complex Charlie.

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2. An increased defensive posture was accomplished with the addition of several organic weapons to the compound's daily Harassment and Interdiction Fire (H&I) program. Two (2) 81 mm mortars, a Quad .50 and three (3) tower mounted .50 cal machine guns were added to the normal contingent of gun trucks for greater fire power and reaction force capability.

3. The enemy initiated two stand-off B-40 rocket attacks and several small arms attacks against the compound complex during the quarter. These attacks resulted in one five ton cargo truck heavily damaged and minor damage to buildings; no personnel were injured. One possible daytime sniper incident left a pregnant Vietnamese mess worker wounded in the back and she died of complications several weeks later. A latrine was partially destroyed by a concussion explosive planted by unknown persons during daylight hours.

4. An IPPRCEV Semi-Annual Physical Security Inspection was conducted during the period 14 – 15 April 1970; Compound Complex Charlie was given a superior rating with only minor short-comings noted.

F. LOGISTICS: (U)

1. The 12 ton semi-trailers sent to Okinawa for rehabilitation have not been returned to the unit at this time. From this example it is evident that offshore rebuild is not responsible to the needs of the 8th Transportation Group.

2. A modification is being tested on 5 ton tractors to prevent improper utilization of the transfer case. A metal bar and seal has been installed so that the transfer can only be placed in high range or neutral. Thus far the test has proven beneficial. No losses of clutches or transfers have been evidenced. The vehicles continue to perform in a satisfactory manner under all operating conditions experienced by the Group in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

3. The units within the 8th Transportation Group are presently hand receiving vehicles from other units to fulfill mission requirements. The additional tankers, SLM trailers, and other hand received equipment have overextended the maintenance capability of the units and has contributed to a slight increase in the deadline rate.
Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. COMMAND: (U) None

B. PERSONNEL: (U) None

C. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. ITEM: Command and Control of Convoys Providing Direct Support to Combat Arms Units.

   a. OBSERVATION: 8th Transportation Group vehicles were recently committed to transport a combat unit to a new operational area. The vehicles were broken out to battalions and subsequently moved under the battalion's control. Because of the small number of vehicles (7 to 10) sent with each battalion it was not possible to send command and control elements with each battalion. The problems of regaining control and returning the vehicles to home station became extensive and a great deal of lift capability was lost while the vehicles were returning.

   b. EVALUATION: Current doctrine (HI 55-3, para 5-2) states that the senior tactical commander is in control of all tactical moves with the transportation officer being subordinate to him.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: While the tactical commander retains control of the vehicles during the initial move, he should release those vehicles immediately upon arrival at destination in order that they may resume other critical missions. In divisional units, this should be closely monitored by the Divisional Transportation Officer.

2. ITEM: The Roco System.

   a. OBSERVATION: 6 April 1970 brought forth the Roco system to the 8th Transportation Group and a challenge of our capabilities of turn around time which has greatly improved.

   b. EVALUATION: The first shipment of Roco trailers had turn around times of six (6) days. At present we are experiencing forty-eight (48) hours turn around. This should continue barring any unforeseen mechanical problems.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 6th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS CSFDL-65 (R-1)

**RECOMMENDATION:** The reason for the increased efficiency is due to the following positive measures:

1. **OBSERVATION:** The 6th Transportation Group assumed the mission of transporting POL with tankers from Hoi An upon the closing of the pipeline to Pleiku and An Khanh. Additional tankers were received from the 5th Maintenance Battalion, 134th Quartermaster Company and from ICCV assets on a temporary loan.

2. **EVALUATION:** The Group is presently 53 tankers over its authorization. It is short of its authorized number of tankers and mechanics.

3. **RECOMMENDATION:** The 6th Transportation Group should be bolstered in tractor assets to provide backup equipment to be utilized while others are undergoing maintenance and to offset the increase in trailer assets. Additional mechanics should be considered to aid in keeping the fleet in its best operating condition.

**ITEM 1: Vehicle Assets; 2 Ton**

- **OBSERVATION:** A critical shortage of 2 ton vehicles presently exists. Of the 32 authorized 2 tons 62 are on hand. These vehicles are used for convoy command, control, and security.
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22 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 6th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

b. EVALUATION: The shortage of those vehicles has placed an additional burden on those remaining. Presently a gun jeep will average 5,000 miles each month under difficult road conditions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: The Group should receive its authorized number of 1 ton trucks as soon as possible. Presently, to offset some of the seriousness of the situation some 3/4 ton trucks are being substituted.


a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period left landing legs became an extremely difficult item to obtain. No field fix is available for this type log as there is for the Westram Leg. The deadline rate rose for trailers in a NORS status.

b. EVALUATION: Improper and negligent operation cause most of the landing leg failures. From past experience and request data the DSU's should be able to keep an adequate supply of these parts on hand to preclude excessive deadline rates of critical assets.

c. RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis be placed on these items by supply personnel.

ALEX T. LANGSTON, JR.
Colonel, TC
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-O, APO 96394

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning control of convoys page 6, para A1. Concur. Maximum effort is required to ensure prompt unloading and release of command transportation assets. The 8th Transportation Group should coordinate closely with tactical commanders to expedite release.

b. Reference item concerning the RO/RO system page 6, para C2. Concur with action taken. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

c. Reference item concerning tractors and tankers page 7, para F1. Concur. This headquarters is presently working with ICCV to fill the TOE shortage of 24 tractors. When this is achieved, a request will be submitted for a 180 day loan of additional tractors.

d. Reference item concerning 4 ton vehicles page 7, para F2. Concur. There is a country-wide shortage of 4 ton vehicles, with no date of delivery prior to 8 August 1970. This headquarters has directed USAD, QN to hand receipt to 8th Group 3/4 ton vehicles released to USAD by ICCV. A total of ten have been released, and five are on back order.

e. Reference item concerning landing legs page 8, para F3. Concur. However, due to limited supply in country and frequent improper operation, resources are expended faster than resupply is made available. Recommend that 8th Group charge careless operators for their negligence and conduct classes in proper operation.

3. The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. E. SHIPLEY
CPT, AG
assistant Adjutant General

CF:
8th Trans Gp
AUSFOR, Da w incl
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.

2. Due to closing of this headquarters, staffing cannot be completed. Normal staffing will be done by Headquarters, USARV.

/Thomass M. Purcell
ILT, TC
CO, 15th MHD
AVIEC-OST (22 May 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 8 JUL '70

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, AFO 96575

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Logistics", page 5, paragraph F1: nonconcur. The high turn around time involved in the 22 Ton Trailer Repair and Return Program is due primarily to the condition in which the trailers are received in Okinawa. The 2nd Logistical Command can provide 30 to 60 day turn around time as an average. However, when the trailer requires extensive welding and is missing major assemblies, this will lengthen the time considerably. Latest Logistical Command messages dated 130813Z Dec 1969 and 310242Z Mar 1970 stress the importance of shipping only trailers that meet the criteria for overhaul. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Landing Legs for 12 Ton S&P Semitrailer", page 8, paragraph F3: concur. Increased supply emphasis has been placed on this item. 300 pairs of old legs are due to be airlifted into Qui Nhon shortly. Red Ball requisitions for the old sets have been cancelled since a new model universal type leg is currently being procured. Due-in at all RVN depots have been established for the new universal leg. However, no lift data has been received to date. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Cy f urn: US Army Support Comd - Qui Nhon
8th Transportation Op

11
GPOP-DT (22 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (F.)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APC San Francisco 96558 24 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L.W. OZARK
Capt. AGC
Aust AG

12
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 8th Transportation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CO, 8th Transportation Group

22 May 1970

702178

N/A

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310