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IN ACCORDANCE WITH

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
   a. General
      (1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry
          Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUYNH-MINES.
      (2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation
          MINES, 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970, is set forth in Inclosure 1.
      (3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting
          period are listed at Inclosure 2.
      (4) Locations, coordinates for villages, LZ's, and FSB's are
          listed at Inclosure 5.
      (5) Missions: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations to
          support GVN pacification programs; to locate, pursue and destroy VC/NVA
          elements attempting to disrupt pacification; to screen routes of infil-
          tration along the CAMBODIAN Border; to secure the major LOC within its
          AO; to relocate its base of operations to Camp Radcliff; to turn over
          to ARVN Camp Shari and tactical responsibility to PLEIKU Province;
          and to redeploy one brigade to CONUS for inactivation.
      (6) Concept of Operation. At the beginning of this period, the
          Division had one brigade in PLEIKU Province and two in BINH DINh.
          The 1st and 2d Brigades were conducting operations to preclude an
          incursion into the coastal lowlands during TET by the 3d NVA Division.
          The 3d Brigade was in an economy of force role in western PLEIKU
          Province preparing to withdraw from combat in preparation for redep-
          loyment activities. At the end of the period, the threat of the 3d
          NVA Division had dissipated, the 3d Brigade had been inactivated at
          Fort Lewis, Washington, and PLEIKU Province and Camp Shari were under
          the control of the 22d ARVN Division.

      (a) Liaison with GVN: The 4th Division maintained continuous
          liaison with Headquarters, II Corps. Brigades maintained liaison with
districts and with ARVN units in whose AO they operated.

(b) Reaction Forces: One infantry battalion was stationed at Camp Radcliff, and was engaged in training, security and patrol activities. This battalion constituted the Division reserve and maintained one company on fifteen minute alert, prepared to reinforce Division elements, or if directed, relieve or reinforce GVN units.

(c) Highway Security: Highway 19% was secured at various times by the mechanized battalion, tank battalion, and armored cavalry squadron. The maximum force employed at any one time was two battalion sized units and the minimum was the armored cavalry squadron. All units on Highway Security operated under Division control. Other routes were secured when necessitated by Division units operating in the area.

(d) Screening the CAMBODIAN Border and Interdiction of Infiltration Routes: The Division armored cavalry squadron conducted screening operations north and west of PLAI DJERIGING; to just south of DUC CO interdicting the infiltration route through the PLAI TRAP Valley and the two infiltration routes north and south of DUC CO. This configuration continued until mid-February when the mechanized battalion relocated to Highway 19, and the cavalry squadron redispersed its screen to the vicinity of LZ OASIS. This disposition continued to provide a screen for the western approaches into Camp Anari. One infantry battalion constituted the defense of Camp Anari.

b. Intelligence

(1) General: Enemy activity in PLEIKU Province for February was light as enemy elements launched a brief offensive on 1 February and then concentrated on highway interdiction for the remainder of the month. The 1-6 BN/24th Regiment was identified in contact in the PLAI MRONG area. Southwest of PLEIKU, 4th Division elements found several rice caches. In BDINH DINH Province activity was moderate, characterized by brief firefightes, small arms sniper fire, and numerous incidents of ground to air fire. Several large food and arms caches were found in an area that had been targeted for a PV Camp and an NCO and Officer Training area northwest of BASE AREA 225.

During March, activity in PLEIKU Province remained light but was highlighted by an attack by fire on Camp Holloway and an attack on the PLAI NE CSP. In BDINH-DINH Province, activity remained moderate with a majority of the incidents being friendly initiated. Division units operating west and northwest of BASE AREA 276 continued to capture and evacuate rice caches, and an extensive hospital complex was found. Long Range Reconnaissance patrols from the K-75 Ranger Company accounted for more than one KIA per contact during the month.

Activity increased in April, in both BDINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces as the enemy began its "Spring Offensive" with numerous attacks against friendly installations, outposts, and fire bases. During April, Division
units participated in two major operations, one in and northwest of BASE AREA 226 against elements of the 3d NVA Division, and the other in VC Valley against elements of the 95B Regiment. Throughout the month, there were numerous attacks by fire and many incidents of ground to air fire that resulted in two downed aircraft and several US casualties. A major portion of ground incidents were friendly initiated.

(2) PLEIKU: Activity in PLEIKU Province during February was light. There was a brief offensive launched early in the month with increased interdiction of Highway 19 later in the month. On 1 February enemy elements hit five US and ARVN installations in the PLEIKU City area with attacks by fire. The 2-3d ARVN Cavalry and the 1st Scout Company reacted, and in the ensuing battle, killed forty-five NVA and captured documents that identified the C-9, C-10, and C-11 Companies of the K-6 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment. During the last week of February, elements of the 95B Regiment launched a series of harassing and interdicting attacks with small arms, mines, and B-40 rockets in the area of Bridges 29 and 30. On 8 and 9 February the 2-8th Mechanized Infantry Battalion found over 35,000 pounds of rice southwest of PLEIKU City.

In March, the 2-8th Mechanized Infantry Battalion continued its operation southwest of PLEIKU and captured over 48,000 pounds of rice, depriving the 95B Regiment and local force units of a much needed food supply and forcing them to utilise other caches being saved for future use. The K-1 Battalion, believed to be on a rice and supply mission between BASE AREA 202 and CAMBODIA, was identified in a series of contacts in the vicinity of the PLEIKU MB GSF camp. During the last three weeks of March, suspected local force units, in conjunction with the K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment, conducted interdiction attacks on Highway 19. Camp Holloway received two attacks by fire resulting in damage to eight aircraft.

Activity in April increased as the enemy launched their "Spring Offensive" with activity mainly around PLEIKU City, along Highway 19, and the area south of Highway 19, where the K-2 Battalion, 95B Regiment was active. Villages and convoy attacks, and attacks on observation posts were common throughout the month. LE BLACKHAWK received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, containing a mixture of high explosives and CS gas. LE TRUNG District Headquarters and a nearby village received a total of 39 rounds of 60mm mortar. On 5 April, the 1-10th Cavalry ARP was inserted south of Highway 19 at BB 166507, and found documents that identified the C-6 Company, K-2 Battalion, and the 95B Regiment. Elements of the K-631st Composite Battalion were believed responsible for attacks on the PLEIKU City area. US installations received a total of thirteen rounds of 122mm rocket during the month.

Activity south of the highway increased toward the end of the month, while activity along the highway decreased, as US forces launched their operation against the 95B Regiment. On 27 April,
D/3-12th Infantry, reacting to a downed aircraft, killed three NVA and captured documents that identified the C.2 Company, 95B Regiment.

(3) BINH DINH: During the month of February, elements from the 4th Division's 1st Brigade conducted sweep operations in the area northwest of BASE AREA 226 targeted against elements of the 3d NVA Division which resulted in several squad and platoon contacts and the uncovering of several rice and ammo caches.

The basic target of the operation was to find a PW camp and a possible Officer and NCO training area. Both areas were found and caches of over 150,000 pounds of rice, 1800 pounds of tobacco, 2000 pounds of salt, and 1000 pounds of corn were uncovered as well as ammunition caches totaling twenty-six Recoilless Rifle rounds, 143 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar, and 8000 rounds of 12.7 and 7.62mm ammunition.

Also, during the month of February, elements of the 2d Brigade operated against the 8th Battalion, 12th NVA Regiment, and encountered brief fire fights and harassing attacks against fire bases. The 1-12th Infantry found two ammunition caches on the 22d and 27th of February that totaled 151 Recoilless Rifle rounds, 381 mortar rounds, 180 RGP rounds, 6 rounds of 840, 6 rounds of 122mm rocket, and over 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

Activity in March remained moderate, with the majority of incidents being friendly initiated. Activity along Highway 19 was confined to mining incidents and harassment of villages.

1st and 2d Brigade elements operating in the area west and northwest of BASE AREA 226 uncovered several supply caches to include over 60,000 pounds of rice. Sweep operations also uncovered an extensive hospital complex which yielded a large quantity of medical supplies and surgical equipment.

US fire bases were the target of enemy harassing attacks as LZ SUSIE and LZ TOUGHIE received a total of 24 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortars in three separate attacks. Also, there were several incidents of sniper fire reported by 4th Division units.

With the start of April, the enemy began its Spring-Summer Offensive with numerous attacks against ARVN, PPA, and RE units on 1 April and continuing until the 6th when Camp Radcliff received a well-planned sapper attack targeted against the Division's air assets. Elements of the 3d NVA Division continued attacks by fire on LZ CHALLENGE with three rounds of 122mm rocket, and LZ HARD TIMES with four rounds of 82mm mortar. Camp Radcliff was again hit by the enemy, this time on 13 April with twelve rounds of 82mm mortar. 1st and 2d Brigade units operating in BASE AREA 226 and north of VINH THANH Valley had sporadic contacts with the enemy in platoon and smaller sized elements. The enemy also employed ground to air fire during the
month resulting in several downed aircraft.

(4) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 30 April 1970.

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<td>Northern BINH DINH</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d VC Regiment</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>Northern BA 226</td>
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<td>18th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>BA 226</td>
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<tr>
<td>500th Transportation Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th NVA Regiment</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Chu Pa (Mt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93rd Regiment</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>BA 202</td>
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<tr>
<td>H-15 Local Force Battalion</td>
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<td>East of Camp Enari</td>
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<tr>
<td>X-45 Local Force Battalion</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Southwest of Camp Enari</td>
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<tr>
<td>408th Sapper Battalion</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>ENE of PLEIKU</td>
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<tr>
<td>631st Composite Battalion</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Southern CHU PRONG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infra Structure</td>
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<td>Guerilla Forces</td>
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<td>TOTAL ENEMY FORCES</td>
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(5) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques:

(a) Since 1 March 1970, contact with villagers in and around the 4th Infantry Division new TAOR has revealed an unwillingness to discuss either enemy activity or possible plans, particularly including plans for the enemy Summer Offensive. This attitude may be attributed to a degree of success in known enemy propaganda concerning American troop withdrawals and enemy reprisals against local villages known to support the GVN and American forces. American troops propagation of rumor concerning troop withdrawal continues to reinforce enemy propaganda efforts. Currently, the villagers are being told of the successes of the Liberation Movement in CAMBODIA.

(b) The enemy continues to employ harassing tactics in villages, including reinforced and fortified villages, and against US and ARVN/GVN installations.

(c) Exploitation of several detainees and some documents has given the 4th Division information that the enemy is now being forced to eat foodstuffs other than rice due to the allied pacification program, the
defoliation program, and capturing and evacuating many tons of rice. Detainees have stated that they have not eaten for three or four days due to lack of rice.

(d) It appears that the enemy is now placing individuals along flight patterns to observe helicopters as they are arriving or departing Landing Zones or Fire Support Bases. This enables them to plot the direction of travel based on certain climatic conditions. The cadre then arrange for personnel to be placed near the flight pattern and interdict with ground to air fire. This type tactic resulted in two downed aircraft with eleven US killed and three wounded.

(6) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

(a) Personnel: KIA (BC) 306
NVA CIA 13
VC/VCN CIA 16
TOTAL 335

(b) Weapons:
S/A 205
C/S 20
TOTAL 225

(c) Ammunition:
S/A rounds 139,078
C/S rounds 1,320
Grenades 80
Mines 112

(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:
Explosives 1,634
Documents 280,090
Rice 457,265 lbs
Salt 2,904 lbs

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1. The 2d VC Regiment of the 3d NVA Division has the capability
to conduct multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas in the PHU MY area of BINH DINH Province.

2. The 18th NVA Regiment of the 3d NVA Division has the capability to conduct multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas supported by their organic 122mm rockets. They can also interdict Highway 19 from the MANG YANG Pass to BINH KHE.

3. The 95B Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion size attacks against fire support bases, isolated camps, and populated areas in the VC Valley and harassing and interdicting Highway 19 from AN KHE to PLEIKU.

4. The 408th Sapper Battalion can conduct company size sapper attacks supported by mortar and possible rocket fire against allied installations and populated areas in PLEIKU Province.

5. The 631st Composite Battalion is capable of launching multi-company size attacks supported by 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets on allied installations, outposts, and populated areas west and north of PLEIKU City.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1. Enemy units are vulnerable to airstrikes and artillery fire when in bivouac or massing for an attack.

2. Enemy munitions and food caches are vulnerable to allied search and clear operations.

3. Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by allied operations.

4. Enemy movement is vulnerable to airborne personnel detection and sensor devices.

5. The enemy is vulnerable to psychological operations due to low morale, heavy personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

1. The Spring-Summer Offensive will continue with brief halts for resupply and reorganization of forces. Enemy forces are expected to maintain their current activity and will conduct attacks by fire on friendly installations and outposts. Again the attacks will be of the harassing type to destroy the current SVN pacification program.

2. In BINH DINH Province, the 2d Regiment will conduct operations against friendly fire bases and local villages and hamlets in the PHU MY area.
area and the area north of BA 226, in an effort to gain control of the
prosperous eastern and the northern BINH DINH region.

3 The 18th Regiment will conduct operations in the AN KH&/VINH
THANH area targeted against allied installations and Highway 19.

4 Local forces, operating in support of the BINH DINH Provin-
cial Committee, will continue harassment and psychological warfare
against the villages and hamlets especially in the coastal districts
of PHU MY and PHU CAT.

5 In PLEIKU Province the 24th NVA Regiment is expected to re-
main inactive as it will continue to resupply its forces with fresh
troops, food and weapons. It is expected to participate in at least
one of the major battles of the Spring Summer Offensive.

6 The 631st Composite Battalion will employ 122mm rockets in
attacks by fire against allied installations around PLEIKU City.

7 The 408th Sapper Battalion will conduct sapper attacks against
allied installations in the PLEIKU area and continue terrorist activities
in the city itself.

8 The 95B Regiment will resume its normal mission of interdiction
of Highway 19 when the US forces, now occupying part of their base area,
leave VC Valley. The 95B Regiment is also expected to attack bridges,
strong points, and to harass villages along Highway 19.

2 Local forces will continue interdiction of lines of communication
and harassment of local villages attempting to disrupt the pacification
program and strengthen VC control of the province.

(b) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the past quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence
Company provided Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation, and In-
terrogation of Prisoners of War support to the Division. Emphasis was
placed on the close coordination and frequent exchange of information
between 4th MIC units and G2. A daily G2 situation briefing for all
G2 related activities and the frequent exchange of ideas and inform-
ation during these briefings greatly enhanced the production, analysis,
and dissemination of intelligence material.

(b) Counterintelligence: The activities of the CI Section during
the reporting period continued to include preplanned operations against
small local force units and individuals with the majority of the CI
effort being devoted to increasing the number of agent sources within
the Tactical Area of Responsibility. An operation is continually con-
ducted to screen all indigenous employees working at Camp Radcliff.
The highly successful operations resulted in the identification and
neutralization of several VCS during the quarter.
(c) Interrogation Prisoners of War: Close cooperation was maintained between the IPW Section and G2, as well as the units in the field, during the last quarter. The advantages of tactful exploitation and close rapport with detainees were amply displayed in IPW's successful interrogation techniques. During February the IPW Section exploited two returnees that had been in a PW camp since 1965. The two returnees gave the location of the VC PW camp, the location of cultivated areas that the VC were using to grow rice and potatoes, and the location of an Officer and NCO Training School. All of the information was compiled and an operation went into this area and located the PW camp and training school, and several areas that were or had recently been used for production of foodstuffs.

(d) Dufflebag Operations: During the reporting period the emphasis on Dufflebag operations was shifted to security of Highway 19 and protection of the Camp Radcliff perimeter.

The highway defense aspect of Dufflebag operations during the period was accomplished through a two fold program. The purpose of the program was to attempt to reduce the number of mining incidents along Highway 19 and to deny the enemy routes of approach to the highway, thereby discouraging interdiction of vehicles on the highway.

In an effort to stop the mining incidents, several seismic and acoustic devices were emplaced in strategic locations to detect the enemy upon his arrival at the highway. The results of these emplacements were quite conclusive. A device near LZ SCHUHLLR detected an individual near the road. M-79 fire was directed into the area and a sweep was conducted finding one mine emplaced, but not yet covered, and another mine not emplaced.

To deny the enemy access to the highway, probable routes of approach were covered with seismic intrusion detectors. Once again the device was successful as five individuals were detected moving north toward a strong point on Highway 19 near LZ BLACKHAWK. Due to the proximity of friendly troops in the area, artillery could not be employed, but the strong point was alerted, and were at 100 percent alert when the strong point began receiving B40 fire.

Camp Radcliff defense consisted of two phases. The initial phase of securing the helipad was accomplished by using a Balanced Pressure System line sensor and installing the devices within the perimeter wire to detect individuals trying to infiltrate the perimeter wire. The second phase of perimeter defense was to saturate possible routes of access outside the perimeter. This mission was initiated with the emplacement of thirty seismic devices to the north and east of the perimeter. Although the program is in its infant stages, the first night after emplacement approximately five individuals were detected.

(e) G2 Air Reconnaissance: During the reporting period, efforts to compile photographic coverage of the new Division AO were met with
limited success due to inclement weather in the AO during the months of February and March.

During April, weather improved and imagery was produced and received for interpretation and analysis of enemy activity in BASE AREA 226. Also during the reporting period Snoopy/Scorpion operational techniques were changed to provide closer direct support to maneuver elements. Missions were conducted within close proximity of maneuver elements and serve as scouting and screening elements in front and along the flanks of ground troops. Limited success of this operation has been experienced due to frequent lack of aircraft assets.

During February and March a study was made to determine the correlation between Red Haze mission readouts and areas of slash and burn field clearing and subsequent cultivation. Results of the study indicate that changes in enemy field clearing and farming activity may be detected by employment of OV-1B aircraft in the Red Haze (IR) configuration.

(9) Weather Forecasting

(a) Support provided:

1. Hourly weather observations 2160
2. Special weather observations 360
3. Routine scheduled forecasts plus amendments 290
4. Planning forecast issued to select staff agencies twice daily 180
5. Aircraft accident reports (summary of weather existing at the time) 11
6. Monthly climatology reports for II Corps 3
7. Out of station briefings conducted at request of staff agencies 30
8. Telephone requests for weather information 2340
9. Area climatology summaries and special area or long range forecasts 12

(b) The most significant operational problem occurred during March when a planned Division operation (MICKELBERGER BLACK) was cancelled due to poor weather in the objective area. A long range forecast had predicted marginal flying weather during the period, and on the tentative operation date of 22 March, proved accurate. The operation was aborted on the 23rd of March again because of weather, but did take place on 24 March as a brigade sized effort.
c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period. Two major operations employing unique techniques were undertaken during the period in an attempt to cope with the enemy's evasive tactics.

The normal enemy response to a major operation in the 4th Division AO is to fragment and exfiltrate the area. The enemy has been generally successful in escaping friendly forces. In an attempt to counter this tactic, the Division conducted two unique operations to test concepts for fixing and destroying enemy units. Neither operation produced a significant body count because they were primarily a test of techniques, and were not conducted in areas where the enemy was known to be concentrated. However, the operations were extremely valuable as training vehicles, and have added a new tactic to the 4th Division repertoire which can be profitably employed whenever an appropriate target is identified.

Both techniques employ a high concentration of troops in a relatively small area. In the first operation five infantry battalions were deployed in a ring around the target area. On D-Day and on successive days, the ring was closed. The second operation saw one brigade of three battalions deployed in a line to sweep through a base area, with ranger patrols ambushing routes of exit forward of the advancing units. Both techniques require detailed planning, tight control of fire and movement, and a high degree of discipline on the part of commanders and troops.

In the cordon operation three battalions moved overland and two were combat assaulted into positions on the outer ring. Plans called for the ring to be closed and all units tied in at flank coordinating points by the end of D-Day. Rifle companies were assigned frontages of 600 meters or less on D-Day, so that an average front line strength of 100 men would permit a density of one man every six meters. Daily phase lines were assigned and on days subsequent to D-Day, all units moved toward the center of the circle, maintaining a continuous line day and night. As the circle constricted, units were pinched out and occupied stay-behind ambush positions. On the final day of the cordon, one battalion swept the center of the circle and other units moved back to an outer position to permit room for employment of small arms weapons. All units then swept back to FZ's and were airlifted to new AO's.

The terrain selected for the exercise was very heavily forested and mountainous, with the D-Day circle encompassing two steep ridges that flanked a river. The river formed the boundary between the two brigades and served as an FCL as the cordon was closed. Vertical cliffs and rock formations added to the difficulty of movement, and
successful execution of the concept in this terrain indicated that the technique has application almost everywhere.

The operation was in general a qualified success. The area chosen was subjected to the most thorough search ever conducted in a jungle area by US troops (results: 12 KIA, 2 detainees, 9 individual weapons CIA, 745 small arms rounds, 750 blasting caps, 5 tons rice CIA, and 12 structures and 2 fortifications destroyed). However, very few enemy were killed and unquestionably a number of individuals successfully extirpated the cordon. A number of unforeseen problems were encountered and though most were overcome during the course of the operation - they undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of the seal. With these problems corrected, the jungle cordon technique holds great promise and will be employed at the first opportunity, i.e., an identified enemy concentration.

Following are some of the most significant lessons learned:

1. Six hundred meters per company is too wide a frontage because of vertical distances in mountainous terrain. Three to five hundred is optimum.

2. The technique is expensive in resources and should be used only when a valid target has been located.

3. Phase lines are necessary as control measures but must not be used to measure forward progress. The use of one phase line per day causes units to regard the phase line as a goal and control suffers from emphasis on speed.

4. The high density of radios causes frequency interference and a special SOI was used to help reduce this problem, with widely separated frequencies for adjacent units.

5. Coordination at limiting points was poor initially due simply to a lack of experience, but great improvement was noted during the course of the operation.

6. Battalion OP's function best when they follow the line of troops moving from one OP to another every second or third day. An LOH per battalion each day is essential.

7. More enemy were engaged and killed outside the cordon than inside, emphasizing the criticality of the stay behind ambushes.

8. Every third or fourth day should see a complete stop by the entire line for resupply and rest. This is the most exhausting type of operation imaginable for the individual soldier.

9. Detailed planning and briefing of all troops is essential. Troops approached this operation with great enthusiasm because the size of the effort was apparent to all.
The second type operation, a linear sweep by one three battalion brigade, was undertaken as a substitute operation when a lengthy period of bad weather prevented a sweep by the entire Division. The brigade was forced to move into position on foot after a two day delay and made its sweep in a direction known to be less desirable than the one selected earlier. The sweep, which lasted eight days, reinforced many of the lessons learned during the cordon and the improvement in command and control was apparent. The Ranger company kept eight to ten teams deployed forward of the brigade and these ambushes accounted for almost all enemy kills (14). In future operations of this type, a much higher ratio of ambushes will be employed. Otherwise, no significant new lessons were learned in the sweep which had not been identified in the cordon operation.

(b) 1st Brigade: At the beginning of February the 1st Brigade had disposed its forces at three fire support bases located in and around the CROWS FOOT area. The 3 8th Infantry occupied Fire Support Base CHALLENGE, the 1-14th Infantry operated from Fire Support Base ABBY, and the 1-22d Infantry operated in the northeast part of BASE AREA 226, with the battalion command post located at Fire Support Base AUGUSTA. Operations consisted of daily search and clear sweeps in platoon size or smaller size force. Each battalion had one firebase company to secure the command post and the direct support artillery battery.

On 1 February the brigade received a warning order to prepare for a new operation. This operation was planned in reaction to a POW report of an NVA Prisoner of War compound in the vicinity of BR 5398.

As operation WAYNE STAB drew to a close the brigade moved their tactical operations center to LZ ENGLISH in preparation for Operation WAYNE STABII.

Coordination was effected with the 22d ARVN Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade both of which were operating along the eastern boundary of the brigade's new area of operation. Liaison with the 173d was established when the 1st Brigade tactical command post moved to LZ ENGLISH. Plans called for the 3 8th Infantry to remain at Fire Support Base CHALLENGE. The 1-14th Infantry was to establish a Fire Support Base at BR 577909 and deploy their rifle companies into selected areas of operation around the firebase. The 1-22d Infantry was to establish a firebase at BR 531971 and deploy similarly to the 1-14th Infantry. Each battalion required one rifle company for security of the direct support artillery battery and the battalion command post located at each fire support base. Rifle companies operated in platoon size forces conducting search and clear and Ivy patrol operations during the day. Ambush and short range reconnaissance patrols were conducted at night on trails and suspected avenues of enemy travel. Coordination was made with K Company 75th Infantry Rangers who were to operate as a company size force initially in the center of the brigade area of operation to locate the suspected POW camp. As the operation progressed, the Rangers reverted back to their conventional role of providing long range recon patrols in selected areas. Air
Force Forward Air Controllers attached to the brigade were airborne over the brigade AO during all daylight hours and they directed a total of thirty-six airstrikes on preplanned targets and targets of opportunity during the operation. The 7-17th Air Cavalry provided the primary means of surveillance over areas not occupied by ground forces. Their capability of immediate reaction to targets of opportunity and the ability to find such targets provided the brigade with a valuable tool for destroying enemy personnel and installations. They were also the best means for finding lucrative targets for airstrikes.

On 16 February the 1st Brigade initiated Operation WAYNE STA II. All available aircraft were utilized in the airlift. A total of 57 UH-1D "Slicks", 12 gunships, 8 CH-47 "Hook"s and 4 "Crane"s provided the means to move 14th Infantry battalions (1-14th and 1-22d), the 3-8th Infantry (-) and K-75 Infantry Rangers. Air Force jets and Army gunships provided an effective preparation for the proposed fire support bases. Two Air Cavalry troops conducted visual reconnaissance and screening missions along the edges of the brigade area of operation. Before 1200 hours on D-Day, the Air Cavalry had accounted for five enemy kills while the K-75 Rangers, operating in company force, combat assaulted into the vicinity of the suspected POW camp at 3R-5396. Shortly after the assault, they made contact with an unknown size force and captured one individual. The detainee reported the POW camp had already moved to the east. As the day closed, the 1st Brigade was disposed in the new AO as planned, and had killed seven enemy.

On the first complete day of search operations during WAYNE STAB II, 1st Brigade troops began uncovering a vast trail network and many hut and bunker complexes in the area. Punji stakes proved to be the major casualty producer, and as a result, by nightfall of the 17th, eleven men had required evacuation due to punji wounds.

Ground operations continued, and on 19 February, the second platoon of Company B, 1-22d Infantry engaged ten enemy after setting up a hasty ambush at SS 501013. A female was captured and heavy blood trails marked the escape routes. Pursuit was initiated, but contact could not be reestablished. As the search for the POW camp continued, Company B, 1-14th Infantry found a large complex believed to be the compound, but once again the occupants had evaded. Fourteen tons of rice were found stored at the compound located at SS 589966.

On 27 February, the 2-35th Infantry conducted a combat assault into the vicinity of BS 483073, to establish a new fire support base (HOOCH). The new disposition covered terrain farther north than had been covered to date. To complement the new posture, and react to intelligence, brigade troops began to redeploy westward to begin search and clear operations in the new area of operations. The first week of March also saw a change in the brigade AO when the 3-8th Infantry chipped to 2d Brigade control on 4 March, again realigning
By 9 March WAYNE STAB II had been completed and attention turned to the new operation scheduled to start 11 March. 1st Brigade forces went into a standdown posture in preparation for Operation HARDHART WHITE.

The limited maneuver space planned for this operation prevented the use of many assets normally employed by the brigade. Artillery became the only effective method of fire support. Intensive preparations were used on planned objectives and suspected enemy locations before the initial insertion of ground troops. Gunships were used to "prep" the landing zones to be used. After the initial preparation, gunships were limited to supporting troops to the rear of the advancing cordon, but could not be effectively employed inside the circle. Artillery fire was limited due to the disposition of the troops on the ground. Air Force strike capabilities could not be employed in the confined space and the FAC's were given missions elsewhere during the operation. Air Cavalry troops were also excluded from operating in direct support of the brigade. Planning called for the 1st Brigade to establish the eastern sector of the cordon in conjunction with the 2d Brigade on the west.

On D-1, 10 March, the 1st Brigade Tactical Command Post was established at LZ SUSIE. To expedite the combat assault on D-Day, the 2-35th Infantry was airlifted to LZ HARD TIMES so that multiple pick-up zones would not have to be used. Liaison with 2d Brigade was established at LZ NIAGARA to coordinate daily advance and provide timely reporting to the 1st Brigade. Two infantry battalions were combat assaulted on D-Day into landing zones and deployed in a linear formation on the western slopes of the DAK SON River system. Phase lines were established as control measures for each day's forward movement. As the cordon grew tighter, selected elements would be pinched out to conduct security and ambush operations to the rear of the advancing troops. The 1-22d Infantry combat assaulted from LZ LOUIS into LZ BLUE and began deployment on line while the 2-35th Infantry combat assaulted into pre-selected landing zones RED and BLUE. Both battalions attempted to close phase line RED. However, rugged terrain and delayed starts prevented final linear deployment. Enemy snipers engaged the 2-35th Infantry TAC CP located at LZ RED at 1410 hours, but artillery could not be fired due to the proximity of friendly forces. Two US soldiers suffered wounds in the contacts, while enemy casualties were unknown.

On 12 March, the 1st Brigade troops had closed their portion of the cordon by 1100 hours. Control of the linear formation proved to be increasingly difficult to maintain. Marginal communications compounded difficulties and the Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) proved invaluable as a means of command and control for the ground commanders.
EARHART WHITE continued with relatively light enemy action or sightings during the week. As the 1-22d Infantry closed the maneuver portion of the sweep on 16 March, plans were made to extract the battalion and return OPCON of both the 1-22d Infantry and 2-35th Infantry to the 2d Brigade.

On 17 March, the 1-22d Infantry airlifted to LZ AMELIA and convoyed overland to Camp Radcliff chopping to 2d Brigade on arrival. The 1st Brigade TAC CP closed out operations at LZ SUSIE and airlifted to Camp Radcliff. The 2-35th Infantry chopped in place to the 2d Brigade at 0600 hours. As Operation EARHART WHITE closed, new plans were being made to begin Operation ZARHART WHITE. This operation was originally planned to be similar to EARHART WHITE. Two infantry brigades were to dispose in a linear formation to sweep south through BASE AREA 226. The 2-8th Infantry (Mech)(-) dismounted, was to conduct a screening and ambush operation on the brigade's western flank, with the K-75 Rangers conducting extensive ambush operations around the eastern flank and forward of advancing troops. The brigade command post was established at FSB HARD TIMES. Division plans were changed for the planned operation when weather forced a delay of D-Day for two successive days. The 1st Brigade requested and was given the mission to conduct the sweep of BASE AREA 226 in lieu of the two brigade planned operation. Plans were made then to move overland and deploy on line rather than by helilift. Ten phase lines were established for reporting and control purposes. Limited K-75 Rangers support was available to the brigade during the operation. An effective LRRP screen could not be maintained on the flanks and front also. Air Force strike capability could not be effectively employed again due to the small area of operation. Troop density provided coordination between Air Force FAC's and ground troops. FAC's did direct numerous airstrikes prior to D-Day in an attempt to establish usable landing zones, but heavy jungle canopy and extremely steep terrain prevented any marked success. As a result, combat engineer repelling teams were employed throughout the operation to establish landing zones and assist in cave destruction. Teams repelled into selected locations at 1600 hours daily. Normally, there were three teams available. The engineers out landing zones as needed, and were extracted early the following morning.

Phase I of the operation was the overland movement of the infantry battalions to their assigned areas of operation. The linear formation consisted of the 2-8th Infantry (Mech)(-) dismounted, on the left, 1-14th Infantry in the center, and the 3-8th Infantry on the right. Initially, 2-8th Infantry (Mech)(-) and 1-14th Infantry had CP's at LZ PROPHET while the 3-8th Infantry was at LZ HARD TIMES. The 1-14th Infantry maintained a TAC CP located at BR 661628. Liaison officers and battalion boundary contact teams were utilized to assist in reporting and control between battalions. Operations continued with relatively slow progress due to the rugged terrain and enemy activity at a low level.
On 4 April the 28th Infantry (Mech) prepared to extract from the operation, and react to enemy activity in the west. By the end of the 5th, the battalion had returned to an LZ south of LZ HARD TIMES and convoyed overland where they chopper to Division control. Also on the same day, the largest cache of the operation was uncovered by D/3-8th Infantry when they uncovered two machine guns, fifteen SKS rifles, and a large amount of assorted ammunition.

By the end of the first week of April, it was decided to abandon the linear sweeps in favor of more conventional methods of maneuver farther to the east. The linear portion of the operation then terminated on 7 April. The battalion had dispositions and had begun platoon and smaller search and clear operations.

Harassing and sniper fire continued throughout the operation, however enemy activity continued at a low level with few significant contacts made. Only one more significant weapons cache was found on 18 April when twenty-one automatic weapons were found with one .51 caliber tripod by B/1-14th Infantry.

As operations drew to a close in BA 226, Operation WAYNE WIND was being planned in VC Valley targeted against the 95B Regiment. Plans called for one infantry battalion to begin search and clear operations in the new AO in conjunction with TF PURSUIT. The TF consisted of 3-506th Infantry (Abn), C/7-17th Air Cavalry, and C/75th Infantry Ranger. The 3-12th Infantry chopper to 1st Brigade control on 22 April and began operating in VC Valley while the brigade continued with the 3-8th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry conducting operations in BASE AREA 226.

As EICHELBERGER BLACK terminated on 26 April, the 3-8th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry chopper to 2d Brigade, and TF PURSUIT came under brigade control.

Operation WAYNE WIND was marked by several contacts with significant results for both sides. The third platoon, A/3-12th Infantry killed two enemy in the vicinity of BR 112359 after a sporadic contact throughout the morning. Two US casualties resulted when the second platoon, Company B, 3-506th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force. On 27 April, a helicopter with the command group of the 3-12th Infantry was shot down while flying over Company D, 3-12th Infantry. It crashed killing all aboard except one door gunner who later died of injuries. A total of nine men were killed including the 3-12th Infantry Battalion Commander, the S3 and key artillery personnel. Three enemy were killed and one captured during a ground contact after the incident.

Throughout the remainder of the reporting period enemy activity picked up considerably. Standoff mortar attacks occurred with frequent regularity on fire support bases while Ranger activities resulted in several enemy contacts. The majority of contacts resulted in enemy KIA's.
2d Brigade: The 2d Brigade began the reporting period conducting Operation PUTNAM SHARK, with the mission of securing populated areas and critical installations. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry secured the populated areas in the VINH THANH and SONG BA valleys, respectively; the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry screened and interdicted enemy movement toward Highway 19 north of LZ ACTION and TF 1st Battalion. 69th Armor secured Highway 19 from the MANG YANG Pass to the CHID boundary.

After the threat of a 1970 TET Offensive subsided, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry moved to an area of operations vicinity of LZ TOUGHIE, northeast of AN KHE. While operating in this AO, they uncovered the largest equipment and munitions cache of the reporting period in the DAK SON, SUOI CON Valley areas. This cache contained approximately 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 158 B61 rounds, 6 122-mm rockets, one complete T20 radio and several miscellaneous Class V items.

On 3 March the 2d Brigade assumed operational control of the 3-8th Infantry in preparation for Operation EARHART WHITE, and on 5 March relinquished operational control of the 1-35th Infantry and 1-69th Armor to the 3d Brigade for subsequent inactivation.

Operation EARHART WHITE, a division level operation employing the 1st and 2d Brigades targeted against elements of the 3d NVA Division vicinity of the DAK SON River Valley, began on 11 March. The 1-8th Infantry, 3-8th Infantry and 1-12th Infantry, under the 2d Brigade control, in conjunction with elements of the 1st Brigade, conducted a large scale cordon operation of the objective area. The battalions enclosed the western portion of the cordon from north to south in the order listed. The 3-8th Infantry and 1-8th Infantry were tied in with the 1st Brigade on the north and south respectively. Four concentric phase lines, red, white, blue and gold, were established for control purposes. During the operation, a fifth phase line, purple, located between phase lines blue and gold was also established. All units advanced towards the center sweeping through the objective area to phase line gold, leaving stay behind ambushes in the vicinity of each of the phase lines. Upon reaching phase line gold, 2d Brigade elements moved back to phase line purple while a battalion from the 1st Brigade swept the center of the objective area. After this was completed, all elements patrolled back to their respective pickup zones for extraction.

A low level of enemy activity continued throughout the operation until its termination on 18 March. Perhaps the most significant find of the operation occurred when the 2-35th Infantry discovered a medical surgical center at BR 58329. A considerable quantity of medicines and equipment was found to include such items as orthopedic, abdominal, gynecological and cranial instruments.
 During the operation, the majority of contacts were friendly initiated, while enemy initiated contact was limited to sniper actions and ground to-air fire. Numerous munitions and weapons caches were found which supported the belief that EICHELBERGER BLACK was indeed interdicting the enemy supply system and LOC's in the planned AO.

On 17 March, the 2d Brigade assumed operational control of the 1-22d Infantry and 2-35th Infantry from the 1st Brigade, and on 18 March, at the termination of Operation EICHELURGER WHITE released the 3-8th Infantry to control of the 1st Brigade and the 18th Infantry to the 3d Brigade for inactivation.

A brief standdown for the elements in the field was conducted until Operation EICHELURGER BLACK commenced on 24 March with the 1-22d Infantry and 2-35th Infantry astride the DAK SON, SUOI CON River Valleys. The operation was planned to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division, and interdict the enemy LOC passing through this area enroute to BASE AREA 226.

On 7 April the 1-12th Infantry was placed under Division control to provide a six hour ready reaction force and the 2d Brigade was placed on alert to move to Pleiku in response to the rapidly changing enemy situation in the vicinity of DAK SEANG.

On 24 April the 2d Brigade assumed operational control of the 1-14th Infantry and 3-8th Infantry in BASE AREA 226 from the 1st Brigade. On 30 April the 2d Brigade extracted these two units from BASE AREA 226 to LZ HARD TIMES returning them to 1st Brigade control, thus terminating Operation EICHELURGER BLACK.

At the end of the reporting period, the 2d Brigade continued to operate in the vicinity of DAK SON, DAK KPHON BUNG Valleys to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division and interdict enemy LOC's through the area.

(d) 3d Brigade: By the beginning of February, the 1-10th Cavalry had closed out FSB MEUDITH, and was continuing its security mission on AM with its CP relocated at LZ BLACKHAWK. At the same time that the 1-10th Cavalry was reducing its screening mission to the west, the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) came under brigade control and replaced the 3-12th Infantry at LZ OASIS, which reestablished its CP at FSB APRIL.

The 3-12th Infantry continued offensive operations in its AO until 21 February, when they terminated operations north of THANH AN District and moved to Camp Khari. On 23 February, the 3d Brigade assumed the security mission of Camp Khari: defense and its surrounding TA0, and used the 3-12th Infantry as a nucleus to form TF EMARI. This allowed the brigade to begin reducing its tactical operations in preparation for redeployment.
The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) meanwhile continued to conduct numerous search and clear and cordon operations in an area generally south of THANH AN District during February and March. Operations during this period were characterized by numerous US/GVN operations, however, resulting in contacts with enemy forces were relatively light.

Early in March, in preparation for the eventual redeployment of the 3d Brigade, the 47th ARVN Regiment assumed control of LZ OASIS. As a result, the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) was displaced to LZ OUTRIDER. On 1 March, as a continuing reduction of the brigade's overall tactical responsibility, the 1-10th Cavalry reverted to Division control. Then on 14 March the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) returned to Camp Enari for stand down. After a brief security mission on Highway 19, the battalion reverted to Division control on 17 March, thus terminating the brigade's highway security mission.

During the first week of March, the 3d Brigade began receiving the first of its inactivating battalions. The 1-35th Infantry and the 1-69th Armor were released from the 2d Brigade, and came under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade on 5 March. The 1-35th Infantry began an immediate standdown at Camp Enari, as did the 1-69th Armor at Camp Radcliff. By 30 March, both battalions had completed the turn in of property and a concurrent drawdown of personnel.

By 18 March the 1-8th Infantry had reverted to brigade control as the final redeploying battalion, and moved to Camp Enari to begin its standdown. By 3 April, all actions necessary to prepare the battalion for redeployment had been completed.

On 10 April the final tactical responsibility ended for the 3d Brigade when the 3-12th Infantry and FP ENARI reverted to Division control.

The colors of the brigade with the 1-8th Infantry, 1-35th Infantry, and 1-69th Armor and a 75 man honor guard departed by a SAM flight to Fort Lewis, Washington, on 10 April 1970 for inactivation.

(a) Division Controlled Operations: The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) continued its mission operating in a variety of roles. Dismounted operations were conducted on several occasions; as well as combat assaults to supplement normal mounted operations. During February, the battalion operated in an area southeast of LZ OASIS, conducting search and clear operations. Toward the end of February the battalion re-located and assumed a new CP astride Highway 19. With its new CP located at Pump Station #9, it was able to provide fire support for elements working south of the highway in an effort to prevent its interdiction.

As the battalion worked south of LZ OASIS, several combined RF/FP
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operations were carried out successfully. A measure of success could be
seen in the thirty tons of rice harvested during this phase of operations.

From 22 March to 5 April, the battalion began dismounted operations
in BA 226 under the OPCON of the 1st Brigade while all rifle companies
were dismounted during this period, a mounted force remained at the
Brigade TAC CP at LZ HARD TIMES.

As the operation in BA 226 came to a conclusion, the battalion reverted
to Division control. A new AO was secured from 6 April to 30
April astride Highway 14 from Pleiku to Kontum. Operations continued
to stress reconnaissance in force, strong points and ambushes.

The 10th Cavalry terminated participation in Operation GREEN DRUM
under the 3d Brigade on 1 March and began Operation PARK SILVER under
Division control.

Through the strategic location of observation posts on key terrain,
platoon sweeps, aerial observation and ambushes, the enemy was unable
to successfully interdict Highway 19.

(f) Division Artillery

The 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, supported by the 6-29th
Artillery, began the reporting period in the CROWS FOOT area located
northeast of An Khe with the mission of disrupting enemy activities
during the TET holidays. On 1 February the 6-29th Artillery controlled
A/6-29 at LZ CHALLENGE, A/2-9th at LZ ABBY, and C/4-42d at LZ AUGUSTA.
One platoon (2 tubes) of C/92 was located at LZ ABBY with the mis-
sion of GSR 6-29th Art. On 3 February the 1-14th LNO reported 30
VC/VNA at BR 777/819. A/2-9, A/7-15 and C/1 92(--) were adjusted onto
the grid and the enemy fled north. On 14 February the 1st Brigade
and the 22d Infantry, with direct support artillery, CA'd into new
fire bases to begin Operation WAYNE STAB II. On 16 February the K-75
Rangers captured a POW at BR 573/95. Interrogation of the POW in-
dicated a possible POW compound in the area. Visual reconnaissance
revealed numerous cultivated fields and crops. A supporting operation
known as the "Lettuce Patch Program" was initiated with the objective
of destroying the enemy's supplies for the enemy. On 22 February
2/3 9th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity
BR 593/47. A/6-29 and C/92(--) fired 77 HE in support, and the enemy
broke contact. A sweep of the contact area led to the discovery of
six 60mm mortar rounds, one AK 47 and numerous spider holes and booby
traps. Beginning 10 March the 1st Brigade participated in Operation
EINAR WHITE a divisional level cordon and search conducted vicinity
of BR 5679. The operation lasted seven days and was characterized by
small enemy contacts. During the period 17 March to 24 March the 1st
Brigade regrouped and on 24 March began Operation MICHEL/BURGER BLACK in
BASE AREA 226. On 31 March LPPP P=5 sighted bunkers vicinity BR 695/605
and adjusted D/5-16 on the target. An ADA by the 17th Air Cavalry
after the mission revealed two enemy KBA. On 1 April LZ HARD TIMES
received approximately twenty rounds of 82mm mortar. A/6 29. C/6 29.
B/5-16 and D/5-16 fired counter mortar fire, and the mortars were silenced. On 16 April A/1-14th Infantry sighted ten to fifteen NVA/VC in vicinity BR 747675 and adjusted A/6-29 on target resulting in eight enemy KIA. On 19 April the 1st Brigade began planning for an operation in the Dak Payou (VC) Valley area. The 1st Brigade assumed OPCON of TP FURSUIT on 24 April for the operation. On 24 April the operation in BASE AREA 226 was turned over to the 2d Brigade, and on 25 April TP FURSUIT CA'd into LZ MATIE (BR225237). The 3-12th Infantry at LZ MARTY became OPCON to the 1st Brigade on 20 April and prepared to join the operation in VC Valley. The on-going operation was characterized by small enemy contacts and standoff attacks directed against LZ MARTY on 26 and 27 April and LZ MATIE on 28 and 29 April.

2 The 2d Brigade supported by the 4-42d Arty (DS) began the reporting period with Operation PUTNAM POWER in progress targeted against the 18th NVA Regiment. The activity between 1 February and 8 February consisted of small enemy contacts in the vicinity of LZ HARD TIMES and along QL19. On 15 February LZ WARRIOR was attacked by an estimated sapper squad. Moderate equipment damage was sustained by B/4-42. Two enemy sappers were killed as they were attempting to exfiltrate from the battery area. On 17 February the area of interest of the 2d Brigade shifted from Camp Radcliff and QL19 to an area approximately twenty kilometers northeast of Camp Radcliff. On 21 February, C/2-9 and the 1-35th Infantry CA'd into LZ SHERIFF. Search and destroy operations conducted in this area, characterized by small enemy contacts. On 4 March the 3-8th Infantry and A/6-29 CA'd into LZ SUSIE and the 2d Brigade prepared for Operation EARHART WHITE. Also on 4 March the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 CA'd into LZ NIAGARA to participate in Operation EARHART WHITE. On 5 March the 1-8th Infantry and A/2-9 CA'd into LZ CHALLENGE and all units were in position to begin the operation. The 2d Brigade and the 4-42d Arty established TAC CP's at LZ NIAGARA to facilitate control of forward elements. Operation EARHART WHITE was again characterized by small enemy contacts as the enemy chose to evade friendly forces. On 19 March the 2d Brigade commenced Operation EICHBERGER BLACK operating in the area approximately forty kilometers northeast of Camp Radcliff. The operation was still continuing at the close of the reporting period with no significant contacts developed.

3 The 3d Brigade, supported by the 2-9th Arty (DS), began the reporting period in Operation GREEN BRUCE, directed at the continuance of offensive operations against enemy units, facilities and routes, support of the UWH pacification program, and reaction to threats against villages and isolated camps in the AO. The offensive operations were marked by light sporadic contact and a general unwillingness of the enemy to stand and fight. There were a significant number of caches, primarily ammunition and rice uncovered in the AO. Beginning the middle of February, the efforts of the 3d Brigade and 2-9th Arty turned to redeployment. On 15 March, the 2-9th Artillery terminated offensive operations to conduct the stand down in preparation for inactivation.
(2) The following OPLANS and OPORDS were published during the reporting period:

(a) OPLAN 7-70, dated 6 Feb 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan concerned the 3d Brigade operation targeted against the 3d NVA Division.

(b) OPLAN 8-70, dated 9 Feb 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan discussed operation of the Division rear at Camp Enari.

(c) OPLAN 9-70, dated 17 Feb 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan concerned the 2d Brigade operation targeted against the 3d NVA Division.

(d) OPLAN 10-70, (EARHART WHITE), dated 6 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan concerned an attack against elements of the 3d NVA Division.

(e) OPLAN 13-70, dated 17 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan concerned the 3d NVA Division.

(f) OPLAN 14-70, dated 19 Apr 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan concerned the 1st Brigade operation against elements of the 95B Regiment in VC Valley.

(g) OPLAN 15-70, dated 19 Apr 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan concerned the 1st Brigade operation against the GIA LAI Provincial Headquarters.

(h) OPLAN 16-70, dated 29 Apr 70, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(i) OPORD 40-70, dated 15 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, concerns the 1st Brigade operation against Camp Radcliff and TAOR defense.

(j) OPORD 41-70, dated 26 Mar 70, classified CONFIDENTIAL, concerns civic action in the Camp Radcliff TAOR.

(3) Air Support

Sorties

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(4) Training: The 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment trained a total of 1,875 enlisted men, 93 officers, and 152 VIETNAMESE enlisted men during the period.

(a) The Non-Commissioned Officer Combat Leadership Course graduated 103 students.

(b) The replacement committee trained 1,875 enlisted men and 93 officers.

(c) The Pre-Recondo School graduated seven students.


(e) RF/PF and Kit Carson Scout programs continued. RF/PF program had 140 graduates while Kit Carson Scout Program had 12 graduates.

(f) RVNAF On-The Job Training Program: The 4th Infantry Division, before relocation from Camp Enari in March, had trained 2,656 RVNAF Military/Civilian personnel through an extensive OJT program. After relocation of the Division to Camp Radcliff, the ARVN OJT program was again initiated with 15 ARVN mechanics undergoing practical training.

(5) Chemical

(a) The Division Chemical section continued to function in the dual capacity of a staff section and an operating section. The Division Chemical Section with the 43d Chemical Detachment OPCON, supported extensive aerial and ground employment of Riot Control Agents (RCA), aerial and ground employment of standard/non-standard defoliants for control of vegetation and crop destruction and operated and maintained the Division Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) equipment. Technical advice was rendered on the use of flame field munitions and inspections were conducted on unit CBR readiness, equipment and supply. The chemical ASP continued to operate in support of the Division.

(b) TRAILDUJST missions decreased drastically from the previously reported period. Those flown were crop destruction missions. Helicopter spray operations increased significantly as standard defoliants became more readily available.

1. The MANG YANG Pass in PLEIKU Province was defoliated with standard agent ORANGE using the ACOVENCO helicopter spray rig. Nineteen sorties were flown over the MANG YANG Pass. Results were considered adequate.

2. Extensive enemy crop targets were killed in northern BINH DINH Province using the ACOVENCO helicopter spray rig. Results have been
excellent with negative hits to any aircraft.

(c) Riot Control Agent (RCA) CS continued to be used effectively in direct support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and harassment of the enemy detected and located through intelligence sources. Both persistent and non-persistent CS was employed throughout the Division AO in support of ground troops, with H&I artillery fires to block enemy withdrawal routes from contact areas.

1. The use of micropulverized CS showed a slight increase over the previous period. The dry season in the Central Highlands increased the long term effectiveness of persistent CS. The Chemical Section employed 1,376 55 gallon drums of CS-2 against targets in the CHU PRONG Mountains, VC Valley and the MANG YANC Pass compared to the 1,383 drums employed during the last period. The drums are employed to contaminate infiltration routes, bunkers, tunnels, and assembly and living areas to reduce the amount of time the enemy can remain in the area and possibly canalize his movements. Drums employed by the section use only the new XM925 Fuze, Burster and Drum System. Fifty-eight JEEPOS were used during the period for cave, bunker and tunnel denial.

2. Non-persistent CS was employed extensively from the air using the XM15 (R158R2) CS canister cluster. These were used against suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery fire. A total of 385 XM15 munitions were employed during the period.

(d) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) operations are now centrally controlled from the Division base camp. The APD missions are still being supported by the 4th Aviation Battalion Scorpion Team. However, briefings and debriefings are conducted by the G2 and OIC APD Program. An increase in the effectiveness of the program from the above changes with greater exploitation being made from the intelligence gathered. A total of 165 missions were conducted during the period for a total of 102 hours.

(e) The training and evaluation of the new XM91 multishot portable flame weapon ended 30 April. A final evaluation report was forwarded to ACTIV. Comments from the using units were incorporated in the report, and indicated units were slow to accept the weapon due to its size and weight. Comments from the field included:

1. The 1-14th Infantry used the XM91 successfully from defensive positions such as Forward Fire Bases and hip shoots.

2. The 1-10th Cavalry carried the weapon on its APC's during road clearing operations.

3. Factors found to hinder successful employment of the system as an offensive weapon were:

   a. Jungle growth tends to snag the weapon, slowing down the
individually carrying the weapon.

b. The mountainous terrain places the weight in excess of 100 pounds on the individual carrying the weapon. The system would be more useful to a line company in the field if helicopter support was sufficient to deliver a night defensive packet to each unit prior to darkness, and then retrieve the packet at the beginning of the day to insure that the infantryman had a lighter load to carry.

(f) A Flame Bath test mission was conducted on 15 April using 55 gallon drums filled with diesel fuel. Nine drums were sling loaded under a CH-47 and dropped at a speed of 50 knots and approximately 200 feet above the ground. Accuracy was extremely good. Each net is capable of starting a fire approximately 40m x 40m, which is ignited by FAC aircraft using WP rockets. Two sorties of 2 nets and 16 drums of diesel fuel were flown in support of the 1st Brigade against a bunker and hootch complex. Experience has shown a difficulty in igniting the diesel fuel. Future missions will include MOGAS for easier ignition.

(6) Research and Development

(a) Mine Roller: Although the M1A mine roller is no longer an ENSURE item, the Division is continuing to conduct tests and evaluations to determine its full capabilities. The roller has been modified to fit the combat engineer vehicle (CEV) in lieu of the design configuration for the M-48 tank chassis. The CEV with roller, since 5 April, has located and destroyed four mines with no equipment damage. There are two operational rollers in the Division now with a third expected in the near future.

(b) AN/PRS-7 Mine Detector: On 22 March, testing began on the AN/PRS-7 mine detector to determine its suitability in comparison with other detectors. Testing was conducted on both metallic and non-metallic mines, as well as debris common to RVN. Various soils were tested also to include sand, clay, laterite, rocks and water covered soils. Field tests were conducted in actual operational terrain. Initial testing has shown the AN/PRS-7 to be moderately effective. Final test results are being evaluated.

d. Logistics

(1) Emphasis continued on utilization of land lines of communications (LLOC) throughout the Division's area of operations for movement of all classes of supply. Relocation of the Division from Camp Enari to Camp Radcliff was almost completely accomplished over LLOC. Favorable weather conditions throughout the period facilitated overland movement. Good flying conditions during the period contributed to greater use of air lines of communications (ALOC). With both lines of communications open throughout the period, movement of troops and supplies was accomplished in an efficient and timely manner.
(2) Elements of the 45th General Support Group and the 593d General Support Group of the QUI NHON Support Command continued to provide logistical support to the Division in Operation HINES. Additional transportation requirements for redeployment and relocation were supported by the 8th Transportation Group.

(3) During the period mid-February through mid-March, major elements of the Division relocated from Camp Anari to Camp Radcliff. This entailed relocating the major support units to Camp Radcliff. The residual units at Camp Anari were supported by an FSE until turnover of the camp to the ARVN. With the turnover of Camp Anari in mid-April, TASK FORCE ANARI was relocated to Camp Radcliff.

(4) On 1 February the 1st Brigade went to LZ ENGLISH and support was provided by an LSA operated by the QUI NHON Support Command, and Division forward support elements. The LSA, augmented by the 4th S&T personnel, provided Class I, III, IIIA, and V supplies. The FSE provided Class II and IV support and both graves registration and laundry service were provided by the LSA. The support activities terminated on 17 March when the 1st Brigade returned to Camp Radcliff.

(5) On 6 April the 2-8th Infantry, under Division control, deployed to the KONTUM area. Class II and IV for the 2-8th Infantry is provided by the Division Supply Office at Camp Radcliff. All other supplies and services are being provided by the 45th General Support Group at PLEIKU.

(6) Direct support maintenance and medical companies have habitually been employed in direct support of brigade task forces.

(7) Transportation Services: During the reporting period, there were 242 convoys with a total of 2,884 vehicles. In addition to this, there were 169 convoys consisting of 2,355 2½ and 5 ton trucks, 416 semi-trailers, and 27 low-boys involved in relocating the Division from Camp Anari to Camp Radcliff. The 4th Supply and Transport Battalion, augmented by the 8th Transportation Group, provided transportation for relocation of the Division.

(8) Material Readiness: During the reporting period the operational readiness had fluctuated somewhat, with an improvement noted in the OR of communications equipment (from 92% to 94%), combat vehicles (from 89% to 96%), and heavy engineer equipment (from 80% to 83%). The increased OR of the combat vehicles and heavy engineer equipment can be attributed, at least in part, to the implementation of the Filter Service Program. It is interesting to note that this program (slightly modified) has been adopted as USARV policy, and implemented as USARV Reg 750-32. The increased OR for communications equipment can be directly attributed to increased emphasis on maintenance management of these items at support level and reduced turn around time on items sent to CONUS under the R&R program.
Several other categories of equipment have noted slight decreases in operational readiness; the OR of tactical vehicles decreased from 92% to 88% at the end of April and the OR of power generators decreased from 93% to 86%. This decrease can be attributed directly to the proportionate increase noted in the amount of equipment reported non-operational for supplies (NORS). The reason for this increase in NORS can be attributed to the relocation of the direct support supply activity (DSSA) which occurred during February. During the relocation of the DSSA from Camp Enari to Camp Radcliff, and for a short period thereafter, only priority (deadline) requisitions were processed for issue. This caused increased zero balance of FLL's and resulted in the increased NORS rate experienced during the second half of the reporting period. With the DSSA now fully operational, the OR of both tactical vehicles and generators has begun improving again.

The overall unit materiel readiness and maintenance consciousness, as reflected by the Division's CMMI's and roadside spot inspections, improved appreciably during the period.

(g) Maintenance Support: Headquarters and A Company (Main Support), 704th Maintenance Battalion continued its role of providing direct support maintenance for base camp units, backup direct support for the battalion forward support companies, supply of Class IX (repair parts), and retrograde of materiel. The 704th Maintenance forward support companies continued to support the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades. B Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion redeployed with the 3d Brigade. Company F (Transportation Aircraft Maintenance) continued its aircraft direct support maintenance mission.

Emphasis was placed on repair by forward maintenance companies with supplementary contact teams provided by Headquarters and A Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

e. Civilian Affairs

(i) Civic Action

(a) TAOR: The relocation of the Division base camp during this period from Camp Enari to Camp Radcliff had some effect on the CA activities within the 4th Division. During the period 20 February to 15 March, the Civic Action teams participated in the VIEHMANIZATION of the Camp Enari TAOR Civic Action effort. On 20 February over eighty officers and men of the 47th ARVN Regiment arrived in the TAOR to assume duties in seven of the villages. Simultaneously, teams from PLEIKU Province assets were designated to move into the remaining five villages. The resident US CA teams remained in the village for a period of time after the arrival of the VIETNAMESE teams to familiarize the new team with the village and current projects. After the initial joint occupation, the US teams moved out and commenced daily visits for a week and then gradually reduced the number of visits per week. Although certain problems were encountered with the transfer
CIVIL ACTION activities in the present TAOR, AN TUC District, BINH DINH Province, have consisted mainly of the effective relocation of all teams from the former TAOR, establishing and organizing an effective CA program for the new TAOR, becoming familiar with the newly assigned AO and to initiate CA activities with the minimum amount of lost time. All CA teams in the present TAOR are mobile and reside at the Division base camp.

(b) AN TUC District and the Division are working in close coordination to insure that the major CA effort is channeled to areas where it will do the most good. Considerable emphasis is being placed on getting officials at all levels within the district to utilize GVN channels to obtain funds and resources.

(c) One project presently under way is the establishment of a consolidated MONTAGNARD village. This is a joint GVN-US project. The MONTAGNARD hamlets located along Highway 19 on the western end of the TAOR are targets of the project. Finalization of the plan and securing the required materials is now in progress.

(2) Psychological Operations

(a) A PSYOP campaign was also conducted in support of the redeployment of the 4th Infantry Division from PLEIKU to AN KHE. The purpose of the campaign was to illustrate the capability of GVN to assume responsibility for the security and conduct of operations in PLEIKU Province. Leaflets and posters were developed in coordination with 3 Company, 3rd PSYOP Battalion, Assistant Province Advisor, PSYOP, PLEIKU Province, and II Corps, G5 Advisor to promote the GVN image and the growing strength of the ARVN and its expanded operations. Other leaflets and posters were reprinted and disseminated urging the civilian population to support the RF/PF program. A special redeployment edition of the PSYOP newspaper BINH MINH was published and disseminated to Brigade 35's and to all PLEIKU PSYOP agencies.

(b) On 25 February, a test was conducted by the PSYOP section to determine the effectiveness of employing a 250 watt loudspeaker in an aerial role from a Light Observation Helicopter. At an altitude of 200-500 feet, the speaker was audible, but the overriding engine noise was too loud to understand the message clearly. The most effective altitude was from 1000 to 1200 feet above the target. At this altitude the speaker was clearly audible and the message could be understood with no interference from engine noise. The pilot was requested to fly at an altitude which he considered to be safe from small arms ground to air fire. At altitudes as high as 1600 feet the message was still audible and discernable although it was fainter. The people in the village over which the test was conducted stated that they were able to understand the words spoken through the speaker at all altitudes, but when the aircraft was lower than 500 feet they had trouble making
out what was said. It was concluded that the 250 watt loudspeaker could be effectively employed from the LOI at altitudes ranging from 1000 to 1500 feet and also afford the personnel in the aircraft a much more favorable margin of safety than at lower altitudes.

(c) During March, an initial issue of 19 AN/PTQ 5A public address systems were received. These bullhorns were issued to the five major sector 5's. In following months, a total of 108 PA systems will be issued to the Division in monthly installments.

(d) During the last week of March, special leaflet and loudspeaker campaigns were planned and executed to support the 1st and 2d Brigade operations in BINH DINH Province. Division assets were used to supplement the preplanned program and to quickly respond to tactical needs. Approximately 1,500,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operations. On 9 March, quick reaction leaflets and taped appeals were employed to exploit a HOI CHANH from the 3d NVA Division. The leaflet contained a handwritten appeal directed at the members of the rallier's unit urging them to rally. The taped appeal was made by the HOI CHANH and was the same general text as the leaflet.

(e) On 2 April, three enemy leaflets were discovered in the hamlet of AN DLEN BAC (BR 553522). They were directed against the civilian population and U.S./P.F. units. Themes were that the U.S. and GVN were losing and running away and that villagers and soldiers should revolt for the people's revolution: protection of rice fields—not to leave them. Leaflet and loudspeaker appeals were employed in the general vicinity of the village and surrounding area to counteract the enemy's message. Leaflets utilized promoted the GVN image and loudspeaker appeals were directed at the erroneous assumption made by the enemy concerning U.S. pullout.

(f) Face-to-face PSYOPs within the Division TAOR was enhanced through the use of the individual talents of two Kit Carson Scouts assigned to the 2d Brigade PSYOP team. When the team entered a village, one of the Scouts sang VIETNAMESE folk songs to his own guitar accompaniment in order to announce the arrival of the team and collect an audience. Once a sufficient crowd has gathered, the second Scout takes over and entertains the audience with various slight-of-hand tricks. When the act is completed, the audience is in a receptive mood and the Scouts then begin to talk about the GVN and disseminate the PSYOP message. The use of this technique has proved to be very effective in increasing the size of the target audience and making them more receptive to the information disseminated.

f. Personnel

(1) Strengths. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

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AVD:GC:MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970. RCS GSPOR 65 (R2) (U)

(a) Beginning of Period (1 Feb 70)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized-organic units</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>16,492</td>
<td>17,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized-attached units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>16,492</td>
<td>17,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned-organic units</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>16,373</td>
<td>17,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned-attached units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>16,373</td>
<td>17,627</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) End of Reporting Period (30 Apr 70)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>AGG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized-organic units</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>12,967</td>
<td>14,028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorized-attached units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>12,967</td>
<td>14,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned-organic units</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>12,865</td>
<td>13,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned-attached units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>12,865</td>
<td>13,959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Replacements: The Division received a total of 136 officers and 1,371 enlisted replacements.

(3) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HOSTILE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>NON-HOSTILE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WOUNDED</td>
<td>KILLED</td>
<td>MISSING</td>
<td>INJURIES</td>
<td>DEATHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVARTY</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10th Cav</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69th Arm</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Troops</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-75</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Morale and Personnel Service Awards and Decorations during the period were presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECORATION AWARDED</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Valor)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Service)</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Valor)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal (Service)</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation (Valor)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVJ0H.GC MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970
HC5 CPOR 65 (R2) (U)

DECORATION AWARDED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation (Service)</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>2614</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3391</td>
<td>4687</td>
<td>3955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Promotions: A total of 2,857 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Reenlistments: There were a total of 143 reenlistments during the period; First Term Reenlistments: 85, AUS reenlistments: 56, ER/NG Reenlistments: 2.

(7) Health: This quarter has seen a new low in malaria for the Division. In March, there were only 20 cases for a rate of 14.1 cases per 1000 men. This was attributed to the ecological conditions that existed during this time, and to an increase in the effectiveness of gametocidal prophylaxis.

g. Engineer

The majority of the engineer effort during this period was directed toward relocation of the Division from Camp Enari to Camp Radcliff. In this connection, construction and rehabilitation of critical installations and facilities at Camp Enari was the priority effort.

In February, the 4th Engineer Battalion officially moved from Camp Enari, however, Company A remained in direct support to the 3d Brigade until 15 March. This direct support normally consisted of one squad. The majority of a company engineer effort was given in general support at Camp Enari which included the tear down and movement to Camp Radcliff of ten Pasco buildings. On 27 March the company started to stand down and turn-in of all equipment in accordance with the Phase III draw down and by 15 April the company was at zero strength.

Company B remained in direct support of the 2d Brigade and provided direct support requirements using one platoon. The remaining two platoons were assigned projects at Camp Radcliff. The major projects completed by B Company were as follows: a POW Compound, bridge bypasses on 4-19, extension of ASP, bunkerline upgrade, and construction of portions of the protective wire around the Golf Course heliport.

Company C remained in direct support of the 2d Brigade throughout
SOUTH, Operation Report
Lessonis Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, HCS CSPCH 6-5 (H2) (U)

the reporting period, with one platoon providing this support. The
remainder of the company was committed to the upgrade of Camp Hadr
cliff. The major projects completed by the company included the 2d
Brigade TOC, DIVARTY TOC, POL Tank Farm wire Golf Course protective
wire, and two timber trestle bridges.

Company D remained in general support of the Division throughout
the reporting period with the exception of one platoon which gave dir-
et support to one battalion for clearance of a hilltop. Major pro-
jects included completion of the South River barrier, finance vault,
rehabilitation of the Division Administration buildings and Headquar-
ters, trailer park, construction of the special security detachment
building, an addition to the Division TOC, 213 two-man fighting po-
sitions, construction of the Division Automatic Data Processing Cen-
ter, and the erection of 10 Pascoe buildings. On 29 April the com-
pany minus one platoon began construction and upgrade of Highway 508.

Company E continued to provide general support for the Division.
This support encompassed transportation of men and material, light con-
struction, bunker destruction and AVL bridging. On 7 March the heavy
equipment platoon of Headquarters and Headquarters Company was trans-
ferred to Company E, since that period the company had to provide
heavy equipment support to the battalion projects as well as completing
several projects on its own. One bridge platoon was reduced to zero
strength on 15 April. Projects included construction of a road to a
Division signal relay hill, clearing an area for a village, and con-
struction of several motor pools.

h. Army Aviation Operations

Operational totals of the 4th Aviation Battalion were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>19,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>36,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAX</td>
<td>43,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Inspector General

(1) 4th Division Annual General Inspections of four divisional
units were conducted along with two courtesy inspections in prepar-
atation for the unit's Annual General Inspection. Due to the displac-
ment of the Division from Camp Anarxi to Camp Hadrcliff, thirteen in-
spections were conducted of unit storage and safekeeping of individual
personnel effects.

(2) Sixty-eight complaints were received during the reporting
period; the two major areas of complaints were medical with twenty-
and unit administration with twenty-two complaints received. Two hun-
dred five requests for assistance were also received during the report-
ing period.
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AVODR 3C MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970. MAC 35 FOR 65 (42) (U)

j. Signal

(1) Operational activities continue to focus on providing multi-channel communications in support of the Division and its elements.

(2) LZ SCHUELLHAUS: On 1 February a MRC 112 was installed to provide multi-channel communications between LZ SCHUELLHAUS and Camp Radcliff. This system is still in operation, however, an AN/GRC-163 is now being used.

(3) LZ ENGLISH: On 18 February the 2d FASCP extended a VHF system to LZ PONY in support of 1st Brigade contingency operations.

(4) Camp Radcliff: The largest operation undertaken during the period was the relocation of the Division Headquarters. In order to accomplish this as smoothly as possible, the Famous Communications Center was placed into operation at Camp Radcliff on 2 March. This was followed with installation of an AN/GRC-142, AN/MTC-10, and an AN/GRC-163 on 7 March.

(5) Camp Enari: While the Division's move to Camp Radcliff continued, the 3d Brigade moved in for standdown and phase out. On 4 March, the communications center of the 3d FASCP set up in support of the 3d Brigade. One AN/MRC-69, located at Signal Hill, provided telephone communications with Camp Radcliff for TASK FORCE ENARI from 6 March to 15 April.

(6) LZ HARD TIMES: On 21 March the 1st FASCP deployed a terminal to LZ HARD TIMES in support of the 1st Brigade TAC CP.

(7) LZ RIPPLES: On 12 April, one AN/MRC-69 was installed at LZ RIPPLES to provide telephone communications to Camp Radcliff.

(8) LZ JIFFY: On 12 April, one AN/GRC-142 was installed at LZ JIFFY by C Company, 124th Signal Battalion. On 14 April the 2d FASCP installed one AN/MRC-69 for telephone communications.

(9) Camp Radcliff: On 14 April the perimeter communication project was completed providing telephonic communications to all bunkers and towers.

(10) LZ AQUARIUS: On 27 April one AN/MRC-69 was installed providing multi-channel communications to Camp Radcliff.

k. Information Activities

(1) News Media Correspondents

(a) During the period, a total of nine news correspondents visited the Division. They covered a variety of subjects, ranging from pure hometown and human interest material, to the Division's active combat activities.
and pacification operations. Included in the visiting news media personnel were representatives from the United Press International, Cincinnati Post and Times-Star, and the Overseas Weekly. Military correspondents from Stars and Stripes, MACV, USARV, IPPV, and a DA Pictorial Team also visited the area. There were two free lance writers in the area during the period.

(b) In addition, the Radio/TV Section broadcast 910 minutes on AFVN (AM-FM) PLEIKU as news broadcasts. An additional 20 minutes of news were aired over the AM facilities of AFVN, QUT NHON. An additional 1872 minutes were utilized for a disk jockey show and Chaplain’s messages over AFVN, PLEIKU. Television was used during this period with 300 minutes of broadcasts used for Division news and special events. A total of 94 hard news radio releases were received, prepared and cleared by the section during the period. On 1 March, with the relocation of the Division to AN KHE, 4th Division news was terminated as part of the daily broadcast schedule of AFVN, PLEIKU. Because of the lack of proper reception in the AN KHE area, studies were initiated to determine the feasibility of establishing an AFVN outlet at Camp Radcliff. These studies continued into the new reporting period.

(2) Home Town News Release Program

(a) The Division continues to rank high in the number of home-town news release submissions. During the period, a total of 3627 DA Forms 1526 were logged and forwarded. This is a drop from the previous quarters and reflects the redeployment of the 3d Brigade, and reduction in the number of incoming personnel as well as an approximate 35% decrease in the number of awards and promotions. A letter was sent to all commanders during the latter part of the quarter to urge a rejuvenation in the program, which also lost continuity and impetus with the relocation to Camp Radcliff.

(b) The photo release program also suffered during the period reported due to the same reasons the 1526 program fell behind. During the quarter, 122 pictures were forwarded for release.

(c) The radio release program, not necessarily susceptible to the proportion of incoming personnel or awards and promotions, kept pace with the best throughout the world. A total of 386 hometown interviews and audio tapes were processed by the Home Town News Center for use by local radio stations in CONUS. Special emphasis was given this program for the Easter and Mother’s Day period.

(d) Improvements continue to be noted in the distribution of command information publications. All newspapers are now continuing to be distributed at the battalion level.

(e) There were five fact sheets prepared and distributed during the period: Compassionate Reassignments, Sounding Board, Next of Kin Notification System Changed, Pay Increase and the National 4th Division Association.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOM-65 (R2) (U)

(3) There were 13 issues of the Division's weekly newspaper, The Ivy Leaf published. Increased emphasis was given to Command Information topics. Special issues were produced on the departure of the 3d Brigade, and the turnover of Camp Khark and the relocation to Camp Hadcliff.

(4) The third issue of the Division quarterly publication, Esprit, was prepared and distributed during the quarter. The fourth issue was prepared for printing and distribution during the next quarter. In February, the second issue of Esprit was given USARV's second place award for all like productions in SVN. The publication, in magazine format, couples feature material, concerning Division activities, with Command Information subjects.

(5) During the period, the responsibility for photo coverage was turned over from the IO's organic photo facility to the 4th Division Signal Photo Lab. The Information Office retained all its own records, contact sheets and negatives. The personnel shortage forced the IO to abandon its photo capabilities to provide sufficient coverage in other areas of the operation. All IO photo lab equipment was transferred to the Signal Photo Lab to assist with the additional workload.

(6) The Public Information Section released a total of 2865 hard news stories and 884 photos during the quarter. Both these total are high for the year. Although feedback is sparse, indications are the direct release programs has resulted in a great deal of favorable publicity for the Division in the various media throughout the United States.

(7) Coverage continues at a high level in the three major command publications in VIETNAM, Stars and Stripes, USARV Reporter, and the MACV Observer. The following coverage was released during the period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Stories</th>
<th>Photos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stars and Stripes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (c) LESSONS LEARNED. COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence

(1) Shaid

(a) Observation: During the reporting period, it was observed that an exceedingly high number of devices were needed to secure bridges, due to the numerous avenues of approach to these sites.
(b) **Evaluation**: To overcome this problem, Shaid devices were used with a multi-external geophone system. This system was developed by the 4th Division Dufflebag Program and proven effective through numerous experiments. The system is in use only in the 4th Division AO and not a component part of the Dufflebag Program in VIETNAM.

The Shaid is a device with both seismic and acoustic capabilities. The external geophone is emplaced to direct seismic vibrations in the ground. When vibrations are detected through the geophone, they are transmitted to the Shaid itself and the acoustic capability is then activated. The activation recorded by the seismic portion of the device can be confirmed by actual audio transmissions in the same area. Each geophone has a detection radius of 30 meters. In order to protect one bridge effectively, three additional geophones were spliced into the one device. The results are that with four geophones 120 meters may be covered, as compared to 30 meters with only one geophone. This allows for protection of a bridge with fewer devices.

(c) **Recommendation**: It is recommended that this system, employing more than one geophone to the Shaid, be continued to enhance greater area coverage with fewer devices.

c. Operations

(1) **Brigade Linear Sweeps**

(a) **Observation**: During brigade linear sweeps, daily objectives tend to be unrealistic.

(b) **Evaluation**: Predetermined phase lines were used as daily objectives and did not take into account terrain and changes in the enemy situation.

(c) **Recommendation**: In large sweep operations, daily advances should be regulated by terrain and enemy situation and not artificial phase lines.

(2) **Unit Frontages**

(a) **Observation**: Assigning unit frontages based on map studies only is not practical.

(b) **Evaluation**: When considering frontages over difficult terrain, a 400 meter map distance may be 600 meters or more ground distance in steep terrain.

(c) **Recommendation**: About 4/5 of a 110 man company normally will move in the linear formation, so a frontage of 575 meters (7 meters per man) or less be assigned to a sweeping company.
(3) Battalion Linear Sweeps

(a) Observation: Dispersion on line in difficult terrain reduces lateral movement and significantly lessens the reaction capability of the sweeping unit commander.

(b) Evaluation: Reserve or reaction elements must be organized and centrally located to react rapidly in the event of enemy contact.

(c) Recommendation: The use of the linear sweep technique should be used by battalions or larger units only when it is part of an encirclement, when it is not part of an encirclement, but has a high density screen on the flanks and forward of the sweep, or when a high probability of finding a cache exists.

(4) Identification of Maneuver Units

(a) Observation: During linear sweep operations, ground identification of maneuver elements is difficult.

(b) Evaluation: The use of colored smoke in a pre-arranged sequence is a positive method of identifying major ground elements (i.e., with battalion size maneuver elements, each company uses only one color smoke. Coordination is made with the adjacent battalions to insure that their colored smoke is different in sequence also).

(c) Recommendation: The use of colored smoke during large scale linear sweep operations is a valuable aid to identify major ground elements.

(5) Storage of Materials

(a) Observation: Since no single location was available at Camp Radcliff for the storage of all Division Class II&IV stocks, it was necessary to establish two separate areas for storage. These areas were approximately two miles apart. This necessitated the development of new channels for the flow of documentation.

(b) Evaluation: At Camp Shari, a single issue facility was operated for Class II&IV items. Material releases were sent to the storage office; a warehouseman was assigned the task of picking the stock; the release and stock were then sent to the issue facility to await customer pickup. Such a system is not practical at Camp Radcliff, due to the reduction in manpower and a lack of the equipment necessary for the movement of items over the distance between the two yards. A substantial time loss between the time the release was cut and the time the item would be available for pickup would be resultant from the utilization of the single facility issue method.

(c) Recommendation: In order to overcome the disadvantages caused by the distance factors, a system has been instituted by which availability time is shortened. Several warehouses in each of the two storage yards are used as issue facilities. Storage areas are designated
by technical service, i.e., Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, Engineer. Each area has a bulk warehouse with backup stockage as well as a shelf storage issue warehouse. Material releases are sent from Stock Control directly to the issue warehouse concerned. The warehouseman then annotates the exact storage location on the back of the release and files it by customer. When the customer receives his notice of release, he goes to the appropriate issue warehouse and the item is issued from the shelf. The receipt document is then directly sent back to Stock Control for filing. This system has permitted a reduction in the amount of handling required to make an item available for issue. There is, of course, the added advantage of reduced wear and tear on materials due to reduced handling.

d. Organization: None

e. Training

(1) Good Marksmanship

(a) Observation: Good marksmanship is essential to effective combat operations. We have experienced numerous instances where poor marksmanship resulted in ineffective engagement of the enemy.

(b) Evaluation: Good marksmanship can be enhanced by constant practice and regular checking of weapons zero.

(c) Recommendation: That all fire bases establish range facilities suitable for confirming the zero of all weapons and for practicing "quick kill" techniques, and that troops securing the base be required to use these facilities on a regular basis.

f. Logistics

(1) Bladders

(a) Observation: On occasion, the tactical situation requires a rapid response in the placement of 10,000 gallon fuel bladders at a forward or temporary location in support of an operation. Often sufficient time is not available to permit the construction of protective fire revetments around the bladders. As a result, refueling aircraft, particularly Chinooks and cranes, causes stones and other objects to be thrown by their rotor wash into the bags. This causes numerous small punctures which, in turn, can render the bladder unserviceable either temporarily or permanently.

(b) Evaluation: The problem is unique only in that it normally occurs at a point and place in time which makes immediate repair of the bladder inconvenient if not difficult.
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Period 1ýndirig 30 April 197,0, ICS CSFOR 65 (RC) (U)

(c) Recommendation: In order to preserve the bladders from damage, one unit experimented with airfield matting. The matting was placed against the bladder on the side facing the refueling points. It protected the bladder from flying objects and the weight of the matting caused no apparent difficulty in operation.

(2) XM203

(a) Observation: M 79grenadiers operating in heavy jungle foliage were not able to effectively employ their weapons during most contacts.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the lack of mass clearance, the M-79 proved to be ineffective in many parts of the AO, and the grenadier was unable to effectively participate in contacts. Those personnel carrying the experimental XM203 over and under M-16/M-79 were able to engage the enemy with the appropriate weapon more readily.

(c) Recommendation: That units operating in heavy jungle or rain forest be issued the XM203 in lieu of M 79's.

(3) Multi-Fuel Engines

(a) Observation: High failure of diesel and multi-fuel engines.

(b) Evaluation: The failure rate has been excessively high for diesel and multi-fuel engines, due to contaminated fuel and extremely dusty operating conditions. The scheduled services for filter changes listed in the applicable Technical Manuals were found to be inadequate.

(c) Recommendation: Units operating under similar conditions should have a Filter Change Program, which requires that all filters be changed or serviced, if applicable, on the 1st of each month. In addition, all fuel and air filters should be changed again, or serviced, if applicable on the 15th of each month.

(4) AT 524A/AB Antenna Element

(a) Observation: The antenna, short whip, AT-992/PRC 25, has a relatively short life under combat field conditions.

(b) Evaluation: Antenna life under field conditions is difficult to predict. One method that can be used as a field expedient in lieu of the normal AT 992/PRC 25 is the USAF antenna element AT-624A/AB. While this antenna is not as flexible as the whip type, but with its flexible base it is durable and no significant impairment to the normal operating radius has been noted.

(c) Recommendation: That the USAF antenna element AT-624A/AB be used for AT 992/PRC 25 when the basic issue item is not available.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVJOH-32-MH
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned - 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, AGC 3700.65 (R2) (J)

(s) Explosives

(a) Observation: Recent shortages of Bangalore torpedoes has resulted in the issue of demolition snakes as a substitute item.

(b) Evaluation: Two sections of demo snakes laid two feet apart, and with 12-13 inches of tampering, will blast a fighting position four feet deep. Use of C-4 requires a series of holes to create the same effect and leads to waste of explosives due to overcharging.

(c) Recommendation: Demolition snakes should be used in hasty construction of fire support bases where construction time is of critical importance.

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PARKER T. ANDERSON
CPT, AGC
Astat AG

6 Incls
1. Organizational Structure
2. Key Personnel
3. List of Abbreviations
4. Locations of Villages, FSB's
5. Map of 4th Div AG
6. Disposition of Forces for SARRART #HITS
Incls 2, 3 & 5 w/ HQ DA

CONFIDENTIAL
AVFA-30-HIST (31 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 4th Infantry Division,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RG3, CSFOR-65 (A2)

TO: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.P. 96350

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-
Lessons Learned and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT L. ALLEN
Lieutenant Colonel, AGC
Acting Adjutant General

OF:
2 - CSFOR, DA
1 - CG, 4TH INF DIV (LASS ORLL)
AVHGC-DST (31 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375
30 JUN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 4th
Infantry Division and conurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Landing Zone", page 6, paragraph
      1b(5)(d). This item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the
      next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or
      USARPAC is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Dufflebag Operations", page 9, paragraph
      1b(8)(d). This item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in
      the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or
      USARPAC is recommended.

   c. Reference item concerning "SHAIDS", page 36, paragraph 2b(1): concur.
      This is a good example of economical, imaginative use of unattended ground
      sensors. So that other US units in RVN may possibly benefit from this
      excellent idea, this item has been extracted for inclusion in the next
      issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC
      is recommended.

   d. Reference item concerning "Bladders", page 39, paragraph 2f(1):
      concur. The use of airfield matting for bladder protection does not fall
      within the purview of authorized usages as stated in USARV message, 07134Z
      Jun 70, subject: Airfield Matting. However, with the ongoing airfield up-
      grade program, airfields throughout the RVN are being resurfaced, providing
      an ample supply of recovered matting which can no longer be used for its
      intended purpose and which is ideally suited as an expedient fuel bladder
      protective device. Recent resurfacing at An Khe Airfield will provide
      sufficient unserviceable matting for 4th Infantry Division requirements.
      This was confirmed with the unit's aviation 34. No action by USARPAC
      or DA is recommended.
AVHGC-DST (31 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

e. Reference item concerning "Multi-Fuel Engines", page 40, paragraph f(3): concur. At the present time USARV Regulation 750-32 provides specific guidance on the replacement of all filters for multi-fuel engines. It is felt that the replacement interval is adequate for all areas of Vietnam. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

f. Reference item concerning "AT-624A/AR Antenna Element", page 40, paragraph 2f(4)(c): concur. When the AT-892/PRG-25 is not available, any antenna that performs satisfactorily should be used. An experimental AT-892 (/ )/PRC-25 (telescopic antenna) has been developed and field tested. The experimental model has a telescopic section (AS-2430 ( )/PRC-25) and a spring base section (AB-1130 ( )/PRC-25). The base section has a flexible portion and a ball joint which allows the antenna to whip and lock in a horizontal or a vertical position. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furl: Assiptat. Adjutant GCenO'l 4th Inf Div

Clark W. Samsen Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

FOR THE COMMANDER:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
ELT, AG
Assist AG
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 31 January 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf (-)
1-14 Inf (A/3-8 OPCON 1-14)
1-22 Inf
A/6-29 Arty DS 3-8 Inf
A/2-9 Arty DS 1-14 Inf
C/4-42 Arty DS 1-22
C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29 Arty
A/7-13 Arty (52d)
C/1-92 Arty (-) (52d)
B/4 Engr
D/704 Maint
B/4 Med
Plat/B/124 Sig
Plat/4 MP

2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf (-)
1-12 Inf (-)
1-35 Inf
1-69 Arm (-)
C/2-8 Inf (M)(OPCON 1-69)
D/1-12 Inf (OPCON 1-69)
C/6-29 Arty DS 1-8 Inf
B/4-42 Arty (-) DS 1-12 Inf
C/2-9 Arty DS 1-35 Inf
C/4 Engr
C/4 Med
Plat/B/124 Sig
Plat/ 4 MP
C/704 Maint

3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (M) (-)
3-12 Inf
1-10 Cav
A/1 69 Arm (OPCON 2-8)
B/6-29 Arty DS 3-12 Inf
A/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9 Arty
B/5-16 Arty (-) GSR 2-9 Arty
D/5-16 Arty (-) GS
2-9 Arty (-)
A/6-14 Arty (52d)
A/4 Engr
B/704 Maint
A/4 Med
Plat/B/124 Sig
Plat/4 MP

Division Troops

2-35 Inf (IDC)
7-17 Cav (-)
B/2-9 Arty DS 2-35 Inf
A/4-42 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty (52d)
4 Engr (-)
124 Sig (-)
K/75 Ranger
704 Maint (-)
4 Med (-)
4 Bn
4 MP (-)
4 MID
4 War Dog (Prov)
29 MID
43d Chem Det

Other

C/1-8 OPCON USASC
C/7-17 Cav DS 173d Abn

Inclosure 1
2. (C) Task Organization change effective 13 Feb 70:
   1-69 Arm RELEASE C/2-8
   1-69 Arm RECEIVE OPCON B/2-8

3. (C) Task Organization change effective 14 Feb 70:
   1-14 Inf RELEASE A/3-8
   3-8 Inf RECEIVE A/3-8

4. (C) Task Organization change effective 15 Feb 70:
   1-69 Arm RELEASE D/1-12 Inf
   1-35 Inf RELEASE 1/D/1-35 Inf
   1-69 Arm RECEIVE OPCON 1/U/1-35

5. (C) Task Organization change effective 17 Feb 70:
   1-69 Arm RELEASE 1/D/1-35
   2-8 (M) RELEASE A(-) 1-69 Arm
   1-69 Arm RECEIVE A(-)/1-69

6. (C) Task Organization change effective 22 Feb 70:
   3-8 Inf RELEASE 1/A/3-8
   1-14 RECEIVE OPCON 1/A/3-8

7. (C) Task Organization change effective 23 Feb 70:
   2d Bde RELEASE A(-)/1-69 Arm
   ROK RECEIVE OPCON A(-) 1-69

8. (C) Task Organization change effective 25 Feb 70:
   1-14 RELEASE 1/A/3-8 Inf
   3-8 RECEIVE OPCON 1/A/3-8

9. (C) Task Organization change effective 26 Feb 70:
   1-14 RELEASE A/B/D/1-14
   2-8 (M) RELEASE D/2-8 (M)
   1-69 Arm RELEASE B/2-8 (M)
   1st Bde RELEASE 1/14
   Div RECEIVE 1-14 (IDC)

10. (C) Task Organization change effective 27 Feb 70:
     Div RELEASE C/2-35 Inf
     1-22 RECEIVE OPCON A/B/D/1-14
     1-69 Arm RECEIVE D/2-8 (M)
     1-69 Arm RECEIVE D/2-8 (M)
     2-8 (M) RELEASE B/2-8 (M)

11. (C) Task Organization change effective 28 Feb 70:
     Div RELEASE 2-35 Inf (-)
     1-22 RELEASE A/1-14
     1-14 RECEIIVE A/B/1-14
     2-35 RELEASE 1/2-35
     USASC RELEASE 1/8

Inclosure 1
CONFIDENTIAL

12. (C) Task Organization change effective 1 Mar 70:
   3-3 RELEASE C(-)/2 35 Inf
   3d Bde RELEASE 1-10 Cav
   2-35 Inf RECEIVE C(-)/2-35
   Div RECEIVE OPCON 1-10 Cav

13. (C) Task Organization change effective 2 Mar 70:
   3 8 RELEASE 2/C/2 35 Inf
   2-35 RECEIVE 2/C/2-35 Inf

14. (C) Task Organization change effective 3 Mar 70:
   1-8 RELEASE D/1-8 Inf
   1st Bde RELEASE 3 8 Inf
   1-12 RECEIVE D/1 8
   2d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 3-8

15. (C) Task Organization change effective 5 Mar 70:
   2d Bde RELEASE 1-35 Inf
   2d Bde RELEASE 1-69 Arm
   1-69 Arm RELEASE B/2 8(M)
   BOK RELEASE A( -)/1-69
   2-8 Inf(M) RELEASE 1/A/1-69
   1-69 Arm RECEIVE A(-)/1-69

16. (C) Task Organization change effective 7 Mar 70:
   1-12 RELEASE D/1-8 Inf
   3d Bde's A(-)/1-69 Arm at CHA BANG
   1-8 Inf RECEIVE D/1-8 Inf

17. (C) Task Organization change effective 10 Mar 70:
   1-14 Inf RELEASE D/1-14 Inf
   1-8 RECEIVE OPCON D/1-14(-)
   1-12 RECEIVE OPCON 3D/1-14

18. (C) Task Organization change effective 11 Mar 70:
   1-10 Cav RELEASE B/2-8 (M)
   1-14 RECEIVE B/2-8(M)

19. (C) Task Organization change effective 15 Mar 70:
   1-10 Cav RELEASE C/1-10
   2-8 RECEIVE OPCON C/1-10

20. (C) Task Organization change effective 17 Mar 70:
   1st Bde RELEASE 1-22, 2-35
   3d Bde RELEASE 2-8(-)(M)
   2-8(-) RELEASE C/1-10, 1B/2-8(-)
   1-14 RELEASE B/2 8(M)
   2-8 RECEIVE B/2-8(M)
   2d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-22, 2-35
   Div RECEIVE OPCON 2-8(-)(M)
   1-10 Cav RECEIVE C/1-10, 1B/2-8(-)

Inclosure 1
21. (C) Task Organization change effective 19 Mar 70:

Div RELEASE 1-14 Inf
1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14, 3-8
2d 3de RELEASE 1/3, 1/8
3d Bde RECEIVE 1/8
1-10 Cav RELEASE 1/B/2, 3
2-8 RECiVE 1/B/2-8(M)
1-12 RELEASE 3/D/1-14
1-14 Cav RECEIYE 3/D/1-14 Inf

22. (C) Task Organization change effective 19 Mar 70:

Div RELEASE 2-8(M)
1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON 2-8(M)

23. (C) Task Organization change effective 22 Mar 70:

2-8(M) RELEASE Rcn/2-8(M)
DIVARTY RECEIVE Rcn/2-8(M)

24. (C) Task Organization change effective 23 Mar 70:

1-14 RELEASE 4,2 mtr/1-14
2-8(M) RECEIYE 4,2 mtr/1-14
B Trp/7-17 Cav at THANH RANG 27 Mar 70

25. (C) Task Organization change effective 30 Mar 70:

DIVARTY RELEASE Rcn/2-8(M)
3-8 RECEIYE Rcn/2-8(M)

26. (C) Task Organization change effective 3 Apr 70:

1-12 RELEASE D/1-12 Inf
1-10 Cav RECEIYE OPCON D/1-12

27. (C) Task Organization change effective 4 Apr 70:

3-12 Inf RELEASE Rcn/3-12
1-10 Cav RECEIYE OPCON Rcn/3-12

28. (C) Task Organization change effective 5 Apr 70:

2-8(M) RELEASE 4,2 mtr/1-14
3-8 RELEASE Sc/2-8(M)
1st Bde RELEASE 2-8(M)
1-14 RECEIYE 4,2 mtr/1-14
2-8 RECEIYE Sc/2-8(M)
Div RECEIYE 2-8(M)

29. (C) Task Organization change effective 6 Apr 70:

2d Bde RELEASE 1-12(-)
Div RECEIYE 1-12(-)

30. (C) Task Organization change effective 8 Apr 70:

1-12(-) RELEASE B/1-12
2 35 RECEIYE B/1-12

31. (C) Task Organization change effective 9 Apr 70:

1-10 Cav RELEASE D/1-12, Rcn/3-12 3-12 RECEIYE Rcn/3-12
173d Abn RELEASE C/7-17 Cav
1-12 RECEIYE D/1-12
1-17 Cav RECEIYE C/7-17

Inclosure 1
32. (C) Task Organization change effective 10 Apr 70:

3d Bde RELEASE 3-12 Inf TASK FORCE ENARI RECEIVE 3-12

33. (C) Task Organization change effective 11 Apr 70:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, 1.-8 Inf, 1.-35 Inf, 1.-69 Arm, 2.-9 Arty redeployed to CONUS as part of KEYSTONE BLUEJAY PHASE III REDEPLOYMENT

34. (C) Task Organization change effective 12 Apr 70:

2.-35 RELEASE B/1-12 1-12 RECEIVE B/1-12

35. (C) Task Organization change effective 13 Apr 70:

1.-12 RELEASE A/1-12 1-10 Cav RECEIVE OPCON A/1-12

36. (C) Task Organization change effective 14 Apr 70:

1.-12( ) RELEASE C/1-12 1-10 Cav RECEIVE C/1-12

37. (C) Task Organization change effective 15 Apr 70:

3.-12 RELEASE OPCON TF ENARI TO DIVISION
B/7 17 Cav return from THANH RANG

38. (C) Task Organization change effective 16 Apr 70:

1.-10 Cav RELEASE A/1-12 1-12 RECEIVE A/1-12

39. (C) Task Organization change effective 17 Apr 70:

Div RELEASE 3.-12 Inf 1st Bde RECEIVE 3-12 Inf

40. (C) Task Organization change effective 18 Apr 70:

1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON TASK FORCE PURSUIT:
C/75 Arng. 3-506 Abn

41. (C) Task Organization change effective 19 Apr 70:

7.-17 Cav RELEASE C/7-17 Cav 3-506 Abn RECEIVE C/7-17
1st Bde RELEASE 1-14 3-8 2d Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14, 3-8

42. (C) Task Organization change effective 20 Apr 70:

2d Bde RELEASE 1-14 3-8 1st Bde RECEIVE OPCON 1-14, 3-8

Inclosure 1
43. (C) Task Organization change effective 30 Apr 70:

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<td>Description:</td>
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| Author: | OC, 4th Infantry Division |

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